Nihilism: Difference between revisions
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{{Short description|Denial of certain aspects of existence}} | {{Short description|Denial of certain aspects of existence}} | ||
{{About|views rejecting certain aspects of existence}} | {{About|views rejecting certain aspects of existence}} | ||
{{Redirect|Nihilist}} | {{Redirect|Nihilist}} | ||
'''Nihilism''' | {{Featured article}} | ||
{{Use American English|date=August 2025}} | |||
[[File:Forms of nihilism.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram with the texts "nihilism", "meaning", "morality", and "knowledge", together with arrows|Different forms of nihilism reject distinct aspects of existence, such as a higher meaning, morality, and knowledge.<ref name="auto5">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA35 35]}} }}</ref>]] | |||
'''Nihilism'''{{efn|Pronunciation: {{IPAc-en|ˈ|n|aɪ|(|h|)|ᵻ|l|ɪ|z|əm|,_|ˈ|n|iː|-}}}} is a family of [[Philosophy|philosophical]] views arguing that [[Meaning of life|life is meaningless]], that [[Morality|moral values]] are baseless, or that [[knowledge]] is impossible. Thus, such views reject the basis of certain ideas. Nihilistic views span several branches of philosophy, including [[ethics]], [[value theory]], [[epistemology]], and [[metaphysics]]. Nihilism is also described as a broad cultural phenomenon or historical movement that pervades [[modernity]] in the [[Western world]]. | |||
Existential nihilism asserts that life is inherently meaningless and lacks a higher purpose. By suggesting that all individual and societal achievements are ultimately pointless, it can lead to [[Apathy|indifference]], [[Motivation#Amotivation and akrasia|lack of motivation]], and [[existential crises]]. In response, some philosophers propose detachment from worldly concerns while others seek to discover or create values. Moral nihilism, a related view, denies the objective existence of | [[Existential nihilism]] asserts that life is inherently meaningless and lacks a higher purpose. By suggesting that all individual and societal achievements are ultimately pointless, it can lead to [[Apathy|indifference]], [[Motivation#Amotivation and akrasia|lack of motivation]], and [[existential crises]]. In response, some philosophers propose detachment from worldly concerns, while others seek to discover or create values. [[Moral nihilism]], a related view, denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that moral evaluations and practices rest on misguided assumptions without any foundation in external [[reality]]. | ||
In the | In epistemology or the theory of knowledge, nihilism challenges knowledge and [[truth]]. According to [[relativism]], knowledge, truth, or [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] are relative to the [[Perspectivism|perspectives]] of specific individuals or cultural contexts. This implies that there is no independent framework to assess which opinion is ultimately correct. [[Philosophical skepticism|Skeptical]] interpretations go further by denying the existence of knowledge or truth altogether. In metaphysics, [[Metaphysical nihilism|one form of nihilism]] states that the universe could have been empty without any objects. This view holds that there is no fundamental reason for [[Why is there anything at all?|why something exists rather than nothing]]. [[Mereological nihilism]] asserts that there are only simple objects, like [[elementary particle]]s, but no composite objects, like tables. Cosmological nihilism is the view that reality is [[Intelligible form|unintelligible]] and indifferent to human understanding. Other nihilist positions include political, semantic, logical, and [[therapeutic nihilism]]. | ||
Some aspects of nihilism have their roots in [[ancient philosophy]] in the form of challenges to established beliefs, values, and practices. However, nihilism is primarily associated with modernity, | Some aspects of nihilism have their roots in [[ancient philosophy]] in the form of challenges to established beliefs, values, and practices. However, nihilism is primarily associated with modernity, emerging in the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly in Germany and Russia through the works of [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] and [[Ivan Turgenev]]. It took center stage in the thought of [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], who understood nihilism as a pervasive cultural trend in which people lose the values and ideals guiding their lives as a result of [[secularization]]. In the 20th century, nihilist themes were explored by [[Dadaism]], [[existentialism]], and [[postmodern philosophy]]. | ||
== Definition, related terms, and etymology == | == Definition, related terms, and etymology == | ||
Nihilism is a family of views that reject or | Nihilism is a family of views that reject or deny certain aspects of [[existence]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–4, 73–76]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA35 35]}} }}</ref> Different forms of nihilism deny different features of reality. For example, [[existential nihilism]] denies that life has [[Meaning of life|a higher meaning]], and [[moral nihilism]] rejects the existence of [[Morality|moral phenomena]]. Similarly, epistemological nihilism questions the possibility of objective [[knowledge]], while political nihilism advocates the destruction of established [[political institution]]s.<ref name="auto5"/> The precise definition of nihilism is disputed, and many other definitions and types of nihilism have been proposed, covering a wide range of topics studied by different branches of philosophy, such as [[ethics]], [[value theory]], [[epistemology]], and [[metaphysics]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2, 18]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA8 8, 35]}} }}</ref> | ||
In addition to philosophical theories, nihilism can also refer to a broader cultural phenomenon or historical movement. In this context, it is primarily associated with [[modernity]] in the [[Western world]], characterized by deep skepticism | In addition to philosophical theories, nihilism can also refer to a broader cultural phenomenon or historical movement. In this context, it is primarily associated with [[modernity]] in the [[Western world]], characterized by deep skepticism toward established norms and values alongside indifference, [[despair]], and a lack of purpose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=1}} | {{harvnb|ter Borg|1988|pp=1–2}}}}</ref> Outside the academic discourse, the term ''nihilism'' is used more loosely in everyday language to describe negative, destructive, or [[Anti-social behaviour|antisocial]] attitudes, expressing that someone fails to care about a particular issue. For instance, [[conservatives]] may be labeled as nihilistic for not valuing progress, while [[progressives]] may be described as such for disregarding established norms.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3–5]}} | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022}} }}</ref> | ||
[[File:Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi portrait.jpg|thumb|alt=Oil painting of a man in a dark coat with golden embroidery and his arms crossed|[[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] | [[File:Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi portrait.jpg|thumb|alt=Oil painting of a man in a dark coat with golden embroidery and his arms crossed|[[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] coined the term ''nihilism'' as a philosophical concept.<ref>{{multiref| {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA32 32]}} | {{harvnb|Livieri|di Giovanni|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. Life and Intellectual Career, § 3.5 The Open Letter to Fichte (1799)}} | {{harvnb|Bensussan|2025|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hb9wEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA12 12]}}}}</ref>]] | ||
Nihilism is closely associated with other | Nihilism is closely associated with other disillusioned attitudes toward the world, like [[Philosophical pessimism|pessimism]], [[absurdism]], [[existentialism]], [[Cynicism (contemporary)|cynicism]], and [[apathy]]. Although the meanings of these terms overlap, they have distinct connotations and do not necessarily imply one another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA59 59]}} | {{harvnb|Cutler|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LdAdBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 33]}} }}</ref> Pessimism contrasts with [[optimism]] as a negative outlook focused on bad outcomes and characterized by [[hopelessness]]. A key difference to nihilism, according to one interpretation, is that pessimists see the world as inherently bad, whereas nihilists deny that it has any positive or negative meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA60 60–64]}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|Llanera|2020|pp=27–28}} }}</ref> Absurdism argues that the world is not just meaningless, as existential nihilism asserts, but also absurd. It examines the absurdity arising from paradoxical attempts to find meaning in an inherently meaningless universe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA44 44–45]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gordon|1984|pp=15–18}} }}</ref> Existentialism is a philosophical tradition that addresses absurdist and nihilist views while exploring the [[human condition]] through themes like [[anxiety]], death, freedom, and [[Authenticity (philosophy)|authenticity]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Aho|2025|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Burnham|Papandreopoulos|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Cynicism is a distrustful attitude toward the motives of other people or society in general.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA64 64–65]}} | {{harvnb|Bewes|1997|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iR3C_y0kYCgC&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|pp=55–56, 59}} }}</ref> Apathy is a [[mental state|state of mind]] in which a person does not care about things, characterized by indifference and a lack of desires and emotions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA68 68–71]}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018}} }}</ref> | ||
The word ''nihilism'' is a combination of the [[Latin]] term {{lang|la|nihil}}, meaning {{gloss|nothing}}, and the [[suffix]] ''-ism'', indicating an [[ideology]]. Its literal meaning is {{gloss|ideology of nothing}} or {{gloss|ideology of negation}}, reflected in terms like ''annihilate'' and ''nihility''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Hoad|1996|p=313}} }}</ref> The word emerged in 18th-century Germany, first as a literary term and later as a philosophical notion, which [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] conceptualized to criticize philosophical thought that rejects meaning or existence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gloy|2013|p=[https://brill.com/display/title/51616 146]}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA32 32]}} | {{harvnb|Livieri|di Giovanni|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. Life and Intellectual Career, § 3.5 The Open Letter to Fichte (1799)}} }}</ref> Its first recorded use in English dates to the 1810s.<ref>{{harvnb|OED staff|2025}}</ref> The term became popular in 19th-century Russia through [[Ivan Turgenev]]'s novel ''[[Fathers and Sons (novel)|Fathers and Sons]]'' and the [[Russian nihilist movement]]. Interest in it increased more broadly in the 20th century in response to [[Friedrich Nietzsche]]'s works while its meaning expanded to cover a wider range of philosophical and cultural phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi, xix–xx, 110}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–673}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} }}</ref> | The word ''nihilism'' is a combination of the [[Latin]] term {{lang|la|nihil}}, meaning {{gloss|nothing}}, and the [[suffix]] ''-ism'', indicating an [[ideology]]. Its literal meaning is {{gloss|ideology of nothing}} or {{gloss|ideology of negation}}, reflected in terms like ''annihilate'' and ''nihility''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Hoad|1996|p=313}} }}</ref> The word emerged in 18th-century Germany, first as a literary term and later as a philosophical notion, which [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]] conceptualized to criticize philosophical thought that rejects meaning or existence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gloy|2013|p=[https://brill.com/display/title/51616 146]}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA32 32]}} | {{harvnb|Livieri|di Giovanni|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. Life and Intellectual Career, § 3.5 The Open Letter to Fichte (1799)}} }}</ref> Its first recorded use in English dates to the 1810s.<ref>{{harvnb|OED staff|2025}}</ref> The term became popular in 19th-century Russia through [[Ivan Turgenev]]'s novel ''[[Fathers and Sons (novel)|Fathers and Sons]]'' and the [[Russian nihilist movement]]. Interest in it increased more broadly in the 20th century in response to [[Friedrich Nietzsche]]'s works, while its meaning expanded to cover a wider range of philosophical and cultural phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi, xix–xx, 110}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–673}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} }}</ref> | ||
== Ethics and value theory == | == Ethics and value theory == | ||
[[File:Nietzsche1882.jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo showing a man with a thick mustache from the side, wearing a dark suit and resting | [[File:Nietzsche1882.jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo showing a man with a thick mustache from the side, wearing a dark suit and resting his head on his hand|[[Friedrich Nietzsche]] described nihilism as the process in which "the highest values devaluate themselves".<ref>{{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=1}}</ref>]] | ||
Forms of nihilism belonging to the fields of [[ethics]] and [[value theory]] question the existence of values, [[morality]], and the [[meaning of life]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Cowan|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=§ Are Value Claims Truth Evaluable?, § Quasi-Realism and Creeping Minimalism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165–169]}} }}</ref> | |||
=== Existential nihilism === | === Existential nihilism === | ||
{{main|Existential nihilism}} | {{main|Existential nihilism}} | ||
Existential nihilism asserts that life is meaningless. It is not limited to the idea that some people fail to find meaning in their lives but makes the broader claim that human existence in general or the world as a whole lacks a higher purpose. This view suggests that | Existential nihilism asserts that life is meaningless. It is not limited to the idea that some people fail to find meaning in their lives but makes the broader claim that human existence in general or the world as a whole lacks a higher purpose. This view suggests that living a genuinely meaningful life is impossible, that there is no higher reason to continue living, and that all efforts, achievements, happiness, and suffering are ultimately pointless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 3. Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Groothuis|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_2jDDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 165–169]}} }}</ref> | ||
Existential nihilism has diverse practical implications since people usually act with a purpose in mind, sometimes with the explicit goal of making their lives meaningful. As a result, the belief that there is no higher meaning or purpose can bring about [[Apathy|indifference]], a [[Motivation#Amotivation_and_akrasia|lack of motivation]], and [[anxiety]]. In extreme cases, this can result in [[Depression (mood)|depression]] and despair or trigger an [[existential crisis]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=423–428}} | {{harvnb|Sommers-Flanagan|Sommers-Flanagan|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RMclh6zR3LEC&pg=PA131 131]}} }}</ref>{{efn|Existential crises are inner conflicts in which individuals struggle to find meaning in their lives. Some authors suggest that nihilistic beliefs can trigger existential crises. Others propose nihilism as one way to resolve them by learning to accept meaninglessness rather than finding a source of meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=125–126}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=423–428}} | {{harvnb|Davis|Hicks|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HcxEAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA166 166, 171–172 ]}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2023}} }}</ref>}} Some philosophers, such as [[Martin Heidegger]] | Existential nihilism has diverse practical implications since people usually act with a purpose in mind, sometimes with the explicit goal of making their lives meaningful. As a result, the belief that there is no higher meaning or purpose can bring about [[Apathy|indifference]], a [[Motivation#Amotivation_and_akrasia|lack of motivation]], and [[anxiety]]. In extreme cases, this can result in [[Depression (mood)|depression]] and despair or trigger an [[existential crisis]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=423–428}} | {{harvnb|Sommers-Flanagan|Sommers-Flanagan|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=RMclh6zR3LEC&pg=PA131 131]}} }}</ref>{{efn|Existential crises are inner conflicts in which individuals struggle to find meaning in their lives. Some authors suggest that nihilistic beliefs can trigger existential crises. Others propose nihilism as one way to resolve them by learning to accept meaninglessness rather than finding a source of meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=125–126}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=423–428}} | {{harvnb|Davis|Hicks|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HcxEAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA166 166, 171–172 ]}} | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2023}} }}</ref>}} Some philosophers, such as [[Martin Heidegger]], highlight the connection to [[boredom]], arguing that the lack of engagement and goals experienced in this [[Mood (psychology)|mood]] makes life appear pointless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25–27]}} | {{harvnb|George|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Ym7vCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 74]}} }}</ref> | ||
[[File: | [[File:Sartre 1967 crop.jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of a man with glasses wearing a dark suit with a tie|Considering the problem of existential nihilism, [[Jean Paul Sartre]] proposed that people can make their lives meaningful by inventing themselves and their values.<ref name="auto4">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=82–85}} }}</ref>]] | ||
Diverse possible reactions to existential nihilism have been proposed.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA41 41–42]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} }}</ref> Inspired by [[Indian philosophy]], [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] suggested a [[Philosophical pessimism|pessimistic]] and [[ascetic]] response, advocating detachment from the world by [[Renunciation|renouncing]] desires and stopping to affirm life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA147 147]}} }}</ref> [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] sought to use the disruptive force of nihilism to [[Transvaluation of values|re-interpret or re-evaluate all established ideals and values]] in an attempt to overcome nihilism and replace it with an [[Nietzschean affirmation|affirmative attitude toward life]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|pp=5, 31}} }}</ref>{{efn|In this context, Nietzsche contrasted passive with active nihilism. Passive nihilism is a form of resignation characterized by pessimism, hopelessness, and disengagement while refusing to acknowledge the absence of meaning. Active nihilism openly accepts meaninglessness and uses its negativity as a force to destroy established values and ideologies.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vattimo|1989|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=G-1YV3x6yakC&pg=PA15 15–17]}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=r4Itb0Zc2hUC&pg=PA179 179–180]}} }}</ref>}} [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] suggested that people can create their own values through the free choices they make, despite the cosmic lack of meaning. After considering the possibility of committing suicide, [[Albert Camus]] argued instead for a defiant attitude in which individuals rebel against meaninglessness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 3. Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} }}</ref> Other responses include a destructive attitude aiming to violently tear down political authorities and social institutions, attempts to undermine nihilism by identifying genuine sources of meaning, and a passive [[resignation]] or quiet acceptance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|pp=3–4, 15–16, 28}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 48–49]}} }}</ref> | |||
