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[[File:Allied tanker torpedoed.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|{{SS|Dixie Arrow||}} torpedoed off [[Cape Hatteras]] by {{GS|U-71|1940|2}}, 26 March 1942]]
[[File:Allied tanker torpedoed.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|{{SS|Dixie Arrow||}} torpedoed off [[Cape Hatteras]] by {{GS|U-71|1940|2}}, 26 March 1942]]
{{Campaignbox Atlantic Campaign}}
{{Campaignbox Atlantic Campaign}}
The '''Second Happy Time''' ({{Langx|de|Zweite glückliche Zeit}}; officially '''Operation Paukenschlag''' ("'''Operation Drumbeat'''"), and also known among German [[submarine]] commanders as the "'''American Shooting Season'''"<ref>Miller, Nathan: ''War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II''. Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 295. {{ISBN|0-19-511038-2}}</ref>) was a phase in the [[Battle of the Atlantic]] during which [[Axis powers|Axis]] submarines attacked [[merchant shipping]] and [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] naval vessels along the east coast of North America. The [[First Happy Time]] was in 1940–41 in the North Atlantic and North Sea. [[Adolf Hitler]] and [[Benito Mussolini]] [[German declaration of war against the United States|declared war on the United States]] on 11 December 1941, and as a result their navies could begin the Second Happy Time.<ref>Duncan Redford; Philip D. Grove (2014). The Royal Navy: A History Since 1900. I.B. Tauris. p. 182</ref>
The '''Second Happy Time''' ({{Langx|de|Zweite glückliche Zeit}}; officially {{lang |de |'''Operation Paukenschlag'''}} ({{dubious span |date=June 2025 |reason=Better translation needed. ''Drum beat'' is a rhythmic pattern, whereas a ''Paukenschlag'' is a singular beat. And wasn't it ''Unternehmen Paukenschlag''? |text={{translation |'''Operation Drumbeat'''}}}}), and also known among German [[submarine]] commanders as the "'''American Shooting Season'''"<ref>Miller, Nathan: ''War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II''. Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 295. {{ISBN|0-19-511038-2}}</ref>) was a phase in the [[Battle of the Atlantic]] during which [[Axis powers|Axis]] submarines attacked [[merchant shipping]] and [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] naval vessels along the east coast of North America. The [[First Happy Time]] was in 1940–41 in the North Atlantic and North Sea. [[Adolf Hitler]] and [[Benito Mussolini]] [[German declaration of war against the United States|declared war on the United States]] on 11 December 1941, and as a result their navies could begin the Second Happy Time.<ref>Duncan Redford; Philip D. Grove (2014). The Royal Navy: A History Since 1900. I.B. Tauris. p. 182</ref>


The Second Happy Time lasted from January 1942 to about August of that year and involved several German naval operations, including [[Operation Neuland]]. German submariners named it the "Happy Time" or the "Golden Time," as defense measures were weak and disorganized,<ref name=Gannon/>{{rp|p292}} and the [[U-boat]]s were able to inflict massive damage with little risk. During this period, Axis submarines sank 609 ships totaling 3.1 million tons, against a loss of only 22 U-boats. This led to the loss of thousands of lives, mainly those of merchant mariners. Although fewer than the losses during the [[Atlantic U-boat campaign of World War I#1917|1917 campaign]] of the [[First World War]],<ref>Churchill (1950): p. 111</ref> those of this period equaled roughly one quarter of all ships sunk by U-boats during the entire [[World War II|Second World War]].
The Second Happy Time lasted from January 1942 to about August of that year and involved several German naval operations, including [[Operation Neuland]]. German submariners named it the "Happy Time" or the "Golden Time", as defense measures were weak and disorganized,{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |p=292}} and the [[U-boat]]s were able to inflict massive damage with little risk. During this period, Axis submarines sank 609 ships totaling {{vague |date=June 2025 |reason=Are these short tons (ST) or long tons (LT)? |text=3.1 million tons}}, against a loss of only 22 U-boats. This led to the loss of thousands of lives, mainly those of merchant mariners. Although fewer than the losses during the [[Atlantic U-boat campaign of World War I#1917|1917 campaign]] of the [[First World War]],{{sfnp |Churchill |1950 |p=111 }} those of this period equaled roughly one quarter of all ships sunk by U-boats during the entire [[World War II|Second World War]].


Historian [[Michael Gannon (historian)|Michael Gannon]] called it "America's Second [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor]]" and placed the blame for the nation's failure to respond quickly to the attacks on the inaction of Admiral [[Ernest King|Ernest J. King]], commander-in-chief of the [[United States Navy]] (USN). As King also refused British offers to provide the US navy with their own ships, the belated institution of a [[convoy]] system was in large part due to a severe shortage of suitable escort vessels, without which convoys were seen as actually more vulnerable than lone ships.<ref>Timothy J. Ryan and Jan M. Copes ''To Die Gallantly – The Battle of the Atlantic'', 1994 Westview Press, Chapter 7.</ref>
Historian [[Michael Gannon (historian)|Michael Gannon]] called it "America's Second [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor]]"{{quote without source |date=June 2025}} and placed the blame for the nation's failure to respond quickly to the attacks on the inaction of Admiral [[Ernest King|Ernest J. King]], commander-in-chief of the [[United States Navy]] (USN). As King also refused British offers to provide the US navy with their own ships, the belated institution of a [[convoy]] system was in large part due to a severe shortage of suitable escort vessels, without which convoys were seen as actually more vulnerable than lone ships.<ref>Timothy J. Ryan and Jan M. Copes ''To Die Gallantly – The Battle of the Atlantic'', 1994 Westview Press, Chapter 7.</ref>


==Background==
==Background==
===German intentions===
===German intentions===
Upon [[German declaration of war against the United States (1941)|Germany's declaration of war on the United States]] on 11 December 1941 just after the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], the US was, on paper at least, in a fortunate position. Where the other combatants on the Allied side had already lost thousands of trained sailors and airmen, and were experiencing shortages of ships and aircraft, the US was at full strength (save for its recent losses at Pearl Harbor). The US had the opportunity to learn about modern naval warfare by observing the conflicts in the [[North Sea]] and the Mediterranean, and through a close relationship with the United Kingdom. The USN had already gained significant experience in countering U-boats in the Atlantic, particularly from April 1941 when President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] extended the "[[Pan-American Security Zone]]" east almost as far as [[Iceland]]. The United States had massive manufacturing capacity and a favorable geographical position from a defensive point of view: the [[New York Harbor|port of New York]], for example, was 3,000 miles to the west of the [[U-boat]] bases in [[Brittany]].
Upon [[German declaration of war against the United States (1941)|Germany's declaration of war on the United States]] on 11 December 1941 just after the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], the US was, on paper at least, in a fortunate position. Where the other combatants on the Allied side had already lost thousands of trained sailors and airmen, and were experiencing shortages of ships and aircraft, the US was at full strength (save for its recent losses at Pearl Harbor). The US had the opportunity to learn about modern naval warfare by observing the conflicts in the [[North Sea]] and the Mediterranean, and through a close relationship with the United Kingdom. The USN had already gained significant experience in countering U-boats in the Atlantic, particularly from April 1941 when President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] extended the "[[Pan-American Security Zone]]" east almost as far as [[Iceland]]. The United States had massive manufacturing capacity and a favorable geographical position from a defensive point of view: the [[New York Harbor|port of New York]], for example, was {{convert|3,000|mi|order=flip}} to the west of the [[U-boat]] bases in [[Brittany]].


U-boat commander ''Vizeadmiral'' [[Karl Dönitz]] saw the entry of the US into the war as a golden opportunity to strike heavy blows in the [[tonnage war]] and Hitler ordered an assault on America on 12 December 1941. The standard [[Type VII submarine]] had insufficient range to patrol off the coast of North America (although, in due time, Type VII submarines were successfully able to patrol off the eastern seaboard of North America, due to refueling, rearming, and resupply logistical support by [[Type XIV submarine|Type XIV]] [[submarine tender]]); the only suitable weapons he had on hand were the larger [[Type IX submarine|Type IX]].<ref>Blair p. 438</ref> These were less maneuverable and slower to submerge, making them much more vulnerable than the Type VIIs. They were also fewer in number.
U-boat commander {{lang |de |Vizeadmiral}} [[Karl Dönitz]] saw the entry of the US into the war as a golden opportunity to strike heavy blows in the [[tonnage war]] and Hitler ordered an assault on America on 12 December 1941. The standard [[Type VII submarine]] had insufficient range to patrol off the coast of North America (although, in due time, Type VII submarines were successfully able to patrol off the eastern seaboard of North America, due to refueling, rearming, and resupply logistical support by [[Type XIV submarine|Type XIV]] [[submarine tender]]); the only suitable weapons he had on hand were the larger [[Type IX submarine|Type IX]].{{sfnp |Blair |1996 |p=438 }} These were less maneuverable and slower to submerge, making them much more vulnerable than the Type VIIs. They were also fewer in number.


