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[[File:British Workman- It's no use trying to hide it, guv'ner. We are going to vote for Tariff Reform - (3268711009).jpg|thumb|An early 1900s poster draws attention to a political debate over tariff policy. |alt=The poster caption reads "British Workman: It's no use trying to hide it, guv'ner. We are going to vote for Tariff Reform"]]
[[File:British Workman- It's no use trying to hide it, guv'ner. We are going to vote for Tariff Reform - (3268711009).jpg|thumb|An early 1900s poster draws attention to a political debate over tariff policy. |alt=The poster caption reads "British Workman: It's no use trying to hide it, guv'ner. We are going to vote for Tariff Reform"]]


A '''tariff''' or '''import tax''' is a [[duty (tax)|duty]] imposed by a national [[Government|government]], [[customs territory]], or [[supranational union]] on [[imports]] of goods and is paid by the importer. Exceptionally, an '''export tax''' may be levied on [[exports]] of goods or raw materials and is paid by the exporter. Besides being a source of [[revenue]], import duties can also be a form of regulation of [[International trade|foreign trade]] and policy that burden foreign products to encourage or safeguard domestic industry.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Furceri |first1=Davide |title=Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs |last2=Hannan |first2=Swarnali A. |last3=Ostry |first3=Jonathon D. |last4=Rose |first4=Andrew K. |publisher=International Monetary Fund |year=2019 |isbn=9781484390061 |pages=4}}</ref> [[Protective tariff]]s are among the most widely used instruments of [[protectionism]], along with [[import quota]]s and [[export quota]]s and other [[non-tariff barriers to trade]].
A '''tariff''' or '''import tax''' is a [[duty (tax)|duty]] imposed by a national [[government]], [[customs territory]], or [[supranational union]] on [[imports]] of goods and is paid by the importer. Exceptionally, an '''export tax''' may be levied on [[exports]] of goods or raw materials and is paid by the exporter. Besides being a source of [[revenue]], import duties can also be a form of regulation of [[International trade|foreign trade]] and policy that burden foreign products to encourage or safeguard domestic industry.<ref name="International Monetary Fund">{{Cite book |last1=Furceri |first1=Davide |title=Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs |last2=Hannan |first2=Swarnali A. |last3=Ostry |first3=Jonathon D. |last4=Rose |first4=Andrew K. |publisher=International Monetary Fund |year=2019 |isbn=9781484390061 |pages=4}}</ref> Protective tariffs are among the most widely used instruments of [[protectionism]], along with [[import quota]]s and [[export quota]]s and other [[non-tariff barriers to trade]].


Tariffs can be fixed (a constant sum per unit of imported goods or a percentage of the price) or variable (the amount varies according to the price). Tariffs on imports are designed to raise the price of imported goods to discourage consumption. The intention is for citizens to buy local products instead, which, according to supporters, would stimulate their country's economy. Tariffs therefore provide an incentive to develop production and replace imports with domestic products. Tariffs are meant to reduce pressure from foreign competition and, according to supporters, would help reduce the [[trade deficit]]. They have historically been justified as a means to protect [[Infant industry argument|infant industries]] and to allow [[import substitution industrialisation]] (industrializing a nation by replacing imported goods with domestic production). Tariffs may also be used to rectify artificially low prices for certain imported goods, due to [[dumping (pricing policy)|dumping]], export subsidies or currency manipulation. The effect is to raise the price of the goods in the destination country.
Tariffs can be fixed (a constant sum per unit of imported goods or a percentage of the price) or variable (the amount varies according to the price). Tariffs on imports are designed to raise the price of imported goods to discourage consumption. The intention is for citizens to buy local products instead, which, according to supporters, would stimulate their country's economy. Tariffs therefore provide an incentive to develop production and replace imports with domestic products. Tariffs are meant to reduce pressure from foreign competition and, according to supporters, would help reduce the [[trade deficit]]. They have historically been justified as a means to protect [[Infant industry argument|infant industries]] and to allow [[import substitution industrialisation]] (industrializing a nation by replacing imported goods with domestic production). Tariffs may also be used to rectify artificially low prices for certain imported goods, due to [[dumping (pricing policy)|dumping]], export subsidies or currency manipulation. The effect is to raise the price of the goods in the destination country.


There is near unanimous consensus among economists that tariffs are self-defeating and have a negative effect on economic growth and economic welfare, while [[free trade]] and the reduction of [[trade barrier]]s has a positive effect on [[economic growth]].<ref>{{cite journal |first=Paul R. |last=Krugman |title=The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade |journal=American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings |volume=83 |number=3 |date=May 1993 |pages=362–366 |jstor=2117691}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Mankiw |first=N. Gregory |title=Economists Actually Agree on This: The Wisdom of Free Trade |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/economists-actually-agree-on-this-point-the-wisdom-of-free-trade.html |website=The New York Times |date=26 April 2015 |access-date=2023-06-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190716060449/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/economists-actually-agree-on-this-point-the-wisdom-of-free-trade.html |archive-date=2019-07-16 |quote=Economists are famous for disagreeing with one another.... But economists reach near unanimity on some topics, including international trade.}}</ref><ref name="Poole p1">{{cite journal |author-link=William Poole (economist) |first=William |last=Poole |url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6958854.pdf |title=Free Trade: Why Are Economists and Noneconomists So Far Apart |journal=Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review |volume=86 |number=5 |page=1 |doi=10.20955/r.86.1-6 |year=2004 |doi-access=free |quote=most observers agree that '[t]he consensus among mainstream economists on the desirability of free trade remains almost universal.' |access-date=2023-06-14 |archive-date=2017-12-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171207055442/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6958854.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=December 7, 2016 |title=Trade Within Europe {{!}} IGM Forum |url=http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/trade-within-europe |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170113054534/http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/trade-within-europe |archive-date=2017-01-13 |access-date=2017-06-24 |website=igmchicago.org |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Wiseman |first=Paul |date=2024-09-27 |title=Trump favors huge new tariffs. How do they work? |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/trump-favors-huge-new-tariffs-how-do-they-work |access-date=2024-10-12 |website=Associated Press |language=en-us |via=PBS News}}</ref> American economist [[Milton Friedman]] said of tariffs: "We call a tariff a protective measure. It does protect . . . It protects the consumer against low prices."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Opinion {{!}} Notable & Quotable: Friedman on Tariffs |url=https://www.wsj.com/opinion/notable-quotable-milton-friedman-on-tariffs-trade-policy-5ae40e7c?msockid=1fdfcb78206e6eec279cde5f21216fdd |access-date=2025-04-08 |website=WSJ |language=en-US}}</ref> Although [[trade liberalisation]] can sometimes result in unequally distributed losses and gains, and can, in the [[short run]], cause economic dislocation of workers in import-competing sectors,<ref name="Poole p2">{{cite journal |author-link=William Poole (economist) |first=William |last=Poole |url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6958854.pdf |title=Free Trade: Why Are Economists and Noneconomists So Far Apart |journal=Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review |volume=86 |number=5 |page=2 |quote=One set of reservations concerns distributional effects of trade. Workers are not seen as benefiting from trade. Strong evidence exists indicating a perception that the benefits of trade flow to businesses and the wealthy, rather than to workers, and to those abroad rather than to those in the United States. |doi=10.20955/r.86.1-6 |year=2004 |doi-access=free |access-date=2023-06-14 |archive-date=2017-12-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171207055442/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6958854.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref> the advantages of free trade are lowering costs of goods for both producers and consumers.<ref>{{cite news |last=Rosenfeld |first=Everett |date=11 March 2016 |title=Here's why everyone is arguing about free trade |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/11/heres-why-everyone-is-arguing-about-free-trade.html |access-date=10 August 2021 |agency=CNBC |archive-date=12 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160312033958/https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/11/heres-why-everyone-is-arguing-about-free-trade.html |url-status=live}}</ref> The economic burden of tariffs falls on the importer, the exporter, and the consumer.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2024 |title=Trump's tariffs: How they work, and who would pay |url=https://www.axios.com/2024/09/28/how-tariffs-work-trump-china |work=Axios}}</ref> Often intended to protect specific industries, tariffs can end up backfiring and harming the industries they were intended to protect through rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Flaaen |first1=Aaron |last2=Pierce |first2=Justin |date=2024 |title=Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector |url=https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01498 |journal=The Review of Economics and Statistics |volume=2024 |issue= |pages=1–45 |doi=10.1162/rest_a_01498|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Amiti |first1=Mary |last2=Redding |first2=Stephen J. |last3=Weinstein |first3=David E. |date=2020 |title=Who's Paying for the US Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pandp.20201018 |journal=AEA Papers and Proceedings |language=en |volume=110 |pages=541–546 |doi=10.1257/pandp.20201018 |issn=2574-0768}}</ref> Import tariffs can also harm domestic exporters by disrupting their [[Supply chain|supply chains]] and raising their input costs.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Handley |first1=Kyle |last2=Kamal |first2=Fariha |last3=Monarch |first3=Ryan |date=2025 |title=Rising Import Tariffs, Falling Exports: When Modern Supply Chains Meet Old-Style Protectionism |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20210051 |journal=American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |language=en |volume=17 |issue=1 |pages=208–238 |doi=10.1257/app.20210051 |issn=1945-7782|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
There is near unanimous consensus among economists that tariffs are self-defeating and have a negative effect on economic growth and economic welfare, while [[free trade]] and the reduction of [[trade barrier]]s has a positive effect on [[economic growth]].<ref>{{cite journal |first=Paul R. |last=Krugman |title=The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade |journal=American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings |volume=83 |number=3 |date=May 1993 |pages=362–366 |jstor=2117691}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Mankiw |first=N. Gregory |title=Economists Actually Agree on This: The Wisdom of Free Trade |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/economists-actually-agree-on-this-point-the-wisdom-of-free-trade.html |website=The New York Times |date=26 April 2015 |access-date=2023-06-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190716060449/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/economists-actually-agree-on-this-point-the-wisdom-of-free-trade.html |archive-date=2019-07-16 |quote=Economists are famous for disagreeing with one another.... But economists reach near unanimity on some topics, including international trade.}}</ref><ref name="Poole p1">{{cite journal |author-link=William Poole (economist) |first=William |last=Poole |url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6958854.pdf |title=Free Trade: Why Are Economists and Noneconomists So Far Apart |journal=Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review |volume=86 |number=5 |page=1 |doi=10.20955/r.86.1-6 |year=2004 |doi-access=free |quote=most observers agree that '[t]he consensus among mainstream economists on the desirability of free trade remains almost universal.' |access-date=2023-06-14 |archive-date=2017-12-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171207055442/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6958854.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=December 7, 2016 |title=Trade Within Europe {{!}} IGM Forum |url=http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/trade-within-europe |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170113054534/http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/trade-within-europe |archive-date=2017-01-13 |access-date=2017-06-24 |website=igmchicago.org |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Wiseman |first=Paul |date=2024-09-27 |title=Trump favors huge new tariffs. How do they work? |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/trump-favors-huge-new-tariffs-how-do-they-work |access-date=2024-10-12 |website=Associated Press |language=en-us |via=PBS News}}</ref> American economist [[Milton Friedman]] said of tariffs: "We call a tariff a protective measure. It does protect . . . It protects the consumer against low prices."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Opinion {{!}} Notable & Quotable: Friedman on Tariffs |url=https://www.wsj.com/opinion/notable-quotable-milton-friedman-on-tariffs-trade-policy-5ae40e7c?msockid=1fdfcb78206e6eec279cde5f21216fdd |access-date=2025-04-08 |website=WSJ |language=en-US}}</ref> Although [[trade liberalisation]] can sometimes result in unequally distributed losses and gains, and can, in the [[short run]], cause economic dislocation of workers in import-competing sectors,<ref name="Poole p2">{{cite journal |author-link=William Poole (economist) |first=William |last=Poole |url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6958854.pdf |title=Free Trade: Why Are Economists and Noneconomists So Far Apart |journal=Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review |volume=86 |number=5 |page=2 |quote=One set of reservations concerns distributional effects of trade. Workers are not seen as benefiting from trade. Strong evidence exists indicating a perception that the benefits of trade flow to businesses and the wealthy, rather than to workers, and to those abroad rather than to those in the United States. |doi=10.20955/r.86.1-6 |year=2004 |doi-access=free |access-date=2023-06-14 |archive-date=2017-12-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171207055442/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6958854.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref> the advantages of free trade are lowering costs of goods for both producers and consumers.<ref>{{cite news |last=Rosenfeld |first=Everett |date=11 March 2016 |title=Here's why everyone is arguing about free trade |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/11/heres-why-everyone-is-arguing-about-free-trade.html |access-date=10 August 2021 |agency=CNBC |archive-date=12 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160312033958/https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/11/heres-why-everyone-is-arguing-about-free-trade.html |url-status=live}}</ref> The economic burden of tariffs falls on the importer, the exporter, and the consumer.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2024 |title=Trump's tariffs: How they work, and who would pay |url=https://www.axios.com/2024/09/28/how-tariffs-work-trump-china |work=Axios}}</ref> Often intended to protect specific industries, tariffs can end up backfiring and harming the industries they were intended to protect through rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Flaaen |first1=Aaron |last2=Pierce |first2=Justin |date=2024 |title=Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector |url=https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01498 |journal=The Review of Economics and Statistics |volume=2024 |issue= |pages=1–45 |doi=10.1162/rest_a_01498|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Amiti |first1=Mary |last2=Redding |first2=Stephen J. |last3=Weinstein |first3=David E. |date=2020 |title=Who's Paying for the US Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pandp.20201018 |journal=AEA Papers and Proceedings |language=en |volume=110 |pages=541–546 |doi=10.1257/pandp.20201018 |issn=2574-0768}}</ref> Import tariffs can also harm domestic exporters by disrupting their [[supply chain]]s and raising their input costs.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Handley |first1=Kyle |last2=Kamal |first2=Fariha |last3=Monarch |first3=Ryan |date=2025 |title=Rising Import Tariffs, Falling Exports: When Modern Supply Chains Meet Old-Style Protectionism |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20210051 |journal=American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |language=en |volume=17 |issue=1 |pages=208–238 |doi=10.1257/app.20210051 |issn=1945-7782|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lake |first=James |last2=Liu |first2=Ding |date=2025 |title=Local Labor Market Effects of the 2002 Bush Steel Tariffs |url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20220472 |journal=American Economic Journal: Economic Policy |language=en |volume=17 |issue=4 |pages=292–330 |doi=10.1257/pol.20220472 |issn=1945-7731}}</ref>


== Etymology ==
== Etymology ==


[[File:A complete view of the British Customs; containing the rates of merchandize Fleuron T135021-3.png|thumb|British customs tariff rates for different alcoholic beverages from 1725. ]]
[[File:A complete view of the British Customs; containing the rates of merchandize Fleuron T135021-3.png|thumb|British customs tariff rates for different alcoholic beverages from 1725.]]
The English term ''tariff'' derives from the {{Langx|fr|tarif|lit=set price}} which is itself a descendant of the {{Langx|it|tariffa|lit=mandated price; schedule of taxes and customs|translit=}} which derives from {{Langx|la-x-medieval|tariffe|lit=set price}}. This term was introduced to the [[Latin]]-speaking world through contact with the Turks and derives from the {{Langx|ota|تعرفه|lit=list of prices; table of the rates of customs|translit=taʿrife}}. This Turkish term is a [[loanword]] of the {{Langx|fa|تعرفه|translit=taʿrefe|lit=set price, receipt}}. The Persian term derives from {{Langx|ar|تعريف|translit=taʿrīf|lit=notification; description; definition; announcement; assertion; inventory of fees to be paid}} which is the verbal noun of {{Langx|ar|عرف|lit=to know; to be able; to recognise; to find out|translit=ʿarafa}}.<ref>[http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=tariff The Online Etymology Dictionary: tariff.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121004133019/http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=tariff |date=2012-10-04 }} The 2nd edition of the Oxford English Dictionary gives the same etymology, with a reference dating to 1591.</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Steingass |first=Francis Joseph |url=http://archive.org/details/cu31924026873194 |title=The student's Arabic-English dictionary. |date=1884 |publisher=London : W.H. Allen |others=Cornell University Library |pages=178}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Lokotsch |first=Karl |url=http://archive.org/details/etymologische00lokoguat |title=Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Europäischen (Germanischen, Romanischen und Slavischen) Wörter Orientalischen Ursprungs |date=1927 |publisher=Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung C. F. Wintersche Buchdruckerei |others=Universidad Francisco Marroquín Biblioteca Ludwig von Mises |pages=160 |language=de}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Etimologia : tariffa; |url=http://www.etimo.it/?term=tariffa&find=Cerca |access-date=2021-09-10 |website=etimo.it |language=it |archive-date=2021-09-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910235445/http://www.etimo.it/?term=tariffa&find=Cerca |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=tariffa in Vocabolario - Treccani |url=https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/tariffa |access-date=2021-09-10 |website=treccani.it |language=it-IT |archive-date=2021-09-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910235443/https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/tariffa |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Kluge |first=Friedrich |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/20959587 |title=Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache |date=1989 |publisher=De Gruyter |others=Max Bürgisser, Bernd Gregor, Elmar Seebold |isbn=3-11-006800-1 |edition=22. Aufl. |location=Berlin |pages=721 |language=de |oclc=20959587 |access-date=2021-09-10 |archive-date=2022-05-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220507213326/http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/20959587 |url-status=live}}</ref>
The English term ''tariff'' derives from the {{Langx|fr|tarif|lit=set price}} which is itself a descendant of the {{Langx|it|tariffa|lit=mandated price; schedule of taxes and customs|translit=}} which derives from {{Langx|la-x-medieval|tariffe|lit=set price}}. This term was introduced to the [[Latin]]-speaking world through contact with the Turks and derives from the {{Langx|ota|تعرفه|lit=list of prices; table of the rates of customs|translit=taʿrife}}. The Ottoman Turkish term derives from {{Langx|ar|تعريف|translit=taʿrīf|lit=notification; description; definition; announcement; assertion; inventory of fees to be paid}} which is the verbal noun of {{Langx|ar|عرف|lit=to know; to be able; to recognise; to find out|translit=ʿarafa}}.<ref>[http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=tariff The Online Etymology Dictionary: tariff.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121004133019/http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=tariff |date=2012-10-04 }} The 2nd edition of the Oxford English Dictionary gives the same etymology, with a reference dating to 1591.</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Steingass |first=Francis Joseph |url=http://archive.org/details/cu31924026873194 |title=The student's Arabic-English dictionary. |date=1884 |publisher=London : W.H. Allen |others=Cornell University Library |pages=178}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Lokotsch |first=Karl |url=http://archive.org/details/etymologische00lokoguat |title=Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Europäischen (Germanischen, Romanischen und Slavischen) Wörter Orientalischen Ursprungs |date=1927 |publisher=Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung C. F. Wintersche Buchdruckerei |others=Universidad Francisco Marroquín Biblioteca Ludwig von Mises |pages=160 |language=de}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Etimologia : tariffa; |url=http://www.etimo.it/?term=tariffa&find=Cerca |access-date=2021-09-10 |website=etimo.it |language=it |archive-date=2021-09-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910235445/http://www.etimo.it/?term=tariffa&find=Cerca |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=tariffa in Vocabolario - Treccani |url=https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/tariffa |access-date=2021-09-10 |website=treccani.it |language=it-IT |archive-date=2021-09-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910235443/https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/tariffa |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Kluge |first=Friedrich |title=Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache |date=1989 |publisher=De Gruyter |others=Max Bürgisser, Bernd Gregor, Elmar Seebold |isbn=3-11-006800-1 |edition=22. Aufl. |location=Berlin |pages=721 |language=de |oclc=20959587 }}</ref><ref>[https://www.nisanyansozluk.com/kelime/tarif] Nişanyan Dictionary "tarif"</ref>


