Operation Brother Sam

File:USS Forrestal (CVA-59) underway at sea on 31 May 1962 (KN-4507).jpg

USS Forrestal in 1962

Operation Brother Sam was the use of the United States Navy and Air Force in support of the coup in Brazil in 1964. With the deterioration in relations with João Goulart's government and the favorable attitude of the groups conspiring against him, the idea of an operation to ensure the success of an uprising arose. The issue was discussed between the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, and officials in Washington throughout the administration of president John F. Kennedy and his successor Lyndon B. Johnson. They thought about logistical support, the positioning of a squadron on the Brazilian coast to "show the flag" and even, in an extreme situation, a plan for a gigantic land operation, which was not used. The operation was planned by maintaining contact with Brazilian conspirators such as general Castelo Branco, and had as an assumption the formation of a provisional government that would request foreign aid.

With the outbreak of the coup d'état, the operation was activated to transfer fuel such as gasoline by sea to the insurgent military, to leave a squadron near Brazil, and to take war supplies by air. The naval component consisted of the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal, a helicopter carrier and six destroyers from the Second Fleet, as well as four tankers. The aircraft carrier departed from Virginia, while the tankers were to load in the Caribbean. The air component was seven C-135 aircraft, eight supply aircraft, one air support and rescue aircraft, eight fighters, a communications plane, an airborne command post, weapons and ammunition. Air Force general George S. Brown was given command of the mission, which was coordinated by the Southern Command in Panama.Template:Efn

While shipments waited at the air bases, ships began to leave their ports. However, the opposition military in Brazil quickly overthrew the Goulart government, and Castelo Branco reported that logistical support would not be needed.Template:Sfn The operation was thus deactivated before it had any physical effect in Brazil,Template:Sfn but it demonstrated the interventionist disposition of the American government.Template:Sfn It came to light between 1976 and 1977 with the declassification of documents.

Context

After the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the U.S. government's attitude toward leftist leaders in Latin America hardened. Among them was the government of João Goulart in Brazil. The United States was worried by Goulart's domestic and foreign policies and bilateral relations deteriorated. As the Alliance for Progress failed to influence him with moderate methods, Washington resorted to weakening the Brazilian government with measures such as financing the opposition's electoral campaigns in 1962 and redirecting economic assistance to opposition governors.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

After a certain period, disputed in the literature, Washington became favorable to the ousting of Goulart.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Since 1961 some groups in the Brazilian military were conspiring against the government, and the U.S. Embassy was aware of such movements.Template:Sfn By 1963 the U.S. government was already looking for a group in the Brazilian Armed Forces capable of overthrowing Goulart.Template:Sfn Meanwhile, by the end of that year it was developing contingency plans and working on what to do in case of a rebellion.Template:Sfn A concern arose that the rebels would need American support to succeed;Template:Sfn on October 7, Kennedy asked Gordon about the possibility that intervention might be necessary.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn A State Department document made in November mentioned a new contingency plan with "heavy emphasis on armed U.S. intervention."Template:Sfn The contingency plan that would lead to operation Brother Sam had a wider scope than the operation itself.Template:Sfn

Developing the operation

American Summit discussions

The December 11, 1963 version of the contingency plan,Template:Efn probably in development since the previous months, listed four possibilities. The third, the removal of Goulart, was similar to what actually happened.Template:Sfn The second was:

The military conspirators were called "democratic forces".Template:Sfn At their request,

The document stressed that its premature discovery would be politically harmful.Template:Sfn Likewise, an open intervention followed by Goulart's victory against his opponents would be an embarrassment.Template:Sfn The idea of a naval task force was not present at this point,Template:Sfn but the possibility of "intervening with force only if there was Soviet or Cuban intervention" could allude to such a task force or even to a ground operation.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

By mid-March 1964, the Embassy reported on the worsening political crisis, the unity of military conspirators under the figure of general Castelo Branco, who could lead a coup d'état, and the adhesion of State governors to the conspiracy.Template:Sfn A meeting at the White House on March 20 and another at the Embassy shortly thereafter established that an aircraft carrier and tankers would be sent to support the opposition. The former had the assumption that, even with Castelo Branco's supporters taking most of the country, there might be resistance in Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco, and a naval presence on the coast, "showing the flag", would be a show of force in favor of the rebels.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Lincoln Gordon later stated that one of the goals of the task force would be to evacuate American citizens on Brazilian territory.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn This is possible, but it is not mentioned in his correspondence with the Secretary of State in 1964.Template:Sfn

