Battle of Siffin

The Battle of Siffin (Template:Langx) was fought in 657 CE (37 AH) between the fourth Rashidun caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib and the rebellious governor of Syria Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan. The battle is named after its location Siffin on the banks of the Euphrates. The fighting stopped after the Syrians called for arbitration to escape defeat, to which Ali agreed under pressure from some of his troops. The arbitration process ended inconclusively in 658 though it strengthened the Syrians' support for Mu'awiya and weakened the position of Ali. The battle is considered part of the First Fitna and a major step towards the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate.

Location

The battlefield was located in Siffin, a ruined Byzantine-era village at the right bank of the Euphrates in the vicinity of Raqqa in present-day Syria.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn It has been identified with the modern village of Abu Hureyra in the Raqqa Governorate.Template:Sfn

Background

Opposition to Uthman

Ali frequently accused the third caliph, Uthman, of deviating from the Quran and the Sunna,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn and was joined in his criticism by most of the senior companions of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, including Talha and Zubayr.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Uthman was also widely accused of nepotism,Template:Sfn corruption,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn and injustice,Template:Sfn and Ali is known to have protested his conduct,Template:Sfn including his lavish gifts for his kinsmen, the Umayyads.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Ali also protected outspoken companions, such as Abu Dharr al-Ghifari and Ammar ibn Yasir,Template:Sfn from Uthman.Template:Sfn Ali appears in early sources as a restraining influence on Uthman without directly opposing him.Template:Sfn Some supporters of Ali were also part of the opposition to Uthman,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn joined in their efforts by TalhaTemplate:Sfn and Zubayr, and by Aisha, a widow of Muhammad.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn The last was critical of Uthman for religious innovations and nepotism, but also objected to him for reducing her pension.Template:Sfn Among the supporters of Ali were Malik al-Ashtar (Template:Died in) and other religiously-learnedTemplate:Sfn (Template:Lit).Template:Sfn These wanted to see Ali as the next caliph, though there is no evidence that he communicated or coordinated with them.Template:Sfn Ali is also said to have rejected the requests to lead the rebels,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn although he might have sympathized with their grievances,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn and was thus considered a natural focus for the opposition,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn at least morally.Template:Sfn It is also likely that some companions supported the protests with the hope of either deposing Uthman,Template:Sfn or changing his policies,Template:Sfn thus underestimating the severity of the opposition to Uthman.Template:Sfn

Assassination of Uthman

As their grievances mounted, discontented groups from provinces began arriving in Medina in 35/656.Template:Sfn On their first attempt,Template:Sfn the Egyptian opposition sought the advice of Ali, who urged them to send a delegation to negotiate with Uthman, unlike Talha and Ammar, who might have encouraged the Egyptians to advance on the town.Template:Sfn Ali similarly asked the Iraqi opposition to avoid violence, which was heeded.Template:Sfn He also acted as a mediator between Uthman and the provincial dissidentsTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn more than onceTemplate:Sfn to address their economicTemplate:Sfn and politicalTemplate:Sfn grievances. In particular, he negotiated and guaranteed on behalf of Uthman the promises that persuaded the rebels to return home and ended the first siege.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Ali then urged Uthman to publicly repent, which he did.Template:Sfn The caliph soon retracted his statement, however, possibly because his secretary Marwan convinced him that repentance would only embolden the opposition.Template:Sfn On their way back home, some Egyptian rebels intercepted an official letter ordering their punishment. They now returned to Medina and laid siege to Uthman's residence for a second time, demanding that he abdicate. The caliph refused and claimed he was unaware of the letter,Template:Sfn for which Marwan is often blamed in the early sources.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Ali and another companion, Muhammad ibn Maslama, sided with Uthman about the letter,Template:Sfn and suspected Marwan,Template:Sfn while a report by the Sunni historian al-Baladhuri (Template:Died in) suggests that the caliph accused Ali of forging the letter.Template:Sfn This is likely when Ali refused to further intercede for Uthman.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn That Ali was behind the letter is also the opinion of the Islamicist Leone Caetani (Template:Died in). Among other Western historians, Giorgio Levi della Vida (Template:Died in) is unsure, while Wilferd Madelung strongly rejects the accusation, saying that it "stretches the imagination" in the absence of any evidence.Template:Sfn In turn, he accuses Marwan,Template:Sfn the bellicose secretary of Uthman,Template:Sfn while Hugh N. Kennedy holds Uthman responsible for the letter.Template:Sfn The caliph was assassinated soon afterward in the final days of 35 AH (June 656) by the Egyptian rebels,Template:Sfn during a raid on his residence in Medina.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn

Role of Ali in the assassination

Ali played no role in the deadly attack,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn and his son Hasan was injured while guarding the besieged residence of Uthman at the request of Ali.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn He also convinced the rebels not to prevent the delivery of water to Uthman's house during the siege.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Beyond this, historians disagree about his measures to protect the third caliph.Template:Sfn Ali is represented by the Sunni historian al-Tabari (Template:Died in) as an honest negotiator genuinely concerned for Uthman.Template:Sfn Madelung and the modern historian Husain M. Jafri (Template:Died in) highlight the attempts by Ali for reconciliation,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn and the Islamicist Martin Hinds (Template:Died in) believes that Ali could not have done anything more for Uthman.Template:Sfn The Islamic author Reza Shah-Kazemi points to Ali's "constructive criticism" of Uthman and his opposition to violence,Template:Sfn while the Bahai scholar Moojan Momen writes that Ali mediated between Uthman and the rebels, urging the former to alter his policies and refusing the requests from the latter to lead them.Template:Sfn This is similar to the view of the Islamicist John McHugo, who adds that Ali withdrew in frustration when his peace efforts where thwarted by Marwan.Template:Sfn The historians Fred Donner and Robert Gleave suggest that Ali was the immediate beneficiary of Uthman's death.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn In turn, their opinion is challenged by Madelung, who argues that Aisha would have not actively opposed Uthman if Ali had been the prime mover of the rebellion and its future beneficiary.Template:Sfn He and others observe the hostility of Aisha toward Ali,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn which resurfaced immediately after his accession in the Battle of the Camel (656).Template:Sfn The orientalist Laura Veccia Vaglieri (Template:Died in) believes that Ali refused to lead the rebellion but still sympathized with them and possibly agreed with their calls for abdication.Template:Sfn Among other scholars, Hossein Nasr and Asma Afsaruddin,Template:Sfn Levi della Vida,Template:Sfn and Julius Wellhausen (Template:Died in) believe that Ali remained neutral in this conflict,Template:Sfn while Caetani labels Ali as the chief culprit in the murder of Uthman, even though the evidence suggests otherwise.Template:Sfn The Muslim scholar Mahmoud M. Ayoub (Template:Died in) notes the often pro-Umayyad stance of the Western classical orientalists, with the exception of Madelung.Template:Sfn