===American deficiencies===
===American deficiencies===
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The American response in early 1942 was hampered by poor organization and doctrine, and a lack of [[anti-submarine warfare]] (ASW) aircraft, ships, and personnel.
The American response in early 1942 was hampered by poor organization and doctrine, and a lack of [[anti-submarine warfare]] (ASW) aircraft, ships, and personnel.


The USN entered the war without the equivalent of the British {{sclass|Black Swan|sloop|0}} [[Sloop-of-war|sloop]] or the {{sclass2|River|frigate}} despite previous involvement in the Atlantic (see {{USS|Reuben James|DD-245|6}}.) The massive new naval construction program prioritized other types of ships. Fleet destroyers did not have the qualities for ASW; the ideal ASW escort had relatively low speed; carried a large number of depth charges; was highly maneuverable; and had long endurance.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}} The 50 World War I-era [[destroyer]]s transferred to Britain in the 1941 [[Destroyers for Bases Agreement]] would have been poor ASW escorts, even had they been retained, due to poor maneuverability.<ref>Gannon 1990. p. 238</ref>
The USN entered the war without the equivalent of the British {{sclass|Black Swan|sloop|0}} [[Sloop-of-war|sloop]] or the {{sclass2|River|frigate}} despite previous involvement in the Atlantic (see {{USS|Reuben James|DD-245|6}}.) The massive new naval construction program prioritized other types of ships. Fleet destroyers did not have the qualities for ASW; the ideal ASW escort had relatively low speed; carried a large number of depth charges; was highly maneuverable; and had long endurance.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}} The 50 World War I-era [[destroyer]]s transferred to Britain in the 1941 [[Destroyers for Bases Agreement]] would have been poor ASW escorts, even had they been retained, due to poor maneuverability.{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |p=238 }}


The USN had some destroyers available on the east coast at the time of the first attacks. It had previously recalled at least 25 Atlantic Convoy Escort Command Destroyers, including seven at anchor in [[New York Harbor]]. It initially refused to use them as escorts even as losses mounted.<ref name=Gannon/>{{rp|p238}} When the first destroyers were finally released, their employment was hampered by poor doctrine. They were assigned to offensive patrols rather than escorting convoys due to public and political pressure. As late as March, USN escort doctrine was aggressive with an emphasis on destroying attackers, rather than stopping losses.<ref>Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("In the absence of proper escort vessels...")</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}} The option of pressing small civilian ships into service as rudimentary convoy escorts in early 1942 was not exercised.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_ncs">Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("The establishment of a convoy system...")</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}}
The USN had some destroyers available on the east coast at the time of the first attacks. It had previously recalled at least 25 Atlantic Convoy Escort Command Destroyers, including seven at anchor in [[New York Harbor]]. It initially refused to use them as escorts even as losses mounted.{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |p=238}} When the first destroyers were finally released, their employment was hampered by poor doctrine. They were assigned to offensive patrols rather than escorting convoys due to public and political pressure. As late as March, USN escort doctrine was aggressive with an emphasis on destroying attackers, rather than stopping losses.{{sfnp |Milner |2011 |p= |loc=chapter 4, "In the absence of proper escort vessels..." }}{{page needed|date=February 2022}} The option of pressing small civilian ships into service as rudimentary convoy escorts in early 1942 was not exercised.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_ncs">{{harvb |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 4 }}, "The establishment of a convoy system..."</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}}


Even if escorts had been available, the USN was unprepared to perform "Naval Control of Shipping" (NCS), the control and tracking of shipping (in convoy or sailing independently), although it had already received the reference material from Canada. Without escorts, the US could not take advantage of the existing Allied NCS. For shipping in the western Atlantic north of the equator, NCS was handled by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] (RCN) since the start of the war; the RCN only passed the responsibility to the USN in July 1942.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_ncs"/>
Even if escorts had been available, the USN was unprepared to perform "Naval Control of Shipping" (NCS), the control and tracking of shipping (in convoy or sailing independently), although it had already received the reference material from Canada. Without escorts, the US could not take advantage of the existing Allied NCS. For shipping in the western Atlantic north of the equator, NCS was handled by the [[Royal Canadian Navy]] (RCN) since the start of the war; the RCN only passed the responsibility to the USN in July 1942.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_ncs"/>


Operationally, the USN's ASW effort was fragmented. In theory, Admiral King was responsible for coordinating all ASW activities, including the development of doctrine. In practice, King's many other responsibilities prevented him from doing an adequate job. Therefore, the three Atlantic operational commands – the Atlantic Fleet, the [[Eastern Sea Frontier]], and the [[Sea Frontier|Gulf Sea Frontier]] – were left to develop their own ASW tactics individually.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_us_asw">Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("The U-boat campaign in American waters...")</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}} The issue was not resolved until May 1943 with the formation of the [[United States Tenth Fleet]].<ref name="milner_2011_ch7_us10">Milner (2011): chapter 7 ("His moves did not go unnoticed.")</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}}
Operationally, the USN's ASW effort was fragmented. In theory, Admiral King was responsible for coordinating all ASW activities, including the development of doctrine. In practice, King's many other responsibilities prevented him from doing an adequate job. Therefore, the three Atlantic operational commands – the Atlantic Fleet, the [[Eastern Sea Frontier]], and the [[Sea Frontier|Gulf Sea Frontier]] – were left to develop their own ASW tactics individually.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_us_asw">{{harvb |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 4 }}, "The U-boat campaign in American waters..."</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022|reason="The U-boat campaign in American waters..." starts on some page.}} The issue was not resolved until May 1943 with the formation of the [[United States Tenth Fleet]].<ref name="milner_2011_ch7_us10">{{harvb |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 7 }}, "His moves did not go unnoticed."</ref>{{page needed|date=February 2022}}


British experience in the first two years of World War II, which included the massive losses incurred to their shipping during the [[First Happy Time]] confirmed that ships sailing in [[convoy]] – with or without escort – were far safer than ships sailing alone. The British recommended that merchant ships should avoid obvious standard routings wherever possible; navigational markers, lighthouses, and other aids to the enemy should be removed, and a strict coastal [[Blackout (wartime)|blackout]] be enforced. In addition, any available air and sea forces should perform daylight patrols to restrict the U-boats' flexibility. For several months, none of the recommendations were followed. Coastal shipping continued to sail along marked routes and burn normal navigation lights. Boardwalk communities ashore were only 'requested' to 'consider' turning their illuminations off on 18 December 1941, but not in the cities; they did not want to offend the tourism, recreation and business sectors.<ref name=Gannon/> {{rp|p186}}
British experience in the first two years of World War II, which included the massive losses incurred to their shipping during the [[First Happy Time]] confirmed that ships sailing in [[convoy]] – with or without escort – were far safer than ships sailing alone. The British recommended that merchant ships should avoid obvious standard routings wherever possible; navigational markers, lighthouses, and other aids to the enemy should be removed, and a strict coastal [[Blackout (wartime)|blackout]] be enforced. In addition, any available air and sea forces should perform daylight patrols to restrict the U-boats' flexibility. For several months, none of the recommendations were followed. Coastal shipping continued to sail along marked routes and burn normal navigation lights. Boardwalk communities ashore were only 'requested' to 'consider' turning their illuminations off on 18 December 1941, but not in the cities; they did not want to offend the tourism, recreation and business sectors.{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |p=186}}


The primary target area was the Eastern Sea Frontier, commanded by Rear-Admiral [[Adolphus Andrews]] and covering the area from [[Maine]] to [[North Carolina]]. Andrews had practically no modern forces to work with: on the water he commanded seven [[United States Coast Guard|Coast Guard]] [[United States Coast Guard Cutter|cutters]], four converted yachts, three 1919-vintage [[patrol boat]]s, two [[gunboat]]s dating back to 1905, and four wooden [[submarine chaser]]s. About 100 aircraft were available, but these were short-range models only suitable for training. As a consequence of the traditionally antagonistic relationship between the USN and the [[United States Army Air Forces|Army Air Forces]], all larger aircraft remained under USAAF control, and in any case the USAAF was neither trained nor equipped for ASW.<ref name=Gannon/>{{rp|p182}}
The primary target area was the Eastern Sea Frontier, commanded by Rear-Admiral [[Adolphus Andrews]] and covering the area from [[Maine]] to [[North Carolina]]. Andrews had practically no modern forces to work with: on the water he commanded seven [[United States Coast Guard|Coast Guard]] [[United States Coast Guard Cutter|cutters]], four converted yachts, three 1919-vintage [[patrol boat]]s, two [[gunboat]]s dating back to 1905, and four wooden [[submarine chaser]]s. About 100 aircraft were available, but these were short-range models only suitable for training. As a consequence of the traditionally antagonistic relationship between the USN and the [[United States Army Air Forces|Army Air Forces]], all larger aircraft remained under USAAF control, and in any case the USAAF was neither trained nor equipped for ASW.{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |p=182}}