The idea was criticized by some experts at a meeting at the White House. For McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor, "the punishment doesn't seem to match the crime." General Andrew Goodpaster did not understand how the squad could help the oppositionists.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Lincoln Gordon had to face opposition from his superiors to get his ideas across,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn standing out as the central figure in the entire effort to support Brazilian military conspirators.Template:Sfn

Fuel deliveries would prevent Goulart supporters in Petrobras from cutting off supply.Template:Sfn This concern had been transmitted to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by São Paulo businessman Alberto Byington.Template:Sfn On the other hand, the December 1963 plan already mentioned fuel and stated that its provisions should be guaranteed, evidencing that the idea was not born at the last minute.Template:Sfn In addition to fuel, there was concern about armaments. Gordon had already registered on Brazil's internal defense plan,Template:Efn dated March 20, how Brazilian security forces were poorly equipped.Template:Sfn

Provisional government and state of belligerency

The December 1963 contingency plan set a condition for logistical support:

Similarly, at the time of the coup the State Department specified that fuel and ammunition supplies could come only after "the point at which some group having a reasonable claim to legitimacy is able to formally request recognition and assistance from us and if possible from other American republics."Template:Sfn The state of insurgency or belligerency would regularize the opposition on a legal level. It was up to Brazilian oppositionists to create this new government, which suggests they were in contact with American plans. The link between this idea and the Brazilian conspiracy was senator Template:Ill.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

Magalhães Pinto, governor of Minas Gerais, threw his state into rebellion in conjunction with the local Army garrison at the beginning of the coup d'état.Template:Efn The day before, he had named a supra-partisan secretariat "of hermetic unity", including a Secretariat without Portfolio reserved for Afonso Arinos.Template:Sfn Once called to Belo Horizonte on the 31st, his function would be that of "chancellor of the revolution", "the first chancellor of the Republic outside Itamaraty",Template:Sfn in charge of getting the state of belligerency recognized abroad.Template:Sfn According to him, Magalhães first extended this invitation in November 1963, when he mentioned the possibility of a prolonged resistance from Minas Gerais; his actions would allow, for example, the purchase of weapons abroad.Template:Sfn According to him,

The Minas Gerais government intended to use the Template:Ill to receive foreign arms, especially from the U.S. It obtained the consent of the governor of Espírito Santo and defined that the Military Police of Minas Gerais would defend this logistical corridor.Template:Sfn At the time of the rebellion, it organized the "East Detachment" near Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo's borders, with the 6th and 11th Infantry Battalions.Template:Sfn Nevertheless, a rebellion could be crushed early on, as foreign supplies would take days to arrive. In case of a civil war, Minas Gerais would be at a disadvantage even if it could get arms for 50,000 volunteers.Template:Sfn The CIA reported that the Port of Vitória would be needed to receive fuel, and the rebels could control it.Template:Sfn

Gordon went as far as to message to several governors about the need for a legitimate government.Template:Sfn The CIA reported that in the event of open conflict in Brazil, Argentina would request OAS intervention in Brazil.Template:Sfn

Afonso Arinos was relevant during the coup when he informed congressman San Tiago Dantas of his planned involvement. On the morning of April 1, Dantas told Goulart that the US State Department would be willing to recognize a parallel rebel government. This was one of the reasons for the president's departure from Rio de Janeiro.Template:Sfn

Hypothetical land operation

In his conversation with Kennedy in October 1963, Lincoln Gordon mentioned that:

Such an operation would far exceed the scale of the presence in Vietnam, where there were 16,300 American troops at the end of 1963. It is comparable to the 1940 "Pot of Gold" plan to land 100,000 men in Brazil.Template:Sfn The six-division plan has not yet been declassified. There is a difference of opinion about being part of or distinct from Brother Sam.Template:Efn The contingency plan vaguely alluded to the possibility of such an operation in case of external communist interference.Template:Sfn The air and naval operation activated during the coup, however, did not include boots on the ground. On March 30, Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that "in a country of over 75 million people, larger than continental United States, this is not a job for a handful of United States Marines."Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

According to Template:Ill, the delivery of supplies to Brazilian ports would still require a small land presence, and in the case of an internal conflict in Brazil it would be possible to find some external communist interference as a pretext for military intervention. In this case it would be necessary to consult the American Congress and the Organization of American States, a "truly shocking scenario".Template:Sfn Template:Ill noted that the ships were not carrying land contingents, and the growing involvement in Vietnam would make a second front in Brazil difficult.Template:Sfn Moniz Bandeira emphasized the possibility of an invasion.Template:Sfn Elio Gaspari wrote that "there is no documented record that determined an immediate landing of troops".Template:Sfn