Election of Ali

When Uthman was killed in 656 CE by the Egyptian rebels,Template:Sfn the potential candidates for the caliphate were Ali and Talha. The Umayyads had fled Medina, and the provincial rebels and the Ansar (early Medinan Muslims) were in control of the city. Among the Egyptians, Talha enjoyed some support, but the Basrans and Kufans, who had heeded Ali's call for nonviolence, and most of the Ansar supported Ali.Template:Sfn Some authors add the (majority of the) Muhajirun (early Meccan Muslims) to this list of Ali's supporters.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn The key tribal chiefs also seem to have favored Ali at the time.Template:Sfn The caliphate was thus offered by these groups to Ali, who was initially reluctant to accept it,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn saying that he preferred to be a minister ().Template:Sfn Soon after, possibly after it became clear that he enjoyed popular support, Ali did accept the caliphate,Template:Sfn demanding a public pledge at the mosque.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn One factor in his decision to accept the caliphate might have been to prevent further chaos,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn but his nomination by the rebels nevertheless left Ali exposed to accusations of complicity in the assassination of Uthman.Template:Sfn It also appears that Ali personally did not force anyone for pledge and, among others, Sa'ad ibn Abi Waqqas, Abd-Allah ibn Umar,Template:Sfn Sa'id ibn al-As, al-Walid ibn Uqba, and Marwan likely refused to give their oaths, some possibly motivated by their personal grudges against Ali.Template:Sfn On the whole, Madelung suggests that there is less evidence for any violence here than in the case of the first caliph, Abu Bakr (Template:Reign), even though many broke with Ali later, claiming that they had pledged under duress.Template:Sfn At the same time, that the majority favored Ali in Medina might have created an intimidating atmosphere for those opposed to him.Template:Sfn

Uthman's governors

At the time of the assassination, the key governorships were in the hands of the Umayyads,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn their often late conversion to IslamTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn might have suggested expediency to Ali and the Ansar.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Ali was nevertheless advised to initially confirm the governors of Uthman,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn some of whom were unpopular,Template:Sfn to consolidate his caliphate. He rejected this advice and replaced nearly all those who had served Uthman,Template:Sfn saying that the likes of those men should not be appointed to any office.Template:Sfn In this and other decisions, Ali was driven by his sense of religious mission, writes Madelung,Template:Sfn while Poonawala suggests that Ali changed the governors to please the rebels.Template:Sfn Donner has a similar view to Madelung and Shah-Kazemi maintains that justice was the key principle that molded Ali's policies in all domains.Template:Sfn Even so, Madelung views this decision of Ali as politically naive.Template:Sfn His view is in turn rejected by the Shia scholar Ali Bahramian, who believes that replacing the governors was the only available course of action, both on principle and in practice. He contends that injustice was the main grievance of the provincial rebels and they would have turned against Ali had he confirmed Uthman's governors.Template:Sfn Among these governors was Uthman's cousin Mu'awiya, who had been appointed as the governor of Syria by the second caliph Umar (Template:Reign) and then reconfirmed by Uthman.Template:Sfn Having ruled Syria for almost twenty years,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn without interruption and almost since its conquest, Mu'awiya had a power base in Syria which made his removal difficult.Template:Sfn Ali replaced Mu'awiya with Ibn Abbas, who feared the retaliation of Mu'awiya and asked Ali to postpone his appointment until his rule was firmly established, according to al-Baladhuri.Template:Sfn

Mu'awiya's revolt

Removal of Mu'awiya

There are some reports of early correspondence,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn and al-Baladhuri writes about a letter by Ali that asked Mu'awiya to report to him in Medina.Template:Sfn Alternatively, Madelung suggests that Ali contacted Mu'awiya only after arriving in Kufa, following his victory in the Battle of the Camel.Template:Sfn He might have waited this long perhaps to have the upper hand after his victory or perhaps because Mu'awiya was not a serious contender for the caliphate anyway,Template:Sfn considering that he was a (those pardoned by Muhammad when Mecca fell to Muslims),Template:Sfn the son of Abu Sufyan, who had led the confederates against Muslims,Template:Sfn and Hind,Template:Sfn who was responsible for mutilating the body of Muhammad's uncle Hamza.Template:Sfn For his part, Mu'awiya had waited through the Battle of the Camel,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn and was perhaps emboldened by that challenge to the authority of Ali.Template:Sfn

Once in Kufa, Ali dispatched his first emissary, Jarir ibn Abd-Allah al-Bajali,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn a notable Yemenite and Uthman's governor of Hamadan,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn who volunteered to represent Ali because of his personal ties with the Umayyads.Template:Sfn His was nevertheless deemed unfit for the task by some, including Malik al-Ashtar,Template:Sfn who questioned his loyalty.Template:Sfn Jarir carried with him a letter to Mu'awiya that demanded his pledge of allegiance to Ali and made it clear that he would be dismissed from his post afterward.Template:Sfn The caliph argued in his letter that his election in Medina was binding on Mu'awiya in Syria because he was elected by the same people who had pledged to his predecessors, as reported in Waq'at Siffin,Template:Sfn authored by the Shia Nasr ibn Muzahim (Template:Died in), one of the earliest historians of the civil war.Template:Sfn The letter added that the election of the caliph was the right of the Muhajiran and the Ansar, thus explicitly excluding Mu'awiya, as a late convert (), from any ,Template:Sfn and from the caliphate itself.Template:Sfn The letter also urged Mu'awiya to leave justice for Uthman to Ali, promising that he would deal with the issue in due course.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn By this time, Mu'awiya had already publicly charged Ali in the death of Uthman.Template:Sfn Having failed to intimidate Ali's governor of Egypt to switch sides,Template:Sfn Mu'awiya had also forged a letter from the governor to himself in which the latter supported the former's right for revenge, according to Madelung.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn In response to Ali's letter, Mu'awiya asked Jarir for time,Template:Sfn then addressed the congregation at the next prayer, appealed to their Syrian patriotism, and received their pledge as to revenge Uthman,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn as detailed by Ibn Muzahim and the Shia historian Ibn A'tham al-Kufi (ninth century).Template:Sfn He soon launched a propaganda campaign across Syria, charging Ali in the death of Uthman and calling for revenge.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn

Alliance against Ali

Mu'awiya also wrote to Amr ibn al-As to join him in Damascus,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn possibly to draw on his political and military expertise,Template:Sfn or perhaps he hoped that Amr would bring the neighboring Egypt under his rule,Template:Sfn having failed earlier to intimidate Ali's governor of Egypt to switch sides.Template:Sfn A Qurayshite companion of Muhammad and a military strategist,Template:Sfn Amr was believed to be an illegitimate child of Abu Sufyan.Template:Sfn He had conquered,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn and then governed Egypt, but was later removed by Uthman.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn After his dismissal, Amr incited rebellion against Uthman,Template:Sfn and later publicly took some credit for the assassination of Uthman by the Egyptian rebels.Template:Sfn However, he soon changed his tone and pinned the murder on Ali,Template:Sfn possibly fearing the Umayyads' wrath,Template:Sfn or perhaps realizing that he would not receive a post in Ali's government.Template:Sfn After arriving in Damascus, Amr officially swore his allegiance to Mu'awiya in 657.Template:Sfn He thus pledged to back the Umayyads against Ali in return for the life-long governorship of Egypt.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn This pact turned a suspect in the assassination of Uthman into his avenger,Template:Sfn and also later gave rise to a story recorded by some historians, including al-Baladhuri and the Shia-leaning al-Ya'qubi (Template:Died in).Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Amr privately confesses in this story to selling his religion for worldly gain.Template:Sfn Even though the story itself is apocryphal, Ayoub suggests that it may portray the popular perception of the conflict between the Ali and Mu'awiya,Template:Sfn which the story presents as a conflict between "the people of religion" and "the people of this world," respectively.Template:Sfn The Mu'tazilite Ibn Abi'l-Hadid (Template:Died in) gives Amr the credit for successfully spreading the rumor that Ali had killed Uthman.Template:Sfn

Mu'awiya also brought into his camp the influential Syrian Shurahbil ibn Simt,Template:Sfn whom he convinced that Ali was guilty in the death of Uthman,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn probably with false witnesses and reports.Template:Sfn After some hesitation, Shurahbil became an enthusiastic advocate for Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn Mu'awiya also reached out to the religious elite in Mecca and Medina,Template:Sfn asked them to hold Ali accountable for sheltering the murderers of Uthman, and proposed that the next caliph should be elected by general consultation, emphasizing that he was not interested in the caliphate himself.Template:Sfn According to Ayoub, the Medinans rejected his request and accused him of deception and treachery, citing al-Kufi.Template:Sfn Madelung similarly writes that al-Miswar ibn Makhrama refused to support Mu'awiya on behalf of the holy cities, asking him in a letter what a whose father had led the confederate armies against Muslims had to do with the caliphate.Template:Sfn Mu'awiya did, however, win to his side Ubayd Allah, son of the second caliph Umar and a triple murderer, who had fled after learning that Ali intended to apply the lex talionis to him.Template:Sfn Mu'awiya also separately wrote to Abd-Allah ibn Umar and Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas among the Muhajirun, and Muhammad ibn Maslama among the Ansar. These all vowed neutrality in response. The last one also accused Mu'awiya of abandoning Uthman in his life and taking advantage of his death.Template:Sfn

Proposed secession of Syria and Egypt

Mu'awiya soon privately visited Ali's emissary, Jarir, and proposed to recognize Ali as the caliph in return for Syria and Egypt and their revenues during the caliphates of Ali and his successor.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn The major historical accounts are unaware of this proposal, writes Madelung, which is nevertheless mentioned in a poem by al-Walid ibn Uqba, who was close to Mu'awiya. The latter kept this proposal secret evidently because it contradicted the public statements that his goal was to revenge Uthman.Template:Sfn Jarir conveyed this proposal to Ali in a letter, who rejected it,Template:Sfn possibly perceiving the proposal as a stratagem for Mu'awiya to take over the caliphate step by step.Template:Sfn Alternatively, had Ali accepted Mu'awiya's proposal, the Islamic territory might have been irreversibly divided into two parts, suggests McHugo.Template:Sfn

Declaration of war by Mu'awiya

Mu'awiya now sent Jarir back to Kufa with a formal declaration of war, which charged Ali with the murder of Uthman and vowed that the Syrians would fight Ali until he surrendered Uthman's murderers. Then there would be a Syrian council () to elect the next caliph, the declaration continued.Template:Sfn Ali replied to this letter that he was innocent and that the accusations of Mu'awiya lacked any evidence. He also challenged Mu'awiya to name any Syrian who would qualify to vote in a . As for handing Uthman's killers to Mu'awiya, Ali asked the latter to pledge allegiance and then present his case before Ali's court.Template:Sfn Ali viewed this as a rebellion against the legitimate Muslim caliph, that is, a challenge to "God's authority."Template:Sfn

Mu'awiya's motives

Modern authors often suggest that Mu'awiya defied Ali after he deposed him as the governor of Syria,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn or conditioned his pledge to Ali on the revenge for Uthman,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn knowing that Ali would dismiss him after giving his oath.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn At the time, Mu'awiya was repeatedly accused of abandoning Uthman during the deadly siege of his residence, and Ayoub thus views Mu'awiya's claim of revenge as a pretext.Template:Sfn Other modern authors similarly tend to consider Mu'awiya's call for revenge as a guise,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn intended initially to maintain his rule over Syria,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn or to seize the caliphate altogether later.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn For McHugo, this view is corroborated by Mu'awiya's secret offer to recognize the caliphate of Ali in return for Syria and Egypt.Template:Sfn An exception is Kennedy, who believes that Mu'awiya was sincerely seeking justice for Uthman.Template:Sfn Some authors instead regard the call for revenge as a pious cloak for broader issues: Hinds and Poonawala trace back Mu'awiya's revolt to his demands to rule over an autonomous Syria,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn which was kept free (unlike Iraq) from uncontrolled immigration to check the Byzantine threats.Template:Sfn In contrast, after the Byzantines' defeats,Template:Sfn Ali might have expected all provinces to equally share the burden of immigration.Template:Sfn Shaban has a similar view.Template:Sfn Verse 17:33 of the Quran was cited by Mu'awiya to justify revenge,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn "If anyone is killed wrongfully, We give his next-of-kin authority, but let him not be extravagant in killing, surely he is being helped," although Madelung suggests that the clause about a commensurate response was later ignored in the "frenzy of patriotic self-righteousness" created by Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn Mu'awiya's other justification for revolting against Ali was that he had not participated in the election of Ali,Template:Sfn or that the rebels were involved in the election.Template:Sfn

Regarding the emphasis on a Syrian after Ali, Mu'awiya's justification was that the people of Hejaz had abandoned the truth and it was now the Syrians who had to uphold the justice, as explained in a letter attributed to him shortly before the Battle of Siffin.Template:Sfn In reality, however, this emphasis was likely to ensure his own caliphate.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Madelung comments here that Mu'awiya later designated his son Yazid as his successor without any .Template:Sfn As for whether and when Mu'awiya first aspired to the caliphate,Template:Sfn it is the conclusion of Ayoub that he might have had two scenarios in mind: The first one was keeping the rule of Syria and annexing Egypt, as he indeed proposed to Ali's envoy, Jarir. Another clause of this same proposal was that Mu'awiya would not recognize the successor of Ali in case of his death, which suggests that Mu'awiya might have considered himself the future caliph after Ali.Template:Sfn The second scenario was that Mu'awiya would succeed in removing Ali from office. This is evident in some speeches and letters attributed to Mu'awiya before the Battle of Siffin, in which his case for the caliphate and seizing it by force is defended.Template:Sfn Gaining political power by force soon became the common practice for Muslim rulers and was also legitimized by some (Sunni) jurists.Template:Sfn

