Controlling interest: Difference between revisions
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A '''controlling interest''' is an [[ownership interest]] in a corporation with enough voting [[Share capital|stock]] shares to prevail in any [[stockholder]]s' motion. A majority of voting shares (over 50%) is always a controlling interest. When a party holds less than the majority of the voting shares, other present circumstances can be considered to determine whether that party is still considered to hold a controlling ownership interest.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Hefter|first1=Michael|last2=Philip|first2=Ryan|last3=Kolker|first3=David|title=Delaware Court Establishes "Taxonomy" For Controlling Stockholder Claims|url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/delaware-court-establishes-taxonomy-controlling-stockholder-claims|publisher=Transaction Advisors|issn=2329-9134|access-date=2015-01-16|archive-date=2016-03-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160325003229/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/delaware-court-establishes-taxonomy-controlling-stockholder-claims|url-status=dead}}</ref> | A '''controlling interest''' is an [[ownership interest]] in a corporation with enough voting [[Share capital|stock]] shares to prevail in any [[stockholder]]s' motion. A majority of voting shares (over 50%) is always a controlling interest. When a party holds less than the majority of the voting shares, other present circumstances can be considered to determine whether that party is still considered to hold a controlling ownership interest.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Hefter|first1=Michael|last2=Philip|first2=Ryan|last3=Kolker|first3=David|title=Delaware Court Establishes "Taxonomy" For Controlling Stockholder Claims|url=https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/delaware-court-establishes-taxonomy-controlling-stockholder-claims|publisher=Transaction Advisors|issn=2329-9134|access-date=2015-01-16|archive-date=2016-03-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160325003229/https://www.transactionadvisors.com/insights/delaware-court-establishes-taxonomy-controlling-stockholder-claims|url-status=dead}}</ref> | ||
In the United States, [[Delaware General Corporation Law|Delaware corporation]]s have a 2/3 vote requirement for a motion to pass.{{Citation needed|date=December 2014}} In theory, this | In the United States, [[Delaware General Corporation Law|Delaware corporation]]s have a 2/3 vote requirement for a motion to pass.{{Citation needed|date=December 2014}} In theory, this would mean that a controlling interest would have to be over two-thirds of the voting shares. | ||
A 2019 study published in the [[Virginia Law Review]] said dual-class stock structures, common to newly public technology companies, creates governance risks and costs, including the potential loss of [[Value (economics)|economic value]] for non-voting shares held by public investors.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/03/the-perils-of-lyfts-dual-class-structure/|title=The Perils of Lyft's Dual-Class Structure|first1=Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate|last1=Governance|first2=Financial|last2=Regulation|website=corpgov.law.harvard.edu|date=3 April 2019 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2954630|title=The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock|first1=Lucian A.|last1=Bebchuk|first2=Kobi|last2=Kastiel|date=April 18, 2017|doi=10.2139/ssrn.2954630 |ssrn=2954630 |s2cid=157125087 |via=papers.ssrn.com}}</ref> | A 2019 study published in the ''[[Virginia Law Review]]'' said dual-class stock structures, common to newly public technology companies, creates governance risks and costs, including the potential loss of [[Value (economics)|economic value]] for non-voting shares held by public investors.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/03/the-perils-of-lyfts-dual-class-structure/|title=The Perils of Lyft's Dual-Class Structure|first1=Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate|last1=Governance|first2=Financial|last2=Regulation|website=corpgov.law.harvard.edu|date=3 April 2019 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2954630|title=The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock|first1=Lucian A.|last1=Bebchuk|first2=Kobi|last2=Kastiel|date=April 18, 2017|doi=10.2139/ssrn.2954630 |ssrn=2954630 |s2cid=157125087 |via=papers.ssrn.com}}</ref> | ||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
Latest revision as of 19:29, 22 October 2025
Template:Short description Template:Refimprove A controlling interest is an ownership interest in a corporation with enough voting stock shares to prevail in any stockholders' motion. A majority of voting shares (over 50%) is always a controlling interest. When a party holds less than the majority of the voting shares, other present circumstances can be considered to determine whether that party is still considered to hold a controlling ownership interest.[1]
In the United States, Delaware corporations have a 2/3 vote requirement for a motion to pass.Script error: No such module "Unsubst". In theory, this would mean that a controlling interest would have to be over two-thirds of the voting shares.
A 2019 study published in the Virginia Law Review said dual-class stock structures, common to newly public technology companies, creates governance risks and costs, including the potential loss of economic value for non-voting shares held by public investors.[2][3]
See also
References
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