== History ==
== History ==
=== Ancient Greece ===
=== Ancient Greece ===
[[File:AtheneOudheid.JPG|thumb|In Ancient Greek, the port of Piraeus was connected to Athens with [[Long Walls]] that provided security for transportation of goods.]]
[[File:AtheneOudheid.JPG|thumb|In Ancient Greece, the port of Piraeus was connected to Athens with [[Long Walls]] that provided security for transportation of goods.]]
In the city state of [[Classical Athens|Athens]], the port of [[Piraeus]] enforced a system of levies to raise taxes for the Athenian government. Grain was a key commodity that was imported through the port, and Piraeus was one of the main ports in the [[east Mediterranean]]. A levy of two percent was placed on goods arriving in the market through the docks of Piraeus.<ref>{{cite book |last=Wilson |first=Nigel |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_TzjAQAAQBAJ&q=piraeus+ancient+greece&pg=PA573 |title=Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece |date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-78799-7 |language=en}}</ref> The Athenian government also placed restrictions on the lending of money and transport of grain to only be allowed through the port of Piraeus.<ref>{{cite book |last=Michell |first=H. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=njIDBAAAQBAJ&q=piraeus |title=The Economics of Ancient Greece |date=2014 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-41911-7 |page=253 |language=en}}</ref>
In the city state of [[Classical Athens|Athens]], the port of [[Piraeus]] enforced a system of levies to raise taxes for the Athenian government. Grain was a key commodity that was imported through the port, and Piraeus was one of the main ports in the [[east Mediterranean]]. A levy of two percent was placed on goods arriving in the market through the docks of Piraeus.<ref>{{cite book |last=Wilson |first=Nigel |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_TzjAQAAQBAJ&q=piraeus+ancient+greece&pg=PA573 |title=Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece |date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-78799-7 |language=en}}</ref> The Athenian government also placed restrictions on the lending of money and transport of grain to only be allowed through the port of Piraeus.<ref>{{cite book |last=Michell |first=H. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=njIDBAAAQBAJ&q=piraeus |title=The Economics of Ancient Greece |date=2014 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-41911-7 |page=253 |language=en}}</ref>


===Britain===
===Britain===
{{See also|Protectionism#In the United Kingdom}}
{{See also|Protectionism#In the United Kingdom}}
In the 14th century, [[Edward III of England|Edward III]] took interventionist measures, such as banning the import of woollen cloth in an attempt to develop local manufacturing. Beginning in 1489, [[Henry VII of England|Henry VII]] took actions such as increasing export duties on raw wool. The Tudor monarchs, especially [[Henry VIII]] and [[Elizabeth I]], used protectionism, subsidies, distribution of monopoly rights, government-sponsored industrial espionage and other means of government intervention to protect the wool industry.<ref name=Chang />
In the 14th century, [[Edward III of England|Edward III]] took interventionist measures, such as banning the import of woollen cloth in an attempt to develop local manufacturing. Beginning in 1489, [[Henry VII of England|Henry VII]] took actions such as increasing export duties on raw wool. The Tudor monarchs, especially [[Henry VIII]] and [[Elizabeth I]], used protectionism, subsidies, distribution of monopoly rights, government-sponsored industrial espionage and other means of government intervention to protect the wool industry.<ref name=Chang />


A protectionist turning point in British economic policy came in 1721, when policies to promote manufacturing industries were introduced by [[Robert Walpole]]. These included, for example, increased tariffs on imported foreign manufactured goods, export subsidies, reduced tariffs on imported raw materials used for manufactured goods and the abolition of export duties on most manufactured goods. Thus, the UK was among the first countries to pursue a strategy of large-scale infant-industry development. <ref name="Chang">{{cite conference |url=https://www.cepal.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/8/7598/chang.pdf |title=Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective{{snd}} A Rope to Hang Oneself or a Ladder to Climb With? |author=[[Ha-Joon Chang]] (Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge) |date=2001 |conference=Development Theory at the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century |location=Santiago, Chile |publisher=[[United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean]] |access-date=2021-05-13 |archive-date=2021-03-08 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308192131/https://www.cepal.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/8/7598/chang.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref> Outlining his policy, Walpole declared:<blockquote>Nothing contributes as much to the promotion of public welfare as the export of manufactured goods and the import of foreign raw materials.</blockquote>
A protectionist turning point in British economic policy came in 1721, when policies to promote manufacturing industries were introduced by [[Robert Walpole]]. These included, for example, increased tariffs on imported foreign manufactured goods, export subsidies, reduced tariffs on imported raw materials used for manufactured goods and the abolition of export duties on most manufactured goods. Britain was thus among the first countries to pursue a strategy of large-scale infant-industry development.<ref name="Chang">{{cite conference |url=https://www.cepal.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/8/7598/chang.pdf |title=Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective{{snd}} A Rope to Hang Oneself or a Ladder to Climb With? |author=[[Ha-Joon Chang]] (Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge) |date=2001 |conference=Development Theory at the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century |location=Santiago, Chile |publisher=[[United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean]] |access-date=2021-05-13 |archive-date=2021-03-08 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308192131/https://www.cepal.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/8/7598/chang.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref> Outlining his policy, Walpole declared:<blockquote>Nothing contributes as much to the promotion of public welfare as the export of manufactured goods and the import of foreign raw materials.</blockquote>
 
Walpole's protectionist policies continued over the next century. Britain remained a highly protectionist country until the mid-19th century. By 1820, the UK's average tariff rate on manufactured imports was 45-55%.<ref name=Chang /> Moreover, in its colonies, the UK imposed a total ban on advanced manufacturing activities that the country did not want to see developed. Walpole forced Americans to specialize in low-value-added products. The UK also banned exports from its colonies that competed with its own products at home and abroad. The country banned imports of cotton textiles from India, which at the time were superior to British products. It banned the export of woollen fabrics from its colonies to other countries (Wool Act). Finally, Britain wanted to ensure that the colonists stuck to the production of raw materials and never became a competitor to British manufacturers. Policies were established to encourage the production of raw materials in the colonies. Walpole granted export subsidies (on the American side) and abolished import taxes (on the British side) on raw materials produced in the American colonies. The colonies were thus forced to leave the most profitable industries in the hands of the United Kingdom.<ref name=Chang />
 
In 1800, Britain, with about 10% of Europe's population, supplied 29% of all [[pig iron]] produced in Europe, a proportion that had risen to 45% by 1830. Per capita industrial production was even higher: in 1830 it was 250% higher than in the rest of Europe, up from 110% in 1800.<ref name="Bairoch">{{cite book |last1=Bairoch |title=Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes |year=1993 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=9780226034621 |url=https://archive.org/details/economicsworldhi00bair |url-access=registration}}</ref>
 
Protectionist industrial policies remained in place until the mid-19th century. At the beginning of that century, the average tariff on British manufactured goods was about 50%, the highest of all major European countries. Despite its growing technological lead over other nations, the UK continued its protectionist policy until the mid-19th century, maintaining very high tariffs on manufactured goods until the 1820s, two generations after the start of the [[Industrial Revolution]].


Free trade in Britain began in earnest with the [[repeal of the Corn Laws]] in 1846, which was equivalent to free trade in grain. The Corn Acts had been passed in 1815 to restrict wheat imports and to guarantee the incomes of British farmers; their repeal devastated Britain's old rural economy, but began to mitigate the effects of the [[Great Famine (Ireland)|Great Famine]] in Ireland. Tariffs on many manufactured goods were also abolished. But while free-trade was progressing in Britain, protectionism continued on the European mainland and in the United States.<ref name="Chang" />
British protectionist policies continued over the next century, with Britain remained a highly protectionist country until the mid-19th century. By 1820, the UK's average tariff rate on manufactured imports was 45–55%.<ref name=Chang /> In 1815 the [[Corn Laws]] were enforced: tariffs and other [[trade restriction]]s on imported food and [[grain|corn]]. The laws were designed to keep corn prices high to favour domestic farmers, and represented British [[mercantilism]].{{efn|According to David Cody (English Faculty, [[Hartwick College]]), they "were designed to protect English landholders by encouraging the export and limiting the import of corn when prices fell below a fixed point. They were eventually abolished in the face of militant agitation by the [[Anti-Corn Law League]], formed in [[Manchester]] in 1839, which maintained that the laws, which amounted to a subsidy, increased industrial costs. After a lengthy campaign, opponents of the law finally got their way in 1846{{mdash}}a significant triumph which was indicative of the new political power of the English middle class."<ref>{{cite web|author= Cody, D | date= 1987 | url=http://www.victorianweb.org/history/hist5.html | title=Corn Laws | website= The Victorian Web: literature, history and culture in the age of Victoria| access-date= 16 September 2007}}</ref> }} The Corn Laws enhanced the profits and political power associated with [[land ownership]]. The laws raised [[food prices]] and the costs of living for the British public, and hampered the growth of other British economic sectors, such as manufacturing, by reducing the disposable income of the British public.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Williamson|first=Jeffrey G|date=1990-04-01|title=The impact of the Corn Laws just prior to repeal|journal=Explorations in Economic History|volume=27|issue=2|pages=123–156|doi=10.1016/0014-4983(90)90007-L}}</ref>


Customs duties on many manufactured goods were also abolished. The Navigation Acts were abolished in 1849 when free traders won the public debate in the UK. But while free trade progressed in the UK, protectionism continued on the Continent. The UK unilaterally pursued free trade, even as most other industrial powers retained protectionist policies. For example the USA emerged from the Civil War even more explicitly protectionist than before, Germany under [[Otto von Bismarck|Bismarck]] rejected free trade, and the rest of Europe followed suit.<ref name="Chang" />
In 1846 the Corn Laws were repealed, so tariffs were significantly reduced. Economic historians see the repeal of the Corn Laws as a decisive shift towards [[free trade]] in Britain.<ref name="Findlay-ORourke-2003">{{Cite journal| first1=Ronald | last1=Findlay| last2=O'Rourke | first2=Kevin H. |date=1 January 2003| title=Commodity Market Integration, 1500–2000 | url=https://www.nber.org/chapters/c9585 |journal=NBER| pages=13–64}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/the-cambridge-economic-history-of-modern-britain/trade-discovery-mercantilism-and-technology/A0D309440D728FC14CC299FACB7A5876|title=The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain|pages=175–203|language=en|access-date=2017-06-27|doi=10.1017/CHOL9780521820363.008|chapter=Trade: Discovery, mercantilism and technology|year=2004|last1=Harley|first1=C. Knick|isbn=9781139053853}}</ref> According to a 2021 study, the repeal of the Corn Laws benefitted the bottom 90% of income earners in the United Kingdom economically, while causing income losses for the top 10% of income earners.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Irwin|first1=Douglas A|last2=Chepeliev|first2=Maksym G|date=2021|title=The Economic Consequences of Sir Robert Peel: A Quantitative Assessment of the Repeal of the Corn Laws|url=https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueab029|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=131|issue=640|pages=3322–3337|doi=10.1093/ej/ueab029|issn=0013-0133|url-access=subscription}}</ref>


After the 1870s, the British economy continued to grow, but inexorably lagged behind the protectionist United States and Germany: from 1870 to 1913, industrial production grew at an average annual rate of 4.7% in the USA, 4.1% in Germany and only 2.1% in Great Britain. Thus, Britain was finally overtaken economically by the United States around 1880. British leadership in fields such as steel and textiles was eroded, and the country fell behind as new, more technologically advanced industries emerged after 1870 in other countries still practicing protectionism.<ref name=Bairoch />
In the UK customs duties on many manufactured goods were also abolished. The [[Navigation Acts]] were abolished in 1849 when free traders won the public debate in the UK. But while free trade progressed in the UK, protectionism continued on the Continent. The UK unilaterally pursued free trade, even as most other large industrial powers retained protectionist policies. For example, the USA emerged from the Civil War even more explicitly protectionist than before, Germany under [[Otto von Bismarck|Bismarck]] rejected free trade, and the rest of Europe followed suit.<ref name="Chang" /> Countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland, and arguably Sweden and Belgium, had fully moved towards free trade prior to 1860.<ref name="Findlay-ORourke-2003"/>


On June 15, 1903, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, [[Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne]], made a speech in the House of Lords in which he defended fiscal retaliation against countries that applied high tariffs and whose governments subsidised products sold in Britain (known as "premium products", later called "[[Dumping (pricing policy)|dumping]]"). The retaliation was to take the form of threats to impose duties in response to goods from that country. [[Liberal Unionists|Liberal unionists]] had split from the [[Liberal Party (UK)|liberals]], who advocated free trade, and this speech marked a turning point in the group's slide toward [[protectionism]]. Lansdowne argued that the threat of retaliatory tariffs was similar to gaining respect in a room of gunmen by pointing a big gun (his exact words were "a gun a little bigger than everyone else's"). The "Big Revolver" became a slogan of the time, often used in speeches and cartoons.<ref>{{cite book |author1=Hugh Montgomery |author2=Philip George Cambray |title=A Dictionary of Political Phrases and Allusions : With a short bibliography |publisher=S. Sonnenschein |url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24174 |year=1906 |page=[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24174/page/n41 33]}}</ref>
On June 15, 1903, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, [[Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne]], made a speech in the House of Lords in which he defended fiscal retaliation against countries that applied high tariffs and whose governments subsidised products sold in Britain (known as "premium products", later called "[[Dumping (pricing policy)|dumping]]"). The retaliation was to take the form of threats to impose duties in response to goods from that country. [[Liberal Unionists|Liberal unionists]] had split from the [[Liberal Party (UK)|liberals]], who advocated free trade, and this speech marked a turning point in the group's slide toward [[protectionism]]. Lansdowne argued that the threat of retaliatory tariffs was similar to gaining respect in a room of gunmen by pointing a big gun (his exact words were "a gun a little bigger than everyone else's"). The "Big Revolver" became a slogan of the time, often used in speeches and cartoons.<ref>{{cite book |author1=Hugh Montgomery |author2=Philip George Cambray |title=A Dictionary of Political Phrases and Allusions : With a short bibliography |publisher=S. Sonnenschein |url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24174 |year=1906 |page=[https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24174/page/n41 33]}}</ref>
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===United States===
===United States===
{{See also|History of tariffs in the United States|Protectionism in the United States}}
{{Main article|History of tariffs in the United States}}
[[File:Average tariff rates (France, UK, US).png|thumb|Average tariff rates (France, UK, US){{Update needed|date=November 2024}}]]
[[File:Average tariff rates (France, UK, US).png|thumb|Average tariff rates (France, UK, US){{Update inline|date=November 2024}}]]
[[File:Average Tariff Rates in USA (1821-2016).png|thumb|Average tariff rates in US (1821–2016){{Update needed|date=November 2024}}]]
[[File:Average Tariff Rates in USA (1821-2016).png|thumb|Average tariff rates in US (1821–2016){{Update inline|date=November 2024}}]]
According to [[Douglas Irwin]],{{efn|{{excerpt|Douglas Irwin}}}} tariffs have historically served three main purposes: generating revenue for the [[federal government of the United States|federal government]], restricting imports to protect domestic producers, and securing reciprocity through [[trade agreement]]s that reduce barriers. The history of [[United States trade policy|U.S. trade policy]] can be divided into three distinct eras, each characterized by the predominance of one goal. From 1790 to 1860, revenue considerations dominated, as import duties accounted for approximately 90% of federal government receipts. From 1861 to 1933, the growing reliance on [[taxation in the United States|domestic taxation]] shifted the focus of tariffs toward protecting domestic industries. From 1934 to 2016, the primary objective of trade policy became the negotiation of trade agreements with other countries. The three eras of U.S. tariff history were separated by two major shocks—the Civil War and the Great Depression—that realigned political power and shifted trade policy objectives.<ref name="ARE">{{cite journal |last=Irwin |first=Douglas A. |title=Trade policy in American economic history |journal=[[Annual Review of Economics]] |volume=12 |issue=1 |year=2020 |pages=23–44 |url=https://ccd.ucsd.edu/_files/papers/paper_irwin_annurev-economics.pdf}}</ref>


Before the [[Constitution of the United States|new Constitution]] took effect in 1789, the Congress could not levy taxes{{snd}}it sold land or begged money from the states. The new national government needed revenue and decided to depend upon a tax on imports with the [[Tariff of 1789]].<ref>John C. Miller, ''The Federalist Era: 1789–1801'' (1960), pp. 14–15,</ref> The policy of the U.S. before 1860 was low tariffs "for revenue only" (since duties continued to fund the national government).<ref>Percy Ashley, ''Modern Tariff History: Germany, United States, France'' (3rd ed. 1920) pp. 133–265.</ref>
Political support by members of [[United States Congress|Congress]] often reflects the economic interests of producers rather than [[consumer]]s, as producers tend to be better organized politically and employ many voting workers. Trade-related interests differ across industries, depending on whether they focus on exports or face import competition. In general, workers in export-oriented sectors favor lower tariffs, while those in import-competing industries support higher tariffs.<ref name="ARE" />


The [[Embargo Act of 1807]] was passed by the U.S. Congress in that year in response to European interference with American merchant shipping. While not a tariff per se, the Act prohibited the import of all kinds of manufactured imports, resulting in a huge drop in US trade and protests from all regions of the country. However, the embargo also had the effect of launching new, emerging US domestic industries across the board, particularly the textile industry, and marked the beginning of the manufacturing system in the United States.<ref>Smith, Ryan P., "A History of America's Ever-Shifting Stance on Tariffs: Unpacking a debate as old as the United States itself", ''Smithsonian Magazine'', 18 April 2018, retrieved 5 April 2023</ref>
Because congressional representation is geographically based, regional economic interests tend to shape consistent voting patterns over time. For much of U.S. history, the primary division over trade policy has been along the North–South axis. In the early 19th century, a [[Manufacturing Belt|manufacturing corridor]] developed in the [[Northeastern United States|Northeast]], including [[textile]] production in [[New England]] and [[iron]] industries in [[Pennsylvania]] and [[Ohio]], which often faced import competition. By contrast, the [[Southern United States|South]] specialized in agricultural exports such as [[cotton]] and [[tobacco]].<ref name="ARE" />