Arguments for and against existential nihilism are discussed in the academic discourse. Arguments from a [[cosmological]] perspective assert that human existence is a minor and insignificant aspect of the [[universe]] as a whole, which is indifferent to human concerns and aspirations. This outlook aligns with an [[atheistic]] view, stating that, without a God, there is no source of higher values that transcend the natural world. Another viewpoint highlights the pervasiveness of senseless suffering and violence while emphasizing the fleeting nature of happiness. Some theorists link this view to human mortality, suggesting that the inevitability of [[death]] renders all human accomplishments transient and ultimately futile.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA38 38–40, 46–47, 53, 55–58]}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21–25]}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–4]}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA81 81, 87]}} }}</ref> A different perspective from biology argues that life is driven by blind [[natural selection]] on a large scale and the satisfaction of innate [[need]]s on an individual scale, neither of which aims at a higher purpose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acazCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21–22]}} }}</ref> Subjectivists, by contrast, focus on the [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|subjective]] nature of all value experiences, asserting that they lack any objective ground.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Critical comment}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA41 41–42]}} }}</ref> | |||
Opponents of existential nihilism have responded with counterarguments to these statements. For example, some reject the pessimistic outlook that life is primarily characterized by suffering, violence, and death, claiming instead that these negative phenomena are counterbalanced by positive | Opponents of existential nihilism have responded with counterarguments to these statements. For example, some reject the pessimistic outlook that life is primarily characterized by suffering, violence, and death, claiming instead that these negative phenomena are counterbalanced by positive experiences such as happiness and love.<ref>{{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA352 352–357]}}</ref> Many non-nihilistic theories of the meaning of life are examined in the academic discourse. [[Supernaturalistic]] views focus on God or the soul as sources of meaning. [[Ethical naturalism|Naturalistic]] views, by contrast, assert that subjective or objective values are inherent in the physical world. They include the discussion of fields where humans actively find meaning, such as exercising [[freedom]], committing oneself to a cause, pursuing [[altruism]], and engaging in positive [[social relationships]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA364 364–367, 369–370]}} | {{harvnb|Metz|2023|loc=§ 2. Supernaturalism, § 3. Naturalism}} | {{harvnb|Seachris|loc=§ 3. Theories of Meaning ''in'' Life}} | {{harvnb|Yalom|2020|pp=431–435}} }}</ref> | ||
=== Moral nihilism === | === Moral nihilism === | ||
{{main|Moral nihilism}} | {{main|Moral nihilism}} | ||
Unlike existential nihilism, moral nihilism focuses specifically on moral phenomena rather than a higher meaning or purpose. In its broadest form, it is the [[metaethics|metaethical]] view that there are no moral facts. Also called ''amoralism'' and ''error theory'', it denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that the theories and practices categorized under this label rest on misguided assumptions without any substantial link to reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–12]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} }}</ref> On a practical level, some moral nihilists, such as | Unlike existential nihilism, moral nihilism focuses specifically on moral phenomena rather than a higher meaning or purpose. In its broadest form, it is the [[metaethics|metaethical]] view that there are no moral facts. Also called ''amoralism'' and ''error theory'', it denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that the theories and practices categorized under this label rest on misguided assumptions without any substantial link to reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–12]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} | {{harvnb|Pradhan|2024|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=m4wWEQAAQBAJ&pg=183 183–184]}} }}</ref> On a practical level, some moral nihilists, such as Nietzsche, assert that without moral obligations, anything is permitted, suggesting that people are allowed to act however they want. Other moral nihilists reject this conclusion and argue that the denial of morality affects not only moral obligations, or what people are required to do, but also moral permissions, or what people are allowed to do.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44631529 75–90]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} }}</ref> [[Value theory|Axiological]] nihilism, a related view, disputes the objective existence of values in general. This rejection is not limited to moral values and also concerns other types, like aesthetic and religious values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mulligan|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Bt99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA401 401–402]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} }}</ref> | ||
One | One argument for moral nihilism suggests that moral properties do not exist because of their odd nature, prescribing what to do rather than describing facts, such as shape and size. Science-based versions of this view hold that scientific inquiry does not reveal objective moral facts or that humans lack a [[Epistemology#Sources|source]] of moral knowledge. A related argument for moral nihilism focuses on the conventional aspects of moral evaluations and the difficulties in resolving moral disagreements.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=242–249}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=76–80}} }}</ref> Another line of thought emphasizes the [[evolution]]ary origin of morality, viewing it as a mere product of natural selection without a deeper metaphysical foundation.<ref>{{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=76–80}}</ref> | ||
[[Moral realism|Moral realists]] have raised | [[Moral realism|Moral realists]] have raised objections to moral nihilism. Naturalists argue that moral facts belong to the natural world and can be empirically observed. [[Ethical non-naturalism|Non-naturalists]] propose that moral phenomena are different from natural phenomena, but are real nonetheless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 2. Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} | {{harvnb|FitzPatrick|2011|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> [[Common sense|Common-sense]] philosophers assert that moral beliefs are deeply ingrained in practical experience and everyday reasoning, making the wholesale denial of moral facts implausible. A similar objection asserts that moral nihilism is incoherent and rests on a misunderstanding of moral language. Some critics focus on negative practical consequences rather than truth, suggesting that moral nihilism erodes social trust and leads to antisocial conduct.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2007|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5pzCOHmcDocC&pg=PA59 53–59]}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=80–82}} }}</ref> | ||
Some philosophers use the term ''moral nihilism'' in a more restricted sense that does not imply a rejection of all forms of morality. In one alternative sense, moral nihilism is the same as moral subjectivism, arguing that moral evaluations are purely subjective and lack rational objective justification. As a result, moral judgments are seen as [[Expressivism|expressions of arbitrary personal preferences]], making moral disagreements rationally unresolvable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–14]}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref> In another sense, moral nihilism refers to [[ethical egoism]], the theory that morality is determined by self-interest. This view denies that the [[well-being]] of others has moral implications unless it has external consequences for one's own well-being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11, 14–15]}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref> | |||
== Epistemology == | == Epistemology == | ||
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A related form of relativistic nihilism focuses on [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] rather than truth. It argues that different people rely on incompatible [[conceptual scheme]]s{{efn|A conceptual scheme is a system of categories, concepts, or beliefs through which people organize their ideas, understand their experiences, and interpret reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Blackburn|2008}}</ref>}} to make sense of the world. In the absence of a universal framework, genuine communication and [[Intersubjectivity|shared understanding]] are deemed impossible since each viewpoint has its own interpretation of reality. Without a common ground, these [[Commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurable]] belief systems are arbitrary constructions, limiting reason to operations within a specific system without the ability to reconcile them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–19, 23–26, 35}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} }}</ref> | A related form of relativistic nihilism focuses on [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] rather than truth. It argues that different people rely on incompatible [[conceptual scheme]]s{{efn|A conceptual scheme is a system of categories, concepts, or beliefs through which people organize their ideas, understand their experiences, and interpret reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Blackburn|2008}}</ref>}} to make sense of the world. In the absence of a universal framework, genuine communication and [[Intersubjectivity|shared understanding]] are deemed impossible since each viewpoint has its own interpretation of reality. Without a common ground, these [[Commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurable]] belief systems are arbitrary constructions, limiting reason to operations within a specific system without the ability to reconcile them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–19, 23–26, 35}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} }}</ref> | ||
[[File:Jean-Francois Lyotard cropped.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Black-and-white photo of man wearing a white shirt with his gaze directed slightly upward|Exploring [[antifoundationalism]], [[Jean- | [[File:Jean-Francois Lyotard cropped.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Black-and-white photo of man wearing a white shirt with his gaze directed slightly upward|Exploring [[antifoundationalism]], [[Jean-François Lyotard]] challenged [[metanarratives]] that aim to provide universal frameworks of rational understanding.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3.2 Justice in light of the Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|loc=§ 4b. The Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–90, 92–93}} }}</ref>]] | ||
Proponents of relativism emphasize the diversity of human viewpoints and the frequent inability to resolve [[Disagreement (epistemology)|disagreements]] and reach a shared understanding.<ref>{{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=§ 2. Why Relativism?}}</ref> Another argument asserts that theories are usually [[Underdetermination|underdetermined]] by the data supporting them. As a result, there are different equally valid interpretations without an objective standard to resolve their differences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=§ 2.4 Underdetermination of theory by data}} | {{harvnb|Davis|2014}} }}</ref> An influential criticism argues that relativism [[self-refuting idea|undermines itself]]: if all truths are relative to a viewpoint, then relativism itself is only true for some viewpoints and false for others.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} | {{harvnb|Moruzzi|2008|pp=207–208}} }}</ref> Another objection is that the absence of absolute epistemic standards may have odd consequences, for example, that people should not argue if they disagree or that they should generally suspend their judgments.<ref>{{harvnb|Moruzzi|2008|pp=211–212, 221–222}}</ref> | |||
Nietzsche was an influential proponent of relativistic nihilism. He saw belief systems as | Nietzsche was an influential proponent of relativistic nihilism. He saw belief systems as an expression of the [[will to power]], arguing that their goal is to assert dominance rather than represent reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–21}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> In [[postmodern philosophy]], epistemological nihilism is associated with [[antifoundationalism]], arguing that there is no ultimate rational ground of knowledge or action. It challenges universal frameworks, termed ''[[Metanarrative|grand metanarratives]]'', that claim to provide such a ground.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism, § 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}}</ref> | ||
=== Skepticism === | === Skepticism === | ||
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While relativist versions of epistemological nihilism allow that knowledge exists relative to a perspective, skeptic versions deny the existence of knowledge in general.{{efn|Some philosophers, such as [[Karen L. Carr]], distinguish epistemological nihilism from skepticism and relativism. According to this interpretation, skepticism and relativism imply uncertainty about the existence of knowledge and objectivity, recommending the suspension of judgment. Epistemological nihilism, by contrast, firmly asserts that knowledge or objectivity do not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i2VZYYYp-gC&pg=PA20 20–21]}} | {{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 29]}} }}</ref>}} Also called ''radical skepticism'', this view argues that there is no foundation or justification of knowledge claims. Unlike more moderate forms of skepticism, it questions even the most reasonable knowledge claims grounded in basic common sense.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA33 33]}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=472}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> A closely related form of epistemological nihilism, sometimes called ''alethiological nihilism'', centers on truth rather than knowledge, stating that truth does not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=5}} }}</ref> | While relativist versions of epistemological nihilism allow that knowledge exists relative to a perspective, skeptic versions deny the existence of knowledge in general.{{efn|Some philosophers, such as [[Karen L. Carr]], distinguish epistemological nihilism from skepticism and relativism. According to this interpretation, skepticism and relativism imply uncertainty about the existence of knowledge and objectivity, recommending the suspension of judgment. Epistemological nihilism, by contrast, firmly asserts that knowledge or objectivity do not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i2VZYYYp-gC&pg=PA20 20–21]}} | {{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 29]}} }}</ref>}} Also called ''radical skepticism'', this view argues that there is no foundation or justification of knowledge claims. Unlike more moderate forms of skepticism, it questions even the most reasonable knowledge claims grounded in basic common sense.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA33 33]}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=472}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> A closely related form of epistemological nihilism, sometimes called ''alethiological nihilism'', centers on truth rather than knowledge, stating that truth does not exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=5}} }}</ref> | ||
One argument in favor of radical skepticism asserts that absolute certainty is required for knowledge. It attempts to show that [[doubt]] can never be fully expelled.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=§ 8. Implications of Fallibilism: No Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> For example, the [[dream argument]], suggested by philosophers such as [[René Descartes]], points out that, while [[dream]]ing, people usually cannot distinguish between | One argument in favor of radical skepticism asserts that absolute certainty is required for knowledge. It attempts to show that [[doubt]] can never be fully expelled.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''"|loc=§ 8. Implications of Fallibilism: No Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> For example, the [[dream argument]], suggested by philosophers such as [[René Descartes]], points out that, while [[dream]]ing, people usually cannot distinguish between dream and reality. Based on this observation, it argues that there is no knowledge since an individual can never be certain that they are not currently dreaming.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Windt|2021|loc=§ 1.1 Cartesian Dream Skepticism}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} }}</ref> A related approach, inspired by [[Roderick Chisholm]], asserts that [[Problem of the criterion|a criterion]] or a standard of evaluation is required to judge what counts as knowledge. It holds that knowledge is impossible because people cannot have this criterion without prior knowledge, meaning that knowledge and its criterion cannot be established independently, as each relies on the other, similar to the [[Chicken or the egg|chicken-or-the-egg problem]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McCain|loc=§ 1. The Problem, § 2. Chisholm on the Problem of the Criterion}} | {{harvnb|Pitts|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=T_SkDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA263 263]}} }}</ref>{{efn|[[Agrippa's trilemma]] presents a similar conundrum for the existence of knowledge.<ref>{{harvnb|Klein|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1ETRCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA484 484–485]}}</ref>}} | ||
Despite these arguments, radical skepticism is a rare position, accepted only by few philosophers and challenged by many criticisms. Its main influence stems from attempts by non-skeptical philosophers to prove that their theories overcome the challenge of skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hookway|2005|p=838}} | {{harvnb|Comesaña|Klein|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Kyriacou|Wallbridge|2021|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> Some objections state that radical skepticism is incoherent or self-refuting. For example, if there is no knowledge then skeptics cannot know that there is no knowledge, making it questionable why anyone should believe their theories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671, 673}} | {{harvnb|Huemer|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ccmNDGIiJ3IC&pg=PA27 27]}} }}</ref> Another counterargument is that common sense gives stronger support for the existence of knowledge than the abstract arguments used to defend skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2024|loc=§ 6.2 Responses to the Closure Argument}} | {{harvnb|Reed|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=geSrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref> | |||
Despite these arguments, radical skepticism is a rare position, accepted only by few philosophers and challenged by | |||
Epistemological nihilism can lead to other forms of nihilism. For instance, the inability to discern the meaning of life can lead to the conclusion that there is no such meaning, resulting in existential nihilism.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}}</ref> [[Moral skepticism]], the view that there is no moral knowledge, can have a similar effect: the incapacity to distinguish right from wrong behavior can lead to the rejection of moral facts. Some theorists associate epistemological nihilism primarily with moral skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2006|pp=618–619}} | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} }}</ref> | Epistemological nihilism can lead to other forms of nihilism. For instance, the inability to discern the meaning of life can lead to the conclusion that there is no such meaning, resulting in existential nihilism.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}}</ref> [[Moral skepticism]], the view that there is no moral knowledge, can have a similar effect: the incapacity to distinguish right from wrong behavior can lead to the rejection of moral facts. Some theorists associate epistemological nihilism primarily with moral skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2006|pp=618–619}} | {{harvnb|Cuneo|2007|pp=115–116}} }}</ref> | ||
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=== Metaphysical nihilism === | === Metaphysical nihilism === | ||
{{main|Metaphysical nihilism}} | {{main|Metaphysical nihilism}} | ||
Metaphysical or ontological nihilism encompasses | Metaphysical or ontological nihilism encompasses views about the fundamental nature of [[reality]]. One version addresses the question of [[Why is there anything at all?|why there is anything at all]]. It suggests that, at least in principle, an empty world is possible. While this view recognises that the world contains [[concrete objects]], it argues that their existence is not inevitable, because there could have been nothing. In such a scenario, the universe would be entirely empty, without any people, animals, planets, and no other forms of matter or energy.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coggins|2005|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=673–674}} | {{harvnb|Coggins|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–2]}} }}</ref> | ||
