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{{Short description|Societal transition away from religion}}
{{Short description|Societal transition away from religion}}
{{other uses}}
{{other uses}}
In [[sociology]], '''secularization''' ({{langx|en-GB|'''secularisation'''}}) is a multilayered concept that generally denotes "a transition from a religious to a more worldly level."<ref name="Latre">{{cite journal |last1=Latré |first1=Stijn |last2=Vanheeswijck |first2=Guido |title=Secularization: History of the Concept |journal=International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition) |date=1 January 2015 |pages=388–394 |doi=10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.03113-5|isbn=9780080970875 }}</ref> There are many types of secularization and most do not lead to atheism or irreligion, nor are they automatically antithetical to religion.<ref name="Eller" /> Secularization has different connotations such as implying differentiation of secular from religious domains, the marginalization of religion in those domains, or it may also entail the transformation of religion as a result of its recharacterization (e.g. as a private concern, or as a non-political matter or issue).<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Bullivant|first1=Stephen|last2=Lee|first2=Lois|year=2016|title=A Dictionary of Atheism|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=9780191816819}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ertit |first1=Volkan |title=Secularization: The Decline of the Supernatural Realm1 |journal=[[Religions (journal)|Religions]] |date=2018 |volume=9 |issue=4 |pages=92 |doi=10.3390/rel9040092 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
[[File:Countries_by_importance_of_religion.png|thumb|270x270px|[[Importance of religion by country]] in a 2008-2009 poll by [[Gallup, Inc.|Gallup]]]]
In [[sociology]], '''secularization''' ({{langx|en-GB|'''secularisation'''}}) is a multilayered concept that generally denotes "a transition from a religious to a more worldly level."<ref name="Latre">{{cite journal |last1=Latré |first1=Stijn |last2=Vanheeswijck |first2=Guido |title=Secularization: History of the Concept |journal=International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition) |date=1 January 2015 |pages=388–394 |doi=10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.03113-5|isbn=978-0-08-097087-5 }}</ref> There are many types of secularization and most do not lead to atheism or irreligion, nor are they automatically antithetical to religion.<ref name="Eller" /> Secularization has different connotations such as implying differentiation of secular from religious domains, the marginalization of religion in those domains, or it may also entail the transformation of religion as a result of its recharacterization (e.g., as a private concern, or as a non-political matter or issue).<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Bullivant|first1=Stephen|last2=Lee|first2=Lois|year=2016|title=A Dictionary of Atheism|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-181681-9}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ertit |first1=Volkan |title=Secularization: The Decline of the Supernatural Realm1 |journal=[[Religions (journal)|Religions]] |date=2018 |volume=9 |issue=4 |page=92 |doi=10.3390/rel9040092 |doi-access=free}}</ref>


The '''secularization thesis''' expresses the idea that through the lens of the European [[Age of Enlightenment|enlightenment]] [[Modernization theory|modernization]], [[rationalization (sociology)|rationalization]], combined with the ascent of science and technology, religious authority diminishes in all aspects of social life and governance.<ref name=":0">[https://web.archive.org/web/20051208002707/http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/ACROBAT/Sacred_and_Secular/Chapter%201.pdf "The Secularization Debate"], chapter 1 (pp. [https://books.google.com/books?id=dto-P2YfWJIC&dq=%22The+Secularization+Debate%22&pg=PA3 3]-[https://books.google.com/books?id=dto-P2YfWJIC&pg=PA32 32]) of {{cite book|first1= Pippa |last1= Norris |author-link1= Pippa Norris |first2= Ronald |last2= Inglehart |author-link2= Ronald Inglehart |title= Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide |url= https://archive.org/details/sacredsecularrel0000norr |url-access= registration |publisher= [[Cambridge University Press]] |year= 2004 |isbn= 978-0-521-83984-6 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hekmatpour|first=Peyman|date=2020-06-01|title=Inequality and Religiosity in a Global Context: Different Secularization Paths for Developed and Developing Nations|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/00207659.2020.1771013|journal=International Journal of Sociology|volume=50|issue=4|pages=286–309|doi=10.1080/00207659.2020.1771013|s2cid=219748670|issn=0020-7659|url-access=subscription}}</ref> According to [[Pippa Norris]] and [[Ronald Inglehart]], global demographics are complex since "virtually all advanced industrial societies" have become more secular in recent decades while also stating that people with religious beliefs represent a growing share of the world population due to fertility rates.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last1=Norris |first1=Pippa |title=Sacred and secular : religion and politics worldwide |last2=Inglehart |first2=Ronald |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2011 |isbn=9781139128674 |edition=2nd |location=Cambridge |pages=Chapter 1 |oclc=767732041}}</ref>
The '''secularization thesis''' expresses the idea that through the lens of the European [[Age of Enlightenment|enlightenment]] [[Modernization theory|modernization]], [[rationalization (sociology)|rationalization]], combined with the ascent of science and technology, religious authority diminishes in all aspects of social life and governance.<ref name=":0">[https://web.archive.org/web/20051208002707/http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/ACROBAT/Sacred_and_Secular/Chapter%201.pdf "The Secularization Debate"], chapter 1 (pp. [https://books.google.com/books?id=dto-P2YfWJIC&dq=%22The+Secularization+Debate%22&pg=PA3 3]-[https://books.google.com/books?id=dto-P2YfWJIC&pg=PA32 32]) of {{cite book|first1= Pippa |last1= Norris |author-link1= Pippa Norris |first2= Ronald |last2= Inglehart |author-link2= Ronald Inglehart |title= Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide |url= https://archive.org/details/sacredsecularrel0000norr |url-access= registration |publisher= [[Cambridge University Press]] |year= 2004 |isbn= 978-0-521-83984-6 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hekmatpour|first=Peyman|date=2020-06-01|title=Inequality and Religiosity in a Global Context: Different Secularization Paths for Developed and Developing Nations|journal=International Journal of Sociology|volume=50|issue=4|pages=286–309|doi=10.1080/00207659.2020.1771013|s2cid=219748670|issn=0020-7659}}</ref> [[Pew Research Center]] notes that economic development is positively correlated with less religiousness.<ref name=":19">{{Cite web |last1=Hackett |first1=Conrad |last2=Stonawski |first2=Marcin |last3=Tong |first3=Yunping |last4=Kramer |first4=Stephanie |last5=Shi |first5=Anne |last6=Fahmy |first6=Dalia |date=2025-06-09 |title=How the Global Religious Landscape Changed From 2010 to 2020 |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2025/06/09/how-the-global-religious-landscape-changed-from-2010-to-2020/ |access-date=2025-06-14 |website=Pew Research Center |language=en-US}}</ref> According to [[Pippa Norris]] and [[Ronald Inglehart]], "virtually all advanced industrial societies" have become more secular in recent decades.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last1=Norris |first1=Pippa |title=Sacred and secular: religion and politics worldwide |last2=Inglehart |first2=Ronald |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-1-139-12867-4 |edition=2nd |location=Cambridge |pages=Chapter 1 |oclc=767732041}}</ref>


In recent years, the secularization thesis has been challenged due to some global studies indicating that the irreligious population of the world may be in decline as a percentage of the world population due to irreligious countries having [[Sub-replacement fertility|subreplacement fertility]] rates and religious countries having higher birth rates in general.<ref name=":12" /><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Ellis|first1=Lee|last2=Hoskin|first2=Anthony W.|last3=Dutton|first3=Edward|last4=Nyborg|first4=Helmuth|title=The Future of Secularism: a Biologically Informed Theory Supplemented with Cross-Cultural Evidence |journal=Evolutionary Psychological Science|date=8 March 2017|volume=3|issue=3|pages=224–242|doi=10.1007/s40806-017-0090-z|url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-017-0090-z|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="CambridgeZuckerman">{{cite book|last=Zuckerman|first=Phil|editor1-last=Martin|editor1-first=Michael|title=The Cambridge Companion to Atheism|date=2006|doi=10.1017/CCOL0521842700.004|pages=47–66|chapter=3 - Atheism: Contemporary Numbers and Patterns|isbn=9781139001182}}</ref><ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=5eV3hMR7lmoC&dq=secularization+thesis&pg=PA253 Cultures and Globalization: Conflicts and Tensions] edited by Helmut K Anheier, Yudhishthir Raj Isar, SAGE, Mar 27, 2007, page 253</ref><ref>[http://www.sneps.net/RD/uploads/1-Shall%20the%20Religious%20Inherit%20the%20Earth.pdf Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century] by [[Eric Kaufmann]], Belfer Center, Harvard University/Birkbeck College, University of London</ref> Christian sociologist [[Peter L. Berger]] coined the term [[desecularization]] to describe this phenomenon.<ref>[https://academic.oup.com/jcs/article/52/2/232/781896 Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework] by Vyacheslav Karpov, Journal of Church and State, Volume 52, Issue 2, Spring 2010, Pages 232–270, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csq058</ref> In addition, secularization rates are stalling or reversing in some countries/regions such as the countries in the former [[Soviet Union]] or large cities in the [[Western world]] with significant amounts of religious immigrants.<ref>[https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/eric-kaufmann/london-a-rising-island-of-religion_b_2336699.html London: A Rising Island of Religion in a Secular Sea] by [[Eric Kaufmann]], ''Huffington Post'', February 20, 2013</ref><ref>{{cite book| url= https://wcfia.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/723_moghadam03_03.pdf | title= A Global Resurgence of Religion? | author= [[Assaf Moghadam]] | publisher= Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, [[Harvard University]] | work= Paper No. 03-03 | date= August 2003 }}</ref> There is no particular monolithic direction or trend for secularization since, even in Europe, the trends in religious history and demographical religious measures (e.g. belief, belonging, etc) are mixed and make the region an exception compared to other parts of the world.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Davie |first1=Grace |title=The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Europe |date=2022 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0198834267 |pages=270, 273, 278, 282 |chapter=15. Religion, Secularity, and Secularization in Europe}}</ref> Global studies show that many people who do not identify with a religion still hold religious beliefs and participate in religious practices.<ref name="Religiously Unaffiliated">{{cite web |url=http://www.pewforum.org/global-religious-landscape-unaffiliated.aspx |title=Religiously Unaffiliated |work=The Global Religious Landscape |publisher=[[Pew Research Center]]: Religion & Public Life |date=18 December 2012}}</ref><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" /> The secular vs religion dichotomy is false and neither concept is mutually exclusive.<ref name="Eller" />
The secularization thesis was challenged in 1999 by [[Peter L. Berger]], who coined the term ''[[desecularization]]'' to refer to a resurgence of religion after a period of secularization, with examples such as the [[Islamic revival]] since the 1970s, in particular the [[Iranian Revolution]], and the resurgence of religion in post-Soviet Russia.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last=Karpov |first=V. |date=2010-03-01 |title=Desecularization: A Conceptual Framework |url=https://academic.oup.com/jcs/article/52/2/232/781896 |journal=Journal of Church and State |language=en |volume=52 |issue=2 |pages=232–270, 232 |doi=10.1093/jcs/csq058 |issn=0021-969X |doi-access=free}}</ref> Some researchers have said that people with religious beliefs may be increasing as a share of world population, due to higher fertility rates in poorer, more religious countries,<ref name=":12" /><ref name="CambridgeZuckerman">{{cite book |last=Zuckerman |first=Phil |title=The Cambridge Companion to Atheism |date=2006 |isbn=978-1-139-00118-2 |editor1-last=Martin |editor1-first=Michael |pages=47–66 |chapter=3 - Atheism: Contemporary Numbers and Patterns |doi=10.1017/CCOL0521842700.004}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ellis |first1=Lee |last2=Hoskin |first2=Anthony W. |last3=Dutton |first3=Edward |last4=Nyborg |first4=Helmuth |date=8 March 2017 |title=The Future of Secularism: a Biologically Informed Theory Supplemented with Cross-Cultural Evidence |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-017-0090-z |journal=Evolutionary Psychological Science |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=224–242 |doi=10.1007/s40806-017-0090-z |url-access=subscription}}</ref> but [[Pew Research Center]] estimates that between 2010 and 2020, the religiously unaffiliated share of world population increased from 23.3% to 24.2%.<ref name=":19" />
 