An attempt at imposing a high tariff occurred in 1828, but the South denounced it as a "[[Tariff of Abominations]]" and it almost caused a rebellion in South Carolina until it was lowered.<ref>Robert V. Remini, "Martin Van Buren and the Tariff of Abominations." ''American Historical Review'' 63.4 (1958): 903–917.</ref>
In more recent times, representatives from the [[Rust Belt]]—spanning from [[Upstate New York]] through the [[Midwestern United States|industrial Midwest]]—have often opposed trade agreements, while those from the South and the [[Western United States|West]] have generally supported them. The regional variation in trade-related interests implies that political parties may adopt opposing positions on trade policy when their electoral bases differ geographically. Each of the three trade policy eras—focused respectively on revenue, restriction, and reciprocity—occurred during periods of political dominance by a single party able to implement its preferred policies.<ref name="ARE" />


Between 1816 and the end of the Second World War, the United States had one of the highest average tariff rates on manufactured imports in the world. According to Paul Bairoch, the United States was "the homeland and bastion of modern protectionism" during this period.<ref name=Chang1>{{cite web |url=http://www.ips-dc.org/kicking_away_the_ladder_the_real_history_of_free_trade/ |title=Kicking Away the Ladder: The 'Real' History of Free Trade |last1=Chang |first1=Ha-Joon |last2=Gershman |first2=John |publisher=Institute for Policy Studies |access-date=1 September 2017 |date=2003-12-30 |archive-date=2017-09-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170902002011/http://www.ips-dc.org/kicking_away_the_ladder_the_real_history_of_free_trade/ |url-status=live}}</ref>
====Colonial period====
Trade policy was a subject of controversy even prior to the independence of the United States. The [[Thirteen Colonies|thirteen North American colonies]] were subject to the restrictive framework of the [[Navigation Acts]], which directed most colonial trade through Britain. Approximately three-quarters of colonial exports were enumerated goods that had to pass through a British port before being reexported elsewhere, a policy that reduced the prices received by American planters.<ref name="ARE" />


Many American intellectuals and politicians during the country's catching-up period felt that the free trade theory advocated by British classical economists was not suited to their country. They argued that the country should develop manufacturing industries and use government protection and subsidies for this purpose, as Britain had done before them. Many of the American economists of the time, until the last quarter of the 19th century, were strong advocates of industrial protection: [[Daniel Raymond]] who influenced [[Friedrich List]], [[Mathew Carey]] and his son Henry, who was one of Lincoln's economic advisers. The intellectual leader of this movement was [[Alexander Hamilton]], the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States (1789–1795). The United States rejected [[David Ricardo]]'s [[theory of comparative advantage]] and protected its industry. The country pursued a protectionist policy from the beginning of the 19th century until the middle of the 20th century, after the Second World War.<ref name=Chang1/><ref name="Chang"/>
Historians have debated whether British [[mercantilist]] policies harmed American colonial interests and fueled the [[American Revolution]]. Harper estimated that trade restrictions cost the colonies about 2.3% of their income in 1773, though this excluded benefits of empire, such as defense and lower shipping insurance.<ref>{{cite book |last=Harper |first=Lawrence A. |title=The English Navigation Laws |publisher=Columbia University Press |location=New York |year=1939}}</ref> The economic burden of the Navigation Acts fell mostly on the southern colonies, especially tobacco planters in Maryland and Virginia, potentially reducing regional income by up to 2.5% and strengthening support for independence. American foreign trade declined sharply during the [[American Revolutionary War|Revolutionary War]] and remained subdued into the 1780s. Trade revived during the 1790s but remained volatile due to ongoing military conflicts in Europe.<ref name="ARE" />


In [[Report on Manufactures]], considered the first text to express modern protectionist theory, Alexander Hamilton argued that if a country wished to develop a new activity on its soil, it would have to temporarily protect it. According to him, this protection against foreign producers could take the form of import duties or, in rare cases, prohibition of imports. He called for customs barriers to allow American industrial development and to help protect infant industries, including bounties (subsidies) derived in part from those tariffs. He also believed that duties on raw materials should be generally low.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dorfman & Tugwell |title=Early American Policy |date=1960}}</ref> Hamilton argued that despite an initial "increase of price" caused by regulations that control foreign competition, once a "domestic manufacture has attained to perfection... it invariably becomes cheaper.<ref name=Chang2/> In this report, Hamilton also proposed export bans on major raw materials, tariff reductions on industrial inputs, pricing and patenting of inventions, regulation of product standards and development of financial and transportation infrastructure. The U.S. Congress adopted the tariffs but refused to grant subsidies to manufactures.<ref name=Chang2/>
====Revenue period (1790–1860)====


[[Alexander Hamilton]] and [[Daniel Raymond]] were among the first theorists to present the [[infant industry argument]]. Hamilton was the first to use the term "infant industries" and to introduce it to the forefront of economic thinking. Hamilton believed that political independence was predicated upon economic independence. Increasing the domestic supply of manufactured goods, particularly war materials, was seen as an issue of national security. And he feared that Britain's policy towards the colonies would condemn the United States to be only producers of agricultural products and raw materials.<ref name=Chang1/><ref name=Chang2/>
Beginning in 1790, the newly established federal government adopted tariffs as its primary source of revenue. There was a consensus among the [[Founding Fathers of the United States|Founding Fathers]] that tariffs were the most efficient way of raising [[public funds]] as well as the most politically acceptable. Early [[sales tax]]es in the post-colonial period were highly controversial, difficult to enforce, and costly to administer. This was evident during events like the [[Whiskey Rebellion]], where the enforcement of sales taxes led to significant resistance. Similarly, an [[income tax]] did not make sense for numerous reasons, particularly due to the complexities of tracking and collecting it. In contrast, tariffs were a simpler solution. [[Import]]s entered the United States primarily through a limited number of [[port]]s, such as [[Boston]], [[New York City]], [[Philadelphia]], [[Baltimore]], and [[Charleston, South Carolina]]. This concentration of imports made it easier to impose taxes directly at these points, streamlining the process of collection. Furthermore, tariffs were less visible to the general public because they were built into the price of goods, reducing political resistance. The system allowed for efficient revenue generation without the immediate visibility or perceived burden of other tax forms, contributing to its political acceptability among the Founders.<ref name="EconFocus">{{cite web
| title = Interview: Douglas Irwin
| author = Aaron Steelman
| publisher = Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
| work = Econ Focus
| date = August 2017
| url = https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/2017/q3/interview
| access-date = 4 July 2025
}}</ref>


Britain initially did not want to industrialise the American colonies, and implemented policies to that effect (for example, banning high value-added manufacturing activities). Under British rule, America was denied the use of tariffs to protect its new industries. This explains why, after independence, the Tariff Act of 1789 was the second bill of the Republic signed by President Washington allowing Congress to impose a fixed tariff of 5% on all imports, with a few exceptions.<ref name="Chang2">{{cite book |author1=Ha-Joon Chang |title=Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective}}</ref>
President [[Thomas Jefferson]] initiated a notable policy experiment by enacting a complete embargo on maritime commerce, with Congressional support, beginning in December 1807. The stated objective of the embargo was to protect American vessels and sailors from becoming entangled in the Anglo-French naval conflict (the [[Napoleonic Wars]]). By mid-1808, the United States had reached near-[[autarky|autarkic]] conditions, representing one of the most extreme peacetime interruptions of international trade in its history. The embargo, which remained in effect from December 1807 to March 1809, imposed significant economic costs.<ref name="ARE" /> Irwin (2005) estimates that the static welfare loss associated with the embargo was approximately 5% of GDP.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Irwin |first=Douglas A. |title=The welfare costs of autarky: evidence from the Jeffersonian embargo, 1807–1809 |journal=Review of International Economics |volume=13 |pages=631–645 |year=2005 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00527.x |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00527.x}}</ref>


The Congress passed a tariff act (1789), imposing a 5% flat rate tariff on all imports.<ref name="Bairoch"/> Between 1792 and the war with Britain in 1812, the average tariff level remained around 12.5%, which was too low to encourage consumers to buy domestic products and thus support emerging American industries. When the [[War of 1812]] broke out, all rates doubled to an average of 25% to account for increased government spending. The war paved the way for new industries by disrupting manufacturing imports from the UK and the rest of Europe. A major policy shift occurred in 1816, when American manufacturers who had benefited from the tariffs lobbied to retain them. New legislation was introduced to keep tariffs at the same levels —especially protected were cotton, woolen, and iron goods.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Thomas C. Cochran, William Miller |title=The Age of Enterprise: A Social History of Industrial America |date=1942}}</ref> The American industrial interests that had blossomed because of the tariff lobbied to keep it, and had it raised to 35 percent in 1816. The public approved, and by 1820, America's average tariff was up to 40 percent.
From 1837 to 1860, spanning the [[Second Party System]] and ending with the Civil War, the Democratic Party held political dominance in the United States. The Democrats drew support primarily from the export-oriented South and promoted the slogan “a tariff for revenue only” to express their opposition to protective tariffs. As a result, the average tariff declined from early 1830s levels to under 20% by 1860. During this period, there were 12 sessions of Congress: 7 under unified government (6 led by Democrats, 1 by Whigs) and 5 under divided control. This meant that over the 34-year span, the pro-tariff [[Whig Party (United States)|Whig Party]], based in the North, held power for only two years. They succeeded in raising tariffs in 1842, but this was reversed in 1846 after Democrats returned to power. Throughout the 10 years of divided government, tariff policy remained unchanged.<ref name="ARE" />


===19th century onwards===
====Civil War (1861–1865) ====
In the 19th century, statesmen such as Senator [[Henry Clay]] continued Hamilton's themes within the [[Whig Party (United States)|Whig Party]] under the name "[[American System (economic plan)|American System]]" which consisted of protecting industries and developing infrastructure in explicit opposition to the "British system" of free trade.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Luthin |first1=Reinhard H. |title=Abraham Lincoln and the Tariff |journal=The American Historical Review |date=1944 |volume=49 |issue=4 |pages=609–629 |doi=10.2307/1850218 |jstor=1850218}}</ref> Before 1860 they were always defeated by the low-tariff Democrats.<ref>William K. Bolt, ''Tariff Wars and the Politics of Jacksonian America'' (2017) covers 1816 to 1861.</ref>
Some non-academic commentators have argued that trade restrictions were a major factor in the South’s decision to secede during the [[American Civil War|Civil War]], although this view is not widely supported among academic historians. After the 1828 Tariff of Abominations, South Carolina threatened secession, but the crisis was resolved through the [[Compromise of 1833]], which led to a steady decline in tariffs. Further reductions followed in 1846 and 1857, bringing the average tariff below 20% on the eve of the war—one of the lowest levels in the antebellum period. Irwin notes that Southern Democrats had substantial influence over trade policy until the Civil War. He rejects the [[historical revisionism|revisionist]] claim—often associated with the [[Lost Cause of the Confederacy|Lost Cause]] narrative—that the [[Morrill Tariff]] triggered the conflict. Instead, Irwin argues that the Morrill Tariff only passed because Southern states had already seceded and their representatives were no longer in Congress to oppose it. It was signed by President [[James Buchanan]], a Democrat, before Lincoln took office. In short, Irwin finds no evidence that tariffs were a major cause of the Civil War.<ref name="EconFocus" />


From 1846 to 1861, American tariffs were lowered but this was followed by a series of recessions and the 1857 panic, which eventually led to higher demands for tariffs than President James Buchanan signed in 1861 (Morrill Tariff).<ref name=Chang1/><ref name=Chang2/>
====Restriction period (1866–1928)====
The Civil War shifted political power from the South to the North, benefiting the Republican Party, which favored protective tariffs. As a result, trade policy focused more on restriction than revenue, and average tariffs increased. From 1861 to 1932, the Republicans dominated American politics and drew their political support from the North, where manufacturing interests were concentrated. Republicans supported high tariffs to limit imports, leading to rates rising to 40–50% during the Civil War and remaining at that level for several decades. During this time, there were 35 sessions of Congress, including 21 under unified government (17 Republican, 4 Democratic) and 14 under divided control. Over the span of 72 years, Democrats succeeded in reducing tariffs only twice, in 1894 and 1913, but both efforts were swiftly reversed when Republicans regained power. Although trade policy was often contested, it remained relatively stable due to prolonged one-party dominance and institutional barriers to change.<ref name="ARE" />


During the American Civil War (1861–1865), agrarian interests in the South were opposed to any protection, while manufacturing interests in the North wanted to maintain it. The war marked the triumph of the protectionists of the industrial states of the North over the free traders of the South. Abraham Lincoln was a protectionist like Henry Clay of the Whig Party, who advocated the "American system" based on infrastructure development and protectionism. Once elected, Lincoln implemented a 44-percent tariff during the [[American Civil War|Civil War]]—in part to pay for railroad subsidies and for the war effort, and to protect favored industries. After the war, tariffs remained at or above wartime levels. High tariffs were a policy designed to encourage rapid industrialisation and protect the high American wage rates.<ref name="Chang2" />
According to Irwin, a common myth about U.S. trade policy is that high tariffs made the United States into a great industrial power in the late 19th century. As its share of global manufacturing powered from 23% in 1870 to 36% in 1913, the admittedly high tariffs of the time came with a cost, estimated at around 0.5% of GDP in the mid-1870s. In some industries, they might have sped up development by a few years. U.S. economic growth during its protectionist era was driven more by its abundant [[natural resource]]s and openness to people and ideas, including large-scale [[immigration]], [[foreign capital]], and imported technologies. While tariffs on manufactured goods were high, the country remained open in other respects, and much of the economic growth occurred in services such as [[railroad]]s and [[telecommunication]]s rather than in manufacturing, which had already expanded significantly before the Civil War when tariffs were lower.<ref name=":5">{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/ahistorianonthemythsofamericantradescapegoatingtrade|title=A historian on the myths of American trade|newspaper=The Economist|access-date=26 November 2017|language=en}}</ref><ref name="IrwinAEI">{{cite web |last=Irwin |first=Douglas A. |title=Did Tariffs Make America Great? A Long-Read Q&A with Trade Historian Douglas A. Irwin |publisher=American Enterprise Institute |date=August 2018 |url=https://www.aei.org/economics/did-tariffs-make-america-great-a-long-read-qa-with-trade-historian-douglas-a-irwin/ |access-date=4 July 2025}}</ref>


The policy from 1860 to 1933 was usually high protective tariffs (apart from 1913 to 1921). After 1890, the tariff on wool did affect an important industry, but otherwise the tariffs were designed to keep American wages high. The conservative Republican tradition, typified by [[William McKinley]] was a high tariff, while the Democrats typically called for a lower tariff to help consumers but they always failed until 1913.<ref name=Taussig1931>F.W. Taussig,. ''The Tariff History of the United States''. 8th ed. (1931); [https://books.google.com/books?id=MyqgiptJzfwC 5th ed. 1910 is online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230107190506/https://books.google.com/books?id=MyqgiptJzfwC |date=2023-01-07 }}</ref><ref>Robert W. Merry, ''President McKinley: Architect of the American Century'' (2017) pp. 70–83.</ref>
====Great Depression and Smoot–Hawley Tariff (1929–1933)====
{{further|Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act}}
The Tariff Act of 1930, commonly known as the Smoot–Hawley Tariff, is considered one of the most controversial tariff laws ever enacted by the United States Congress. The act raised the average tariff on dutiable imports from approximately 40% to 47%, though price deflation during the [[Great Depression]] caused the effective rate to rise to nearly 60% by 1932. The Smoot–Hawley Tariff was implemented as the global economy was entering a severe downturn. The Great Depression of 1929–1933 represented an economic collapse for both the United States—where real GDP declined by about 25% and [[unemployment]] exceeded 20%—and much of the world. As international trade contracted, trade barriers multiplied, unemployment increased, and industrial output declined worldwide, leading many to attribute part of the global economic crisis to the Smoot–Hawley Tariff. The extent to which this legislation contributed to the depth of the Great Depression has remained a subject of ongoing debate.<ref name="ARE" />


In the early 1860s, Europe and the United States pursued completely different trade policies. The 1860s were a period of growing protectionism in the United States, while the European free trade phase lasted from 1860 to 1892. The tariff average rate on imports of manufactured goods in 1875 was from 40% to 50% in the United States, against 9% to 12% in continental Europe at the height of free trade.<ref name=Bairoch />
Irwin argues that while the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was not the primary cause of the Great Depression, it contributed to its severity by provoking international retaliation and reducing global trade. What mitigated the impact of Smoot-Hawley was the small size of the trade sector at the time. Only a third of total imports to the United States in 1930 were subject to duties, and those dutiable imports represented only 1.4 percent of GDP. According to Irwin, there is no evidence that the legislation achieved its goals of net job creation or economic recovery. Even from a [[Keynesian economics|Keynesian]] perspective, the policy was counterproductive, as the decline in exports exceeded the reduction in imports. While falling foreign incomes were a key factor in the collapse of U.S. exports, the tariff also limited foreign access to [[U.S. dollar]]s, appreciating the currency and making American goods less competitive abroad. Irwin emphasizes that one of the most damaging consequences of the Act was the deterioration of the United States' trade relations with key partners. Enacted at a time when the [[League of Nations]] was seeking to implement a global "tariff truce", the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was widely perceived as a unilateral and hostile move, undermining [[international cooperation]]. In his assessment, the most significant long-term impact was that the resentment it generated encouraged other countries to form discriminatory [[trading bloc]]s. These preferential arrangements, diverted trade away from the United States and hindered the global economic recovery.<ref name="Peddling Protectionism">{{cite journal |author=Daniel Griswold |title=Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression |journal=Cato Journal |volume=31 |issue=3 |pages=661–665 |date=2011 |url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/905851675 |access-date=3 April 2025 |id={{ProQuest|905851675}}}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Irwin |first=Douglas A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oz_BDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA116 |title=Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=2011 |isbn=9781400888429 |page=116}}</ref>


After the United States caught up with European industries in the 1890s, the [[Mckinley Tariff]]'s argument was no longer to protect "infant industries", but to maintain workers' wages, support agricultural protection and the principle of reciprocity.<ref name=Bairoch />
In a November 2024 article, ''[[The Economist]]'' observed that the Act, "which raised average tariffs on imports by around 20% and incited a tit-for-tat trade war, was devastatingly effective: global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic for growth in America and around the world that legislators have not touched the issue since. 'Smoot-Hawley' became synonymous with disastrous policy making".<ref>{{cite magazine |magazine=The Economist |first=Alice |last=Fulwood |title=What Donald Trump's election means for the global economy |url=https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2024/11/20/what-donald-trumps-election-means-for-the-global-economy |date=20 November 2024}} Alice Fulwood is Wall Street editor of the Economist</ref>


In 1913, following the electoral victory of the Democrats in 1912, there was a significant reduction in the average tariff on manufactured goods from 44% to 25%. However, the First World War rendered this bill ineffective, and new "emergency" tariff legislation was introduced in 1922 after the Republicans returned to power in 1921.<ref name="Chang2" />
Economist [[Paul Krugman]] argues that protectionism does not necessarily cause [[recession]]s, since a reduction in imports resulting from tariffs can have an expansionary effect that offsets the decline in exports. In his view, trade wars tend to reduce exports and imports symmetrically, with limited net impact on economic growth. He contends that the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act was not the cause of the Great Depression; instead, he sees the sharp decline in trade between 1929 and 1933 as a consequence of the Depression, with trade barriers representing a policy response rather than a trigger.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Krugman |first=Paul |date=2016-03-04 |title=The Mitt-Hawley Fallacy |url=https://archive.nytimes.com/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/the-mitt-hawley-fallacy/ |access-date=2024-11-01 |website=Paul Krugman Blog |language=en}}</ref>