The subtraction argument | The subtraction argument proposes a procedure to support this view. It states that the world does not depend on any particular concrete object. For example, the world could still exist if a specific rock was removed. The argument concludes that an empty world is possible since it is the result of continuously reapplying this idea, subtracting objects at each step until an empty universe remains.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coggins|2005|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=673–674}} | {{harvnb|Coggins|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11–12]}} }}</ref>{{efn|Some forms of the subtraction argument include the assumption that the world is finite to ensure that this endpoint is reached.<ref>{{harvnb|Coggins|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11–12]}}</ref>}} Opponents of metaphysical nihilism assert that an empty world is impossible, meaning that something must exist. A theologically inspired version asserts that God is a necessary object that must be present even if nothing else is. Another version accepts that any individual concrete object can be removed, but not all at once. It asserts that abstract objects, such as natural numbers, have necessary existence and that they require the existence of at least some concrete objects without depending on any specific object in particular.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coggins|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–4, 141]}} | {{harvnb|Rodriguez-Pereyra|2000|pp=335–336}} }}</ref> | ||
A more radical and controversial form of metaphysical nihilism denies the actual existence of objects. It states that there is no world, arguing that the experience of the universe is a mere illusion without an underlying reality. As a result, nothing at all is real. This view is sometimes interpreted as [[Metaphysical solipsism|a form of solipsism]], proposing that only [[the self]] exists and that the external world is merely an idea held by the self without a substantial reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=4, 6}} | {{harvnb|Turner|2011|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i2VZYYYp-gC&pg=PA17 17–18, 149]}} }}</ref> | A more radical and controversial form of metaphysical nihilism denies the actual existence of objects. It states that there is no world, arguing that the experience of the universe is a mere illusion without an underlying reality. As a result, nothing at all is real. This view is sometimes interpreted as [[Metaphysical solipsism|a form of solipsism]], proposing that only [[the self]] exists and that the external world is merely an idea held by the self without a substantial reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=4, 6}} | {{harvnb|Turner|2011|pp=3–4}} | {{harvnb|Carr|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_i2VZYYYp-gC&pg=PA17 17–18, 149]}} }}</ref> | ||
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=== Mereological nihilism === | === Mereological nihilism === | ||
{{main|Mereological nihilism}} | {{main|Mereological nihilism}} | ||
Mereological or compositional nihilism is the view that complex or composite objects do not exist. Composite objects are objects made up of [[proper part]]s. For example, a house is a composite object made up of parts like walls, windows, doors | Mereological or compositional nihilism is the view that complex or composite objects do not exist. Composite objects are objects made up of [[proper part]]s. For example, a house is a composite object made up of parts like walls, windows, and doors. Each of these parts is itself a composite object made up of smaller parts, such as molecules and atoms. Mereological nihilists argue that only noncomposite or simple objects exist, such as [[elementary particle]]s. As a result, composite objects are understood as mere collections of simple objects. According to this view, there are no houses or tables; there are only elementary particles arranged house-wise or table-wise.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}} | {{harvnb|Brenner|2015|pp=318–319}} | {{harvnb|Turner|2011|pp=3–4}} }}</ref> | ||
Proponents of mereological nihilism highlight the parsimony and [[simplicity]] of a minimal [[ontology]] that excludes everything except simple objects, citing metaphysical principles like [[Ockham's Razor]] in its favor.<ref>{{harvnb|Brenner|2015|pp=318–319}}</ref> Another supporting argument suggests that mereological nihilism avoids certain metaphysical paradoxes associated with the relation between parts and wholes, like the [[Ship of Theseus]].<ref>{{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}}</ref>{{efn|The Ship of Theseus is a thought experiment in which the parts of a ship are gradually replaced until no original part remains. The metaphysical paradox is tied to the question of whether the resulting ship is the same as the original ship. This problem does not arise for mereological nihilism, since it denies the existence of composite objects.<ref>{{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843, 854–855}}</ref>}} Opponents of mereological nihilism highlight the counterintuitive consequences of denying the existence of ordinary objects, contradicting [[common sense]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rettler|2018|pp=842–843}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} }}</ref> Other criticisms assert that mereological nihilism is unable to provide a coherent framework for how to understand collections of elementary particles or fails to explain phenomena like [[emergent properties]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tallant|2014|pp=1511–1512, 1526}} | {{harvnb|Cornell|2017|pp=77–78}} }}</ref> | |||
=== Cosmic nihilism === | === Cosmic nihilism === | ||
Cosmic or cosmological nihilism is the view that reality is [[Intelligibility (philosophy)|unintelligible]] and lacks inherent meaning. Closely related to epistemological and existential nihilism, it asserts that the world is blank, featureless, or chaotic, making it indifferent to human attempts to understand it. Cosmic nihilists often emphasize the vastness of the universe, arguing that it shows the insignificance of humans and their endeavors.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Cosmic nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=26–27, 30}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA74 74]}} }}</ref> | Cosmic or cosmological nihilism is the view that reality is [[Intelligibility (philosophy)|unintelligible]] and lacks inherent meaning. Closely related to epistemological and existential nihilism, it asserts that the world is blank, featureless, or chaotic, making it indifferent to human attempts to understand it. Cosmic nihilists often emphasize the vastness of the universe, arguing that it shows the insignificance of humans and their endeavors.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Cosmic nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=26–27, 30}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vwZ9wgEACAAJ&pg=PA74 74]}} }}</ref> | ||
A broad form of cosmic nihilism states that reality as a whole is unintelligible. According to this view, the chaotic nature of the world makes it impossible to comprehend the universe | A broad form of cosmic nihilism states that reality as a whole is unintelligible. According to this view, the chaotic nature of the world makes it impossible to comprehend the universe at any level or find meaningful patterns in it, leading to alienation as human understanding fails to grasp reality.<ref name="auto3">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=26–27}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Cosmic nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11]}} }}</ref> For example, [[Max Stirner]] characterized the world as a "metaphysical chaos" without "a comprehensive structure of objective meanings".<ref>{{harvnb|Crosby|1988|p=27}}</ref> In response to arguments stating that it is possible in certain cases to discern patterns and predict outcomes, some cosmic nihilists have proposed more narrow versions. One version acknowledges that humans can understand some aspects of reality, for example, through rigorous scientific study. Nonetheless, this view maintains that the universe remains impenetrable to comprehension and indifferent to human aspirations on other levels, lacking intelligible structures that correspond to objective values, moral principles, and a higher purpose.<ref name="auto3"/> | ||
== Other forms == | == Other forms == | ||
[[File:Marcel Duchamp, 1917, Fountain, photograph by Alfred Stieglitz.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Black-and-white photo of a porcelain urinal signed "R. Mutt"|[[Dadaism]] expresses nihilistic themes in art by challenging artistic standards, for example, by presenting ''[[Fountain (Duchamp)|Fountain]]'', a readymade urinal, at a 1917 art exhibition.<ref name="auto">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=i, 18}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=89–90}} | {{harvnb|Hopkins|2004|pp=14, 110, 154}} }}</ref>]] | [[File:Marcel Duchamp, 1917, Fountain, photograph by Alfred Stieglitz.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Black-and-white photo of a porcelain urinal signed "R. Mutt"|[[Dadaism]] expresses nihilistic themes in art by challenging artistic standards, for example, by presenting ''[[Fountain (Duchamp)|Fountain]]'', a readymade urinal, at a 1917 art exhibition.<ref name="auto">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=i, 18}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=89–90}} | {{harvnb|Hopkins|2004|pp=14, 110, 154}} }}</ref>]] | ||
[[File:Edvard Munch - The Scream - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Oil painting of a person screaming against the backdrop of an orange sky|[[Edvard Munch]]'s 1893 painting ''[[The Scream]]'' is sometimes associated with nihilism due to its theme of [[Existentialism#Angst and dread|existential terror]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|2024|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FG4iEQAAQBAJ&pg=PT144 § 15. Thinking without Foundations]}} | {{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=83}} }}</ref>]] | [[File:Edvard Munch - The Scream - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Oil painting of a person screaming against the backdrop of an orange sky|[[Edvard Munch]]'s 1893 painting ''[[The Scream]]'' is sometimes associated with nihilism due to its theme of [[Existentialism#Angst and dread|existential terror]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|2024|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FG4iEQAAQBAJ&pg=PT144 § 15. Thinking without Foundations]}} | {{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=83}} }}</ref>]] | ||
In addition to the main nihilistic theories discussed in ethics, value theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, | In addition to the main nihilistic theories discussed in ethics, value theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, nihilism is also examined in other areas. Discussions include fields such as [[literature]], [[art]], culture, and politics.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA9 9–11]}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–672}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=i, 18}} | {{harvnb|Walicki|2002}} }}</ref> Various literary works portray characters or attitudes that reject established norms, exhibit disillusionment with life, or struggle with existential despair. Bazarov, the protagonist of [[Ivan Turgenev]]'s novel ''[[Fathers and Sons (novel)|Fathers and Sons]]'', is an early and influential example. Driven by a deep distrust of established authorities, Bazarov follows a cold scientific rationalism. He openly expresses his hate toward conventional beliefs, societal norms, and [[sentimentality]], aiming to dismantle them without a vision of what should replace them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xix, 145–148}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=85–86}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} }}</ref> In response to Turgenev's novel, [[Nikolay Chernyshevsky]]'s ''[[What Is to Be Done? (novel)|What Is to Be Done?]]'' explored nihilism from the perspective of [[rational egoism]].<ref>{{harvnb|Dowdall|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA141 141]}}</ref> Many of [[Fyodor Dostoevsky]]'s works explore the problem of nihilism, particularly the idea that without God, there is no moral basis for right or wrong.<ref>{{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix, 195]}}</ref> For example, his novel ''[[The Brothers Karamazov]]'' examines the tensions between faith, free will, and nihilism through the perspectives of the protagonists.<ref>{{harvnb|Stepenberg|2019|pp=xi–xv, 115–116}}</ref> Nothingness is a central concern for many characters in the works of [[Samuel Beckett]], either as the object of desire or fear.<ref>{{harvnb|Weller|2008|pp=321–322}}</ref> Nihilist themes are also present in the literary works of [[Franz Kafka]], [[Jean-Paul Sartre]], and [[Albert Camus]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=164, 178}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=86–88, 90–93}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–672}} }}</ref> | ||
In the field of art, [[Dadaism]] emerged during the [[First World War]] as a nihilistic rejection of established moral, societal, and [[Beauty|artistic standards]]. Dadaists embraced chaos, spontaneity, and irrationality, infusing their art with irreverence, nonsense, and [[humor]] to provoke and challenge traditional [[Philosophy of art|conceptions of art]]. For example, [[Marcel Duchamp]] presented ''[[Fountain (Duchamp)|Fountain]]'', a readymade urinal, at an [[art exhibition]], which became one of the most iconic pieces of the movement.<ref name="auto"/> In cinema, the movie ''[[Citizen Kane]]'' suggests a form of epistemic nihilism, showcasing moral ambiguity and the impossibility of arriving at an objective assessment of the protagonist's character.<ref>{{harvnb|Stoehr|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0OYyBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1, 67–68]}}</ref> Elements of nihilism are also found in movies such as ''[[Taxi Driver]]'',<ref>{{harvnb|Smith|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-1mUcGRpt0EC&pg=PA350 350]}}</ref> ''[[A Clockwork Orange (film)|A Clockwork Orange]]'',<ref>{{harvnb|Abrams|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QbJo2oiFFoUC&pg=PA6 6]}}</ref> ''[[Fight Club]]'',<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kavadlo|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lXwvBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA14 14]}} | {{harvnb|Yeo|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R6k7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}} }}</ref> ''[[The Big Lebowski]]'',<ref>{{harvnb|Gaughran|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-OV50oVxKyoC&pg=PA231 231]}}</ref> and ''[[American Psycho (film)|American Psycho]]''.<ref>{{harvnb|Yeo|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R6k7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}}</ref> | In the field of art, [[Dadaism]] emerged during the [[First World War]] as a nihilistic rejection of established moral, societal, and [[Beauty|artistic standards]]. Dadaists embraced chaos, spontaneity, and irrationality, infusing their art with irreverence, nonsense, and [[humor]] to provoke and challenge traditional [[Philosophy of art|conceptions of art]]. For example, [[Marcel Duchamp]] presented ''[[Fountain (Duchamp)|Fountain]]'', a readymade urinal, at an [[art exhibition]], which became one of the most iconic pieces of the movement.<ref name="auto"/> In cinema, the movie ''[[Citizen Kane]]'' suggests a form of epistemic nihilism, showcasing moral ambiguity and the impossibility of arriving at an objective assessment of the protagonist's character.<ref>{{harvnb|Stoehr|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0OYyBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1, 67–68]}}</ref> Elements of nihilism are also found in movies such as ''[[Taxi Driver]]'',<ref>{{harvnb|Smith|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-1mUcGRpt0EC&pg=PA350 350]}}</ref> ''[[A Clockwork Orange (film)|A Clockwork Orange]]'',<ref>{{harvnb|Abrams|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QbJo2oiFFoUC&pg=PA6 6]}}</ref> ''[[Fight Club]]'',<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kavadlo|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lXwvBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA14 14]}} | {{harvnb|Yeo|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R6k7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}} }}</ref> ''[[The Big Lebowski]]'',<ref>{{harvnb|Gaughran|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-OV50oVxKyoC&pg=PA231 231]}}</ref> and ''[[American Psycho (film)|American Psycho]]''.<ref>{{harvnb|Yeo|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R6k7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}}</ref> | ||
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=== Political nihilism === | === Political nihilism === | ||
{{Anchor|Political|Political nihilism}} | {{Anchor|Political|Political nihilism}}Political nihilism is a negative outlook on existing political and social structures, similar to [[anarchism]]. It seeks to uphold individual freedom against oppressive governmental controls and societal norms. Its radical and nihilistic tendencies are expressed in the revolutionary aim to dismantle these established forms of order. It targets [[political institution]]s, and the traditional beliefs and social practices supporting them, without offering new systems to take their place.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA9 9–11, 35]}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} }}</ref>{{efn|[[National nihilism]], a related outlook, is a negative attitude toward one's own country.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nairn|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vQDfDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA380 380]}} | {{harvnb|Marples|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=evVZCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25]}} }}</ref> In China, the term ''[[historical nihilism]]'' is used by the [[Chinese Communist Party]] to describe historical views that challenge the party's official account of the past.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cadell|2021}} | {{harvnb|Peng|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gRLREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1597 1597]}} }}</ref>}} | ||
Political nihilism is | Political nihilism is mainly linked to the [[Russian nihilist movement]] of the late 19th century. It emerged as a reaction to the rigid social structures and [[authoritarian]] rule in [[Tsar|Tsarist]] Russia. In their rejection of established institutions and norms, Russian nihilists resorted to extreme means to promote a radical social [[revolution]], leading to forms of violence and [[terrorism]], including [[assassination]]s and [[arson]]. Some of the revolutionaries saw Turgenev's character Bazarov as their inspiration and role model.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA9 9–11]}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} }}</ref> | ||
== History == | == History == | ||
{{main|History of nihilism}} | {{main|History of nihilism}} | ||
Although nihilism is primarily associated with [[modernity]], some of its origins trace back to [[ancient philosophy]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=1, 5}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=13}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–672}} }}</ref> [[Socrates]]'s ({{circa|470–399 BCE}}) method of [[Socratic_method#Questioning_methods|radical questioning]] | Although nihilism is primarily associated with [[modernity]], some of its origins trace back to [[ancient philosophy]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=1, 5}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=13}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–672}} }}</ref> Some [[Sophists]], like [[Protagoras]] ({{circa|490–420 BCE}}), disputed the existence of objective truth, arguing for a relativistic nihilism according to which "man is the measure of all things".<ref>{{harvnb|Iannone|2013|p=235}}</ref> [[Socrates]]'s ({{circa|470–399 BCE}}) method of [[Socratic_method#Questioning_methods|radical questioning]] served as a precursor of nihilism by challenging established beliefs, values, and practices, often with the goal of exposing their lack of a solid foundation.<ref>{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=13–17}}</ref>{{efn|For example, he suggested in the [[Allegory of the cave]] that commonly held beliefs about reality are just a shadow of a higher unperceived reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=14–15}}</ref>}} [[Pyrrho]] ({{circa|360–270 BCE}}) formulated a broad version of epistemological nihilism in his attempt to show that knowledge is impossible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=1, 5}} | {{harvnb|Iannone|2013|p=496}} }}</ref> | ||
Negative attitudes toward objective knowledge and the world are also found in [[ancient Indian philosophy]]. However, it is controversial to what extent they constitute forms of nihilism in a strict sense, and some interpreters limit nihilism to the Western tradition.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200}} | {{harvnb|Morrison|2002|pp=3–6, 34, 50}} | {{harvnb|Westerhoff|2016|pp=337–338}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} }}</ref> In the 6th century BCE, the school of [[Ajñana]] developed a radical skepticism, questioning the possibility and usefulness of knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fountoulakis|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23 23]}} | {{harvnb|Warder|1998|pp=43–44}} | {{harvnb|Fletcher|Romero|Talbot|Warburton|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=drX4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46]}} }}</ref> [[Buddhist]] thought, starting in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, focuses on the pervasiveness of [[dukkha|suffering]], identifying it as a fundamental [[three marks of existence|aspect of existence]]. It teaches [[renunciation]] of worldly desires to achieve liberation from suffering in the state of [[nirvana]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morrison|2002|pp=24–25, 31–34}} | {{harvnb|Gómez|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sQULdfIlBIYC&pg=PA110 110]}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=192, 208, 226, 289}} | {{harvnb|Braak|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oVFuqMvr7D4C&pg=PA38 38–39]}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=72}} }}</ref> According to a common interpretation, the school of [[Mādhyamaka]], which emerged in the 2nd century CE, defends metaphysical nihilism, rejecting the existence of an ultimate foundation or absolute reality underlying the multiplicity of experienced phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frazier|2024|loc=§ 3. The Critique of 'Things': Madhyamaka Metaphysical Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Westerhoff|2016|pp=337–338}} | {{harvnb|Arnold|loc=§ 1. Nāgārjuna and the Paradoxical “Perfection of Wisdom” Literature, § 2c. Ethics and the Charge of Nihilism}} }}</ref> | |||