There is no particular monolithic direction or trend for secularization since, even in Europe, the trends in religious history and demographical religious measures (e.g., belief, belonging, etc.) are mixed and make the region an exception compared to other parts of the world.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Davie |first1=Grace |title=The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Europe |date=2022 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-883426-7 |pages=270, 273, 278, 282 |chapter=15. Religion, Secularity, and Secularization in Europe}}</ref> There are many debates about the boundaries of both religion and secular and some have suggested "post-secular" models since there are areas of growth of religious influence which challenge the underlying assumptions on conventional views on secularism.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kettell |first1=Steven |title=Secularism and Religion |journal=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics |date=2019 |doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.898 |isbn=978-0-19-022863-7 }}</ref> Global studies show that many people who do not identify with a religion still hold religious beliefs and participate in religious practices.<ref name="Religiously Unaffiliated">{{cite web |url=http://www.pewforum.org/global-religious-landscape-unaffiliated.aspx |title=Religiously Unaffiliated |work=The Global Religious Landscape |publisher=[[Pew Research Center]]: Religion & Public Life |date=18 December 2012 |access-date=6 January 2023 |archive-date=30 July 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130730043126/http://www.pewforum.org/global-religious-landscape-unaffiliated.aspx |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" /><ref>{{cite book |last1=Blankholm |first1=Joseph |title=The Secular Paradox: On the Religiosity of the Not Religious |date=2022 |publisher=New York University Press |isbn=978-1-4798-0950-9 |location=New York |page=3,8}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Fuller |first1=Robert C. |title=Secular Spirituality |journal=The Oxford Handbook of Secularism |date=2017 |pages=571–586 |url=https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/28028/chapter/211861053 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en}}</ref> The secular vs religion dichotomy is false and neither concept is mutually exclusive.<ref name="Eller" /> Both "religion" and "secular" are Western terms and concepts that are not universal across cultures, languages, or time.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Eller |first1=David |title=Varieties of Secular Experience |journal=The Oxford Handbook of Secularism |date=2017 |pages=500–501, 512 |url=https://www.jimmunol.org/edited-volume/28028/chapter-abstract/211860078?redirectedFrom=fulltext |publisher=Oxford University Press|quote=It is commonplace today to note that the term "secular" is of Western origin—and not originally antagonistic to religion ("secular priests" were hardly averse to religion). Frankly, "secular" is not inherently related to religion at all: denoting "of the current age" or "of the present generation," it could apply to any subject...Some societies, as anthropology has discovered, do not even have a term or concept for "religion" and therefore obviously do not have a concept akin to our "secular." For the purposes of the present chapter, they do not have "secular experience" at all, since "the secular"—like religion—is nowhere and everywhere...What investigators can and should do is discover how particular groups, institutions, and societies talk about and practice secularism—if in fact they do at all—rather than to impose a speciously unified concept, derived from one society's experience, on all places and times.}}</ref>


==Overview==
==Overview==
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In contrast to the "modernization" thesis, [[Christian Smith (sociologist)|Christian Smith]] and others argue that intellectual and cultural élites promote secularization to enhance their own status and influence. Smith believes that [[intellectual]]s have an inherent tendency to be hostile to their native cultures, causing them to embrace secularism.<ref>Smith, Christian. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IbEwDwAAQBAJ&dq=info:paCf6RiVs7IJ:scholar.google.com/&pg=PR7 The Secular Revolution: Powers, Interests, and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life] (2012)</ref>
In contrast to the "modernization" thesis, [[Christian Smith (sociologist)|Christian Smith]] and others argue that intellectual and cultural élites promote secularization to enhance their own status and influence. Smith believes that [[intellectual]]s have an inherent tendency to be hostile to their native cultures, causing them to embrace secularism.<ref>Smith, Christian. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IbEwDwAAQBAJ&dq=info:paCf6RiVs7IJ:scholar.google.com/&pg=PR7 The Secular Revolution: Powers, Interests, and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life] (2012)</ref>


According to Jack David Eller, secularization is compatible with religion since most versions of secularity do not lead to atheism or irreligion.<ref name="Eller">{{cite book |last1=Eller |first1=Jack |editor1-last=Zuckerman |editor1-first=Phil |title=Atheism and Secularity |date=2010 |publisher=Praeger |location=Santa Barbara, Calif. |isbn=9780313351839 |pages=12–13 |chapter=What is Atheism? |quote=The point is that the sacred/secular dichotomy is, like most dichotomies, false. "Secular" certainly does not mean "atheistic" or without religion, definitely not anti-religion; in fact, as I illustrate in a chapter in the second volume of this collection, there is a proud tradition of "Islamic secularism." Despite the predictions of the "secularization theorists" like Marx and Weber, "modern" or secular processes have not meant the demise of religion and have actually proved to be quite compatible with religion—have even led, at least in the short term, to a surprising revival of religion. The problem with earlier secularization theories is that they presumed that secularization was a single, all-encompassing, and unidirectional phenomenon. However, as Peter Glasner has more recently shown, "secular" and "secularization" embrace a variety of diverse processes and responses, not all of which—indeed, few of which—are inherently antithetical to religion, Glasner identifies ten different versions of secularization, organized in terms of whether their thrust is primarily institutional, normative, or cognitive... The upshot of this analysis is that secularism most assuredly does not translate simply and directly into atheism. Many good theists support the secularization of the American government in the form of the "separation of church and state," and all of them go about at least part of their day without doing religion.}}</ref> Global studies show that many people who do not identify with a religion, still hold religious beliefs and participate in religious practices, thus complicating the situation.<ref name="Religiously Unaffiliated"/><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" />
According to Jack David Eller, secularization is compatible with religion since most versions of secularity do not lead to atheism or irreligion.<ref name="Eller">{{cite book |last1=Eller |first1=Jack |editor1-last=Zuckerman |editor1-first=Phil |title=Atheism and Secularity |date=2010 |publisher=Praeger |location=Santa Barbara, Calif. |isbn=978-0-313-35183-9 |pages=12–13 |chapter=What is Atheism? |quote=The point is that the sacred/secular dichotomy is, like most dichotomies, false. "Secular" certainly does not mean "atheistic" or without religion, definitely not anti-religion; in fact, as I illustrate in a chapter in the second volume of this collection, there is a proud tradition of "Islamic secularism." Despite the predictions of the "secularization theorists" like Marx and Weber, "modern" or secular processes have not meant the demise of religion and have actually proved to be quite compatible with religion—have even led, at least in the short term, to a surprising revival of religion. The problem with earlier secularization theories is that they presumed that secularization was a single, all-encompassing, and unidirectional phenomenon. However, as Peter Glasner has more recently shown, "secular" and "secularization" embrace a variety of diverse processes and responses, not all of which—indeed, few of which—are inherently antithetical to religion, Glasner identifies ten different versions of secularization, organized in terms of whether their thrust is primarily institutional, normative, or cognitive... The upshot of this analysis is that secularism most assuredly does not translate simply and directly into atheism. Many good theists support the secularization of the American government in the form of the "separation of church and state," and all of them go about at least part of their day without doing religion.}}</ref> Global studies show that many people who do not identify with a religion, still hold religious beliefs and participate in religious practices, thus complicating the situation.<ref name="Religiously Unaffiliated"/><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" />


==Background==
==Background==
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# Differentiation — a redefined place or relation to society such as in pluralization  
# Differentiation — a redefined place or relation to society such as in pluralization  
# Disengagement — the detachment of certain facets of social life from religion  
# Disengagement — the detachment of certain facets of social life from religion  
# Transformation — change over time (e.g. Protestantism developed in Christianity)
# Transformation — change over time (e.g., Protestantism developed in Christianity)
# Generalization — where religion becomes less specific, more abstract, and inclusive
# Generalization — where religion becomes less specific, more abstract, and inclusive
# Segmentation — the development of specialized religious institutions coexisting with other social institutions
# Segmentation — the development of specialized religious institutions coexisting with other social institutions
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# Secularism — the only form that leads to outright rejection of religion, amounting to atheism
# Secularism — the only form that leads to outright rejection of religion, amounting to atheism


C. John Sommerville (1998) outlined six uses of the term secularization in the scientific literature. The first five are more along the lines of 'definitions' while the sixth is more of a 'clarification of use':<ref>Somerville, C. J. "Secular Society Religious Population: Our Tacit Rules for Using the Term Secularization''. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 37 (2):249-53. (1998)</ref>
C. John Sommerville (1998) outlined six uses of the term secularization in the scientific literature. The first five are more along the lines of 'definitions' while the sixth is more of a 'clarification of use':<ref>Somerville, C. J. ''Secular Society Religious Population: Our Tacit Rules for Using the Term Secularization''. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 37 (2):249-53. (1998)</ref>
# When discussing '''macro social structures''', secularization can refer to ''differentiation'': a process in which the various aspects of society, economic, political, legal, and moral, become increasingly specialized and distinct from one another.
# When discussing '''macro social structures''', secularization can refer to ''differentiation'': a process in which the various aspects of society, economic, political, legal, and moral, become increasingly specialized and distinct from one another.
# When discussing '''individual institutions''', secularization can denote the transformation of a religion into a secular institution. Examples would be the evolution of institutions such as [[Harvard University]] from a predominantly religious institution into a secular institution (with a divinity school now housing the religious element illustrating differentiation).
# When discussing '''individual institutions''', secularization can denote the transformation of a religion into a secular institution. Examples would be the evolution of institutions such as [[Harvard University]] from a predominantly religious institution into a secular institution (with a divinity school now housing the religious element illustrating differentiation).
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[[Abdel Wahab El-Messiri|Abdel Wahab Elmessiri]] (2002) outlined two meanings of the term secularization:
[[Abdel Wahab El-Messiri|Abdel Wahab Elmessiri]] (2002) outlined two meanings of the term secularization:
# '''Partial Secularization''': which is the common meaning of the word, and expresses "The separation between religion and state".
# '''Partial Secularization''': which is the common meaning of the word, and expresses "the separation between religion and state".
# '''Complete Secularization''': this definition is not limited to the partial definition, but exceeds it to "The separation between all (religion, moral, and human) values, and (not just the state) but also to (the human nature in its public and private sides), so that the holiness is removed from the world, and this world is transformed into a usable matter that can be employed for the sake of the strong".
# '''Complete Secularization''': this definition is not limited to the partial definition, but exceeds it to "The separation between all (religion, moral, and human) values, and (not just the state) but also to (the human nature in its public and private sides), so that the holiness is removed from the world, and this world is transformed into a usable matter that can be employed for the sake of the strong".


== History ==
== History ==
Secularism's origins can be traced to the Bible itself and fleshed out throughout Christian history into the modern era.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Berlinerblau |first1=Jacques |title=Secularism: The Basics |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9780367691585 |page=4 |quote=In the first part of this book we will chart the slow, unsteady development of political secularism (Set 2) across time and space. You might be surprised to see that we'll trace its origins to the Bible. From there we will watch how secularism's core principles emerged, in dribs and drabs, during the Christian Middle Ages, the Protestant Reformation, and the Enlightenment. Secularism, some might be surprised to learn, has a religious genealogy.}}</ref> "[[Secular]]" is a part of the Christian church's history, which even has ''secular clergy'' since the medieval period.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Thomas |first1=Hugh M. |title=The Secular Clergy in England, 1066-1216 |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780198702566}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Eller |first1=Jack David |title=Introducing Anthropology of Religion : Culture to the Ultimate |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781032023045 |edition=Third |page=282}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=April 2011 |title=Secular Priest |url=https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/religion-past-and-present/secular-priest-SIM_124156 |website=Religion Past and Present Online |publisher=Brill}}</ref> Furthermore, secular and religious entities were not separated in the medieval period, but coexisted and interacted naturally.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Tierney |first1=Brian |title=The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300 : With Selected Documents |date=1988 |publisher=Published by University of Toronto Press in association with the Medieval Academy of America |isbn=9780802067012 |location=Toronto}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Strayer |first1=Joseph R. |title=On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State |date=2016 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=9780691169330 |location=Princeton}}</ref> Significant contributions to principles used in modern secularism came from prominent theologians and Christian writers such as [[St. Augustine]], [[William of Ockham]], [[Marsilius of Padua]], [[Martin Luther]], [[Roger Williams]], [[John Locke]] and [[Talleyrand]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Berlinerblau |first1=Jacques |title=Secularism: The Basics |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9780367691585 |page=35}}</ref>
Secularism's origins can be traced to the Bible itself and fleshed out throughout Christian history into the modern era.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Berlinerblau |first1=Jacques |title=Secularism: The Basics |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-367-69158-5 |page=4 |quote=In the first part of this book we will chart the slow, unsteady development of political secularism (Set 2) across time and space. You might be surprised to see that we'll trace its origins to the Bible. From there we will watch how secularism's core principles emerged, in dribs and drabs, during the Christian Middle Ages, the Protestant Reformation, and the Enlightenment. Secularism, some might be surprised to learn, has a religious genealogy.}}</ref> "[[Secular]]" is a part of the Christian church's history, which even has ''secular clergy'' since the medieval period.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Thomas |first1=Hugh M. |title=The Secular Clergy in England, 1066-1216 |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-870256-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Eller |first1=Jack David |title=Introducing Anthropology of Religion: Culture to the Ultimate |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-032-02304-5 |edition=Third |page=282}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=April 2011 |title=Secular Priest |url=https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/religion-past-and-present/secular-priest-SIM_124156 |website=Religion Past and Present Online |publisher=Brill}}</ref> Furthermore, secular and religious entities were not separated in the medieval period, but coexisted and interacted naturally.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Tierney |first1=Brian |title=The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300: With Selected Documents |date=1988 |publisher=Published by University of Toronto Press in association with the Medieval Academy of America |isbn=978-0-8020-6701-2 |location=Toronto}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Strayer |first1=Joseph R. |title=On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State |date=2016 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-16933-0 |location=Princeton}}</ref> Significant contributions to principles used in modern secularism came from prominent theologians and Christian writers such as [[St. Augustine]], [[William of Ockham]], [[Marsilius of Padua]], [[Martin Luther]], [[Roger Williams]], [[John Locke]] and [[Talleyrand]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Berlinerblau |first1=Jacques |title=Secularism: The Basics |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-367-69158-5 |page=35}}</ref>