Ali and retribution for Uthman

Ali was openly critical of the conduct of Uthman, though he generally neither justified his violent death nor condemned his killers.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn While he did not condone the assassination,Template:Sfn Ali probably held Uthman responsible through his injustice for the protests that led to his death,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn a view for which Poonawala cites Waq'at Siffin.Template:Sfn From this same source, Ayoub cites the account of the negotiations before the Battle of Siffin, in which Ali is quoted as saying that Uthman was killed by those indignant about his transgressions. Even when pressed by Mu'awiya's envoys, the report adds that Ali refused to say that Uthman was killed wrongfully.Template:Sfn Madelung sides with this judgment of Ali from a judicial point of view, saying that Uthman probably did not sanction the murder of Niyar ibn Iyad Aslami, which triggered the deadly raid on his residence, but he obstructed justice by preventing an investigation into the murder, fearing that his aide Marwan was behind it.Template:Sfn Still, in his letters to Mu'awiya and elsewhere,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Ali insisted that he would bring the murderers to justice in due course,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn probably after establishing his authority.Template:Sfn Quoting al-Ya'qubi and al-Kufi, Ayoub suggests that a mob from various tribes murdered Uthman and that Ali could have not punished them without risking widespread tribal conflict, even if he could identify them.Template:Sfn Here, the Islamicists Farhad Daftary and John Kelsay say that the actual murderers soon fled (Medina) after the assassination,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn a view for which Jafri cites al-Tabari.Template:Sfn Closely associated with Ali was Malik al-Ashtar, a leader of the ,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn who had led the Kufan delegation against Uthman,Template:Sfn even though they had heeded Ali's call for nonviolence,Template:Sfn and did not participate in the deadly siege.Template:Sfn A leading Egyptian rebel with links to Ali was his stepson, Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr, who was allegedly among those who killed Uthman.Template:Sfn Other authors have rejected this accusation,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn though most sources seem to agree that Muhammad visited Uthman shortly before his death and rebuked him for his conduct.Template:Sfn These two men and some other supporters of Ali were implicated by Mu'awiya in the assassination of Uthman.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn In this light, some authors suggest that Ali was unwilling or unable to punish these individuals.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn In any case, the revenge for Uthman soon became the pretext for two revolts against Ali.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

Role of Mu'awiya in the assassination

Other authors have instead implicated Mu'awiya or his close associates in the assassination of Uthman. Madelung writes that Amr ibn al-As, a close ally of Mu'awiya, had earlier publicly taken credit for the assassination.Template:Sfn At the time, Mu'awiya was also repeatedly accused of abandoning Uthman during the deadly siege of his residence,Template:Sfn and this view is echoed by the Islamic author Hassan Abbas and by the Shia scholar Muhammad H. Tabatabai (Template:Died in).Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Similarly, a letter ascribed to the besieged Uthman by al-Tabari and al-Ya'qubi alleges that Mu'awiya deliberately withheld the requested reinforcements to benefit politically from the caliph's death.Template:Sfn It is also commonly believed that Marwan, the secretary of Uthman, was responsible for the intercepted instructions to punish the rebels that set off the final siege. However, Lesley Hazleton, an author on religion and politics, further suggests that Marwan may have done so at the instigation of Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn Abbas shares this view.Template:Sfn Tabatabai writes that, during his own caliphate, Mu'awiya no longer pursued vengeance for Uthman,Template:Sfn which was the basis for his claim to the caliphate.Template:Sfn

War preparations

Iraq

In Iraq, Ali called a council of the Muhajirun and the Ansar who unanimously urged him to fight Mu'awiya after the latter declared war.Template:Sfn Some apparently suggested that Ali remain in Kufa and send a force against Mu'awiya, but the caliph preferred to take the command himself.Template:Sfn As for the public, the Kufans were not united in supporting the war, either simply because of its expected toll,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn or because they were reluctant to shed other Muslims' blood,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn or perhaps because the Syrians had never pledged allegiance to Ali in the first place,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn even though similar cases were judged to be apostasy by Abu Bakr.Template:Sfn This last argument was also put forward to justify the rebellion in a letter directed at Ali and attributed to Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn Elsewhere, Ali is said to have barred his followers from cursing the Syrians, saying that it might jeopardize any remaining hopes for a peaceful resolution.Template:Sfn One such report is in connection with Hujr ibn Adi and Amr ibn al-Hamiq, both loyal to Ali. When the caliph learned that they were openly dissociating from and cursing the Syrians, he asked them to describe the evil in their actions instead of vilifying them.Template:Sfn After the Battle of Siffin, however, Ali introduced a curse on Mu'awiya in the s of his congregational prayers when the latter declared himself caliph in Syria.Template:Sfn A report by al-Tabari indicates that Ali directly negotiated with the Kufan tribal leaders and enlisted in his army some 40,000 (Template:Lit), 17,000 of their sons who had reached the fighting age, and 8,000 clients and slaves. In Basra, however, Ali's governor was only able to recruit some 3200 men.Template:Sfn

Syria

In Syria, Uthman's bloodstained shirt was taken from town to town to incite the people to revenge,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn though the support for the war was also not unanimous there.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Among others, Shurahbil ibn Simt rallied support against Ali across Syria, directly accusing the caliph of killing Uthman in his speeches, according to Ibn Muzahim.Template:Sfn To show the success of Mu'awiya's campaign against Ali, Bahramian cites a report by al-Tabari, according to which a Syrian soldier told his Iraqi counterpart that their prayers were invalid because they were led by Ali.Template:Sfn Mua'wiya also secured the Byzantine borders by agreeing to a truce at the cost of a "humiliating" tribute to them.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn He left the protection of his western borders to three local Palestinian commanders, probably because Muhammad ibn Abu Bakr faced internal problems as Ali's new governor in Egypt.Template:Sfn