== Campaign ==
== Campaign ==
=== Opening moves ===
=== Opening moves ===
Immediately after war was declared on the United States, Dönitz began to implement Operation Paukenschlag (often translated as "drumbeat" or "drumroll",<ref>Fairbank White, David – ''Bitter Ocean – The dramatic story of the Battle of the Atlantic 1939–1945'', 2006, Headline Publishing Group {{ISBN|978-0-7553-1089-0}}, p. 146</ref> and literally as "[[timpani]] beat"). Only six of the twenty operational Type IX boats were available, and one of those six encountered mechanical trouble. This left just five long-range submarines for the opening moves of the campaign.<ref>Blair pp. 438–441</ref>
Immediately after war was declared on the United States, Dönitz began to implement Operation Paukenschlag (often translated as "drumbeat" or "drumroll",{{sfnp |Fairbank White |2006 |p=146 }} and literally as "[[timpani]] beat"). Only six of the twenty operational Type IX boats were available, and one of those six encountered mechanical trouble. This left just five long-range submarines for the opening moves of the campaign.{{sfnp |Blair |1996 |pp=438–441 }}


Loaded with the maximum possible amounts of fuel, food and ammunition, the first of the five Type IXs left [[Lorient]] in France on 18 December 1941, the others following over the next few days. Each carried sealed orders to be opened after passing 20°W, which directed them to different parts of the North American coast. No charts or sailing directions were available: ''[[Kapitänleutnant]]'' [[Reinhard Hardegen]] of {{GS|U-123|1940|2}}, for example, was provided with two tourist guides to New York, one of which contained a fold-out map of the harbor.<ref name=Gannon>Michael Gannon, ''Operation Drumbeat: the dramatic true story of Germany's first U-boat attacks along the American coast in World War II'', 1990, Harper and Row publishers, {{ISBN|0-06-016155-8}}</ref>{{rp|p137}}
Loaded with the maximum possible amounts of fuel, food and ammunition, the first of the five Type IXs left [[Lorient]] in France on 18 December 1941, the others following over the next few days. Each carried sealed orders to be opened after passing 20°W, which directed them to different parts of the North American coast. No charts or sailing directions were available: ''[[Kapitänleutnant]]'' [[Reinhard Hardegen]] of {{GS|U-123|1940|2}}, for example, was provided with two tourist guides to New York, one of which contained a fold-out map of the harbor.{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |p=137}}


Each U-boat made routine signals on exiting the [[Bay of Biscay]], which were picked up by the British [[Y service]] and plotted in [[Rodger Winn]]'s London Submarine Tracking Room, which were then able to follow the progress of the Type IXs across the Atlantic, and cable an early warning to the RCN. Working on the slimmest of evidence, Winn correctly deduced the target area and passed a detailed warning to Admiral King,<ref>Fairbank White, p. 147</ref> of a "heavy concentration of U-boats off the North American seaboard", including the five boats already on station and further groups that were in transit, 21 U-boats in all. Rear-Admiral [[Edwin T. Layton]] of the US Combined Operations and Intelligence Center then informed the responsible area commanders, but little or nothing else was done.<ref>Gannon 1990. Chapter 9</ref>
Each U-boat made routine signals on exiting the [[Bay of Biscay]], which were picked up by the British [[Y service]] and plotted in [[Rodger Winn]]'s London Submarine Tracking Room, which were then able to follow the progress of the Type IXs across the Atlantic, and cable an early warning to the RCN. Working on the slimmest of evidence, Winn correctly deduced the target area and passed a detailed warning to Admiral King,{{sfnp |Fairbank White |2006 |p=147 }} of a "heavy concentration of U-boats off the North American seaboard", including the five boats already on station and further groups that were in transit, 21 U-boats in all. Rear-Admiral [[Edwin T. Layton]] of the US Combined Operations and Intelligence Center then informed the responsible area commanders, but little or nothing else was done.{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |loc=chapter 9 }}


On 12 January 1942, Admiral Andrews was warned that "three or four U-boats" were about to commence operations against coastal shipping (in fact, there were indeed three),<ref>Gannon 1990. p. 212</ref> but he refused to institute a convoy system on the grounds that this would only provide the U-boats with more targets.
On 12 January 1942, Admiral Andrews was warned that "three or four U-boats" were about to commence operations against coastal shipping (in fact, there were indeed three),{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |p=212 }} but he refused to institute a convoy system on the grounds that this would only provide the U-boats with more targets.


When {{GS|U-123|1940|2}} sank the 9,500-ton Norwegian tanker ''Norness'' within sight of [[Long Island]] in the early hours of 14 January, no warships were dispatched to investigate, allowing the ''U-123'' to sink the 6,700-ton British tanker ''Coimbra'' off [[Sandy Hook, New Jersey|Sandy Hook]] on the following night before proceeding south towards [[New Jersey]]. By this time there were 13 destroyers idle in New York Harbor, yet none were employed to deal with the immediate threat, and over the following nights ''U-123'' was presented with a succession of easy targets, most of them burning navigation lamps. At times, ''U-123'' was operating in coastal waters that were so shallow that they barely allowed it to conceal itself, let alone evade a depth charge attack.
When {{GS|U-123|1940|2}} sank the 9,500-ton Norwegian tanker ''Norness'' within sight of [[Long Island]] in the early hours of 14 January, no warships were dispatched to investigate, allowing the ''U-123'' to sink the 6,700-ton British tanker ''Coimbra'' off [[Sandy Hook, New Jersey|Sandy Hook]] on the following night before proceeding south towards [[New Jersey]]. By this time there were 13 destroyers idle in New York Harbor, yet none were employed to deal with the immediate threat, and over the following nights ''U-123'' was presented with a succession of easy targets, most of them burning navigation lamps. At times, ''U-123'' was operating in coastal waters that were so shallow that they barely allowed it to conceal itself, let alone evade a depth charge attack.


=== Operation Drumbeat ===
=== Operation Drumbeat ===
The first attack wave, Operation Drumbeat, consisted of five Type IX boats. Their first victory upon arriving in the coastal region of North America was the Canadian freighter ''Cyclops'', sunk on 12 January off [[Nova Scotia]]. According to Robert Fisher, 26 more ships were sunk in the following nine days.<ref name="fisher_oil_34">Fisher (1993): p. 34</ref> The boats cruised along the coast, safely submerged through the day, and surfacing at night to pick off merchant vessels outlined against the lights of the cities.
The first attack wave, Operation Drumbeat, consisted of five Type IX boats. Their first victory upon arriving in the coastal region of North America was the Canadian freighter ''Cyclops'', sunk on 12 January off [[Nova Scotia]]. According to Robert Fisher, 26 more ships were sunk in the following nine days.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=34 }} The boats cruised along the coast, safely submerged through the day, and surfacing at night to pick off merchant vessels outlined against the lights of the cities.
* [[Reinhard Hardegen]] in {{GS|U-123|1940|2}} sank seven ships totalling 46,744 tons before he ran out of torpedoes and returned to base;
* [[Reinhard Hardegen]] in {{GS|U-123|1940|2}} sank seven ships totaling {{vague |date=June 2025 |reason=Are these short tons (ST) or long tons (LT)? |text=46,744 tons}} before he ran out of torpedoes and returned to base;
* [[Ernst Kals]] in {{GS|U-130|1941|2}} sank six ships of 36,988 tons;
* [[Ernst Kals]] in {{GS|U-130|1941|2}} sank six ships of {{vague |date=June 2025 |reason=Are these short tons (ST) or long tons (LT)? |text=36,988 tons;}}
* [[Robert-Richard Zapp]] in {{GS|U-66|1940|2}} sank five ships of 33,456 tons;
* [[Robert-Richard Zapp]] in {{GS|U-66|1940|2}} sank five ships of {{vague |date=June 2025 |reason=Are these short tons (ST) or long tons (LT)? |text=33,456 tons;}}
* [[Heinrich Bleichrodt]] in {{GS|U-109|1940|2}} sank four ships of 27,651 tons; and
* [[Heinrich Bleichrodt]] in {{GS|U-109|1940|2}} sank four ships of {{vague |date=June 2025 |reason=Are these short tons (ST) or long tons (LT)? |text=27,651 tons;}} and
* [[Ulrich Folkers]] on his first patrol in {{GS|U-125|1940|2}} sank one 6,666-ton vessel, the ''West Ivis'' (he was criticized by Dönitz for his poor performance, although he would later win the [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross]]).<ref name=Gannon/>{{rp|p. 271}}
* [[Ulrich Folkers]] on his first patrol in {{GS|U-125|1940|2}} sank one {{vague |date=June 2025 |reason=Are these short tons (ST) or long tons (LT)? |text=6,666-ton}} vessel, the ''West Ivis'' (he was criticized by Dönitz for his poor performance, although he would later win the [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross]]).{{sfnp |Gannon |1990 |p=271}}


When the first wave of U-boats returned to port through the early part of February, Dönitz wrote that each commander "had such an abundance of opportunities for attack that he could not by any means utilize them all: there were times when there were up to ten ships in sight, sailing with all lights burning on peacetime courses."
When the first wave of U-boats returned to port through the early part of February, Dönitz wrote that each commander;{{quote without source |date=June 2025}}
{{blockquote |text=had such an abundance of opportunities for attack that he could not by any means utilize them all: there were times when there were up to ten ships in sight, sailing with all lights burning on peacetime courses.}}