The term "secularization" also has additional meanings, primarily historical and religious.<ref>Casanova, Jose (1994).  ''Public Religions in the Modern World''.  University of Chicago Press, pg. 13. {{ISBN|0-226-09535-5}}</ref>  Applied to [[Secularization (church property)|church property]], historically it refers to the seizure of church lands and buildings, such as [[Henry VIII]]'s 16th-century [[dissolution of the monasteries]] in England and the later acts during the 18th-century [[French Revolution]], as well as by various [[Anti-clericalism|anti-clerical]] [[Enlightened absolutism|enlightened absolutist]] European governments during the 18th and 19th centuries, which resulted in the expulsion and suppression of the religious communities which occupied them. The 19th-century ''[[Kulturkampf]]'' in Germany and Switzerland and similar events in many other countries also were expressions of secularization.<ref>Gould, Andrew in: ''Origins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party in Nineteenth-century Europe'', University of Michigan Press, 1999, p. 82, {{ISBN|978-0-472-11015-5}}</ref>
The term "secularization" also has additional meanings, primarily historical and religious.<ref>Casanova, Jose (1994).  ''Public Religions in the Modern World''.  University of Chicago Press, pg. 13. {{ISBN|0-226-09535-5}}</ref>  Applied to [[Secularization (church property)|church property]], historically it refers to the seizure of church lands and buildings, such as [[Henry VIII]]'s 16th-century [[dissolution of the monasteries]] in England and the later acts during the 18th-century [[French Revolution]], as well as by various [[Anti-clericalism|anti-clerical]] [[Enlightened absolutism|enlightened absolutist]] European governments during the 18th and 19th centuries, which resulted in the expulsion and suppression of the religious communities which occupied them. The 19th-century ''[[Kulturkampf]]'' in Germany and Switzerland and similar events in many other countries also were expressions of secularization.<ref>Gould, Andrew in: ''Origins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party in Nineteenth-century Europe'', University of Michigan Press, 1999, p. 82, {{ISBN|978-0-472-11015-5}}</ref>


The term "secularization" can also mean the lifting of monastic restrictions from a member of the clergy,<ref>{{cite web |title=secularization |url=http://www.thefreedictionary.com/secularization |access-date=2 May 2018 |via=The Free Dictionary}}</ref> and to [[deconsecration]], removing the consecration of a religious building so that it may be used for other purposes.<ref>{{cite web |author=Donald S. Armentrout and Robert Boak Slocum |date=2000 |title=Secularizing a Consecrated Building |url=https://www.episcopalchurch.org/glossary/secularizing-a-consecrated-building/ |website=An Episcopal Dictionary of the Church |publisher=The Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society |quote=This service is used to deconsecrate and secularize a consecrated building that is to be taken down or used for other purposes.}}</ref> The first use of "secular" as a change from religion to the mundane is from the 16th century that referred to transforming ecclesiastical possessions for civil purposes, such as monasteries to hospitals; and by the 19th century it gained traction as a political object of secularist movements.<ref name="Latre" /> In the 20th century, "secularization" had diversified into various versions in light of the diversity of experiences from different cultures and institutions.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Glasner |first1=Peter E. |title=The Sociology of Secularisation : A Critique of a Concept |date=1977 |publisher=Routledge & K. Paul |isbn=9780710084552 |location=London}}</ref> Scholars recognize that secularity is structured by Protestant models of Christianity, shares a parallel language to religion, and intensifies Protestant features such as iconoclasm and skepticism towards rituals, and emphasizes beliefs.<ref name="sec para">{{cite book |last1=Blankholm |first1=Joseph |title=The Secular Paradox : On the Religiosity of the Not Religious |date=2022 |publisher=New York University Press |isbn=9781479809509 |location=New York |page=8}}</ref> In doing so, secularism perpetuates Christian traits under a different name.<ref name="sec para" />
The term "secularization" can also mean the lifting of monastic restrictions from a member of the clergy,<ref>{{cite web |title=secularization |url=http://www.thefreedictionary.com/secularization |access-date=2 May 2018 |via=The Free Dictionary}}</ref> and to [[deconsecration]], removing the consecration of a religious building so that it may be used for other purposes.<ref>{{cite web |author=Donald S. Armentrout and Robert Boak Slocum |date=2000 |title=Secularizing a Consecrated Building |url=https://www.episcopalchurch.org/glossary/secularizing-a-consecrated-building/ |website=An Episcopal Dictionary of the Church |publisher=The Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society |quote=This service is used to deconsecrate and secularize a consecrated building that is to be taken down or used for other purposes.}}</ref> The first use of "secular" as a change from religion to the mundane is from the 16th century that referred to transforming ecclesiastical possessions for civil purposes, such as monasteries to hospitals; and by the 19th century it gained traction as a political object of secularist movements.<ref name="Latre" /> In the 20th century, "secularization" had diversified into various versions in light of the diversity of experiences from different cultures and institutions.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Glasner |first1=Peter E. |title=The Sociology of Secularisation: A Critique of a Concept |date=1977 |publisher=Routledge & K. Paul |isbn=978-0-7100-8455-2 |location=London}}</ref> Scholars recognize that secularity is structured by Protestant models of Christianity, shares a parallel language to religion, and intensifies Protestant features such as iconoclasm and skepticism towards rituals, and emphasizes beliefs.<ref name="sec para">{{cite book |last1=Blankholm |first1=Joseph |title=The Secular Paradox: On the Religiosity of the Not Religious |date=2022 |publisher=New York University Press |isbn=978-1-4798-0950-9 |location=New York |page=8}}</ref> In doing so, secularism perpetuates Christian traits under a different name.<ref name="sec para" />


Still another form of secularization refers to the act of [[Prince-bishop|Prince-Bishops]] or holders of a position in a [[Monasticism|Monastic]] or [[Military order (religious society)|Military Order]] - holding a combined religious and secular authority under the Catholic Church - who broke away and made themselves into completely secular (typically, [[Protestantism|Protestant]]) hereditary rulers. For example, [[Gotthard Kettler]] (1517–1587), the last Master of the [[Livonian Order]], converted to [[Lutheranism]],  secularised (and took to himself) the lands of [[Semigallia]] and [[Courland]] which he had held on behalf of the order – which enabled him to marry and leave to his descendants the [[Duchy of Courland and Semigallia]]. Perhaps the most widely known example of such secularization is that of 1525, which led to the establishment of [[Prussia]], a state which would later become a major power in European politics.
Still another form of secularization refers to the act of [[Prince-bishop|Prince-Bishops]] or holders of a position in a [[Monasticism|Monastic]] or [[Military order (religious society)|Military Order]] - holding a combined religious and secular authority under the Catholic Church - who broke away and made themselves into completely secular (typically, [[Protestantism|Protestant]]) hereditary rulers. For example, [[Gotthard Kettler]] (1517–1587), the last Master of the [[Livonian Order]], converted to [[Lutheranism]],  secularised (and took to himself) the lands of [[Semigallia]] and [[Courland]] which he had held on behalf of the order – which enabled him to marry and leave to his descendants the [[Duchy of Courland and Semigallia]]. Perhaps the most widely known example of such secularization is that of 1525, which led to the establishment of [[Prussia]], a state which would later become a major power in European politics.
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The 1960s saw a trend toward increasing secularization in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. This transformation accompanied major social factors: economic prosperity, youth rebelling against the rules and conventions of society, [[sexual revolution]], [[Women's liberation movement|women's liberation]], radical theology, and radical politics.<ref>
The 1960s saw a trend toward increasing secularization in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. This transformation accompanied major social factors: economic prosperity, youth rebelling against the rules and conventions of society, [[sexual revolution]], [[Women's liberation movement|women's liberation]], radical theology, and radical politics.<ref>
Jeffrey Cox, "Secularization and other master narratives of religion in modern Europe." ''Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte'' (2001): 24-35.
Jeffrey Cox, "Secularization and other master narratives of religion in modern Europe." ''Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte'' (2001): 24-35.
</ref> A study found evidence that a rise in secularization generally has preceded economic growth over the past century. The multilevel, time-lagged regressions also indicate that tolerance for individual rights predicted 20th century economic growth even better than secularization.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ruck |first1=Damian J. |last2=Bentley |first2=R. Alexander |last3=Lawson |first3=Daniel J. |date=2018 |title=Religious change preceded economic change in the 20th century |journal=[[Science Advances]] |volume=4 |issue=7 |pages=eaar8680 |bibcode=2018SciA....4.8680R |doi=10.1126/sciadv.aar8680 |pmc=6051740 |pmid=30035222 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
</ref> A study found evidence that a rise in secularization generally has preceded economic growth over the past century. The multilevel, time-lagged regressions also indicate that tolerance for individual rights predicted 20th century economic growth even better than secularization.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ruck |first1=Damian J. |last2=Bentley |first2=R. Alexander |last3=Lawson |first3=Daniel J. |date=2018 |title=Religious change preceded economic change in the 20th century |journal=[[Science Advances]] |volume=4 |issue=7 |article-number=eaar8680 |bibcode=2018SciA....4.8680R |doi=10.1126/sciadv.aar8680 |pmc=6051740 |pmid=30035222 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
 
According to another study, the rise of [[automation]] ([[robotics]] and [[AI]]) could accelerate secularization throughout the 21st century in many world regions, even though "this correlation does not prove any meaningful connection between automation and religious decline". The findings suggest that automation may reduce the instrumental value of religion, as technology provides secular alternatives for solving problems traditionally addressed by religion.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Joshua Conrad |last2=Yam |first2=Kai Chi |last3=Tang |first3=Pok Man |last4=Sibley |first4=Chris G. |last5=Waytz |first5=Adam |date=2023 |title=Exposure to automation explains religious declines |journal=[[Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America|Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences]] |volume=120 |issue=34 |article-number=e2304748120 |doi=10.1073/pnas.2304748120 |pmc=10450436 |pmid=37579178 |doi-access=free|bibcode=2023PNAS..12004748J }}</ref>


According to another study, the rise of [[automation]] ([[robotics]] and [[AI]]) could accelerate secularization throughout the 21st century in many world regions, even though "this correlation does not prove any meaningful connection between automation and religious decline". The findings suggest that automation may reduce the instrumental value of religion, as technology provides secular alternatives for solving problems traditionally addressed by religion.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Joshua Conrad |last2=Yam |first2=Kai Chi |last3=Tang |first3=Pok Man |last4=Sibley |first4=Chris G. |last5=Waytz |first5=Adam |date=2023 |title=Exposure to automation explains religious declines |journal=[[Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America|Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences]] |volume=120 |issue=34 |pages=e2304748120 |doi=10.1073/pnas.2304748120 |pmc=10450436 |pmid=37579178 |doi-access=free|bibcode=2023PNAS..12004748J }}</ref>
[[Pope Francis]]' view of secularization was characterised by biographer [[Austen Ivereigh]] as a "God-given shock" that gives the church a chance to change how it relates to the world.<ref name=":5">{{Cite news |last=Ivereigh |first=Austen |date=2025-04-26 |title=The battle for the Catholic Church's future will not be over doctrine |url=https://www.ft.com/content/57dc3191-2a54-4156-b8d4-d5f965cb387d |access-date=2025-07-14 |work=Financial Times}}</ref> In 2022, Francis expressed regret that Christianity has lost significance after secularization, but criticised what he described as the "negative view" that sees its faith as an "armour" and believes that "the world is evil, sin reigns", but which masks a "nostalgia for a sacralised world, a bygone society in which the Church and her ministers had greater power and social relevance". He advocated a "discerning view" that sees secularization as a legitimate effort, compatible with religion, to discover the laws governing human life.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Mayaki |first=Benedict |date=2022-07-29 |title=Pope invites Canadian clergy to confront challenges of secularized world |url=https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2022-07/pope-canada-bishops-clergy-witness-fraternity-proclamation.html |access-date=2025-07-14 |website=Vatican News |language=en}}</ref>


==Sociological use and differentiation==
==Sociological use and differentiation==
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[[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]] in ''[[A Secular Age]]'' (2007) challenges what he calls 'the subtraction thesis' – that science leads to religion being subtracted from more and more areas of life.
[[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]] in ''[[A Secular Age]]'' (2007) challenges what he calls 'the subtraction thesis' – that science leads to religion being subtracted from more and more areas of life.