Comparisons

Siffin is described in Arabic sources as a conflict between the people of Iraq and Syria,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn in which most tribes were represented on both sides,Template:Sfn such as the Banu Kath'am, which was divided to Iraqi and Syrian branches.Template:Sfn The number of troops is uncertain. According to Nasr ibn Muzahim (Template:Died in), both armies numbered around 150,000 by one report, whereas another report puts the numbers at 100,000 and 130,000 for Ali and Mu'awiya, respectively.Template:Sfn As for their Islamic credentials, a considerable number of Muhammad's companions were present in Ali's army, whereas Mu'awiya could only boast a handful of companions.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn In the opinion of Ayoub, the Syrian army was loyal to Mu'awiya, whereas Ali's troops were mostly semi-nomadic men unaccustomed to a central authority.Template:Sfn To support his view, Ayoub cites a tradition attributed to al-Hajjaj ibn Khuzayma. He reportedly brought the news of the assassination to Mu'awiya, praised the loyalty of his army, and added that with Ali were men who often interrupted his speech and questioned his command.Template:Sfn As for the recruitments, the historian Michael Lecker considers Mua'wiya's "fierce and at times cynical" propaganda more successful than Ali's. The former also promised better material benefits to tribal leaders compared to Ali, who applied strict measures to governors who embezzled money, and this in turn led to their defection to Mu'awiya's side. Lecker thus considers Mu'awiya's or well-considered opportunism to be more successful at Siffin than Ali's piety.Template:Sfn Some Arabic sources further contrast Mu'awiya's or opportunism with Ali's (Islamic chivalry).Template:Sfn Shia sources also describe Siffin as a confrontation of Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law with the son of Muhammad's arch-enemy, Abu Sufyan, who had led the confederate armies against Muslims in the Battle of the Trench.Template:Sfn This attitude is also reflected in a report by the Sunni al-Tabari, in which a companion of Ali likens the battle against Mu'awiya to Muhammad's battle against the polytheists () or rather its continuation.Template:Sfn In Iraq, it is the view of historian Bernard Lewis (Template:Died in) that the position of Ali was weakened by tribal disunity and insubordination.Template:Sfn To illustrate the division among Kufans, Ayoub cites an account by Ibn Muzahim to the effect that some asked Ali for permission to accompany his army without engaging in battle until they made up their minds.Template:Sfn In contrast, Syria was ruled by the Ghassanids before Islam, and the Syrians were thus accustomed to a central authority and obedient to Mu'awiya, according to Wellhausen.Template:Sfn

Skirmishes

After leaving Kufa, Ali's army took the route through al-Mada'in.Template:Sfn They reached Siffin early in the summer of 36/657, a location west of the Euphrates.Template:Sfn There, the forces of Mu'awiya were already waiting for them,Template:Sfn and prevented them from accessing the watering place.Template:Sfn A messenger of Ali now told Mu'awiya that they did not wish to fight the Syrians without proper warning,Template:Sfn to which Mu'awiya responded by fortifying the forces who were guarding the water.Template:Sfn Their justification for depriving Iraqis of water was their claim that their enemies were the murderers of Uthman. This is indeed what al-Imama wa al-siyasa quotes from al-Walid ibn Uqba, an advisor to Mu'awiya.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn In the opinion of Madelung, however, Mu'awiya and the Syrians were perhaps carried away by their own propaganda against Ali.Template:Sfn In a related account, al-Ya'qubi quotes Mu'awiya as saying, "May God not allow me and [my father] Abu Sufyan drink from the spring () of the messenger of God if they [the enemies] ever drink from this water."Template:Sfn Soon, however, the Iraqis drove off the Syrians and seized control of the watering place, though Ali permitted the enemies to freely access the water source.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn For Ayoub, this episode is an example of how Mu'awiya used religious language for military and political gain, while Ali held religious imperatives above all.Template:Sfn The two sides at Siffin engaged in skirmishes and negotiations.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn This continued for some three months,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn certainly through the month of Muharram,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn in which fighting is prohibited in Islam.Template:Sfn The long idle period reflects the troops' reluctance for battle,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn possibly because they were averse to shedding other Muslims' blood,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn or because most tribes were represented on both sides.Template:Sfn Donner believes that neither of the two leaders enjoyed strong support among their armies.Template:Sfn At any rate, the negotiations failed,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn possibly on 18 July 657, and the two sides readied for battle.Template:Sfn Per Arab customs, prominent figures fought with small retinues prior to the main battle, which took place a week later.Template:Sfn

Main battle

File:Sword and shield reproduction from Bab al Nasr gate Cairo Egypt.jpg

Zulfiqar with and without the shield. The Fatimid depiction of Ali's sword as carved on the Gates of Old Cairo, namely Bab al-Nasr.

Historical materials are abundant about the Battle of Siffin but they often describe disconnected episodes of the war. Lecker and Wellhausen have thus found it impossible to establish the course of the battle.Template:Sfn Nevertheless, it can be said with some certainty that the battle began on Wednesday, 26 July 657,Template:Sfn and continued to Friday or Saturday morning.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Ali probably refrained from initiating hostilities, according to al-Tabari,Template:Sfn and fought with his men on the frontline when the main battle broke out, whereas Mu'awiya led from his pavilion.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn At the end of the first day, having pushed back Ali's right-wing, Mu'awiya had fared better overall.Template:Sfn Amr ibn al-As was one of the commanders of the Syrian army.Template:Sfn Their advance guard was led by Abu al-A'war al-Sulami, who is credited with depriving Ali's troops from drinking water prior to battle. On the other side, Kennedy suggests that Malik al-Ashtar was an inspiration on the battlefield to many of the Iraqis, at one point saving his men from fleeing in panic. Early on, he is said to have challenged Abu al-A'war to single combat, but the latter refused.Template:Sfn

On the second day, Mu'awiya concentrated his assault on Ali's left wing but his forces were pushed back by the Iraqis.Template:Sfn Mu'awiya was compelled to flee his pavilion and took shelter in an army tent.Template:Sfn On this day, Ubayd Allah ibn Umar was killed fighting for Mu'awiya. He had earlier fled to Syria when he learned that Ali intended to punish him for murdering some Persians innocent in the assassination of Umar.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn On the other side, Ammar ibn Yasir, an octogenarian companion of Muhammad, was killed fighting for Ali.Template:Sfn In the canonical Sunni sources Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, a prophetic hadith (Template:Lit) predicts Ammar's death at the hands of (Template:Lit) who invite to hellfire.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

On the third day, Mu'awiya turned down the proposal to settle the matters in a personal duel with Ali, brought forward separately by Ali and some of Mu'awiya's followers.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Urwa ibn Dawud al-Dimashqi volunteered to fight instead of Mu'awiya and was promptly "cleft in two" by Ali.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn After another indecisive day, the battle continued throughout (Template:Lit).Template:Sfn Unlike Ali, Mu'awiya did not allow the enemy to recover and bury their dead when he advanced.Template:Sfn It was perhaps around this time that Mu'awiya repeated his earlier offer for peace in return for the rule of Syria, according to Ibn Muzahim. His account adds that Ali rejected the offer again, saying that he would not abandon against the enemies of God, even if he were to be killed in His way seventy times and revived each time.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn According to the same source, also around the same time did Mu'awiya send his brother Utba to negotiate a separate truce with al-Ash'ath ibn Qays, the influential Yemenite tribal leader, who was not closely associated with Ali or his cause.Template:Sfn

Call to arbitration

By the next morning,Template:Sfn the balance had moved in favor of Ali,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn as also suggested by al-Tabari and al-Baladhuri.Template:Sfn Before noon, however, some of the Syrians raised pages of the Quran on their lances, shouting, "Let the Book of God be the judge between us."Template:Sfn The fighting thus stopped at once.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Bahramian lists two precedents for this: Before the Battle of the Camel, a representative of Ali, carrying a copy of the Quran, had summoned the rebels to the book. The war broke out when that man was killed by the rebels. Then during the Battle of the Camel, Ka'b ibn Sur al-Azdi, the judge () of Basra, who counted among the rebels, walked to the battlefield with a copy of the Quran and pleaded for the fighting to stop.Template:Sfn By this point at Siffin, Ali is estimated to have lost 25,000 men, while Mu'awiya might have lost 45,000 men.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn It was consistently Mu'awiya's position that battle was the only option acceptable to the Syrians. The Syrians' call for arbitration thus indicates that Mu'awiya had sensed imminent defeat, argue Madelung and McHugo.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn This tends to be the view of many other modern authors,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn some of whom add that Mu'awiya was advised to do so by Amr ibn al-As,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn citing al-Tabari and al-Baladhuri, among others.Template:Sfn

