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{{Short description|Being in accord with fact or reality}}
{{Short description|Conformity to reality}}
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'''Truth''' is conformity to [[reality]] or [[fact]]. It contrasts with [[falsity]] or misrepresentation that fails to align with the world. Truth is typically treated as a [[Property (philosophy)|property]] of [[Truth-bearer|truthbearers]], such as [[Sentence (linguistics)|sentences]], [[proposition]]s, or [[belief]]s that describe things as they are. It is closely related to truthfulness, a [[virtue]] associated with [[honesty]], and to [[truthlikeness]], a characteristic of theories that approximate the truth.
{{Epistemology sidebar}}'''Truth''' or '''verity''' is the [[Property (philosophy)|property]] of being in accord with [[fact]] or [[reality]].<ref name = Merriam-Webster-def>Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, [http://m-w.com/dictionary/truth truth] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091229155658/http://m-w.com/dictionary/truth |date=2009-12-29 }}, 2005</ref> In everyday language, it is typically ascribed to things that aim to represent reality or otherwise correspond to it, such as [[belief]]s, [[proposition]]s, and [[declarative sentence]]s.<ref name="SEP Truth">{{cite web |title=Truth |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/ |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=29 June 2020 |archive-date=20 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220120210351/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/ |url-status=live }}</ref>


True statements are usually held to be the opposite of [[false statement|false statements]]. The [[concept]] of truth is discussed and debated in various contexts, including [[philosophy]], [[art]], [[theology]], [[law]], and [[science]]. Most human activities depend upon the concept, where its nature as a concept is assumed rather than being a subject of discussion, including [[journalism]] and everyday life. Some philosophers view the concept of truth as basic, and unable to be explained in any terms that are more easily understood than the concept of truth itself.<ref>{{cite book |last=Asay |first=Jamin |date=October 2013 |title=The Primitivist Theory of Truth |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9781107038974 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |page=30-33 |isbn=9781107038974}}</ref> Most commonly, truth is viewed as the correspondence of [[language]] or [[thought]] to a mind-independent world. This is called the [[correspondence theory of truth]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=O'Connor |first=Daniel John |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7UkYAAAAIAAJ |title=The Correspondence Theory of Truth |date=1975 |publisher=Hutchinson |isbn=978-0-09-123200-9 |language=en}}</ref>
Various [[Theories of truth|theories of the nature of truth]] have been proposed, but its precise definition remains contested. The [[Correspondence theory of truth|correspondence theory]] holds that a statement is true if it corresponds to facts. According to the [[Coherence theory of truth|coherence theory]], truth consists in logical consistency and mutual support among beliefs. [[Pragmatic theory of truth|Pragmatists]] understand truth in terms of practical consequences and epistemic practices, claiming that truth is what works or what would withstand the test of unlimited inquiry. The [[Semantic theory of truth|semantic theory]] analyzes the [[truth conditions]] of sentences in an object language from the perspective of a [[metalanguage]]. [[Deflationary theory of truth|Deflationary theories]] argue that truth has no significant intrinsic nature, holding that the linguistic role of truth-related expressions exhausts the concept of truth. [[Pluralism (philosophy)|Pluralists]] assert that the definition of truth varies with the domain of analysis, while [[Relativism|relativists]] maintain that the same statement can be true in one perspective and false in another. Theories of truth are challenged by logical [[paradox]]es, such as the [[liar paradox]]. There are also discussions about the existence of additional truth values besides ''true'' and ''false'' and about the possibility of truth value gaps{{em dash}}statements that have no truth value.


Various theories and views of truth continue to be debated among scholars, philosophers, and theologians.<ref name="SEP Truth"/><ref name=PUP32014>{{cite book|author1=Alexis G. Burgess and John P. Burgess|title=Truth|year=2011|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-14401-6|edition=1st|url=http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9460.html|access-date=October 4, 2014|format=hardcover|quote=a concise introduction to current philosophical debates about truth|archive-date=October 6, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006131358/http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9460.html|url-status=live}}</ref> There are many different questions about the nature of truth which are still the subject of contemporary debates. These include the question of defining truth; whether it is even possible to give an informative definition of truth; identifying things as [[truth-bearer]]s capable of being true or false; if truth and falsehood are [[Principle of bivalence|bivalent]], or if there are other truth values; identifying the [[criteria of truth]] that allow us to identify it and to distinguish it from falsehood; the role that truth plays in constituting [[knowledge]]; and, if truth is always [[Universality (philosophy)|absolute]] or if it can be [[knowledge relativity|relative]] to one's perspective.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Achourioti |first1=Theodora |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G8PpCQAAQBAJ |title=Unifying the Philosophy of Truth |last2=Galinon |first2=Henri |last3=Fernández |first3=José Martínez |last4=Fujimoto |first4=Kentaro |date=2015 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-94-017-9673-6 |language=en}}</ref>
Philosophers distinguish types of truth by domain, content, and epistemic access, including ''[[a priori]]'', necessary, [[Morality|moral]], [[aesthetic]], [[religious]], and [[scientific]] truths. Truth plays a central role in the sciences as a goal of inquiry. The empirical sciences seek truth through [[observation]] and [[experimentation]], whereas the [[formal sciences]] rely on [[deductive reasoning]] from [[Axiom|fundamental principles]]. Many religious traditions regard truth as a virtue and ground it in a divine source. Truth also acts as a guiding norm in the fields of [[ethics]], [[law]], and [[journalism]].


==Etymology and ordinary usage==
Discussions of truth arose in [[Ancient philosophy|antiquity]] in [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]], [[Jain philosophy|Jain]], [[Buddhist philosophy|Buddhist]], and [[Ancient Greek philosophy|Greek thought]]. In the [[medieval period]], [[Christian philosophy|Christian]] and [[Islamic philosophy|Islamic philosophers]] explored the relation between truth and [[God]]. Discussions in the modern and contemporary periods have addressed diverse topics, such as the nature of truth and its relation to thought, language, and reality.
{{Further|Veritas|Aletheia|Tryggvi|category=|Page 4=Satya|selfref=}}
{{anchor|treowe}}
The English word ''truth'' is derived from [[Old English]] {{lang|ang|triewth}}, [[Middle English]] {{lang|enm|trewthe}}, as a ''-th'' nominalisation of the adjective ''true'' (Old English {{lang|ang|treowe}}). In ordinary usage, the word may denote either a quality of "faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, sincerity, veracity",<ref>[[OED]] on ''true'' has "Steadfast in adherence to a commander or friend, to a principle or cause, to one's promises, faith, etc.; firm in allegiance; faithful, loyal, constant, trusty; honest, honourable, upright, virtuous, trustworthy; free from deceit, sincere, truthful" besides "Conformity with fact; agreement with reality; accuracy, correctness, verity; Consistent with fact; agreeing with the reality; representing the thing as it is; real, genuine; rightly answering to the description; properly so called; not counterfeit, spurious, or imaginary."</ref><ref name = Merriam-Webster-def/> or that of "agreement with fact or reality".


The adjective, cognate with German {{lang|de|treu}} 'faithful', stems from [[Proto-Germanic]] ''*trewwj-'' 'having [[good faith]]', and perhaps ultimately from [[Proto-Indo-European]] ''{{PIE|*dru-}}'' 'tree', on the notion of "steadfast as an oak" ({{cf.}}[[Sanskrit]] {{tlit|sa|dā́ru}} '(piece of) wood';<ref name="Truth from Online Etymology">{{cite dictionary|title=Truth|url=http://www.etymonline.com/|access-date=2013-11-27|archive-date=2007-07-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070713125946/http://www.etymonline.com/|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Old Norse]] {{lang|nos|trú}} 'faith, word of honour, belief').<ref name=":0">''[http://www.northvegr.org/zoega/h442.php A Concise Dictionary of Old Icelandic] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930210807/http://www.northvegr.org/zoega/h442.php|date=2007-09-30}}'', [[Geir T. Zoëga]] (1910), Northvegr.org</ref>
== Definition ==
Truth is conformity to [[facts]] or accordance with [[reality]]. It is often understood as a property of [[Proposition|statements]] or [[beliefs]] that present the world as it is, or as a relation between language or thought and how things actually are. However, its precise definition is disputed, with different theories focusing on elements such as correspondence, coherence, or practical usefulness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|p=534–535}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2018|pp=1–3}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|pp=926–927}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zXzEP1SgMz8C&pg=PA1 1–3]}} }}</ref> In a slightly different sense, the term can also refer to genuineness, as in "a true friend" or "true gold", spiritual teachings, like "the truth of the scriptures", or facts themselves, such as "in truth, the product was defective."<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|Cevolani|2022|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|pp=901–902}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} | {{harvnb|MW staff|2026}} }}</ref> Truth contrasts with [[falsehood]] or falsity, which encompasses misrepresentations that do not meet this standard and fail to align with reality. The [[negation]] of a true statement is a falsehood.<ref>{{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=6–7}}</ref>


==Major theories<!-- 'Philosophy of truth', 'Theory of truth', 'Theories of truth', and 'Truth theory' redirect here. Please do not alter the title of the section without also fixing the redirect pages. -->==
Truth plays a central role in many human endeavors. It acts as a goal of inquiry when deciding what to believe and as a standard to which right conduct should conform by being responsive to how things actually are. People refer to truth to indicate reliable information, mark scientific findings well supported by [[evidence]], distinguish accurate legal [[testimony]] from misrepresentation, and emphasize honesty and sincerity in personal life. Truth is typically regarded as a positive value, either because of its beneficial consequences or as an [[Value theory#Intrinsic and instrumental|intrinsic good]] pursued for its own sake.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lynch|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zXzEP1SgMz8C&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|Cevolani|2022|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2004|pp=2–3, 12–15}} }}</ref>


[[File:Statue of Truth.jpg|thumb|right|[[Walter Seymour Allward]]'s ''Veritas'' (Truth) outside [[Supreme Court of Canada]], [[Ottawa, Ontario]] [[Canada]]]]
The word ''truth'' comes from the [[Old English]] {{lang|ang|trēowth}}, meaning {{gloss|fidelity}}. It entered [[Modern English]] via the [[Middle English]] term {{lang|enm|trewthe}}.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|MW staff|2026}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} | {{harvnb|OED staff|2026}} }}</ref>


The question of what is a proper basis for deciding how words, symbols, ideas and beliefs may properly be considered true, whether by a single person or an entire society, is dealt with by the five most prevalent substantive '''theories of truth'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> listed below. Each presents perspectives that are widely shared by published scholars.<ref name="EPT">[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Supp., "Truth", auth: Michael Williams, pp. 572–573 (Macmillan, 1996)</ref><ref>Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'', Oxford University Press, Oxford. Includes papers by James, Ramsey, Russell, Tarski, and more recent work.</ref><ref name=":1">{{cite book |editor1-last=Hale |editor1-first=Bob |editor2-last=Wright |editor2-first=Crispin |editor3-last=Miller |editor3-first=Alexander |date=1997 |publisher=Blackwell |location=Oxford |title=A Companion to the Philosophy of Language |isbn=978-0-631-21326-0 |edition=1999 reprint |oclc=40839879}}
== Basic concepts ==
* {{multiref2|1={{cite book |date=1997 |publisher=Blackwell |location=Oxford |last=Heal |first= Jane | others="Chapter postscript" by Alexander Miller |chapter=13. Radical Interpretation |title=A Companion to the Philosophy of Language|doi=10.1002/9781118972090.ch13 |pages=299−323|isbn=978-1-118-97471-1 |ref=none}}|2={{cite book|last= Richard |first=Mark |date=1997 |publisher=Blackwell |location=Oxford|chapter=14. Propositional Attitudes |title=A Companion to the Philosophy of Language |pages=324–356|ref=none}} }}</ref>{{rp|309–330}}
=== Truthbearers ===
{{main|Truthbearer}}
Truth is commonly treated as a feature of truthbearers{{em dash}}entities that can be true or false. Philosophers discuss which entities serve as truthbearers, including [[Sentence (linguistics)|sentences]], [[propositions]], and [[beliefs]]. Sentences are concrete linguistic entities composed of strings of words, like "It's raining in Nairobi." Their public nature and clear structure can aid philosophical analysis of truth-related phenomena. However, it is not always possible to establish a straightforward relation between a sentence and its truth value since its meaning can be [[context]]-dependent and may also be influenced by [[ambiguous]] terms. As a result, a sentence may be true under one [[Interpretation (philosophy)|interpretation]] and false under another. Another difficulty is that sentences belong to specific languages, with the danger of limiting philosophical analysis to language-specific features rather than articulating universal principles.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=7–11}} | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=Lead section, § What Sorts of Things are True (or False)?}} | {{harvnb|Strollo|2023|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 6.1 Truth-bearers}} }}</ref>{{efn|There are several versions of the view that sentences are truthbearers. Some theorists focus on general sentence types, while others prefer individual sentence [[Type–token distinction|tokens]], which are particular instances occurring in specific contexts. A common restriction limits the discussion to statements or declarative sentences, excluding sentences that do not have truth values, such as questions and commands.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=§ What Sorts of Things are True (or False)?}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 6.1 Truth-bearers, § 6.6 Truth and Assertion}} }}</ref>}}


Theories other than the most prevalent substantive theories are also discussed. According to a survey of professional philosophers and others on their philosophical views which was carried out in November 2009 (taken by 3226 respondents, including 1803 philosophy faculty members and/or PhDs and 829 philosophy graduate students) 45% of respondents accept or lean toward correspondence theories, 21% accept or lean toward deflationary theories and 14% [[Epistemic theories of truth|epistemic theories]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=All+respondents&areas0=0&areas_max=1&grain=medium |title=The PhilPapers Surveys – Preliminary Survey results |website=The PhilPapers Surveys |publisher=Philpapers.org |access-date=2012-05-27 |archive-date=2012-03-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120320074244/http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=All+respondents&areas0=0&areas_max=1&grain=medium |url-status=live }}</ref>
Propositions are typically understood as [[Abstract object|abstract entities]] that serve as the meanings of declarative sentences, mitigating the difficulties of context dependence, ambiguity, and language specificity. However, their abstract nature can make philosophical discussions less tangible, and there is disagreement about the existence of abstract objects. Beliefs and related [[mental states]] are concrete psychological entities, taking the form of subjective attitudes about what is the case. They establish a direct link between truth and [[cognition]] but are difficult to study because of their private nature.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=§ What Sorts of Things are True (or False)?}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=7–11}} | {{harvnb|Strollo|2023|pp=6–7}} }}</ref>


===Substantive===
Monists argue that there is only a single kind of truthbearer, while [[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralists]] accept different kinds. Some identify one kind as primary, explaining the truth values of secondary truthbearers in terms of the primary one. For example, one proposal reduces the truth of beliefs to sentences since sentences can be used to express beliefs.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Strollo|2023|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=7–11}} }}</ref>
====Correspondence====
{{Main|Correspondence theory of truth}}
Correspondence theories emphasize that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of affairs.<ref name=":2">[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth.: [[Arthur N. Prior]], p. 223 (Macmillan, 1969). Prior uses [[Bertrand Russell]]'s wording in defining correspondence theory. According to Prior, Russell was substantially responsible for helping to make correspondence theory widely known under this name.</ref> This type of theory stresses a relationship between thoughts or statements on one hand, and things or objects on the other. It is a traditional model tracing its origins to [[ancient Greece|ancient Greek]] philosophers such as [[Socrates]], [[Plato]], and [[Aristotle]].<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth.: Arthur N. Prior, pp. 223–224 (Macmillan, 1969).</ref> This class of theories holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is determined in principle entirely by how it relates to "things" according to whether it accurately describes those "things". A classic example of correspondence theory is the statement by the thirteenth century philosopher and theologian [[Thomas Aquinas]]: "''[[Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus]]''" ("Truth is the adequation of things and [[intellect]]"), which Aquinas attributed to the ninth century [[Neoplatonist]] [[Isaac Israeli ben Solomon|Isaac Israeli]].<ref name=":3">[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol. 2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth.: Arthur N. Prior, Macmillan, 1969, p. 224.</ref><ref>[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence "Correspondence Theory of Truth", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191031140950/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/ |date=2019-10-31 }}.</ref><ref name=":4">Thomas Aquinas, ''[[Summa Theologiae]]'', I. Q.16, A.2 arg. 2.</ref> Aquinas also restated the theory as: "A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality".<ref name=":5">[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence "Correspondence Theory of Truth", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191031140950/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/ |date=2019-10-31 }} (citing ''De Veritate'' Q.1, A.1–3 and ''[[Summa Theologiae]]'', I. Q.16).</ref>


Correspondence theory centres around the assumption that truth is a matter of accurately copying what is known as "[[objective reality]]" and then representing it in thoughts, words, and other symbols.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' Bradley, F.H., "On Truth and Copying", in Blackburn, ''et al.'' (eds., 1999),''Truth'', 31–45.</ref> Many modern theorists have stated that this ideal cannot be achieved without analysing additional factors.<ref name=EPT/><ref name=":6">[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth: Arthur N. Prior, pp. 223 ''ff''. Macmillan, 1969. See especially, section on "Moore's Correspondence Theory", 225–226, "Russell's Correspondence Theory", 226–227, "Remsey and Later Wittgenstein", 228–229, "Tarski's Semantic Theory", 230–231.</ref> For example, language plays a role in that all languages have words to represent concepts that are virtually undefined in other languages. The [[German language|German]] word ''[[Zeitgeist]]'' is one such example: one who speaks or understands the language may "know" what it means, but any translation of the word apparently fails to accurately capture its full meaning (this is a problem with many abstract words, especially those derived in [[agglutinative languages]]). Thus, some words add an additional parameter to the construction of an accurate [[truth predicate]]. Among the philosophers who grappled with this problem is [[Alfred Tarski]], whose [[semantic theory of truth|semantic theory]] is summarized further on.<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Correspondence Theory of Truth", auth: Arthur N. Prior, pp. 223 ''ff''. Macmillan, 1969. See the section on "Tarski's Semantic Theory", 230–231.</ref>
=== Truthmakers and truth conditions ===
{{Main|Truthmaker|Truth condition}}
[[File:DavidMArmstrong (cropped).jpg|thumb|left|alt=David Malet Armstrong.|[[David Malet Armstrong]] emphasized the role of truthmakers in establishing a connection between truth and being.<ref name="auto5">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Asay|loc=§ 1. History of Truthmaker Theory}} | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=291–292}} }}</ref>]]


====Coherence====
Various theories rely on the concept of truthmakers as the counterpart of truthbearers. A truthmaker is a real entity whose existence makes a truthbearer true, establishing a link between language or thought and the world. For example, an orange carrot could act as a truthmaker of the sentence "the carrot is orange". Truthmakers are often treated as [[Necessity and sufficiency|sufficient conditions]]: the existence of a truthmaker is enough for the sentence to be true, independent of other factors.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=152}} | {{harvnb|Armstrong|2004|pp=1–7}} | {{harvnb|Beebee|Dodd|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=l24TDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–3]}} }}</ref> Philosophers discuss which entities function as truthmakers, with candidates including facts or [[states of affairs]], [[Trope (philosophy)|tropes]], and [[Particulars|particular objects]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Asay|loc=Lead section, § 4. Kinds of Truthmakers}} | {{harvnb|MacBride|Daly|2025|loc=§ 2.5 Truth Supervenes Upon Being}} }}</ref>
{{Main|Coherence theory of truth}}


For coherence theories in general, truth requires a proper fit of elements within a whole system. Very often, coherence is taken to imply something more than simple logical consistency; often there is a demand that the propositions in a coherent system lend mutual inferential support to each other. So, for example, the completeness and comprehensiveness of the underlying set of concepts is a critical factor in judging the validity and usefulness of a coherent system.<ref>[[Immanuel Kant]], for instance, assembled a controversial but quite coherent system in the early 19th century, whose validity and usefulness continues to be debated even today. Similarly, the systems of [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]] and [[Spinoza]] are characteristic systems that are internally coherent but controversial in terms of their utility and validity.</ref> A central tenet of coherence theories is the idea that truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions, and can be ascribed to an individual proposition only in virtue of its relationship to that system as a whole. Among the assortment of perspectives commonly regarded as coherence theory, theorists differ on the question of whether coherence entails many possible true systems of thought or only a single absolute system.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Rescher |first=Nicholas |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D-7WAAAAMAAJ |title=The Coherence Theory of Truth |date=1973 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0-19-824401-1 |language=en}}</ref>
Truthmakers are closely related to truth conditions, which are ways or circumstances under which a statement is true. Truth conditions are requirements of how the world must be for a statement to be true. For instance, one truth condition of the sentence "it is raining" is that raindrops are falling. Truth conditions are often treated as necessary conditions: if a truth condition does not obtain, then the sentence cannot be true, independent of other factors.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=11–12, 152}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 6.2 Truth and Truth Conditions}} }}</ref>{{efn|[[Truth-conditional semantics]] define sentence meaning through truth conditions: to understand a sentence is to grasp the circumstances in which it is true, with truth conditions as the necessary and sufficient conditions of its truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shaw|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zb2ZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA190 190]}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 6.2 Truth and Truth Conditions}} | {{harvnb|Kearns|2011|pp=8–11}} }}</ref>}} A key motivation for truthmakers and truth conditions is the idea that truth depends on reality: truth is not a free-floating convention but is anchored in how things are.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=11–12, 152}} | {{harvnb|Armstrong|2004|pp=1–7}} | {{harvnb|MacBride|Daly|2025|loc=§ 3.2 Truth Depends on Being}} }}</ref>