Proponents of "secularization theory" demonstrate widespread declines in the prevalence of religious belief throughout the West, particularly in Europe.<ref name=":0" /><ref>Bruce, Steve. God is Dead: Secularization in the West. (2002)</ref>  Some scholars (e.g.,&nbsp;[[Rodney Stark]],<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Stark|first=Rodney|date=1999|title=Secularization, R.I.P.|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3711936|journal=Sociology of Religion|volume=60|issue=3|pages=249–273|doi=10.2307/3711936|jstor=3711936|issn=1069-4404|url-access=subscription}}</ref> [[Peter L. Berger|Peter Berger]]<ref>{{Cite book|last=Berger|first=Peter|title=The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion|publisher=Doubleday|year=1969}}</ref>) have argued that levels of religiosity are not declining, while other scholars (e.g.,&nbsp;Mark Chaves, N.&nbsp;J. Demerath) have countered by introducing the idea of 'neo-secularization', which broadens the definition of secularization to include the decline of religious authority and its ability to influence society.
Proponents of "secularization theory" demonstrate widespread declines in the prevalence of religious belief throughout the West, particularly in Europe.<ref name=":0" /><ref>Bruce, Steve. God is Dead: Secularization in the West. (2002)</ref>  Some scholars (e.g.,&nbsp;[[Rodney Stark]],<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Stark|first=Rodney|date=1999|title=Secularization, R.I.P.|journal=Sociology of Religion|volume=60|issue=3|pages=249–273|doi=10.2307/3711936|jstor=3711936|issn=1069-4404}}</ref> [[Peter L. Berger|Peter Berger]]<ref>{{Cite book|last=Berger|first=Peter|title=The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion|publisher=Doubleday|year=1969}}</ref>) have argued that levels of religiosity are not declining, while other scholars (e.g.,&nbsp;Mark Chaves, N.&nbsp;J. Demerath) have countered by introducing the idea of 'neo-secularization', which broadens the definition of secularization to include the decline of religious authority and its ability to influence society.


In other words, rather than using the proportion of irreligious apostates as the sole measure of secularity, 'neo-secularization' argues that individuals increasingly look outside of religion for authoritative positions. 'Neo-secularizationists' would argue that religion has diminishing authority on issues such as [[birth control]], and argue that religion's authority is declining and secularization is taking place even if religious affiliation may not be declining in the United States (a debate still taking place).<ref>Rick Phillips, Can Rising Rates of Church Participation be a Consequence of Secularization?, Sociology of Religion, Volume 65, Issue 2, Summer 2004, Pages 139–153, https://doi.org/10.2307/3712403</ref>
In other words, rather than using the proportion of irreligious apostates as the sole measure of secularity, 'neo-secularization' argues that individuals increasingly look outside of religion for authoritative positions. 'Neo-secularizationists' would argue that religion has diminishing authority on issues such as [[birth control]], and argue that religion's authority is declining and secularization is taking place even if religious affiliation may not be declining in the United States (a debate still taking place).<ref>Rick Phillips, Can Rising Rates of Church Participation be a Consequence of Secularization?, Sociology of Religion, Volume 65, Issue 2, Summer 2004, Pages 139–153, https://doi.org/10.2307/3712403</ref>
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==Criticism of secularization theory==
==Criticism of secularization theory==
Today, criticism is directed against the assertion that religion has become less important in the modern age. Critics point to developments in South Korea, Russia and the United States. The combination of institutional religion with other interests, such as economic or political interests, leads to the strengthening of these religions in their respective societies. However, there are also factors that lead to a diminishing importance of religion. This is the main trend in Western Europe.[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Säkularisierung#cite_note-28] Some scholars point to the permanent interplay between secularization and (re)sacralization in Western societies. For example, after the first democratic revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries, religious traditions quickly regained strength.[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Säkularisierung#cite_note-29] It has also been denied that secularization ever took place in the United States - a country that was co-founded by many religious sectarians who were expelled from their home countries and where witches were still being persecuted in 1692. Detlef Pollack [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detlef_Pollack], on the other hand, argues that the higher religiosity of Americans compared to Europeans is well compatible with the assumptions of secularization theory: among other things, it can be explained by the unusually high degree of existential insecurity and social inequality in the United States and the millions of religious immigrants from Latin America. However, liberal Americans have increasingly distanced themselves from church and religion due to the growing fusion of evangelical and conservative positions.[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Säkularisierung#cite_note-30]
Today, criticism is directed against the assertion that religion has become less important in the modern age. Critics point to developments in South Korea, Russia and the United States. The combination of institutional religion with other interests, such as economic or political interests, leads to the strengthening of these religions in their respective societies. However, there are also factors that lead to a diminishing importance of religion. This is the main trend in Western Europe.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Pollack |first=Detlef |title=Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos? |year=2003 |location=Tübingen |language=De}}</ref> Some scholars point to the permanent interplay between secularization and desecularization in Western societies. For example, after the first democratic revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries, religious traditions quickly regained strength.<ref>{{Citation |last=Willems |first=Ulrich |title=Säkularisierung des Politischen oder politikwissenschaftlicher Säkularismus? Zum disziplinären Perzeptionsmuster des Verhältnisses von Religion und Politik in gegenwärtigen Gesellschaften |date=2001 |work=Sakulärisierung und Resakralisierung in westlichen Gesellschaften |pages=215–240 |editor-last=Hildebrandt |editor-first=Mathias |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-322-89593-6_14 |access-date=2025-06-24 |place=Wiesbaden |publisher=VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften |language=de |doi=10.1007/978-3-322-89593-6_14 |isbn=978-3-531-13602-8 |editor2-last=Brocker |editor2-first=Manfred |editor3-last=Behr |editor3-first=Hartmut|url-access=subscription }}</ref> It has also been denied that secularization ever took place in the United States - a country that was co-founded by many religious sectarians who were expelled from their home countries and where witches were still being persecuted in 1692. [[:de:Detlef_Pollack|Detlef Pollack]], on the other hand, argues that the higher religiosity of Americans compared to Europeans is well compatible with the assumptions of secularization theory: among other things, it can be explained by the unusually high degree of existential insecurity and social inequality in the United States and the millions of religious immigrants from Latin America. However, liberal Americans have increasingly distanced themselves from church and religion due to the growing fusion of evangelical and conservative positions.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Moderne |first=Universität Münster, Centrum für Religion und |date=2012-12-12 |title=Pollack - USA und Säkularisierung |url=https://www.uni-muenster.de/Religion-und-Moderne/aktuelles/forschung/standpunkte/pollack_usa_saekularisierung.html |access-date=2025-06-24 |website=www.uni-muenster.de |language=de}}</ref>


Another point of criticism in the discourse on secularization is the inadequate examination of the Eurocentric nature of general terms, concepts, and definitions. For example, the religious studies scholar and intercultural theologian Michael Bergunder [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Bergunder] criticizes the fact that the terms religion and esotericism [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_esotericism#:~:text=Somewhat%20crudely%2C%20esotericism%20can%20be,the%20divine%20aspect%20of%20existence.] are tainted by a Eurocentric origin thinking. This inaccurate use of the terms hinders a constructive discussion about secularization in a global context. As an alternative, Bergunder [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Bergunder] argues for a historicization from the present of these general terms according to Foucault's [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault]. In this way, hitherto unseen connections and the origins of the modern understanding of secularization from the 19th century can be revealed.[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Säkularisierung#cite_note-:0-31]
Another point of criticism in the discourse on secularization is the inadequate examination of the Eurocentric nature of general terms, concepts, and definitions. For example, the religious studies scholar and intercultural theologian [[:de:Michael_Bergunder|Michael Bergunder]] criticizes the fact that the terms religion and esotericism<ref>{{Cite book |last=Bogdan |first=Henrik |title=Western esotericism and rituals of initiation |date=2007 |publisher=State University of New York Press |isbn=978-0-7914-7069-5 |series=SUNY series in Western esoteric traditions |location=Albany}}</ref> are tainted by a Eurocentric origin thinking. This inaccurate use of the terms hinders a constructive discussion about secularization in a global context. As an alternative, Bergunder argues for a historicization from the present of these general terms according to [[Michel Foucault|Foucault's]]. In this way, hitherto unseen connections and the origins of the modern understanding of secularization from the 19th century can be revealed.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Wissen um Religion: Erkenntnis - Interesse: Epistemologie und Episteme in Religionswissenschaft und Interkultureller Theologie |date=2020 |publisher=Evangelische Verlagsanstalt |isbn=978-3-374-06691-9 |editor-last=Hock |editor-first=Klaus |series=Veröffentlichungen der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Theologie (VWGTh) |location=Leipzig}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=46-86}}


== Regional developments ==
== Regional developments ==
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===United States===
===United States===


'''1870–1930'''. Christian Smith examined the secularization of American public life between 1870 and 1930. He noted that in 1870 a Protestant establishment thoroughly dominated American culture and its public institutions. By the turn of the 20th century, however, [[positivism]] had displaced the [[Baconian method]] (which had hitherto bolstered [[natural theology]]) and higher education had been thoroughly secularized. In the 1910s "[[legal realism]]" gained prominence, de-emphasizing the religious basis for [[law]]. That same decade publishing houses emerged that were independent of the Protestant establishment. During the 1920s secularization extended into popular culture and mass public education ceased to be under Protestant cultural influence. Although the general public was still highly religious during this time period, by 1930 the old Protestant establishment was in "shambles".<ref>Smith, Christian. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IbEwDwAAQBAJ&dq=info:paCf6RiVs7IJ:scholar.google.com/&pg=PR7 ''The Secular Revolution: Powers, Interests, and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life''] (2012) pp.25-28</ref>
====1870–1930====
 
Christian Smith examined the secularization of American public life between 1870 and 1930. He noted that in 1870 a Protestant establishment thoroughly dominated American culture and its public institutions. By the turn of the 20th century, however, [[positivism]] had displaced the [[Baconian method]] (which had hitherto bolstered [[natural theology]]) and higher education had been thoroughly secularized. In the 1910s, "[[legal realism]]" gained prominence, de-emphasizing the religious basis for [[law]]. That same decade, publishing houses emerged that were independent of the Protestant establishment. During the 1920s, secularization extended into popular culture and mass public education ceased to be under Protestant cultural influence. Although the general public was still highly religious during this time period, by 1930 the old Protestant establishment was in "shambles".<ref>Smith, Christian. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IbEwDwAAQBAJ&dq=info:paCf6RiVs7IJ:scholar.google.com/&pg=PR7 ''The Secular Revolution: Powers, Interests, and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life''] (2012) pp.25-28</ref>