Iraqis' reaction

The Syrians' call to arbitration on the basis of the Quran has thus been interpreted as an offer to surrender.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Even so, Ali's army stopped fighting, perhaps because devout Muslims in his camp had been fighting to enforce the rule of the Quran all along,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn or simply because both armies were exhausted and a truce must have appealed to them,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn or because some in his camp saw the ceasefire as an opportunity to regain their influence over Ali.Template:Sfn While this majority wanted the fighting to stop,Template:Sfn there was also probably a minority that was certain of victory and wanted the fight to continue,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn and yet another minority that followed Ali unconditionally.Template:Sfn For his part, Ali is said to have exhorted his men to continue fighting, telling them to no avail that raising the Quran was for deception.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn The account of Ibn Muzahim too reflects this attitude of Ali.Template:Sfn Despite his pleas, the majorityTemplate:Sfn of the Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn and those reluctant for war insisted on accepting the call to arbitration.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn In the former group, Mis'ar ibn Fadaki and Zayd ibn Hisn al-Ta'i, who both later became Kharijite leaders, threatened to kill Ali if he did not answer the Syrians' call.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn The latter group included the tribesmen of Kufa and all newcomers to the city from their clans.Template:Sfn These formed the largest bloc in Ali's army.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn They followed al-Ash'ath ibn Qays, who told Ali that his clan would not fight for him if he refused the Syrians' call,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn as reported in Waq'at Siffin and Moruj.Template:Sfn Ali might have thus faced a mutiny,Template:Sfn and was forced to recall al-Ashtar,Template:Sfn who is said to have advanced far towards the Syrian camp,Template:Sfn reportedly separated from victory by "a horse's gallop."Template:Sfn He initially refused to stop fighting,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn perhaps sensing imminent victory.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Contrary to all these reports, an account by al-Kufi suggests that Ali welcomed the call to arbitration, even comparing it to the Treaty of Hudaybiyya (628) by Muhammad.Template:Sfn This account is also what John Kelsay and Reza Aslan prefer,Template:Sfn with the latter saying that most of his men pleaded with Ali to ignore the call to arbitration but he accepted it and cited the Quranic verse 2:193, "if [the enemy] desists, then you must also cease hostilities."Template:Sfn Fred Donner writes that Ali only reluctantly accepted arbitration.Template:Sfn Notwithstanding these two, modern authors tend to view Ali as opposed to the arbitration, including Madelung,Template:Sfn McHugo,Template:Sfn Poonawala,Template:Sfn and Ayoub.Template:Sfn

Iraqis' motives

As for the motives of al-Ash'ath, Ali had confirmed him in his post as the governor of Azerbaijan under Uthman, but also warned him in a letter about embezzling public funds.Template:Sfn The governor might have done so during his tenure under Uthman,Template:Sfn and thus perhaps contemplated joining Mu'awiya in rebellion but was dissuaded from doing so.Template:Sfn Ali later supported Hujr ibn Adi, a rival of al-Ash'ath within the Kinda tribe,Template:Sfn and then removed the latter from his military post just before leaving Iraq, replacing him with Hasan ibn Makhduj. These last two belonged to different Yemenite tribes and the appointment thus rekindled old tribal rivalries, according to Ayoub.Template:Sfn While al-Ash'ath is also known to have expressed concern over the insecurity of Iran and the Byzantines' threat during the civil war,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Kennedy suggests that he also preferred a weakened Ali.Template:Sfn Jafri similarly writes that al-Ash'ath and other Kufan tribal leaders would have benefited from a deadlock between Ali and Mu'awiya: On the one hand, they would have lost their tribal power under a victorious Ali, who likely intended to restore the Islamic leadership in Kufa at the cost of its tribal aristocracy that had emerged under Uthman.Template:Sfn On the other hand, Mu'awiya's victory would have meant the subjugation and loss of Iraq as the base of their power.Template:Sfn Therefore, they reluctantly participated in Siffin and readily accepted the arbitration offers.Template:Sfn The opinion of Hinds is close,Template:Sfn while Shaban similarly writes that the Kufan tribes had benefited from Uthman's policies and were not enthusiastic about the war with Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn Jafri further suggests that the Kufan tribal leaders probably resented the egalitarian policies of Ali, as he divided the treasury funds equally among Arabs and non-Arabs, and among late- and new-comers to Kufa.Template:Sfn This is also the view of Ayoub.Template:Sfn

There are different views as to why the preferred arbitration. Perhaps they welcomed arbitration by the Quran because they had been fighting to enforce the rule of the Quran all along.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Alternatively, Kennedy suggests that the may have wanted a compromise with the Syrians that would have restricted the caliph. His argument is that the Iraqi had opposed Uthman to gain more financial and political autonomy. They were thus willing to grant the same autonomy to the Syrians.Template:Sfn In contrast, Jafri first argues that the term in early sources loosely refers to two groups: The first group was the Kufan who revolted against Uthman and loyally supported Ali, led by the likes of Malik al-Ashtar and Hujr ibn Adi. The second group was the Basran and other tribesmen who conveniently advanced their claims under the cloak of Islamic priority. It was this second group that backed the arbitration proposal, following the tribal leaders, who then nominated as their representative Abu Musa al-Ash'ari with a known preference for Qurayshite domination. It was at this point that the disillusioned second group rejected the arbitration and formed the Kharijites.Template:Sfn That the Kharijites consisted primarily of Basran tribesmen is also the view of the modern Islamicist Maria M. Dakake.Template:Sfn

Arbitration agreement

Mu'awiya then conveyed his proposal that representatives from both sides should together reach a binding solution on the basis of the Quran.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn He was silent at this point about revenge for Uthman and removal of Ali from office.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Ibn Muzahim names Abu al-A'war al-Sulami as Mu'awiya's envoy to Ali.Template:Sfn The proposal of Mu'awiya was accepted by the majority of Ali's army, reports al-Tabari.Template:Sfn Nevertheless, the opposition to arbitration was a sizeable minority in Ali's camp,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn consisting of those who now realized the political motives of Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn This minority wanted Ali to resume fighting,Template:Sfn and their proposal was likely favored by Ali too.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn He declined it, however, saying that they would be crushed by the majority and the Syrians who all demanded arbitration.Template:Sfn Some of these dissidents left for Kufa, while others stayed, perhaps hoping that Ali might later change his mind.Template:Sfn Facing strong peace sentiments in his army, Ali thus accepted the arbitration proposal,Template:Sfn most likely against his own judgment.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Here, Madelung criticizes Ali for this decision and suggests that he acted more like a tribal chief than the caliph.Template:Sfn Later Ali defended his decision in Kufa, saying that he considered continuing the fight, alongside that minority, but feared that Hasan and Husayn would perish and with them the lineage of Muhammad.Template:Sfn It is also possible that he expected the arbitration to collapse but reluctantly went along with it to exhaust this option which was favored by the majority in his camp who apparently hoped for an honorable settlement with Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn In any case, the arbitration agreement divided the camp of Ali, as many there could not accept that he would negotiate with Mu'awiya, whose claims they considered fraudulent. It also handed Mu'awiya a moral victory as an equal contender for the caliphate.Template:Sfn