According to economic historian Douglas Irwin, a common myth about United States trade policy is that low tariffs harmed American manufacturers in the early 19th century and then that high tariffs made the United States into a great industrial power in the late 19th century.<ref name="The Economist 20171126">{{cite news |url=https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly |title=A historian on the myths of American trade |newspaper=The Economist |access-date=2017-11-26 |language=en |archive-date=2017-11-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171126044721/https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly |url-status=live}}</ref> A review by the ''Economist'' of Irwin's 2017 book ''Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy'' notes:<ref name="The Economist 20171126" /><blockquote>Political dynamics would lead people to see a link between tariffs and the economic cycle that was not there. A boom would generate enough revenue for tariffs to fall, and when the bust came pressure would build to raise them again. By the time that happened, the economy would be recovering, giving the impression that tariff cuts caused the crash and the reverse generated the recovery. Mr Irwin also methodically debunks the idea that protectionism made America a great industrial power, a notion believed by some to offer lessons for developing countries today. As its share of global manufacturing powered from 23% in 1870 to 36% in 1913, the admittedly high tariffs of the time came with a cost, estimated at around 0.5% of GDP in the mid-1870s. In some industries, they might have sped up development by a few years. But American growth during its protectionist period had more to do with its abundant resources and openness to people and ideas.</blockquote>
Economist [[Milton Friedman]] argued that while the tariffs of 1930 caused harm, they were not the main cause for the Great Depression. He placed greater blame on the lack of sufficient action on the part of the Federal Reserve.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Noble |first=Holcombe B. |date=2006-11-16 |title=Milton Friedman, Free Markets Theorist, Dies at 94 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/16/business/17friedmancnd.html |access-date=2025-02-13 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> [[Peter Temin]], an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has agreed that the contractionary effect of the tariff was small.<ref>{{cite book |last=Temin |first=P. |year=1989 |title=Lessons from the Great Depression |publisher=[[MIT Press]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=squLnSDrJ4EC&q=peter+temin+smoot+hawley+Lessons+from+the+Great+Depression&pg=PA46 |isbn=9780262261197}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=November 2024}} Other economists have contended that the record tariffs of the 1920s and early 1930s exacerbated the [[Great Depression in the United States|Great Depression in the U.S.]], in part because of retaliatory tariffs imposed by other countries on the United States.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Guzik |first=Erik |date=2024-10-31 |title=Tariffs are back in the spotlight, but skepticism of free trade has deep roots in American history |url=https://theconversation.com/tariffs-are-back-in-the-spotlight-but-skepticism-of-free-trade-has-deep-roots-in-american-history-241311 |access-date=2024-11-01 |website=The Conversation |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Schulman |first=Bruce J. |date=2024-10-24 |title=Tariffs Don't Have to Make Economic Sense to Appeal to Trump Voters |url=https://time.com/7095746/trump-tariffs-politics-rhetoric/ |access-date=2024-11-01 |magazine=TIME |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Helm |first=Sally |date=April 5, 2018 |title=Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: A Classic Economics Horror Story |url=https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599707003/smoot-hawley-tariff-act-a-classic-economics-horror-story |work=NPR}}</ref>


===Tariffs and the Great Depression===
====Reciprocity period (1934–2016)====
{{more|Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act}}
The Great Depression led to a political realignment following the Democratic victory in the 1932 election. This election ended decades of Republican dominance and initiated a period of Democratic control over the federal government that lasted from 1933 to 1993. The realignment shifted influence toward the party that prioritized export-oriented interests in the South. Consequently, the focus of trade policy moved from protectionism to reciprocity, and average tariff levels declined significantly. During this period, there were 30 sessions of Congress, with 16 under unified government (15 Democratic, 1 Republican) and 14 under divided government. Over these 60 years, the overarching goal of promoting reciprocal trade agreements remained largely unchanged, including during the two-year span (1953–1955) when Republicans held unified control.<ref name="ARE" />
Economist [[Douglas A. Irwin]] assesses the impact of the Smoot-Hawley Act: in the two years following the imposition of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in June 1930, the volume of U.S. imports fell by over 40%. He shows that part of this collapse in trade is attributed to the tariff itself, and not to other factors such as falling incomes or foreign retaliation. Partial and general equilibrium evaluations indicate that the Smoot-Hawley tariff reduced imports by between 4% and 8% (ceteris paribus). In addition, a counterfactual simulation suggests that almost a quarter of the observed 40% drop in imports can be attributed to the increase in the effective tariff (i.e. Smoot-Hawley plus deflation).<ref name="Peddling Protectionism"></ref>


Irwin argues that while the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was not the primary cause of the Great Depression, it contributed to its severity by provoking international retaliation and reducing global trade. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act raised the average level of tariffs on dutiable imports by 15 to 18 percent. What mitigated the impact of Smoot-Hawley was the small size of the trade sector at the time. Only a third of total imports to the United States in 1930 were subject to duties, and those dutiable imports represented only 1.4 percent of GDP. According to Irwin, there is no evidence that the legislation achieved its goals of net job creation or economic recovery. Even from a Keynesian perspective, the policy was counterproductive, as the decline in exports exceeded the reduction in imports. While falling foreign incomes were a key factor in the collapse of U.S. exports, the tariff also limited foreign access to U.S. dollars, appreciating the currency and making American goods less competitive abroad. Irwin emphasizes that one of the most damaging consequences of the Act was the deterioration of the United States' trade relations with key partners. Enacted at a time when the League of Nations was seeking to implement a global "tariff truce", the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was widely perceived as a unilateral and hostile move, undermining international cooperation. In his assessment, the most significant long-term impact was that the resentment it generated encouraged other countries to form discriminatory trading blocs. These preferential arrangements, diverted trade away from the United States and hindered the global economic recovery.<ref name="Peddling Protectionism">{{cite journal |author=Daniel Griswold |title=Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression |journal=Cato Journal |volume=31 |issue=3 |pages=661–665 |date=2011 |url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/905851675 |access-date=3 April 2025 |id={{ProQuest|905851675}}}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Irwin |first=Douglas A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oz_BDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA116 |title=Peddling Protectionism: Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=2011 |isbn=9781400888429 |page=116}}</ref>
Following [[World War II]], and in contrast to earlier periods, the Republican Party began supporting [[trade liberalization]]. From the early 1950s through the early 1990s, an unusual era of bipartisan consensus emerged, during which both parties generally aligned on trade policy. This occurred during the [[Cold War]], when foreign policy concerns were prominent and partisan divisions were subdued (Bailey 2003).<ref>{{cite journal |last=Bailey |first=Michael A. |title=The politics of the difficult: Congress, public opinion, and early Cold War aid and trade policies |journal=Legislative Studies Quarterly |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=147–177 |year=2003 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3162/036298003X200845 |doi=10.3162/036298003X200845|url-access=subscription }}</ref>


In a November 2024 article,''[[The Economist]]'' observed that the Act, "which raised average tariffs on imports by around 20% and incited a tit-for-tat trade war, was devastatingly effective: global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic for growth in America and around the world that legislators have not touched the issue since. 'Smoot-Hawley' became synonymous with disastrous policy making".<ref>{{cite magazine |magazine=The Economist |first=Alice |last=Fulwood |title=What Donald Trump's election means for the global economy |url=https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2024/11/20/what-donald-trumps-election-means-for-the-global-economy |date=20 November 2024}} Alice Fulwood is Wall Street editor of the Economist</ref>
After the 1993 vote on the [[North American Free Trade Agreement]] (NAFTA), Democratic support for trade liberalization declined significantly. By that time, the two major parties had effectively reversed their positions on trade policy. This shift in party alignment primarily reflects changes in regional representation: the South transitioned from being a Democratic stronghold to a Republican one,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kuziemko |first1=Ilyana |last2=Washington |first2=Ebonya |title=Why did the Democrats lose the South? Bringing new data to an old debate |journal=American Economic Review |volume=108 |issue=10 |pages=2830–2867 |year=2018 |url=https://assets.aeaweb.org/asset-server/files/8017.pdf |doi=10.1257/aer.20161413}}</ref> while the Northeast became increasingly Democratic. As a result, regional views on trade policy remained largely consistent, but the parties came to represent different geographic constituencies.<ref name="ARE" />
 
Economist [[Milton Friedman]] argued that while the tariffs of 1930 caused harm, they were not the main cause for the Great Depression. He placed greater blame on the lack of sufficient action on the part of the Federal Reserve.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Noble |first=Holcombe B. |date=2006-11-16 |title=Milton Friedman, Free Markets Theorist, Dies at 94 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/16/business/17friedmancnd.html |access-date=2025-02-13 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref>
 
[[Paul Krugman]] writes that protectionism does not lead to recessions. According to him, the decrease in imports (which can be obtained by introducing tariffs) has an expansive effect, that is, it is favourable to growth. Thus, in a trade war, since exports and imports will decrease equally, for everyone, the negative effect of a decrease in exports will be offset by the expansionary effect of a decrease in imports. Therefore, a trade war does not cause a recession. Furthermore, in his view,  the [[Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act]] did not cause the Great Depression and that the decline in trade between 1929 and 1933 "was almost entirely a consequence of the Depression, not a cause. Trade barriers were a response to the Depression".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Krugman |first=Paul |date=2016-03-04 |title=The Mitt-Hawley Fallacy |url=https://archive.nytimes.com/krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/the-mitt-hawley-fallacy/ |access-date=2024-11-01 |website=Paul Krugman Blog |language=en}}</ref>
 
[[Peter Temin]], an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has agreed that the contractionary effect of the tariff was small.<ref>{{cite book |last=Temin |first=P. |year=1989 |title=Lessons from the Great Depression |publisher=[[MIT Press]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=squLnSDrJ4EC&q=peter+temin+smoot+hawley+Lessons+from+the+Great+Depression&pg=PA46 |isbn=9780262261197}}</ref>{{Page needed|date=November 2024}} Other economists have contended that the record tariffs of the 1920s and early 1930s exacerbated the [[Great Depression in the United States|Great Depression in the U.S.]], in part because of retaliatory tariffs imposed by other countries on the United States.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Guzik |first=Erik |date=2024-10-31 |title=Tariffs are back in the spotlight, but skepticism of free trade has deep roots in American history |url=https://theconversation.com/tariffs-are-back-in-the-spotlight-but-skepticism-of-free-trade-has-deep-roots-in-american-history-241311 |access-date=2024-11-01 |website=The Conversation |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Schulman |first=Bruce J. |date=2024-10-24 |title=Tariffs Don't Have to Make Economic Sense to Appeal to Trump Voters |url=https://time.com/7095746/trump-tariffs-politics-rhetoric/ |access-date=2024-11-01 |magazine=TIME |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Helm |first=Sally |date=April 5, 2018 |title=Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: A Classic Economics Horror Story |url=https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599707003/smoot-hawley-tariff-act-a-classic-economics-horror-story |work=NPR}}</ref>
                   <!--       
                   <!--       
                   Any material about modern tariffs goes in that section (below), not here in the history section.
                   Any material about modern tariffs goes in that section (below), not here in the history section.
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=== Domestic output,  productivity and welfare ===
=== Domestic output,  productivity and welfare ===
An empirical study by Furceri et al. (2019) found that protectionist policies like raising tariffs significantly reduce domestic output and productivity.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Furceri |first1=Davide |title=Macroeconomic Consequences of Tariffs |last2=Hannan |first2=Swarnali A. |last3=Ostry |first3=Jonathon D. |last4=Rose |first4=Andrew K. |publisher=International Monetary Fund |year=2019 |isbn=9781484390061 |pages=4}}</ref>  A study from 1999 by Frankel and Romer showed that, after accounting for other factors, countries with more trade tend to have higher growth and income. The effect is quantitatively large and statistically significant.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Frankel|first1=Jeffrey A|last2=Romer|first2=David|date=June 1999|title=Does Trade Cause Growth?|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=89|issue=3|pages=379–99|doi=10.1257/aer.89.3.379|issn=0002-8282|doi-access=free}}</ref>
An empirical study by Furceri et al. (2019) found that protectionist policies like raising tariffs significantly reduce domestic output and productivity.<ref name="International Monetary Fund"/>  A study from 1999 by Frankel and Romer showed that, after accounting for other factors, countries with more trade tend to have higher growth and income. The effect is quantitatively large and statistically significant.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Frankel|first1=Jeffrey A|last2=Romer|first2=David|date=June 1999|title=Does Trade Cause Growth?|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=89|issue=3|pages=379–99|doi=10.1257/aer.89.3.379|issn=0002-8282|doi-access=free}}</ref>


That tariffs overall reduce welfare is not controversial among economists.In a 2018 survey by the University of Chicago, about 40 top economists were asked whether new U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum would benefit Americans. Two-thirds strongly disagreed, and the rest simply disagreed. None agreed. Several explained that these tariffs would help a small number of Americans but harm many more.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/steel-and-aluminum-tariffs |title=Steel and Aluminum Tariffs |date=March 12, 2018 |website=igmchicago.org |access-date=2019-10-07 |archive-date=2018-03-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180312212826/http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/steel-and-aluminum-tariffs |url-status=live}}</ref> This is consistent with the basic economic analysis provided above, which shows that the costs to consumers are larger than the combined gains for domestic producers and the government, resulting in net losses known as deadweight loss.{{sfnp|Krugman |Wells|2005}}
That tariffs overall reduce welfare is not controversial among economists. In a 2018 survey by the University of Chicago, about 40 top economists were asked whether new U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum would benefit Americans. Two-thirds strongly disagreed, and the rest simply disagreed. None agreed. Several explained that these tariffs would help a small number of Americans but harm many more.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/steel-and-aluminum-tariffs |title=Steel and Aluminum Tariffs |date=March 12, 2018 |website=igmchicago.org |access-date=2019-10-07 |archive-date=2018-03-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180312212826/http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/steel-and-aluminum-tariffs |url-status=live}}</ref> This is consistent with the basic economic analysis provided above, which shows that the costs to consumers are larger than the combined gains for domestic producers and the government, resulting in net losses known as deadweight loss.{{sfnp|Krugman |Wells|2005}}


A 2021 study covering 151 countries from 1963 to 2014 found that raising tariffs leads to long-term drops in output and productivity, along with more unemployment and inequality. It also found that tariffs tend to push up the value of the currency, while trade balances stay largely unchanged.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Furceri |first1=Davide |last2=Hannan |first2=Swarnali A |last3=Ostry |first3=Jonathan D |last4=Rose |first4=Andrew K |date=2021 |title=The Macroeconomy After Tariffs |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhab016 |journal=The World Bank Economic Review |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=361–381 |doi=10.1093/wber/lhab016 |issn=0258-6770 |hdl=10986/36630 |hdl-access=free|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
A 2021 study covering 151 countries from 1963 to 2014 found that raising tariffs leads to long-term drops in output and productivity, along with more unemployment and inequality. It also found that tariffs tend to push up the value of the currency, while trade balances stay largely unchanged.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Furceri |first1=Davide |last2=Hannan |first2=Swarnali A |last3=Ostry |first3=Jonathan D |last4=Rose |first4=Andrew K |date=2021 |title=The Macroeconomy After Tariffs |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhab016 |journal=The World Bank Economic Review |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=361–381 |doi=10.1093/wber/lhab016 |issn=0258-6770 |hdl=10986/36630 |hdl-access=free|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
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Caliendo, Feenstra, Romalis, and Taylor (2015) used a global economic model covering 189 countries and 15 industries to study the impact of lower tariffs from 1990 to 2010. They found that cutting tariffs increased trade, allowed more firms to start up, and raised overall welfare. Some countries, like India and Vietnam, might have gained even more from fully open trade or even import subsidies, meaning their "optimal" tariff could be negative.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Caliendo |first1=Lorenzo |last2=Feenstra |first2=Robert C. |last3=Romalis |first3=John |last4=Taylor |first4=Alan M. |title=Tariff Reductions, Entry, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for the Last Two Decades |journal=NBER Working Paper Series |date=2015 |issue=21768 |doi=10.3386/w21768 |url=https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21768/w21768.pdf}}</ref>
Caliendo, Feenstra, Romalis, and Taylor (2015) used a global economic model covering 189 countries and 15 industries to study the impact of lower tariffs from 1990 to 2010. They found that cutting tariffs increased trade, allowed more firms to start up, and raised overall welfare. Some countries, like India and Vietnam, might have gained even more from fully open trade or even import subsidies, meaning their "optimal" tariff could be negative.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Caliendo |first1=Lorenzo |last2=Feenstra |first2=Robert C. |last3=Romalis |first3=John |last4=Taylor |first4=Alan M. |title=Tariff Reductions, Entry, and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for the Last Two Decades |journal=NBER Working Paper Series |date=2015 |issue=21768 |doi=10.3386/w21768 |url=https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21768/w21768.pdf}}</ref>


The [[OECD]] (2005) simulated the effects of tariff reductions in 24 developing countries and showed that a well-designed combination of tariff cuts and tax reform (e.g., replacing lost tariff revenues with [[consumption tax]]es) can lead to net welfare gains.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Impact of Changes in Tariffs on Developing Countries’ Government Revenue |publisher=OECD |date=2005 |url=https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2005/04/impact-of-changes-in-tariffs-on-developing-countries-government-revenue_g17a1707/210755276421.pdf |access-date=2025-05-20}}</ref>
The [[OECD]] (2005) simulated the effects of tariff reductions in 24 developing countries and showed that a well-designed combination of tariff cuts and tax reform (e.g., replacing lost tariff revenues with [[consumption tax]]es) can lead to net welfare gains.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Impact of Changes in Tariffs on Developing Countries' Government Revenue |publisher=OECD |date=2005 |url=https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2005/04/impact-of-changes-in-tariffs-on-developing-countries-government-revenue_g17a1707/210755276421.pdf |access-date=2025-05-20}}</ref>