Key to understanding the secularization, Smith argues, was the rise of an elite intellectual class skeptical of religious orthodoxies and influenced by the European [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] tradition. They consciously sought to displace a Protestant establishment they saw as standing in their way.<ref>Smith, Christian. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IbEwDwAAQBAJ&dq=info:paCf6RiVs7IJ:scholar.google.com/&pg=PR7 The Secular Revolution: Powers, Interests, and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life] (2012) pp.32-43</ref>
Key to understanding the secularization, Smith argues, was the rise of an elite intellectual class skeptical of religious orthodoxies and influenced by the European [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] tradition. They consciously sought to displace a Protestant establishment they saw as standing in their way.<ref>Smith, Christian. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IbEwDwAAQBAJ&dq=info:paCf6RiVs7IJ:scholar.google.com/&pg=PR7 The Secular Revolution: Powers, Interests, and Conflicts in the Secularization of American Public Life] (2012) pp.32-43</ref>


'''2000–2021'''. Annual [[Gallup (company)|Gallup]] polls from 2008 through 2015 showed that the fraction of Americans who did not identify with any particular religion steadily rose from 14.6% in 2008 to 19.6% in 2015. At the same time, the fraction of Americans identifying as [[Christianity in the United States|Christians]] sank from 80.1% to 69% in 2021.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/187955/percentage-christians-drifting-down-high.aspx|title=Percentage of Christians in U.S. Drifting Down, but Still High|last=Inc.|first=Gallup|work=Gallup.com|access-date=2018-09-03|language=en-us}}</ref><ref name=":4" /> In December 2021 ~21% of Americans declared no religious identity or preference.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/224642/2017-update-americans-religion.aspx|title=2017 Update on Americans and Religion|last=Inc.|first=Gallup|work=Gallup.com|access-date=2018-09-03|language=en-us}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web|last=Inc|first=Gallup|date=2021-12-23|title=How Religious Are Americans?|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/358364/religious-americans.aspx|access-date=2021-12-27|website=Gallup.com|language=en}}</ref> Given that non-Christian religions stayed roughly the same (at about 5-7% from 2008 to 2021) secularization thus seems to have affected primarily Christians.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" />
====2000–2021====
 
Annual [[Gallup (company)|Gallup]] polls from 2008 through 2015 showed that the fraction of Americans who did not identify with any particular religion steadily rose from 14.6% in 2008 to 19.6% in 2015. At the same time, the fraction of Americans identifying as [[Christianity in the United States|Christians]] sank from 80.1% to 69% in 2021.<ref name=":3">{{Cite news|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/187955/percentage-christians-drifting-down-high.aspx|title=Percentage of Christians in U.S. Drifting Down, but Still High|last=Inc.|first=Gallup|work=Gallup.com|access-date=2018-09-03|language=en-us}}</ref><ref name=":4" /> In December 2021, ~21% of Americans declared no religious identity or preference.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/224642/2017-update-americans-religion.aspx|title=2017 Update on Americans and Religion|last=Inc.|first=Gallup|work=Gallup.com|access-date=2018-09-03|language=en-us}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web|last=Inc|first=Gallup|date=2021-12-23|title=How Religious Are Americans?|url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/358364/religious-americans.aspx|access-date=2021-12-27|website=Gallup.com|language=en}}</ref> Given that non-Christian religions stayed roughly the same (at about 5-7% from 2008 to 2021), secularization thus seems to have affected primarily Christians.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" />


However, researchers argue that being unaffiliated does not automatically mean objectively nonreligious<ref>Frank Newport, ''God is Alive and Well: The Future of Religion in America''. Simon and Schuster (2013). pp 14-15. "All of this points to a simple conclusion: When Americans answer the "what is your religion" question by saying "none," it doesn't necessarily mean that they are devoid of religiousness. A "none" response could also mean that the respondents simply don't belong to a formal religious organization, group, or denomination. Or it could mean that they don't choose to label themselves with the name of a formal religious organization, group, or denomination. The "none" in these instances reflects how the respondents wanted to view themselves or how they chose to express their religion, not necessarily an absence of religiousness.</ref><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" /><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hout |first1=Michael |last2=Fischer |first2=Claude S. |title=Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012 |journal=Sociological Science |date=13 October 2014 |volume=1 |pages=423–447 |doi=10.15195/v1.a24|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Hout 2017">{{cite journal |last1=Hout |first1=Michael |title=American Religion, All or Nothing at All |journal=Contexts |date=November 2017 |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=78–80 |doi=10.1177/1536504217742401|s2cid=67327797 |doi-access=free }}</ref> since most of the unaffiliated do still hold some religious and spiritual beliefs.<ref name="Unaff Yet Rel">{{cite book |last1=Johnson |first1=Todd |last2=Zurlo |first2=Gina |editor1-last=Cipriani |editor1-first=Roberto |editor2-last=Garelli |editor2-first=Franco |title=Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion: Volume 7: Sociology of Atheism |date=2016 |publisher=Brill |location=Leiden |isbn=9789004317536 |pages=56–60 |chapter=Unaffiliated, Yet Religious: A Methodological and Demographic Analysis}}</ref><ref name="Choosing our Religion: The Spiritua">{{cite book |last1=Drescher |first1=Elizabeth |title=Choosing our Religion: The Spiritual Lives of America's Nones |date=2016 |location=New York |isbn=9780199341221}}</ref> For example, 72% of American unaffiliated or "Nones" believe in God or a Higher Power.<ref>{{cite web |title=Key findings about Americans' belief in God |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/25/key-findings-about-americans-belief-in-god/ |website=Pew Research Center |date=April 25, 2018}}</ref> The "None" response is more of an indicator for lacking affiliation than an active measure for irreligiosity, and a majority of the "Nones" can either be conventionally religious or "spiritual".<ref>Frank Newport, ''God is Alive and Well: The Future of Religion in America''. Simon and Schuster (2013). pp 14-15.</ref><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" /><ref name="Choosing our Religion: The Spiritua"/>
However, researchers argue that being unaffiliated does not automatically mean objectively nonreligious<ref>Frank Newport, ''God is Alive and Well: The Future of Religion in America''. Simon and Schuster (2013). pp 14-15. "All of this points to a simple conclusion: When Americans answer the "what is your religion" question by saying "none," it doesn't necessarily mean that they are devoid of religiousness. A "none" response could also mean that the respondents simply don't belong to a formal religious organization, group, or denomination. Or it could mean that they don't choose to label themselves with the name of a formal religious organization, group, or denomination. The "none" in these instances reflects how the respondents wanted to view themselves or how they chose to express their religion, not necessarily an absence of religiousness.</ref><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" /><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hout |first1=Michael |last2=Fischer |first2=Claude S. |title=Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012 |journal=Sociological Science |date=13 October 2014 |volume=1 |pages=423–447 |doi=10.15195/v1.a24|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Hout 2017">{{cite journal |last1=Hout |first1=Michael |title=American Religion, All or Nothing at All |journal=Contexts |date=November 2017 |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=78–80 |doi=10.1177/1536504217742401|s2cid=67327797 |doi-access=free }}</ref> since most of the unaffiliated do still hold some religious and spiritual beliefs.<ref name="Unaff Yet Rel">{{cite book |last1=Johnson |first1=Todd |last2=Zurlo |first2=Gina |editor1-last=Cipriani |editor1-first=Roberto |editor2-last=Garelli |editor2-first=Franco |title=Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion: Volume 7: Sociology of Atheism |date=2016 |publisher=Brill |location=Leiden |isbn=978-90-04-31753-6 |pages=56–60 |chapter=Unaffiliated, Yet Religious: A Methodological and Demographic Analysis}}</ref><ref name="Choosing our Religion: The Spiritua">{{cite book |last1=Drescher |first1=Elizabeth |title=Choosing our Religion: The Spiritual Lives of America's Nones |date=2016 |location=New York |isbn=978-0-19-934122-1}}</ref> For example, 72% of American unaffiliated or "Nones" believe in God or a Higher Power.<ref>{{cite web |title=Key findings about Americans' belief in God |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/25/key-findings-about-americans-belief-in-god/ |website=Pew Research Center |date=April 25, 2018}}</ref> The "None" response is more of an indicator for lacking affiliation than an active measure for irreligiosity, and a majority of the "Nones" can either be conventionally religious or "spiritual".<ref>Frank Newport, ''God is Alive and Well: The Future of Religion in America''. Simon and Schuster (2013). pp 14-15.</ref><ref name="Unaff Yet Rel" /><ref name="Choosing our Religion: The Spiritua"/>


===Britain===
===Britain===
====History====
====History====


In Britain, secularization came much later than in most of Western Europe. It began in the 1960s as part of a much larger social and cultural revolution. Until then the postwar years had seen a revival of religiosity in Britain.<ref>Callum G. Brown, ''The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000'' (2009) pp 170-92.</ref> Sociologists and historians have engaged in vigorous debates over when it started, how fast it happened, and what caused it.<ref>Jeremy Morris, "Secularization and religious experience: arguments in the historiography of modern British religion." ''Historical Journal'' 55#1 (2012): 195-219.</ref>
In Britain, secularization came much later than in most of Western Europe. It began in the 1960s as part of a much larger social and cultural revolution. Until then, the postwar years had seen a revival of religiosity in Britain.<ref>Callum G. Brown, ''The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000'' (2009) pp 170-92.</ref> Sociologists and historians have engaged in vigorous debates over when it started, how fast it happened, and what caused it.<ref>Jeremy Morris, "Secularization and religious experience: arguments in the historiography of modern British religion." ''Historical Journal'' 55#1 (2012): 195-219.</ref>


Sponsorship by royalty, aristocracy, and influential local gentry provided an important support system for organized religion. The sponsorship faded away in the 20th century, as the local élites were no longer so powerful or so financially able to subsidize their favorite activities. In coal-mining districts, local collieries typically funded local chapels, but that ended{{when|date=March 2016}} as the industry grew distressed and the unionized miners rejected élite interference in their local affairs. This allowed secularizing forces to gain strength.<ref>Steve Bruce, "Patronage and secularization: social obligation and church support Patronage and secularization: social obligation and church support," ''British Journal of Sociology'' (2012) 63#3 pp 533-552.</ref>
Sponsorship by royalty, aristocracy, and influential local gentry provided an important support system for organized religion. The sponsorship faded away in the 20th century, as the local élites were no longer so powerful or so financially able to subsidize their favorite activities. In coal-mining districts, local collieries typically funded local chapels, but that ended{{when|date=March 2016}} as the industry grew distressed and the unionized miners rejected élite interference in their local affairs. This allowed secularizing forces to gain strength.<ref>Steve Bruce, "Patronage and secularization: social obligation and church support Patronage and secularization: social obligation and church support," ''British Journal of Sociology'' (2012) 63#3 pp 533-552.</ref>
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Data from the annual [[British Social Attitudes Survey|British Social Attitudes survey]] and the biennial [[European Social Survey]] suggest that the proportion of Britons who identify as Christian fell from 55% (in 1983) to 43% (in 2015). While members of non-Christian religions – principally Muslims and Hindus – quadrupled, the non-religious ("nones") now make up 53% of the British population.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21728600-only-15-call-themselves-anglicans-dont-bet-church-losing-its-official-role-any-time|title=A majority of Britons now follow no religion|date=9 Sep 2017|newspaper=The Economist|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171013065031/https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21728600-only-15-call-themselves-anglicans-dont-bet-church-losing-its-official-role-any-time|archive-date=2017-10-13|url-status=live}}</ref> More than six in 10 "nones" were brought up as Christians, mainly Anglican or Catholic. Only 2% of "nones" were raised in religions other than Christian.<ref name=":1">{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/13/uk-losing-faith-religion-young-reject-parents-beliefs|title=Nearly 50% are of no religion – but has UK hit 'peak secular'?|last1=Sherwood|first1=Harriet|date=2017-05-13|work=The Guardian|access-date=2017-09-01|last2=correspondent|first2=religion|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170831194722/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/13/uk-losing-faith-religion-young-reject-parents-beliefs|archive-date=2017-08-31}}</ref> People who were brought up to practice a religion, but who now identify as having no religion, so-called "non-verts", had different rates of leaving the religion of their upbringing, namely 14% for Jews, 10% for Muslims and Sikhs, and 6% for Hindus. The proportions of the non-religious who convert to a faith are small: 3% now identify as Anglicans, less than 0.5% convert to Catholicism, 2% join other Christian denominations, and 2% convert to non-Christian faiths.<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Bullivant |first=Steven |date=2017 |title=The "No Religion" Population of Britain: Recent Data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (2015) and the European Social Survey (2014) |url=https://www.stmarys.ac.uk/research/centres/benedict-xvi/docs/2017-may-no-religion-report.pdf |access-date=2024-03-27 |website=[[St Mary's University, Twickenham]]}}</ref>
Data from the annual [[British Social Attitudes Survey|British Social Attitudes survey]] and the biennial [[European Social Survey]] suggest that the proportion of Britons who identify as Christian fell from 55% (in 1983) to 43% (in 2015). While members of non-Christian religions – principally Muslims and Hindus – quadrupled, the non-religious ("nones") now make up 53% of the British population.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21728600-only-15-call-themselves-anglicans-dont-bet-church-losing-its-official-role-any-time|title=A majority of Britons now follow no religion|date=9 Sep 2017|newspaper=The Economist|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171013065031/https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21728600-only-15-call-themselves-anglicans-dont-bet-church-losing-its-official-role-any-time|archive-date=2017-10-13|url-status=live}}</ref> More than six in 10 "nones" were brought up as Christians, mainly Anglican or Catholic. Only 2% of "nones" were raised in religions other than Christian.<ref name=":1">{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/13/uk-losing-faith-religion-young-reject-parents-beliefs|title=Nearly 50% are of no religion – but has UK hit 'peak secular'?|last1=Sherwood|first1=Harriet|date=2017-05-13|work=The Guardian|access-date=2017-09-01|last2=correspondent|first2=religion|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170831194722/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/13/uk-losing-faith-religion-young-reject-parents-beliefs|archive-date=2017-08-31}}</ref> People who were brought up to practice a religion, but who now identify as having no religion, so-called "non-verts", had different rates of leaving the religion of their upbringing, namely 14% for Jews, 10% for Muslims and Sikhs, and 6% for Hindus. The proportions of the non-religious who convert to a faith are small: 3% now identify as Anglicans, less than 0.5% convert to Catholicism, 2% join other Christian denominations, and 2% convert to non-Christian faiths.<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Bullivant |first=Steven |date=2017 |title=The "No Religion" Population of Britain: Recent Data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (2015) and the European Social Survey (2014) |url=https://www.stmarys.ac.uk/research/centres/benedict-xvi/docs/2017-may-no-religion-report.pdf |access-date=2024-03-27 |website=[[St Mary's University, Twickenham]]}}</ref>