Some variants of coherence theory are claimed to describe the essential and intrinsic properties of [[formal system]]s in logic and mathematics.<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: [[Alan R. White]], pp. 130–131 (Macmillan, 1969)</ref> Formal reasoners are content to contemplate [[independence (mathematical logic)|axiomatically independent]] and sometimes mutually contradictory systems side by side, for example, the various [[noneuclidean geometry|alternative geometries]]. On the whole, coherence theories have been rejected for lacking justification in their application to other areas of truth, especially with respect to assertions about the [[Natural environment|natural world]], [[empirical]] data in general, assertions about practical matters of psychology and society, especially when used without support from the other major theories of truth.<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: Alan R. White, pp. 131–133, ''see'' esp., section on "Epistemological assumptions" (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>
=== Others ===
Truthfulness is a [[virtue]]{{efn|In a slightly different sense, ''truthful'' is also used as a synonym of ''true'' or ''accurate''.<ref>{{harvnb|AHD staff|2022a}}</ref>}} associated with [[honesty]] and consistency among one's words, beliefs, and behavior. It is closely related to speaking the truth but differs in some key aspects. For example, if a person sincerely states a belief, they may be truthful even if the belief is false. Conversely, someone may state a truth with the intent to [[Deception|deceive]], or a [[liar]] may accidentally tell a truth. In both cases, truth alone is insufficient for truthfulness. Truthfulness contrasts with deception and dishonesty. Lying occurs when a speaker intentionally says something they believe to be false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cooper|2005|pp=927–928}} | {{harvnb|Bok|1998|loc=Lead section, § Truth, Truthfulness, Falsity and Deceit}} }}</ref> [[On Bullshit|Bullshitting]] is a related phenomenon in which a speaker is indifferent to truth or falsehood, for instance, because they only care about persuading or manipulating their audience. [[Truthiness]], a similar term, refers to the tendency to prioritize intuition and [[gut feelings]] over evidence and [[Rationality|rational analysis]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kozma|Schroer|2014|pp=104–105}} | {{harvnb|Johnson|2011|loc=§ 3. Wikiality, Truthiness, and Gut Thinking: Doing Philosophy Colbert-Style}} }}</ref> Its meaning overlaps with the term ''[[post-truth]]'', which denotes situations in which [[public opinion]] is shaped by [[appeal to emotions]] rather than objective facts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|OUP staff|2016}} | {{harvnb|CUP staff|2026}} | {{harvnb|O'Callaghan|2020|pp=339–340}} }}</ref> Deception can also take [[Non-verbal communication|non-verbal]] forms, such as edited photographs, [[deepfakes]], and [[AI-generated content]] intended to mislead or fabricate events.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dynel|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=CZFdDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA236 236–237]}} | {{harvnb|Dhamani|2026|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VayEEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA163 163]}} }}</ref>


Coherence theories distinguish the thought of [[rationalism|rationalist]] philosophers, particularly of [[Baruch Spinoza]], [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]], and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]], along with the British philosopher [[F. H. Bradley]].<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Coherence Theory of Truth", auth: Alan R. White, p. 130</ref> They have found a resurgence also among several proponents of [[logical positivism]], notably [[Otto Neurath]] and [[Carl Hempel]].
[[Truthlikeness]] or verisimilitude is a concept applied to theories or statements that are close to the truth. It is often used in the context of inquiry to indicate that a theory is not fully true but approximates this goal better than others. For example, [[heliocentrism]] is a model of the [[Solar System]] that is correct in certain aspects, like that planets orbit around the sun, and wrong in others, like claiming that the orbits are perfect circles. As a result, heliocentrism is not true in a strict sense but truthlike. Truthlikeness comes in degrees. For instance, heliocentrism is more truthlike than [[geocentrism]], which places the [[Earth]] at the center of the universe.{{efn|Truthlikeness can also be used to compare true assertions. For instance, the assertion "spiders have more than two legs" is less truthlike than the assertion "spiders have eight legs" because it is less precise.<ref>{{harvnb|Oddie|Cevolani|2022|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Logical Problem}}</ref>}} Different philosophical approaches to truthlikeness have been proposed. Some look at [[logical consequences]], arguing that a theory's degree of truthlikeness depends on the number of its true and false consequences. Others focus on [[Similarity (philosophy)|resemblance]], comparing how similar the theory's description is to the actual world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Niiniluoto|1987|pp=[xi–x, 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|Cevolani|2022|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Logical Problem, § 3. The Axiological Problem}} }}</ref> According to some suggestions, [[Degree of truth|truth itself also comes in degrees]], an idea found in [[fuzzy logics]]. However, the traditional view is that truth is [[Principle of bivalence|bivalent]]: an assertion is either true or false with nothing in between.<ref>{{harvnb|James|2005|p=326}}</ref>


====Pragmatic====
Truth is closely related to [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]] and [[evidence]] with some key differences. A belief is justified if it meets certain epistemic norms, for example, by resting on good reasons or strong evidence. Evidence for a proposition is something that supports its truth, such as [[observation]] or reliable [[testimony]]. Justification and evidence separate warranted beliefs from [[superstition]] and lucky guesses but do not guarantee truth: even well-founded beliefs can be false in unfavorable circumstances. If a justified belief is true, it may amount to [[knowledge]], which, unlike justification on its own, has truth as a core component.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=50–51, 92–95}} | {{harvnb|Goldman|Bender|2005|p=465}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=149}} }}</ref> [[Epistemologists]] discuss various sources of knowledge or how people may arrive at truth, such as [[perception]], [[introspection]], [[memory]], [[reason]], and testimony.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 5. Sources of Knowledge and Justification}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|loc=§ 3. Ways of Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Smith|2023|p=3}}}}</ref> Verification and [[fact-checking]] are processes that aim to assess the truth value of a proposition.<ref>{{harvnb|Hickerson|Schwartz|Wright|2025|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Vk6dEQAAQBAJ&pg=PT122 § Glossary: Fact-checking]}}</ref> They may rely on [[criteria of truth]], which are standards by which one can recognize that a claim is true.<ref>{{harvnb|Engel|2002|p=13}}</ref>
{{Main|Pragmatic theory of truth}}


Three influential forms of the ''pragmatic theory of truth'' were introduced around the turn of the 20th century by [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], [[William James]], and [[John Dewey]]. Although there are wide differences in viewpoint among these and other proponents of pragmatic theory, they all hold that truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice.<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol. 5, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth", 427 (Macmillan, 1969).</ref>
== <span class="anchor" id="Major theories"></span>Theories ==
{{main|Theories of truth}}
[[Theories of truth]] aim to identify what all truths have in common. Their goal is not to list true statements but to clarify the [[concept]] of truth, discern its [[Essence|essential features]], and explain truth-related phenomena. There are disagreements about whether such features exist and whether a given feature is an essential component or an external criterion only indicating the presence of truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=1–6}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2018|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=13, 35}} }}</ref>


Peirce defines it: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth."<ref name="Peirce Truth and Falsity">Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 716–720 in [[James Mark Baldwin]], ed., ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'', v. 2. Peirce's section is entitled "''Logical''", beginning on p. 718, column 1, and ending on p. 720 with the initials "(C.S.P.)", see Google Books [https://archive.org/details/beginningthirdr00randgoog/page/n748 <!-- pg=718 --> Eprint]. Reprinted, ''[[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography#CP|Collected Papers]]'' v. 5, pp. 565–573.</ref> This statement stresses Peirce's view that ideas of approximation, incompleteness, and partiality, what he describes elsewhere as ''[[fallibilism]]'' and "reference to the future", are essential to a proper conception of truth. Although Peirce uses words like ''concordance'' and ''correspondence'' to describe one aspect of the pragmatic [[sign relation]], he is also quite explicit in saying that definitions of truth based on mere correspondence are no more than ''nominal'' definitions, which he accords a lower status than ''real'' definitions.
=== Correspondence ===
{{main|Correspondence theory of truth}}
[[File:Correspondence theory of truth.svg|thumb|alt=A red apple, and the statement "[This] apple is red."|According to the correspondence theory, a statement is true if it corresponds to facts.<ref name="auto7">{{multiref | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|p=902}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=14–15}} }}</ref>]]


James' version of pragmatic theory, while complex, is often summarized by his statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving."<ref name=WJP>James, William, ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism','' (1909).</ref> By this, James meant that truth is a ''quality'', the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to practice (thus, "pragmatic").
The correspondence theory asserts that a belief or statement is true if it corresponds to facts. This view emphasizes the relation between thought or language and reality, arguing that truth matches how things are. It is one of the oldest and most influential theories of truth.<ref name="auto7"/>


Dewey, less broadly than James but more broadly than Peirce, held that [[inquiry]], whether scientific, technical, sociological, philosophical, or cultural, is self-corrective over time ''if'' openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to clarify, justify, refine, and/or refute proposed truths.<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol.2, "Dewey, John", by [[Richard J. Bernstein]], p. 383 (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>
Correspondence theorists distinguish truthbearers from the reality they represent,{{efn|This separates them from identity theorists, who argue that truths are identical to facts.<ref>{{harvnb|David|2018|p=245}}</ref>}} but the precise relation between the two is disputed. Various suggestions have been made regarding the nature of truthbearers, like seeing them as propositions, sentences, or beliefs. The classical view analyzes their relation to reality in terms of objects and [[Property (philosophy)|properties]]. It assumes that truthbearers have a subject-predicate structure, in which the [[Subject (grammar)|subject]] refers to an entity and the [[Predicate (grammar)|predicate]] denotes a property. According to this view, a statement corresponds to reality if it refers to an entity that carries the denoted property. Fact-based theories, by contrast, hold that a statement expresses a fact, and it is true if the fact obtains.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=§ 1. History of the Correspondence Theory}} | {{harvnb|David|2018|pp=238–245}} }}</ref> One version asserts a one-to-one correlation between truths and facts, while another understands correspondence more broadly as a structural similarity that does not require a perfect one-to-one mirroring.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=§ 6. Correspondence as Isomorphism}} | {{harvnb|David|2018|pp=245–247}} }}</ref>


Though not widely known, a new variation of the pragmatic theory was defined and wielded successfully from the 20th century forward. Defined and named by [[William Ernest Hocking]], this variation is known as "negative pragmatism". Essentially, what works may or may not be true, but what fails cannot be true because the truth always works.<ref>Sahakian, W.S. & Sahakian, M.L., Ideas of the Great Philosophers, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966, {{LCCN|66-23155}}</ref> Philosopher of science [[Richard Feynman]] also subscribed to it: "We never are definitely right, we can only be sure we are wrong."<ref name="FeynmanThe">{{cite book |last1=Feynman |first1=Richard Phillips |title=The Character of Physical Law |date=1994 |publisher=Modern Library |location=New York |isbn=978-0-679-60127-2|orig-date=First published 1965}}</ref> This approach incorporates many of the ideas from Peirce, James, and Dewey. For Peirce, the idea of "endless investigation would tend to bring about scientific belief" fits negative pragmatism in that a negative pragmatist would never stop testing. As Feynman noted, an idea or theory "could never be proved right, because tomorrow's experiment might succeed in proving wrong what you thought was right."<ref name="FeynmanThe" /> Similarly, James and Dewey's ideas also ascribe truth to repeated testing which is "self-corrective" over time.
[[Truthmaker theory]] is closely related to correspondence theory and is often treated as a modern version of it.<ref>{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=21–23}}</ref> Truthmaker theory stresses that truth depends on reality and analyzes the relation between truths and their truthmakers. Its most comprehensive form is truthmaker maximalism, which asserts that every truth has a truthmaker. Atomic truthmaker theory, by contrast, limits this view to simple statements and analyzes the truth of complex statements in terms of simpler ones.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Asay|loc=Lead section, § 3. Maximalism and Non-Maximalism}} | {{harvnb|Beebee|Dodd|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=l24TDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–3]}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=26–27, 31–32}} }}</ref>


Pragmatism and negative pragmatism are also closely aligned with the [[coherence theory of truth]] in that any testing should not be isolated but rather incorporate knowledge from all human endeavors and experience. The universe is a whole and integrated system, and testing should acknowledge and account for its diversity. As Feynman said, "...{{nbsp}}if it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong."{{r|FeynmanThe|p=150}}
A key motivation for the correspondence theory is its intuitive appeal and its ability to ground truth in objective reality. A key challenge is to clarify how exactly truths relate to facts. Critics hold that the correspondence theory is uninformative or circular because it fails to explain what ''correspondence'' means. They argue that it assumes an implicit understanding of the relation without offering an independent account. Another objection asserts that the correspondence theory is too narrow because it is unable to explain truth in fields like mathematics, logic, and morality, where it is more difficult to identify independent facts corresponding to statements.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=14–26}} | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=§ 4. Arguments for the Correspondence Theory, § 5. Objections to the Correspondence Theory}} | {{harvnb|Kirkham|1998|loc=Lead section, § 3. Objections to Correspondence Theories}} }}</ref>


====Constructivist====
=== Coherence ===
{{Main|Constructivist epistemology}}
{{main|Coherence theory of truth}}
[[File:Coherence theory of truth.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram of three beliefs and arrows between them|The coherence theory understands truth as logical consistency and mutual support among beliefs.<ref name="auto6">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|p=902}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=536}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=26–27}} }}</ref>]]


[[Constructivist epistemology|Social constructivism]] holds that truth is constructed by social processes, is historically and culturally specific, and that it is in part shaped through the power struggles within a community. Constructivism views all of our knowledge as "constructed," because it does not reflect any external "transcendent" realities (as a pure correspondence theory might hold). Rather, perceptions of truth are viewed as contingent on convention, human perception, and social experience. It is believed by constructivists that representations of physical and biological reality, including [[Race (classification of human beings)|race]], [[Human sexuality|sexuality]], and [[gender]], are socially constructed.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kukla |first=André |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AFmkqMbS0LoC |title=Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science |date=2000 |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-0-415-23419-1 |language=en}}</ref>
The coherence theory understands truth{{efn|The coherence theory of truth is similar to the coherence theory of [[knowledge]] but not identical.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fei|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Ot6uEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA79 79]}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|p=902}} }}</ref>}} as a relation between beliefs rather than between a belief and a fact. It asserts that a belief is true if it is part of a coherent web of beliefs. Coherence theorists typically stress that beliefs do not occur in isolation but are part of a broader perspective on reality since they depend on conceptual frameworks and background assumptions not explicitly represented in the content of each belief. For example, the belief that [[photons]] lack mass rests on a network of ideas from [[particle physics]] that ground its meaning and ramifications. Accordingly, coherence theory is associated with a form of [[holism]] that privileges comprehensive perspectives over individual beliefs.<ref name="auto6"/>{{efn|Historically, coherentism is often linked to [[metaphysical idealism]].<ref>{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=29}}</ref>}}


[[Giambattista Vico]] was among the first to claim that history and culture were man-made. Vico's [[epistemology|epistemological]] orientation unfolds in one axiom: ''verum ipsum factum''—"truth itself is constructed". [[Hegel]] and [[Marx]] were among the other early proponents of the premise that truth is, or can be, socially constructed. Marx, like many critical theorists who followed, did not reject the existence of objective truth, but rather distinguished between true knowledge and knowledge that has been distorted through power or ideology. For Marx, scientific and true knowledge is "in accordance with the dialectical understanding of history" and ideological knowledge is "an epiphenomenal expression of the relation of material forces in a given economic arrangement".<ref>{{cite book |author1=May, Todd |author-link1=Todd May (philosopher) |title=Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics, and Knowledge in the Thought of Michel Foucault |date=1993 |publisher=Pennsylvania State University Press |location=University Park |isbn=978-0-271-02782-1|oclc= 26553016}}</ref>
Different suggestions for the nature of coherence have been proposed. A minimal requirement is usually that the beliefs are [[Consistency|logically consistent]]: they do not contradict each other. Another often-discussed condition is that the beliefs support each other, meaning that a collection of unrelated but consistent beliefs is not sufficient for coherence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=3}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=26–27}} }}</ref> In the strongest form, coherentism requires that all beliefs cohere. Less demanding versions assert that only the majority of beliefs need to cohere or that coherence is required within specific domains, such as scientific or moral beliefs, but not across domains.<ref>{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=26–29}}</ref>


====Consensus====
One criticism acknowledges that coherence is relevant for testing or verifying what is true but contends that coherence theory confuses criteria of verification with truth itself. Another objection argues that there can be competing coherent sets of beliefs where one set contradicts the other, meaning that coherence alone cannot determine which set is correct. For example, a fictional story does not become true just because it is coherent.<ref name="auto6"/>
{{Main|Consensus theory of truth}}


[[Consensus theory of truth|Consensus theory]] holds that truth is whatever is agreed upon, or in some versions, might come to be agreed upon, by some specified group. Such a group might include all human beings, or a [[subset]] thereof consisting of more than one person.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Warburton |first=Nigel |url=https://archive.org/details/thinkingfromtoz00warb/page/134/mode/2up |title=Thinking from A to Z |date=2000 |publisher=London ; New York : Routledge |others=Internet Archive |isbn=978-0-415-22280-8}}</ref>
=== Pragmatic ===
{{main|Pragmatic theory of truth}}


Among the current advocates of consensus theory as a useful accounting of the concept of "truth" is the philosopher [[Jürgen Habermas]].<ref>''See, e.g.'', Habermas, Jürgen, ''Knowledge and Human Interests'' (English translation, 1972).</ref> Habermas maintains that truth is what would be agreed upon in an [[ideal speech situation]].<ref>''See, e.g.'', Habermas, Jürgen, ''Knowledge and Human Interests'' (English translation, 1972), esp. Part III, pp. 187 ''ff''.</ref> Among the current strong critics of consensus theory is the philosopher [[Nicholas Rescher]].<ref>Rescher, Nicholas, ''Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus'' (1995).</ref>
The pragmatic or [[Pragmatism|pragmatist]] theory is a family of views that understand truth in terms of practical consequences and epistemic practices. They characterize truth by the role it plays in human affairs, seeing it as embedded in communal practices, epistemic commitments, or norms of discourse. One version asserts that a belief is true if it is practically useful because holding it and acting in accordance with it has beneficial consequences. This view argues that truth is what works, emphasizing real-life outcomes over speculative abstractions. Pragmatists discuss whether this outlook should focus on individual beliefs or comprehensive belief systems assessed over long periods.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=34–35}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537}} | {{harvnb|Capps|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Misak|2018|pp=283–284}} }}</ref>


===Minimalist===
A central difficulty for utility-based theories is that practical consequences and usefulness depend on situations and desires. This can lead to [[subjectivism]] or [[relativism]] since what is useful in one case may not be in another. Another challenge is that although practical consequences often align with truth, this is not always the case: a false belief may have good consequences in certain situations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=34–35}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537}} }}</ref>
====Deflationary====
{{Main|Deflationary theory of truth}}


Modern developments in the field of philosophy have resulted in the rise of a new thesis: that the term ''truth'' does not denote a real property of sentences or propositions. This thesis is in part a response to the common use of ''truth predicates'' (e.g., that some particular thing "...{{nbsp}}is true") which was particularly prevalent in philosophical discourse on truth in the first half of the 20th century. From this point of view, to assert that "'2 + 2 = 4' is true" is logically equivalent to asserting that "2 + 2 = 4", and the phrase "is true" is—philosophically, if not practically (see: "Michael" example, below)—completely dispensable in this and every other context. In common parlance, truth predicates are not commonly heard, and it would be interpreted as an unusual occurrence were someone to utilize a truth predicate in an everyday conversation when asserting that something is true. Newer perspectives that take this discrepancy into account, and work with sentence structures as actually employed in common discourse, can be broadly described:
A different version of pragmatism defines truth from the perspective of scientific research. It holds that truth is the ideal limit of inquiry or what researchers would believe after unlimited investigation. Other pragmatist approaches define truth as beliefs that have withstood thorough examination or as statements that fulfill discourse norms and can be asserted with warrant.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Capps|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=34–35}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|p=902–903}} }}</ref>
* as ''deflationary'' theories of truth, since they attempt to deflate the presumed importance of the words "true" or ''truth'',
* as ''disquotational'' theories, to draw attention to the disappearance of the quotation marks in cases like the above example, or
* as ''minimalist'' theories of truth.<ref name=EPT/><ref>Blackburn, Simon, and Simmons, Keith (eds., 1999), ''Truth'' in the Introductory section of the book.</ref>


Whichever term is used, deflationary theories can be said to hold in common that "the predicate 'true' is an expressive convenience, not the name of a property requiring deep analysis."<ref name=EPT/> Once we have identified the truth predicate's formal features and utility, deflationists argue, we have said all there is to be said about truth. Among the theoretical concerns of these views is to explain away those special cases where it ''does'' appear that the concept of truth has peculiar and interesting properties. (See, e.g., [[Semantic paradox]]es, and below.)
=== Semantic ===
{{main|Semantic theory of truth}}
[[File:Alfred Tarski 1968 (as-is, cropped) (cropped).jpg|thumb|left|alt=Alfred Tarski.|[[Alfred Tarski]] formulated the semantic theory of truth.<ref>{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=47–50}}</ref>]]


The scope of deflationary principles is generally limited to representations that resemble sentences. They do not encompass a broader range of entities that are typically considered true or otherwise. In addition, some deflationists point out that the concept employed in "...{{nbsp}}is true" formulations does enable us to express things that might otherwise require infinitely long sentences; for example, one cannot express confidence in Michael's accuracy by asserting the endless sentence:
The semantic theory characterizes truth in terms of [[truth conditions]]. It distinguishes between an object language, which contains true sentences that are being analyzed, and a [[meta-language]] to express their truth conditions using so-called T-sentences. T-sentences have the form: '"<math>S</math>" is true in <math>L</math> if and only if <math>p</math>' where <math>L</math> is the object language, <math>S</math> is a sentence of the object language, and <math>p</math> is a sentence of the meta-language describing truth conditions. For example, '"La nieve es blanca." is true in Spanish if and only if snow is white' is a T-sentence with Spanish as the object language and English as the meta-language. The semantic theory was originally formulated by [[Alfred Tarski]], who limited it to the analysis of [[formal languages]]. Subsequent philosophers, such as [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]], have also applied it to [[natural languages]]. The semantic theory is often combined with the idea that truth conditions can be analyzed by [[Principle of compositionality|studying the components of sentences]], such as names and predicates, which are then interpreted to refer to certain entities or situations described in the truth conditions.<ref name="auto2">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537–538}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=47–50}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=49–56, 66–67}} | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dGuYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA16 16–19, 22]}} }}</ref>
{{blockindent|1=''Michael says, 'snow is white' and snow is white, or he says 'roses are red' and roses are red or he says{{nbsp}}... etc.''}}
This assertion can instead be succinctly expressed by saying: ''What Michael says is true''.<ref>[[Richard Kirkham]], ''[[Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction]]'', MIT Press, 1992.</ref>


=====Redundancy and related=====
A key motivation for the semantic theory is its ability to characterize truth in a precise manner without introducing metaphysical assumptions concerning the existence and nature of facts, correspondence, or coherence. By talking about truth in the object language through a metalanguage, it also avoids paradoxes that arise if a language contains its own truth-predicate, such as the liar paradox. However, it is controversial to what extent the semantic theory offers substantial insights into the nature of truth rather than only providing a formal device for analyzing truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=47–50}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=66–67}} | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dGuYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA16 16–19]}} }}</ref>
{{Main|Redundancy theory of truth}}
 