In the [[early modern period]], [[secularization]] and the [[Scientific Revolution]] undermined established religious beliefs and values prevalent in the Western world during the [[medieval period]], preparing the emergence of nihilism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=38–39, 200–203}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xxii}} }}</ref> [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) considered an extreme form of epistemological nihilism in his quest for absolute certainty. He suggested that humans cannot trust even their most fundamental beliefs unless they can rule out that a malevolent God-like being is constantly deceiving them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=18–22}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=206–207, 209–210, 217}} }}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804) drew a sharp distinction between [[Phenomenon|appearances]] and [[Thing-in-itself|things underlying those appearances]]. By limiting knowledge to the sphere of appearances, he prepared a type of existential nihilism, making the deeper meaning of things in themselves inaccessible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=28–34}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=248–249}} }}</ref> In criticizing the [[rationalism]] of the [[Kantianism|Kantian]] philosopher [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]] (1762–1814), [[Friedrich Jacobi]] (1743–1819) | In the [[early modern period]], [[secularization]] and the [[Scientific Revolution]] undermined established religious beliefs and values prevalent in the Western world during the [[medieval period]], preparing the emergence of nihilism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=38–39, 200–203}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xxii}} }}</ref> [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) considered an extreme form of epistemological nihilism in his quest for absolute certainty. He suggested that humans cannot trust even their most fundamental beliefs unless they can rule out that a malevolent God-like being is constantly deceiving them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=18–22}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=206–207, 209–210, 217}} }}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804) drew a sharp distinction between [[Phenomenon|appearances]] and [[Thing-in-itself|things underlying those appearances]]. By limiting knowledge to the sphere of appearances, he prepared a type of existential nihilism, making the deeper meaning of things in themselves inaccessible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=28–34}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=248–249}} }}</ref> In criticizing the [[rationalism]] of the [[Kantianism|Kantian]] philosopher [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]] (1762–1814), [[Friedrich Jacobi]] (1743–1819) coined the philosophical concept of nihilism to describe philosophical thought that leads to the denial of existence and meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=32}} | {{harvnb|Livieri|di Giovanni|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. Life and Intellectual Career, § 3.5 The Open Letter to Fichte (1799)}} | {{harvnb|Crowe|2021|pp=157–158, 167–168}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1200–1201}} }}</ref> | ||
[[File:Turgenev by Repin.jpg|thumb|alt=Oil painting of bearded man with white hair, seated in an armchair and dressed in a dark coat|In 19th-century Russia, [[Ivan Turgenev]] was responsible for popularizing the term ''nihilism''.<ref name="auto2">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>]] | [[File:Turgenev by Repin.jpg|thumb|alt=Oil painting of bearded man with white hair, seated in an armchair and dressed in a dark coat|In 19th-century Russia, [[Ivan Turgenev]] was responsible for popularizing the term ''nihilism''.<ref name="auto2">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>]] | ||
In Russia, the term ''nihilism'' gained popularity through [[Ivan Turgenev]]'s (1818–1883) portrayal of | In Russia, the term ''nihilism'' gained popularity through [[Ivan Turgenev]]'s (1818–1883) portrayal of the nihilist character Bazarov in his novel ''[[Fathers and Sons (novel)|Fathers and Sons]]''.<ref name="auto2"/> Starting in the second half of the 19th century, the [[Russian nihilist movement]] was a form of political nihilism, characterized by a radical rejection of traditional social, political, and aesthetic norms.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Meanwhile in Western Europe, the nihilistic [[egoism]] of [[Max Stirner]] (1806–1856) reduced other people to their usefulness without respect for their [[personhood]]. Stirner also formulated a cosmic nihilism that sees the universe as an unintelligible, metaphysical chaos.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=15, 27}} | {{harvnb|Holbrook|1977|pp=382–383}} }}</ref> [[Søren Kierkegaard]] (1813–1855) explored different lifestyles or "spheres of existence" through which people seek meaning in their lives. He warned against an aesthetic lifestyle of pursuing sensory pleasures without ulterior goals, arguing that it leads to a nihilistic outlook marked by meaninglessness. Instead, he recommended a [[leap of faith]] that trusts in God as a higher source of meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lippitt|Evans|2024|loc=§ 3. The 'Spheres of Existence' or 'Stages on Life's Way'}} | {{harvnb|Carlisle|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lxQLlAM_vrkC&pg=PA21 21–22]}} | {{harvnb|Schulz|2014|pp=135–138}} }}</ref> | ||
[[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788–1860) developed a [[Philosophical pessimism|pessimistic philosophy]], characterizing the world as a place of suffering, brought into being by a blind, irrational [[Will (philosophy)#Schopenhauer|will]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 9, 129–132]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xx}} }}</ref> Influenced by Schopenhauer, the problem of nihilism took center stage in the thought of [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900). He understood it as a broad cultural phenomenon in which people lose the values and ideals guiding their lives. He explored the causes and consequences of this shift in evaluative outlook, examining reactions to it and ways of overcoming it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=1}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=37–40}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi–xii}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} }}</ref> According to Nietzsche, nihilism often manifests in a distorted form as passive nihilism, masking its life-denying nature behind religious dogmas, conventional morality, and societal norms. Against this tendency, Nietzsche recommended active nihilism, which openly acknowledges the lack of meaning and uses its negative force to dismantle established values.{{efn|This includes his pronouncement that "[[God is dead]]".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=51–52}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi–xii}} }}</ref>}} He saw this as a transitional phase to overcome nihilism in general, leading to a vital [[affirmation of life]] through a [[Transvaluation of values|revaluation of all values]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=37–57}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=672–673}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} }}</ref> | [[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788–1860) developed a [[Philosophical pessimism|pessimistic philosophy]], characterizing the world as a place of suffering, brought into being by a blind, irrational [[Will (philosophy)#Schopenhauer|will]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 9, 129–132]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xx}} }}</ref> Influenced by Schopenhauer, the problem of nihilism took center stage in the thought of [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900). He understood it as a broad cultural phenomenon in which people lose the values and ideals guiding their lives. He explored the causes and consequences of this shift in evaluative outlook, examining reactions to it and ways of overcoming it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=1}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=37–40}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi–xii}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} }}</ref> According to Nietzsche, nihilism often manifests in a distorted form as passive nihilism, masking its life-denying nature behind religious dogmas, conventional morality, and societal norms. Against this tendency, Nietzsche recommended active nihilism, which openly acknowledges the lack of meaning and uses its negative force to dismantle established values.{{efn|This includes his pronouncement that "[[God is dead]]".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=51–52}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi–xii}} | {{harvnb|Van Tongeren|2013|pp=589–590}} | {{harvnb|Almeida|2022|loc=[https://www.scielo.br/j/edreal/a/vvF5KGJ98sK97mXpVmzQkBg/?lang=en § Nihilism, an Old Ghost that Haunts Us]}} }}</ref>}} He saw this as a transitional phase to overcome nihilism in general, leading to a vital [[affirmation of life]] through a [[Transvaluation of values|revaluation of all values]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=37–57}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=672–673}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} }}</ref> | ||
[[File:Heidegger 2 (1960).jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of a seated man in a dark suit with white hair.|[[Martin Heidegger]] conceived nihilism as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought.<ref name="auto1">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=170–174}} | {{harvnb| | [[File:Heidegger 2 (1960).jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of a seated man in a dark suit with white hair.|[[Martin Heidegger]] conceived of nihilism as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought.<ref name="auto1">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=170–174}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Wrathall|2025|loc=§ 5. The History of Being}} | {{harvnb|Becker-Lorca|2024|loc=[https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188-66492024000300221&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en § 2. Being as Nothing: The Uncanny Gift of Nihilism]}}}}</ref>]] | ||
Many subsequent developments in the 20th-century history of nihilism were responses to Nietzsche's philosophy.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=57}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism, § 5. Conclusion}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200, 1206–1207}} }}</ref> [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) agreed with Nietzsche's description of the pervasive and corrosive nature of nihilism, seeing it as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought reaching back to the ancient period. Interpreting | Many subsequent developments in the 20th-century history of nihilism were responses to Nietzsche's philosophy.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=57}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism, § 5. Conclusion}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200, 1206–1207}} }}</ref> [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) agreed with Nietzsche's description of the pervasive and corrosive nature of nihilism, seeing it as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought reaching back to the ancient period. Interpreting Nietzsche's concept of the [[will to power]] and [[The Question Concerning Technology|modern technological developments]], Heidegger came to the conclusion that Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism fails and leads to an even more complete nihilism. As an alternative, Heidegger turned to early [[Presocratic philosophy]] to recover a non-nihilistic understanding of being.<ref name="auto1"/> | ||
[[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) proposed a view aligned with cosmic nihilism, characterizing humanity as an accidental and insignificant byproduct of cosmic forces that are alien and indifferent to human concerns.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|p=27}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|p=88}} }}</ref> Against the backdrop of [[World War I]], [[Dadaists]] expressed aspects of nihilism through art, seeking to undermine established norms and values while embracing [[nonsense]] and absurdity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=89–90}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA18 18]}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200, 1206–1207}} }}</ref> The question of nihilism and its denial of the meaning of life played a central role for [[Existentialism|existentialist philosophers]].<ref>{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=81–85}}</ref> [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905–1980) asserted that humans have [[existence precedes essence|no inborn essence]] defining who they are or what their purpose is. He argued that they can overcome this lack of predefined meaning through [[freedom]], proposing that people make their lives meaningful by inventing themselves and their values.<ref name="auto4"/> In his [[Absurdism|absurdist philosophy]], [[Albert Camus]] (1913–1960) explored the psychological paradox that arises from the inherent drive to seek meaning in an objectively meaningless world. He termed this condition "the absurd" and advocated for a defiant stance or rebellion against the lack of meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=32–33}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} }}</ref> | [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) proposed a view aligned with cosmic nihilism, characterizing humanity as an accidental and insignificant byproduct of cosmic forces that are alien and indifferent to human concerns.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|p=27}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|p=88}} }}</ref> Against the backdrop of [[World War I]], [[Dadaists]] expressed aspects of nihilism through art, seeking to undermine established norms and values while embracing [[nonsense]] and absurdity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=89–90}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA18 18]}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200, 1206–1207}} }}</ref> The question of nihilism and its denial of the meaning of life played a central role for [[Existentialism|existentialist philosophers]].<ref>{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=81–85}}</ref> [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905–1980) asserted that humans have [[existence precedes essence|no inborn essence]] defining who they are or what their purpose is. He argued that they can overcome this lack of predefined meaning through [[freedom]], proposing that people make their lives meaningful by inventing themselves and their values.<ref name="auto4"/> In his [[Absurdism|absurdist philosophy]], [[Albert Camus]] (1913–1960) explored the psychological paradox that arises from the inherent drive to seek meaning in an objectively meaningless world. He termed this condition "the absurd" and advocated for a defiant stance or rebellion against the lack of meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=32–33}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} }}</ref> | ||
In the second half of the 20th century, | In the second half of the 20th century, certain aspects of nihilism emerged in [[postmodern philosophy]], often in response to Nietzsche and Heidegger.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=xi–xiii, 77, 79, 86}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–89}} }}</ref> [[Jacques Derrida]]'s (1930–2004) philosophy of [[deconstruction]] challenged the existence of absolute truth and stable meaning. Derrida aimed to expose the hidden assumptions and biases on which this viewpoint rests.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=78–79}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> [[Jean-François Lyotard]] (1924–1998) explored [[antifoundationalism]], rejecting the existence of universal frameworks of understanding, termed [[metanarratives]]. He aimed to undermine their validity as standards of truth claims, proposing instead that they are merely different [[language game]]s people play without a clear hierarchy prioritizing one language game over the others.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=90–93}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3.2 Justice in light of the Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|loc=§ 4b. The Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–90, 92–93}} }}</ref> Similarly, [[Richard Rorty]] (1931–2007) dismissed the notion of objective truths, suggesting that people rely on their own judgment and creativity instead of privileging established perspectives, like the scientific worldview.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2020|p=87}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> Against Nietzsche's and Heidegger's attempts to overcome nihilism, [[Gianni Vattimo]] (1936–2023) embraced it, viewing nihilism as the only viable alternative in the [[postmodern era]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2000|p=184}} | {{harvnb|Harris|loc=Lead section, § 3. Hermeneutical Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=xi, 91}} | {{harvnb|Hryschko|2010|pp=49–51}} }}</ref> | ||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
{{Columns-list | {{Columns-list| | ||
* [[Acosmism]] | * [[Acosmism]] – Denial of the existence of the universe apart from God | ||
* | * {{annotated link|Anattā}} | ||
* | * {{annotated link|Anomie}} | ||
* | * {{annotated link|Antinatalism}} | ||
* | * {{annotated link|Dysteleology}} | ||
* {{annotated link|Fatalism}} | |||
* | * {{annotated link|Meontology}} | ||
* | * {{annotated link|Misanthropy}} | ||
* {{annotated link|Paradox of nihilism}} | |||
* | |||
* | |||
}} | }} | ||
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* {{cite book |last1=Abrams |first1=Jerold |editor1-last=Abrams |editor1-first=Jerold |title=The Philosophy of Stanley Kubrick |publisher=University Press of Kentucky |isbn=978-0-8131-7256-9 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QbJo2oiFFoUC&pg=PA6 |language=en |chapter=Introduciton |date=2007 |pages=1–8 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Abrams |first1=Jerold |editor1-last=Abrams |editor1-first=Jerold |title=The Philosophy of Stanley Kubrick |publisher=University Press of Kentucky |isbn=978-0-8131-7256-9 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QbJo2oiFFoUC&pg=PA6 |language=en |chapter=Introduciton |date=2007 |pages=1–8 }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Aho |first1=Kevin |title=Existentialism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 May 2025 |date=2025 }} | * {{cite web |last1=Aho |first1=Kevin |title=Existentialism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 May 2025 |date=2025 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Almeida |first1=Rogério de |title=Impotence, Resentment, Incredulity: Nihilism in Cinema and Education |journal=Educação & Realidade |volume=47 |doi=10.1590/2175-6236116602vs02 |language=en |issn=0100-3143 |date=2022 |article-number=e116602 |doi-access=free }} | |||
* {{cite journal |last1=Alvarez |first1=Maria |title=Radical Interpretation and Semantic Nihilism: Reply to Glock |journal=The Philosophical Quarterly |volume=44 |issue=176 |doi=10.2307/2219614 |date=1994 |pages=354–360 |jstor=2219614 }} | * {{cite journal |last1=Alvarez |first1=Maria |title=Radical Interpretation and Semantic Nihilism: Reply to Glock |journal=The Philosophical Quarterly |volume=44 |issue=176 |doi=10.2307/2219614 |date=1994 |pages=354–360 |jstor=2219614 }} | ||
* {{cite web |author1=American Psychological Association |url=https://dictionary.apa.org/apathy |website=APA Dictionary of Psychology |language=en |date=2018 |publisher=American Psychological Association |title=Apathy}} | * {{cite web |author1=American Psychological Association |url=https://dictionary.apa.org/apathy |website=APA Dictionary of Psychology |language=en |date=2018 |publisher=American Psychological Association |title=Apathy}} | ||