In 2018, [[Pew Research Center]] that large majority (89%) of those who were raised as Christians in the United Kingdom still identify as such, while the remainder mostly self-identify as religiously unaffiliated.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2018-05-29|title=Being Christian in Western Europe|url=https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2018/05/Being-Christian-in-Western-Europe-FOR-WEB1.pdf|access-date=2021-01-21|website=Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project|language=en-US}}</ref>
In 2018, [[Pew Research Center]] found that a large majority (89%) of those who were raised as Christians in the United Kingdom still identify as such, while the remainder mostly self-identify as religiously unaffiliated.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2018-05-29|title=Being Christian in Western Europe|url=https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2018/05/Being-Christian-in-Western-Europe-FOR-WEB1.pdf|access-date=2021-01-21|website=Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project|language=en-US}}</ref>


=== Spain ===
=== Spain ===
Spain used to be one of the most religious countries in Europe, but secularization has progressed fast during the past few decades. This was partly due to the role of the [[Catholic Church]] constituting the "doctrinal basis of the most significant organizations of the anti-democratic and anti-liberal right-wing"<ref>{{Cite book|pages=255–263|chapter=Catolicismo y derecha autoritaria. Del maurismo a Falange Española|title=Religión y sociedad en España (siglos XIX y XX)|editor-first=Paul|editor-last=Aubert|year=2002|location=Madrid|publisher=[[Casa de Velázquez]]|first=Juan|last=Avilés Farré|series=Collection de la Casa de Velázquez |isbn=9788490961124 |author-link=Juan Avilés Farré|chapter-url=https://books.openedition.org/cvz/2771?lang=es}}</ref> and the resulting [[anti-clericalism]] that was one of the roots of the [[Spanish Civil War|Spanish civil war]]. Notably, the dictatorship of [[Francisco Franco]]'s core ideology was [[national Catholicism]].
Spain used to be one of the most religious countries in Europe, but secularization has progressed fast during the past few decades. This was partly due to the role of the [[Catholic Church]] constituting the "doctrinal basis of the most significant organizations of the anti-democratic and anti-liberal right-wing"<ref>{{Cite book|pages=255–263|chapter=Catolicismo y derecha autoritaria. Del maurismo a Falange Española|title=Religión y sociedad en España (siglos XIX y XX)|editor-first=Paul|editor-last=Aubert|year=2002|location=Madrid|publisher=[[Casa de Velázquez]]|first=Juan|last=Avilés Farré|series=Collection de la Casa de Velázquez |isbn=978-84-9096-112-4 |author-link=Juan Avilés Farré|chapter-url=https://books.openedition.org/cvz/2771?lang=es}}</ref> and the resulting [[anti-clericalism]] that was one of the roots of the [[Spanish Civil War|Spanish civil war]]. Notably, the dictatorship of [[Francisco Franco]]'s core ideology was [[national Catholicism]].


However, agreements linked to the constitution of 1978 separated church and state. In 2001, 82% of Spaniards identified as Catholic but only half did in 2021. Only around 20% of Spaniards go to mass regularly and only 20% of weddings are taking place in a church (2019). Similarly, [[divorce]] was legalized in 1981, as was [[abortion]] and [[same-sex marriage]] soon after.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Anonymous|date=2021-05-01|title=Religion in Spain - Empty pews, big pulpit.|newspaper=The Economist|volume=May 1, 2021|pages=26–27}}</ref>
However, agreements linked to the constitution of 1978 separated church and state. In 2001, 82% of Spaniards identified as Catholic but only half did in 2021. Only around 20% of Spaniards go to mass regularly and only 20% of weddings are taking place in a church (2019). Similarly, [[divorce]] was legalized in 1981, as was [[abortion]] and [[same-sex marriage]] soon after.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Anonymous|date=2021-05-01|title=Religion in Spain - Empty pews, big pulpit.|newspaper=The Economist|volume=May 1, 2021|pages=26–27}}</ref>
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| date = 2007
| date = 2007
| page = 43
| page = 43
| isbn = 9781921300561
| isbn = 978-1-921300-56-1
| access-date = 2016-03-03
| access-date = 2016-03-03
}}
}}
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| date = 2011
| date = 2011
| page = 10
| page = 10
| isbn = 9781441112477
| isbn = 978-1-4411-1247-7
| access-date = 2016-03-03
| access-date = 2016-03-03
| quote = [...] forced secularization is not so easily achieved, and [...] the lengths to which the Soviet and PRC regimes went was insufficient to completely - or even thoroughly - expunge religion from society. [...] [T]hese regimes were willing to go to great lengths to eliminate religion in the name of science and progress, and the outcome at every stage was uncertain.
| quote = [...] forced secularization is not so easily achieved, and [...] the lengths to which the Soviet and PRC regimes went was insufficient to completely - or even thoroughly - expunge religion from society. [...] [T]hese regimes were willing to go to great lengths to eliminate religion in the name of science and progress, and the outcome at every stage was uncertain.
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{{Portal|Society}}
{{Portal|Society}}
{{div col}}
{{div col}}
* [[Christian persecution complex]]
* {{anl|Christian persecution complex}}
* [[Death of God theology]]
* {{anl|Death of God theology}}
* [[Decline of Christianity in the Western world]]
* [[Decline of Christianity in the Western world]]
* [[The Enlightenment]]
* {{anl|Modernity}}
* [[Modernity]]
* {{anl|Progressivism}}
* [[Progressivism]]
* [[Theories of religion#Rational choice theory|Rational choice theory of religion]]
* [[Theories of religion#Rational choice theory|Rational choice theory of religion]]
* [[Secularity]]
* {{anl|Secular state}}
* [[Secular state]]
* {{anl|Secularism}}
* [[Secularism]]
* {{anl|Secularity}}
* [[Separation of church and state]]
* {{anl|Separation of church and state}}
* [[Sociology of religion]]
* [[Sociology of religion]]
* [[State religion]]
* {{anl|State religion}}
* {{anl|The Enlightenment}}
{{end div col}}
{{end div col}}


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* Pollack, Detlef. [https://www.academia.edu/23326428/Varieties_of_Secularization_Theories_and_Their_Indispensable_Core Varieties of Secularization Theories and Their Indispensable Core], ''The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory'', 90:1 (2015), 60-79.
* Pollack, Detlef. [https://www.academia.edu/23326428/Varieties_of_Secularization_Theories_and_Their_Indispensable_Core Varieties of Secularization Theories and Their Indispensable Core], ''The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory'', 90:1 (2015), 60-79.
* Pollack, Detlef & Gergely Rosta. ''Religion and Modernity: An International Comparison''. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
* Pollack, Detlef & Gergely Rosta. ''Religion and Modernity: An International Comparison''. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
* {{cite book |last1=Kasselstrand |first1=Isabella |last2=Zuckerman |first2=Phil |last3=Cragun |first3=Ryan T. |title=Beyond Doubt: The Secularization of Society |date=2023 |publisher=[[New York University Press]] |location=New York |isbn=9781479814282}}
* {{cite book |last1=Kasselstrand |first1=Isabella |last2=Zuckerman |first2=Phil |last3=Cragun |first3=Ryan T. |title=Beyond Doubt: The Secularization of Society |date=2023 |publisher=[[New York University Press]] |location=New York |isbn=978-1-4798-1428-2}}
* Ruck Damian J., Bentley R. Alexander, Lawson Daniel J. ''Religious change preceded economic change in the 20th century''. [[Science Advances]] 4(7):eaar8680 (2018) {{doi|10.1126/sciadv.aar8680}}
* Ruck Damian J., Bentley R. Alexander, Lawson Daniel J. ''Religious change preceded economic change in the 20th century''. [[Science Advances]] 4(7):eaar8680 (2018) {{doi|10.1126/sciadv.aar8680}}
* Sommerville, C. J. "Secular Society Religious Population: Our Tacit Rules for Using the Term Secularization". ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'' 37#2 :249–53. (1998)
* Sommerville, C. J. "Secular Society Religious Population: Our Tacit Rules for Using the Term Secularization". ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'' 37#2 :249–53. (1998)

Latest revision as of 00:40, 23 December 2025

Template:Short description Script error: No such module "other uses".

File:Countries by importance of religion.png
Importance of religion by country in a 2008-2009 poll by Gallup

In sociology, secularization (Template:Langx) is a multilayered concept that generally denotes "a transition from a religious to a more worldly level."[1] There are many types of secularization and most do not lead to atheism or irreligion, nor are they automatically antithetical to religion.[2] Secularization has different connotations such as implying differentiation of secular from religious domains, the marginalization of religion in those domains, or it may also entail the transformation of religion as a result of its recharacterization (e.g., as a private concern, or as a non-political matter or issue).[3][4]

The secularization thesis expresses the idea that through the lens of the European enlightenment modernization, rationalization, combined with the ascent of science and technology, religious authority diminishes in all aspects of social life and governance.[5][6] Pew Research Center notes that economic development is positively correlated with less religiousness.[7] According to Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "virtually all advanced industrial societies" have become more secular in recent decades.[8]

The secularization thesis was challenged in 1999 by Peter L. Berger, who coined the term desecularization to refer to a resurgence of religion after a period of secularization, with examples such as the Islamic revival since the 1970s, in particular the Iranian Revolution, and the resurgence of religion in post-Soviet Russia.[8][9] Some researchers have said that people with religious beliefs may be increasing as a share of world population, due to higher fertility rates in poorer, more religious countries,[8][10][11] but Pew Research Center estimates that between 2010 and 2020, the religiously unaffiliated share of world population increased from 23.3% to 24.2%.[7]

There is no particular monolithic direction or trend for secularization since, even in Europe, the trends in religious history and demographical religious measures (e.g., belief, belonging, etc.) are mixed and make the region an exception compared to other parts of the world.[12] There are many debates about the boundaries of both religion and secular and some have suggested "post-secular" models since there are areas of growth of religious influence which challenge the underlying assumptions on conventional views on secularism.[13] Global studies show that many people who do not identify with a religion still hold religious beliefs and participate in religious practices.[14][15][16][17] The secular vs religion dichotomy is false and neither concept is mutually exclusive.[2] Both "religion" and "secular" are Western terms and concepts that are not universal across cultures, languages, or time.[18]

Overview

Secularization, in the main sociological meaning of the term, involves the historical process in which religion declines in social and cultural significance. As a result of secularization, the role of religion in modern societies becomes restricted. In secularized societies, faith lacks cultural authority, and religious organizations have little social power.