Selection of the arbitrators

In Ali's camp, Abu Musa al-Ashari was proposed as the representative by al-Ash'ath and the Iraqi , who were led by Zayd ibn Hisn al-T'a'i and Mis'ar ibn Fadaki.Template:Sfn Abu Musa was the former governor of Kufa, installed by the Iraqi rebels and later confirmed by Ali,Template:Sfn who was dissuaded from removing him by al-Ashtar.Template:Sfn Anyway, he was soon dismissed after opposing the war preparations for the Battle of the Camel.Template:Sfn The majority in Ali's army also pressed for Abu Musa, even though he was reportedly neutral, and despite the opposition of Ali,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn who said he could not trust Abu Musa because he had earlier agitated against him.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Ali was also apparently concerned about Abu Musa's political naivety,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn or about his neutrality.Template:Sfn The alternatives proposed by Ali were Ibn Abbas and al-Ashtar, according to Ibn Muzahim, both of whom were rejected by al-Ash'ath and other Yemenites,Template:Sfn and also by the Iraqi .Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Veccia Vaglieri and Rahman write that the Iraqis were so convinced of the legitimacy of their cause that they insisted on the neutral Abu Musa,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn whereas others suggest that they were impressed by his piety,Template:Sfn or his beautiful recitations of the Quran,Template:Sfn or that he stood for provincial autonomy in Kufans' view.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Mu'awiya was represented by his top general, Amr ibn al-As,Template:Sfn who acted solely in the interest of Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn

Content of the agreement

The arbitration agreement was written and signed by both parties on 15 Safar 37 (2 August 657).Template:Sfn Abu Musa and Amr represented Ali and Mu'awiya, respectively.Template:Sfn The two representatives committed to meet on neutral territory,Template:Sfn to adhere to the Quran and Sunna and to save the community from war and division,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn a clause added evidently to appease the peace party.Template:Sfn Citing Ibn Muzahim, Ayoub gives additional details: The arbitrators were to find guidance in the "uniting" and not "dividing" Sunna of Muhammad, and to do so only if they could not find their answer in the Quran.Template:Sfn Making peace was the only objective listed in the agreement,Template:Sfn which also guaranteed the safety of the arbitrators and made their ruling binding.Template:Sfn The agreement also initially referred to Ali by his official title of (Template:Lit) but this was omitted at the behest of Mu'awiya,Template:Sfn or Amr ibn al-As.Template:Sfn This was pressed by al-Ash'ath upon Ali, who reluctantly accepted it, apparently comparing it with the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, in which Muhammad was not referred to as the messenger of God at the request of the infidels. Variations of this account are given by al-Tabari, Ibn Muzahim,Template:Sfn al-Kufi, and Ibn Abi'l-Hadid.Template:Sfn The agreement thus treated Ali and Mu'awiya as equal contenders for the caliphate, rather than a rebellious Mu'awiya against the sitting caliph, Ali.Template:Sfn The two arbitrators were given a year to come to a decision,Template:Sfn or until the end of Ramadan, some seven months later, but this deadline was flexible.Template:Sfn In case they failed, hostilities would resume.Template:Sfn Two days after this agreement both armies left the battlefield.Template:Sfn

Seceders

As Ali returned to Kufa, some of his men seceded and gathered outside of Kufa in protest to the arbitration agreement.Template:Sfn Bahramian puts their number at 12,000, citing al-Baladhuri and al-Tabari.Template:Sfn Ali visited them and told them that they had opted for the arbitration despite his warnings,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn according to al-Tabari.Template:Sfn The seceders agreed and told Ali that they had repented for their sins and now demanded that Ali followed suit.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn To this, he responded with the general declaration, "I repent to God and ask for his forgiveness for every sin,"Template:Sfn and also ensured them that the judgment of the arbitrators would not be binding if they deviated from the Quran and Sunna.Template:Sfn He thus largely regained their support at the time.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn But when the seceders returned to Kufa, they spread that Ali had nullified the arbitration agreement,Template:Sfn which he denied,Template:Sfn saying that he was committed to the formal agreement with Mu'awiya.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Similar statements are attributed to Ali by Ibn Muzahim and Ibn Abi'l-Hadid, in which the caliph vows to uphold the covenant with Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn In another account by al-Tabari, Ali cites verse 16:91 for upholding the treaty when two Kharijites, namely, Zur'a ibn al-Burj al-Ta'i and Hurqus ibn Zuhayr al-Sa'di, appealed to him to revoke it.Template:Sfn Many of the dissidents apparently accepted Ali's position,Template:Sfn while the rest left for al-Nahrawan, a town near al-Mada'in, and there declared Abd-Allah ibn Wahb al-Rasibi (Template:Died in) as their leader.Template:Sfn These formed the Kharijites (Template:Lit), who later took up arms against Ali in the Battle of Nahrawan (658).Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn They soon labeled anyone who opposed them as nonbelievers,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn who had to be fought,Template:Sfn thus becoming the forerunners of Islamic extremism, according to some.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn

Their motives

Donner suggests that the seceders, among them many of the ,Template:Sfn may have feared being held accountable for their role in the assassination of Uthman.Template:Sfn Alternatively, Hinds and Poonawala believe that the seceders were disillusioned with the arbitration process, particularly by the removal of Ali's title of in the final agreement and by its reference to the Sunna next to the Quran,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn as noted also in Waq'at Sifin.Template:Sfn After being silent about it initially, the Syrians now said that they also wanted the arbitrators to judge whether the killing of Uthman was justified, about which the had no doubts.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Hinds and Poonawala thus regard the arbitration as a skilfully-planned manoeuvre to disintegrate the coalition of Ali.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn For Ayoub, the seceders were frustrated with a costly war that had achieved nothing and denounced the agreement that questioned the authority of the legitimate Muslim caliph, in their view.Template:Sfn

Their slogan

File:Muhakkimite Creed.png

Kharijites' slogan in Arabic, "No judgment but that of God"