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* {{cite web |last1=Arnold |first1=Dan |title=Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/madhyamaka-buddhist-philosophy/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=1 March 2025}} | * {{cite web |last1=Arnold |first1=Dan |title=Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/madhyamaka-buddhist-philosophy/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=1 March 2025}} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Baghramian |first1=Maria |last2=Carter |first2=J. Adam |title=Relativism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=21 February 2025 |date=2025 }} | * {{cite web |last1=Baghramian |first1=Maria |last2=Carter |first2=J. Adam |title=Relativism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=21 February 2025 |date=2025 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Becker-Lorca |first1=Martin Stephan |title=The Counterintuitive Logic of the Nothing and the Gift of Nihilism: A Reading of Heidegger |journal=Tópicos (México) |issue=70 |doi=10.21555/top.v700.2761 |url=https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188-66492024000300221&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en |language=en |issn=0188-6649 |date=2024 |pages=221–249|doi-access=free }} | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Bensussan |first1=Gérard |editor1-last=Das |editor1-first=Saitya Brata |title=Language and the World: Essays in Honor of Franson Manjali |publisher=Springer Nature Singapore |isbn=978-981-96-6271-5 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hb9wEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA12 |language=en |chapter=Demand for Sense and Nihilism |date=2025 |pages=1–20}} | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Bewes |first1=Timothy |title=Cynicism and Postmodernity |publisher=Verso |isbn=978-1-85984-196-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iR3C_y0kYCgC&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=1997 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Bewes |first1=Timothy |title=Cynicism and Postmodernity |publisher=Verso |isbn=978-1-85984-196-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iR3C_y0kYCgC&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=1997 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Blackburn |first1=Simon |title=The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-954143-0 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095630484 |language=en |chapter=Conceptual Scheme |date=2008 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Blackburn |first1=Simon |title=The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-954143-0 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095630484 |language=en |chapter=Conceptual Scheme |date=2008 |pages=70–71}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Braak |first1=André van der |title=Nietzsche and Zen: Self-Overcoming Without a Self |publisher=Lexington Books |isbn=978-0-7391-6550-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oVFuqMvr7D4C&pg=PA38 |language=en |date=2011 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Braak |first1=André van der |title=Nietzsche and Zen: Self-Overcoming Without a Self |publisher=Lexington Books |isbn=978-0-7391-6550-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oVFuqMvr7D4C&pg=PA38 |language=en |date=2011 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Brenner |first1=Andrew |title=Mereological Nihilism and Theoretical Unification |journal=Analytic Philosophy |volume=56 |issue=4 |doi=10.1111/phib.12072 |date=2015 |pages=318–337 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/BREMNA-2 }} | * {{cite journal |last1=Brenner |first1=Andrew |title=Mereological Nihilism and Theoretical Unification |journal=Analytic Philosophy |volume=56 |issue=4 |doi=10.1111/phib.12072 |date=2015 |pages=318–337 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/BREMNA-2 }} | ||
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* {{cite book |last1=Carroll |first1=Thomas D. |title=A Belief in Humanity: The Untold Story of Conciliar Humanism: The Twentieth-Century Retrieval of Sapiential Consciousness |publisher=Wipf and Stock Publishers |isbn=979-8-3852-0738-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FG4iEQAAQBAJ&pg=PT144 |language=en |date=2024 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Carroll |first1=Thomas D. |title=A Belief in Humanity: The Untold Story of Conciliar Humanism: The Twentieth-Century Retrieval of Sapiential Consciousness |publisher=Wipf and Stock Publishers |isbn=979-8-3852-0738-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FG4iEQAAQBAJ&pg=PT144 |language=en |date=2024 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Coady |first1=C. A. J. |chapter=Relativism, Epistemic |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 |page=800 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Coady |first1=C. A. J. |chapter=Relativism, Epistemic |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 |page=800 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Coggins |first1=Geraldine |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Nihilism, metaphysical |chapter-url=https://uat-rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/nihilism-metaphysical/v-1/sections/the-subtraction-argument | * {{cite book |last1=Coggins |first1=Geraldine |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Nihilism, metaphysical |chapter-url=https://uat-rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/nihilism-metaphysical/v-1/sections/the-subtraction-argument |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N119-1 |date=2005 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Coggins |first1=Geraldine |title=Could there have been Nothing?: Against Metaphysical Nihilism |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-0-230-29524-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2010 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Coggins |first1=Geraldine |title=Could there have been Nothing?: Against Metaphysical Nihilism |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-0-230-29524-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tBh_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2010 }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Comesaña |first1=Juan |last2=Klein |first2=Peter |title=Skepticism |author2-link=Peter D. Klein |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 July 2024 |date=2024 |archive-date=23 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200823021826/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ |url-status=live }} | * {{cite web |last1=Comesaña |first1=Juan |last2=Klein |first2=Peter |title=Skepticism |author2-link=Peter D. Klein |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 July 2024 |date=2024 |archive-date=23 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200823021826/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/ |url-status=live }} | ||
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* {{cite book |last1=Davis |first1=William E. |last2=Hicks |first2=Joshua A. |editor1-last=Hicks |editor1-first=Joshua A. |editor2-last=Routledge |editor2-first=Clay |title=The Experience of Meaning in Life: Classical Perspectives, Emerging Themes, and Controversies |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-94-007-6527-6 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HcxEAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA163 |language=en |chapter=13. Judgments of Meaning in Life Following an Existential Crisis |date=2013 |pages=163–176 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Davis |first1=William E. |last2=Hicks |first2=Joshua A. |editor1-last=Hicks |editor1-first=Joshua A. |editor2-last=Routledge |editor2-first=Clay |title=The Experience of Meaning in Life: Classical Perspectives, Emerging Themes, and Controversies |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-94-007-6527-6 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HcxEAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA163 |language=en |chapter=13. Judgments of Meaning in Life Following an Existential Crisis |date=2013 |pages=163–176 }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=DeLapp |first1=Kevin M. |title=Metaethics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/metaethi/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=19 December 2023 |archive-date=January 23, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240123102700/https://iep.utm.edu/metaethi/ |url-status=live }} | * {{cite web |last1=DeLapp |first1=Kevin M. |title=Metaethics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/metaethi/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=19 December 2023 |archive-date=January 23, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240123102700/https://iep.utm.edu/metaethi/ |url-status=live }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Devanesan |first1=Arjun |title=Medical Nihilism: The Limits of a Decontextualised Critique of Medicine |journal=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences |volume=79 |doi=10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101189 |date=2020 |pmid=31345652 }} | * {{cite journal |last1=Devanesan |first1=Arjun |title=Medical Nihilism: The Limits of a Decontextualised Critique of Medicine |journal=Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences |volume=79 |doi=10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101189 |date=2020 |article-number=101189 |pmid=31345652 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Diken |first1=Bulent |title=Nihilism |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-05582-1 |language=en |date=2008 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Diken |first1=Bulent |title=Nihilism |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-05582-1 |language=en |date=2008 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Dowdall |first1=Tim |title=Max Stirner and Nihilism: Between Two Nothings |publisher=Boydell & Brewer |isbn=978-1-64014-170-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 |language=en |date=2024 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Dowdall |first1=Tim |title=Max Stirner and Nihilism: Between Two Nothings |publisher=Boydell & Brewer |isbn=978-1-64014-170-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bXL6EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29 |language=en |date=2024 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Dreier |first1=James |chapter=Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism |date=2007 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325911.003.0010 |title=The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory |editor-last1=Copp |editor-first1=David |isbn=978-0-19-989207-5 |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=240–264 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Dreier |first1=James |chapter=Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism |date=2007 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325911.003.0010 |title=The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory |editor-last1=Copp |editor-first1=David |isbn=978-0-19-989207-5 |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=240–264 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=FitzPatrick |first1=William J. |editor1-last=Brady |editor1-first=Michael |title=New Waves in Metaethics |date=2011 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan | * {{cite book |last1=FitzPatrick |first1=William J. |editor1-last=Brady |editor1-first=Michael |title=New Waves in Metaethics |date=2011 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-0-230-29489-9 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 |language=en |chapter=Ethical Non-Naturalism and Normative Properties |pages=7–35 |doi=10.1057/9780230294899_2 |access-date=December 22, 2023 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Fletcher |first1=Robert |last2=Romero |first2=Paola |last3=Talbot |first3=Marianne |last4=Warburton |first4=Nigel |last5=Whiston |first5=Amna |author4-link=Nigel Warburton |title=Philosophy: A Visual Encyclopedia |publisher=Dorling Kindersley Limited |isbn=978-0-241-50422-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=drX4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 |language=en |date=2020 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Fletcher |first1=Robert |last2=Romero |first2=Paola |last3=Talbot |first3=Marianne |last4=Warburton |first4=Nigel |last5=Whiston |first5=Amna |author4-link=Nigel Warburton |title=Philosophy: A Visual Encyclopedia |publisher=Dorling Kindersley Limited |isbn=978-0-241-50422-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=drX4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 |language=en |date=2020 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Fountoulakis |first1=Konstantinos N. |title=Psychiatry: From Its Historical and Philosophical Roots to the Modern Face |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-030-86541-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23 |language=en |date=2021 |access-date=19 July 2024 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Fountoulakis |first1=Konstantinos N. |title=Psychiatry: From Its Historical and Philosophical Roots to the Modern Face |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-030-86541-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23 |language=en |date=2021 |access-date=19 July 2024 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Frazier |first1=Jessica Michelle |title=Philosophies of being in India I: Pluralism, nihilism, and monism |journal=Philosophy Compass |volume=19 |issue=11 |doi=10.1111/phc3.70004 |date=2024 |doi-access=free }} | * {{cite journal |last1=Frazier |first1=Jessica Michelle |title=Philosophies of being in India I: Pluralism, nihilism, and monism |journal=Philosophy Compass |volume=19 |issue=11 |doi=10.1111/phc3.70004 |date=2024 |article-number=e70004 |doi-access=free }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Gaughran |first1=Richard |editor1-last=Conard |editor1-first=Mark T. |title=The Philosophy of the Coen Brothers |publisher=University Press of Kentucky |isbn=978-0-8131-2526-8 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-OV50oVxKyoC&pg=PA231 |language=en |chapter='What Kind of Man Are You?' The Coen Brothers and Existentialist Role Playing |date=2009 |pages=227–242}} | * {{cite book |last1=Gaughran |first1=Richard |editor1-last=Conard |editor1-first=Mark T. |title=The Philosophy of the Coen Brothers |publisher=University Press of Kentucky |isbn=978-0-8131-2526-8 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-OV50oVxKyoC&pg=PA231 |language=en |chapter='What Kind of Man Are You?' The Coen Brothers and Existentialist Role Playing |date=2009 |pages=227–242}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Gemes |first1=Ken |last2=Sykes |first2=Chris |editor1-last=Kaldis |editor1-first=Byron |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences |publisher=SAGE |isbn=978-1-4129-8689-2 |doi=10.4135/9781452276052.n254 |chapter=Nihilism |date=2013 |pages=671–674 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Gemes |first1=Ken |last2=Sykes |first2=Chris |editor1-last=Kaldis |editor1-first=Byron |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences |publisher=SAGE |isbn=978-1-4129-8689-2 |doi=10.4135/9781452276052.n254 |chapter=Nihilism |date=2013 |pages=671–674 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=George |first1=Siby K. |title=Heidegger and Development in the Global South |publisher=Springer India |isbn=978-81-322-2304-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ym7vCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 |language=en |date=2015 }} | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Gertz |first1=Nolen |title=Nihilism |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-53717-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2019 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Gertz |first1=Nolen |title=Nihilism |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-53717-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aU6qDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2019 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Gillespie |first1=Michael Allen |title=Nihilism Before Nietzsche |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-29348-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=r4Itb0Zc2hUC&pg=PA179 |language=en |date=1996 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Gillespie |first1=Michael Allen |title=Nihilism Before Nietzsche |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-29348-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=r4Itb0Zc2hUC&pg=PA179 |language=en |date=1996 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Gloy |first1=Karen |title=Zwischen Glück und Tragik |publisher=Brill Fink |isbn=978-3-8467-5645-4 |url=https://brill.com/display/title/51616 |language=de |chapter=VI. Nihilismus – Pessimismus |date=2013 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Gloy |first1=Karen |title=Zwischen Glück und Tragik |publisher=Brill Fink |isbn=978-3-8467-5645-4 |url=https://brill.com/display/title/51616 |language=de |chapter=VI. Nihilismus – Pessimismus |date=2013 |pages=145–200}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Gómez |first1=Luis O. |chapter=Pain and the Suffering Consciousness: The Alleviation of Suffering in Buddhist Discourse |editor-last1=Coakley |editor-first1=Sarah |editor-last2=Shelemay |editor-first2=Kay Kaufman |title=Pain and Its Transformations: The Interface of Biology and Culture |date=2007 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-02456-4 |language=en }} | * {{cite book |last1=Gómez |first1=Luis O. |chapter=Pain and the Suffering Consciousness: The Alleviation of Suffering in Buddhist Discourse |editor-last1=Coakley |editor-first1=Sarah |editor-last2=Shelemay |editor-first2=Kay Kaufman |title=Pain and Its Transformations: The Interface of Biology and Culture |date=2007 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-02456-4 |language=en |pages=101–121}} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Gordon |first1=Jeffrey |title=Nagel or Camus on the Absurd? |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=45 |issue=1 |doi=10.2307/2107324 |date=1984 |pages=15–28|jstor=2107324 }} | * {{cite journal |last1=Gordon |first1=Jeffrey |title=Nagel or Camus on the Absurd? |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=45 |issue=1 |doi=10.2307/2107324 |date=1984 |pages=15–28|jstor=2107324 }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Gratton |first1=Peter |title=Jean François Lyotard |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lyotard/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=1 March 2025 |date=2018 }} | * {{cite web |last1=Gratton |first1=Peter |title=Jean François Lyotard |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lyotard/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=1 March 2025 |date=2018 }} | ||
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* {{cite web |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Knowledge |url=https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ |website=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=18 May 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105750/https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ |url-status=live |ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''" }} | * {{cite web |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Knowledge |url=https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ |website=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=18 May 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105750/https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ |url-status=live |ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''" }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Fallibilism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/fallibil/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=31 July 2024 |ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''" |archive-date=18 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200818125146/https://iep.utm.edu/fallibil/ |url-status=live }} | * {{cite web |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Fallibilism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/fallibil/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=31 July 2024 |ref=Hetherington, "''Fallibilism''" |archive-date=18 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200818125146/https://iep.utm.edu/fallibil/ |url-status=live }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Hoad |first1=T. F. |title=The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology |date=1996 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-283098- | * {{cite book |last1=Hoad |first1=T. F. |title=The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology |date=1996 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-283098-2 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Holbrook |first1=David |title=A Philosopher for Today?: Max Stirner's Egoistical Nihilism |journal=New Blackfriars |volume=58 |issue=687 |doi=10.1111/j.1741-2005.1977.tb02360.x |date=1977 |pages=382–390}} | * {{cite journal |last1=Holbrook |first1=David |title=A Philosopher for Today?: Max Stirner's Egoistical Nihilism |journal=New Blackfriars |volume=58 |issue=687 |doi=10.1111/j.1741-2005.1977.tb02360.x |date=1977 |pages=382–390}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Hookway |first1=C. J. |chapter=Scepticism |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 |pages=838–840 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Hookway |first1=C. J. |chapter=Scepticism |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 |pages=838–840 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Hopkins |first1=David |title=Dada and Surrealism: A Very Short Introduction |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-157769-7 |language=en |date=2004 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Hopkins |first1=David |title=Dada and Surrealism: A Very Short Introduction |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-157769-7 |language=en |date=2004 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Hryschko |first1=Myroslav Feodosijevic |title=Vattimo And The Possibilities Of Nihilistic Ontology |date=2010 |journal=Ideas y Valores |volume=59 |issue=142 |pages=49–65 }} | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Huemer |first1=Michael |title=Skepticism and the Veil of Perception |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-7425-1253-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ccmNDGIiJ3IC&pg=PA27 |language=en |date=2001 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Huemer |first1=Michael |title=Skepticism and the Veil of Perception |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-7425-1253-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ccmNDGIiJ3IC&pg=PA27 |language=en |date=2001 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Iannone |first1=A. Pablo |title=Dictionary of World Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-68043-6 |language=en |date=2013 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Iannone |first1=A. Pablo |title=Dictionary of World Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-68043-6 |language=en |date=2013 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Johnson |first1=Devon R. |editor1-last=Aho |editor1-first=Kevin |editor2-last=Altman |editor2-first=Megan |editor3-last=Pedersen |editor3-first=Hans |title=The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Existentialism |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-040-00629-0 |language=en |chapter=Black Nihilism |date=2024 |pages=289–301}} | * {{cite book |last1=Johnson |first1=Devon R. |editor1-last=Aho |editor1-first=Kevin |editor2-last=Altman |editor2-first=Megan |editor3-last=Pedersen |editor3-first=Hans |title=The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Existentialism |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-040-00629-0 |language=en |chapter=Black Nihilism |date=2024 |pages=289–301}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Joyce |first1=Richard |title=The International Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-4051-8641-4 |edition= | * {{cite book |last1=Joyce |first1=Richard |title=The International Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-4051-8641-4 |edition=1st |doi=10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee055 |language=en |chapter=Nihilism |date=2013 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Kavadlo |first1=Jesse |chapter=The Fiction of Self-Destruction |editor-last1=Schuchardt |editor-first1=Read Mercer |title=You Do Not Talk About Fight Club: I Am Jack's Completely Unauthorized Essay Collection |publisher=BenBella Books, Inc. |isbn=978-1-941631-61-4 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lXwvBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA14 |language=en |date=2015 |pages=13–34 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Kavadlo |first1=Jesse |chapter=The Fiction of Self-Destruction |editor-last1=Schuchardt |editor-first1=Read Mercer |title=You Do Not Talk About Fight Club: I Am Jack's Completely Unauthorized Essay Collection |publisher=BenBella Books, Inc. |isbn=978-1-941631-61-4 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lXwvBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA14 |language=en |date=2015 |pages=13–34 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last=Klein |first=Peter D. |date=1998 |chapter=Knowledge, Concept of |editor1-last=Craig |editor1-first=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |chapter-url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-P031-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |oclc=38096851 |access-date=13 June 2022 |archive-date=13 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220613025031/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1 |url-status=live }} | * {{cite book |last=Klein |first=Peter D. |date=1998 |chapter=Knowledge, Concept of |editor1-last=Craig |editor1-first=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |chapter-url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-P031-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |oclc=38096851 |access-date=13 June 2022 |archive-date=13 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220613025031/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1 |url-status=live }} | ||
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* {{cite web |last1=McCain |first1=Kevin |title=Problem of the Criterion |url=https://iep.utm.edu/problem-of-the-criterion/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=21 February 2025}} | * {{cite web |last1=McCain |first1=Kevin |title=Problem of the Criterion |url=https://iep.utm.edu/problem-of-the-criterion/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=21 February 2025}} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Metz |first1=Thaddeus |title=The Meaning of Life |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 February 2025 |date=2023 }} | * {{cite web |last1=Metz |first1=Thaddeus |title=The Meaning of Life |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 February 2025 |date=2023 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Morrison |first1=Robert G. |title=Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-823556-9 |date=2002 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Morrison |first1=Robert G. |title=Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-823556-9 |date=2002 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Moruzzi |first1=Sebastiano |editor1-last=García-Carpintero |editor1-first=Manuel |editor2-last=Kölbel |editor2-first=Max |title=Relative Truth |publisher=Oxford University | * {{cite book |last1=Moruzzi |first1=Sebastiano |editor1-last=García-Carpintero |editor1-first=Manuel |editor2-last=Kölbel |editor2-first=Max |title=Relative Truth |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-923495-0 |edition=1st |language=en |chapter=Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism |date=2008 |url=https://philarchive.org/archive/MORABA |pages=207–224}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Mulligan |first1=Kevin |editor1-last=Poidevin |editor1-first=Robin Le |editor2-last=Peter |editor2-first=Simons |editor3-last=Andrew |editor3-first=McGonigal |editor4-last=Cameron |editor4-first=Ross P. |title=The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-15586-6 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Bt99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA401 |language=en |chapter=38. Values |date=2009 |pages=401–412}} | * {{cite book |last1=Mulligan |first1=Kevin |editor1-last=Poidevin |editor1-first=Robin Le |editor2-last=Peter |editor2-first=Simons |editor3-last=Andrew |editor3-first=McGonigal |editor4-last=Cameron |editor4-first=Ross P. |title=The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-15586-6 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Bt99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA401 |language=en |chapter=38. Values |date=2009 |pages=401–412}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Nairn |first1=Tom |title=The Enchanted Glass: Britain and Its Monarchy |publisher=Verso | * {{cite book |last1=Nairn |first1=Tom |title=The Enchanted Glass: Britain and Its Monarchy |publisher=Verso |isbn=978-1-84467-775-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vQDfDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA380 |language=en |date=2011 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Oddie |first1=Graham |title=The International Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-4051-8641-4 |edition= | * {{cite book |last1=Oddie |first1=Graham |title=The International Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-4051-8641-4 |edition=1st |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588 |language=en |chapter=Value Realism |doi=10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee588 |date=2013 }} | ||
* {{cite dictionary |url=https://www.oed.com/dictionary/nihilism_n?tab=factsheet |dictionary=Oxford English Dictionary |date=2025 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition= | * {{cite dictionary |chapter-url=https://www.oed.com/dictionary/nihilism_n?tab=factsheet |dictionary=Oxford English Dictionary |date=2025 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=3rd |chapter=Nihilism, n. |author=OED staff |doi=10.1093/OED/1298060344}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Olson |first1=Carl |title=Zen and the Art of Postmodern Philosophy: Two Paths of Liberation from the Representational Mode of Thinking |publisher=SUNY Press |isbn=978-0-7914-4653-9 |language=en |date=2000 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Olson |first1=Carl |title=Zen and the Art of Postmodern Philosophy: Two Paths of Liberation from the Representational Mode of Thinking |publisher=SUNY Press |isbn=978-0-7914-4653-9 |language=en |date=2000 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Olson |first1=Robert G. |editor1-last=Borchert |editor1-first=Donald M. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-02-865783-7 |edition= | * {{cite book |last1=Olson |first1=Robert G. |editor1-last=Borchert |editor1-first=Donald M. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-02-865783-7 |edition=2nd |volume=6 |date=2006 |chapter=Nihilism |pages=617–620 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Peng |first1=Lü |title=A History of China in the 20th Century |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-981-99-0734-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gRLREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1597 |language=en |date=2023 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Peng |first1=Lü |title=A History of China in the 20th Century |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-981-99-0734-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gRLREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1597 |language=en |date=2023 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Pitts |first1=J. Brian |editor1-last=Chamcham |editor1-first=Khalil |editor2-last=Silk |editor2-first=Joseph |editor3-last=Barrow |editor3-first=John D. |editor4-last=Saunders |editor4-first=Simon |title=The Philosophy of Cosmology |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-316-99595-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=T_SkDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA263 |language=en |chapter=13. Progress and Gravity: Overcoming Divisions Between General Relativity and Particle Physics and Between Physics and HPS |date=2017 |pages=263–282 }} | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Pradhan |first1=Ramesh Chandra |title=Ethics, Self and the World: Exploring Metaphysical Foundations in Moral Philosophy |publisher=Springer Nature Singapore |isbn=978-981-97-3496-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=m4wWEQAAQBAJ&pg=183 |language=en |date=2024 }} | |||
* {{cite web |last1=Pratt |first1=Alan |title=Nihilism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/nihilism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=7 February 2025}} | * {{cite web |last1=Pratt |first1=Alan |title=Nihilism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/nihilism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=7 February 2025}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Reed |first1=Baron |editor1-last=Matthen |editor1-first=Mohan |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-960047-2 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=geSrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |language=en |chapter=Skepticism and Perception |date=2015 |access-date=3 August 2024 |pages=66–80 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Reed |first1=Baron |editor1-last=Matthen |editor1-first=Mohan |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-960047-2 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=geSrCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |language=en |chapter=Skepticism and Perception |date=2015 |access-date=3 August 2024 |pages=66–80 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Rettler |first1=Bradley |title=Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects |journal=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |volume=99 |issue=4 |doi=10.1111/papq.12220 |date=2018 |pages=842–868 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/RETMNA }} | * {{cite journal |last1=Rettler |first1=Bradley |title=Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects |journal=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |volume=99 |issue=4 |doi=10.1111/papq.12220 |date=2018 |pages=842–868 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/RETMNA }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Ridge |first1=Michael |title=Moral Non-Naturalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 December 2023 |date=2019 }} | * {{cite web |last1=Ridge |first1=Michael |title=Moral Non-Naturalism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 December 2023 |date=2019 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Rodriguez-Pereyra |first1=Gonzalo |title=Lowe's Argument Against Nihilism |journal=Analysis |volume=60 |issue=268 |doi=10.1111/1467-8284.00250 |date=2000 |pages=335–340}} | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Sapio |first1=Flora |title=Sovereign Power and the Law in China: Zones of Exception in the Criminal Justice System |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-90-04-18768-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-955DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 |language=en |date=2010 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Sapio |first1=Flora |title=Sovereign Power and the Law in China: Zones of Exception in the Criminal Justice System |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-90-04-18768-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-955DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 |language=en |date=2010 }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Sayre-McCord |first1=Geoff |title=Moral Realism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 February 2025 |date=2023 }} | * {{cite web |last1=Sayre-McCord |first1=Geoff |title=Moral Realism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 February 2025 |date=2023 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Schulz |first1=Heiko |title=Band 2 Studien zur Philosophie und Theologie Søren Kierkegaards |publisher=De Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-026710-5 |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110267105.130/html?lang=en |language=de |chapter=5. Aesthetic Nihilism. The Dialectic of Repetition and Non-Repetition in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard |date=2014 |pages=130–145|doi=10.1515/9783110267105.130 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Schulz |first1=Heiko |title=Band 2 Studien zur Philosophie und Theologie Søren Kierkegaards |publisher=De Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-026710-5 |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110267105.130/html?lang=en |language=de |chapter=5. Aesthetic Nihilism. The Dialectic of Repetition and Non-Repetition in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard |date=2014 |pages=130–145|doi=10.1515/9783110267105.130 }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Seachris |first1=Joshua |title=The Meaning of Life: Contemporary Analytic Perspectives |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mean-ana/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=12 February 2025}} | * {{cite web |last1=Seachris |first1=Joshua |title=The Meaning of Life: Contemporary Analytic Perspectives |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mean-ana/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=12 February 2025}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Sinnott-Armstrong |first1=Walter |title=Moral Skepticism |publisher=Oxford University Press | * {{cite book |last1=Sinnott-Armstrong |first1=Walter |title=Moral Skepticism |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-534206-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5pzCOHmcDocC&pg=PA59 |language=en |date=2007 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Slocombe |first1=William |title=Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-48935-9 |language=en |date=2006}} | * {{cite book |last1=Slocombe |first1=William |title=Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-48935-9 |language=en |date=2006}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Smith |first1=Steven C. |title=A Heart at Fire's Center: The Life and Music of Bernard Herrmann |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-92723-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-1mUcGRpt0EC&pg=PA350 |language=en |date=2002 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Smith |first1=Steven C. |title=A Heart at Fire's Center: The Life and Music of Bernard Herrmann |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-92723-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-1mUcGRpt0EC&pg=PA350 |language=en |date=2002 }} | ||
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* {{cite journal |last1=Toribio Vazquez |first1=Juan Luis |title=Nietzsche's shadow: On the origin and development of the term nihilism |journal=Philosophy & Social Criticism |volume=47 |issue=10 |doi=10.1177/0191453720975454 |date=2021 |pages=1199–1212 |doi-access=free }} | * {{cite journal |last1=Toribio Vazquez |first1=Juan Luis |title=Nietzsche's shadow: On the origin and development of the term nihilism |journal=Philosophy & Social Criticism |volume=47 |issue=10 |doi=10.1177/0191453720975454 |date=2021 |pages=1199–1212 |doi-access=free }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Turner |first1=Jason |editor1-last=Bennett |editor1-first=Karen |editor2-last=Zimmerman |editor2-first=Dean W. |title=Oxford Studies in Metaphysics |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-960303-9 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0001 |chapter=1. Ontological Nihilism |date=2011 |pages=3–54 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Turner |first1=Jason |editor1-last=Bennett |editor1-first=Karen |editor2-last=Zimmerman |editor2-first=Dean W. |title=Oxford Studies in Metaphysics |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-960303-9 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0001 |chapter=1. Ontological Nihilism |date=2011 |pages=3–54 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Van Tongeren |first1=Paul |title=Nihilism and Morality |journal=Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe |volume=53 |issue=4 |url=https://scielo.org.za/scielo.php?pid=S0041-47512013000400008&script=sci_abstract&tlng=en |language=en |issn=0041-4751 |date=2013 |pages=589–601}} | |||
* {{cite book |last1=Vattimo |first1=Gianni |editor1-last=Darby |editor1-first=Tom |editor2-last=Egyed |editor2-first=Béla |editor3-last=Jones |editor3-first=Ben |title=Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics |publisher=Carleton University Press |isbn=978-0-88629-093-1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G-1YV3x6yakC&pg=PA15 |language=en |chapter=Nihilism: Reactive and Active |date=1989 |pages=15–22 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Vattimo |first1=Gianni |editor1-last=Darby |editor1-first=Tom |editor2-last=Egyed |editor2-first=Béla |editor3-last=Jones |editor3-first=Ben |title=Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism: Essays on Interpretation, Language and Politics |publisher=Carleton University Press |isbn=978-0-88629-093-1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G-1YV3x6yakC&pg=PA15 |language=en |chapter=Nihilism: Reactive and Active |date=1989 |pages=15–22 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Walicki |first1=Andrzej |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Russian philosophy of law |chapter-url=https://uat-rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/russian-philosophy-of-law/v-1/sections/the-revival-of-natural-law-and-the-legal-philosophers-of-the-silver-age | * {{cite book |last1=Walicki |first1=Andrzej |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |chapter=Russian philosophy of law |chapter-url=https://uat-rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/russian-philosophy-of-law/v-1/sections/the-revival-of-natural-law-and-the-legal-philosophers-of-the-silver-age |publisher=Routledge |access-date=24 February 2025 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-E083-1 |date=2002 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Warder |first1=Anthony Kennedy |author-link=Anthony Kennedy Warder |title=A Course in Indian Philosophy |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass Publishers |isbn=978-81-208-1482-0 |edition= | * {{cite book |last1=Warder |first1=Anthony Kennedy |author-link=Anthony Kennedy Warder |title=A Course in Indian Philosophy |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass Publishers |isbn=978-81-208-1482-0 |edition=2nd |date=1998 }} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Warren |first1=Calvin L. |title=Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope |journal=CR: The New Centennial Review |volume=15 |issue=1 |doi=10.14321/crnewcentrevi.15.1.0215 |date=2015 |pages=215–248}} | * {{cite journal |last1=Warren |first1=Calvin L. |title=Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope |journal=CR: The New Centennial Review |volume=15 |issue=1 |doi=10.14321/crnewcentrevi.15.1.0215 |date=2015 |pages=215–248}} | ||
* {{cite journal |last1=Weller |first1=Shane |title="Gnawing to Be Naught": Beckett and Pre-Socratic Nihilism |journal=Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui |volume=20 |issue=1 |doi=10.1163/18757405-020001026 |date=2008 |pages=321–333 }} | * {{cite journal |last1=Weller |first1=Shane |title="Gnawing to Be Naught": Beckett and Pre-Socratic Nihilism |journal=Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui |volume=20 |issue=1 |doi=10.1163/18757405-020001026 |date=2008 |pages=321–333 }} | ||
Latest revision as of 10:24, 9 November 2025
Template:Short description Script error: No such module "about". Script error: No such module "redirect hatnote". Template:Main other Template:Use American English
NihilismTemplate:Efn is a family of philosophical views arguing that life is meaningless, that moral values are baseless, or that knowledge is impossible. Thus, such views reject the basis of certain ideas. Nihilistic views span several branches of philosophy, including ethics, value theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. Nihilism is also described as a broad cultural phenomenon or historical movement that pervades modernity in the Western world.