Secularization has many levels of meaning, both as a theory and as a political process. Karl Marx (1818–1883), Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), Max Weber (1864–1920), and Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) postulated that the modernization of society would include a decline in levels of formal religiosity. Study of this process seeks to determine the manner in which, or extent to which religious creeds, practices, and institutions are losing social significance. Some theorists argue that the secularization of modern civilization partly results from our inability to adapt the broad ethical and spiritual needs of people to the increasingly fast advance of the physical sciences.[19]

Nonetheless, cross-cultural studies indicate that people in general do not think of natural and supernatural explanations as antagonistic or dichotomous, but instead see them as coexisting and complementary.[20][21] The reconciliation of natural and supernatural explanations is normal and pervasive from a psychological standpoint across cultures.[22]

In contrast to the "modernization" thesis, Christian Smith and others argue that intellectual and cultural élites promote secularization to enhance their own status and influence. Smith believes that intellectuals have an inherent tendency to be hostile to their native cultures, causing them to embrace secularism.[23]

According to Jack David Eller, secularization is compatible with religion since most versions of secularity do not lead to atheism or irreligion.[2] Global studies show that many people who do not identify with a religion, still hold religious beliefs and participate in religious practices, thus complicating the situation.[14][15]

Background

Secularization is sometimes credited both to the cultural shifts in society following the emergence of rationality and the development of science as a substitute for superstitionMax Weber called this process the "disenchantment of the world"—and to the changes made by religious institutions to compensate. At the most basic stages, this begins with a slow transition from oral traditions to a writing culture that diffuses knowledge. This first reduces the authority of clerics as the custodians of revealed knowledge. The shift of responsibility for education from the family and community to the state has had two consequences:

  • Collective conscience as defined by Durkheim is diminished;
  • Religion becomes a matter of individual choice rather than an observed social obligation.

A major issue in the study of secularization is the extent to which certain trends such as decreased attendance at places of worship indicate a decrease in religiosity or simply a privatization of religious belief, where religious beliefs no longer play a dominant role in public life or in other aspects of decision making.

Definitions

Jack David Eller (2010) outlined Peter Glasner's 10 different institutional, normative, or cognitive versions of secularization, most of which do not lead to irreligion or atheism:[2]

  1. Routinization — institutionalizing religion through integration into the society
  2. Differentiation — a redefined place or relation to society such as in pluralization
  3. Disengagement — the detachment of certain facets of social life from religion
  4. Transformation — change over time (e.g., Protestantism developed in Christianity)
  5. Generalization — where religion becomes less specific, more abstract, and inclusive
  6. Segmentation — the development of specialized religious institutions coexisting with other social institutions
  7. Desacralization — distancing the references of the "supernatural" from the material world
  8. Decline — the reduction in quantitative measures of religious identification and participation
  9. Secularization — pluralism through which society moves away from the "sacred" and toward the "profane"
  10. Secularism — the only form that leads to outright rejection of religion, amounting to atheism

C. John Sommerville (1998) outlined six uses of the term secularization in the scientific literature. The first five are more along the lines of 'definitions' while the sixth is more of a 'clarification of use':[24]

  1. When discussing macro social structures, secularization can refer to differentiation: a process in which the various aspects of society, economic, political, legal, and moral, become increasingly specialized and distinct from one another.
  2. When discussing individual institutions, secularization can denote the transformation of a religion into a secular institution. Examples would be the evolution of institutions such as Harvard University from a predominantly religious institution into a secular institution (with a divinity school now housing the religious element illustrating differentiation).
  3. When discussing activities, secularization refers to the transfer of activities from religious to secular institutions, such as a shift in the provision of social services from churches to the government.
  4. When discussing mentalities, secularization refers to the transition from ultimate concerns to proximate concerns, e.g., individuals in the West are now more likely to moderate their behavior in response to more immediately applicable consequences rather than out of concern for post-mortem consequences. This is a personal religious decline or movement toward a secular lifestyle.
  5. When discussing populations, secularization refers to broad patterns of societal decline in levels of religiosity as opposed to the individual-level secularization of (4) above. This understanding of secularization is also distinct from (1) above in that it refers specifically to religious decline rather than societal differentiation.
  6. When discussing religion, secularization can only be used unambiguously to refer to religion in a generic sense. For example, a reference to Christianity is not clear unless one specifies exactly which denominations of Christianity are being discussed.

Abdel Wahab Elmessiri (2002) outlined two meanings of the term secularization:

  1. Partial Secularization: which is the common meaning of the word, and expresses "the separation between religion and state".
  2. Complete Secularization: this definition is not limited to the partial definition, but exceeds it to "The separation between all (religion, moral, and human) values, and (not just the state) but also to (the human nature in its public and private sides), so that the holiness is removed from the world, and this world is transformed into a usable matter that can be employed for the sake of the strong".

History

Secularism's origins can be traced to the Bible itself and fleshed out throughout Christian history into the modern era.[25] "Secular" is a part of the Christian church's history, which even has secular clergy since the medieval period.[26][27][28] Furthermore, secular and religious entities were not separated in the medieval period, but coexisted and interacted naturally.[29][30] Significant contributions to principles used in modern secularism came from prominent theologians and Christian writers such as St. Augustine, William of Ockham, Marsilius of Padua, Martin Luther, Roger Williams, John Locke and Talleyrand.[31]

The term "secularization" also has additional meanings, primarily historical and religious.[32] Applied to church property, historically it refers to the seizure of church lands and buildings, such as Henry VIII's 16th-century dissolution of the monasteries in England and the later acts during the 18th-century French Revolution, as well as by various anti-clerical enlightened absolutist European governments during the 18th and 19th centuries, which resulted in the expulsion and suppression of the religious communities which occupied them. The 19th-century Kulturkampf in Germany and Switzerland and similar events in many other countries also were expressions of secularization.[33]

The term "secularization" can also mean the lifting of monastic restrictions from a member of the clergy,[34] and to deconsecration, removing the consecration of a religious building so that it may be used for other purposes.[35] The first use of "secular" as a change from religion to the mundane is from the 16th century that referred to transforming ecclesiastical possessions for civil purposes, such as monasteries to hospitals; and by the 19th century it gained traction as a political object of secularist movements.[1] In the 20th century, "secularization" had diversified into various versions in light of the diversity of experiences from different cultures and institutions.[36] Scholars recognize that secularity is structured by Protestant models of Christianity, shares a parallel language to religion, and intensifies Protestant features such as iconoclasm and skepticism towards rituals, and emphasizes beliefs.[37] In doing so, secularism perpetuates Christian traits under a different name.[37]

Still another form of secularization refers to the act of Prince-Bishops or holders of a position in a Monastic or Military Order - holding a combined religious and secular authority under the Catholic Church - who broke away and made themselves into completely secular (typically, Protestant) hereditary rulers. For example, Gotthard Kettler (1517–1587), the last Master of the Livonian Order, converted to Lutheranism, secularised (and took to himself) the lands of Semigallia and Courland which he had held on behalf of the order – which enabled him to marry and leave to his descendants the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia. Perhaps the most widely known example of such secularization is that of 1525, which led to the establishment of Prussia, a state which would later become a major power in European politics.

The 1960s saw a trend toward increasing secularization in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. This transformation accompanied major social factors: economic prosperity, youth rebelling against the rules and conventions of society, sexual revolution, women's liberation, radical theology, and radical politics.[38] A study found evidence that a rise in secularization generally has preceded economic growth over the past century. The multilevel, time-lagged regressions also indicate that tolerance for individual rights predicted 20th century economic growth even better than secularization.[39]

According to another study, the rise of automation (robotics and AI) could accelerate secularization throughout the 21st century in many world regions, even though "this correlation does not prove any meaningful connection between automation and religious decline". The findings suggest that automation may reduce the instrumental value of religion, as technology provides secular alternatives for solving problems traditionally addressed by religion.[40]

Pope Francis' view of secularization was characterised by biographer Austen Ivereigh as a "God-given shock" that gives the church a chance to change how it relates to the world.[41] In 2022, Francis expressed regret that Christianity has lost significance after secularization, but criticised what he described as the "negative view" that sees its faith as an "armour" and believes that "the world is evil, sin reigns", but which masks a "nostalgia for a sacralised world, a bygone society in which the Church and her ministers had greater power and social relevance". He advocated a "discerning view" that sees secularization as a legitimate effort, compatible with religion, to discover the laws governing human life.[41][42]

Sociological use and differentiation

As studied by sociologists, one of the major themes of secularization is that of "differentiation"—i.e., the tendency for areas of life to become more distinct and specialized as a society becomes modernized. European sociology, influenced by anthropology, was interested in the process of change from the so-called primitive societies to increasingly advanced societies. In the United States, the emphasis was initially on change as an aspect of progress, but Talcott Parsons refocused on society as a system immersed in a constant process of increased differentiation, which he saw as a process in which new institutions take over the tasks necessary in a society to guarantee its survival as the original monolithic institutions break up. This is a devolution from single, less differentiated institutions to an increasingly differentiated subset of institutions.[43]

Following Parsons, this concept of differentiation has been widely applied. As phrased by José Casanova, this "core and the central thesis of the theory of secularization is the conceptualization of the process of societal modernization as a process of functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres—primarily the state, the economy, and science—from the religious sphere and the concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious sphere". Casanova also describes this as the theory of "privatization" of religion, which he partially criticizes.[44] While criticizing certain aspects of the traditional sociological theory of secularization, however, David Martin argues that the concept of social differentiation has been its "most useful element".[45]

Current issues in secularization

At present, secularization as understood in the West is being debated in the sociology of religion. In his works Legitimacy of the Modern Age (1966) and The Genesis of the Copernican World (1975), Hans Blumenberg has rejected the idea of a historical continuity – fundamental to the so-called 'theorem of secularization'; the Modern age in his view represents an independent epoch opposed to Antiquity and the Middle Ages by a rehabilitation of human curiosity in reaction to theological absolutism. "Blumenberg targets Löwith's argument that progress is the secularization of Hebrew and Christian beliefs and argues to the contrary that the modern age, including its belief in progress, grew out of a new secular self-affirmation of culture against the Christian tradition."[46] Wolfhart Pannenberg, a student of Löwith, has continued the debate against Blumenberg.[47] Hans Blumberg's assumption that secularization did not exactly grow out of a western-christian tradition also seems to be in line with more recent findings by Christoph Kleine and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr who have shown that similar historical developments can also be found in largely non-christian contexts such as Japan or Sri Lanka.[48]

Charles Taylor in A Secular Age (2007) challenges what he calls 'the subtraction thesis' – that science leads to religion being subtracted from more and more areas of life.

Proponents of "secularization theory" demonstrate widespread declines in the prevalence of religious belief throughout the West, particularly in Europe.[5][49] Some scholars (e.g., Rodney Stark,[50] Peter Berger[51]) have argued that levels of religiosity are not declining, while other scholars (e.g., Mark Chaves, N. J. Demerath) have countered by introducing the idea of 'neo-secularization', which broadens the definition of secularization to include the decline of religious authority and its ability to influence society.