An early variety of deflationary theory is the [[redundancy theory of truth]], so-called because—in examples like those above, e.g. "snow is white [is true]"—the concept of "truth" is redundant and need not have been articulated; that is, it is merely a word that is traditionally used in conversation or writing, generally for emphasis, but not a word that actually equates to anything in reality. This theory is commonly attributed to [[Frank P. Ramsey]], who held that the use of words like ''fact'' and ''truth'' was nothing but a [[periphrasis|roundabout]] way of asserting a proposition, and that treating these words as separate problems in isolation from judgment was merely a "linguistic muddle".<ref name="EPT"/><ref>Ramsey, F.P. (1927), "Facts and Propositions", Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, Philosophical Papers, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990</ref><ref>Le Morvan, Pierre. (2004) "Ramsey on Truth and Truth on Ramsey", ''The British Journal for the History of Philosophy'' 12(4), pp. 705–718.</ref>
 
A variant of redundancy theory is the "disquotational" theory, which uses a modified form of the logician [[Alfred Tarski]]'s [[#Semantic theory of truth|schema]]: proponents observe that to say that "'P' is true" ''is'' to assert "P". A version of this theory was defended by [[C. J. F. Williams]] (in his book ''What is Truth?''). Yet another version of deflationism is the prosentential theory of truth, first developed by Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and [[Nuel Belnap]] as an elaboration of Ramsey's claims. They argue that utterances such as "that's true", when said in response to (e.g.) "it's raining", are "[[prosentence]]s"—expressions that merely repeat the content of other expressions. In the same way that ''it'' means the same as ''my dog'' in the statement "my dog was hungry, so I fed it", ''that's true'' is supposed to mean the same as ''it's raining'' when the former is said in reply to the latter.<ref>{{Cite book |last=David |first=Marian Alexander |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=szl6AsLmKIEC |title=Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth |date=1994 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-507924-1 |language=en}}</ref>
 
As noted above, proponents of these ideas do not necessarily follow Ramsey in asserting that truth is not a ''property;'' rather, they can be understood to say that, for instance, the assertion "P" ''may well'' involve a substantial truth—it is only the redundancy involved in statements such as "that's true" (i.e., a prosentence) which is to be minimized.<ref name=EPT/>
 
====Performative====
Attributed to philosopher [[P. F. Strawson]] is the performative theory of truth which holds that to say "'Snow is white' is true" is to perform the [[speech act]] of signaling one's agreement with the claim that snow is white (much like nodding one's head in agreement). The idea that some statements are more actions than communicative statements is not as odd as it may seem. For example, when a wedding couple says "I do" at the appropriate time in a wedding, they are performing the act of taking the other to be their lawful wedded spouse. They are not ''describing'' themselves as taking the other, but actually ''doing'' so (perhaps the most thorough analysis of such "illocutionary acts" is [[J. L. Austin]], most notably in ''[[How to Do Things With Words]]'').<ref>J. L. Austin, "How to Do Things With Words". Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975</ref>
 
Strawson holds that a similar analysis is applicable to all speech acts, not just illocutionary ones: "To say a statement is true is not to make a statement about a statement, but rather to perform the act of agreeing with, accepting, or endorsing a statement. When one says 'It's true that it's raining,' one asserts no more than 'It's raining.' The function of [the statement] 'It's true that{{nbsp}}...' is to agree with, accept, or endorse the statement that 'it's raining.{{' "}}<ref>[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]], Vol. 6: ''Performative Theory of Truth'', auth: Gertrude Ezorsky, p. 88 (Macmillan, 1969)</ref>
 
====Philosophical skepticism====
{{see also|Philosophical skepticism|Certainty}}
 
[[Philosophical skepticism]] is generally any [[doubt]] of one or more items of [[knowledge]] or [[belief]] which ascribe truth to their assertions and propositions.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=skepticism |date=n.d. |url=https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/skepticism |encyclopedia=The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia|archive-date=2012-07-13 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120713170158/http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Skeptikoi |url-status=live|access-date=2018-06-04 }} Citing:
* {{cite book |first=R. H. |last=Popkin |title=The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes |edition=revised |date=1968|ref=none}}
* {{cite book|first=C. L. |last=Stough|title=Greek Skepticism|date=1969|ref=none}}
* {{cite book|editor-first=M. |editor-last=Burnyeat |title=The Skeptical Tradition |date=1983|ref=none}}
* {{cite book|first= B. |last= Stroud |title=The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism |date=1984 |ref=none}}</ref><ref>"Philosophical views are typically classed as skeptical when they involve advancing some degree of doubt regarding claims that are elsewhere taken for granted." [http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/skepcont.htm utm.edu] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090113210019/http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/skepcont.htm |date=2009-01-13 }}</ref> The primary target of philosophical skepticism is [[epistemology]], but it can be applied to any domain, such as the [[supernatural]], morality ([[moral skepticism]]), and [[religious skepticism|religion]] (skepticism about the existence of God).<ref>{{Cite book|title = The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=Ozv0lftrUeEC|publisher = Oxford University Press, US|year = 2008|isbn = 978-0-19-518321-4|language = en|first = John|last = Greco|author-link=John Greco (philosopher)}}</ref>
 
Philosophical skepticism comes in various forms. [[Radical skepticism|Radical forms of skepticism]] deny that knowledge or rational belief is possible and urge us to [[epoche|suspend judgment]] regarding ascription of truth on many or all controversial matters. More moderate forms of skepticism claim only that nothing can be known with certainty, or that we can know little or nothing about the "big questions" in life, such as whether God exists or whether there is an afterlife. [[Religious skepticism]] is "doubt concerning basic religious principles (such as immortality, providence, and revelation)".<ref>{{Cite web|title = Definition of SKEPTICISM|url = http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/skepticism|website = Merriam-Webster |access-date = 2016-02-05|archive-date = 2019-04-24|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190424142033/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/skepticism|url-status = live}}</ref> [[Scientific skepticism]] concerns testing beliefs for reliability, by subjecting them to [[wikt:systematic|systematic]] investigation using the [[scientific method]], to discover [[empirical evidence]] for them.
 
===Pluralist===
{{Main|Pluralist theories of truth}}
Several of the major theories of truth hold that there is a particular property the having of which makes a belief or proposition true. Pluralist theories of truth assert that there may be more than one property that makes propositions true: ethical propositions might be true by virtue of coherence. Propositions about the physical world might be true by corresponding to the objects and properties they are about.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lynch |first=Michael Patrick |title=Truth as one and many |date=2009 |publisher=Clarendon press |isbn=978-0-19-921873-8 |location=Oxford}}</ref>
 
Some of the pragmatic theories, such as those by [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Charles Peirce]] and [[William James]], included aspects of correspondence, coherence and constructivist theories.<ref name="Peirce Truth and Falsity"/><ref name=WJP/> [[Crispin Wright]] argued in his 1992 book ''Truth and Objectivity'' that any predicate which satisfied certain platitudes about truth qualified as a truth predicate. In some discourses, Wright argued, the role of the truth predicate might be played by the notion of superassertibility.<ref>Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992.</ref> [[Michael Lynch (philosopher)|Michael Lynch]], in a 2009 book ''Truth as One and Many'', argued that we should see truth as a functional property capable of being multiply manifested in distinct properties like correspondence or coherence.<ref>Truth as One and Many (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).</ref>
 
==Formal theories==
===Logic===
{{Main|Logical truth|Criteria of truth|Truth value}}
 
[[Logic]] is concerned with the patterns in [[reason]] that can help tell if a [[proposition]] is true or not. Logicians use [[formal language]]s to express the truths they are concerned with, and as such there is only truth under some [[interpretation (logic)|interpretation]] or truth within some [[logical system]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Novaes |first=Catarina Dutilh |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5ZV7AAAAQBAJ |title=Formal Languages in Logic: A Philosophical and Cognitive Analysis |date=2012 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-02091-7 |language=en}}</ref>
 
A logical truth (also called an analytic truth or a necessary truth) is a statement that is true in all logically possible worlds<ref>[[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]''.</ref> or under all possible interpretations, as contrasted to a ''[[fact]]'' (also called a ''[[Analytic-synthetic distinction|synthetic claim]]'' or a ''[[Necessary and sufficient condition|contingency]]''), which is only true in this [[World (philosophy)|world]] as it has historically unfolded. A proposition such as "If p and q, then p" is considered to be a logical truth because of the meaning of the [[symbol (formal)|symbols]] and [[well-formed formula|words]] in it and not because of any fact of any particular world. They are such that they could not be untrue.
 
[[Degree of truth|Degrees]] of [[truth values|truth]] in logic may be represented using two or more discrete values, as with [[principle of bivalence|bivalent logic]] (or [[Boolean logic|binary logic]]), [[three-valued logic]], and other forms of [[finite-valued logic]].<ref>{{cite book| last=Kretzmann| first=Norman| title=William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Words| chapter=IV, section<nowiki>=</nowiki>2. 'Infinitely Many' and 'Finitely Many'| publisher=University of Minnesota Press| year=1968| chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fW5rlSy-5D8C&pg=PA42| isbn=978-0-8166-5805-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite book| last=Smith| first=Nicholas J.J.| chapter=Article 2.6| title=Many-Valued Logics| publisher=Routledge| year=2010| chapter-url=https://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/~njjsmith/papers/smith-many-valued-logics.pdf| access-date=2018-05-25| archive-date=2018-04-08| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408200831/http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/~njjsmith/papers/smith-many-valued-logics.pdf| url-status=live}}</ref> Truth in logic can be represented using numbers comprising a [[continuous or discrete variable|continuous]] range, typically between 0 and 1, as with [[fuzzy logic]] and other forms of [[infinite-valued logic]].<ref>{{cite book| title=The Development of Modern Logic| last1=Mancosu| first1=Paolo| last2=Zach| first2=Richard| last3=Badesa| first3=Calixto| chapter=9. The Development of Mathematical Logic from Russell to Tarski 1900-1935" §7.2 "Many-valued logics| publisher=Oxford University Press| pages=418–420| year=2004| url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0jXavKsArnIC| isbn=978-0-19-972272-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| last=Garrido| first=Angel| title=A Brief History of Fuzzy Logic| publisher=Revista EduSoft| year=2012| url=https://www.edusoft.ro/brain/index.php/brain/article/viewFile/308/390| access-date=2018-05-25| archive-date=2018-05-17| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180517152622/https://www.edusoft.ro/brain/index.php/brain/article/viewFile/308/390| url-status=live}}, Editorial</ref> In general, the concept of representing truth using more than two values is known as [[many-valued logic]].<ref>{{cite book| last=Rescher| first=Nicholas| publisher=Humanities Press Synthese Library volume 17| year=1968| doi=10.1007/978-94-017-3546-9_6| title=Topics in Philosophical Logic|pages = 54–125|isbn = 978-90-481-8331-9| chapter=Many-Valued Logic}}</ref>
 
===Mathematics===
{{anchor|Truth_in_mathematics}}
{{Main|Model theory|Proof theory}}
 
There are two main approaches to truth in mathematics. They are the ''[[model theory|model theory of truth]]'' and the ''[[proof theory|proof theory of truth]]''.<ref>Penelope Maddy; ''Realism in Mathematics''; Series: Clarendon Paperbacks; Paperback: 216 pages; Publisher: Oxford University Press, US (1992); 978-0-19-824035-8.</ref>
 
Historically, with the nineteenth century development of [[Boolean algebra (logic)|Boolean algebra]], mathematical models of logic began to treat "truth", also represented as "T" or "1", as an arbitrary constant. "Falsity" is also an arbitrary constant, which can be represented as "F" or "0". In [[propositional logic]], these symbols can be manipulated according to a set of [[axioms]] and [[rules of inference]], often given in the form of [[truth table]]s.
 
In addition, from at least the time of [[Hilbert's program]] at the turn of the twentieth century to the proof of [[Gödel's incompleteness theorems]] and the development of the [[Church–Turing thesis]] in the early part of that century, true statements in mathematics were [[logical positivism|generally assumed]] to be those statements that are provable in a formal axiomatic system.<ref>Elliott Mendelson; ''Introduction to Mathematical Logic''; Series: Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications; Hardcover: 469 pages; Publisher: Chapman and Hall/CRC; 5 edition (August 11, 2009); 978-1-58488-876-5.</ref>
 
The works of [[Kurt Gödel]], [[Alan Turing]], and others shook this assumption, with the development of statements that are true but cannot be proven within the system.<ref>''See, e.g.,'' Chaitin, Gregory L., ''The Limits of Mathematics'' (1997) esp. 89 ''ff''.</ref> Two examples of the latter can be found in [[Hilbert's problems]]. Work on [[Hilbert's 10th problem]] led in the late twentieth century to the construction of specific [[Diophantine equations]] for which it is undecidable whether they have a solution,<ref>M. Davis. "Hilbert's Tenth Problem is Unsolvable." ''American Mathematical Monthly'' 80, pp. 233–269, 1973</ref> or even if they do, whether they have a finite or infinite number of solutions. More fundamentally, [[Hilbert's first problem]] was on the [[continuum hypothesis]].<ref>Yandell, Benjamin H.. ''The Honors Class. Hilbert's Problems and Their Solvers'' (2002).</ref> Gödel and [[Paul Cohen (mathematician)|Paul Cohen]] showed that this hypothesis cannot be proved or disproved using the standard [[axiom]]s of [[set theory]].<ref>Chaitin, Gregory L., ''The Limits of Mathematics'' (1997) 1–28, 89 ''ff''.</ref> In the view of some, then, it is equally reasonable to take either the continuum hypothesis or its negation as a new axiom.
 
Gödel thought that the ability to perceive the truth of a mathematical or logical proposition is a matter of [[logical intuition|intuition]], an ability he admitted could be ultimately beyond the scope of a formal theory of logic or mathematics<ref>{{cite web| last=Ravitch| first=Harold| title=On Gödel's Philosophy of Mathematics| year=1998| url=http://www.friesian.com/goedel/chap-2.htm| access-date=2018-05-25| archive-date=2018-02-28| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180228005628/http://friesian.com/goedel/chap-2.htm| url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| last=Solomon| first=Martin| title=On Kurt Gödel's Philosophy of Mathematics| year=1998| url=http://calculemus.org/lect/07logika/godel-solomon.html| access-date=2018-05-25| archive-date=2016-03-04| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304030146/http://www.calculemus.org/lect/07logika/godel-solomon.html| url-status=live}}</ref> and perhaps best considered in the realm of human [[comprehension (logic)|comprehension]] and communication. But he commented, "The more I think about language, the more it amazes me that people ever understand each other at all".<ref>{{cite book| last=Wang| first=Hao| title=A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy| publisher=The MIT Press| year=1997| url=https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0262261251}} (A discussion of Gödel's views on [[logical intuition]] is woven throughout the book; the quote appears on page 75.)</ref>
 
===Tarski's semantics===
{{main|Semantic theory of truth}}


[[Tarski's theory of truth]] (named after [[Alfred Tarski]]) was developed for formal languages, such as [[formal logic]]. Here he restricted it in this way: no language could contain its own truth predicate, that is, the expression ''is true'' could only apply to sentences in some other language. The latter he called an ''object language'', the language being talked about. (It may, in turn, have a truth predicate that can be applied to sentences in still another language.) The reason for his restriction was that languages that contain their own truth predicate will contain [[Liar paradox|paradoxical]] sentences such as, "This sentence is not true". As a result, Tarski held that the semantic theory could not be applied to any natural language, such as English, because they contain their own truth predicates. [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] used it as the foundation of his [[truth-conditional semantics]] and linked it to [[radical interpretation]] in a form of [[coherentism]].<ref>{{Citation |last=Hodges |first=Wilfrid |title=Tarski's Truth Definitions |date=2022 |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/ |access-date=2025-04-04 |edition=Winter 2022 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri}}</ref>
=== Deflationary ===
{{main|Deflationary theory of truth}}
[[File:What is truth.jpg|thumb|alt=Painting: Pontius Pilate (left) asks Jesus (right) "What is truth?"|An early skepticism about the nature of truth is expressed in [[Pontius Pilate]]'s rhetorical question to [[Jesus]], asking "[[John 18:38|What is truth?]]"<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|p=34}} | {{harvnb|Blackburn|2005|pp=59–60}} }}</ref>]]


[[Bertrand Russell]] is credited with noticing the existence of such paradoxes even in the best symbolic formations of mathematics in his day, in particular the paradox that came to be named after him, [[Russell's paradox]]. Russell and [[Alfred North Whitehead|Whitehead]] attempted to solve these problems in ''[[Principia Mathematica]]'' by putting statements into a hierarchy of [[type theory|types]], wherein a statement cannot refer to itself, but only to statements lower in the hierarchy. This in turn led to new orders of difficulty regarding the precise natures of types and the structures of conceptually possible [[type system]]s that have yet to be resolved to this day.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Link |first=Godehard |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Xg6QpedPpcsC |title=One Hundred Years of Russell's Paradox: Mathematics, Logic, Philosophy |date=2004 |publisher=Walter de Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-017438-0 |language=en}}</ref>
Deflationary theories argue that truth has no significant or interesting intrinsic nature. They hold that attempts by substantive or robust theories, such as correspondence theory and coherence theory, misconstrue truth by assuming a deep metaphysical structure, engaging in pseudoproblems where trivial answers would suffice. Deflationists typically analyze how truth-related expressions are used in language, holding that understanding their linguistic roles exhausts the concept of truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=33–34}} | {{harvnb|Azzouni|2018|pp=477–478}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zXzEP1SgMz8C&pg=PA5 5]}} }}</ref>


===Kripke's semantics<!--Linked from 'Semantic theory of truth'-->===
Different deflationary theories propose distinct accounts of the linguistic function of truth-related terms,{{efn|One categorization groups deflationary theories into moderate deflationism, which accepts the idea that truth is a predicate in a logical sense, and radical deflationism, which rejects this view.<ref>{{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=34–44}}</ref>}} including the [[Redundancy theory of truth|redundancy theory]], disquotationalism, the performative theory, [[prosententialism]], and minimalism. The redundancy theory asserts that the predicate "is true" is superfluous and does not contribute to meaning. According to this view, the sentences 'Snow is white.' and '"Snow is white" is true.' have the same meaning. Disquotationalism holds that the predicate "is true" acts as a linguistic device to remove quotation marks and make generalizations. The performative theory treats truth as a performative expression that speakers can use to endorse statements, like when saying "That's true." Prosententialism treats truth not as a regular predicate but as an operator. This operator can be applied to expressions that refer to other statements, as in "What Smith said is true." Minimalism understands truth as a logical property whose role is expressed in T-sentences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=34–44}} | {{harvnb|Armour-Garb|Stoljar|Woodbridge|2023|loc=Lead section, § 3. The Varieties of Contemporary Deflationism}} | {{harvnb|Azzouni|2018|pp=477–479}} }}</ref>
{{Main|Semantic theory of truth}}
[[Kripke's theory of truth]] (named after [[Saul Kripke]]) contends that a natural language can in fact contain its own truth predicate without giving rise to contradiction. He showed how to construct one as follows:
* Beginning with a subset of sentences of a natural language that contains no occurrences of the expression "is true" (or "is false"). So, ''The barn is big'' is included in the subset, but not "''The barn is big'' is true", nor problematic sentences such as "''This sentence'' is false".
* Defining truth just for the sentences in that subset.
* Extending the definition of truth to include sentences that predicate truth or falsity of one of the original subset of sentences. So "''The barn is big'' is true" is now included, but not either "''This sentence'' is false" nor "<nowiki>'</nowiki>''The barn is big'' is true' is true".
* Defining truth for all sentences that predicate truth or falsity of a member of the second set. Imagine this process repeated infinitely, so that truth is defined for ''The barn is big''; then for "''The barn is big'' is true"; then for "<nowiki>'</nowiki>''The barn is big'' is true' is true", and so on.