The RCN immediately organized coastal convoys when Drumbeat began despite the difficulty in finding escorts. 37 ships were lost in January and February, and only 11 in March and April. The RCN noted that by March and April the U-boats preferred hunting in US waters.<ref name="fisher_oil_35">Fisher (1993): p. 35</ref>
The RCN immediately organized coastal convoys when Drumbeat began despite the difficulty in finding escorts. 37 ships were lost in January and February, and only 11 in March and April. The RCN noted that by March and April the U-boats preferred hunting in US waters.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=35 }}


===U-boats in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico===
===U-boats in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico===
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The second wave of Type IX boats had arrived in North American waters, and the third wave ([[Operation Neuland]]) had reached its patrol area off the oil ports of the [[Caribbean]]. With such easy pickings and all Type IX boats already committed, Dönitz began sending shorter-range Type VIIs to the US East Coast as well. This required extraordinary measures: cramming every conceivable space with provisions, some even filling the fresh water tanks with diesel oil, and crossing the Atlantic at very low speed on a single engine to conserve fuel.
The second wave of Type IX boats had arrived in North American waters, and the third wave ([[Operation Neuland]]) had reached its patrol area off the oil ports of the [[Caribbean]]. With such easy pickings and all Type IX boats already committed, Dönitz began sending shorter-range Type VIIs to the US East Coast as well. This required extraordinary measures: cramming every conceivable space with provisions, some even filling the fresh water tanks with diesel oil, and crossing the Atlantic at very low speed on a single engine to conserve fuel.


In the United States there was still no concerted response to the attacks. Responsibility rested with Admiral King, but he was preoccupied with the Japanese onslaught in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]]. Admiral Andrews' North Atlantic Coastal Frontier was expanded to take in [[South Carolina]] and renamed the [[Eastern Sea Frontier]] (ESF), but most of the ships and aircraft needed remained under the command of Admiral [[Royal E. Ingersoll]], Commander-in-Chief, [[United States Fleet Forces Command|Atlantic Fleet]], who was often at sea and unavailable to make decisions. Rodger Winn's detailed weekly U-boat situation reports from the Submarine Tracking Room in London were available but ignored.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}} By April, Allied forces along the US east coast included 80 small patrol ships in the USN [[Eastern Sea Frontier]], 160 US aircraft, 24 RN ASW trawlers, and one British [[RAF Coastal Command|Coastal Command]] squadron. By British and Canadian standards these were enough to begin convoying, but no comprehensive convoy system was implemented that month.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_april_convoys"/> Instead, on 1 April the US implemented a partial convoy system where convoys moved along the coast in short hops, moving during daytime and stopping in protected anchorages during nights; these were slow and ineffective.<ref name="churchill_1950_122-123">Churchill (1950): pp. 122–123</ref><ref name="milner_2011_ch4_april_convoys"/>
In the United States there was still no concerted response to the attacks. Responsibility rested with Admiral King, but he was preoccupied with the Japanese onslaught in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]]. Admiral Andrews' North Atlantic Coastal Frontier was expanded to take in [[South Carolina]] and renamed the [[Eastern Sea Frontier]] (ESF), but most of the ships and aircraft needed remained under the command of Admiral [[Royal E. Ingersoll]], Commander-in-Chief, [[United States Fleet Forces Command|Atlantic Fleet]], who was often at sea and unavailable to make decisions. Rodger Winn's detailed weekly U-boat situation reports from the Submarine Tracking Room in London were available but ignored.{{citation needed|date=January 2022}} By April, Allied forces along the US east coast included 80 small patrol ships in the USN [[Eastern Sea Frontier]], 160 US aircraft, 24 RN ASW trawlers, and one British [[RAF Coastal Command|Coastal Command]] squadron. By British and Canadian standards these were enough to begin convoying, but no comprehensive convoy system was implemented that month.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_april_convoys"/> Instead, on 1 April the US implemented a partial convoy system where convoys moved along the coast in short hops, moving during daytime and stopping in protected anchorages during nights; these were slow and ineffective.{{sfnp |Churchill |1950 |pp=122–123 }}<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_april_convoys"/>


Coastal forces were reinforced from the [[Mid-Ocean Escort Force]] (MOEF) before March. The US contribution to the MOEF fell to part of one  group. Five RCN corvettes were withdrawn to escort the new [[BX convoys|Boston-Halifax convoys]], the first convoys along the American seaboard.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_moef">Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("Mid-ocean escort forces were further squeezed...")</ref> In April, a [[Royal Navy]] (RN) group redeployed to the Caribbean to defend tankers.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_april_convoys">Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("In the spring of 1942, the possibility of future problems...")</ref> The RCN attempted to reinforce the MOEF by using training ships in supporting roles.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_moef"/>
Coastal forces were reinforced from the [[Mid-Ocean Escort Force]] (MOEF) before March. The US contribution to the MOEF fell to part of one  group. Five RCN corvettes were withdrawn to escort the new [[BX convoys|Boston-Halifax convoys]], the first convoys along the American seaboard.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_moef">{{harvb |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 4 }}, "Mid-ocean escort forces were further squeezed..."</ref> In April, a [[Royal Navy]] (RN) group redeployed to the Caribbean to defend tankers.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_april_convoys">{{harvb |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 4 }}, "In the spring of 1942, the possibility of future problems..."</ref> The RCN attempted to reinforce the MOEF by using training ships in supporting roles.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_moef"/>


Allied tanker losses were alarming. Losses along the North American coast and in the Caribbean accounted for most of the 73 American tankers lost in the first half of 1942, and 22 British tankers lost in March; three out of the four largest Canadian tankers were also lost from February to May. In March, British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] urged the USN to organize coastal convoys, to little effect. The next month, British tankers from the Caribbean avoided the US coast and sailed east to [[Freetown]] in [[Africa]],<ref name="fisher_oil_34"/> while between 16 and 29 April the US ordered US and Caribbean coastal waters closed to commercial tanker movement.<ref name="fisher_oil_35"/> On 26 April, the US agreed to allow Britain to redeploy a MOEF group to establish Caribbean convoys, but the US refused to start its own Caribbean convoys or to provide escorts.<ref name="fisher_oil_36">Fisher (1993): p. 36</ref>
Allied tanker losses were alarming. Losses along the North American coast and in the Caribbean accounted for most of the 73 American tankers lost in the first half of 1942, and 22 British tankers lost in March; three out of the four largest Canadian tankers were also lost from February to May. In March, British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] urged the USN to organize coastal convoys, to little effect. The next month, British tankers from the Caribbean avoided the US coast and sailed east to [[Freetown]] in [[Africa]],{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=34 }} while between 16 and 29 April the US ordered US and Caribbean coastal waters closed to commercial tanker movement.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=35 }} On 26 April, the US agreed to allow Britain to redeploy a MOEF group to establish Caribbean convoys, but the US refused to start its own Caribbean convoys or to provide escorts.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=36 }}


Eastern Canada was dependent on imported oil from the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.<ref name="fisher_oil_33">Fisher (1993): p. 33</ref> The crisis led to gasoline rationing on 1 April, and the potential consequences of the US-ordered halt to tanker movements were severe. On 28 April, the RCN started [[ad hoc]] convoys to bring Canadian and Canadian-charted tankers trapped in the US and the Caribbean back to Halifax. On 1 May, the Government of Canada insisted that Canadian tankers be escorted, leading the RCN to organize formal convoys to the Caribbean through US coastal waters.<ref name="fisher_oil_35"/> The RCN had only enough escorts to run convoys from Halifax to Trinidad (coded as TH); the loss of supply from other regional suppliers had to be accepted.<ref name="fisher_oil_36"/> In July, Trinidad was replaced by Aruba to accommodate British tanker movement. From May to August, fourteen convoys including 76 tankers and 4 million barrels of oil were run without a single ship lost. The convoys were discontinued in August with the advent of the US's comprehensive convoying system.<ref name="fisher_oil_37">Fisher (1993): p. 37</ref> Canada also began convoys between Nova Scotia and [[Quebec City]] in May.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_overextension"/>
Eastern Canada was dependent on imported oil from the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=33 }} The crisis led to gasoline rationing on 1 April, and the potential consequences of the US-ordered halt to tanker movements were severe. On 28 April, the RCN started [[ad hoc]] convoys to bring Canadian and Canadian-charted tankers trapped in the US and the Caribbean back to Halifax. On 1 May, the Government of Canada insisted that Canadian tankers be escorted, leading the RCN to organize formal convoys to the Caribbean through US coastal waters.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=35 }} The RCN had only enough escorts to run convoys from Halifax to Trinidad (coded as TH); the loss of supply from other regional suppliers had to be accepted.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=36 }} In July, Trinidad was replaced by Aruba to accommodate British tanker movement. From May to August, fourteen convoys{{snd}}including 76 tankers and {{convert|4|e6oilbbl|e6L|abbr=off|order=flip}} of oil{{snd}}were run without a single ship lost. The convoys were discontinued in August with the advent of the US's comprehensive convoying system.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=37 }} Canada also began convoys between Nova Scotia and [[Quebec City]] in May.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_overextension"/>