Final days

The operation was planned in cooperation with Brazilians, with general José Pinheiro de Ulhoa Cintra as an intermediary. On March 28, Gordon recorded how logistical concerns were coming from the conspirators and would be specified the following week through contact between general Cintra and military attaché Vernon Walters.Template:Sfn In Marco Antonio Villa's interpretation, the operation could have in mind the Castelista coup scheduled for the first half of April, which would allow the ships to be already close to Brazil at the moment of deflagration.Template:Sfn On the 27th, a Lincoln Gordon memo predicted the climax of the political crisis in a few days, with Castelo Branco as the leader of the "revolution."Template:Sfn

CIA reports in Minas Gerais on the 30th recorded the imminent beginning of the movement. In the early morning hours of the 31st, general Olímpio Mourão Filho, commander of the Brazilian Army in Minas Gerais, precipitated the coup d'état, over the heads of Castelo Branco and the other conspirators in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.Template:Sfn

The task force in action

Beginning

At 11:30 AM, a high-level meeting in Washington discussed air and naval support capabilities. In a telegram sent to the Embassy, they defined the dilemma between "not letting an opportunity pass that may not be repeated" and "not putting the U.S. government in charge of a lost cause." In addition to the squadron and fuel supplies proposed by the Embassy, the shipment of arms and ammunition was also approved.Template:Sfn At 1:50 PM Rear Admiral John L. Chew ordered the task force with the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal and two guided-missile destroyers to be sent to the vicinity of Santos, where it could receive further orders. In parallel, a helicopter support group would also be sent, embarked on a ship accompanied by four destroyers. These ships belonged to the 4th Aircraft Carrier Division and 162nd and 262nd Destroyer Divisions of the Second Fleet.Template:Sfn The Forrestal task force was to depart Norfolk, Virginia, at 07:00 on the 1st, local time (09:00 in Rio de Janeiro).Template:Sfn The ships would take a few days to assemble.Template:Sfn The carrier task force was expected in the area about April 10Template:Sfn or 11th, and the helicopters, in the 14th.Template:Sfn

• War shipsTemplate:Sfn
• USS Forrestal (CVA-59)
  USS Forrestal (CVA-59)
• Guided Missile Destroyer USS Leahy (DLG-16)
  Guided Missile Destroyer USS Leahy (DLG-16)
• Guided Missile Destroyer USS Barney (DDG-6)
  Guided Missile Destroyer USS Barney (DDG-6)
• TankerTemplate:Efn USS Truckee (AO-147)
  TankerTemplate:Efn USS Truckee (AO-147)
• Destroyer USS Charles R. Ware (DD-865)
  Destroyer USS Charles R. Ware (DD-865)
• Destroyer USS Allen M. Summer (DD-692)
  Destroyer USS Allen M. Summer (DD-692)
• Destroyer USS Harwood (DD-861)
  Destroyer USS Harwood (DD-861)
• Destroyer USS William C. Lawe (DD-763)
  Destroyer USS William C. Lawe (DD-763)

Under secrecy, tankers would be loaded in Aruba starting at 19:00 (Rio de Janeiro time) on the 31st and then sent in the direction of Brazil.Template:Sfn Their cargo of common gasoline would be the equivalent of one day's consumption in Brazil at 1977 levels. On the morning of the 2nd, one of them, the Santa Ynez, was ready to leave.Template:Sfn It was bound for Montevideo, Uruguay, but on April 10 or 11 it would be near Rio de Janeiro.Template:Sfn There was the alternative of transporting fuel by air.Template:Sfn

Oil TankerTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn	It would load in:	Start	It would arrive in Rio in:	Cargo (thousand barrels)
				Regular gasoline	Aviation Gasoline 115/145	Jet Fuel JP-4	Diesel Oil	Kerosene
USNS Santa Ynez	Aruba	April 2	April 10/11	40	16		33	20
USNS Chepachet	Aruba	April 4	April 14/15	40	33	35
SS Hampton Roads	Aruba	April 6	April 14/15			130/150
SS Nash Bulk	Trinidad	April 7	April 15/16	56	39	70 or 92
TotalTemplate:Efn				136	88	235–277	33	20

For airlift, 250 12 gauge shotguns would be transferred to Ramey Air Force Base in Puerto Rico at 03:00 (Rio de Janeiro time) on the 1st. Meanwhile, by noon (US Eastern time) 110 tons of handguns and ammunition would arrive at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey. The aerial contingent would consist of approximately seven C-135 aircraft (six for transport and one for support), eight escort fighters, up to eight tankers, one air relief aircraft, one communications aircraft, and one airborne command post.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Tear gas would also be transported for crowd control. Telegram from the State Department to the Embassy on March 31 determined that if conditions for shipment existed, it would take 24 to 36 hours and would be destined for Campinas.Template:Sfn Another telegram expected a landing in Recife.Template:Sfn