Truth never gets defined for sentences like ''This sentence is false'', since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the [[principle of bivalence]]: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the [[liar paradox]], the paradox is dissolved.<ref>Kripke, Saul. "Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 690–716</ref>
Various criticisms of deflationism target specific versions of it, such as criticisms of the redundancy theory or minimalism. However, there are also broader objections that seek to undermine deflationism in general. One argument holds that deflationism fails to explain key aspects of truth, like that truth serves as the aim of beliefs or that theoretical truth can lead to practical success.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Armour-Garb|Stoljar|Woodbridge|2023|loc=§ 4. Objections to Deflationism}} | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|p=51}} }}</ref>


[[Kripke semantics|Kripke's semantics]] are related to the use of [[topos|topoi]] and other concepts from [[category theory]] in the study of [[mathematical logic]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Goldblatt |first=Robert |title=Topoi, the categorial analysis of logic |date=1983 |publisher=Sole distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, Elsevier North-Holland |isbn=0-444-86711-2 |edition=revised |location=Amsterdam |oclc=9622076}}</ref> They provide a choice of formal semantics for [[intuitionistic logic]].
=== Others ===
[[Pluralist theories of truth|Pluralists]] hold that there is no unified concept of truth that covers all cases. Instead, they argue that truth is a heterogeneous notion and that different theories apply to different domains. For example, a pluralist may accept the correspondence theory for empirical truths but adopt the coherence theory for mathematical truths.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=20, 110}} | {{harvnb|Pedersen|Lynch|2018|pp=543–545}} | {{harvnb|Lynch|2004|pp=4–5}} }}</ref>


==Folk beliefs==
Absolutism asserts that truth is the same for everyone, meaning that what is true does not depend on individual standpoints, opinions, or contexts. It contrasts with [[relativism]], which maintains that the same statement can be true in one perspective or [[Contextualism|context]] and false in another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blackburn|2005|pp=xiii–xvii}} | {{harvnb|Cappelen|Huvenes|2018|pp=521}} }}</ref> Local relativism limits this dependency to particular domains, such as moral truth. Global relativism, by contrast, extends this view to all truths. Critics argue that global relativism is self-defeating theory that undermines its own authority: applied to itself, it holds that it is only true in some perspectives that all truths are relative.<ref>{{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=65–66}}</ref> [[Nihilism#Skepticism|Nihilism]] or skepticism about truth{{efn|This view differs from [[Philosophical skepticism|skepticism]] about knowledge, an often-discussed view in [[epistemology]] that asks whether knowledge is possible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stone|2000|pp=527–528}} | {{harvnb|Pedersen|Lynch|2018|pp=543–544}} }}</ref>}} presents a more radical view that rejects the existence of truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pedersen|Lynch|2018|pp=543–544}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Asay|2022|pp=687–688}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=4–5}} }}</ref>
The [[truth predicate]] "''P'' is true" has great practical value in human language, allowing ''efficient'' endorsement or impeaching of claims made by others, to emphasize the truth or falsity of a statement, or to enable various indirect ([[Gricean]]) conversational implications.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Scharp|first1=Kevin|title=Replacing truth|date=2013|publisher=Oxford Univ. Press|location=Oxford|isbn=978-0-19-965385-0|edition=First|chapter=6: What is the Use?}}</ref> Individuals or societies will sometime punish "false" statements to deter falsehoods;<ref>{{cite web|title=truth {{!}} philosophy and logic|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/truth-philosophy-and-logic|website=Encyclopedia Britannica|access-date=28 July 2017|language=en|quote=Truth is important. Believing what is not true is apt to spoil a person's plans and may even cost him his life. Telling what is not true may result in legal and social penalties.|archive-date=5 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190605223755/https://www.britannica.com/topic/truth-philosophy-and-logic|url-status=live}}</ref> the oldest surviving law text, the [[Code of Ur-Nammu]], lists penalties for false accusations of sorcery or adultery, as well as for committing [[perjury]] in court. Even four-year-old children can pass simple "[[Theory of mind#False-belief task|false belief]]" tests and successfully assess that another individual's belief diverges from reality in a specific way;<ref>Wellman, Henry M., David Cross, and Julanne Watson. "Meta‐analysis of theory‐of‐mind development: the truth about false belief." Child development 72.3 (2001): 655–684.</ref> by adulthood there are strong implicit intuitions about "truth" that form a "folk theory" of truth. These intuitions include:<ref>Lynch, Michael P. "Alethic functionalism and our folk theory of truth." Synthese 145.1 (2005): 29–43.</ref>
* Capture (''T''-in): If ''P'', then ''P'' is true
* Release (''T''-out): If ''P'' is true, then ''P''
* [[Law of noncontradiction|Noncontradiction]]: A statement cannot be both true and false
* Normativity: It is usually good to believe what is true
* False beliefs: The notion that believing a statement does not necessarily make it true


Like many folk theories, the folk theory of truth is useful in everyday life but, upon deep analysis, turns out to be technically self-contradictory; in particular, any [[formal system]] that fully obeys "capture and release" semantics for truth (also known as the ''[[T-schema]]''), and that also respects classical logic, is provably [[inconsistent]] and succumbs to the [[liar paradox]] or to a similar contradiction.<ref>Bueno, Otávio, and Mark Colyvan. "Logical non-apriorism and the law of non-contradiction." The law of non-contradiction: New philosophical essays (2004): 156–175.</ref>
One common categorization divides theories of truth into [[Philosophical realism|realism]] and [[anti-realism]]. Realists see truth as an objective feature that is determined by what the world is like and exists independently of thoughts and descriptions. Anti-realists argue that truth depends in part or entirely on the epistemic situation or how beliefs relate to justification, verification, inquiry, or one another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 4. Realism and Anti-realism}} | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=5, 9}} | {{harvnb|Strollo|2023|p=5}} }}</ref> Realism is typically associated with absolutism, while anti-realism is more closely linked to relativism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Young|1996|pp=68–69}} | {{harvnb|Young|1986|pp=503–504}} }}</ref>


==Ancient Greek philosophy==
[[Verificationism]] argues that a statement is true if it is verifiable. It maintains that the procedures for confirming or disconfirming claims are not external tests of truth but constitutive norms. Verificationists typically assert that there are different verification procedures for different claims, for example, that scientific claims about empirical phenomena require observation and experimentation, whereas mathematical claims are established through deductive proof.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=29–31}} | {{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 4.2 Anti-realism and truth}} }}</ref> What is verifiable or falsifiable depends on the situation and the abilities of investigators, meaning that verificationist truth is not purely objective. Additionally, some statements may be neither verifiable nor falsifiable, raising the question of whether verificationism requires a third truth value or truth-value gaps.<ref>{{harvnb|Glanzberg|2025|loc=§ 4.2 Anti-realism and truth}}</ref> Verificationism is sometimes grouped with coherentism as an [[Epistemic theories of truth|epistemic theory]]. Epistemic theories define truth in terms of epistemic concepts, including coherence, verifiability, [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]], and [[rationality]].<ref>{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=27, 29–31}}</ref>


{{see also| Aletheia}}
[[File:Liar paradox.svg|thumb|alt=Illustration of the undefined truth value of the proposition "This proposition is false."|The liar paradox involves a proposition with an inconsistent truth assignment: if the proposition is true, it follows that it is false, and if it is false, it follows that it is true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Deutsch|2022|pp=533–534}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Glanzberg|Ripley|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>]]
[[Socrates]]', [[Plato]]'s and [[Aristotle]]'s ideas about truth are seen by some as consistent with [[Correspondence theory of truth|correspondence theory]]. In his ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'', Aristotle stated: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true".<ref name=StanfordCorr>David, Marion (2005). [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#1 "Correspondence Theory of Truth"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140225071446/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#1 |date=2014-02-25 }} in [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]</ref> The [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] proceeds to say of Aristotle:<ref name=StanfordCorr/>


<blockquote>...{{nbsp}}Aristotle sounds much more like a genuine correspondence theorist in the ''Categories'' (12b11, 14b14), where he talks of "underlying things" that make statements true and implies that these "things" (pragmata) are logically structured situations or facts (viz., his sitting, his not sitting). Most influential is his claim in ''De Interpretatione'' (16a3) that thoughts are "likenesses" (homoiosis) of things. Although he nowhere defines truth in terms of a thought's likeness to a thing or fact, it is clear that such a definition would fit well into his overall philosophy of mind.{{nbsp}}...</blockquote>
The identity theory holds that something is true if it is identical to reality. This view rejects the distinction between truthbearers and truthmakers, arguing that truths are facts rather than representations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=37–39}} | {{harvnb|Gaskin|2021|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Axiomatic theories are deductive theories based on a small number of [[Axiom|fundamental principles]]. Instead of providing explicit definitions, they treat truth as a primitive or undefined concept and formulate general rules of how it behaves.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fujimoto|Halbach|2018|pp=718–719}} | {{harvnb|Halbach|Leigh|Łełyk|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> According to the [[Consensus theory of truth|consensus theory]], proposed by [[Jürgen Habermas]], truth is what people would agree upon under ideal circumstances.<ref>{{harvnb|Hesse|1978|pp=372, 379–380}}</ref> The term ''folk theory of truth'' refers to widely held beliefs of ordinary people about truth, like the idea that a proposition is true if its negation is false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lynch|2005|pp=29–30}} | {{harvnb|Ulatowski|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8ipADwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–3]}} }}</ref>


Similar statements can also be found in Plato's dialogues (''[[Cratylus (dialogue)|Cratylus]]'' 385b2, ''[[Sophist (dialogue)|Sophist]]'' 263b).<ref name=StanfordCorr/>
Theories of truth are challenged by various [[paradoxes]] in which basic intuitions or principles yield [[Contradiction|contradictory]] conclusions. The [[liar paradox]] involves a statement with an inconsistent truth assignment, like the claims "I am lying" or "This statement is false": if the statement is true, it follows that it is false, and if it is false, it follows that it is true. Other paradoxes include the [[Curry paradox]], the [[Russell-Myhill paradox]], and Grelling's paradox.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burgess|Burgess|2011|pp=5–7, 119}} | {{harvnb|Field|2008|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7KASDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2, 23–24, 83–84]}} | {{harvnb|Deutsch|2022|pp=534–535, 541–543}} }}</ref> Some paradoxes arise if a language contains its own [[truth predicate]].{{efn|A truth predicate is a linguistic device that ascribes truth to a sentence, like the expression "... is true".<ref>{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=48–49}}</ref>}} Tarski sought to avoid this problem by analyzing formal languages that do not have truth predicates. [[Saul Kripke]] proposed a different approach that limits how truth predicates can be used within a language without excluding them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Field|2008|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7KASDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA56 56–58]}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=47–50}} }}</ref>


Some Greek philosophers maintained that truth was either not accessible to mortals, or of greatly limited accessibility, forming early [[philosophical skepticism]]. Among these were [[Xenophanes]], [[Democritus]], and [[Pyrrho]], the founder of [[Pyrrhonism]], who argued that there was no criterion of truth.
== Types ==
[[File:Pythagorean theorem2.svg|thumb|alt=The Pythagorean theorem: given a right triangle with legs of lengths a and b, and hypotenuse of length c, a^2 + b^2 = c^2|Mathematical truths, like the [[Pythagorean theorem]], are traditionally categorized as ''a priori'' truths.<ref>{{harvnb|Horsten|2023|loc=§ 5.4 Mathematical Proof}}</ref>]]


The [[Epicureanism|Epicureans]] believed that all sense perceptions were true,<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995|url-access=limited|last=Asmis|first=Elizabeth|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009|editor-last=Warren|editor-first=James|page=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995/page/n93 84]|chapter=Epicurean empiricism}}</ref><ref name=":252">{{Cite book|title=Epicureanism|last=O'Keefe|first=Tim|publisher=University of California Press|year=2010|pages=97–98}}</ref> and that errors arise in how we judge those perceptions.
Various types of truth are distinguished in the academic discourse by domain, content, and epistemic access. For some types, it is controversial whether they exist in a strict sense. The difference between {{lang|la|[[A priori and a posteriori|a posteriori]]}} and {{lang|la|a priori}} truths rests on the source of knowledge. {{lang|la|A posteriori}} truths require sensory experience, such as observing that water boils at 100°C at [[standard atmospheric pressure]]. {{lang|la|A priori}} truths can be known through pure reasoning, such as a proof of a mathematical theorem.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ A Priori and a Posteriori Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Baehr|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> A related distinction is between [[Analytic–synthetic distinction|synthetic and analytic]] truths, based on the source of the truth. A sentence is synthetic if its truth depends on what the world is like, such as "[[Mount Everest]] is the highest mountain on Earth" or "all bachelors are tetchy and demanding". A sentence is analytic if its truth depends only on the meanings of its terms, as in "all bachelors are unmarried".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Juhl|Loomis|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix–x, 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2023}} | {{harvnb|Pradhan|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DR-VDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} | {{harvnb|Cohen|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K3AM9VyP2gEC&pg=PA17 17]}} }}</ref>{{efn|{{lang|la|A priori}} truths are typically associated with analytic truths and {{lang|la|a posteriori}} truths are typically associated with synthetic truths, but the precise characterization of their relation is disputed.<ref>{{harvnb|Weatherson|2016|pp=231–233}}</ref>}}


The [[Stoicism|Stoics]] conceived truth as accessible from [[Phantasiai|impressions]] via [[katalepsis|cognitive grasping]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Stoic Philosophy of Mind {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/stoicmind/ |access-date=2025-03-09 |language=en-US}}</ref>
[[Logical truth]]s or [[Tautology (logic)|tautologies]] are a special class of analytic truths. Their truth is determined by the [[logical form]] of statements, regardless of concrete contents, as in statements of the form "if <math>P</math>, then <math>P</math>".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Soames|1999|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LQ0nSJtm4KYC&pg=PA120 120]}} | {{harvnb|Gómez-Torrente|2022|loc=Lead section, § 1. The Nature of Logical Truth}} | {{harvnb|Blackburn|2008}} }}</ref> The [[negation]] of a logical truth is a logical falsity or [[contradiction]]. Contradictions can take the form of affirming and denying the same idea within a single statement, as in "the light is on and the light is not on". Most logicians consider all contradictions to be false to avoid absurdity. One exception is the school of [[dialetheism]], which holds that some contradictions are true, arguing that reality itself can be contradictory.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Akiba|2020|p=67}} | {{harvnb|Priest|Berto|Weber|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>


==Medieval philosophy==
Philosophers distinguish between necessary, actual, and possible truths based on the circumstances or conditions relative to which a statement is evaluated. A truth is necessary if it could not have been otherwise, meaning that it is true under all conceivable circumstances. A sentence is actually true if it correctly describes the actual world. A sentence is possibly true if there are conceivable circumstances where it is true, regardless of whether these circumstances obtain in the actual world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=149–150}} | {{harvnb|Parent|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>
===Avicenna (980–1037)===
In [[early Islamic philosophy]], [[Avicenna]] (Ibn Sina) defined truth in his work ''[[The Book of Healing]]'', Book I, Chapter 8, as:
{{blockquote|What corresponds in the mind to what is outside it.<ref>Osman Amin (2007), "Influence of Muslim Philosophy on the West", ''Monthly Renaissance'' 17 (11).</ref>}}


[[Avicenna]] elaborated on his definition of truth later in Book VIII, Chapter 6:
[[Value theory|Evaluative truths]] are about what is good or bad in some sense. They include [[Ethics|ethical]] truths, which assess the [[Morality|moral]] status of principles, actions, and persons, such as the claim "murder is wrong". [[Aesthetic]] truths are about the appeal of entities, including judgments about what is [[beauty|beautiful]] and about the [[Aesthetic interpretation|meanings of artworks]]. Axiological nihilists and [[Error theory|error theorists]] challenge the existence of evaluative truths, arguing that no values exist or that all value statements are false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} | {{harvnb|Oliver|1998}} | {{harvnb|Zangwill|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Aesthetic Truth}} }}</ref> [[Subjectivism]], another view, holds that they are [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|subjective]] truths. A subjective truth depends on individual attitudes or personal preferences, meaning that a statement may be true from the perspective of one person and false from another. They contrast with objective truths, which are verifiable and hold regardless of individual attitudes or perspectives.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Solomon|2005|p=900}} | {{harvnb|Lyon|2005|p=667}} }}</ref>
{{Blockquote|The truth of a thing is the property of the being of each thing which has been established in it.<ref name=Aertsen>Jan A. Aertsen (1988), ''Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought'', p. 152. Brill, 978-90-04-08451-3.</ref>}}


This definition is but a rendering of the [[medieval]] Latin translation of the work by Simone van Riet.<ref>{{cite book
The concept of religious truth encompasses core teachings and doctrines within religious traditions, addressing not only how things are but also how people relate to the world. They typically concern the [[meaning of life]], the nature of [[ultimate reality]] and [[the divine]], and the values and practices that should guide human conduct. Some traditions distinguish between absolute and relative truth, with absolute truth pointing to a [[Transcendence (religion)|transcendent]], divine reality while relative truth refers to conventional or context-dependent teachings for everyday life. Religious truths are often grounded in [[faith]], drawing rationalist and scientific criticisms for lacking substantial [[empirical evidence]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Streng|2005|pp=9368–9370}} | {{harvnb|Grøn|2003|pp=903–904}} }}</ref>
| author = Simone van Riet
| title = Liber de philosophia prima, sive Scientia divina
| page = 413
| language = la}}</ref> A modern translation of the original Arabic text states:


{{blockquote|Truth is also said of the veridical belief in the existence [of something].<ref>{{cite book
Various forms of truth are distinguished by the field of inquiry they belong to. Scientific truths are well-established theories in the scientific community, validated through rigorous application of the [[scientific method]].<ref name="auto4">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Girifalco|2007|pp=267–268}} | {{harvnb|Hatfield|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> In studying the empirical world, scientists often employ mathematical truths, which are abstract theorems or principles demonstrated through [[deductive reasoning]] from [[Axioms|basic principles]]. [[Philosophers of mathematics]] discuss whether mathematical truths should be interpreted as insights into [[Mathematical Platonism|mind-independent abstract objects]] or as human [[Constructivism (philosophy of mathematics)|constructions]] arising from formal frameworks and symbolic manipulation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nutting|loc=Lead section, § 1. Introducing the Problem}} | {{harvnb|Horsten|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Benacerraf|1973|pp=661–666}} }}</ref> In the field of history, [[History#Historical objectivity|Historical truth]] refers to the accurate presentation of past events, but it is controversial to what extent historians can achieve this ideal. Difficulties arise from the subjective nature of interpretation and the influence of personal values and biases when integrating evidence from diverse sources to arrive at a coherent narrative.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Haecker|1985|pp=267–268}} | {{harvnb|Carr|2006|loc=§ 2. "Critical" Philosophy of History: Philosophical Reflection on Historical Knowledge, § 3. Postmodern Skepticism and Its Critics}} }}</ref> Personal historical truth plays a role in [[psychoanalysis]] as a factor shaping an [[Personal identity|individual's identity]], such as the lasting effects of [[Adverse childhood experiences|traumatic childhood experiences]]. The remembered events may diverge from objective reality due to distortions introduced by [[Repression (psychoanalysis)|repression]] and [[confabulation]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Akhtar|2009|pp=557–558}} | {{harvnb|De Mijolla-Mellor|2005|pp=749–750}} }}</ref>
| title = Avicenna: The Metaphysics of The Healing |author=Avicenna|author-mask=0
| publisher = Brigham Young University Press
| year = 2005
| page = 284
| others =Introduction and annotation by Michael E. Marmura
|translator-last=Marmura |translator-first=Michael E.
| isbn = 978-0-934893-77-0
}}</ref>}}


===Aquinas (1225–1274)===
In [[logic]] and [[semantics]], truth {{lang|la|simpliciter}} is sometimes distinguished from truth relative to a certain context, such as truth in a [[possible world]] or in a [[Model theory|model]]. A possible world is a way of how things could have been. For example, the dinosaurs went extinct in the actual world, but there are possible worlds where they survived. Accordingly, the sentence "the dinosaurs were wiped out" is true in the actual world but false in some possible worlds. Similarly, model theory uses models{{em dash}}abstract mathematical structures{{em dash}}to represent the meanings of logical terms and expressions. In this context, the truth value of a formula can depend on the model: it may be true in one model and false in another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cresswell|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QOGO-sab1PIC&pg=PA113 113]}} | {{harvnb|Garson|2024|loc=§ 6. Possible Worlds Semantics}} | {{harvnb|Winter|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aDRWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17–20, 24–27, 240–241]}} }}</ref> A related problem in the [[philosophy of literature]] concerns truth in [[fiction]], referring to statements that accurately describe events or characters in the imagined universe of a work of fiction, such as the claim that [[Harry Potter (character)|Harry Potter]] wears glasses.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Currie|1986|pp=195–196}} | {{harvnb|Bourne|Caddick Bourne|2022|pp=15–16}} }}</ref>
Reevaluating Avicenna, and also Augustine and Aristotle, [[Thomas Aquinas]] stated in his ''Disputed Questions on Truth'':


{{blockquote|A natural thing, being placed between two intellects, is called ''true'' insofar as it conforms to either. It is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine intellect insofar as it fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect{{nbsp}}... With respect to its conformity with a human intellect, a thing is said to be true insofar as it is such as to cause a true estimate about itself.<ref>''Disputed Questions on Truth'', 1, 2, c, reply to Obj. 1. Trans. Mulligan, McGlynn, Schmidt, ''Truth'', vol. I, pp. 10–12.</ref>}}
== In various fields ==
=== Science and philosophy ===
Truth is central to many disciplines. It is often considered a goal of inquiry that guides scientific research and intellectual life.<ref>{{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=1–2}}</ref> Empirical scientists formulate testable [[hypotheses]] to explain phenomena. They rely on [[observation]] and [[experimentation]] to collect objective data, comparing results with initial hypotheses to confirm or disconfirm theories.<ref name="auto4"/> The [[natural sciences]] engage in [[quantitative research]], employing precise numerical measurements, often to arrive at exact general laws that can predict future outcomes. [[Qualitative research]] is more common in the [[social sciences]], where researchers examine cultural phenomena, social processes, and subjective experiences that may resist purely numerical interpretation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Howell|2013|pp=193–194}} | {{harvnb|Kasim|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9-TqIjCDp6YC&pg=PA29 29–30]}} | {{harvnb|Aspers|Corte|2019|pp=139, 145–148}} }}</ref>


Thus, for Aquinas, the truth of the human intellect (logical truth) is based on the truth in things (ontological truth).<ref>"Veritas supra ens fundatur" (Truth is founded on being). ''Disputed Questions on Truth'', 10, 2, reply to Obj. 3.</ref> Following this, he wrote an elegant re-statement of Aristotle's view in his [http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1016.htm Summa I.16.1]:
The [[formal sciences]] demonstrate the truth of theories through more abstract methods, usually based on [[deductive reasoning]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Löwe|2002|pp=5–6}} | {{harvnb|Agazzi|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nd0eEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 27]}} }}</ref> For example, mathematicians employ [[Mathematical proof|several proof methods]] to establish theorems, such as [[direct proof]], [[proof by contradiction]], and [[mathematical induction]].<ref>{{harvnb|DeBonis|2025|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RYdBEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17–18]}}</ref> [[Formal logic]] studies the nature of deductive reasoning and the [[rules of inference]] it follows. A key principle in this field is that deductive inferences preserve truth: if all premises are true, then the conclusion cannot be false. Logicians develop [[formal systems]]{{em dash}}abstract frameworks that precisely encode forms of deductive reasoning{{em dash}}and examine which truths can and cannot be proven within a given formal system.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bonevac|1999|pp=679–681}} | {{harvnb|Hintikka|2019|loc=Lead section, § Nature and Varieties of Logic}} }}</ref>{{efn|Some formal systems introduce a [[truth predicate]] as a formal device to talk about the truth of sentences within the system.<ref>{{harvnb|Eberle|1984|pp=151–152}}</ref>}} [[Truth tables]], another tool in logic, express how the truth values of compound propositions depend on those of their constituent propositions.<ref>{{harvnb|Marcus|2005|p=928}}</ref>
{{blockquote|Veritas est adæquatio intellectus et rei.{{pb}}(Truth is the conformity of the intellect and things.)}} Aquinas also said that real things participate in the act of being of the [[God|Creator God]] who is Subsistent Being, Intelligence, and Truth. Thus, these beings possess the light of intelligibility and are knowable. These things (beings; [[reality]]) are the foundation of the truth that is found in the human mind, when it acquires knowledge of things, first through the [[sense]]s, then through the [[understanding]] and the [[judgement]] done by [[reason]]. For Aquinas, human [[intelligence]] ("intus", within and "legere", to read) has the capability to reach the [[essence]] and [[existence]] of things because it has a non-material, [[Spirituality|spiritual]] element, although some moral, educational, and other elements might interfere with its capability.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Summa Theologicae: How God is known by us (Prima Pars, Q. 12) |url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1012.htm |website=www.newadvent.org}}</ref>