Existential nihilism asserts that life is inherently meaningless and lacks a higher purpose. By suggesting that all individual and societal achievements are ultimately pointless, it can lead to indifference, lack of motivation, and existential crises. In response, some philosophers propose detachment from worldly concerns, while others seek to discover or create values. Moral nihilism, a related view, denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that moral evaluations and practices rest on misguided assumptions without any foundation in external reality.
In epistemology or the theory of knowledge, nihilism challenges knowledge and truth. According to relativism, knowledge, truth, or meaning are relative to the perspectives of specific individuals or cultural contexts. This implies that there is no independent framework to assess which opinion is ultimately correct. Skeptical interpretations go further by denying the existence of knowledge or truth altogether. In metaphysics, one form of nihilism states that the universe could have been empty without any objects. This view holds that there is no fundamental reason for why something exists rather than nothing. Mereological nihilism asserts that there are only simple objects, like elementary particles, but no composite objects, like tables. Cosmological nihilism is the view that reality is unintelligible and indifferent to human understanding. Other nihilist positions include political, semantic, logical, and therapeutic nihilism.
Some aspects of nihilism have their roots in ancient philosophy in the form of challenges to established beliefs, values, and practices. However, nihilism is primarily associated with modernity, emerging in the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly in Germany and Russia through the works of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Ivan Turgenev. It took center stage in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche, who understood nihilism as a pervasive cultural trend in which people lose the values and ideals guiding their lives as a result of secularization. In the 20th century, nihilist themes were explored by Dadaism, existentialism, and postmodern philosophy.
Nihilism is a family of views that reject or deny certain aspects of existence.[2] Different forms of nihilism deny different features of reality. For example, existential nihilism denies that life has a higher meaning, and moral nihilism rejects the existence of moral phenomena. Similarly, epistemological nihilism questions the possibility of objective knowledge, while political nihilism advocates the destruction of established political institutions.[1] The precise definition of nihilism is disputed, and many other definitions and types of nihilism have been proposed, covering a wide range of topics studied by different branches of philosophy, such as ethics, value theory, epistemology, and metaphysics.[3]
In addition to philosophical theories, nihilism can also refer to a broader cultural phenomenon or historical movement. In this context, it is primarily associated with modernity in the Western world, characterized by deep skepticism toward established norms and values alongside indifference, despair, and a lack of purpose.[4] Outside the academic discourse, the term nihilism is used more loosely in everyday language to describe negative, destructive, or antisocial attitudes, expressing that someone fails to care about a particular issue. For instance, conservatives may be labeled as nihilistic for not valuing progress, while progressives may be described as such for disregarding established norms.[5]
Nihilism is closely associated with other disillusioned attitudes toward the world, like pessimism, absurdism, existentialism, cynicism, and apathy. Although the meanings of these terms overlap, they have distinct connotations and do not necessarily imply one another.[7] Pessimism contrasts with optimism as a negative outlook focused on bad outcomes and characterized by hopelessness. A key difference to nihilism, according to one interpretation, is that pessimists see the world as inherently bad, whereas nihilists deny that it has any positive or negative meaning.[8] Absurdism argues that the world is not just meaningless, as existential nihilism asserts, but also absurd. It examines the absurdity arising from paradoxical attempts to find meaning in an inherently meaningless universe.[9] Existentialism is a philosophical tradition that addresses absurdist and nihilist views while exploring the human condition through themes like anxiety, death, freedom, and authenticity.[10] Cynicism is a distrustful attitude toward the motives of other people or society in general.[11] Apathy is a state of mind in which a person does not care about things, characterized by indifference and a lack of desires and emotions.[12]
The word nihilism is a combination of the Latin term Script error: No such module "Lang"., meaning Template:Gloss, and the suffix -ism, indicating an ideology. Its literal meaning is Template:Gloss or Template:Gloss, reflected in terms like annihilate and nihility.[13] The word emerged in 18th-century Germany, first as a literary term and later as a philosophical notion, which Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi conceptualized to criticize philosophical thought that rejects meaning or existence.[14] Its first recorded use in English dates to the 1810s.[15] The term became popular in 19th-century Russia through Ivan Turgenev's novel Fathers and Sons and the Russian nihilist movement. Interest in it increased more broadly in the 20th century in response to Friedrich Nietzsche's works, while its meaning expanded to cover a wider range of philosophical and cultural phenomena.[16]
Ethics and value theory
Forms of nihilism belonging to the fields of ethics and value theory question the existence of values, morality, and the meaning of life.[18]
Existential nihilism
Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Existential nihilism asserts that life is meaningless. It is not limited to the idea that some people fail to find meaning in their lives but makes the broader claim that human existence in general or the world as a whole lacks a higher purpose. This view suggests that living a genuinely meaningful life is impossible, that there is no higher reason to continue living, and that all efforts, achievements, happiness, and suffering are ultimately pointless.[19]
Existential nihilism has diverse practical implications since people usually act with a purpose in mind, sometimes with the explicit goal of making their lives meaningful. As a result, the belief that there is no higher meaning or purpose can bring about indifference, a lack of motivation, and anxiety. In extreme cases, this can result in depression and despair or trigger an existential crisis.[20]Template:Efn Some philosophers, such as Martin Heidegger, highlight the connection to boredom, arguing that the lack of engagement and goals experienced in this mood makes life appear pointless.[21]
Diverse possible reactions to existential nihilism have been proposed.[23] Inspired by Indian philosophy, Arthur Schopenhauer suggested a pessimistic and ascetic response, advocating detachment from the world by renouncing desires and stopping to affirm life.[24] Friedrich Nietzsche sought to use the disruptive force of nihilism to re-interpret or re-evaluate all established ideals and values in an attempt to overcome nihilism and replace it with an affirmative attitude toward life.[25]Template:Efn Jean-Paul Sartre suggested that people can create their own values through the free choices they make, despite the cosmic lack of meaning. After considering the possibility of committing suicide, Albert Camus argued instead for a defiant attitude in which individuals rebel against meaninglessness.[26] Other responses include a destructive attitude aiming to violently tear down political authorities and social institutions, attempts to undermine nihilism by identifying genuine sources of meaning, and a passive resignation or quiet acceptance.[27]
Arguments for and against existential nihilism are discussed in the academic discourse. Arguments from a cosmological perspective assert that human existence is a minor and insignificant aspect of the universe as a whole, which is indifferent to human concerns and aspirations. This outlook aligns with an atheistic view, stating that, without a God, there is no source of higher values that transcend the natural world. Another viewpoint highlights the pervasiveness of senseless suffering and violence while emphasizing the fleeting nature of happiness. Some theorists link this view to human mortality, suggesting that the inevitability of death renders all human accomplishments transient and ultimately futile.[28] A different perspective from biology argues that life is driven by blind natural selection on a large scale and the satisfaction of innate needs on an individual scale, neither of which aims at a higher purpose.[29] Subjectivists, by contrast, focus on the subjective nature of all value experiences, asserting that they lack any objective ground.[30]
Opponents of existential nihilism have responded with counterarguments to these statements. For example, some reject the pessimistic outlook that life is primarily characterized by suffering, violence, and death, claiming instead that these negative phenomena are counterbalanced by positive experiences such as happiness and love.[31] Many non-nihilistic theories of the meaning of life are examined in the academic discourse. Supernaturalistic views focus on God or the soul as sources of meaning. Naturalistic views, by contrast, assert that subjective or objective values are inherent in the physical world. They include the discussion of fields where humans actively find meaning, such as exercising freedom, committing oneself to a cause, pursuing altruism, and engaging in positive social relationships.[32]
Moral nihilism
Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Unlike existential nihilism, moral nihilism focuses specifically on moral phenomena rather than a higher meaning or purpose. In its broadest form, it is the metaethical view that there are no moral facts. Also called amoralism and error theory, it denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that the theories and practices categorized under this label rest on misguided assumptions without any substantial link to reality.[33] On a practical level, some moral nihilists, such as Nietzsche, assert that without moral obligations, anything is permitted, suggesting that people are allowed to act however they want. Other moral nihilists reject this conclusion and argue that the denial of morality affects not only moral obligations, or what people are required to do, but also moral permissions, or what people are allowed to do.[34] Axiological nihilism, a related view, disputes the objective existence of values in general. This rejection is not limited to moral values and also concerns other types, like aesthetic and religious values.[35]
One argument for moral nihilism suggests that moral properties do not exist because of their odd nature, prescribing what to do rather than describing facts, such as shape and size. Science-based versions of this view hold that scientific inquiry does not reveal objective moral facts or that humans lack a source of moral knowledge. A related argument for moral nihilism focuses on the conventional aspects of moral evaluations and the difficulties in resolving moral disagreements.[36] Another line of thought emphasizes the evolutionary origin of morality, viewing it as a mere product of natural selection without a deeper metaphysical foundation.[37]
Moral realists have raised objections to moral nihilism. Naturalists argue that moral facts belong to the natural world and can be empirically observed. Non-naturalists propose that moral phenomena are different from natural phenomena, but are real nonetheless.[38] Common-sense philosophers assert that moral beliefs are deeply ingrained in practical experience and everyday reasoning, making the wholesale denial of moral facts implausible. A similar objection asserts that moral nihilism is incoherent and rests on a misunderstanding of moral language. Some critics focus on negative practical consequences rather than truth, suggesting that moral nihilism erodes social trust and leads to antisocial conduct.[39]
Some philosophers use the term moral nihilism in a more restricted sense that does not imply a rejection of all forms of morality. In one alternative sense, moral nihilism is the same as moral subjectivism, arguing that moral evaluations are purely subjective and lack rational objective justification. As a result, moral judgments are seen as expressions of arbitrary personal preferences, making moral disagreements rationally unresolvable.[40] In another sense, moral nihilism refers to ethical egoism, the theory that morality is determined by self-interest. This view denies that the well-being of others has moral implications unless it has external consequences for one's own well-being.[41]
Epistemology
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Relativism
Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Epistemological or epistemic nihilism is a family of views that challenge the existence or universal nature of knowledge. Some versions embrace relativism, denying that objectivity is possible. For example, truth-relativism asserts that truth is relative to the perspectives of specific individuals, groups, historical epochs, or cultural contexts.Template:Efn According to this view, statements like "the sun rises in the east" and "killing is wrong" are true in some perspectives and false in others. This theory not only claims that different people have different opinions but additionally asserts that no independent framework exists to assess which opinion is ultimately correct. As a result, there is no absolute truth on which observers from different perspectives can agree.[42]
A related form of relativistic nihilism focuses on meaning rather than truth. It argues that different people rely on incompatible conceptual schemesTemplate:Efn to make sense of the world. In the absence of a universal framework, genuine communication and shared understanding are deemed impossible since each viewpoint has its own interpretation of reality. Without a common ground, these incommensurable belief systems are arbitrary constructions, limiting reason to operations within a specific system without the ability to reconcile them.[43]
Proponents of relativism emphasize the diversity of human viewpoints and the frequent inability to resolve disagreements and reach a shared understanding.[45] Another argument asserts that theories are usually underdetermined by the data supporting them. As a result, there are different equally valid interpretations without an objective standard to resolve their differences.[46] An influential criticism argues that relativism undermines itself: if all truths are relative to a viewpoint, then relativism itself is only true for some viewpoints and false for others.[47] Another objection is that the absence of absolute epistemic standards may have odd consequences, for example, that people should not argue if they disagree or that they should generally suspend their judgments.[48]
Nietzsche was an influential proponent of relativistic nihilism. He saw belief systems as an expression of the will to power, arguing that their goal is to assert dominance rather than represent reality.[49] In postmodern philosophy, epistemological nihilism is associated with antifoundationalism, arguing that there is no ultimate rational ground of knowledge or action. It challenges universal frameworks, termed grand metanarratives, that claim to provide such a ground.[50]
Skepticism
Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". While relativist versions of epistemological nihilism allow that knowledge exists relative to a perspective, skeptic versions deny the existence of knowledge in general.Template:Efn Also called radical skepticism, this view argues that there is no foundation or justification of knowledge claims. Unlike more moderate forms of skepticism, it questions even the most reasonable knowledge claims grounded in basic common sense.[51] A closely related form of epistemological nihilism, sometimes called alethiological nihilism, centers on truth rather than knowledge, stating that truth does not exist.[52]
One argument in favor of radical skepticism asserts that absolute certainty is required for knowledge. It attempts to show that doubt can never be fully expelled.[53] For example, the dream argument, suggested by philosophers such as René Descartes, points out that, while dreaming, people usually cannot distinguish between dream and reality. Based on this observation, it argues that there is no knowledge since an individual can never be certain that they are not currently dreaming.[54] A related approach, inspired by Roderick Chisholm, asserts that a criterion or a standard of evaluation is required to judge what counts as knowledge. It holds that knowledge is impossible because people cannot have this criterion without prior knowledge, meaning that knowledge and its criterion cannot be established independently, as each relies on the other, similar to the chicken-or-the-egg problem.[55]Template:Efn Despite these arguments, radical skepticism is a rare position, accepted only by few philosophers and challenged by many criticisms. Its main influence stems from attempts by non-skeptical philosophers to prove that their theories overcome the challenge of skepticism.[56] Some objections state that radical skepticism is incoherent or self-refuting. For example, if there is no knowledge then skeptics cannot know that there is no knowledge, making it questionable why anyone should believe their theories.[57] Another counterargument is that common sense gives stronger support for the existence of knowledge than the abstract arguments used to defend skepticism.[58]