Air Force General George S. Brown was designated the mission commander,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn while General Breitweiser, head of air forces in the Southern Command,Template:Sfn commanded the Southern Command's Joint Task Force.Template:Sfn Starting at 07:00 (09:00 Rio time), this task force, with officers from the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA met at the Air Force Base in Panama to coordinate the logistics of the operation.Template:Sfn

Cancellation

On the 1st of April, senior officials in Washington, concerned about the possibility of open support for the rebellion benefiting Goulart, asked the Embassy whether "the momentum would continue on the anti-Goulart side without covert or overt encouragement from us." Lincoln Gordon replied that "the momentum clearly picked up" and open support would be a political error. He added that Ademar de Barros, governor of São Paulo, and others from his state had requested fuel and an overt naval presence, but they were not important. The Americans were well informed of the course of events in BrazilTemplate:Sfn and in contact with Castelo Branco. The latter told Gordon that he did not need logistical support, and from then on the operation began to be dismantled.Template:Sfn At 5:30 pm, the ambassador reported from the "95% victorious democratic rebellion".Template:Sfn

In a report sent at 01:00 in the morning on the 2nd, Gordon clarified that fuel and armaments might still be needed, since control over the refineries was not yet guaranteed and there was still resistance in the Third Army. At 16:00, Castelo Branco confirmed that the last military resistance in the Third Army was over.Template:Sfn The order to disband the Joint Task Force came at 17:22, going into effect at 20:00. At 16:30 (Rio time) on the 3rd, it was determined that "the current situation in Brazil will not require the presence of the Task Force with aircraft carriers in ocean waters to the south of the country",Template:Sfn as suggested by Gordon in the middle of the previous day.Template:Sfn

The operation became the "Quick Kick" exercise, after which the ships returned to business as usual.Template:Sfn The Forrestal's logbook how the carrier left Hampton Roads on April 1, headed 17º N 60º WTemplate:Efn and came back, anchoring on the 8th.Template:Sfn On the 3rd, Dean Rusk informed Gordon that with the operation's deactivation, costs of $2.3 million for the tankers would not be covered by the budget and might have to be reimbursed by Brazil, but this did not occur.Template:Sfn In the afternoon general O'Meara dismissed the air commands, keeping only the movement of fuel. In the evening, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cancelled air and fuel transport. Tankers continued moving until April 4 or 5, while weapons and ammunition remained at bases until April 7.Template:Sfn

Discovery

After the coup, some evidence of an American military operation emerged. Brazilianist Thomas Skidmore mentioned in an article at the time that Brazilian conspirators requested material support from American diplomats. Four years later, during an interview by Carlos Lacerda on the television program Firing Line, a sailor in the audience stated that at the time his ship was ordered to follow to Brazil.Template:Efn Some conspirators also made mention of it, such as Mourão Filho, who admitted knowing about the possible approach of a squadron.Template:Sfn However, Lincoln Gordon and Vernon Walters denied there was anything more than veiled monitoring of events.Template:Sfn

In the words of Elio Gaspari, "the American fleet was only sighted twelve years later".Template:Sfn The operation came to light through historian Phyllis R. Parker. As part of her master's program, begun in 1974, she accessed newly released documents at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. With Gordon's own help interpreting the documents, she found events missing from the history books of Skidmore and John W. F. Dulles and in contradiction to the official version of American officials. Journalist Template:Ill also examined the documents and published articles in Jornal do Brasil, which were later included in the book 1964 visto e comentado pela Casa Branca ("1964 seen and commented by the White House").Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn On the 40th and 50th anniversaries of the coup in 2004 and 2014, the National Security Archive published additional records on the operation itself and American policy on Brazil in the previous two years.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

See also

• Operation Condor
• Operation Farroupilha
• United States involvement in regime change
• United States involvement in regime change in Latin America

References

Sources

Books

Articles and works

• Template:Cite thesis
• Template:Cite thesis

Newspapers, magazines and websites

Documents

• Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Monday, October 7, 1963 (tape 114/A50, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston)
• State Department, Memorandum, "Embassy Contingency Plan," Top Secret, November 22, 1963
• NSC, Memcon, "Brazil," Top Secret, March 28, 1964
• CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerais," March 30, 1964 (IN 50 173)
• CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerais," March 30, 1964 (IN 50 182)
• Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil, Washington, March 30, 1964
• State Department, Secret Cable to Amb. Lincoln Gordon in Rio, March 31, 1964
• Teleconference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in Brazil, April 1, 1964
• Logbooks of U.S. Navy Ships and Stations, 1941 - 1983: Forrestal (CVA-59) - April 1964. National Archives and Records Administration.