===Changing concepts of truth in the Middle Ages===
Many issues concerning the relation between truth and inquiry are addressed by [[epistemology]], which studies the nature, origins, and limits of knowledge. This field treats truth as a central aspect of [[knowledge]]{{efn|Epistemology differs in this respect from [[anthropology]] and [[sociology]], which tend to characterize knowledge as ideas and practices that are shared and reproduced in societies, irrespective of their truth values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]}} | {{harvnb|Barth|2002|p=1}} | {{harvnb|Tufari|2003|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>}} and examines the ways of attaining it, including the approaches of the empirical and formal sciences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blaauw|Pritchard|2005|pp=49–50, 92–95, 101}} | {{harvnb|Bird|2010|p=5}} }}</ref> The [[philosophy of language]] and [[semantics]] regard truth as an aspect of the meaning of sentences. They are interested in the relation between words, ideas, and the world and analyze phenomena that complicate this relation, such as [[ambiguity]], [[vagueness]], and [[context]] dependence. They also address the problem of truth-value gaps: the question of whether some statements are neither true nor false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Williams|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Beall|Middleton|2024|pp=7–11}} | {{harvnb|Mcdowell|1982|pp=299–300}} | {{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=526–531}} }}</ref>{{efn|Truth-value gaps are sometimes contrasted with contradictions in which a statement is both affirmed and denied, implying that it is both true and false.<ref>{{harvnb|Priest|Berto|Weber|2025|loc=Lead section}}</ref>}}
[[Richard Firth Green]] examined the concept of truth in the later Middle Ages in his ''A Crisis of Truth'', and concludes that roughly during the reign of [[Richard II of England]] the very meaning of the concept changes. The idea of the oath, which was so much part and parcel of for instance [[Romance (heroic literature)|Romance literature]],<ref>{{cite journal|last=Rock|first=Catherine A.|year=2006|title=Forsworn and Fordone: Arcite as Oath-Breaker in the "Knight's Tale"|journal=[[The Chaucer Review]]|volume=40|issue=4|pages=416–432|jstor=25094334|doi=10.1353/cr.2006.0009|s2cid=159853483 }}</ref> changes from a subjective concept to a more objective one (in [[Derek Pearsall]]'s summary).<ref name=pearsall>{{cite journal|last=Pearsall|first=Derek|year=2004|title=Medieval Literature and Historical Enquiry|journal=[[Modern Language Review]]|volume=99|issue=4|pages=xxxi–xlii|jstor=3738608|doi=10.2307/3738608|s2cid=155446847 }}</ref> Whereas truth (the "trouthe" of ''[[Sir Gawain and the Green Knight]]'') was first "an ethical truth in which truth is understood to reside in persons", in Ricardian England it "transforms{{nbsp}}... into a [[political truth]] in which truth is understood to reside in documents".<ref>{{cite journal|last=Fowler|first=Elizabeth|year=2003|title=Rev. of Green, ''A Crisis of Truth''|journal=[[Speculum (journal)|Speculum]]|volume=78|issue=1|pages=179–182|jstor=3301477|doi=10.1017/S0038713400099310}}</ref>


==Modern philosophy==
[[Ethics]] is concerned with right behavior, including truth-related behavior. For example, [[Immanuel Kant]] argued that people have a duty to tell the truth and are prohibited from lying. In [[metaethics]], philosophers discuss whether moral statements and principles can be true, as [[Moral cognitivism|cognitivists]] claim, or not, as [[Non-cognitivism|non-cognitivists]] contend.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mertens|2016|pp=27–28}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 3a. Cognitivism Versus Non-Cognitivism}} }}</ref>
===Kant (1724–1804)===
[[Immanuel Kant]] endorses a definition of truth along the lines of the correspondence theory of truth.<ref name=StanfordCorr/> Kant writes in the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'': "The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed".<ref name = "Kant-1781">Kant, Immanuel (1781/1787), ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]''. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A58/B82.</ref> He denies that this correspondence definition of truth provides us with a test or criterion to establish which judgements are true. He states in his logic lectures:<ref name = "Kant-1801">Kant, Immanuel (1801), ''The Jäsche Logic'', in ''Lectures on Logic''. Translated and edited by J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 557–558.</ref>
<blockquote>...{{nbsp}}Truth, it is said, consists in the agreement of cognition with its object. In consequence of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however, only ''by cognizing it''.<!-- I wonder if the original had this cursive... --> Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which is far short of being sufficient for truth. For since the object is outside me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgement on is whether my cognition of the object agrees with my cognition of the object.{{pb}} The ancients called such a circle in explanation a ''diallelon''. And actually the logicians were always reproached with this mistake by the sceptics, who observed that with this definition of truth it is just as when someone makes a statement before a court and in doing so appeals to a witness with whom no one is acquainted, but who wants to establish his credibility by maintaining that the one who called him as witness is an honest man. The accusation was grounded, too. Only the solution of the indicated problem is impossible without qualification and for every man.{{nbsp}}...</blockquote>
This passage makes use of his distinction between nominal and real definitions. A nominal definition explains the meaning of a linguistic expression. A real definition describes the essence of certain [[Object (philosophy)|objects]] and enables us to determine whether any given item falls within the definition.<ref name = "Vanzo-Kant">Alberto Vanzo, "Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth", ''Kant-Studien'', 101 (2010), pp. 147–166.</ref> Kant holds that the definition of truth is merely nominal and, therefore, we cannot employ it to establish which judgements are true. According to Kant, the ancient skeptics were critical of the logicians for holding that, by means of a merely nominal definition of truth, they can establish which judgements are true. They were trying to do something that is "impossible without qualification and for every man".<ref name = "Kant-1801" />


===Hegel (1770–1831)===
=== Religion and art ===
[[G. W. F. Hegel]] distanced his philosophy from empiricism by presenting truth as a self-moving process, rather than a matter of merely subjective thoughts. Hegel's truth is analogous to an organism in that it is self-determining according to its own inner logic: "Truth is its own self-movement within itself."<ref>"Die Wahrheit ist die Bewegung ihrer an ihr selbst." ''[[The Phenomenology of Spirit]]'', Preface, ¶ 48</ref>
[[File:Al-Haqq.svg|thumb|upright=.8|alt="Al-Haqq", written in Arabic|The [[Abrahamic religions|Abrahamic traditions]] associate truth with the divine, such as the [[Islamic]] term {{tlit|ar|[[Al-Haqq]]}} ('the Truth') as one of [[Allah]]'s names.<ref>{{harvnb|Streng|2005|pp=9368–9372}}</ref>]]
Truth plays a central role [[Religious views on truth|in many religions]]. The [[Abrahamic religions|Abrahamic traditions]] stress the importance of truthfulness and closely link truth to the divine, as reflected in the [[Jewish]] description of God as {{tlit|he|El Emet}} ('God of Truth'), [[Jesus]]'s statement "[[Via et veritas et vita|I am the way, the truth, and the life]]" in [[Christianity]], and the [[Islamic]] term {{tlit|ar|[[Al-Haqq]]}} ({{lit|the Truth}}) as one of [[Allah]]'s names.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Streng|2005|pp=9368–9372}} | {{harvnb|Green|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3FoYjBICoU8C&pg=PA21 21]}} }}</ref> Philosophers in these traditions have debated the relationship between the religious truths of [[faith]] and the philosophical truths of [[reason]]. They typically argue that apparent tensions are resolvable through right interpretation. An alternative approach relies on the doctrine of [[double truth]], according to which divergent truths can coexist in different domains.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|pp=219–220}} | {{harvnb|Wolenski|2004|pp=10–11}} }}</ref>


===Schopenhauer (1788–1860)===
In [[Hinduism]], truth or [[satya]] is a key virtue to be practiced in thought, speech, and action, and is considered a source of individual and societal [[well-being]]. For example, it is one of the [[Yamas|five moral restraints]] in [[Yoga Sutras of Patanjali|Patanjali's Yoga]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jones|Ryan|2007|p=509}} | {{harvnb|Mohapatra|Mohapatra|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vpiU9m7T_tQC&pg=PA39 39]}} }}</ref> In [[Buddhism]], the concept of truth is closely related to [[Buddha]]'s teachings, such as the doctrine of the [[Four Noble Truths]] about the causes of [[Dukkha|suffering]] and the path to [[Nirvana|liberation]].<ref>{{harvnb|Sarao|2017|pp=150–151}}</ref> Buddhists also hold the [[Two truths doctrine|theory of two truths]], according to which conventional truth, associated with the phenomenal world and everyday experience, differs from ultimate truth, which concerns the fundamental nature of reality and is required for attaining liberation.<ref>{{harvnb|Thakchoe|2025|loc=Lead section}}</ref> A related contrast in [[Jainism]] distinguishes between relative truth, which is limited to a particular time, place, and [[Anekantavada|perspective]], and absolute truth, which transcends individual viewpoints but cannot be fully expressed in language.<ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|2017|pp=1257–1258}}</ref> A form of perspectivism is also found in [[Taoism]], which argues that knowledge is shaped by a person's interests and engagement with the world, with each perspective providing only a partial view of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Singh|2025|pp=146, 150–151}} | {{harvnb|Connolly|2011|pp=487–488}} }}</ref>
For [[Arthur Schopenhauer]],<ref name=":7">''On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason'', §§ 29–33</ref> a [[judgment]] is a combination or separation of two or more [[concept]]s. If a judgment is to be an expression of [[knowledge]], it must have a [[Principle of sufficient reason|sufficient reason]] or ground by which the judgment could be called true. ''Truth is the reference of a judgment to something different from itself which is its sufficient reason (ground)''. Judgments can have material, formal, transcendental, or metalogical truth. A judgment has ''material'' truth if its concepts are based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called logical or ''formal''. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, empirical knowledge, then the judgment has ''transcendental'' truth.<ref name=":7" />


===Kierkegaard (1813–1855)===
Truth can also be expressed in the field of [[art]] by manifesting ideas or understanding through aesthetic phenomena. The meanings of artworks are not always directly accessible and may require [[Aesthetic interpretation|interpretation]] to uncover. For example, a novel exploring the feelings and choices of fictional characters may reveal deeper truths about human nature and [[moral dilemmas]]. Artworks may also evoke experiences that a person has not felt before, showing them new perspectives, familiarizing them with alternative ways of life, or preparing them for possible future challenges. Aesthetic philosophers discuss whether or how the truths expressed in an artwork shape aesthetic experience and contribute to its overall value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Taylor|1998|loc=Lead section, § 2.Literature and Moral Insight, § 4. The Artistic Relevance of Truth}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|2006|pp=333, 336–337}} }}</ref>
When [[Søren Kierkegaard]], as his character ''Johannes Climacus'', ends his writings: ''My thesis was, subjectivity, heartfelt is the truth'', he does not advocate for [[subjectivism]] in its extreme form (the theory that something is true simply because one believes it to be so), but rather that the objective approach to matters of personal truth cannot shed any light upon that which is most essential to a person's life. Objective truths are concerned with the facts of a person's being, while subjective truths are concerned with a person's way of being. Kierkegaard agrees that objective truths for the study of subjects like mathematics, science, and history are relevant and necessary, but argues that objective truths do not shed any light on a person's inner relationship to existence. At best, these truths can only provide a severely narrowed perspective that has little to do with one's actual experience of life.<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. ''Concluding Unscientific Postscript''. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992</ref>


While objective truths are final and static, subjective truths are continuing and dynamic. The truth of one's existence is a living, inward, and subjective experience that is always in the process of becoming. The values, morals, and spiritual approaches a person adopts, while not denying the existence of objective truths of those beliefs, can only become truly known when they have been inwardly appropriated through subjective experience. Thus, Kierkegaard criticizes all systematic philosophies which attempt to know life or the truth of existence via theories and objective knowledge about reality. As Kierkegaard claims, human truth is something that is continually occurring, and a human being cannot find truth separate from the subjective experience of one's own existing, defined by the values and fundamental essence that consist of one's way of life.<ref>Watts, Michael. ''Kierkegaard'', Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003</ref>
=== Others ===
[[File:Statue of Truth.jpg|thumb|right|alt=Photo of a statue of a robed woman holding a book|[[Walter Seymour Allward]]'s {{lang|la|Veritas}} ('Truth') outside [[Supreme Court of Canada]], emphasizing truth as a guiding norm of law]]
Truth plays a central role in [[law]] as a guiding norm to which legal processes and decisions should align. Because of difficulties in reconstructing what happened, this field relies on various [[Burden of proof (law)|standards of proof]] and [[Evidence (law)|evidentiary]] rules to ascertain pertinent facts. Consequently, truth by itself can be insufficient if it cannot be proven in [[court]], contrasting factual truth with legal truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lawson|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tZUtDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2, 24]}} | {{harvnb|Mordini|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aZ0NDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA359 359]}} }}</ref>


===Nietzsche (1844–1900)===
Similarly, truth is a key element in [[journalism]], where reporters seek information from reliable sources and [[Fact-checking|fact-check]] claims to accurately inform the public. [[Media studies|Media theorists]] discuss obstacles to this process, such as the spread of [[misinformation]], [[Photograph manipulation|misleadingly edited photographs]], [[AI-generated image]]s, [[political propaganda]], and [[algorithmic bias]]es on social media platforms.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Birks|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zaO-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Goldstein|2007|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ha6i7TTKCtsC&pg=PR9 ix–xii, 1–2, 126–127]}} | {{harvnb|Zhang|Billard|2025|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=JccdEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA84 84]}} }}</ref>
[[Friedrich Nietzsche]] believed the search for truth, or 'the will to truth', was a consequence of the ''[[will to power]]'' of philosophers. He thought that truth should be used as long as it promoted life and the ''will to power'', and he thought untruth was better than truth if it had this life enhancement as a consequence. As he wrote in ''[[Beyond Good and Evil]]'', "The falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment{{nbsp}}... The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding{{nbsp}}..." (aphorism 4). He proposed the ''will to power'' as a truth only because, according to him, it was the most life-affirming and sincere perspective one could have.


Robert Wicks discusses Nietzsche's basic view of truth as follows:<ref>Robert Wicks, [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#EarWri187187 "Friedrich Nietzsche – Early Writings: 1872–1876"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180904231138/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/#EarWri187187 |date=2018-09-04 }}, ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Spring 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)</ref>
[[Psychology|Psychologists]] and [[Cognitive science|cognitive scientists]] study [[cognitions]] as truth-related mental processes that acquire, transform, or use information. They examine different types of cognitive processes, like [[perception]], [[memory]], and [[thought]], and investigate how [[Cognitive bias|biases]] and distortions affect these processes.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Matlin|2013|pp=21–22, 419–420, 427–428}} | {{harvnb|Balota|Cortese|2000|pp=153–154}} }}</ref>
<blockquote>...{{nbsp}}Some scholars regard Nietzsche's 1873 unpublished essay, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense" ("{{lang|de|Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn}}") as a keystone in his thought. In this essay, Nietzsche rejects the idea of universal constants, and claims that what we call "truth" is only "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms." His view at this time is that arbitrariness completely prevails within human experience: concepts originate via the very artistic transference of nerve stimuli into images; "truth" is nothing more than the invention of fixed conventions for merely practical purposes, especially those of repose, security and consistence.{{nbsp}}...</blockquote>


Separately Nietzsche suggested that an ancient, metaphysical belief in the divinity of Truth lies at the heart of and has served as the foundation for the entire subsequent [[Western intellectual tradition]]: "But you will have gathered what I am getting at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith on which our faith in science rests—that even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take ''our'' fire too, from the flame lit by the thousand-year old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato's faith, that God is Truth; that Truth is 'Divine'{{nbsp}}..."<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Vf8KETLiKXMC&q=%22even+we+knowers+of+today%22&pg=PA201|title=Nietzsche: The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs|first1=Friedrich|last1=Nietzsche|first2=Bernard|last2=Williams|first3=Josefine|last3=Nauckhoff|year=2001|publisher=Cambridge University Press|via=Google Books|isbn=978-0-521-63645-2}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wMzu8j4D1SYC&q=god+is+truth&pg=PA112|title=Nietzsche: 'On the Genealogy of Morality' and Other Writings Student Edition|first=Friedrich|last=Nietzsche|year=2006|publisher=Cambridge University Press|via=Google Books|isbn=978-1-139-46121-4}}</ref>
In [[computer science]], ''true'' and ''false'' are values of constants and variables belonging to the [[Boolean data type]]. One of their key applications happens in [[control structures]] that determine the flow of code execution, such as [[Conditional (computer programming)|conditional expressions]] that execute a code path only if a test condition evaluates to ''true''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wagener|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5Jaa1BVverIC&pg=PA209 209–212]}} | {{harvnb|Henderson|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3Tla6d153uwC&pg=PA53 53–54]}} }}</ref>


Moreover, Nietzsche challenges the notion of objective truth, arguing that truths are human creations and serve practical purposes. He wrote, "Truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Beyond Good and Evil|first1=Friedrich|last1=Nietzsche|year=1997|publisher=Dover Publications|isbn=978-0-486-29868-9|page=46}}</ref> He argues that truth is a human invention, arising from the artistic transference of nerve stimuli into images, serving practical purposes like repose, security, and consistency; formed through metaphorical and rhetorical devices, shaped by societal conventions and forgotten origins:<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qZAmAQAAIAAJ|title=The Portable Nietzsche|first1=Friedrich|last1=Nietzsche|year=1976|publisher=Penguin Books|isbn=978-0-14-015062-9|page=46}}</ref> <blockquote>"What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically{{nbsp}}..."</blockquote>
[[Probability theory]] deals with uncertain information. It uses numbers between 0 and 1 to represent the [[probability]] that a statement is true and provides rules for calculating how the probabilities of different statements influence each other.<ref>{{harvnb|Belhaouari|Bensmail|Mehrdoust|2025|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uYREEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA99 99–101]}}</ref>


Nietzsche argues that truth is always filtered through individual perspectives and shaped by various interests and biases. In "On the Genealogy of Morality," he asserts, "There are no facts, only interpretations."<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rttCAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA73|title=On the Genealogy of Morality|first1=Friedrich|last1=Nietzsche|year=1887|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-953708-2|page=73}}</ref> He suggests that truth is subject to constant reinterpretation and change, influenced by shifting cultural and historical contexts as he writes in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" that "I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star."<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ezSQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT121|title=Thus Spoke Zarathustra|first1=Friedrich|last1=Nietzsche|year=1883|publisher=Penguin UK|isbn=978-0-14-044118-5|page=46}}</ref> In the same book, Zarathustra proclaims, "Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins."<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ezSQDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT121|title=Thus Spoke Zarathustra|first1=Friedrich|last1=Nietzsche|year=1883|publisher=Penguin UK|isbn=978-0-14-044118-5|page=121}}</ref>
== History ==
=== Ancient and medieval ===
[[File:1500-1200 BCE Rigveda, manuscript page sample i, Mandala 1, Hymn 1 (Sukta 1), Adhyaya 1, lines 1.1.1 to 1.1.9, Sanskrit, Devanagari.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of a text written in Sanskrit|The [[Rigveda]], an ancient Indian scripture, explored the relation between [[Ṛta|cosmic truth]] and [[Satya|individual truth]].<ref name="auto3">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brown|1972|pp=57–60}} | {{harvnb|Whitehouse|1983|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jrexCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA430 430]}} }}</ref>]]
[[File:Aristotle Altemps Inv8575.jpg|thumb|alt=Bust of Aristotle.|upright=.8|[[Aristotle]] conceived an early form of the correspondence theory of truth.<ref name="auto1">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Woleński|2004|pp=354–358}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Greek Origins}} }}</ref>]]


===Heidegger (1889–1976)===
Discussions of the role and nature of truth arose in [[Ancient history|antiquity]]. In [[ancient India]], the [[Rigveda]], composed in the 2nd millennium BCE, stressed the spiritual importance of truthfulness, exploring the relation between [[Ṛta|the cosmic truth]], which concerns the laws of the universe, and [[Satya|individual truth]], which concerns each individual's duty.<ref name="auto3"/> [[Jainism]] flourished in the 6th century BCE and distinguished relative truth that differs according to perspective from absolute truth that transcends [[Anekantavada|individual viewpoints]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schwartz|2017|pp=1257–1258}} | {{harvnb|Nath|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pxjOEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA65 65–66]}} }}</ref> [[Buddhism]], originating roughly in the 6th century BCE,<ref>{{harvnb|DK staff|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8rqpDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA76 76]}}</ref> closely associated truth with [[Buddha]]'s teachings and formulated the [[two truths doctrine]], according to which conventional truth of everyday life differs from ultimate truth about the fundamental nature of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sarao|2017|pp=150–151}} | {{harvnb|Thakchoe|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> The school of [[Nyaya]], which arose around 200 CE,<ref>{{harvnb|Phillips|1998|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=z02WEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA39 39]}}</ref> understood truth as a property of accurate cognitions, analyzing their internal structure in terms of objects, properties, and relations.<ref>{{harvnb|Shaw|2024|pp=178–184}}</ref> The topic of truth received less attention in ancient Chinese thought, where the focus was more on right conduct and practical consequences than on abstract semantic properties of statements.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fraser|2020|pp=113–117}} | {{harvnb|Fraser|2024|loc=§ 3. The Search for Objective Standards, § 4. Epistemology}} }}</ref>
Other philosophers take this common meaning to be secondary and derivative. According to [[Martin Heidegger]], the original meaning and [[essence]] of truth in [[Ancient Greece]] was unconcealment, or the revealing or bringing of what was previously hidden into the open, as indicated by the original Greek term for truth, {{lang|el-latn|[[aletheia]]}}.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Heidegger |first=Martin |title=On the Essence of Truth |url=https://aphelis.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Martin-Heidegger-On-the-Essence-of-Truth.pdf |access-date=3 October 2023 |website=aphelis.net}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ontology.co/heidegger-aletheia.htm|title=Martin Heidegger on Aletheia (Truth) as Unconcealment|access-date=2010-08-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150626101634/http://www.ontology.co/heidegger-aletheia.htm|archive-date=2015-06-26}}</ref> On this view, the conception of truth as correctness is a later derivation from the concept's original essence, a development Heidegger traces to the [[Latin]] term {{lang|la|[[veritas]]}}. Owing to the primacy of [[ontology]] in Heidegger's philosophy, he considered this truth to lie within Being itself, and already in ''[[Being and Time]]'' (1927) had identified truth with "[[Heideggerian terminology|being-truth]]" or the "truth of Being" and partially with the Kantian [[thing-in-itself]] in an epistemology essentially concerning a mode of ''[[Dasein]]''.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Heidegger |first=Martin |title=Being and Time |publisher=Basil Blackswell |year=1962 |edition=1st |location=Oxford |pages=256–274}}</ref>