The search for Allied tankers and the support of {{GS|U-459||2}}, a Type XIV, pushed the U-boat offensive into the Gulf of Mexico.<ref name="fisher_oil_36"/> On 21 April, ''U-459'' was 600 miles north-west of Bermuda; it refuelled fourteen U-boats through 6 May, including Type VIIs, headed for the Gulf and the Caribbean. In May, they sank 115 ships (of which 101 were steaming independently), about half being in the Gulf, with half of that tonnage being tankers. In June, they sank 122 ships, of which 108 were sailing independently. The Gulf Sea Frontier, formed in early February, had barely any resources and was ineffective.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_gulf">Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("As U-boat attacks spilled into the Gulf of Mexico...")</ref>
The search for Allied tankers and the support of {{GS|U-459||2}}, a Type XIV, pushed the U-boat offensive into the Gulf of Mexico.{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=36 }} On 21 April, ''U-459'' was 600 miles north-west of Bermuda; it refuelled fourteen U-boats through 6 May, including Type VIIs, headed for the Gulf and the Caribbean. In May, they sank 115 ships (of which 101 were steaming independently), about half being in the Gulf, with half of that tonnage being tankers. In June, they sank 122 ships, of which 108 were sailing independently. The Gulf Sea Frontier, formed in early February, had barely any resources and was ineffective.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_gulf">{{harvb |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 4 }}, "As U-boat attacks spilled into the Gulf of Mexico..."</ref>


=== US convoys arrive ===
=== US convoys arrive ===
The first organized US coastal convoy sailed on 14 May 1942 from [[Hampton Roads]] for [[Key West]]; convoys eventually extended to Halifax.<ref name="churchill_1950_122-123"/> The US sought another  15 to 20 corvettes from Britain.<ref>Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("By mid-May, with both the British and Canadians operating...")</ref> By this time, two British escort groups were already in the Caribbean and the MOEF was under strain. Nonetheless, Britain and Canada responded to US requests by reducing the size of the remaining MOEF groups. The MOEF and the RCN had no further slack. The RCN struggled to meet its commitments even with 90% of its escort fleet being operational, as opposed to being used for training or being refitted;<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_overextension">Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("While Hecht was chasing convoys in the mid-ocean...")</ref> the negative effects of this over-extension would be felt well into 1943.<ref name="milner_2011_ch5_overextension">Milner (2011): chapter 5 ("By late summer 1942, the RCN was over extended...")</ref>  By comparison the RN escort fleet was merely two-thirds operational.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_overextension"/> The weakening of MOEF contributed to difficulties in the mid-Atlantic in August.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_moef"/>
The first organized US coastal convoy sailed on 14 May 1942 from [[Hampton Roads]] for [[Key West]]; convoys eventually extended to Halifax.{{sfnp |Churchill |1950 |pp=122–123 }} The US sought another  15 to 20 corvettes from Britain.{{sfnp |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 4, "By mid-May, with both the British and Canadians operating..." }} By this time, two British escort groups were already in the Caribbean and the MOEF was under strain. Nonetheless, Britain and Canada responded to US requests by reducing the size of the remaining MOEF groups. The MOEF and the RCN had no further slack. The RCN struggled to meet its commitments even with 90% of its escort fleet being operational, as opposed to being used for training or being refitted;<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_overextension">{{harvb |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 4 }}, "While Hecht was chasing convoys in the mid-ocean..."</ref> the negative effects of this over-extension would be felt well into 1943.<ref name="milner_2011_ch5_overextension">{{harvb |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 5 }}, "By late summer 1942, the RCN was over extended..."</ref>  By comparison the RN escort fleet was merely two-thirds operational.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_overextension"/> The weakening of MOEF contributed to difficulties in the mid-Atlantic in August.<ref name="milner_2011_ch4_moef"/>


The US convoy system effectively brought the crisis to an end. By early-July most U-boats only operated along the perimeter of the Caribbean. German attention returned to the mid-Atlantic.<ref>Milner (2011): chapter 4 ("By early July, four U-boats were still slaughtering...")</ref>
The US convoy system effectively brought the crisis to an end. By early-July most U-boats only operated along the perimeter of the Caribbean. German attention returned to the mid-Atlantic.{{sfnp |Milner |2011 |loc=chapter 4, "By early July, four U-boats were still slaughtering..." }}
 