Epistemological nihilism can lead to other forms of nihilism. For instance, the inability to discern the meaning of life can lead to the conclusion that there is no such meaning, resulting in existential nihilism.[59] Moral skepticism, the view that there is no moral knowledge, can have a similar effect: the incapacity to distinguish right from wrong behavior can lead to the rejection of moral facts. Some theorists associate epistemological nihilism primarily with moral skepticism.[60]
Metaphysics
Metaphysical nihilism
Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Metaphysical or ontological nihilism encompasses views about the fundamental nature of reality. One version addresses the question of why there is anything at all. It suggests that, at least in principle, an empty world is possible. While this view recognises that the world contains concrete objects, it argues that their existence is not inevitable, because there could have been nothing. In such a scenario, the universe would be entirely empty, without any people, animals, planets, and no other forms of matter or energy.[61]
The subtraction argument proposes a procedure to support this view. It states that the world does not depend on any particular concrete object. For example, the world could still exist if a specific rock was removed. The argument concludes that an empty world is possible since it is the result of continuously reapplying this idea, subtracting objects at each step until an empty universe remains.[62]Template:Efn Opponents of metaphysical nihilism assert that an empty world is impossible, meaning that something must exist. A theologically inspired version asserts that God is a necessary object that must be present even if nothing else is. Another version accepts that any individual concrete object can be removed, but not all at once. It asserts that abstract objects, such as natural numbers, have necessary existence and that they require the existence of at least some concrete objects without depending on any specific object in particular.[63]
A more radical and controversial form of metaphysical nihilism denies the actual existence of objects. It states that there is no world, arguing that the experience of the universe is a mere illusion without an underlying reality. As a result, nothing at all is real. This view is sometimes interpreted as a form of solipsism, proposing that only the self exists and that the external world is merely an idea held by the self without a substantial reality.[64]
Mereological nihilism
Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Mereological or compositional nihilism is the view that complex or composite objects do not exist. Composite objects are objects made up of proper parts. For example, a house is a composite object made up of parts like walls, windows, and doors. Each of these parts is itself a composite object made up of smaller parts, such as molecules and atoms. Mereological nihilists argue that only noncomposite or simple objects exist, such as elementary particles. As a result, composite objects are understood as mere collections of simple objects. According to this view, there are no houses or tables; there are only elementary particles arranged house-wise or table-wise.[65]
Proponents of mereological nihilism highlight the parsimony and simplicity of a minimal ontology that excludes everything except simple objects, citing metaphysical principles like Ockham's Razor in its favor.[66] Another supporting argument suggests that mereological nihilism avoids certain metaphysical paradoxes associated with the relation between parts and wholes, like the Ship of Theseus.[67]Template:Efn Opponents of mereological nihilism highlight the counterintuitive consequences of denying the existence of ordinary objects, contradicting common sense.[68] Other criticisms assert that mereological nihilism is unable to provide a coherent framework for how to understand collections of elementary particles or fails to explain phenomena like emergent properties.[69]
Cosmic nihilism
Cosmic or cosmological nihilism is the view that reality is unintelligible and lacks inherent meaning. Closely related to epistemological and existential nihilism, it asserts that the world is blank, featureless, or chaotic, making it indifferent to human attempts to understand it. Cosmic nihilists often emphasize the vastness of the universe, arguing that it shows the insignificance of humans and their endeavors.[70]
A broad form of cosmic nihilism states that reality as a whole is unintelligible. According to this view, the chaotic nature of the world makes it impossible to comprehend the universe at any level or find meaningful patterns in it, leading to alienation as human understanding fails to grasp reality.[71] For example, Max Stirner characterized the world as a "metaphysical chaos" without "a comprehensive structure of objective meanings".[72] In response to arguments stating that it is possible in certain cases to discern patterns and predict outcomes, some cosmic nihilists have proposed more narrow versions. One version acknowledges that humans can understand some aspects of reality, for example, through rigorous scientific study. Nonetheless, this view maintains that the universe remains impenetrable to comprehension and indifferent to human aspirations on other levels, lacking intelligible structures that correspond to objective values, moral principles, and a higher purpose.[71]
Other forms
In addition to the main nihilistic theories discussed in ethics, value theory, epistemology, and metaphysics, nihilism is also examined in other areas. Discussions include fields such as literature, art, culture, and politics.[75] Various literary works portray characters or attitudes that reject established norms, exhibit disillusionment with life, or struggle with existential despair. Bazarov, the protagonist of Ivan Turgenev's novel Fathers and Sons, is an early and influential example. Driven by a deep distrust of established authorities, Bazarov follows a cold scientific rationalism. He openly expresses his hate toward conventional beliefs, societal norms, and sentimentality, aiming to dismantle them without a vision of what should replace them.[76] In response to Turgenev's novel, Nikolay Chernyshevsky's What Is to Be Done? explored nihilism from the perspective of rational egoism.[77] Many of Fyodor Dostoevsky's works explore the problem of nihilism, particularly the idea that without God, there is no moral basis for right or wrong.[78] For example, his novel The Brothers Karamazov examines the tensions between faith, free will, and nihilism through the perspectives of the protagonists.[79] Nothingness is a central concern for many characters in the works of Samuel Beckett, either as the object of desire or fear.[80] Nihilist themes are also present in the literary works of Franz Kafka, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus.[81]
In the field of art, Dadaism emerged during the First World War as a nihilistic rejection of established moral, societal, and artistic standards. Dadaists embraced chaos, spontaneity, and irrationality, infusing their art with irreverence, nonsense, and humor to provoke and challenge traditional conceptions of art. For example, Marcel Duchamp presented Fountain, a readymade urinal, at an art exhibition, which became one of the most iconic pieces of the movement.[73] In cinema, the movie Citizen Kane suggests a form of epistemic nihilism, showcasing moral ambiguity and the impossibility of arriving at an objective assessment of the protagonist's character.[82] Elements of nihilism are also found in movies such as Taxi Driver,[83] A Clockwork Orange,[84] Fight Club,[85] The Big Lebowski,[86] and American Psycho.[87]
In the field of law, legal nihilists assert that laws lack an inherent meaning or a moral foundation, viewing them as unjust or arbitrary constructs used to maintain control and exercise power.[88] Religious or theological nihilism is associated with atheism and denies the existence of God. Some theorists identify this view as the root of other nihilist outlooks, such as existential and moral nihilism.[89]
In the philosophy of language, semantic nihilism denies that linguistic meaning is possible, arguing that there is no genuine communication since language fails to describe reality.[90] Logical nihilism is a theory about the relation between formal logic and natural language inference. It asserts that the logical consequence relation studied by logicians is unable to accurately reflect inferential practices in natural language.[91] In Africana philosophy, black nihilism is a negative outlook on discrimination and the possibility of reforming political and social systems to avoid antiblack racism.[92]
Therapeutic or medical nihilism is the position that medical interventions are largely ineffective. Against the advances of modern medicine, it argues that the methodology of medical research is fundamentally flawed and further distorted by financial incentives, resulting in a systematic overestimation of the benefits of treatments.[93]
Political nihilism
Script error: No such module "anchor".Political nihilism is a negative outlook on existing political and social structures, similar to anarchism. It seeks to uphold individual freedom against oppressive governmental controls and societal norms. Its radical and nihilistic tendencies are expressed in the revolutionary aim to dismantle these established forms of order. It targets political institutions, and the traditional beliefs and social practices supporting them, without offering new systems to take their place.[94]Template:Efn
Political nihilism is mainly linked to the Russian nihilist movement of the late 19th century. It emerged as a reaction to the rigid social structures and authoritarian rule in Tsarist Russia. In their rejection of established institutions and norms, Russian nihilists resorted to extreme means to promote a radical social revolution, leading to forms of violence and terrorism, including assassinations and arson. Some of the revolutionaries saw Turgenev's character Bazarov as their inspiration and role model.[95]
History
Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Although nihilism is primarily associated with modernity, some of its origins trace back to ancient philosophy.[96] Some Sophists, like Protagoras (Template:Circa), disputed the existence of objective truth, arguing for a relativistic nihilism according to which "man is the measure of all things".[97] Socrates's (Template:Circa) method of radical questioning served as a precursor of nihilism by challenging established beliefs, values, and practices, often with the goal of exposing their lack of a solid foundation.[98]Template:Efn Pyrrho (Template:Circa) formulated a broad version of epistemological nihilism in his attempt to show that knowledge is impossible.[99]
Negative attitudes toward objective knowledge and the world are also found in ancient Indian philosophy. However, it is controversial to what extent they constitute forms of nihilism in a strict sense, and some interpreters limit nihilism to the Western tradition.[100] In the 6th century BCE, the school of Ajñana developed a radical skepticism, questioning the possibility and usefulness of knowledge.[101] Buddhist thought, starting in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, focuses on the pervasiveness of suffering, identifying it as a fundamental aspect of existence. It teaches renunciation of worldly desires to achieve liberation from suffering in the state of nirvana.[102] According to a common interpretation, the school of Mādhyamaka, which emerged in the 2nd century CE, defends metaphysical nihilism, rejecting the existence of an ultimate foundation or absolute reality underlying the multiplicity of experienced phenomena.[103]
In the early modern period, secularization and the Scientific Revolution undermined established religious beliefs and values prevalent in the Western world during the medieval period, preparing the emergence of nihilism.[104] René Descartes (1596–1650) considered an extreme form of epistemological nihilism in his quest for absolute certainty. He suggested that humans cannot trust even their most fundamental beliefs unless they can rule out that a malevolent God-like being is constantly deceiving them.[105] Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) drew a sharp distinction between appearances and things underlying those appearances. By limiting knowledge to the sphere of appearances, he prepared a type of existential nihilism, making the deeper meaning of things in themselves inaccessible.[106] In criticizing the rationalism of the Kantian philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Friedrich Jacobi (1743–1819) coined the philosophical concept of nihilism to describe philosophical thought that leads to the denial of existence and meaning.[107]
In Russia, the term nihilism gained popularity through Ivan Turgenev's (1818–1883) portrayal of the nihilist character Bazarov in his novel Fathers and Sons.[108] Starting in the second half of the 19th century, the Russian nihilist movement was a form of political nihilism, characterized by a radical rejection of traditional social, political, and aesthetic norms.[109] Meanwhile in Western Europe, the nihilistic egoism of Max Stirner (1806–1856) reduced other people to their usefulness without respect for their personhood. Stirner also formulated a cosmic nihilism that sees the universe as an unintelligible, metaphysical chaos.[110] Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) explored different lifestyles or "spheres of existence" through which people seek meaning in their lives. He warned against an aesthetic lifestyle of pursuing sensory pleasures without ulterior goals, arguing that it leads to a nihilistic outlook marked by meaninglessness. Instead, he recommended a leap of faith that trusts in God as a higher source of meaning.[111]
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) developed a pessimistic philosophy, characterizing the world as a place of suffering, brought into being by a blind, irrational will.[112] Influenced by Schopenhauer, the problem of nihilism took center stage in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). He understood it as a broad cultural phenomenon in which people lose the values and ideals guiding their lives. He explored the causes and consequences of this shift in evaluative outlook, examining reactions to it and ways of overcoming it.[113] According to Nietzsche, nihilism often manifests in a distorted form as passive nihilism, masking its life-denying nature behind religious dogmas, conventional morality, and societal norms. Against this tendency, Nietzsche recommended active nihilism, which openly acknowledges the lack of meaning and uses its negative force to dismantle established values.Template:Efn He saw this as a transitional phase to overcome nihilism in general, leading to a vital affirmation of life through a revaluation of all values.[114]
Many subsequent developments in the 20th-century history of nihilism were responses to Nietzsche's philosophy.[116] Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) agreed with Nietzsche's description of the pervasive and corrosive nature of nihilism, seeing it as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought reaching back to the ancient period. Interpreting Nietzsche's concept of the will to power and modern technological developments, Heidegger came to the conclusion that Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism fails and leads to an even more complete nihilism. As an alternative, Heidegger turned to early Presocratic philosophy to recover a non-nihilistic understanding of being.[115]
Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) proposed a view aligned with cosmic nihilism, characterizing humanity as an accidental and insignificant byproduct of cosmic forces that are alien and indifferent to human concerns.[117] Against the backdrop of World War I, Dadaists expressed aspects of nihilism through art, seeking to undermine established norms and values while embracing nonsense and absurdity.[118] The question of nihilism and its denial of the meaning of life played a central role for existentialist philosophers.[119] Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) asserted that humans have no inborn essence defining who they are or what their purpose is. He argued that they can overcome this lack of predefined meaning through freedom, proposing that people make their lives meaningful by inventing themselves and their values.[22] In his absurdist philosophy, Albert Camus (1913–1960) explored the psychological paradox that arises from the inherent drive to seek meaning in an objectively meaningless world. He termed this condition "the absurd" and advocated for a defiant stance or rebellion against the lack of meaning.[120]
In the second half of the 20th century, certain aspects of nihilism emerged in postmodern philosophy, often in response to Nietzsche and Heidegger.[121] Jacques Derrida's (1930–2004) philosophy of deconstruction challenged the existence of absolute truth and stable meaning. Derrida aimed to expose the hidden assumptions and biases on which this viewpoint rests.[122] Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998) explored antifoundationalism, rejecting the existence of universal frameworks of understanding, termed metanarratives. He aimed to undermine their validity as standards of truth claims, proposing instead that they are merely different language games people play without a clear hierarchy prioritizing one language game over the others.[123] Similarly, Richard Rorty (1931–2007) dismissed the notion of objective truths, suggesting that people rely on their own judgment and creativity instead of privileging established perspectives, like the scientific worldview.[124] Against Nietzsche's and Heidegger's attempts to overcome nihilism, Gianni Vattimo (1936–2023) embraced it, viewing nihilism as the only viable alternative in the postmodern era.[125]
See also
References
Notes
Citations
Sources
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External links
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