=== Sartre (1905–1980) ===
In [[Ancient Greek philosophy|ancient Greek thought]], truth was understood as {{lang|grc|aletheia}} or disclosure, which could refer both to reality itself and to what is revealed to the mind.<ref>{{harvnb|Woleński|2004|pp=339–342}}</ref> [[Parmenides]] (fl. 5th century BCE)<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|2025|loc=Lead section}}</ref> distinguished truth from opinion, associating truth with thought and being while contrasting it with non-being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Woleński|2004|pp=347–349}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Greek Origins}} }}</ref> [[Protagoras]] ({{circa|490|420 BCE}}) proposed a form of relativism according to which "man is the measure of all things".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Woleński|2004|pp=349–350}} | {{harvnb|Bonazzi|2024|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> The [[Ancient skepticism|skeptics]] questioned the human ability to acquire truth and recommended [[Epoché|suspension of belief]].<ref>{{harvnb|Vogt|2022|loc=Lead section}}</ref> [[Plato]] ({{circa|428|348 BCE}}) formulated an account of true and false statements, linking truth to reality or the way things are. His student [[Aristotle]] (384–322 BCE) conceived an early form of the correspondence theory of truth. He distinguished truthbearers in thought and speech from the things they describe, arguing that a statement is true if it aligns with how things are. Aristotle also separated truth itself from criteria of truth and held that something can be true even if no one thinks about it.<ref name="auto1"/> [[Stoicism]], which emerged around 300 BCE,<ref>{{harvnb|Hill|Blazejak|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UQE5EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}}</ref> defended the [[Principle of bivalence|bivalence of truth]], according to which every proposition is either true or false, and distinguished propositions from uttered sentences and the reality they describe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dentsoras|2022|pp=107–110}} | {{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=§ 1. Brief History}} }}</ref>
In ''[[Being and Nothingness]]'' (1943), partially following Heidegger, [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] identified our knowledge of the truth as a relation between the [[Being in itself|in-itself]] and [[for-itself]] of [[being]] - yet simultaneously closely connected in this vein to the data available to the material personhood, in the body, of an individual in their interaction with the world and others - with Sartre's description that "the world is human" allowing him to postulate all truth as strictly ''understood'' by [[self-consciousness]] as self-consciousness ''of'' something,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=Jean-Paul |title=Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontolgoy |publisher=Philosophical Library |year=1956 |edition=1st |location=New York}}</ref> a view also preceded by [[Henri Bergson]] in ''[[Time and Free Will]]'' (1889), the reading of which Sartre had credited for his interest in philosophy.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=Jean-Paul |title=The imaginary: a phenomenological psychology of the imagination |date=2004 |publisher=Routledge |others=Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre, Jonathan Webber |isbn=0-203-64410-7 |location=London |oclc=56549324}}</ref> This first [[Existentialism|existentialist]] theory, more fully fleshed out in Sartre's essay ''Truth and Existence'' (1948), which already demonstrates a more radical departure from Heidegger in its emphasis on the primacy of the idea, already formulated in ''Being and Nothingness'', of [[Existence precedes essence|existence as preceding essence]] in its role in the formulation of truth, has nevertheless been critically examined as [[Idealism|idealist]] rather than [[Materialism|materialist]] in its departure from more traditional idealist epistemologies such as those of [[Ancient Greek philosophy]] in Plato and Aristotle, and staying as does Heidegger with Kant.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wilder |first=Kathleen |title=Truth and existence: The idealism in Sartre's theory of truth |journal=International Journal of Philosophical Studies |year=1995 |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=91–109|doi=10.1080/09672559508570805 }}</ref>


Later, in the ''[[Search for a Method]]'' (1957), in which Sartre used a unification of existentialism and [[Marxism]] that he would later formulate in the ''[[Critique of Dialectical Reason]]'' (1960), Sartre, with his growing emphasis on the [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegelian]] totalisation of [[historicity]], posited a conception of truth still defined by its process of relation to a container giving it material meaning, but with specific reference to a role in this broader totalisation, for "subjectivity is neither everything nor nothing; it represents a moment in the objective process (that in which externality is internalised), and this moment is perpetually eliminated only to be perpetually reborn": "For us, truth is something which becomes, it ''has'' and ''will have'' become. It is a totalisation which is forever being totalised. Particular facts do not signify anything; they are neither true nor false so long as they are not related, through the mediation of various partial totalities, to the totalisation in process." Sartre describes this as a "''[[Philosophical realism|realistic]]'' epistemology", developed out of [[Karl Marx|Marx]]'s ideas but with such a development only possible in an existentialist light, as with the theme of the whole work.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=Jean-Paul |title=Search for a Method |publisher=Knopf |year=1963 |location=New York}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Skirke |first=Christian |section=Jean-Paul Sartre |date=2014-04-28 |title=Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0192 |isbn=978-0-19-539657-7}}</ref> In an early segment of the lengthy two-volume ''Critique'' of 1960, Sartre continued to describe truth as a "totalising" "truth of history" to be interpreted by a "Marxist historian", whilst his break with Heidegger's epistemological ideas is finalised in the description of a seemingly antinomous "[[Dualism in cosmology|dualism]] of Being and Truth" as the essence of a truly Marxist epistemology.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sartre |first=Jean-Paul |title=Critique of Dialectical Reason |publisher=Verso |year=2004 |location=London |pages=15–41}}</ref>
At the transition to the [[Medieval philosophy|medieval period]], [[Augustine of Hippo]] (354–430 CE) integrated Greek philosophy with [[Christianity|Christian]] doctrine. He held that truth is unchangeable, eternal, and necessary, maintaining that truth is identical to God.<ref>{{harvnb|Cameron|2018|pp=50–52}}</ref> Building on Augustine's ideas, [[Anselm of Canterbury]] (1033–1109 CE) argued that statements are true only in a derivative sense since truth primarily resides in things that participate in God as the highest truth. Similarly, [[Thomas Aquinas]] (1225–1274 CE) conceived truth as a metaphysical property of entities. He maintained that a thing is true if it matches God's idea of it, analogous to how a designed artifact may perfectly correspond to what the artisan intended.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cameron|2018|pp=52–53}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Patristic and Medieval Thought}} }}</ref> In [[Islamic philosophy|Islamic thought]], [[Avicenna]] ({{circa|980}}–1037 CE) distinguished three senses of truth: as the reality of individual entities, as the divine reality of God as a necessary being, and as the correctness of statements.<ref>{{harvnb|Lizzini|2023|pp=246–249, 258–260}}</ref>


=== Camus (1913–1960) ===
=== Modern and contemporary ===
The well-regarded French philosopher [[Albert Camus]] wrote in his famous essay, ''[[The Myth of Sisyphus]]'' (1942), that "there are truths but no truth", in fundamental agreement with Nietzsche's [[perspectivism]], and favourably cites Kierkergaad in posing that "no truth is absolute or can render satisfactory an existence that is impossible in itself".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Camus |first=Albert |title=The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays |publisher=Penguin Group |year=2020 |edition=1st |location=London |pages=14–16}}</ref> Later, in ''[[The Rebel (book)|The Rebel]]'' (1951), he declared, akin to Sartre, that "the very lowest form of truth" is "the truth of history",<ref>{{Cite book |last=Camus |first=Albert |title=The Rebel |publisher=Penguin Group |year=2013 |edition=3rd |location=London |page=180}}</ref> but describes this in the context of its abuse and like Kierkergaad in the ''[[Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments|Concluding Unscientific Postscript]]'' he criticizes Hegel in holding a historical attitude "which consists of saying: 'This is truth, which appears to us, however, to be error, but which is true precisely because it happens to be error. As for proof, it is not I, but history, at its conclusion, that will furnish it.'"<ref>{{Cite book |last=Camus |first=Albert |title=The Rebel |publisher=Penguin Group |year=2013 |edition=3rd |location=London |page=90}}</ref>
[[File:Wismar Marienkirche Bronzebüste Gottlob Frege (01-1).JPG|thumb|upright=.6|alt=Bust of Gottlob Frege.|[[Gottlob Frege]] examined the role of truth in logic.<ref>{{harvnb|Heck|May|2018|pp=193–197, 200, 208–209, 212–213}}</ref>]]
[[File:Russell1907-2.jpg|thumb|alt=Bertrand Russell.|upright=0.8|[[Bertrand Russell]] proposed an influential fact-based correspondence theory of truth.<ref name="auto">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=228–233}} | {{harvnb|David|2025|loc=Lead section, § 1.2 Object-Based and Fact-Based Versions}} }}</ref>]]


===Peirce (1839–1914)===
In [[early modern philosophy]], [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) examined truth from an epistemological perspective, arguing for the existence of clear and distinct ideas that are true and cannot be doubted.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nelson|2018|pp=75–80}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Modern Development}} }}</ref> [[Baruch Spinoza]] (1632–1677) asserted that human ideas are adequate or inadequate but not true in a strict sense since only ideas in God's mind are true.<ref>{{harvnb|Nelson|2018|pp=80–82}}</ref> [[John Locke]] (1632–1704) maintained that thoughts or mental propositions are the primary truthbearers, understanding them as combinations of signs or ideas. Unlike Descartes's and Spinoza's focus on true ideas, Locke also considered true sentences or verbal propositions, holding that they are true in a derivative sense if they express true mental propositions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nelson|2018|pp=83–85}} | {{harvnb|Murray|Tillman|2022|p=9}} | {{harvnb|Powell|2022|pp=131–133}} }}</ref>
[[Pragmatists]] like [[C. S. Peirce]] take truth to have some manner of essential relation to human practices for inquiring into and [[discovering]] truth, with Peirce himself holding that truth is what human [[inquiry]] would find out on a matter, if our practice of inquiry were taken as far as it could profitably go: "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth{{nbsp}}..."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html|title=How to Make Our Ideas Clear|access-date=2015-08-31|archive-date=2018-10-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181003203035/http://www.peirce.org/writings/p119.html|url-status=live}}</ref>


===Nishida (1870–1945)===
[[Immanuel Kant]] understood [[judgments]] as the main truthbearers, arguing that a judgment is true if it agrees with its object. In his [[transcendental idealism]], objects are not entirely independent of observers since the mind actively structures experience following inbuilt forms and [[Category (Kant)|categories]]. This raises the question of the extent to which truth is objective or subjective.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tolley|2018|pp=93–98}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Modern Development}} }}</ref> [[Bernard Bolzano]] (1781–1848) criticized this aspect of Kant's philosophy and proposed a clear distinction between subjective acts of representation and the objective contents of those acts, which can be true or false.<ref>{{harvnb|Tolley|2018|pp=101–103}}</ref> [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831) regarded truth as an agreement of a thing with its concept rather than a property of statements. According to his holistic vision, all finite things are strictly speaking false, and only the whole is true.<ref>{{harvnb|Magee|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=khvwPJMzNzMC&pg=PA250 250–251]}}</ref> Inspired by Hegel, [[F. H. Bradley]] (1846–1924) agreed that truth ultimately resides in the whole or [[Absolute (philosophy)|the absolute]]. He held that truth comes in degrees based on the extent to which an entity aligns with the whole. His views are often interpreted as a form of coherence theory or identity theory.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baldwin|2018|pp=125–128}} | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=233–237}} }}</ref>
According to [[Kitaro Nishida]], "knowledge of things in the world begins with the differentiation of unitary consciousness into knower and known and ends with self and things becoming one again. Such unification takes form not only in knowing but in the valuing (of truth) that directs knowing, the willing that directs action, and the feeling or emotive reach that directs sensing."<ref>John Maraldo, [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nishida-kitaro/#2.2 Nishida Kitarô – Self-Awareness] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101204043326/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nishida-kitaro/#2.2 |date=2010-12-04 }}, in: ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)</ref>


===Fromm (1900–1980)===
[[Søren Kierkegaard]] (1813–1855) emphasized subjective truth or how a person's inward commitments shape their existence, expressed in the slogan "truth is subjectivity".<ref>{{harvnb|Schacht|1973|pp=297–313}}</ref> [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900) understood truth as a moral phenomenon that serves the preservation and enhancement of life. He saw it as an expression of the [[will to power]], rejecting correspondence theory in favor of a [[perspectivism]] that acknowledges multiple viewpoints without an overarching objective truth.<ref>{{harvnb|Burnham|2014|p=325–329}}</ref> In the [[Pragmatism|pragmatist]] tradition, [[William James]] (1842–1910) characterized truth in terms of practical consequences and utility, while [[C. S. Peirce]] (1839–1914) argued that truth is what would result after endless scientific inquiry.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=34–35}} | {{harvnb|Capps|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Simmons|2006|pp=537}} }}</ref>
[[Erich Fromm]] finds that trying to discuss truth as "absolute truth" is sterile and that emphasis ought to be placed on "optimal truth". He considers truth as stemming from the survival imperative of grasping one's environment physically and intellectually, whereby young children instinctively seek truth so as to orient themselves in "a strange and powerful world". The accuracy of their perceived approximation of the truth will therefore have direct consequences on their ability to deal with their environment. Fromm can be understood to define truth as a functional approximation of reality. His vision of optimal truth is described below:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Fromm Erich |url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.28965 |title=Man For Himself |date=1949}}</ref>
{{bq|text=...{{nbsp}}the dichotomy between 'absolute = perfect' and 'relative = imperfect' has been superseded in all fields of scientific thought, where "it is generally recognized that there is no absolute truth but nevertheless that there are objectively valid laws and principles".{{pb}}[...] In that respect, "a scientifically or rationally valid statement means that the power of reason is applied to all the available data of observation without any of them being suppressed or falsified for the sake of the desired result". The history of science is "a history of inadequate and incomplete statements, and every new insight makes possible the recognition of the inadequacies of previous propositions and offers a springboard for creating a more adequate formulation."{{pb}}[...] As a result "the history of thought is the history of an ever-increasing approximation to the truth. Scientific knowledge is not absolute but optimal; it contains the optimum of truth attainable in a given historical period." Fromm furthermore notes that "different cultures have emphasized various aspects of the truth" and that increasing interaction between cultures allows for these aspects to reconcile and integrate, increasing further the approximation to the truth.}}


===Foucault (1926–1984)===
[[Gottlob Frege]] (1848–1925) examined the role of truth in logic, such as his ideas that sentences refer to truth values and that [[logical operators]] and [[Predicate (logic)|predicates]] are functions that yield truth values. His outlook inspired deflationism, but not all of his views are compatible with this theory.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heck|May|2018|pp=193–197, 200, 208–209, 212–213}} | {{harvnb|Dowden|Swartz|loc=§ 7. Deflationary Theories}} }}</ref> In their early philosophies, [[G. E. Moore]] (1873–1958) and [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) defended a kind of primitivism according to which truth is an indefinable property. They later proposed a fact-based correspondence theory, often treated as the classical formulation of this view, stating that a belief is true if it corresponds to a fact.<ref name="auto"/> Responding to Russell, [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]] (1889–1951) defined truth as a form of correspondence in which a proposition [[Picture theory of language|pictures a fact]].<ref>{{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=244–245}}</ref>
Truth, says [[Michel Foucault]], is problematic when any attempt is made to see truth as an "objective" quality. He prefers not to use the term truth itself but "Regimes of Truth". In his historical investigations he found truth to be something that was itself a part of, or embedded within, a given power structure. Thus Foucault's view shares much in common with the concepts of [[#Nietzsche (1844–1900)|Nietzsche]]. Truth for Foucault is also something that shifts through various [[episteme]] throughout history.<ref>Foucault, M. "The Order of Things", London: Vintage Books, 1970 (1966)</ref>


===Baudrillard (1929–2007)===
[[Alfred Tarski]] (1901–1983) developed the [[semantic theory of truth]], which uses a meta-language to analyze the truth conditions of sentences in an object language. He limited this view to truth in [[formal languages]]. [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] (1917–2003) extended Tarski's approach to the study of truth in [[natural languages]].<ref name="auto2"/> [[David Malet Armstrong]] (1926–2014) developed [[truthmaker theory]] as a modern version of correspondence theory. He stressed the dependence of truth on being and explored truthmaker theory as an approach to metaphysical inquiry.<ref name="auto5"/>
[[Jean Baudrillard]] considered truth to be largely simulated, that is pretending to have something, as opposed to dissimulation, pretending to not have something. He took his cue from [[iconoclasm|iconoclasts]] whom he claims knew that images of God demonstrated that God did not exist.<ref name = "Baudrillard">Jean Baudrillard. Simulacra and Simulation. Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1994.</ref> Baudrillard wrote in "Precession of the Simulacra":
::The [[simulacrum]] is never that which conceals the truth—it is the truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is true.
::—Ecclesiastes<ref>Baudrillard, Jean. [http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html "Simulacra and Simulations", in ''Selected Writings''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040209024621/http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Baudrillard/Baudrillard_Simulacra.html |date=2004-02-09 }}, ed. [[Mark Poster]], [[Stanford University Press]], 1988; 166 ''ff''</ref><ref>Baudrillard's attribution of this quote to [[Ecclesiastes]] is deliberately fictional. "Baudrillard attributes this quote to Ecclesiastes. However, the quote is a fabrication (see Jean Baudrillard. Cool Memories III, 1991–95. London: Verso, 1997). Editor's note: In Fragments: Conversations With François L'Yvonnet. New York: Routledge, 2004:11, Baudrillard acknowledges this 'Borges-like' fabrication." Cited in footnote #4 in Smith, Richard G., [https://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol2_1/smith.htm#_edn4 "Lights, Camera, Action: Baudrillard and the Performance of Representations"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180425060347/https://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol2_1/smith.htm#_edn4 |date=2018-04-25 }}, International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Volume 2, Number 1 (January 2005)</ref>


Some examples of [[simulacra]] that Baudrillard cited were: that prisons simulate the "truth" that society is free; scandals (e.g., [[Watergate scandal|Watergate]]) simulate that corruption is corrected; Disney simulates that the U.S. itself is an adult place. Though such examples seem extreme, such extremity is an important part of Baudrillard's theory. For a less extreme example, movies usually end with the bad being punished, humiliated, or otherwise failing, thus affirming for viewers the concept that the good end happily and the bad unhappily, a narrative which implies that the status quo and established power structures are largely legitimate.<ref name = "Baudrillard"/>
Various deflationary theories in the 20th century aimed to show that truth is a trivial linguistic device without a deeper metaphysical significance, proposed by philosophers such as [[P. F. Strawson]] (1919–2006), [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] (1908–2000), and [[Paul Horwich]] (born 1947).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=268–269, 273, 288}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=6, 44, 46, 50–51}} }}</ref> [[Michael Dummett]] (1925–2011) criticized deflationism and developed a form of verificationism according to which a statement is true if it is verifiable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=275–279}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=31–32, 52}} }}</ref>{{efn|The idea of verificationism was already discussed earlier by the [[Logical positivism|logical positivists]]. However, it is controversial whether they understood it only as a theory of meaning or also as a theory of truth.<ref>{{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=254–256}}</ref>}} Responding to the difficulties of providing a unified concept of truth, [[Hilary Putnam]] (1926–2016) and [[Richard Rorty]] (1931–2007) formulated pluralist theories of truth, according to which the nature of truth is not uniform but depends on the analyzed domain.<ref>{{harvnb|Candlish|Damnjanovic|2007|pp=278, 301–302}}</ref>


=== Other contemporary positions ===
[[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938) analyzed truth from a [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenological]] perspective as an ideal correlate of intentional acts, emphasizing the role of evident experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dupre|1964|pp=345}} | {{harvnb|Dahlstrom|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2l7M6YHn9VoC&pg=PA34 34]}} }}</ref> His student [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) understood truth as unconcealment in his attempt to recover the ancient Greek concept of {{lang|grc|aletheia}}, which he regarded as more fundamental than the modern concept of correspondence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wrathall|2025|loc=§ 2.7 Truth}} | {{harvnb|O'Farrell|2003|loc=§ Contemporary Directions}} | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=4–5}} }}</ref> Inspired by Kant's idealism, [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905–1980) characterized truth as "subjectivity externalized", understanding it as the way the mind-independent world is illuminated and becomes meaningful to human consciousness.<ref>{{harvnb|Wider|1995|pp=91–92}}</ref> [[Postmodern philosophy|Postmodern philosophers]] challenged the idea that truth is objective and universal, analyzing how power relations and social contexts shape what is accepted as true. For example, [[Michel Foucault]] explored the role of truth in discursive practices and social institutions, such as the idea that institutions determine what counts as truth and use it to wield power.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Engel|2002|pp=4–5}} | {{harvnb|Gutting|Oksala|2025|loc=§ 3. Major Works}} | {{harvnb|Trakakis|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=XXdKCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35 35–36]}} }}</ref>
[[Truthmaker theory]] is "the branch of [[metaphysics]] that explores the relationships between what is true and what [[Existence|exists]]".<ref name="Asay">{{cite web |last1=Asay |first1=Jamin |title=Truthmaker Theory |url=https://iep.utm.edu/truth-ma/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2020-11-28 |archive-date=2020-11-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124032018/https://iep.utm.edu/truth-ma/ |url-status=live }}</ref> It is different from substantive theories of truth in the sense that it does not aim at giving a definition of what truth is. Instead, it has the goal of ''determining'' how truth depends on being.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Beebee |first1=Helen |last2=Dodd |first2=Julian |title=Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate |year=2005 |publisher=Clarendon Press |pages=13–14 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEETTC |access-date=2020-11-28 |archive-date=2020-12-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201206202200/https://philpapers.org/rec/BEETTC |url-status=live }}</ref>


==See also==
==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy|Psychology}}
{{Portal|Philosophy|Psychology}}
{{Div col|colwidth=15em}}
* [[Asha]]
* [[Asha]]
* [[Confirmation holism]]
* [[Contextualism]]
* [[Degree of truth]]
* [[Disposition]]
* [[Eclecticism]]
* [[Epistemic theories of truth]]
* [[Imagination]]
* [[Independence (probability theory)]]
* [[Invariant (mathematics)]]
* [[McNamara fallacy]]
* [[Normative science]]
* ''[[On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense]]''
* [[Perspectivism]]
* [[Physical symbol system]]
* [[Public opinion]]
* [[Relativism]]
* [[Religious views on truth]]
* [[Revision theory]]
* [[Slingshot argument]]
* [[Slingshot argument]]
* [[Subjectivity]]
* [[Tautology (logic)]]
* [[Tautology (rhetoric)]]
* [[Theory of justification]]
* [[Truth prevails]]
* [[Truthiness]]
* [[Unity of the proposition]]
* [[Verisimilitude]]
{{div col end}}


===Other theorists===
== References ==
{{Div col|colwidth=20em}}
=== Notes ===
* [[Augustine of Hippo]]
{{notelist|30em}}
* [[Brand Blanshard]]
* [[Hartry Field]]
* [[Gottlob Frege]]
* [[Paul Horwich]]
* [[Harold Joachim]]
* [[Karl Popper]]
{{div col end}}