== Propaganda ==
{{Empty section|date=May 2025}}


==Losses==
==Losses==
===Allies===
===Allies===
[[File:Benson3 big.jpg|thumb|[[SS Byron D. Benson|SS ''Byron D. Benson'']] torpedoed on 4 April 1942 east of [[Southern Shores, North Carolina]].]]
[[File:Benson3 big.jpg|thumb|[[SS Byron D. Benson|SS ''Byron D. Benson'']] torpedoed on 4 April 1942 east of [[Southern Shores, North Carolina]].]]
* 12 January – Canadian steamship [[SS Cyclops (1906)|''Cyclops'']] sunk by {{GS|U-123|1940|2}}<ref name="fisher_oil_34"/> (87 of 182 crew, gunners, and passengers were lost)<ref>Tennant (2001) p. 178</ref>
* 12 January – Canadian steamship [[SS Cyclops (1906)|''Cyclops'']] sunk by {{GS|U-123|1940|2}}{{sfnp |Fisher |1993 |p=34 }} (87 of 182 crew, gunners, and passengers were lost){{sfnp |Tennant |2001 |p=178 }}
* 14 January – Panamanian tanker ''Norness'' sunk by {{GS|U-123|1940|2}} at {{coord|40.44|-70.91|type:event|display=inline|name=Norness sunk by U-123}}<ref name="cressman69">Cressman (2000) p. 69</ref>
* 14 January – Panamanian tanker ''Norness'' sunk by {{GS|U-123|1940|2}} at {{coord|40.44|-70.91|type:event|display=inline|name=Norness sunk by U-123}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=69 }}
* 18 January – US tanker ''Allan Jackson'' sunk by {{GS|U-66|1940|2}} at {{coord|35.95|-74.33|display=inline|type:event}} (23 of 35 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman70">Cressman (2000) p. 70</ref>
* 18 January – US tanker ''Allan Jackson'' sunk by {{GS|U-66|1940|2}} at {{coord|35.95|-74.33|display=inline|type:event}} (23 of 35 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=70 }}
* 18 January – US tanker ''Malay'' damaged by ''U-123'' at {{coord|35.42|-75.38|display=inline|type:event}} (5 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman70"/>
* 18 January – US tanker ''Malay'' damaged by ''U-123'' at {{coord|35.42|-75.38|display=inline|type:event}} (5 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=70 }}
* 19 January – US steamship ''City of Atlanta'' sunk by {{GS|U-123|1940|2}} at {{coord|35.70|-75.35|display=inline|type:event}} (43 of 46 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman70"/>
* 19 January – US steamship ''City of Atlanta'' sunk by {{GS|U-123|1940|2}} at {{coord|35.70|-75.35|display=inline|type:event}} (43 of 46 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=70 }}
* 19 January – Canadian steamship ''Lady Hawkins'' sunk by ''U-66'' at {{coord|35.0|-72.5|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman70"/> (251 of 322 crew, gunners, and passengers were lost)<ref>Tennant (2001) p. 57</ref>
* 19 January – Canadian steamship ''Lady Hawkins'' sunk by ''U-66'' at {{coord|35.0|-72.5|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=70 }} (251 of 322 crew, gunners, and passengers were lost){{sfnp |Tennant |2001 |p=57 }}
* 22 January – US freighter ''Norvana'' sunk by ''U-123'' south of [[Cape Hatteras]] (no survivors)<ref name="cressman71">Cressman (2000) p. 71</ref>
* 22 January – US freighter ''Norvana'' sunk by ''U-123'' south of [[Cape Hatteras]] (no survivors){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=71 }}
* 23 January – US collier ''[[SS Venore|Venore]]'' sunk by ''U-66'' at {{coord|35.83|-75.33|display=inline|type:event}} (17 of 41 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman71"/>
* 23 January – US collier ''[[SS Venore|Venore]]'' sunk by ''U-66'' at {{coord|35.83|-75.33|display=inline|type:event}} (17 of 41 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=71 }}
* 25 January – US tanker ''Olney'' damaged by {{GS|U-125|1940|2}} at {{coord|37.92|-74.93|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman71"/>
* 25 January – US tanker ''Olney'' damaged by {{GS|U-125|1940|2}} at {{coord|37.92|-74.93|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=71 }}
* 26 January – US freighter ''West Ivis'' sunk by ''U-125'' (all 45 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman71"/>
* 26 January – US freighter ''West Ivis'' sunk by ''U-125'' (all 45 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=71 }}
* 27 January – US tanker ''Francis E. Powell'' sunk by ''U-130'' at {{coord|37.75|-74.88|display=inline|type:event}} (4 of 32 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman72">Cressman (2000) p. 72</ref>
* 27 January – US tanker ''Francis E. Powell'' sunk by ''U-130'' at {{coord|37.75|-74.88|display=inline|type:event}} (4 of 32 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=72 }}
* 27 January – US tanker ''Halo'' damaged by ''U-130'' at {{coord|35.55|-75.33|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman72"/>
* 27 January – US tanker ''Halo'' damaged by ''U-130'' at {{coord|35.55|-75.33|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=72 }}
* 30 January – US tanker ''Rochester'' sunk by {{GS|U-106|1940|2}} at {{coord|37.17|-73.97|display=inline|type:event}} (3 of 32 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman72"/>
* 30 January – US tanker ''Rochester'' sunk by {{GS|U-106|1940|2}} at {{coord|37.17|-73.97|display=inline|type:event}} (3 of 32 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=72 }}
* 31 January – US ''San Arcadio'' sunk by {{GS|U-107|1940|2}} at {{coord|38.17|-63.83|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman72"/>
* 31 January – US ''San Arcadio'' sunk by {{GS|U-107|1940|2}} at {{coord|38.17|-63.83|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=72 }}
* 31 January – US ''Tacoma Star'' sunk by ''U-109'' at {{coord|37.55|-69.35|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman72"/>
* 31 January – US ''Tacoma Star'' sunk by ''U-109'' at {{coord|37.55|-69.35|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=72 }}
* 2 February – US tanker ''W.L. Steed'' sunk by {{GS|U-103|1940|2}} at {{coord|38.42|-72.72|display=inline|type:event}} (34 of 38 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman73">Cressman (2000) p. 73</ref>
* 2 February – US tanker ''W.L. Steed'' sunk by {{GS|U-103|1940|2}} at {{coord|38.42|-72.72|display=inline|type:event}} (34 of 38 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=73 }}
* 3 February – Panamanian freighter ''San Gil'' sunk by ''U-103'' at {{coord|38.08|-74.67|display=inline|type:event}} (2 of 40 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman73"/>
* 3 February – Panamanian freighter ''San Gil'' sunk by ''U-103'' at {{coord|38.08|-74.67|display=inline|type:event}} (2 of 40 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=73 }}
* 4 February – US tanker ''[[SS India Arrow|India Arrow]]'' sunk by ''U-103'' at {{coord|38.80|-73.67|display=inline|type:event}} (26 of 38 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman73"/>
* 4 February – US tanker ''[[SS India Arrow|India Arrow]]'' sunk by ''U-103'' at {{coord|38.80|-73.67|display=inline|type:event}} (26 of 38 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=73 }}
* 5 February – US tanker ''[[SS China Arrow|China Arrow]]'' sunk by ''U-103'' at {{coord|38.73|-73.30|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman73"/>
* 5 February – US tanker ''[[SS China Arrow|China Arrow]]'' sunk by ''U-103'' at {{coord|38.73|-73.30|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=73 }}
* 6 February – US freighter ''Major Wheeler'' sunk by ''U-107'' (all 35 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman74">Cressman (2000) p. 74</ref>
* 6 February – US freighter ''Major Wheeler'' sunk by ''U-107'' (all 35 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=74 }}
* 8 February – British freighter ''Ocean Venture'' sunk by ''U-108'' at {{coord|37.08|-74.75|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman74"/> (31 of 45 crew, and gunners were lost)<ref>Tennant (2001) p. 198</ref>
* 8 February – British freighter ''Ocean Venture'' sunk by ''U-108'' at {{coord|37.08|-74.75|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=74 }} (31 of 45 crew, and gunners were lost){{sfnp |Tennant |2001 |p=198 }}
* 10 February – Canadian tanker ''Victolite'' sunk by {{GS|U-564||2}} at {{coord|36.20|-67.23|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman74"/> (all 47 crew and gunners were lost)<ref>Tennant (2001) p. 188</ref>
* 10 February – Canadian tanker ''Victolite'' sunk by {{GS|U-564||2}} at {{coord|36.20|-67.23|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=74 }} (all 47 crew and gunners were lost){{sfnp |Tennant |2001 |p=188 }}
* 15 February – Brazilian steamship ''Buarque'' sunk by ''U-432'' at {{coord|36.58|-75.33|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman75">Cressman (2000) p. 75</ref>
* 15 February – Brazilian steamship ''Buarque'' sunk by ''U-432'' at {{coord|36.58|-75.33|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=75 }}
* 18 February – Brazilian tanker ''Olinda'' sunk by ''U-432'' at {{coord|37.5|-75.0|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman76">Cressman (2000) p. 76</ref>
* 18 February – Brazilian tanker ''Olinda'' sunk by ''U-432'' at {{coord|37.5|-75.0|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=76 }}
* 19 February – US tanker ''Pan Massachusetts'' sunk by {{GS|U-128|1941|2}} at {{coord|28.45|-80.13|display=inline|type:event}} (20 of 38 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman76"/>
* 19 February – US tanker ''Pan Massachusetts'' sunk by {{GS|U-128|1941|2}} at {{coord|28.45|-80.13|display=inline|type:event}} (20 of 38 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=76 }}
* 20 February – US freighter ''Azalea City'' sunk by ''U-432'' at {{coord|38.0|-73.0|display=inline|type:event}} (All 38 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman77">Cressman (2000) p. 77</ref>
* 20 February – US freighter ''Azalea City'' sunk by ''U-432'' at {{coord|38.0|-73.0|display=inline|type:event}} (All 38 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=77 }}
* 21 February – US tanker ''Republic'' sunk by {{GS|U-504||2}} at {{coord|27.08|-80.25|display=inline|type:event}} (5 of 29 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman77"/>
* 21 February – US tanker ''Republic'' sunk by {{GS|U-504||2}} at {{coord|27.08|-80.25|display=inline|type:event}} (5 of 29 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=77 }}
* 22 February – US tanker ''Cities Service Empire'' sunk by ''U-128'' at {{coord|28.00|-80.27|display=inline|type:event}} (14 of 50 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman77"/>
* 22 February – US tanker ''Cities Service Empire'' sunk by ''U-128'' at {{coord|28.00|-80.27|display=inline|type:event}} (14 of 50 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=77 }}
* 22 February – US tanker ''W.D. Anderson'' sunk by ''U-504'' at {{coord|27.15|-79.93|display=inline|type:event}} (35 of 36 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman77"/>
* 22 February – US tanker ''W.D. Anderson'' sunk by ''U-504'' at {{coord|27.15|-79.93|display=inline|type:event}} (35 of 36 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=77 }}
* 26 February – US bulk carrier ''Marore'' sunk by ''U-432'' at {{coord|35.55|-74.97|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman79">Cressman (2000) p. 79</ref>
* 26 February – US bulk carrier ''Marore'' sunk by ''U-432'' at {{coord|35.55|-74.97|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=79 }}
* 26 February – US tanker ''[[SS R.P. Resor|R.P. Resor]]'' sunk by ''U-578'' at {{coord|39.78|-73.43|display=inline|type:event}} (47 of 49 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman79"/>
* 26 February – US tanker ''[[SS R.P. Resor|R.P. Resor]]'' sunk by ''U-578'' at {{coord|39.78|-73.43|display=inline|type:event}} (47 of 49 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=79 }}
* 28 February – US destroyer {{USS|Jacob Jones|DD-130|2}} sunk by ''U-578'' at {{coord|38.70|-74.65|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman79"/>
* 28 February – US destroyer {{USS|Jacob Jones|DD-130|2}} sunk by ''U-578'' at {{coord|38.70|-74.65|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=79 }}
* 7 March – US freighter ''Barbara'' sunk by ''U-126'' at {{coord|20.00|-73.93|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman81">Cressman (2000) p. 81</ref>
* 7 March – US freighter ''Barbara'' sunk by ''U-126'' at {{coord|20.00|-73.93|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=81 }}
* 7 March – US freighter ''Cardonia'' sunk by ''U-126'' at {{coord|19.88|-73.45|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman81"/>
* 7 March – US freighter ''Cardonia'' sunk by ''U-126'' at {{coord|19.88|-73.45|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=81 }}
* 7 March – Brazilian steamship ''Arabutan'' sunk by {{GS|U-155|1941|2}} at {{coord|35.25|-73.92|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman81"/>
* 7 March – Brazilian steamship ''Arabutan'' sunk by {{GS|U-155|1941|2}} at {{coord|35.25|-73.92|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=81 }}
* 9 March – Brazilian steamship ''Cayru'' sunk by {{GS|U-94|1940|2}} at {{coord|39.16|-72.03|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman81"/>
* 9 March – Brazilian steamship ''Cayru'' sunk by {{GS|U-94|1940|2}} at {{coord|39.16|-72.03|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=81 }}
* 10 March – US tanker ''Gulftrade'' sunk by ''U-588'' at {{coord|39.84|-73.87|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman82">Cressman (2000) p. 82</ref>