However, some studies point to possible negative effects. For instance, [[Petia Topalova|Topalova]] (2007) shows that tariff reductions in India during the 1990s were associated with slower progress in poverty reduction, particularly in areas lacking social safety nets and little labor mobility.  She argues that policy changes that policymakers should implement complementary measures to ensure a fairer distribution of the gains from liberalization. In particular, reforms that enhance labor mobility, such as changes to labor market policies, can help mitigate the negative effects and reduce inequality.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Topalova |first=Petia |title=Trade Liberalization, Poverty, and Inequality: Evidence from Indian Districts |journal=Globalization and Poverty |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=2007 |pages=291–336 |url=https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c0110/c0110.pdf}}</ref>
However, some studies point to possible negative effects. For instance, [[Petia Topalova|Topalova]] (2007) shows that tariff reductions in India during the 1990s were associated with slower progress in poverty reduction, particularly in areas lacking social safety nets and little labor mobility.  She argues that policy changes that policymakers should implement complementary measures to ensure a fairer distribution of the gains from liberalization. In particular, reforms that enhance labor mobility, such as changes to labor market policies, can help mitigate the negative effects and reduce inequality.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Topalova |first=Petia |title=Trade Liberalization, Poverty, and Inequality: Evidence from Indian Districts |journal=Globalization and Poverty |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=2007 |pages=291–336 |url=https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c0110/c0110.pdf}}</ref>
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=== Protection of domestic industry ===
=== Protection of domestic industry ===
One of the most common arguments for imposing tariffs is the protection of domestic industries that are struggling to survive against foreign competition. However, most economists, particularly those adhering to the theory of comparative advantage, argue that such industries should not be maintained through protection. Instead, the resources employed in these industries should be reallocated to sectors where the country has a comparative advantage, thereby increasing overall economic efficiency. According to this view, the gains in national welfare would outweigh the losses experienced by specific groups affected by import competition, resulting in higher real national income overall.<ref name="Britannica"></ref>
One of the most common arguments for imposing tariffs is the protection of domestic industries that are struggling to survive against foreign competition. However, most economists, particularly those adhering to the theory of comparative advantage, argue that such industries should not be maintained through protection. Instead, the resources employed in these industries should be reallocated to sectors where the country has a comparative advantage, thereby increasing overall economic efficiency. According to this view, the gains in national welfare would outweigh the losses experienced by specific groups affected by import competition, resulting in higher real national income overall.<ref name="Britannica" />


Economists also recognize, however, that the adjustment process—moving labor and capital from less efficient to more efficient sectors—can be slow and socially costly. As a result, while there is broad consensus against increasing tariffs, many economists support a gradual reduction of existing trade barriers rather than abrupt removal. This approach is seen as a way to avoid further misallocation of resources while minimizing disruption to affected workers and communities.<ref name="Britannica"></ref>
Economists also recognize, however, that the adjustment process—moving labor and capital from less efficient to more efficient sectors—can be slow and socially costly. As a result, while there is broad consensus against increasing tariffs, many economists support a gradual reduction of existing trade barriers rather than abrupt removal. This approach is seen as a way to avoid further misallocation of resources while minimizing disruption to affected workers and communities.<ref name="Britannica" />


===Infant industry argument ===
===Infant industry argument ===
{{See also|Infant industry argument}}
{{See also|Infant industry argument}}
Protectionists argue that emerging industries, especially in less-developed countries, may need temporary protection from established foreign competitors in order to develop and become competitive. Mainstream economists do acknowledge that tariffs can in the short-term help domestic industries to develop but this depends on the short-term nature of the protective tariffs and the ability of the government to pick the winners.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-22/the-case-for-protecting-infant-industries|title=The Case for Protecting Infant Industries|date=22 December 2016|work=Bloomberg.com|access-date=24 June 2017}}</ref><ref name="Baldwin1969">{{Cite journal|last=Baldwin|first=Robert E.|date=1969|title=The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection|jstor=1828905|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=77|issue=3|pages=295–305|doi=10.1086/259517|s2cid=154784307}}</ref> In practice, tariffs often remain in place after the industry matures, and governments frequently fail to pick winners.<ref name="Baldwin1969" /> Multiple empirical studies across different countries—such as Turkey in the 1960s and several Latin American nations—document failed attempts at infant industry protection.<ref name="Krueger1982">{{Cite journal|last1=Krueger|first1=Anne O|last2=Baran|first2=Tuncer|date=1982|title=An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument|url=http://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a72_3ay_3a1982_3ai_3a5_3ap_3a1142-52.htm|journal=American Economic Review|volume=72|issue=5}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Choudhri|first1=Ehsan U.|last2=Hakura|first2=Dalia S.|date=2000|title=International Trade and Productivity Growth: Exploring the Sectoral Effects for Developing Countries|jstor=3867624|journal=IMF Staff Papers|volume=47|issue=1|pages=30–53|doi=10.2307/3867624 |url=http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/03777-9781451843521/03777-9781451843521/03777-9781451843521.xml }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Baldwin |first1=Richard E. |last2=Krugman |first2=Paul |date=June 1986 |title=Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories |doi=10.3386/w1936 |journal=NBER Working Paper No. 1936 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Luzio|first1=Eduardo|last2=Greenstein|first2=Shane|date=1995|title=Measuring the Performance of a Protected Infant Industry: The Case of Brazilian Microcomputers |journal=The Review of Economics and Statistics|volume=77|issue=4|pages=622–633|doi=10.2307/2109811|jstor=2109811|hdl=2142/29917|url=https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/2142/29917/2/measuringperform93180luzi.pdf|hdl-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/us-tire-tariffs-saving-few-jobs-high-cost|title=US Tire Tariffs: Saving Few Jobs at High Cost|date=2 March 2016|work=PIIE|access-date=24 June 2017|language=en}}</ref> In many developing countries, industries have failed to attain international competitiveness even after 15 or 20 years of operation and might not survive if protective tariffs were removed.<ref name="Britannica">{{Cite news |title=International trade - Arguments for and against interference |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-trade/Arguments-for-and-against-interference |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200603024245/https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-trade/Arguments-for-and-against-interference |archive-date=2020-06-03 |access-date=2020-05-03 |newspaper=Encyclopedia Britannica}}</ref> Moreover, economists argue that infant-industry protection can be harmful not only at the national level but also internationally. If multiple countries pursue such protection simultaneously, it can fragment global markets, preventing firms from achieving economies of scale through exports, and leading to inefficient, small-scale production across countries.<ref name="Britannica"></ref>
Protectionists argue that emerging industries, especially in less-developed countries, may need temporary protection from established foreign competitors in order to develop and become competitive. Mainstream economists do acknowledge that tariffs can in the short-term help domestic industries to develop but this depends on the short-term nature of the protective tariffs and the ability of the government to pick the winners.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-22/the-case-for-protecting-infant-industries|title=The Case for Protecting Infant Industries|date=22 December 2016|work=Bloomberg.com|access-date=24 June 2017}}</ref><ref name="Baldwin1969">{{Cite journal|last=Baldwin|first=Robert E.|date=1969|title=The Case against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection|jstor=1828905|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=77|issue=3|pages=295–305|doi=10.1086/259517|s2cid=154784307}}</ref> In practice, tariffs often remain in place after the industry matures, and governments frequently fail to pick winners.<ref name="Baldwin1969" /> Multiple empirical studies across different countries—such as Turkey in the 1960s and several Latin American nations—document failed attempts at infant industry protection.<ref name="Krueger1982">{{Cite journal|last1=Krueger|first1=Anne O|last2=Baran|first2=Tuncer|date=1982|title=An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument|url=http://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a72_3ay_3a1982_3ai_3a5_3ap_3a1142-52.htm|journal=American Economic Review|volume=72|issue=5}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Choudhri|first1=Ehsan U.|last2=Hakura|first2=Dalia S.|date=2000|title=International Trade and Productivity Growth: Exploring the Sectoral Effects for Developing Countries|jstor=3867624|journal=IMF Staff Papers|volume=47|issue=1|pages=30–53|doi=10.2307/3867624 |url=http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/03777-9781451843521/03777-9781451843521/03777-9781451843521.xml }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Baldwin |first1=Richard E. |last2=Krugman |first2=Paul |date=June 1986 |title=Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories |doi=10.3386/w1936 |journal=NBER Working Paper No. 1936 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Luzio|first1=Eduardo|last2=Greenstein|first2=Shane|date=1995|title=Measuring the Performance of a Protected Infant Industry: The Case of Brazilian Microcomputers|journal=The Review of Economics and Statistics|volume=77|issue=4|pages=622–633|doi=10.2307/2109811|jstor=2109811|hdl=2142/29917|url=https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/2142/29917/2/measuringperform93180luzi.pdf|hdl-access=free}}{{Dead link|date=August 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/us-tire-tariffs-saving-few-jobs-high-cost|title=US Tire Tariffs: Saving Few Jobs at High Cost|date=2 March 2016|work=PIIE|access-date=24 June 2017|language=en}}</ref> In many developing countries, industries have failed to attain international competitiveness even after 15 or 20 years of operation and might not survive if protective tariffs were removed.<ref name="Britannica">{{Cite news |title=International trade - Arguments for and against interference |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-trade/Arguments-for-and-against-interference |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200603024245/https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-trade/Arguments-for-and-against-interference |archive-date=2020-06-03 |access-date=2020-05-03 |newspaper=Encyclopedia Britannica}}</ref> Moreover, economists argue that infant-industry protection can be harmful not only at the national level but also internationally. If multiple countries pursue such protection simultaneously, it can fragment global markets, preventing firms from achieving economies of scale through exports, and leading to inefficient, small-scale production across countries.<ref name="Britannica" />


=== Unemployment ===
=== Unemployment ===
Tariffs are sometimes proposed as a means to protect domestic employment during economic downturns. However, there is near-unanimous agreement among modern economists that this approach is misguided. Tariffs may shift unemployment abroad without increasing overall output and often provoke retaliatory measures. Economists generally agree that unemployment is more effectively addressed through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies.<ref name="Britannica"></ref>
Tariffs are sometimes proposed as a means to protect domestic employment during economic downturns. However, there is near-unanimous agreement among modern economists that this approach is misguided. Tariffs may shift unemployment abroad without increasing overall output and often provoke retaliatory measures. Economists generally agree that unemployment is more effectively addressed through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies.<ref name="Britannica" />


=== National defense ===
=== National defense ===
Industries often invoke national security to justify tariff protection, arguing that certain products are essential in times of war when imports may be disrupted. Economists generally consider this a weak argument, noting that tariffs are an inefficient way to ensure the survival of critical industries. Instead, they recommend direct subsidies as a more transparent and effective means of supporting sectors deemed vital for national defense.<ref name="Britannica"></ref>
Industries often invoke national security to justify tariff protection, arguing that certain products are essential in times of war when imports may be disrupted. Economists generally consider this a weak argument, noting that tariffs are an inefficient way to ensure the survival of critical industries. Instead, they recommend direct subsidies as a more transparent and effective means of supporting sectors deemed vital for national defense.<ref name="Britannica" />


=== Autarky ===
=== Autarky ===
Some protectionist arguments are rooted in [[Autarky|autarkic]] sentiment—the desire for national self-sufficiency and independence from global economic risks. However, there is general agreement that no modern nation, regardless of how rich and varied its resources, could really practice self-sufficiency, and attempts in that direction could produce sharp drops in real income.<ref name="Britannica"></ref>
Some protectionist arguments are rooted in [[Autarky|autarkic]] sentiment—the desire for national self-sufficiency and independence from global economic risks. However, there is general agreement that no modern nation, regardless of how rich and varied its resources, could really practice self-sufficiency, and attempts in that direction could produce sharp drops in real income.<ref name="Britannica" />


===Trade deficits===
===Trade deficits===
According to some proponents of tariffs, [[trade deficits]] are seen as inherently harmful and in need of removal,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Swanson |first=Ana |date=April 5, 2025 |title=What to Know About Trump's New Tariffs |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/03/business/economy/trump-tariffs-trade.html |archive-url=https://archive.today/20250406021402/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/03/business/economy/trump-tariffs-trade.html |archive-date=April 6, 2025 |access-date=April 6, 2025 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> a view many economists rejected as a flawed understanding of trade.<ref name="AQ">{{Cite news |author=Bryan Mena |author2=Alicia Wallace |date=April 5, 2025 |title=Trump's 'reciprocal' tariffs aren't quite what they seem. Here's the real story |url=https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/05/business/trump-reciprocal-tariffs-real-numbers/index.html |access-date=April 8, 2025 |publisher=CNN |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Schneid">{{cite magazine |last1=Schneid |first1=Rebecca |title=Why Economists Are Horrified by Trump's Tariff Math |url=https://time.com/7274651/why-economists-are-horrified-by-trump-tariff-math/ |access-date=April 4, 2025 |magazine=Time |date=April 4, 2025}}</ref><ref name="WH">{{Cite news |last=Weissmann |first=Jordan |date=April 6, 2025 |title=The White House cited these economists to justify its tariffs. They aren't thrilled. |url=https://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-white-house-cited-these-economists-to-justify-its-tariffs-they-arent-thrilled-193615537.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250405223531/https://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-white-house-cited-these-economists-to-justify-its-tariffs-they-arent-thrilled-193615537.html |archive-date=April 5, 2025 |access-date=April 6, 2025 |work=[[Yahoo Finance]]}}</ref><ref name="MJ">{{Cite news |last=Neiman |first=Brent |date=April 7, 2025 |title=Why Trump's Tariff Math Is a Joke |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/07/opinion/trump-tariff-math-formula.html |department=Opinion |work=The New York Times |access-date=April 7, 2025 |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The notion that bilateral [[Balance of trade|trade deficits]] are per se detrimental to the respective national economies is overwhelmingly rejected by trade experts and economists.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Analysis: Trump rails against trade deficit, but economists say there's no easy way for him to make it go away |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/07/trump-rails-against-the-trade-deficit-but-economists-say-theres-no-easy-way-for-him-to-make-it-go-away/ |access-date=12 March 2017 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Trump warns of trade deficits. Economists say, who cares? |url=https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-01/trump-warns-trade-deficits-economists-say-who-cares |access-date=2017-10-17 |work=Public Radio International |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Trade Balances |url=http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/trade-balances |access-date=2017-10-27 |website=www.igmchicago.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2018-06-09 |title=What Is the Trade Deficit? |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/upshot/what-is-the-trade-deficit.html |access-date=2018-06-10 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
According to some proponents of tariffs, [[trade deficits]] are seen as inherently harmful and in need of removal,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Swanson |first=Ana |date=April 5, 2025 |title=What to Know About Trump's New Tariffs |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/03/business/economy/trump-tariffs-trade.html |archive-url=https://archive.today/20250406021402/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/03/business/economy/trump-tariffs-trade.html |archive-date=April 6, 2025 |access-date=April 6, 2025 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> a view many economists rejected as a flawed understanding of trade.<ref name="AQ">{{Cite news |author=Bryan Mena |author2=Alicia Wallace |date=April 5, 2025 |title=Trump's 'reciprocal' tariffs aren't quite what they seem. Here's the real story |url=https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/05/business/trump-reciprocal-tariffs-real-numbers/index.html |access-date=April 8, 2025 |publisher=CNN |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Schneid">{{cite magazine |last1=Schneid |first1=Rebecca |title=Why Economists Are Horrified by Trump's Tariff Math |url=https://time.com/7274651/why-economists-are-horrified-by-trump-tariff-math/ |access-date=April 4, 2025 |magazine=Time |date=April 4, 2025 |archive-date=April 4, 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250404001442/https://time.com/7274651/why-economists-are-horrified-by-trump-tariff-math/ |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="WH">{{Cite news |last=Weissmann |first=Jordan |date=April 6, 2025 |title=The White House cited these economists to justify its tariffs. They aren't thrilled. |url=https://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-white-house-cited-these-economists-to-justify-its-tariffs-they-arent-thrilled-193615537.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250405223531/https://finance.yahoo.com/news/the-white-house-cited-these-economists-to-justify-its-tariffs-they-arent-thrilled-193615537.html |archive-date=April 5, 2025 |access-date=April 6, 2025 |work=[[Yahoo Finance]]}}</ref><ref name="MJ">{{Cite news |last=Neiman |first=Brent |date=April 7, 2025 |title=Why Trump's Tariff Math Is a Joke |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/07/opinion/trump-tariff-math-formula.html |department=Opinion |work=The New York Times |access-date=April 7, 2025 |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The notion that bilateral [[Balance of trade|trade deficits]] are per se detrimental to the respective national economies is overwhelmingly rejected by trade experts and economists.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Analysis: Trump rails against trade deficit, but economists say there's no easy way for him to make it go away |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/07/trump-rails-against-the-trade-deficit-but-economists-say-theres-no-easy-way-for-him-to-make-it-go-away/ |access-date=12 March 2017 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Trump warns of trade deficits. Economists say, who cares? |url=https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-01/trump-warns-trade-deficits-economists-say-who-cares |access-date=2017-10-17 |work=Public Radio International |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Trade Balances |url=http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/trade-balances |access-date=2017-10-27 |website=www.igmchicago.org |archive-date=2017-11-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171103030840/http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/trade-balances |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2018-06-09 |title=What Is the Trade Deficit? |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/upshot/what-is-the-trade-deficit.html |access-date=2018-06-10 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>


According to proponents tariffs can help reduce trade deficits, but according to economists tariffs do not determine the size of trade deficits and trade balances are driven by consumption. Rather, it is that a strong economy creates rich consumers who in turn create the demand for imports.<ref name="Economist 041123">{{cite news |title=Trade wars: episode II |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |date=4 November 2023 |author=Editorial |url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/11/02/donald-trumps-tariff-plans-would-inflict-grievous-damage-on-america-and-the-world}}</ref> Industries protected by tariffs expand their domestic market share but an additional effect is that their need to be efficient and cost-effective is reduced. This cost is imposed on (domestic) purchasers of the products of those industries,<ref name="Economist 041123" /> a cost that is eventually passed on to the end consumer. Finally, other countries must be expected to retaliate by imposing countervailing tariffs, a [[lose-lose situation]] that would lead to increased world-wide inflation.<ref name="Economist 041123" />
According to proponents tariffs can help reduce trade deficits, but according to economists tariffs do not determine the size of trade deficits and trade balances are driven by consumption. Rather, it is that a strong economy creates rich consumers who in turn create the demand for imports.<ref name="Economist 041123">{{cite news |title=Trade wars: episode II |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |date=4 November 2023 |author=Editorial |url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/11/02/donald-trumps-tariff-plans-would-inflict-grievous-damage-on-america-and-the-world}}</ref> Industries protected by tariffs expand their domestic market share but an additional effect is that their need to be efficient and cost-effective is reduced. This cost is imposed on (domestic) purchasers of the products of those industries,<ref name="Economist 041123" /> a cost that is eventually passed on to the end consumer. Finally, other countries must be expected to retaliate by imposing countervailing tariffs, a [[lose-lose situation]] that would lead to increased world-wide inflation.<ref name="Economist 041123" />


=== Protection against environmental  dumping ===
=== Protection against environmental  dumping ===
Some argue in favor of tariffs in cases of [[environmental dumping]], where companies benefit from weaker environmental regulations than in other countries, leading to unfair competition. For example, the [[EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism|European Union starts its carbon border-adjustment mechanism]] in 2026 to level the playing field with firms not subject to European carbon pricing. In 2019, more than 3,500 U.S. economists, including 45 Nobel laureates and former Federal Reserve chairmen, signed the [[Economists' Statement on Carbon Dividends]].This statement advocates for a border carbon adjustment system that will prevent [[carbon leakage]] and enhance the competitiveness of American firms that are more energy-efficient that their foreign competitors.<ref>{{Cite news|date=January 16, 2019|title=Economists’ Statement on Carbon Dividends|work=The Wall Street Journal|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/economists-statement-on-carbon-dividends-11547682910|archive-date=2020-01-02|archive-url=https://archive.today/20200102005448/https://www.wsj.com/articles/economists-statement-on-carbon-dividends-11547682910}}</ref>
Some argue in favor of tariffs in cases of [[environmental dumping]], where companies benefit from weaker environmental regulations than in other countries, leading to unfair competition. For example, the [[EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism|European Union starts its carbon border-adjustment mechanism]] in 2026 to level the playing field with firms not subject to European carbon pricing. In 2019, more than 3,500 U.S. economists, including 45 Nobel laureates and former Federal Reserve chairmen, signed the "[[Economists' Statement on Carbon Dividends]]." This statement advocates for a border carbon adjustment system that will prevent [[carbon leakage]] and enhance the competitiveness of American firms that are more energy-efficient than their foreign competitors.<ref>{{Cite news|date=January 16, 2019|title=Economists' Statement on Carbon Dividends|work=The Wall Street Journal|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/economists-statement-on-carbon-dividends-11547682910|archive-date=2020-01-02|archive-url=https://archive.today/20200102005448/https://www.wsj.com/articles/economists-statement-on-carbon-dividends-11547682910}}</ref>