The seceders adopted the slogan, "No judgment but that of God,"Template:Sfn highlighting their rejection of the arbitration (by men) in reference to the Quranic verse 49:9, "If two parties of the Believers fight with one another, make peace between them; but if one rebels against the other, then fight against the one that rebels, until they return to obedience to God."Template:Sfn When they interrupted Ali's sermon with this slogan, he commented that it was a word of truth by which the seceders sought falsehood. He added that they were repudiating government even though a ruler was indispensable in the conduct of religion.Template:Sfn Ali nevertheless did not bar their entry to mosques or deprive them of their shares in the treasury, saying that they should be fought only if they initiate hostilities.Template:Sfn

Arbitration

The accounts of the arbitration are highly tendentious.Template:Sfn Nevertheless, after some months of preparation, or perhaps even a year after the initial agreement,Template:Sfn it appears that the two arbitrators met together, first in Dumat al-Jandal, halfway between Iraq and Syria,Template:Sfn and then in Udhruh,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn in southern Palestine.Template:Sfn This is the understanding of Madelung, Veccia Vaglieri, Caetani,Template:Sfn and Bahramian,Template:Sfn while some others believe that the two arbitrators met only once.Template:Sfn

First meeting

In Dumat al-Jandal, the proceedings lasted for (possibly three) weeks,Template:Sfn likely extending to mid-April 658.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn The account of al-Tabari depicts Abu Musa as opposed to the caliphates of both Ali and Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn As an early companion of Muhammad, it is similarly the understanding of Madelung that Abu Musa did not support the caliphate of Mu'awiya, a . With a strong preference for peace among Muslims, Abu Musa was likely willing to confirm Ali as the caliph, provided that he would reinstate Mu'awiya as the governor of Syria, perhaps because he was well-liked by his army, and on the condition that Mu'awiya would, in turn, recognize Ali as the caliph. Ideally, however, Abu Musa may have preferred a broad that included Ali and Abd-Allah ibn Umar. The latter was his son-in-law and also favorite for the caliphate.Template:Sfn The similar account of Ibn Muzahim is that Abu Musa proposed removing Ali and installing the neutral Abd-Allah ibn Umar for the caliphate,Template:Sfn even though Abd-Allah was probably uninterested in it.Template:Sfn This attitude of Abu Musa is also evident in an account given by al-Kufi and al-Tabari, who write that Mu'awiya sent al-Mughira ibn Shu'ba to assess the arbitrators' progress. He reportedly asked both what they thought of those who remained neutral in the conflict between Ali and Mu'awiya. Abu Musa answered that they were the best of mankind for they did not carry its burden, while Amr answered that they were the worst of mankind for neither they upheld a truth nor repudiated a falsehood.Template:Sfn Perhaps as an opener for the peace negotiations,Template:Sfn the two arbitrators first discussed the assassination of Uthman,Template:Sfn most likely at the initiative of Amr.Template:Sfn They reached the verdict that Uthman had been killed wrongfully and that Mu'awiya had the right to seek revenge,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn but could not agree on anything else, either because Amr blocked the choice of Ali for the caliphate or a fresh ,Template:Sfn or because Abu Musa was adamant in his opposition to Mu'awiya.Template:Sfn Madelung views the verdict about Uthman as a political one, a judicial misjudgment, and a blunder of the naive Abu Musa, who might have hoped that Amr would later reciprocate his concession.Template:Sfn From the perspective of Abu Musa himself, his verdict did not authorize Mu'awiya to claim the caliphate, a prerogative which was reserved for the Muhajirun in his view,Template:Sfn as reported by Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Muzahim.Template:Sfn The verdict was not made public but both parties learned of it anyway.Template:Sfn In particular, Ali denounced the conduct of the two arbitrators as contrary to the Quran and began organizing a new expedition to Syria.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn

Second meeting

Evidently not endorsed by Ali, the second meeting was convened in Udhruh in January 659,Template:Sfn or in August–September 658,Template:Sfn probably to discuss the succession to Ali.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn Not part of the arbitration process, this second meeting was solely an initiative of Mu'awiya,Template:Sfn who also invited the sons of prominent companions to take part, including Abd-Allah ibn Umar, Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr, Abd-Allah ibn al-Zubayr, al-Mughira ibn Shu'ba, and some others.Template:Sfn Some of these were from Hejaz and had remained neutral throughout the conflict, perhaps lured to Udhruh by the promise of a broad for choosing the next caliph.Template:Sfn Their presence was nevertheless a major coup, suggests Madelung, because Hejaz was still controlled by Ali at the time.Template:Sfn In particular, that Abd-Allah ibn Umar accepted the invitation of Mu'awiya hints at his interest in the caliphate,Template:Sfn contrary to the rumors showing him uninterested.Template:Sfn The negotiations failed eventually,Template:Sfn as the two arbitrators could not agree on the next caliph: Amr supported Mu'awiya,Template:Sfn while Abu Musa nominated his son-in-law Abd Allah ibn Umar,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn who stood down in the interest of unity by his own account,Template:Sfn or more likely because he was intimidated by Mu'awiya,Template:Sfn who also publicly threatened him in the closing gala.Template:Sfn

As for the final scene of the Udhruh meeting, one popular account is that Abu Musa deposed both Ali and Mu'awiya and called for a council to appoint the new caliph per his earlier agreement with Amr. When Amr took the stage, however, he deposed Ali but confirmed Mu'awiya as the new caliph, thus violating his agreement with Abu Musa.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Similar variants of this account are recounted by Ibn Muzahim and al-Kufi.Template:Sfn The Kufan delegation then reacted furiously to Abu Musa's concessions,Template:Sfn and he fled to Mecca in disgrace, whereas Amr was well-received by Mu'awiya upon his return to Syria.Template:Sfn The common view is that the arbitration failed,Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn or was inconclusive.Template:SfnTemplate:Sfn This sentiment is perhaps summed up by the early historian Khalifah ibn Khayyat (Template:Died in) in one sentence, "The arbiters agreed on nothing."Template:Sfn The arbitration nevertheless strengthened the Syrians' support for Mu'awiya and weakened the position of Ali.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn It also gave the former an opportunity to regroup, according to Momen.Template:Sfn

Aftermath

After the conclusion of the arbitration, Syrians pledged their allegiance to Mu'awiya as the next caliph in 659,Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn or by the end of April–May 658, according to Bahramian.Template:Sfn Upon learning that Mu'awiya had declared himself caliph, Ali broke off all communications with him and introduced a curse on him in his congregational prayers, following the precedent of Muhammad.Template:Sfn Mu'awiya soon reciprocated by introducing a curse on Ali, his sons, and his top general.Template:Sfn With the news of their violence against civilians, Ali had to postpone his new Syria campaign to subdue the Kharijites in the Battle of Nahrawan in 658.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn Just before embarking on his second campaign to Syria in 661,Template:Sfn Ali was assassinated by a Kharijite during the morning prayers at the Mosque of Kufa.Template:SfnTemplate:SfnTemplate:Sfn In the long term, it is the opinion of Ayoub that the Battle of Siffin crystalized the emerging divide in the Muslim community and changed its course.Template:Sfn