==References==
=== Citations ===
{{Reflist}}
{{reflist|30em}}


==Bibliography==
=== Sources ===
{{refbegin|20em}}
{{refbegin|30em}}
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* {{cite book |last1=Taylor |first1=C. C. W.  |chapter=Double Truth |page=219–220 |date=2005 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7}}
* {{cite web |last1=Thakchoe |first1=Sonam |title=The Theory of Two Truths in India |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 January 2026  |date=2025 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Tolley |first1=Clinton |pages=93–122 |chapter=4. Idealism and the Question of Truth |editor1-last=Glanzberg |editor1-first=Michael |title=The Oxford Handbook of Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-174977-3 |language=en |date=2018}}
* {{cite book |last1=Trakakis |first1=N. N. |editor1-last=Oppy |editor1-first=Graham |title=The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-51592-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XXdKCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA36 |language=en |chapter=Postmodern Approches to Religion |date=2015 |pages=32–50}}
* {{cite book |last1=Tufari |first1=P. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |date=2003 |publisher=Thomson/Gale |isbn=978-0-7876-4008-8 |language=en |chapter=Knowledge, Sociology of |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociology-knowledge}}
* {{cite book |last1=Ulatowski |first1=Joseph |title=Commonsense Pluralism about Truth: An Empirical Defence |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-69465-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8ipADwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2017 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Vogt |first1=Katja |title=Ancient Skepticism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 January 2026  |date=2022 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Wagener |first1=Jerrold L. |editor1-last=Reilly |editor1-first=Edwin D. |title=Concise Encyclopedia of Computer Science |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-09095-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5Jaa1BVverIC&pg=PA209 |language=en |chapter=Control Structures |date=2004 |pages=209–212}}
* {{cite book |last1=Weatherson |first1=Brian |editor1-last=Cappelen |editor1-first=Herman |editor2-last=Gendler |editor2-first=Tamar Szabó |editor3-last=Hawthorne |editor3-first=John |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-966877-9 |edition=1st |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.24 |language=en |chapter=13. Analytic–Synthetic and A Priori–A Posteriori History |date=2016 |pages=231–248}}
* {{cite book |last1=Whitehouse |first1=Ruth |title=Macmillan Dictionary of Archaeology |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-1-349-04874-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jrexCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA430 |language=en |date=1983 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Wider |first1=Kathleen |title=Truth and Existence: The Idealism in Sartre's Theory of Truth |journal=International Journal of Philosophical Studies |volume=3 |issue=1 |doi=10.1080/09672559508570805 |date=1995 |pages=91–109}}
* {{cite book |last1=Williams |first1=Stephen G. |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Meaning and Truth |publisher=Routledge |date=1998 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-X024-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Winter |first1=Yoad |title=Elements of Formal Semantics: An Introduction to the Mathematical Theory of Meaning in Natural Language |publisher=Edinburgh University Press |isbn=978-0-7486-7777-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aDRWDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2016 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Wolenski |first1=Jan |author-link=Jan Wolenski |editor1-last=Niiniluoto |editor1-first=I. |editor2-last=Sintonen |editor2-first=Matti |editor3-last=Wolenski |editor3-first=Jan |title=Handbook of Epistemology |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-4020-1986-9 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6gvlBwAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=History of Epistemology |date=2004 |pages=3–56 |doi=10.1007/978-1-4020-1986-9_1}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Woleński |first1=Jan |title=Aletheia in Greek thought until Aristotle |journal=Annals of Pure and Applied Logic |volume=127 |issue=1-3 |doi=10.1016/j.apal.2003.11.020 |date=2004 |pages=339–360 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Wrathall |first1=Mark |title=Martin Heidegger |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=30 January 2026  |date=2025 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Young |first1=James O. |title=Relatively Speaking: The Coherence of Anti-Realist Relativism |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |volume=16 |issue=3 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1986.10717132 |date=1986 |pages=503–509}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Young |first1=James O. |title=Relativism and Anti-realism |journal=Ratio |volume=9 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9329.1996.tb00094.x |date=1996 |pages=68–77}}
* {{cite web |last1=Zangwill |first1=Nick |title=Aesthetic Judgment |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-judgment/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 January 2026  |date=2024 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Zhang |first1=Erique |last2=Billard |first2=Thomas J. |editor1-last=Ramasubramanian |editor1-first=Srividya |editor2-last=Banjo |editor2-first=Omotayo O. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Media and Social Justice |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-774436-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JccdEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA84 |language=en |chapter=Queer and Transgender Media Studies |date=2025 |pages=78–86}}
{{refend}}
{{refend}}


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{{Wiktionary|truth}}
{{Wiktionary|truth}}
{{Commons category|Truth}}
{{Commons category|Truth}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20150626133902/http://www.galilean-library.org/site/index.php/page/index.html/_/essays/introducingphilosophy/10-truth-r26 An Introduction to Truth] by Paul Newall, aimed at beginners.
* [[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]:
** [http://www.iep.utm.edu/truth "Truth"]
** [http://www.iep.utm.edu/plur-tru "Pluralist Theories of Truth"]
** [http://www.iep.utm.edu/truth-ma"Truthmaker Theory"]
** [http://www.iep.utm.edu/truthpro"Prosentential Theory of Truth"]
* [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]:
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/ Truth]
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence/ Coherence theory of truth]
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/ Correspondence theory of truth]
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/ Deflationary theory of truth]
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-identity/ Identity theory of truth]
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-revision/ Revision theory of truth]
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tarski-truth/ Tarski's definition of truth]
** [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-axiomatic/ Axiomatic theories of truth]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20150626101634/http://www.ontology.co/heidegger-aletheia.htm Heidegger on Truth (Aletheia) as Unconcealment]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20150609001038/http://www.ontology.co/aletheia.htm History of Truth: The Greek "Aletheia"]
* [http://www.ontology.co/veritas.htm History of Truth: The Latin "Veritas"]


{{Theories of Truth|state=expanded}}
{{Theories of Truth|state=expanded}}
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[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Concepts in logic]]
[[Category:Concepts in logic]]
[[Category:Metaphysical properties]]
[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]]
[[Category:Ethical principles]]
[[Category:Meaning (philosophy)]]
[[Category:Meaning (philosophy of language)]]
[[Category:Ontology]]
[[Category:Mathematical logic]]
[[Category:Philosophical logic]]
[[Category:Reality]]
[[Category:Theories of truth]]
[[Category:Virtue]]

Latest revision as of 17:49, 13 June 2026

Template:Short description Script error: No such module "redirect hatnote". Script error: No such module "Protection banner". Script error: No such module "Unsubst". Truth is conformity to reality or fact. It contrasts with falsity or misrepresentation that fails to align with the world. Truth is typically treated as a property of truthbearers, such as sentences, propositions, or beliefs that describe things as they are. It is closely related to truthfulness, a virtue associated with honesty, and to truthlikeness, a characteristic of theories that approximate the truth.

Various theories of the nature of truth have been proposed, but its precise definition remains contested. The correspondence theory holds that a statement is true if it corresponds to facts. According to the coherence theory, truth consists in logical consistency and mutual support among beliefs. Pragmatists understand truth in terms of practical consequences and epistemic practices, claiming that truth is what works or what would withstand the test of unlimited inquiry. The semantic theory analyzes the truth conditions of sentences in an object language from the perspective of a metalanguage. Deflationary theories argue that truth has no significant intrinsic nature, holding that the linguistic role of truth-related expressions exhausts the concept of truth. Pluralists assert that the definition of truth varies with the domain of analysis, while relativists maintain that the same statement can be true in one perspective and false in another. Theories of truth are challenged by logical paradoxes, such as the liar paradox. There are also discussions about the existence of additional truth values besides true and false and about the possibility of truth value gaps—statements that have no truth value.

Philosophers distinguish types of truth by domain, content, and epistemic access, including a priori, necessary, moral, aesthetic, religious, and scientific truths. Truth plays a central role in the sciences as a goal of inquiry. The empirical sciences seek truth through observation and experimentation, whereas the formal sciences rely on deductive reasoning from fundamental principles. Many religious traditions regard truth as a virtue and ground it in a divine source. Truth also acts as a guiding norm in the fields of ethics, law, and journalism.

Discussions of truth arose in antiquity in Hindu, Jain, Buddhist, and Greek thought. In the medieval period, Christian and Islamic philosophers explored the relation between truth and God. Discussions in the modern and contemporary periods have addressed diverse topics, such as the nature of truth and its relation to thought, language, and reality.

Definition

Truth is conformity to facts or accordance with reality. It is often understood as a property of statements or beliefs that present the world as it is, or as a relation between language or thought and how things actually are. However, its precise definition is disputed, with different theories focusing on elements such as correspondence, coherence, or practical usefulness.[1] In a slightly different sense, the term can also refer to genuineness, as in "a true friend" or "true gold", spiritual teachings, like "the truth of the scriptures", or facts themselves, such as "in truth, the product was defective."[2] Truth contrasts with falsehood or falsity, which encompasses misrepresentations that do not meet this standard and fail to align with reality. The negation of a true statement is a falsehood.[3]

Truth plays a central role in many human endeavors. It acts as a goal of inquiry when deciding what to believe and as a standard to which right conduct should conform by being responsive to how things actually are. People refer to truth to indicate reliable information, mark scientific findings well supported by evidence, distinguish accurate legal testimony from misrepresentation, and emphasize honesty and sincerity in personal life. Truth is typically regarded as a positive value, either because of its beneficial consequences or as an intrinsic good pursued for its own sake.[4]

The word truth comes from the Old English Script error: No such module "Lang"., meaning Template:Gloss. It entered Modern English via the Middle English term Script error: No such module "Lang"..[5]

Basic concepts

Truthbearers

Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Truth is commonly treated as a feature of truthbearers—entities that can be true or false. Philosophers discuss which entities serve as truthbearers, including sentences, propositions, and beliefs. Sentences are concrete linguistic entities composed of strings of words, like "It's raining in Nairobi." Their public nature and clear structure can aid philosophical analysis of truth-related phenomena. However, it is not always possible to establish a straightforward relation between a sentence and its truth value since its meaning can be context-dependent and may also be influenced by ambiguous terms. As a result, a sentence may be true under one interpretation and false under another. Another difficulty is that sentences belong to specific languages, with the danger of limiting philosophical analysis to language-specific features rather than articulating universal principles.[6]Template:Efn

Propositions are typically understood as abstract entities that serve as the meanings of declarative sentences, mitigating the difficulties of context dependence, ambiguity, and language specificity. However, their abstract nature can make philosophical discussions less tangible, and there is disagreement about the existence of abstract objects. Beliefs and related mental states are concrete psychological entities, taking the form of subjective attitudes about what is the case. They establish a direct link between truth and cognition but are difficult to study because of their private nature.[7]

Monists argue that there is only a single kind of truthbearer, while pluralists accept different kinds. Some identify one kind as primary, explaining the truth values of secondary truthbearers in terms of the primary one. For example, one proposal reduces the truth of beliefs to sentences since sentences can be used to express beliefs.[8]

Truthmakers and truth conditions

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David Malet Armstrong.
David Malet Armstrong emphasized the role of truthmakers in establishing a connection between truth and being.[9]

Various theories rely on the concept of truthmakers as the counterpart of truthbearers. A truthmaker is a real entity whose existence makes a truthbearer true, establishing a link between language or thought and the world. For example, an orange carrot could act as a truthmaker of the sentence "the carrot is orange". Truthmakers are often treated as sufficient conditions: the existence of a truthmaker is enough for the sentence to be true, independent of other factors.[10] Philosophers discuss which entities function as truthmakers, with candidates including facts or states of affairs, tropes, and particular objects.[11]

Truthmakers are closely related to truth conditions, which are ways or circumstances under which a statement is true. Truth conditions are requirements of how the world must be for a statement to be true. For instance, one truth condition of the sentence "it is raining" is that raindrops are falling. Truth conditions are often treated as necessary conditions: if a truth condition does not obtain, then the sentence cannot be true, independent of other factors.[12]Template:Efn A key motivation for truthmakers and truth conditions is the idea that truth depends on reality: truth is not a free-floating convention but is anchored in how things are.[13]

Others

Truthfulness is a virtueTemplate:Efn associated with honesty and consistency among one's words, beliefs, and behavior. It is closely related to speaking the truth but differs in some key aspects. For example, if a person sincerely states a belief, they may be truthful even if the belief is false. Conversely, someone may state a truth with the intent to deceive, or a liar may accidentally tell a truth. In both cases, truth alone is insufficient for truthfulness. Truthfulness contrasts with deception and dishonesty. Lying occurs when a speaker intentionally says something they believe to be false.[14] Bullshitting is a related phenomenon in which a speaker is indifferent to truth or falsehood, for instance, because they only care about persuading or manipulating their audience. Truthiness, a similar term, refers to the tendency to prioritize intuition and gut feelings over evidence and rational analysis.[15] Its meaning overlaps with the term post-truth, which denotes situations in which public opinion is shaped by appeal to emotions rather than objective facts.[16] Deception can also take non-verbal forms, such as edited photographs, deepfakes, and AI-generated content intended to mislead or fabricate events.[17]

Truthlikeness or verisimilitude is a concept applied to theories or statements that are close to the truth. It is often used in the context of inquiry to indicate that a theory is not fully true but approximates this goal better than others. For example, heliocentrism is a model of the Solar System that is correct in certain aspects, like that planets orbit around the sun, and wrong in others, like claiming that the orbits are perfect circles. As a result, heliocentrism is not true in a strict sense but truthlike. Truthlikeness comes in degrees. For instance, heliocentrism is more truthlike than geocentrism, which places the Earth at the center of the universe.Template:Efn Different philosophical approaches to truthlikeness have been proposed. Some look at logical consequences, arguing that a theory's degree of truthlikeness depends on the number of its true and false consequences. Others focus on resemblance, comparing how similar the theory's description is to the actual world.[18] According to some suggestions, truth itself also comes in degrees, an idea found in fuzzy logics. However, the traditional view is that truth is bivalent: an assertion is either true or false with nothing in between.[19]

Truth is closely related to justification and evidence with some key differences. A belief is justified if it meets certain epistemic norms, for example, by resting on good reasons or strong evidence. Evidence for a proposition is something that supports its truth, such as observation or reliable testimony. Justification and evidence separate warranted beliefs from superstition and lucky guesses but do not guarantee truth: even well-founded beliefs can be false in unfavorable circumstances. If a justified belief is true, it may amount to knowledge, which, unlike justification on its own, has truth as a core component.[20] Epistemologists discuss various sources of knowledge or how people may arrive at truth, such as perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony.[21] Verification and fact-checking are processes that aim to assess the truth value of a proposition.[22] They may rely on criteria of truth, which are standards by which one can recognize that a claim is true.[23]

Theories

Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Theories of truth aim to identify what all truths have in common. Their goal is not to list true statements but to clarify the concept of truth, discern its essential features, and explain truth-related phenomena. There are disagreements about whether such features exist and whether a given feature is an essential component or an external criterion only indicating the presence of truth.[24]

Correspondence

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A red apple, and the statement "[This] apple is red."
According to the correspondence theory, a statement is true if it corresponds to facts.[25]

The correspondence theory asserts that a belief or statement is true if it corresponds to facts. This view emphasizes the relation between thought or language and reality, arguing that truth matches how things are. It is one of the oldest and most influential theories of truth.[25]

Correspondence theorists distinguish truthbearers from the reality they represent,Template:Efn but the precise relation between the two is disputed. Various suggestions have been made regarding the nature of truthbearers, like seeing them as propositions, sentences, or beliefs. The classical view analyzes their relation to reality in terms of objects and properties. It assumes that truthbearers have a subject-predicate structure, in which the subject refers to an entity and the predicate denotes a property. According to this view, a statement corresponds to reality if it refers to an entity that carries the denoted property. Fact-based theories, by contrast, hold that a statement expresses a fact, and it is true if the fact obtains.[26] One version asserts a one-to-one correlation between truths and facts, while another understands correspondence more broadly as a structural similarity that does not require a perfect one-to-one mirroring.[27]

Truthmaker theory is closely related to correspondence theory and is often treated as a modern version of it.[28] Truthmaker theory stresses that truth depends on reality and analyzes the relation between truths and their truthmakers. Its most comprehensive form is truthmaker maximalism, which asserts that every truth has a truthmaker. Atomic truthmaker theory, by contrast, limits this view to simple statements and analyzes the truth of complex statements in terms of simpler ones.[29]

A key motivation for the correspondence theory is its intuitive appeal and its ability to ground truth in objective reality. A key challenge is to clarify how exactly truths relate to facts. Critics hold that the correspondence theory is uninformative or circular because it fails to explain what correspondence means. They argue that it assumes an implicit understanding of the relation without offering an independent account. Another objection asserts that the correspondence theory is too narrow because it is unable to explain truth in fields like mathematics, logic, and morality, where it is more difficult to identify independent facts corresponding to statements.[30]

Coherence

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Diagram of three beliefs and arrows between them
The coherence theory understands truth as logical consistency and mutual support among beliefs.[31]

The coherence theory understands truthTemplate:Efn as a relation between beliefs rather than between a belief and a fact. It asserts that a belief is true if it is part of a coherent web of beliefs. Coherence theorists typically stress that beliefs do not occur in isolation but are part of a broader perspective on reality since they depend on conceptual frameworks and background assumptions not explicitly represented in the content of each belief. For example, the belief that photons lack mass rests on a network of ideas from particle physics that ground its meaning and ramifications. Accordingly, coherence theory is associated with a form of holism that privileges comprehensive perspectives over individual beliefs.[31]Template:Efn

Different suggestions for the nature of coherence have been proposed. A minimal requirement is usually that the beliefs are logically consistent: they do not contradict each other. Another often-discussed condition is that the beliefs support each other, meaning that a collection of unrelated but consistent beliefs is not sufficient for coherence.[32] In the strongest form, coherentism requires that all beliefs cohere. Less demanding versions assert that only the majority of beliefs need to cohere or that coherence is required within specific domains, such as scientific or moral beliefs, but not across domains.[33]

One criticism acknowledges that coherence is relevant for testing or verifying what is true but contends that coherence theory confuses criteria of verification with truth itself. Another objection argues that there can be competing coherent sets of beliefs where one set contradicts the other, meaning that coherence alone cannot determine which set is correct. For example, a fictional story does not become true just because it is coherent.[31]

Pragmatic

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The pragmatic or pragmatist theory is a family of views that understand truth in terms of practical consequences and epistemic practices. They characterize truth by the role it plays in human affairs, seeing it as embedded in communal practices, epistemic commitments, or norms of discourse. One version asserts that a belief is true if it is practically useful because holding it and acting in accordance with it has beneficial consequences. This view argues that truth is what works, emphasizing real-life outcomes over speculative abstractions. Pragmatists discuss whether this outlook should focus on individual beliefs or comprehensive belief systems assessed over long periods.[34]

A central difficulty for utility-based theories is that practical consequences and usefulness depend on situations and desires. This can lead to subjectivism or relativism since what is useful in one case may not be in another. Another challenge is that although practical consequences often align with truth, this is not always the case: a false belief may have good consequences in certain situations.[35]

A different version of pragmatism defines truth from the perspective of scientific research. It holds that truth is the ideal limit of inquiry or what researchers would believe after unlimited investigation. Other pragmatist approaches define truth as beliefs that have withstood thorough examination or as statements that fulfill discourse norms and can be asserted with warrant.[36]

Semantic

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Alfred Tarski.
Alfred Tarski formulated the semantic theory of truth.[37]

The semantic theory characterizes truth in terms of truth conditions. It distinguishes between an object language, which contains true sentences that are being analyzed, and a meta-language to express their truth conditions using so-called T-sentences. T-sentences have the form: '"S" is true in L if and only if p' where L is the object language, S is a sentence of the object language, and p is a sentence of the meta-language describing truth conditions. For example, '"La nieve es blanca." is true in Spanish if and only if snow is white' is a T-sentence with Spanish as the object language and English as the meta-language. The semantic theory was originally formulated by Alfred Tarski, who limited it to the analysis of formal languages. Subsequent philosophers, such as Donald Davidson, have also applied it to natural languages. The semantic theory is often combined with the idea that truth conditions can be analyzed by studying the components of sentences, such as names and predicates, which are then interpreted to refer to certain entities or situations described in the truth conditions.[38]

A key motivation for the semantic theory is its ability to characterize truth in a precise manner without introducing metaphysical assumptions concerning the existence and nature of facts, correspondence, or coherence. By talking about truth in the object language through a metalanguage, it also avoids paradoxes that arise if a language contains its own truth-predicate, such as the liar paradox. However, it is controversial to what extent the semantic theory offers substantial insights into the nature of truth rather than only providing a formal device for analyzing truth.[39]

Deflationary

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Painting: Pontius Pilate (left) asks Jesus (right) "What is truth?"
An early skepticism about the nature of truth is expressed in Pontius Pilate's rhetorical question to Jesus, asking "What is truth?"[40]

Deflationary theories argue that truth has no significant or interesting intrinsic nature. They hold that attempts by substantive or robust theories, such as correspondence theory and coherence theory, misconstrue truth by assuming a deep metaphysical structure, engaging in pseudoproblems where trivial answers would suffice. Deflationists typically analyze how truth-related expressions are used in language, holding that understanding their linguistic roles exhausts the concept of truth.[41]

Different deflationary theories propose distinct accounts of the linguistic function of truth-related terms,Template:Efn including the redundancy theory, disquotationalism, the performative theory, prosententialism, and minimalism. The redundancy theory asserts that the predicate "is true" is superfluous and does not contribute to meaning. According to this view, the sentences 'Snow is white.' and '"Snow is white" is true.' have the same meaning. Disquotationalism holds that the predicate "is true" acts as a linguistic device to remove quotation marks and make generalizations. The performative theory treats truth as a performative expression that speakers can use to endorse statements, like when saying "That's true." Prosententialism treats truth not as a regular predicate but as an operator. This operator can be applied to expressions that refer to other statements, as in "What Smith said is true." Minimalism understands truth as a logical property whose role is expressed in T-sentences.[42]

Various criticisms of deflationism target specific versions of it, such as criticisms of the redundancy theory or minimalism. However, there are also broader objections that seek to undermine deflationism in general. One argument holds that deflationism fails to explain key aspects of truth, like that truth serves as the aim of beliefs or that theoretical truth can lead to practical success.[43]

Others

Pluralists hold that there is no unified concept of truth that covers all cases. Instead, they argue that truth is a heterogeneous notion and that different theories apply to different domains. For example, a pluralist may accept the correspondence theory for empirical truths but adopt the coherence theory for mathematical truths.[44]

Absolutism asserts that truth is the same for everyone, meaning that what is true does not depend on individual standpoints, opinions, or contexts. It contrasts with relativism, which maintains that the same statement can be true in one perspective or context and false in another.[45] Local relativism limits this dependency to particular domains, such as moral truth. Global relativism, by contrast, extends this view to all truths. Critics argue that global relativism is self-defeating theory that undermines its own authority: applied to itself, it holds that it is only true in some perspectives that all truths are relative.[46] Nihilism or skepticism about truthTemplate:Efn presents a more radical view that rejects the existence of truth.[47]