==Modern tariff practices==
==Modern tariff practices==
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===Armenia===
===Armenia===
[[Armenia]] established its custom service in 1992 after the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]]. When Armenia became a member of the [[Eurasian Economic Union|EAEU]], it was given access to the [[Eurasian Customs Union]] in 2015; this resulted in mostly tariff-free trade with other members and an increased number of import tariffs from outside of the customs union. Armenia does not currently have export taxes. In addition, it does not declare temporary imports duties and credit on government imports or pursuant to other international assistance imports.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.export.gov/article?id=Armenia-import-tariffs |title=Armenia – Import Tariffs |publisher=export.gov |date=2015-01-02 |access-date=2019-10-07 |archive-date=2019-09-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190913033813/https://www.export.gov/article?id=Armenia-import-tariffs |url-status=live}}</ref> Upon joining Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, led by Russians, [[Armenia]] applied tariffs on its imports at a rate 0–10 percent. This rate has increased over the years, since in 2009 it was around three percent. Moreover, the tariffs increased significantly on agricultural products rather than on non-agricultural products.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-import-tariffs |title=Armenia – Country Commercial Guide – Import Tariffs |publisher=trade.gov |date=2022-07-31 |access-date=2021-12-05 |archive-date=2021-12-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211228060939/https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-import-tariffs |url-status=live}}</ref> Armenia has committed to ultimately adopting the EAEU's uniform tariff schedule as part of its EAEU admission. Until 2022, Armenia was authorised to apply non-EAEU tariff rates, according to Decision No. 113. Some beef, pork, poultry, and dairy products; seed potatoes and peas; olives; fresh and dried fruits; some tea items; cereals, especially wheat and rice; starches, vegetable oils, margarine; some prepared food items, such as infant food; pet food; tobacco; glycerol; and gelatin are included in the list.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Договор от 10.10.2014. Таможенные документы |trans-title=Contract dated 10.10.2014. Customs documents |url=https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0007297/itia_11102014 |website=eaeunion.org}}</ref>
[[Armenia]] established its customs service in 1992 after the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]]. Since joining the [[Eurasian Economic Union|Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)]] in 2015, it has benefited from mostly tariff-free trade within the [[Eurasian Customs Union]], while applying more import tariffs on goods from outside. Armenia does not impose export taxes, nor does it declare temporary import duties or credits on government or international assistance imports.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.export.gov/article?id=Armenia-import-tariffs |title=Armenia – Import Tariffs |publisher=export.gov |date=2015-01-02 |access-date=2019-10-07 |archive-date=2019-09-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190913033813/https://www.export.gov/article?id=Armenia-import-tariffs |url-status=live}}</ref>
Membership in the EAEU is forcing Armenia to apply stricter standardisation, sanitary, and phytosanitary requirements in line with EAEU{{snd}}and, by extension, Russian{{snd}}standards, regulations, and practices. Armenia has had to surrender control over many aspects of its foreign trade regime in the context of EAEU membership. Tariffs have also increased, granting protection to several domestic industries. Armenia is increasingly beholden to comply with EAEU standards and regulations as post-accession transition periods have, or will soon, end. All Armenian goods circulating in the territory of the EAEU must meet EAEU requirements following the end of relevant transition periods.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-trade-barriers |title=Armenia – Trade Barriers |date=31 July 2022 |access-date=2022-12-05 |archive-date=2022-12-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221204062200/https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-trade-barriers |url-status=live}}</ref>


Armenia became a WTO member in 2003, which resulted in the Most Favored Country (MFC) benefits from the organisation. Currently, the tariffs of 2.7% implemented in Armenia are the lowest in the entire framework. The country is also a member of the World Customs Organization (WCO), resulting in a harmonised system for tariff classification.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Import and Export Regime |url=https://investinarmenia.am/en/import-and-export-regime |access-date=2023-06-01 |website=investinarmenia.am |archive-date=2023-01-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230107190513/https://investinarmenia.am/en/import-and-export-regime |url-status=live}}</ref>
Upon joining Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, led by Russians, Armenia set tariffs at 0–10%, rising over time, especially on agricultural goods.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-import-tariffs |title=Armenia – Country Commercial Guide – Import Tariffs |publisher=trade.gov |date=2022-07-31 |access-date=2021-12-05 |archive-date=2021-12-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211228060939/https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-import-tariffs |url-status=live}}</ref> It committed to adopt the EAEU's common tariff schedule, but until 2022, it was allowed to apply non-EAEU rates to certain goods, including meat, dairy, cereals, oils, and some processed foods.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Договор от 10.10.2014. Таможенные документы |trans-title=Contract dated 10.10.2014. Customs documents |url=https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0007297/itia_11102014 |website=eaeunion.org}}</ref> EAEU membership requires Armenia to follow stricter EAEU (largely Russian) standards, including sanitary and phytosanitary measures. It has ceded control over much of its trade regime, and rising tariffs offer more protection to domestic industries. Armenian goods must comply with EAEU standards as transition periods expire.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-trade-barriers |title=Armenia – Trade Barriers |date=31 July 2022 |access-date=2022-12-05 |archive-date=2022-12-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221204062200/https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/armenia-trade-barriers |url-status=live}}</ref>
 
Armenia joined the WTO in 2003, gaining Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. Its average tariff rate of 2.7% is among the lowest in the WTO. It is also a member of the World Customs Organization, using a harmonized tariff classification system.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Import and Export Regime |url=https://investinarmenia.am/en/import-and-export-regime |access-date=2023-06-01 |website=investinarmenia.am |archive-date=2023-01-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230107190513/https://investinarmenia.am/en/import-and-export-regime |url-status=live}}</ref>


===Switzerland===
===Switzerland===
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===United States===
===United States===
{{Main|Tariffs in the second Trump administration}}
{{See also|China-United States trade war|Tariffs in the first Trump administration|Tariffs in the second Trump administration}}
In April 2025, [[President of the United States|President]] [[Donald Trump]] of the [[United States]] announced a substantial increase in tariffs and a 10% base tariff on all imported products, resulting in the US trade-weighted average tariff rising from 2% to an estimated 24%,<ref>{{Cite news |date=April 5, 2025 |title=Checks and Balance newsletter: The view as "Liberation Day" unfolded |url=https://www.economist.com/united-states/2025/04/05/checks-and-balance-newsletter-the-view-as-liberation-day-unfolded |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20250405141843/https://www.economist.com/united-states/2025/04/05/checks-and-balance-newsletter-the-view-as-liberation-day-unfolded |archive-date=April 5, 2025 |access-date=April 6, 2025 |newspaper=[[The Economist]]}}</ref> the highest level in over a century, including under the [[Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act]] of 1930.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Donnan |first=Shawn |date=31 March 2025 |title=Trump's Tariffs Set to Make History and Break a System MAGA Loathes |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-03-31/trump-s-reciprocal-tariffs-risk-us-recession-trade-turmoil |website=[[Bloomberg News|Bloomberg]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Tully |first=Shawn |title=Are Trump's tariffs as bad as the Smoot-Hawley Act, which is blamed for deepening the Great Depression? They're actually worse |url=https://fortune.com/2025/04/03/smoot-hawley-act-tariffs-great-depression-trump/ |access-date=2025-04-08 |website=Fortune |language=en}}</ref>
Tariffs during the [[first presidency of Donald Trump]] involved [[Protectionism|protectionist]] trade initiatives against other countries,  [[China–United States trade war|most notably against China]]. In January 2018, Trump imposed tariffs on [[solar panel]]s and [[washing machine]]s of 30–50%.<ref>{{cite web|first=Richard|last=Gonzales|url=https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/22/579848409/trump-slaps-tariffs-on-imported-solar-panels-and-washing-machines|title=Trump Slaps Tariffs On Imported Solar Panels and Washing Machines|publisher=NPR|date=January 22, 2018|access-date=March 14, 2018|archive-date=October 21, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191021042215/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/22/579848409/trump-slaps-tariffs-on-imported-solar-panels-and-washing-machines|url-status=live}}</ref> In March 2018, he imposed tariffs on steel (25%) and [[Aluminium|aluminum]] (10%) from most countries,<ref name="HorsleyFormal">{{cite web|first=Scott|last=Horsley|url=https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591744195/trump-expected-to-formally-order-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-imports|title=Trump Formally Orders Tariffs on Steel, Aluminum Imports|publisher=NPR|date=March 8, 2018|access-date=March 14, 2018|archive-date=December 31, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191231034502/https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591744195/trump-expected-to-formally-order-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-imports|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Long">{{cite news|first=Heather|last=Long|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/05/31/trump-has-officially-put-more-tariffs-on-u-s-allies-than-on-china/|title=Trump has officially put more tariffs on U.S. allies than on China|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=May 31, 2018|access-date=June 2, 2018|archive-date=December 6, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191206014401/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/05/31/trump-has-officially-put-more-tariffs-on-u-s-allies-than-on-china/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>The President also authorized the Department of Commerce to provide relief, or exclusion, from these tariffs for U.S. steel and aluminum importers in certain circumstances, such as when the product is not available domestically or based on national security considerations. See [https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-517 "Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Commerce Should Improve Its Exclusion Request Process and Economic Impact Reviews".] and [https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104564 "Steel and Aluminum Tariffs:Commerce Should Update Public Guidance to Reflect Changes in the Exclusion Process".] ''U.S. Government Accountability Office''. Retrieved January 12, 2022.</ref> which, according to [[Morgan Stanley]], covered an estimated 4.1% of U.S. imports.<ref>{{Cite news|first=David|last=Chance|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-trump-rhetoric-analysis/trumps-trade-tariffs-long-on-rhetoric-short-on-impact-idUSKBN1GH37N|title=Trump's trade tariffs: Long on rhetoric, short on impact?|date=March 5, 2018|work=Reuters|access-date=March 9, 2018|archive-date=September 23, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190923051627/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-trump-rhetoric-analysis/trumps-trade-tariffs-long-on-rhetoric-short-on-impact-idUSKBN1GH37N|url-status=live}}</ref> In June 2018, this was extended to the [[European Union]], Canada, and Mexico.<ref name="Long" /> The Trump administration separately set and escalated tariffs on goods imported from China, leading to [[China–United States trade war|a trade war]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-fires-back-at-us-tariffs-vows-to-defend-its-core-interests/2018/07/06/f42fc812-8091-11e8-a63f-7b5d2aba7ac5_story.html|title=As Trump's trade war starts, China retaliates with comparable tariffs of its own|newspaper=The Washington Post|language=en|access-date=2018-07-06|archive-date=December 5, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191205192806/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-fires-back-at-us-tariffs-vows-to-defend-its-core-interests/2018/07/06/f42fc812-8091-11e8-a63f-7b5d2aba7ac5_story.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
 
In April 2025, [[second presidency of Donald Trump|President]] [[Donald Trump]] announced a substantial increase in tariffs and a 10% base tariff on all imported products, resulting in the US trade-weighted average tariff rising from 2% to an estimated 24%,<ref>{{Cite news |date=April 5, 2025 |title=Checks and Balance newsletter: The view as "Liberation Day" unfolded |url=https://www.economist.com/united-states/2025/04/05/checks-and-balance-newsletter-the-view-as-liberation-day-unfolded |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20250405141843/https://www.economist.com/united-states/2025/04/05/checks-and-balance-newsletter-the-view-as-liberation-day-unfolded |archive-date=April 5, 2025 |access-date=April 6, 2025 |newspaper=[[The Economist]]}}</ref> the highest level in over a century, including under the [[Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act]] of 1930.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Donnan |first=Shawn |date=31 March 2025 |title=Trump's Tariffs Set to Make History and Break a System MAGA Loathes |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-03-31/trump-s-reciprocal-tariffs-risk-us-recession-trade-turmoil |website=[[Bloomberg News|Bloomberg]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Tully |first=Shawn |title=Are Trump's tariffs as bad as the Smoot-Hawley Act, which is blamed for deepening the Great Depression? They're actually worse |url=https://fortune.com/2025/04/03/smoot-hawley-act-tariffs-great-depression-trump/ |access-date=2025-04-08 |website=Fortune |language=en}}</ref>


==Political analysis==
==Political analysis==
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The political impact of tariffs is judged depending on the political perspective; for example, the [[2002 United States steel tariff]] imposed a 30% tariff on a variety of imported steel products for a period of three years and American steel producers supported the tariff.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2002/nf2002038_1478.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020605041815/http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2002/nf2002038_1478.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=June 5, 2002 |work=Business Week Online |date=March 8, 2002 |title=Behind the Steel-Tariff Curtain}}</ref>
The political impact of tariffs is judged depending on the political perspective; for example, the [[2002 United States steel tariff]] imposed a 30% tariff on a variety of imported steel products for a period of three years and American steel producers supported the tariff.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2002/nf2002038_1478.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020605041815/http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2002/nf2002038_1478.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=June 5, 2002 |work=Business Week Online |date=March 8, 2002 |title=Behind the Steel-Tariff Curtain}}</ref>


Tariffs can emerge as a political issue prior to an election. The [[Nullification Crisis]] of 1832 arose from the passage of a new tariff by the United States Congress, a few months before that year's [[1832 United States elections|federal elections]]; the state of South Carolina was outraged by the new tariff, and civil war nearly resulted.<ref>"[https://thehermitage.com/learn/andrew-jackson-nullification Andrew Jackson & the Nullification Crisis] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230808024520/https://thehermitage.com/learn/andrew-jackson-nullification/ |date=2023-08-08 }}", [[The Hermitage (Nashville, Tennessee)|The Hermitage]], 2023. Accessed 2023-08-08.</ref> In the leadup to the [[2007 Australian federal election|2007 Australian Federal election]], the [[Australian Labor Party]] announced it would undertake a review of Australian car tariffs if elected.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22729573-5013871,00.html |title=PM rulses out more help for car firms |author=Sid Marris and Dennis Shanahan |date=November 9, 2007 |newspaper=The Australian |access-date=2007-11-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071109183702/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22729573-5013871,00.html |archive-date=2007-11-09 |url-status=dead}}</ref> The [[Liberal Party of Australia|Liberal Party]] made a similar commitment, while independent candidate [[Nick Xenophon]] announced his intention to introduce tariff-based legislation as "a matter of urgency".<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Candidate-wants-car-tariff-cuts-halted/2007/10/29/1193618771259.html |title=Candidate wants car tariff cuts halted |newspaper=The Age |location=Melbourne |date=October 29, 2007 |access-date=November 11, 2007 |archive-date=November 13, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101113142838/http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Candidate-wants-car-tariff-cuts-halted/2007/10/29/1193618771259.html |url-status=live}}</ref>
Tariffs can emerge as a political issue prior to an election. The [[Nullification Crisis]] of 1832 arose from the passage of a new tariff by the United States Congress, a few months before that year's [[1832 United States elections|federal elections]]; the state of South Carolina was outraged by the new tariff, and civil war nearly resulted.<ref>"[https://thehermitage.com/learn/andrew-jackson-nullification Andrew Jackson & the Nullification Crisis] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230808024520/https://thehermitage.com/learn/andrew-jackson-nullification/ |date=2023-08-08 }}", [[The Hermitage (Nashville, Tennessee)|The Hermitage]], 2023. Accessed 2023-08-08.</ref> In the leadup to the [[2007 Australian federal election|2007 Australian Federal election]], the [[Australian Labor Party]] announced it would undertake a review of Australian car tariffs if elected.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22729573-5013871,00.html |title=PM rulses out more help for car firms |first1=Sid|last1=Marris|first2=Dennis|last2=Shanahan|date=November 9, 2007 |newspaper=The Australian |access-date=2007-11-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071109183702/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22729573-5013871,00.html |archive-date=2007-11-09 |url-status=dead}}</ref> The [[Liberal Party of Australia|Liberal Party]] made a similar commitment, while independent candidate [[Nick Xenophon]] announced his intention to introduce tariff-based legislation as "a matter of urgency".<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Candidate-wants-car-tariff-cuts-halted/2007/10/29/1193618771259.html |title=Candidate wants car tariff cuts halted |newspaper=The Age |location=Melbourne |date=October 29, 2007 |access-date=November 11, 2007 |archive-date=November 13, 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101113142838/http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Candidate-wants-car-tariff-cuts-halted/2007/10/29/1193618771259.html |url-status=live}}</ref>


Unpopular tariffs are known to have ignited social unrest, for example the 1905 [[meat riots]] in Chile that developed in protest against tariffs applied to the [[Argentine beef|cattle imports from Argentina]].<ref name=mem>{{in lang|es}} ''[http://www.memoriachilena.cl/temas/dest.asp?id=movimientoshuelgadelacarne Primeros movimientos sociales chileno (1890–1920)]''. Memoria Chilena. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120308040535/http://www.memoriachilena.cl/temas/dest.asp?id=movimientoshuelgadelacarne |date=2012-03-08 }}</ref><ref name=benjamin>Benjamin S. 1997. Meat and Strength: The Moral Economy of a Chilean Food Riot. ''[[Cultural Anthropology]]'', 12, pp. 234–268.</ref>
Unpopular tariffs are known to have ignited social unrest, for example the 1905 [[meat riots]] in Chile that developed in protest against tariffs applied to the [[Argentine beef|cattle imports from Argentina]].<ref name=mem>{{in lang|es}} ''[http://www.memoriachilena.cl/temas/dest.asp?id=movimientoshuelgadelacarne Primeros movimientos sociales chileno (1890–1920)]''. Memoria Chilena. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120308040535/http://www.memoriachilena.cl/temas/dest.asp?id=movimientoshuelgadelacarne |date=2012-03-08 }}</ref><ref name=benjamin>Benjamin S. 1997. Meat and Strength: The Moral Economy of a Chilean Food Riot. ''[[Cultural Anthropology]]'', 12, pp. 234–268.</ref>
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=== Digital goods and services ===
=== Digital goods and services ===
[[Digital goods]] and [[Service (economics)|services]] generally do not pass through [[customs]], making monitoring and application of tariffs more difficult. [[Non-tariff barriers to trade]] of services can be higher than tariffs on goods.<ref name="i469">{{cite journal |last=Hoekman |first=Bernard |title=The General Agreement on Trade in Services: Doomed to Fail? Does it Matter? |journal=Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade |volume=8 |issue=3–4 |date=2008 |issn=1566-1679 |doi=10.1007/s10842-008-0036-z |pages=295–318}}</ref>
[[Digital goods]] and [[Service (economics)|services]] generally do not pass through [[customs]], making monitoring and application of tariffs more difficult. [[Non-tariff barriers to trade]] of services can be higher than tariffs on goods.<ref name="i469">{{cite journal |last=Hoekman |first=Bernard |title=The General Agreement on Trade in Services: Doomed to Fail? Does it Matter? |journal=Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade |volume=8 |issue=3–4 |date=2008 |issn=1566-1679 |doi=10.1007/s10842-008-0036-z |pages=295–318}}</ref>
=== Export taxes ===
Export taxes have historically been commonplace in developing countries.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |date=2025-10-31 |title=Argentina Has the World’s Weirdest Tax. Can Milei Scrap it? |url=https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/argentina-export-tax-milei-economy-74f30747 |website=The Wall Street Journal |language=en-US}}</ref> In recent decades, export taxes have become a rarity.<ref name=":0" /> By 2025, Argentina was one of few countries with export taxes.<ref name=":0" />


== See also ==
== See also ==
{{div col}}
{{div col}}
* {{anli|Balance of trade}}
* {{annotated link|Balance of trade}}
* {{Annotated link |Economic sanctions}}
* {{Annotated link |Economic sanctions}}
* {{Annotated link |Protectionism}}
* {{Annotated link |Protectionism}}
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* {{Annotated link |Eco-tariff}}
* {{Annotated link |Eco-tariff}}
* {{Annotated link |Import quota}}
* {{Annotated link |Import quota}}
* {{Annotated link |Import surtaxes}}
* {{Annotated link |List of tariffs}}
* {{Annotated link |List of tariffs}}
* {{Annotated link |Tariff-rate quota}}
* {{Annotated link |Tariff-rate quota}}
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* {{Annotated link |United States International Trade Commission}}
* {{Annotated link |United States International Trade Commission}}
{{div col end}}
{{div col end}}
==Notes==
{{notelist}}


==References==
==References==
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==External links==
==External links==
{{Commonscat}}
{{Commons category}}
{{NIE Poster|year=1905}}
{{NIE Poster|year=1905}}
*[https://wits.worldbank.org/ Trade and Tariff] resource by [[World Bank]]
*[https://wits.worldbank.org/ Trade and Tariff] resource by [[World Bank]]

Latest revision as of 13:08, 7 November 2025

Template:Short description Template:Hatnote group

The poster caption reads "British Workman: It's no use trying to hide it, guv'ner. We are going to vote for Tariff Reform"
An early 1900s poster draws attention to a political debate over tariff policy.