* 10 March – US tanker ''Gulftrade'' sunk by ''U-588'' at {{coord|39.84|-73.87|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 11 March – US freighter ''Texan'' sunk by ''U-126'' at {{coord|21.53|-76.40|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 11 March – US freighter ''Texan'' sunk by ''U-126'' at {{coord|21.53|-76.40|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 11 March – US freighter ''Caribsea'' sunk by ''U-158'' at {{coord|34.67|-76.16|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 11 March – US freighter ''Caribsea'' sunk by ''U-158'' at {{coord|34.67|-76.16|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 12 March – US tanker ''John D. Gill'' sunk by ''U-158'' at {{coord|35.92|-77.65|display=inline|type:event}} (4 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 12 March – US tanker ''John D. Gill'' sunk by ''U-158'' at {{coord|35.92|-77.65|display=inline|type:event}} (4 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 12 March – US freighter ''Olga'' sunk by ''U-126'' at {{coord|23.65|-77.00|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 12 March – US freighter ''Olga'' sunk by ''U-126'' at {{coord|23.65|-77.00|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 12 March – US freighter ''Colabee'' damaged by ''U-126'' at {{coord|22.23|-77.58|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 12 March – US freighter ''Colabee'' damaged by ''U-126'' at {{coord|22.23|-77.58|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 13 March – US schooner ''Albert F. Paul'' sunk by ''U-332'' at {{coord|26.0|-72.0|display=inline|type:event}} (no survivors)<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 13 March – US schooner ''Albert F. Paul'' sunk by ''U-332'' at {{coord|26.0|-72.0|display=inline|type:event}} (no survivors){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 13 March – Chilean freighter ''Tolten'' sunk by {{GS|U-404||2}} at {{coord|40.16|-73.84|display=inline|type:event}} (15 of 16 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 13 March – Chilean freighter ''Tolten'' sunk by {{GS|U-404||2}} at {{coord|40.16|-73.84|display=inline|type:event}} (15 of 16 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 14 March – US collier ''Lemuel Burrows'' sunk by ''U-404'' at {{coord|39.20|-74.27|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 14 March – US collier ''Lemuel Burrows'' sunk by ''U-404'' at {{coord|39.20|-74.27|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 15 March – US tanker ''Ario'' sunk by ''U-158'' at {{coord|34.33|-76.65|display=inline|type:event}} (7 of 36 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 15 March – US tanker ''Ario'' sunk by ''U-158'' at {{coord|34.33|-76.65|display=inline|type:event}} (7 of 36 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 15 March – US tanker ''Olean'' sunk by ''U-158'' at {{coord|34.40|-76.48|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 15 March – US tanker ''Olean'' sunk by ''U-158'' at {{coord|34.40|-76.48|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 16 March – US tanker ''Australia'' sunk by ''U-332'' at {{coord|35.12|-75.37|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman82"/>
* 16 March – US tanker ''Australia'' sunk by ''U-332'' at {{coord|35.12|-75.37|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=82 }}
* 16 March – British tanker ''[[MV San Demetrio|San Demetrio]]'' sunk by ''U-404'' at {{coord|37.05|-73.84|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman83">Cressman (2000) p. 83</ref> (19 of 51 crew, and gunners were lost)<ref>Tennant (2001) p. 110</ref>
* 16 March – British tanker ''[[MV San Demetrio|San Demetrio]]'' sunk by ''U-404'' at {{coord|37.05|-73.84|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }} (19 of 51 crew, and gunners were lost){{sfnp |Tennant |2001 |p=110 }}
* 17 March – US tanker ''[[USS Abarenda (IX-131)|Acme]]'' damaged by {{GS|U-124|1940|2}} at {{coord|35.10|-76.67|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 17 March – US tanker ''[[USS Abarenda (IX-131)|Acme]]'' damaged by {{GS|U-124|1940|2}} at {{coord|35.10|-76.67|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 17 March – Greek freighter ''Kassandra Louloudi'' sunk by ''U-124'' four mile off Diamond Shoals gas buoy<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 17 March – Greek freighter ''Kassandra Louloudi'' sunk by ''U-124'' four mile off Diamond Shoals gas buoy{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 17 March – Honduran freighter ''Ceiba'' sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|35.72|-73.82|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 17 March – Honduran freighter ''Ceiba'' sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|35.72|-73.82|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 18 March – US tanker {{SS|E.M. Clark||2}} sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|34.84|-75.58|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 18 March – US tanker {{SS|E.M. Clark||2}} sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|34.84|-75.58|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 18 March – US tanker ''Papoose'' sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|34.28|-76.65|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 18 March – US tanker ''Papoose'' sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|34.28|-76.65|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 18 March – US tanker ''W.E. Hutton'' sunk by ''U-332'' at {{coord|34.08|-76.67|display=inline|type:event}} (13 of 36 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 18 March – US tanker ''W.E. Hutton'' sunk by ''U-332'' at {{coord|34.08|-76.67|display=inline|type:event}} (13 of 36 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 19 March – US freighter ''Liberator'' sunk by ''U-332'' at {{coord|35.08|-75.50|display=inline|type:event}} (5 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 19 March – US freighter ''Liberator'' sunk by ''U-332'' at {{coord|35.08|-75.50|display=inline|type:event}} (5 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 20 March – US tanker ''Oakmar'' sunk by ''U-71'' at {{coord|36.35|-68.84|display=inline|type:event}} (6 of 36 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 20 March – US tanker ''Oakmar'' sunk by ''U-71'' at {{coord|36.35|-68.84|display=inline|type:event}} (6 of 36 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 21 March – US tanker ''Esso Nashville'' sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|33.58|-77.37|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 21 March – US tanker ''Esso Nashville'' sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|33.58|-77.37|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 21 March – US tanker ''Atlantic Sun'' damaged by ''U-124''<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 21 March – US tanker ''Atlantic Sun'' damaged by ''U-124''{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 22 March – US tanker ''Naeco'' sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|33.98|-76.67|display=inline|type:event}} (24 of 39 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 22 March – US tanker ''Naeco'' sunk by ''U-124'' at {{coord|33.98|-76.67|display=inline|type:event}} (24 of 39 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 25 March – Dutch tanker ''Ocana'' sunk by {{GS|U-552||2}} at {{coord|42.60|-64.42|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman83"/>
* 25 March – Dutch tanker ''Ocana'' sunk by {{GS|U-552||2}} at {{coord|42.60|-64.42|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=83 }}
* 26 March – US [[Q-ship]] {{USS|Atik|AK-101|6}} sunk by ''U-123'' at {{coord|36.0|-70.0|display=inline|type:event}} (All 139 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman84">Cressman (2000) p. 84</ref>
* 26 March – US [[Q-ship]] {{USS|Atik|AK-101|6}} sunk by ''U-123'' at {{coord|36.0|-70.0|display=inline|type:event}} (All 139 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=84 }}
* 26 March – US tanker [[SS Dixie Arrow|''Dixie Arrow'']] sunk by ''[[German submarine U-71|U-71]]'' at {{coord|34.98|-75.55|display=inline|type:event}} (11 of 33 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman84"/>
* 26 March – US tanker [[SS Dixie Arrow|''Dixie Arrow'']] sunk by ''[[German submarine U-71|U-71]]'' at {{coord|34.98|-75.55|display=inline|type:event}} (11 of 33 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=84 }}
* 26 March – Panamanian tanker ''Equipoise'' sunk by ''[[German submarine U-160 (1941)|U-160]]'' at {{coord|36.60|-74.75|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman84"/>
* 26 March – Panamanian tanker ''Equipoise'' sunk by ''[[German submarine U-160 (1941)|U-160]]'' at {{coord|36.60|-74.75|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=84 }}
* 29 March – US steamship ''[[SS City of New York (1930)|City of New York]]'' sunk by ''U-160'' at {{coord|35.27|-74.42|display=inline|type:event}} (24 of 157 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman84"/>
* 29 March – US steamship ''[[SS City of New York (1930)|City of New York]]'' sunk by ''U-160'' at {{coord|35.27|-74.42|display=inline|type:event}} (24 of 157 crewmen perished){{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=84 }}
* 31 March – US tug ''Menominee'' and barges ''Allegheny'' and ''Barnegat'' sunk by {{GS|U-754||2}} at {{coord|37.57|-75.42|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman84"/>
* 31 March – US tug ''Menominee'' and barges ''Allegheny'' and ''Barnegat'' sunk by {{GS|U-754||2}} at {{coord|37.57|-75.42|display=inline|type:event}}{{sfnp |Cressman |2000 |p=84 }}
* 31 March – US tanker ''Tiger'' sunk by ''U-754'' (1 of 43 crewmen perishes)<ref name="cressman85">Cressman (2000) p. 85</ref>
* 31 March – US tanker ''Tiger'' sunk by ''U-754'' (1 of 43 crewmen perishes)<ref name="cressman85">Cressman (2000) p. 85</ref>
* 3 April – US freighter ''Otho'' sunk by ''U-754'' at {{coord|36.42|-71.95|display=inline|type:event}} (31 of 53 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman85"/>
* 3 April – US freighter ''Otho'' sunk by ''U-754'' at {{coord|36.42|-71.95|display=inline|type:event}} (31 of 53 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman85"/>
Line 154: Line 152:
* 6 April – US tanker ''Bidwell'' damaged by ''U-160'' {{coord|34.42|-75.95|display=inline|type:event}} (1 of 33 crewmen perishes)<ref name="cressman86">Cressman (2000) p. 86</ref>
* 6 April – US tanker ''Bidwell'' damaged by ''U-160'' {{coord|34.42|-75.95|display=inline|type:event}} (1 of 33 crewmen perishes)<ref name="cressman86">Cressman (2000) p. 86</ref>
* 7 April – Norwegian freighter ''Lancing'' sunk by ''U-552'' off Cape Hatteras<ref name="cressman86"/>
* 7 April – Norwegian freighter ''Lancing'' sunk by ''U-552'' off Cape Hatteras<ref name="cressman86"/>
* 7 April – British tanker ''[[British Splendour (ship)|British Splendour]]'' sunk by ''U-552'' off Cape Hatteras<ref name="cressman86"/> (12 of 53 crew and gunners were lost)<ref name="Tennant 2001 p.44">Tennant (2001) p. 44</ref>
* 7 April – British tanker ''[[British Splendour (ship)|British Splendour]]'' sunk by ''U-552'' off Cape Hatteras<ref name="cressman86"/> (12 of 53 crew and gunners were lost){{sfnp |Tennant |2001 |p=44 }}
* 8 April – US tanker ''Oklahoma'' damaged by ''U-123'' at {{coord|31.30|-80.98|display=inline|type:event}} (19 of 37 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman86"/>
* 8 April – US tanker ''Oklahoma'' damaged by ''U-123'' at {{coord|31.30|-80.98|display=inline|type:event}} (19 of 37 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman86"/>
* 8 April – US tanker ''Esso Baton Rouge'' damaged by ''U-123'' at {{coord|31.22|-80.08|display=inline|type:event}} (3 of 39 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman86"/>
* 8 April – US tanker ''Esso Baton Rouge'' damaged by ''U-123'' at {{coord|31.22|-80.08|display=inline|type:event}} (3 of 39 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman86"/>
Line 163: Line 161:
* 10 April – US tanker ''Gulfamerica'' sunk by ''U-123'' at {{coord|30.23|-81.30|display=inline|type:event}} (19 of 48 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman87"/>
* 10 April – US tanker ''Gulfamerica'' sunk by ''U-123'' at {{coord|30.23|-81.30|display=inline|type:event}} (19 of 48 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman87"/>
* 11 April – US tanker ''Harry F. Sinclair Jr.'' damaged by ''U-203'' at {{coord|34.42|-76.50|display=inline|type:event}} (10 of 36 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman87"/>
* 11 April – US tanker ''Harry F. Sinclair Jr.'' damaged by ''U-203'' at {{coord|34.42|-76.50|display=inline|type:event}} (10 of 36 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman87"/>
* 11 April – British steamship ''Ulysses'' sunk by ''U-160'' at {{coord|34.38|-75.58|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman87"/> (all 290 crew, gunners, and passengers rescued)<ref>Tennant (2001) p. 175</ref>
* 11 April – British steamship ''Ulysses'' sunk by ''U-160'' at {{coord|34.38|-75.58|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman87"/> (all 290 crew, gunners, and passengers rescued){{sfnp |Tennant |2001 |p=175 }}
* 12 April – Panamanian tanker ''Stanvac Melbourne'' sunk by ''U-203'' at {{coord|33.88|-77.48|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman87"/>
* 12 April – Panamanian tanker ''Stanvac Melbourne'' sunk by ''U-203'' at {{coord|33.88|-77.48|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman87"/>
* 12 April – US freighter ''Leslie'' sunk by ''U-123'' at {{coord|28.62|-80.42|display=inline|type:event}} (3 of 32 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman87"/>
* 12 April – US freighter ''Leslie'' sunk by ''U-123'' at {{coord|28.62|-80.42|display=inline|type:event}} (3 of 32 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman87"/>
* 14 April – British freighter ''Empire Thrush'' sunk by ''U-203'' at {{coord|35.20|-75.23|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman88">Cressman (2000) p. 88</ref> (all 55 crew and gunners rescued)<ref name="Tennant 2001 p.44"/>
* 14 April – British freighter ''Empire Thrush'' sunk by ''U-203'' at {{coord|35.20|-75.23|display=inline|type:event}}<ref name="cressman88">Cressman (2000) p. 88</ref> (all 55 crew and gunners rescued){{sfnp |Tennant |2001 |p=44 }}
* 14 April – US freighter ''Margaret'' sunk by {{GS|U-571||2}} at {{coord|35.20|-75.23|display=inline|type:event}} (All 29 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman88"/>
* 14 April – US freighter ''Margaret'' sunk by {{GS|U-571||2}} at {{coord|35.20|-75.23|display=inline|type:event}} (All 29 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman88"/>
* 15 April – US freighter ''Robin Hood'' sunk by ''U-575'' at {{coord|38.65|-66.63|display=inline|type:event}} (14 of 38 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman88"/>
* 15 April – US freighter ''Robin Hood'' sunk by ''U-575'' at {{coord|38.65|-66.63|display=inline|type:event}} (14 of 38 crewmen perished)<ref name="cressman88"/>
Line 229: Line 227:
* {{GS|U-106|1940|2}}: active in the east coast operations, sunk 2 August 1943, by aircraft attack by [[No. 461 Squadron RAAF]] flown by Flight Lieutenant A. F. Clarke.
* {{GS|U-106|1940|2}}: active in the east coast operations, sunk 2 August 1943, by aircraft attack by [[No. 461 Squadron RAAF]] flown by Flight Lieutenant A. F. Clarke.