One common categorization divides theories of truth into realism and anti-realism. Realists see truth as an objective feature that is determined by what the world is like and exists independently of thoughts and descriptions. Anti-realists argue that truth depends in part or entirely on the epistemic situation or how beliefs relate to justification, verification, inquiry, or one another.[48] Realism is typically associated with absolutism, while anti-realism is more closely linked to relativism.[49]

Verificationism argues that a statement is true if it is verifiable. It maintains that the procedures for confirming or disconfirming claims are not external tests of truth but constitutive norms. Verificationists typically assert that there are different verification procedures for different claims, for example, that scientific claims about empirical phenomena require observation and experimentation, whereas mathematical claims are established through deductive proof.[50] What is verifiable or falsifiable depends on the situation and the abilities of investigators, meaning that verificationist truth is not purely objective. Additionally, some statements may be neither verifiable nor falsifiable, raising the question of whether verificationism requires a third truth value or truth-value gaps.[51] Verificationism is sometimes grouped with coherentism as an epistemic theory. Epistemic theories define truth in terms of epistemic concepts, including coherence, verifiability, justification, and rationality.[52]

Illustration of the undefined truth value of the proposition "This proposition is false."
The liar paradox involves a proposition with an inconsistent truth assignment: if the proposition is true, it follows that it is false, and if it is false, it follows that it is true.[53]

The identity theory holds that something is true if it is identical to reality. This view rejects the distinction between truthbearers and truthmakers, arguing that truths are facts rather than representations.[54] Axiomatic theories are deductive theories based on a small number of fundamental principles. Instead of providing explicit definitions, they treat truth as a primitive or undefined concept and formulate general rules of how it behaves.[55] According to the consensus theory, proposed by Jürgen Habermas, truth is what people would agree upon under ideal circumstances.[56] The term folk theory of truth refers to widely held beliefs of ordinary people about truth, like the idea that a proposition is true if its negation is false.[57]

Theories of truth are challenged by various paradoxes in which basic intuitions or principles yield contradictory conclusions. The liar paradox involves a statement with an inconsistent truth assignment, like the claims "I am lying" or "This statement is false": if the statement is true, it follows that it is false, and if it is false, it follows that it is true. Other paradoxes include the Curry paradox, the Russell-Myhill paradox, and Grelling's paradox.[58] Some paradoxes arise if a language contains its own truth predicate.Template:Efn Tarski sought to avoid this problem by analyzing formal languages that do not have truth predicates. Saul Kripke proposed a different approach that limits how truth predicates can be used within a language without excluding them.[59]

Types

The Pythagorean theorem: given a right triangle with legs of lengths a and b, and hypotenuse of length c, a^2 + b^2 = c^2
Mathematical truths, like the Pythagorean theorem, are traditionally categorized as a priori truths.[60]

Various types of truth are distinguished in the academic discourse by domain, content, and epistemic access. For some types, it is controversial whether they exist in a strict sense. The difference between Script error: No such module "Lang". and Script error: No such module "Lang". truths rests on the source of knowledge. Script error: No such module "Lang". truths require sensory experience, such as observing that water boils at 100°C at standard atmospheric pressure. Script error: No such module "Lang". truths can be known through pure reasoning, such as a proof of a mathematical theorem.[61] A related distinction is between synthetic and analytic truths, based on the source of the truth. A sentence is synthetic if its truth depends on what the world is like, such as "Mount Everest is the highest mountain on Earth" or "all bachelors are tetchy and demanding". A sentence is analytic if its truth depends only on the meanings of its terms, as in "all bachelors are unmarried".[62]Template:Efn

Logical truths or tautologies are a special class of analytic truths. Their truth is determined by the logical form of statements, regardless of concrete contents, as in statements of the form "if P, then P".[63] The negation of a logical truth is a logical falsity or contradiction. Contradictions can take the form of affirming and denying the same idea within a single statement, as in "the light is on and the light is not on". Most logicians consider all contradictions to be false to avoid absurdity. One exception is the school of dialetheism, which holds that some contradictions are true, arguing that reality itself can be contradictory.[64]

Philosophers distinguish between necessary, actual, and possible truths based on the circumstances or conditions relative to which a statement is evaluated. A truth is necessary if it could not have been otherwise, meaning that it is true under all conceivable circumstances. A sentence is actually true if it correctly describes the actual world. A sentence is possibly true if there are conceivable circumstances where it is true, regardless of whether these circumstances obtain in the actual world.[65]

Evaluative truths are about what is good or bad in some sense. They include ethical truths, which assess the moral status of principles, actions, and persons, such as the claim "murder is wrong". Aesthetic truths are about the appeal of entities, including judgments about what is beautiful and about the meanings of artworks. Axiological nihilists and error theorists challenge the existence of evaluative truths, arguing that no values exist or that all value statements are false.[66] Subjectivism, another view, holds that they are subjective truths. A subjective truth depends on individual attitudes or personal preferences, meaning that a statement may be true from the perspective of one person and false from another. They contrast with objective truths, which are verifiable and hold regardless of individual attitudes or perspectives.[67]

The concept of religious truth encompasses core teachings and doctrines within religious traditions, addressing not only how things are but also how people relate to the world. They typically concern the meaning of life, the nature of ultimate reality and the divine, and the values and practices that should guide human conduct. Some traditions distinguish between absolute and relative truth, with absolute truth pointing to a transcendent, divine reality while relative truth refers to conventional or context-dependent teachings for everyday life. Religious truths are often grounded in faith, drawing rationalist and scientific criticisms for lacking substantial empirical evidence.[68]

Various forms of truth are distinguished by the field of inquiry they belong to. Scientific truths are well-established theories in the scientific community, validated through rigorous application of the scientific method.[69] In studying the empirical world, scientists often employ mathematical truths, which are abstract theorems or principles demonstrated through deductive reasoning from basic principles. Philosophers of mathematics discuss whether mathematical truths should be interpreted as insights into mind-independent abstract objects or as human constructions arising from formal frameworks and symbolic manipulation.[70] In the field of history, Historical truth refers to the accurate presentation of past events, but it is controversial to what extent historians can achieve this ideal. Difficulties arise from the subjective nature of interpretation and the influence of personal values and biases when integrating evidence from diverse sources to arrive at a coherent narrative.[71] Personal historical truth plays a role in psychoanalysis as a factor shaping an individual's identity, such as the lasting effects of traumatic childhood experiences. The remembered events may diverge from objective reality due to distortions introduced by repression and confabulation.[72]

In logic and semantics, truth Script error: No such module "Lang". is sometimes distinguished from truth relative to a certain context, such as truth in a possible world or in a model. A possible world is a way of how things could have been. For example, the dinosaurs went extinct in the actual world, but there are possible worlds where they survived. Accordingly, the sentence "the dinosaurs were wiped out" is true in the actual world but false in some possible worlds. Similarly, model theory uses models—abstract mathematical structures—to represent the meanings of logical terms and expressions. In this context, the truth value of a formula can depend on the model: it may be true in one model and false in another.[73] A related problem in the philosophy of literature concerns truth in fiction, referring to statements that accurately describe events or characters in the imagined universe of a work of fiction, such as the claim that Harry Potter wears glasses.[74]

In various fields

Science and philosophy

Truth is central to many disciplines. It is often considered a goal of inquiry that guides scientific research and intellectual life.[75] Empirical scientists formulate testable hypotheses to explain phenomena. They rely on observation and experimentation to collect objective data, comparing results with initial hypotheses to confirm or disconfirm theories.[69] The natural sciences engage in quantitative research, employing precise numerical measurements, often to arrive at exact general laws that can predict future outcomes. Qualitative research is more common in the social sciences, where researchers examine cultural phenomena, social processes, and subjective experiences that may resist purely numerical interpretation.[76]

The formal sciences demonstrate the truth of theories through more abstract methods, usually based on deductive reasoning.[77] For example, mathematicians employ several proof methods to establish theorems, such as direct proof, proof by contradiction, and mathematical induction.[78] Formal logic studies the nature of deductive reasoning and the rules of inference it follows. A key principle in this field is that deductive inferences preserve truth: if all premises are true, then the conclusion cannot be false. Logicians develop formal systems—abstract frameworks that precisely encode forms of deductive reasoning—and examine which truths can and cannot be proven within a given formal system.[79]Template:Efn Truth tables, another tool in logic, express how the truth values of compound propositions depend on those of their constituent propositions.[80]

Many issues concerning the relation between truth and inquiry are addressed by epistemology, which studies the nature, origins, and limits of knowledge. This field treats truth as a central aspect of knowledgeTemplate:Efn and examines the ways of attaining it, including the approaches of the empirical and formal sciences.[81] The philosophy of language and semantics regard truth as an aspect of the meaning of sentences. They are interested in the relation between words, ideas, and the world and analyze phenomena that complicate this relation, such as ambiguity, vagueness, and context dependence. They also address the problem of truth-value gaps: the question of whether some statements are neither true nor false.[82]Template:Efn

Ethics is concerned with right behavior, including truth-related behavior. For example, Immanuel Kant argued that people have a duty to tell the truth and are prohibited from lying. In metaethics, philosophers discuss whether moral statements and principles can be true, as cognitivists claim, or not, as non-cognitivists contend.[83]

Religion and art

"Al-Haqq", written in Arabic
The Abrahamic traditions associate truth with the divine, such as the Islamic term Template:Tlit ('the Truth') as one of Allah's names.[84]

Truth plays a central role in many religions. The Abrahamic traditions stress the importance of truthfulness and closely link truth to the divine, as reflected in the Jewish description of God as Template:Tlit ('God of Truth'), Jesus's statement "I am the way, the truth, and the life" in Christianity, and the Islamic term Template:Tlit (Template:Lit) as one of Allah's names.[85] Philosophers in these traditions have debated the relationship between the religious truths of faith and the philosophical truths of reason. They typically argue that apparent tensions are resolvable through right interpretation. An alternative approach relies on the doctrine of double truth, according to which divergent truths can coexist in different domains.[86]

In Hinduism, truth or satya is a key virtue to be practiced in thought, speech, and action, and is considered a source of individual and societal well-being. For example, it is one of the five moral restraints in Patanjali's Yoga.[87] In Buddhism, the concept of truth is closely related to Buddha's teachings, such as the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths about the causes of suffering and the path to liberation.[88] Buddhists also hold the theory of two truths, according to which conventional truth, associated with the phenomenal world and everyday experience, differs from ultimate truth, which concerns the fundamental nature of reality and is required for attaining liberation.[89] A related contrast in Jainism distinguishes between relative truth, which is limited to a particular time, place, and perspective, and absolute truth, which transcends individual viewpoints but cannot be fully expressed in language.[90] A form of perspectivism is also found in Taoism, which argues that knowledge is shaped by a person's interests and engagement with the world, with each perspective providing only a partial view of reality.[91]

Truth can also be expressed in the field of art by manifesting ideas or understanding through aesthetic phenomena. The meanings of artworks are not always directly accessible and may require interpretation to uncover. For example, a novel exploring the feelings and choices of fictional characters may reveal deeper truths about human nature and moral dilemmas. Artworks may also evoke experiences that a person has not felt before, showing them new perspectives, familiarizing them with alternative ways of life, or preparing them for possible future challenges. Aesthetic philosophers discuss whether or how the truths expressed in an artwork shape aesthetic experience and contribute to its overall value.[92]

Others

Photo of a statue of a robed woman holding a book
Walter Seymour Allward's Script error: No such module "Lang". ('Truth') outside Supreme Court of Canada, emphasizing truth as a guiding norm of law

Truth plays a central role in law as a guiding norm to which legal processes and decisions should align. Because of difficulties in reconstructing what happened, this field relies on various standards of proof and evidentiary rules to ascertain pertinent facts. Consequently, truth by itself can be insufficient if it cannot be proven in court, contrasting factual truth with legal truth.[93]

Similarly, truth is a key element in journalism, where reporters seek information from reliable sources and fact-check claims to accurately inform the public. Media theorists discuss obstacles to this process, such as the spread of misinformation, misleadingly edited photographs, AI-generated images, political propaganda, and algorithmic biases on social media platforms.[94]

Psychologists and cognitive scientists study cognitions as truth-related mental processes that acquire, transform, or use information. They examine different types of cognitive processes, like perception, memory, and thought, and investigate how biases and distortions affect these processes.[95]

In computer science, true and false are values of constants and variables belonging to the Boolean data type. One of their key applications happens in control structures that determine the flow of code execution, such as conditional expressions that execute a code path only if a test condition evaluates to true.[96]

Probability theory deals with uncertain information. It uses numbers between 0 and 1 to represent the probability that a statement is true and provides rules for calculating how the probabilities of different statements influence each other.[97]

History

Ancient and medieval

Photo of a text written in Sanskrit
The Rigveda, an ancient Indian scripture, explored the relation between cosmic truth and individual truth.[98]
Bust of Aristotle.
Aristotle conceived an early form of the correspondence theory of truth.[99]

Discussions of the role and nature of truth arose in antiquity. In ancient India, the Rigveda, composed in the 2nd millennium BCE, stressed the spiritual importance of truthfulness, exploring the relation between the cosmic truth, which concerns the laws of the universe, and individual truth, which concerns each individual's duty.[98] Jainism flourished in the 6th century BCE and distinguished relative truth that differs according to perspective from absolute truth that transcends individual viewpoints.[100] Buddhism, originating roughly in the 6th century BCE,[101] closely associated truth with Buddha's teachings and formulated the two truths doctrine, according to which conventional truth of everyday life differs from ultimate truth about the fundamental nature of reality.[102] The school of Nyaya, which arose around 200 CE,[103] understood truth as a property of accurate cognitions, analyzing their internal structure in terms of objects, properties, and relations.[104] The topic of truth received less attention in ancient Chinese thought, where the focus was more on right conduct and practical consequences than on abstract semantic properties of statements.[105]

In ancient Greek thought, truth was understood as Script error: No such module "Lang". or disclosure, which could refer both to reality itself and to what is revealed to the mind.[106] Parmenides (fl. 5th century BCE)[107] distinguished truth from opinion, associating truth with thought and being while contrasting it with non-being.[108] Protagoras (c. 490 – c. 420 BCEScript error: No such module "Check for unknown parameters".) proposed a form of relativism according to which "man is the measure of all things".[109] The skeptics questioned the human ability to acquire truth and recommended suspension of belief.[110] Plato (c. 428 – c. 348 BCEScript error: No such module "Check for unknown parameters".) formulated an account of true and false statements, linking truth to reality or the way things are. His student Aristotle (384–322 BCE) conceived an early form of the correspondence theory of truth. He distinguished truthbearers in thought and speech from the things they describe, arguing that a statement is true if it aligns with how things are. Aristotle also separated truth itself from criteria of truth and held that something can be true even if no one thinks about it.[99] Stoicism, which emerged around 300 BCE,[111] defended the bivalence of truth, according to which every proposition is either true or false, and distinguished propositions from uttered sentences and the reality they describe.[112]

At the transition to the medieval period, Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) integrated Greek philosophy with Christian doctrine. He held that truth is unchangeable, eternal, and necessary, maintaining that truth is identical to God.[113] Building on Augustine's ideas, Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109 CE) argued that statements are true only in a derivative sense since truth primarily resides in things that participate in God as the highest truth. Similarly, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) conceived truth as a metaphysical property of entities. He maintained that a thing is true if it matches God's idea of it, analogous to how a designed artifact may perfectly correspond to what the artisan intended.[114] In Islamic thought, Avicenna (c. 980Script error: No such module "Check for unknown parameters".–1037 CE) distinguished three senses of truth: as the reality of individual entities, as the divine reality of God as a necessary being, and as the correctness of statements.[115]

Modern and contemporary

Bust of Gottlob Frege.
Gottlob Frege examined the role of truth in logic.[116]
Bertrand Russell.
Bertrand Russell proposed an influential fact-based correspondence theory of truth.[117]

In early modern philosophy, René Descartes (1596–1650) examined truth from an epistemological perspective, arguing for the existence of clear and distinct ideas that are true and cannot be doubted.[118] Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) asserted that human ideas are adequate or inadequate but not true in a strict sense since only ideas in God's mind are true.[119] John Locke (1632–1704) maintained that thoughts or mental propositions are the primary truthbearers, understanding them as combinations of signs or ideas. Unlike Descartes's and Spinoza's focus on true ideas, Locke also considered true sentences or verbal propositions, holding that they are true in a derivative sense if they express true mental propositions.[120]

Immanuel Kant understood judgments as the main truthbearers, arguing that a judgment is true if it agrees with its object. In his transcendental idealism, objects are not entirely independent of observers since the mind actively structures experience following inbuilt forms and categories. This raises the question of the extent to which truth is objective or subjective.[121] Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) criticized this aspect of Kant's philosophy and proposed a clear distinction between subjective acts of representation and the objective contents of those acts, which can be true or false.[122] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) regarded truth as an agreement of a thing with its concept rather than a property of statements. According to his holistic vision, all finite things are strictly speaking false, and only the whole is true.[123] Inspired by Hegel, F. H. Bradley (1846–1924) agreed that truth ultimately resides in the whole or the absolute. He held that truth comes in degrees based on the extent to which an entity aligns with the whole. His views are often interpreted as a form of coherence theory or identity theory.[124]

Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) emphasized subjective truth or how a person's inward commitments shape their existence, expressed in the slogan "truth is subjectivity".[125] Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) understood truth as a moral phenomenon that serves the preservation and enhancement of life. He saw it as an expression of the will to power, rejecting correspondence theory in favor of a perspectivism that acknowledges multiple viewpoints without an overarching objective truth.[126] In the pragmatist tradition, William James (1842–1910) characterized truth in terms of practical consequences and utility, while C. S. Peirce (1839–1914) argued that truth is what would result after endless scientific inquiry.[127]

Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) examined the role of truth in logic, such as his ideas that sentences refer to truth values and that logical operators and predicates are functions that yield truth values. His outlook inspired deflationism, but not all of his views are compatible with this theory.[128] In their early philosophies, G. E. Moore (1873–1958) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) defended a kind of primitivism according to which truth is an indefinable property. They later proposed a fact-based correspondence theory, often treated as the classical formulation of this view, stating that a belief is true if it corresponds to a fact.[117] Responding to Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) defined truth as a form of correspondence in which a proposition pictures a fact.[129]

Alfred Tarski (1901–1983) developed the semantic theory of truth, which uses a meta-language to analyze the truth conditions of sentences in an object language. He limited this view to truth in formal languages. Donald Davidson (1917–2003) extended Tarski's approach to the study of truth in natural languages.[38] David Malet Armstrong (1926–2014) developed truthmaker theory as a modern version of correspondence theory. He stressed the dependence of truth on being and explored truthmaker theory as an approach to metaphysical inquiry.[9]

Various deflationary theories in the 20th century aimed to show that truth is a trivial linguistic device without a deeper metaphysical significance, proposed by philosophers such as P. F. Strawson (1919–2006), Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000), and Paul Horwich (born 1947).[130] Michael Dummett (1925–2011) criticized deflationism and developed a form of verificationism according to which a statement is true if it is verifiable.[131]Template:Efn Responding to the difficulties of providing a unified concept of truth, Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) and Richard Rorty (1931–2007) formulated pluralist theories of truth, according to which the nature of truth is not uniform but depends on the analyzed domain.[132]

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) analyzed truth from a phenomenological perspective as an ideal correlate of intentional acts, emphasizing the role of evident experience.[133] His student Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) understood truth as unconcealment in his attempt to recover the ancient Greek concept of Script error: No such module "Lang"., which he regarded as more fundamental than the modern concept of correspondence.[134] Inspired by Kant's idealism, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) characterized truth as "subjectivity externalized", understanding it as the way the mind-independent world is illuminated and becomes meaningful to human consciousness.[135] Postmodern philosophers challenged the idea that truth is objective and universal, analyzing how power relations and social contexts shape what is accepted as true. For example, Michel Foucault explored the role of truth in discursive practices and social institutions, such as the idea that institutions determine what counts as truth and use it to wield power.[136]

See also

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References

Notes

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Citations

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  1. ↑ Template:Multiref
  2. ↑ Template:Multiref
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  4. ↑ Template:Multiref
  5. ↑ Template:Multiref
  6. ↑ Template:Multiref
  7. ↑ Template:Multiref
  8. ↑ Template:Multiref
  9. ↑ a b Template:Multiref
  10. ↑ Template:Multiref
  11. ↑ Template:Multiref
  12. ↑ Template:Multiref
  13. ↑ Template:Multiref
  14. ↑ Template:Multiref
  15. ↑ Template:Multiref
  16. ↑ Template:Multiref
  17. ↑ Template:Multiref
  18. ↑ Template:Multiref
  19. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  21. ↑ Template:Multiref
  22. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
  23. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
  24. ↑ Template:Multiref
  25. ↑ a b Template:Multiref
  26. ↑ Template:Multiref
  27. ↑ Template:Multiref
  28. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
  29. ↑ Template:Multiref
  30. ↑ Template:Multiref
  31. ↑ a b c Template:Multiref
  32. ↑ Template:Multiref
  33. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
  34. ↑ Template:Multiref
  35. ↑ Template:Multiref
  36. ↑ Template:Multiref
  37. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
  38. ↑ a b Template:Multiref
  39. ↑ Template:Multiref
  40. ↑ Template:Multiref
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  42. ↑ Template:Multiref
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  44. ↑ Template:Multiref
  45. ↑ Template:Multiref
  46. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  48. ↑ Template:Multiref
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  50. ↑ Template:Multiref
  51. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
  52. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
  53. ↑ Template:Multiref
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  56. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  58. ↑ Template:Multiref
  59. ↑ Template:Multiref
  60. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  62. ↑ Template:Multiref
  63. ↑ Template:Multiref
  64. ↑ Template:Multiref
  65. ↑ Template:Multiref
  66. ↑ Template:Multiref
  67. ↑ Template:Multiref
  68. ↑ Template:Multiref
  69. ↑ a b Template:Multiref
  70. ↑ Template:Multiref
  71. ↑ Template:Multiref
  72. ↑ Template:Multiref
  73. ↑ Template:Multiref
  74. ↑ Template:Multiref
  75. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  77. ↑ Template:Multiref
  78. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  80. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  84. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  88. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  90. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  96. ↑ Template:Multiref
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  113. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
  114. ↑ Template:Multiref
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  122. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  124. ↑ Template:Multiref
  125. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  132. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  134. ↑ Template:Multiref
  135. ↑ Script error: No such module "Footnotes".
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  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
  • Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".

External links

Script error: No such module "Side box". Script error: No such module "Side box". Script error: No such module "Side box".

Template:Theories of Truth Script error: No such module "navboxes". Script error: No such module "Navbox". Script error: No such module "Navbox". Script error: No such module "Navbox". Template:PositivismScript error: No such module "navboxes".Script error: No such module "Check for unknown parameters".

Script error: No such module "Authority control".