A tariff or import tax is a duty imposed by a national government, customs territory, or supranational union on imports of goods and is paid by the importer. Exceptionally, an export tax may be levied on exports of goods or raw materials and is paid by the exporter. Besides being a source of revenue, import duties can also be a form of regulation of foreign trade and policy that burden foreign products to encourage or safeguard domestic industry.[1] Protective tariffs are among the most widely used instruments of protectionism, along with import quotas and export quotas and other non-tariff barriers to trade.

Tariffs can be fixed (a constant sum per unit of imported goods or a percentage of the price) or variable (the amount varies according to the price). Tariffs on imports are designed to raise the price of imported goods to discourage consumption. The intention is for citizens to buy local products instead, which, according to supporters, would stimulate their country's economy. Tariffs therefore provide an incentive to develop production and replace imports with domestic products. Tariffs are meant to reduce pressure from foreign competition and, according to supporters, would help reduce the trade deficit. They have historically been justified as a means to protect infant industries and to allow import substitution industrialisation (industrializing a nation by replacing imported goods with domestic production). Tariffs may also be used to rectify artificially low prices for certain imported goods, due to dumping, export subsidies or currency manipulation. The effect is to raise the price of the goods in the destination country.

There is near unanimous consensus among economists that tariffs are self-defeating and have a negative effect on economic growth and economic welfare, while free trade and the reduction of trade barriers has a positive effect on economic growth.[2][3][4][5][6] American economist Milton Friedman said of tariffs: "We call a tariff a protective measure. It does protect . . . It protects the consumer against low prices."[7] Although trade liberalisation can sometimes result in unequally distributed losses and gains, and can, in the short run, cause economic dislocation of workers in import-competing sectors,[8] the advantages of free trade are lowering costs of goods for both producers and consumers.[9] The economic burden of tariffs falls on the importer, the exporter, and the consumer.[10] Often intended to protect specific industries, tariffs can end up backfiring and harming the industries they were intended to protect through rising input costs and retaliatory tariffs.[11][12] Import tariffs can also harm domestic exporters by disrupting their supply chains and raising their input costs.[13][14]

Etymology

File:A complete view of the British Customs; containing the rates of merchandize Fleuron T135021-3.png
British customs tariff rates for different alcoholic beverages from 1725.

The English term tariff derives from the Template:Langx which is itself a descendant of the Template:Langx which derives from Template:Langx. This term was introduced to the Latin-speaking world through contact with the Turks and derives from the Template:Langx. The Ottoman Turkish term derives from Template:Langx which is the verbal noun of Template:Langx.[15][16][17][18][19][20][21]

History

Ancient Greece

File:AtheneOudheid.JPG
In Ancient Greece, the port of Piraeus was connected to Athens with Long Walls that provided security for transportation of goods.

In the city state of Athens, the port of Piraeus enforced a system of levies to raise taxes for the Athenian government. Grain was a key commodity that was imported through the port, and Piraeus was one of the main ports in the east Mediterranean. A levy of two percent was placed on goods arriving in the market through the docks of Piraeus.[22] The Athenian government also placed restrictions on the lending of money and transport of grain to only be allowed through the port of Piraeus.[23]

Britain

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In the 14th century, Edward III took interventionist measures, such as banning the import of woollen cloth in an attempt to develop local manufacturing. Beginning in 1489, Henry VII took actions such as increasing export duties on raw wool. The Tudor monarchs, especially Henry VIII and Elizabeth I, used protectionism, subsidies, distribution of monopoly rights, government-sponsored industrial espionage and other means of government intervention to protect the wool industry.[24]

A protectionist turning point in British economic policy came in 1721, when policies to promote manufacturing industries were introduced by Robert Walpole. These included, for example, increased tariffs on imported foreign manufactured goods, export subsidies, reduced tariffs on imported raw materials used for manufactured goods and the abolition of export duties on most manufactured goods. Britain was thus among the first countries to pursue a strategy of large-scale infant-industry development.[24] Outlining his policy, Walpole declared:

Nothing contributes as much to the promotion of public welfare as the export of manufactured goods and the import of foreign raw materials.

British protectionist policies continued over the next century, with Britain remained a highly protectionist country until the mid-19th century. By 1820, the UK's average tariff rate on manufactured imports was 45–55%.[24] In 1815 the Corn Laws were enforced: tariffs and other trade restrictions on imported food and corn. The laws were designed to keep corn prices high to favour domestic farmers, and represented British mercantilism.Template:Efn The Corn Laws enhanced the profits and political power associated with land ownership. The laws raised food prices and the costs of living for the British public, and hampered the growth of other British economic sectors, such as manufacturing, by reducing the disposable income of the British public.[25]

In 1846 the Corn Laws were repealed, so tariffs were significantly reduced. Economic historians see the repeal of the Corn Laws as a decisive shift towards free trade in Britain.[26][27] According to a 2021 study, the repeal of the Corn Laws benefitted the bottom 90% of income earners in the United Kingdom economically, while causing income losses for the top 10% of income earners.[28]

In the UK customs duties on many manufactured goods were also abolished. The Navigation Acts were abolished in 1849 when free traders won the public debate in the UK. But while free trade progressed in the UK, protectionism continued on the Continent. The UK unilaterally pursued free trade, even as most other large industrial powers retained protectionist policies. For example, the USA emerged from the Civil War even more explicitly protectionist than before, Germany under Bismarck rejected free trade, and the rest of Europe followed suit.[24] Countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland, and arguably Sweden and Belgium, had fully moved towards free trade prior to 1860.[26]

On June 15, 1903, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne, made a speech in the House of Lords in which he defended fiscal retaliation against countries that applied high tariffs and whose governments subsidised products sold in Britain (known as "premium products", later called "dumping"). The retaliation was to take the form of threats to impose duties in response to goods from that country. Liberal unionists had split from the liberals, who advocated free trade, and this speech marked a turning point in the group's slide toward protectionism. Lansdowne argued that the threat of retaliatory tariffs was similar to gaining respect in a room of gunmen by pointing a big gun (his exact words were "a gun a little bigger than everyone else's"). The "Big Revolver" became a slogan of the time, often used in speeches and cartoons.[29]

In response to the Great Depression, Britain temporarily abandoned free trade in 1932. The country reintroduced large-scale tariffs.[24]

United States

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Average tariff rates (France, UK, US)Template:Update inline
File:Average Tariff Rates in USA (1821-2016).png
Average tariff rates in US (1821–2016)Template:Update inline

According to Douglas Irwin,Template:Efn tariffs have historically served three main purposes: generating revenue for the federal government, restricting imports to protect domestic producers, and securing reciprocity through trade agreements that reduce barriers. The history of U.S. trade policy can be divided into three distinct eras, each characterized by the predominance of one goal. From 1790 to 1860, revenue considerations dominated, as import duties accounted for approximately 90% of federal government receipts. From 1861 to 1933, the growing reliance on domestic taxation shifted the focus of tariffs toward protecting domestic industries. From 1934 to 2016, the primary objective of trade policy became the negotiation of trade agreements with other countries. The three eras of U.S. tariff history were separated by two major shocks—the Civil War and the Great Depression—that realigned political power and shifted trade policy objectives.[30]

Political support by members of Congress often reflects the economic interests of producers rather than consumers, as producers tend to be better organized politically and employ many voting workers. Trade-related interests differ across industries, depending on whether they focus on exports or face import competition. In general, workers in export-oriented sectors favor lower tariffs, while those in import-competing industries support higher tariffs.[30]

Because congressional representation is geographically based, regional economic interests tend to shape consistent voting patterns over time. For much of U.S. history, the primary division over trade policy has been along the North–South axis. In the early 19th century, a manufacturing corridor developed in the Northeast, including textile production in New England and iron industries in Pennsylvania and Ohio, which often faced import competition. By contrast, the South specialized in agricultural exports such as cotton and tobacco.[30]

In more recent times, representatives from the Rust Belt—spanning from Upstate New York through the industrial Midwest—have often opposed trade agreements, while those from the South and the West have generally supported them. The regional variation in trade-related interests implies that political parties may adopt opposing positions on trade policy when their electoral bases differ geographically. Each of the three trade policy eras—focused respectively on revenue, restriction, and reciprocity—occurred during periods of political dominance by a single party able to implement its preferred policies.[30]

Colonial period

Trade policy was a subject of controversy even prior to the independence of the United States. The thirteen North American colonies were subject to the restrictive framework of the Navigation Acts, which directed most colonial trade through Britain. Approximately three-quarters of colonial exports were enumerated goods that had to pass through a British port before being reexported elsewhere, a policy that reduced the prices received by American planters.[30]

Historians have debated whether British mercantilist policies harmed American colonial interests and fueled the American Revolution. Harper estimated that trade restrictions cost the colonies about 2.3% of their income in 1773, though this excluded benefits of empire, such as defense and lower shipping insurance.[31] The economic burden of the Navigation Acts fell mostly on the southern colonies, especially tobacco planters in Maryland and Virginia, potentially reducing regional income by up to 2.5% and strengthening support for independence. American foreign trade declined sharply during the Revolutionary War and remained subdued into the 1780s. Trade revived during the 1790s but remained volatile due to ongoing military conflicts in Europe.[30]

Revenue period (1790–1860)

Beginning in 1790, the newly established federal government adopted tariffs as its primary source of revenue. There was a consensus among the Founding Fathers that tariffs were the most efficient way of raising public funds as well as the most politically acceptable. Early sales taxes in the post-colonial period were highly controversial, difficult to enforce, and costly to administer. This was evident during events like the Whiskey Rebellion, where the enforcement of sales taxes led to significant resistance. Similarly, an income tax did not make sense for numerous reasons, particularly due to the complexities of tracking and collecting it. In contrast, tariffs were a simpler solution. Imports entered the United States primarily through a limited number of ports, such as Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston, South Carolina. This concentration of imports made it easier to impose taxes directly at these points, streamlining the process of collection. Furthermore, tariffs were less visible to the general public because they were built into the price of goods, reducing political resistance. The system allowed for efficient revenue generation without the immediate visibility or perceived burden of other tax forms, contributing to its political acceptability among the Founders.[32]

President Thomas Jefferson initiated a notable policy experiment by enacting a complete embargo on maritime commerce, with Congressional support, beginning in December 1807. The stated objective of the embargo was to protect American vessels and sailors from becoming entangled in the Anglo-French naval conflict (the Napoleonic Wars). By mid-1808, the United States had reached near-autarkic conditions, representing one of the most extreme peacetime interruptions of international trade in its history. The embargo, which remained in effect from December 1807 to March 1809, imposed significant economic costs.[30] Irwin (2005) estimates that the static welfare loss associated with the embargo was approximately 5% of GDP.[33]

From 1837 to 1860, spanning the Second Party System and ending with the Civil War, the Democratic Party held political dominance in the United States. The Democrats drew support primarily from the export-oriented South and promoted the slogan “a tariff for revenue only” to express their opposition to protective tariffs. As a result, the average tariff declined from early 1830s levels to under 20% by 1860. During this period, there were 12 sessions of Congress: 7 under unified government (6 led by Democrats, 1 by Whigs) and 5 under divided control. This meant that over the 34-year span, the pro-tariff Whig Party, based in the North, held power for only two years. They succeeded in raising tariffs in 1842, but this was reversed in 1846 after Democrats returned to power. Throughout the 10 years of divided government, tariff policy remained unchanged.[30]

Civil War (1861–1865)

Some non-academic commentators have argued that trade restrictions were a major factor in the South’s decision to secede during the Civil War, although this view is not widely supported among academic historians. After the 1828 Tariff of Abominations, South Carolina threatened secession, but the crisis was resolved through the Compromise of 1833, which led to a steady decline in tariffs. Further reductions followed in 1846 and 1857, bringing the average tariff below 20% on the eve of the war—one of the lowest levels in the antebellum period. Irwin notes that Southern Democrats had substantial influence over trade policy until the Civil War. He rejects the revisionist claim—often associated with the Lost Cause narrative—that the Morrill Tariff triggered the conflict. Instead, Irwin argues that the Morrill Tariff only passed because Southern states had already seceded and their representatives were no longer in Congress to oppose it. It was signed by President James Buchanan, a Democrat, before Lincoln took office. In short, Irwin finds no evidence that tariffs were a major cause of the Civil War.[32]

Restriction period (1866–1928)

The Civil War shifted political power from the South to the North, benefiting the Republican Party, which favored protective tariffs. As a result, trade policy focused more on restriction than revenue, and average tariffs increased. From 1861 to 1932, the Republicans dominated American politics and drew their political support from the North, where manufacturing interests were concentrated. Republicans supported high tariffs to limit imports, leading to rates rising to 40–50% during the Civil War and remaining at that level for several decades. During this time, there were 35 sessions of Congress, including 21 under unified government (17 Republican, 4 Democratic) and 14 under divided control. Over the span of 72 years, Democrats succeeded in reducing tariffs only twice, in 1894 and 1913, but both efforts were swiftly reversed when Republicans regained power. Although trade policy was often contested, it remained relatively stable due to prolonged one-party dominance and institutional barriers to change.[30]

According to Irwin, a common myth about U.S. trade policy is that high tariffs made the United States into a great industrial power in the late 19th century. As its share of global manufacturing powered from 23% in 1870 to 36% in 1913, the admittedly high tariffs of the time came with a cost, estimated at around 0.5% of GDP in the mid-1870s. In some industries, they might have sped up development by a few years. U.S. economic growth during its protectionist era was driven more by its abundant natural resources and openness to people and ideas, including large-scale immigration, foreign capital, and imported technologies. While tariffs on manufactured goods were high, the country remained open in other respects, and much of the economic growth occurred in services such as railroads and telecommunications rather than in manufacturing, which had already expanded significantly before the Civil War when tariffs were lower.[34][35]

Great Depression and Smoot–Hawley Tariff (1929–1933)

Script error: No such module "labelled list hatnote". The Tariff Act of 1930, commonly known as the Smoot–Hawley Tariff, is considered one of the most controversial tariff laws ever enacted by the United States Congress. The act raised the average tariff on dutiable imports from approximately 40% to 47%, though price deflation during the Great Depression caused the effective rate to rise to nearly 60% by 1932. The Smoot–Hawley Tariff was implemented as the global economy was entering a severe downturn. The Great Depression of 1929–1933 represented an economic collapse for both the United States—where real GDP declined by about 25% and unemployment exceeded 20%—and much of the world. As international trade contracted, trade barriers multiplied, unemployment increased, and industrial output declined worldwide, leading many to attribute part of the global economic crisis to the Smoot–Hawley Tariff. The extent to which this legislation contributed to the depth of the Great Depression has remained a subject of ongoing debate.[30]

Irwin argues that while the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was not the primary cause of the Great Depression, it contributed to its severity by provoking international retaliation and reducing global trade. What mitigated the impact of Smoot-Hawley was the small size of the trade sector at the time. Only a third of total imports to the United States in 1930 were subject to duties, and those dutiable imports represented only 1.4 percent of GDP. According to Irwin, there is no evidence that the legislation achieved its goals of net job creation or economic recovery. Even from a Keynesian perspective, the policy was counterproductive, as the decline in exports exceeded the reduction in imports. While falling foreign incomes were a key factor in the collapse of U.S. exports, the tariff also limited foreign access to U.S. dollars, appreciating the currency and making American goods less competitive abroad. Irwin emphasizes that one of the most damaging consequences of the Act was the deterioration of the United States' trade relations with key partners. Enacted at a time when the League of Nations was seeking to implement a global "tariff truce", the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was widely perceived as a unilateral and hostile move, undermining international cooperation. In his assessment, the most significant long-term impact was that the resentment it generated encouraged other countries to form discriminatory trading blocs. These preferential arrangements, diverted trade away from the United States and hindered the global economic recovery.[36][37]

In a November 2024 article, The Economist observed that the Act, "which raised average tariffs on imports by around 20% and incited a tit-for-tat trade war, was devastatingly effective: global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic global trade fell by two-thirds. It was so catastrophic for growth in America and around the world that legislators have not touched the issue since. 'Smoot-Hawley' became synonymous with disastrous policy making".[38]

Economist Paul Krugman argues that protectionism does not necessarily cause recessions, since a reduction in imports resulting from tariffs can have an expansionary effect that offsets the decline in exports. In his view, trade wars tend to reduce exports and imports symmetrically, with limited net impact on economic growth. He contends that the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act was not the cause of the Great Depression; instead, he sees the sharp decline in trade between 1929 and 1933 as a consequence of the Depression, with trade barriers representing a policy response rather than a trigger.[39]

Economist Milton Friedman argued that while the tariffs of 1930 caused harm, they were not the main cause for the Great Depression. He placed greater blame on the lack of sufficient action on the part of the Federal Reserve.[40] Peter Temin, an economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has agreed that the contractionary effect of the tariff was small.[41]Script error: No such module "Unsubst". Other economists have contended that the record tariffs of the 1920s and early 1930s exacerbated the Great Depression in the U.S., in part because of retaliatory tariffs imposed by other countries on the United States.[42][43][44]

Reciprocity period (1934–2016)

The Great Depression led to a political realignment following the Democratic victory in the 1932 election. This election ended decades of Republican dominance and initiated a period of Democratic control over the federal government that lasted from 1933 to 1993. The realignment shifted influence toward the party that prioritized export-oriented interests in the South. Consequently, the focus of trade policy moved from protectionism to reciprocity, and average tariff levels declined significantly. During this period, there were 30 sessions of Congress, with 16 under unified government (15 Democratic, 1 Republican) and 14 under divided government. Over these 60 years, the overarching goal of promoting reciprocal trade agreements remained largely unchanged, including during the two-year span (1953–1955) when Republicans held unified control.[30]

Following World War II, and in contrast to earlier periods, the Republican Party began supporting trade liberalization. From the early 1950s through the early 1990s, an unusual era of bipartisan consensus emerged, during which both parties generally aligned on trade policy. This occurred during the Cold War, when foreign policy concerns were prominent and partisan divisions were subdued (Bailey 2003).[45]

After the 1993 vote on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Democratic support for trade liberalization declined significantly. By that time, the two major parties had effectively reversed their positions on trade policy. This shift in party alignment primarily reflects changes in regional representation: the South transitioned from being a Democratic stronghold to a Republican one,[46] while the Northeast became increasingly Democratic. As a result, regional views on trade policy remained largely consistent, but the parties came to represent different geographic constituencies.[30]

Basic economic analysis

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File:Effect of Import Tariff - v1.png
Effects of an import tariff, which hurts domestic consumers more than domestic producers are helped. Higher prices and lower quantities reduce consumer surplus by areas A+B+C+D, while expanding producer surplus by A and government revenue by C. Areas B and D are dead-weight losses, surplus lost by consumers and overall.[47] For a more detailed analysis of this diagram, see Free trade#Economics.