In other words, rather than using the proportion of irreligious apostates as the sole measure of secularity, 'neo-secularization' argues that individuals increasingly look outside of religion for authoritative positions. 'Neo-secularizationists' would argue that religion has diminishing authority on issues such as birth control, and argue that religion's authority is declining and secularization is taking place even if religious affiliation may not be declining in the United States (a debate still taking place).[52]

Finally, some claim that demographic forces offset the process of secularization, and may do so to such an extent that individuals can consistently drift away from religion even as society becomes more religious. This is especially the case in societies like Israel (with the ultra-Orthodox and religious Zionists) where committed religious groups have several times the birth rate of seculars. The religious fertility effect operates to a greater or lesser extent in all countries, and is amplified in the West by religious immigration. For instance, even as the white British became more secular, London, England, has become more religious in the past 25 years as religious immigrants and their descendants have increased their share of the population.[53] Across the board, the question of secularization has generated considerable (and occasionally heated) debates in the social sciences.[54]

Criticism of secularization theory

Today, criticism is directed against the assertion that religion has become less important in the modern age. Critics point to developments in South Korea, Russia and the United States. The combination of institutional religion with other interests, such as economic or political interests, leads to the strengthening of these religions in their respective societies. However, there are also factors that lead to a diminishing importance of religion. This is the main trend in Western Europe.[55] Some scholars point to the permanent interplay between secularization and desecularization in Western societies. For example, after the first democratic revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries, religious traditions quickly regained strength.[56] It has also been denied that secularization ever took place in the United States - a country that was co-founded by many religious sectarians who were expelled from their home countries and where witches were still being persecuted in 1692. Detlef Pollack, on the other hand, argues that the higher religiosity of Americans compared to Europeans is well compatible with the assumptions of secularization theory: among other things, it can be explained by the unusually high degree of existential insecurity and social inequality in the United States and the millions of religious immigrants from Latin America. However, liberal Americans have increasingly distanced themselves from church and religion due to the growing fusion of evangelical and conservative positions.[57]

Another point of criticism in the discourse on secularization is the inadequate examination of the Eurocentric nature of general terms, concepts, and definitions. For example, the religious studies scholar and intercultural theologian Michael Bergunder criticizes the fact that the terms religion and esotericism[58] are tainted by a Eurocentric origin thinking. This inaccurate use of the terms hinders a constructive discussion about secularization in a global context. As an alternative, Bergunder argues for a historicization from the present of these general terms according to Foucault's. In this way, hitherto unseen connections and the origins of the modern understanding of secularization from the 19th century can be revealed.[59]Template:Rp

Regional developments

File:State Religions.svg
State religion by country

United States

1870–1930

Christian Smith examined the secularization of American public life between 1870 and 1930. He noted that in 1870 a Protestant establishment thoroughly dominated American culture and its public institutions. By the turn of the 20th century, however, positivism had displaced the Baconian method (which had hitherto bolstered natural theology) and higher education had been thoroughly secularized. In the 1910s, "legal realism" gained prominence, de-emphasizing the religious basis for law. That same decade, publishing houses emerged that were independent of the Protestant establishment. During the 1920s, secularization extended into popular culture and mass public education ceased to be under Protestant cultural influence. Although the general public was still highly religious during this time period, by 1930 the old Protestant establishment was in "shambles".[60]

Key to understanding the secularization, Smith argues, was the rise of an elite intellectual class skeptical of religious orthodoxies and influenced by the European Enlightenment tradition. They consciously sought to displace a Protestant establishment they saw as standing in their way.[61]

2000–2021

Annual Gallup polls from 2008 through 2015 showed that the fraction of Americans who did not identify with any particular religion steadily rose from 14.6% in 2008 to 19.6% in 2015. At the same time, the fraction of Americans identifying as Christians sank from 80.1% to 69% in 2021.[62][63] In December 2021, ~21% of Americans declared no religious identity or preference.[64][63] Given that non-Christian religions stayed roughly the same (at about 5-7% from 2008 to 2021), secularization thus seems to have affected primarily Christians.[62][63]

However, researchers argue that being unaffiliated does not automatically mean objectively nonreligious[65][15][66][67] since most of the unaffiliated do still hold some religious and spiritual beliefs.[15][68] For example, 72% of American unaffiliated or "Nones" believe in God or a Higher Power.[69] The "None" response is more of an indicator for lacking affiliation than an active measure for irreligiosity, and a majority of the "Nones" can either be conventionally religious or "spiritual".[70][15][68]

Britain

History

In Britain, secularization came much later than in most of Western Europe. It began in the 1960s as part of a much larger social and cultural revolution. Until then, the postwar years had seen a revival of religiosity in Britain.[71] Sociologists and historians have engaged in vigorous debates over when it started, how fast it happened, and what caused it.[72]

Sponsorship by royalty, aristocracy, and influential local gentry provided an important support system for organized religion. The sponsorship faded away in the 20th century, as the local élites were no longer so powerful or so financially able to subsidize their favorite activities. In coal-mining districts, local collieries typically funded local chapels, but that endedScript error: No such module "Unsubst". as the industry grew distressed and the unionized miners rejected élite interference in their local affairs. This allowed secularizing forces to gain strength.[73]

Recent developments

Data from the annual British Social Attitudes survey and the biennial European Social Survey suggest that the proportion of Britons who identify as Christian fell from 55% (in 1983) to 43% (in 2015). While members of non-Christian religions – principally Muslims and Hindus – quadrupled, the non-religious ("nones") now make up 53% of the British population.[74] More than six in 10 "nones" were brought up as Christians, mainly Anglican or Catholic. Only 2% of "nones" were raised in religions other than Christian.[75] People who were brought up to practice a religion, but who now identify as having no religion, so-called "non-verts", had different rates of leaving the religion of their upbringing, namely 14% for Jews, 10% for Muslims and Sikhs, and 6% for Hindus. The proportions of the non-religious who convert to a faith are small: 3% now identify as Anglicans, less than 0.5% convert to Catholicism, 2% join other Christian denominations, and 2% convert to non-Christian faiths.[75][76]

In 2018, Pew Research Center found that a large majority (89%) of those who were raised as Christians in the United Kingdom still identify as such, while the remainder mostly self-identify as religiously unaffiliated.[77]

Spain

Spain used to be one of the most religious countries in Europe, but secularization has progressed fast during the past few decades. This was partly due to the role of the Catholic Church constituting the "doctrinal basis of the most significant organizations of the anti-democratic and anti-liberal right-wing"[78] and the resulting anti-clericalism that was one of the roots of the Spanish civil war. Notably, the dictatorship of Francisco Franco's core ideology was national Catholicism.

However, agreements linked to the constitution of 1978 separated church and state. In 2001, 82% of Spaniards identified as Catholic but only half did in 2021. Only around 20% of Spaniards go to mass regularly and only 20% of weddings are taking place in a church (2019). Similarly, divorce was legalized in 1981, as was abortion and same-sex marriage soon after.[79]

Germany

Like other European countries, Germany has recorded a decrease in religiosity (in terms of proportion of individuals affiliated to a Church and baptisms for example) but the trends in East and West Germany are significantly different. In East Germany, the process of secularization has been significantly quicker.[80] These differences are explained by sociologists (Jörg Stolz, Detlef Pollack and Nan Dirk de Graaf[81]) by the State repression in the 1950s and 1960s, which challenges predictions of natural cohort replacements stated by the Voas model.[82]

Asia

India

Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". India, post-independence, has seen the emergence of an assertive secular state.[83]

China

One traditional view of Chinese culture sees the teachings of Confucianism – influential over many centuries – as basically secular.[84]

Chang Pao-min summarises perceived historical consequences of very early secularization in China:

The early secularization of Chinese society, which must be recognized as a sign of modernity [...] has ironically left China for centuries without a powerful and stable source of morality and law. All this simply means that the pursuit of wealth or power or simply the competition for survival can be and often has been ruthless without any sense of restraint. [...] Along with the early secularization of Chinese society which was equally early, the concomitant demise of feudalism and hereditary aristocracy, another remarkable development, transformed China earlier than any other country into a unitary system politically, with one single power centre. It also rendered Chinese society much more egalitarian than Western Europe and Japan.[85]

In this arguably secular setting, the Chinese Communist Party régime of the People's Republic of China (in power on the Chinese mainland from 1949) promoted deliberate secularization.[86]

Arab world

Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote".Many countries in the Arab world show signs of increasing secularization. For instance, in Egypt, support for imposing sharia (Islamic law) fell from 84% in 2011 to 34% in 2016. Egyptians also pray less: among older Egyptians (55+) 90% prayed daily in 2011. Among the younger generation (age 18–24) that fraction was only 70% in 2011. By contrast, in 2016 these numbers had fallen to <80% (55+) and <40% (18–24).[87] The other age groups were in between these values. In Lebanon and Morocco, the number of people listening to daily recitals of the Quran fell by half from 2011 to 2016.[87] Some of these developments seem to be driven by need, e.g. by stagnating incomes which force women to contribute to household income and therefore to work. High living costs delay marriage and, as a consequence, seem to encourage pre-marital sex.[87] However, in other countries, such as Jordan and Palestine, support for sharia and Islamist ideas seems to grow. Even in countries in which secularization is growing, there are backlashes. For instance, the president of Egypt, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, has banned hundreds of newspapers and websites who may provoke opposition.[87]

See also

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References

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  73. Steve Bruce, "Patronage and secularization: social obligation and church support Patronage and secularization: social obligation and church support," British Journal of Sociology (2012) 63#3 pp 533-552.
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  80. Melissa Hardy, Vegard Skirbekk & Marcin Stonawski (2020) The Religiously Unaffiliated in Germany, 1949–2013: Contrasting Patterns of Social Change in East and West, The Sociological Quarterly, 61:2, 254-286, https://doi.org/10.1080/00380253.2019.1593064.
  81. Jörg Stolz, Detlef Pollack, Nan Dirk De Graaf, Can the State Accelerate the Secular Transition? Secularization in East and West Germany as a Natural Experiment, European Sociological Review, Volume 36, Issue 4, August 2020, Pages 626–642, https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa014.
  82. David Voas, The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe, European Sociological Review, Volume 25, Issue 2, April 2009, Pages 155–168, https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcn044.
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Further reading

  • Berger, Peter. The Sacred Canopy. (1967)
  • Berger, Peter. The Desecularization of the World. (1999)
  • Brown, Callum G. The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000 (2009).
  • Bruce, Steve, and Tony Glendinning, "When was secularization? Dating the decline of the British churches and locating its cause" British journal of sociology 61#1 (2010): 107-126.
  • Bruce, Steve. Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults (1996)
  • Bruce, Steve. God is Dead: Secularization in the West. (2002)
  • Casanova, Jose. Public Religions in the Modern World. (1994)
  • Chaves, M. Secularization As Declining Religious Authority. Social Forces 72(3):749–74. (1994)
  • Ellul, Jacques. The New Demons. (1973/tr. 1975)
  • Gauchet, Marcel. The Disenchantment of the World. (1985/tr. 1997)
  • Gilbert, Alan D. The making of post-Christian Britain: a history of the secularization of modern society (Longman, 1980).
  • Inglehart, Ronald F., "Giving Up on God: The Global Decline of Religion", Foreign Affairs, vol. 99, no. 5 (September / October 2020), pp. 110–118.
  • Martin, David. A General Theory of Secularization. (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).
  • Pollack, Detlef. Varieties of Secularization Theories and Their Indispensable Core, The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory, 90:1 (2015), 60-79.
  • Pollack, Detlef & Gergely Rosta. Religion and Modernity: An International Comparison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
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  • Ruck Damian J., Bentley R. Alexander, Lawson Daniel J. Religious change preceded economic change in the 20th century. Science Advances 4(7):eaar8680 (2018) Script error: No such module "CS1 identifiers".
  • Sommerville, C. J. "Secular Society Religious Population: Our Tacit Rules for Using the Term Secularization". Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 37#2 :249–53. (1998)
  • Said, E. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. London: Penguin. (1978).
  • Skolnik, Jonathan and Peter Eli Gordon, eds., New German Critique 94 (2005) Special Issue on Secularization and Disenchantment
  • Stark, Rodney, Laurence R. Iannaccone, Monica Turci, and Marco Zecchi. "How Much Has Europe Been Secularized?" Inchiesta 32 #136 pp:99–112. (2002)
  • Stark, Rodney. Triumph of Faith: Why the World Is More Religious than Ever. Wilmington: ISI Books. (2015)
  • Stolz, J. Secularization theories in the twenty-first century: Ideas, evidence, and problems. Presidential address. Social Compass, 67(2), 282-308 (2020) Script error: No such module "CS1 identifiers".
  • Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. (Harvard University Press, 2007)
  • Warrier, Maya. "Processes of Secularisation in Contemporary India: Guru Faith in the Mata Amritanandamayi Mission," Modern Asian Studies (2003)
  • Wohlrab-Sahr, Monika & Marian Burchardt. "Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities". Comparative Sociology 11(6): 875-909, doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341249.

External links

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