Economic analyses of tariffs generally find that tariffs distort the free market and increase prices of both foreign and domestic products. The welfare effects of tariffs on an importing country are usually negative, even if other countries do not retaliate, as the loss of foreign competition drives up prices for domestic goods by the amount of the tariff.[48] The diagrams at right show the costs and benefits of imposing a tariff on a good in the domestic economy under the standard model of tariffs in a competitive economy.[47] Because of its importance, simplicity, and widespread applicability, this microeconomic model of tariffs is usually taught in introductory (first-year) microeconomics courses.

Imposing an import tariff has the following effects, shown in the first diagram in a hypothetical domestic market for televisions:

  • Price rises from world price Pw to higher tariff price Pt.
  • Quantity demanded by domestic consumers falls from C1 to C2, a movement along the demand curve due to higher price.
  • Domestic suppliers are willing to supply Q2 rather than Q1, a movement along the supply curve due to the higher price, so the quantity imported falls from C1−Q1 to C2−Q2.
  • Consumer surplus (the area under the demand curve but above price) shrinks by areas A+B+C+D, as domestic consumers face higher prices and consume lower quantities.
  • Producer surplus (the area above the supply curve but below price) increases by area A, as domestic producers shielded from international competition can sell more of their product at a higher price.
  • Government tax revenue equals the import quantity (C2 − Q2) multiplied by the tariff price (Pw − Pt), shown as area C.
  • Areas B and D are deadweight losses, surplus formerly captured by consumers that is now lost to all parties.

The overall change in welfare = Change in Consumer Surplus + Change in Producer Surplus + Change in Government Revenue = (−A−B−C−D) + A + C = −B−D. The final state after imposition of the tariff has overall welfare reduced by the areas B and D. The losses to domestic consumers are greater than the combined benefits to domestic producers and government.[47]

Tariffs are generally more inefficient than consumption taxes.[49]

Optimal tariff

For economic efficiency, free trade is often the best policy, however levying a tariff is sometimes second best.

A tariff is called an optimal tariff if it is set to maximise the welfare of the country imposing the tariff.Template:Sfnp It is a tariff derived from the intersection between the trade indifference curve of that country and the offer curve of another country. In this case, the welfare of the other country grows worse simultaneously, thus the policy is a kind of beggar thy neighbor policy. If the offer curve of the other country is a line through the origin point, the original country is in the condition of a small country, so any tariff worsens the welfare of the original country.[50]Template:Sfnp

It is possible to levy a tariff as a political policy choice, and to consider a theoretical optimum tariff rate.Template:Sfnp However, imposing an optimal tariff will often lead to the foreign country increasing their tariffs as well, leading to a loss of welfare in both countries. When countries impose tariffs on each other, they will reach a position off the contract curve, meaning that both countries' welfare could be increased by reducing tariffs.Template:Sfnp

Impact

Domestic output, productivity and welfare

An empirical study by Furceri et al. (2019) found that protectionist policies like raising tariffs significantly reduce domestic output and productivity.[1] A study from 1999 by Frankel and Romer showed that, after accounting for other factors, countries with more trade tend to have higher growth and income. The effect is quantitatively large and statistically significant.[51]

That tariffs overall reduce welfare is not controversial among economists. In a 2018 survey by the University of Chicago, about 40 top economists were asked whether new U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum would benefit Americans. Two-thirds strongly disagreed, and the rest simply disagreed. None agreed. Several explained that these tariffs would help a small number of Americans but harm many more.[52] This is consistent with the basic economic analysis provided above, which shows that the costs to consumers are larger than the combined gains for domestic producers and the government, resulting in net losses known as deadweight loss.Template:Sfnp

A 2021 study covering 151 countries from 1963 to 2014 found that raising tariffs leads to long-term drops in output and productivity, along with more unemployment and inequality. It also found that tariffs tend to push up the value of the currency, while trade balances stay largely unchanged.[53]

Developing countries

Some commentators note a correlation between protectionist (mercantilist) policies and strong economic growth in countries such as China, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.[54][55][56][57] However, there is broad consensus among economists that free trade helps workers in developing countries, even if those countries have lower labor and environmental standards. This is because "the growth of manufacturing—and of the myriad other jobs that the new export sector creates—has a ripple effect throughout the economy" that creates competition among producers, lifting wages and living conditions.[58]

Caliendo, Feenstra, Romalis, and Taylor (2015) used a global economic model covering 189 countries and 15 industries to study the impact of lower tariffs from 1990 to 2010. They found that cutting tariffs increased trade, allowed more firms to start up, and raised overall welfare. Some countries, like India and Vietnam, might have gained even more from fully open trade or even import subsidies, meaning their "optimal" tariff could be negative.[59]

The OECD (2005) simulated the effects of tariff reductions in 24 developing countries and showed that a well-designed combination of tariff cuts and tax reform (e.g., replacing lost tariff revenues with consumption taxes) can lead to net welfare gains.[60]

However, some studies point to possible negative effects. For instance, Topalova (2007) shows that tariff reductions in India during the 1990s were associated with slower progress in poverty reduction, particularly in areas lacking social safety nets and little labor mobility. She argues that policy changes that policymakers should implement complementary measures to ensure a fairer distribution of the gains from liberalization. In particular, reforms that enhance labor mobility, such as changes to labor market policies, can help mitigate the negative effects and reduce inequality.[61]

Arguments used by proponents of tariffs

Protection of domestic industry

One of the most common arguments for imposing tariffs is the protection of domestic industries that are struggling to survive against foreign competition. However, most economists, particularly those adhering to the theory of comparative advantage, argue that such industries should not be maintained through protection. Instead, the resources employed in these industries should be reallocated to sectors where the country has a comparative advantage, thereby increasing overall economic efficiency. According to this view, the gains in national welfare would outweigh the losses experienced by specific groups affected by import competition, resulting in higher real national income overall.[62]

Economists also recognize, however, that the adjustment process—moving labor and capital from less efficient to more efficient sectors—can be slow and socially costly. As a result, while there is broad consensus against increasing tariffs, many economists support a gradual reduction of existing trade barriers rather than abrupt removal. This approach is seen as a way to avoid further misallocation of resources while minimizing disruption to affected workers and communities.[62]

Infant industry argument

Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Protectionists argue that emerging industries, especially in less-developed countries, may need temporary protection from established foreign competitors in order to develop and become competitive. Mainstream economists do acknowledge that tariffs can in the short-term help domestic industries to develop but this depends on the short-term nature of the protective tariffs and the ability of the government to pick the winners.[63][64] In practice, tariffs often remain in place after the industry matures, and governments frequently fail to pick winners.[64] Multiple empirical studies across different countries—such as Turkey in the 1960s and several Latin American nations—document failed attempts at infant industry protection.[65][66][67][68][69] In many developing countries, industries have failed to attain international competitiveness even after 15 or 20 years of operation and might not survive if protective tariffs were removed.[62] Moreover, economists argue that infant-industry protection can be harmful not only at the national level but also internationally. If multiple countries pursue such protection simultaneously, it can fragment global markets, preventing firms from achieving economies of scale through exports, and leading to inefficient, small-scale production across countries.[62]

Unemployment

Tariffs are sometimes proposed as a means to protect domestic employment during economic downturns. However, there is near-unanimous agreement among modern economists that this approach is misguided. Tariffs may shift unemployment abroad without increasing overall output and often provoke retaliatory measures. Economists generally agree that unemployment is more effectively addressed through appropriate fiscal and monetary policies.[62]

National defense

Industries often invoke national security to justify tariff protection, arguing that certain products are essential in times of war when imports may be disrupted. Economists generally consider this a weak argument, noting that tariffs are an inefficient way to ensure the survival of critical industries. Instead, they recommend direct subsidies as a more transparent and effective means of supporting sectors deemed vital for national defense.[62]

Autarky

Some protectionist arguments are rooted in autarkic sentiment—the desire for national self-sufficiency and independence from global economic risks. However, there is general agreement that no modern nation, regardless of how rich and varied its resources, could really practice self-sufficiency, and attempts in that direction could produce sharp drops in real income.[62]

Trade deficits

According to some proponents of tariffs, trade deficits are seen as inherently harmful and in need of removal,[70] a view many economists rejected as a flawed understanding of trade.[71][72][73][74] The notion that bilateral trade deficits are per se detrimental to the respective national economies is overwhelmingly rejected by trade experts and economists.[75][76][77][78]

According to proponents tariffs can help reduce trade deficits, but according to economists tariffs do not determine the size of trade deficits and trade balances are driven by consumption. Rather, it is that a strong economy creates rich consumers who in turn create the demand for imports.[79] Industries protected by tariffs expand their domestic market share but an additional effect is that their need to be efficient and cost-effective is reduced. This cost is imposed on (domestic) purchasers of the products of those industries,[79] a cost that is eventually passed on to the end consumer. Finally, other countries must be expected to retaliate by imposing countervailing tariffs, a lose-lose situation that would lead to increased world-wide inflation.[79]

Protection against environmental dumping

Some argue in favor of tariffs in cases of environmental dumping, where companies benefit from weaker environmental regulations than in other countries, leading to unfair competition. For example, the European Union starts its carbon border-adjustment mechanism in 2026 to level the playing field with firms not subject to European carbon pricing. In 2019, more than 3,500 U.S. economists, including 45 Nobel laureates and former Federal Reserve chairmen, signed the "Economists' Statement on Carbon Dividends." This statement advocates for a border carbon adjustment system that will prevent carbon leakage and enhance the competitiveness of American firms that are more energy-efficient than their foreign competitors.[80]

Modern tariff practices

Russia

The Russian Federation adopted more protectionist trade measures in 2013 than any other country, making it the world leader in protectionism. It alone introduced 20% of protectionist measures worldwide and one-third of measures in the G20 countries. Russia's protectionist policies include tariff measures, import restrictions, sanitary measures, and direct subsidies to local companies. For example, the government supported several economic sectors such as agriculture, space, automotive, electronics, chemistry, and energy.[81][82]

India

From 2017, as part of the promotion of its "Make in India" programme[83] to stimulate and protect domestic manufacturing industry and to combat current account deficits, India has introduced tariffs on several electronic products and "non-essential items". This concerns items imported from countries such as China and South Korea. For example, India's national solar energy programme favours domestic producers by requiring the use of Indian-made solar cells.[84][85][86]

Armenia

Armenia established its customs service in 1992 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015, it has benefited from mostly tariff-free trade within the Eurasian Customs Union, while applying more import tariffs on goods from outside. Armenia does not impose export taxes, nor does it declare temporary import duties or credits on government or international assistance imports.[87]

Upon joining Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, led by Russians, Armenia set tariffs at 0–10%, rising over time, especially on agricultural goods.[88] It committed to adopt the EAEU's common tariff schedule, but until 2022, it was allowed to apply non-EAEU rates to certain goods, including meat, dairy, cereals, oils, and some processed foods.[89] EAEU membership requires Armenia to follow stricter EAEU (largely Russian) standards, including sanitary and phytosanitary measures. It has ceded control over much of its trade regime, and rising tariffs offer more protection to domestic industries. Armenian goods must comply with EAEU standards as transition periods expire.[90]

Armenia joined the WTO in 2003, gaining Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. Its average tariff rate of 2.7% is among the lowest in the WTO. It is also a member of the World Customs Organization, using a harmonized tariff classification system.[91]

Switzerland

In 2024, Switzerland abolished tariffs on industrial products imported into the country.[92][93] Using 2016 trade figures, the Swiss government estimated the move could have economic benefits of 860 million CHF per year.[94]

United States

Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Tariffs during the first presidency of Donald Trump involved protectionist trade initiatives against other countries, most notably against China. In January 2018, Trump imposed tariffs on solar panels and washing machines of 30–50%.[95] In March 2018, he imposed tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) from most countries,[96][97][98] which, according to Morgan Stanley, covered an estimated 4.1% of U.S. imports.[99] In June 2018, this was extended to the European Union, Canada, and Mexico.[97] The Trump administration separately set and escalated tariffs on goods imported from China, leading to a trade war.[100]

In April 2025, President Donald Trump announced a substantial increase in tariffs and a 10% base tariff on all imported products, resulting in the US trade-weighted average tariff rising from 2% to an estimated 24%,[101] the highest level in over a century, including under the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.[102][103]

Political analysis

The tariff has been used as a political tool to establish an independent nation; for example, the United States Tariff Act of 1789, signed specifically on July 4, was called the "Second Declaration of Independence" by newspapers because it was intended to be the economic means to achieve the political goal of a sovereign and independent United States.[104]

The political impact of tariffs is judged depending on the political perspective; for example, the 2002 United States steel tariff imposed a 30% tariff on a variety of imported steel products for a period of three years and American steel producers supported the tariff.[105]

Tariffs can emerge as a political issue prior to an election. The Nullification Crisis of 1832 arose from the passage of a new tariff by the United States Congress, a few months before that year's federal elections; the state of South Carolina was outraged by the new tariff, and civil war nearly resulted.[106] In the leadup to the 2007 Australian Federal election, the Australian Labor Party announced it would undertake a review of Australian car tariffs if elected.[107] The Liberal Party made a similar commitment, while independent candidate Nick Xenophon announced his intention to introduce tariff-based legislation as "a matter of urgency".[108]

Unpopular tariffs are known to have ignited social unrest, for example the 1905 meat riots in Chile that developed in protest against tariffs applied to the cattle imports from Argentina.[109][110]

Additional information on tariffs

Calculation of customs duty

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Harmonized System of Nomenclature

For the purpose of assessment of customs duty, products are given an identification code that has come to be known as the Harmonized System code. This code was developed by the World Customs Organization based in Brussels. A 'Harmonized System' code may be from four to ten digits. For example, 17.03 is the HS code for "molasses from the extraction or refining of sugar". However, within 17.03, the number 17.03.90 stands for "Molasses (Excluding Cane Molasses)".[111]

Customs authority

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Evasion

Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Evasion of customs duties takes place mainly in two ways. In one, the trader under-declares the value so that the assessable value is lower than actual. In a similar vein, a trader can evade customs duty by understatement of quantity or volume of the product of trade. A trader may also evade duty by misrepresenting traded goods, categorizing goods as items which attract lower customs duties. The evasion of customs duty may take place with or without the collaboration of customs officials.Script error: No such module "Unsubst".

Duty-free goods

Many countries allow a traveller to bring goods into the country duty-free. These goods may be bought at ports and airports or sometimes within one country without attracting the usual government taxes and then brought into another country duty-free. Some countries specify 'duty-free allowances' which limit the number or value of duty-free items that one person can bring into the country. These restrictions often apply to tobacco, wine, spirits, cosmetics, gifts and souvenirs.Script error: No such module "Unsubst".

Deferment of tariffs and duties

Products may sometimes be imported into a free economic zone (or 'free port'), processed there, then re-exported without being subject to tariffs or duties. According to the 1999 Revised Kyoto Convention, a Template:"'free zone' means a part of the territory of a contracting party where any goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being outside the customs territory".[112]

Digital goods and services

Digital goods and services generally do not pass through customs, making monitoring and application of tariffs more difficult. Non-tariff barriers to trade of services can be higher than tariffs on goods.[113]

Export taxes

Export taxes have historically been commonplace in developing countries.[114] In recent decades, export taxes have become a rarity.[114] By 2025, Argentina was one of few countries with export taxes.[114]

See also

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Types

Trade dynamics

Trade liberalisation

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Notes

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References

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Sources

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External links

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  15. The Online Etymology Dictionary: tariff. Template:Webarchive The 2nd edition of the Oxford English Dictionary gives the same etymology, with a reference dating to 1591.
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  21. [1] Nişanyan Dictionary "tarif"
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  38. Template:Cite magazine Alice Fulwood is Wall Street editor of the Economist
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  50. Almost all real-life examples may be in this case.
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  58. Krugman, Paul (21 March 1997). In Praise of Cheap Labor Template:Webarchive. Slate.
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  98. The President also authorized the Department of Commerce to provide relief, or exclusion, from these tariffs for U.S. steel and aluminum importers in certain circumstances, such as when the product is not available domestically or based on national security considerations. See "Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Commerce Should Improve Its Exclusion Request Process and Economic Impact Reviews". and "Steel and Aluminum Tariffs:Commerce Should Update Public Guidance to Reflect Changes in the Exclusion Process". U.S. Government Accountability Office. Retrieved January 12, 2022.
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  106. "Andrew Jackson & the Nullification Crisis Template:Webarchive", The Hermitage, 2023. Accessed 2023-08-08.
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  109. Template:In lang Primeros movimientos sociales chileno (1890–1920). Memoria Chilena. Template:Webarchive
  110. Benjamin S. 1997. Meat and Strength: The Moral Economy of a Chilean Food Riot. Cultural Anthropology, 12, pp. 234–268.
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