==Notes==
==References==
{{Reflist}}
{{Reflist |20em}}


==Bibliography==
==Sources==
* Bauer, E. ''The History of the Second World War''.
{{Refbegin |30em |indent=yes}}
* {{cite book |last=Behrens |first=C. B. A. |author-link=Betty Behrens |series=History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series |title=Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War  |year=1955 |publisher=HMSO and Longmans |location=London |oclc=557756251|url=https://archive.org/details/merchant-shipping-demands-of-war}}
* {{cite book |last=Blair |first=Clay |title=Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–1942 |publisher=Random House |year=1996 |isbn=0394588398}}
* Blair, Clay ''Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–1942'' Random House (1996) {{ISBN|0394588398}}
* {{cite book |last=Churchill |first=Winston |author-link=Winston Churchill |title=The Hinge of Fate |series=[[The Second World War]] |publisher =Houghton Mifflin Company |date=1950 |location=Boston}}
* {{cite book |last=Churchill |first=Winston |author-link=Winston Churchill |title=The Hinge of Fate |series=[[The Second World War]] |publisher =Houghton Mifflin Company |date=1950 |location=Boston}}
* {{cite book |last=Cressman |first=R. J. |year=2000|title=The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II |location=Annapolis |publisher=Naval Institute Press |isbn=1557501491 |url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/TheOfficialChronologyOfTheUSNavyInWorldWarII}}
* {{cite book |last=Cressman |first=R. J. |year=2000|title=The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II |location=Annapolis |publisher=Naval Institute Press |isbn=1557501491 |url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/TheOfficialChronologyOfTheUSNavyInWorldWarII}}
* Ellis, John. ''The World War II Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants''. London: Aurum Press, 1993. {{ISBN|1854102540}}.
* {{cite book |last=Fairbank White |first=David |title=Bitter Ocean: The dramatic story of the Battle of the Atlantic 1939–1945 |year=2006 |publisher=Headline Publishing Group |isbn=9780755310890 }}
* Fairbank White, David. ''Bitter Ocean: The dramatic story of the Battle of the Atlantic 1939–1945'', 2006, Headline Publishing Group, {{ISBN|9780755310890}}.
* {{cite journal |last=Fisher |first=Robert C. |date=April 1993 |title='We'll Get Our Own': Canada And The Oil Shipping Crisis Of 1942 |url=https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol03/tnm_3_2_33-39.pdf |journal=The Northern Mariner |volume=3 |issue=2 |pages=33–39 |publisher=Canadian Nautical Research Society; North American Society for Oceanic History |doi=10.25071/2561-5467.772 |s2cid=247653126 |access-date=23 January 2022}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Fisher |first1=Robert C. |date=April 1993 |title='We'll Get Our Own': Canada And The Oil Shipping Crisis Of 1942 |url=https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol03/tnm_3_2_33-39.pdf |journal=The Northern Mariner |volume=3 |issue=2 |pages=33–39 |publisher=Canadian Nautical Research Society; North American Society for Oceanic History |doi=10.25071/2561-5467.772 |s2cid=247653126 |access-date=23 January 2022}}
* {{cite book |last=Gannon |first=Michael |year=1990 |title=Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany's First U-Boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II |location=New York |publisher=Harper and Row |isbn=0-06-016155-8 }}
* Gannon, Michael. ''Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany's First U-Boat Attacks Along the American Coast in World War II''. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. {{ISBN|0060161558}}.
* {{cite book |last=Milner |first=Marc |author-link=Marc Milner |year=2011 |title=Battle of the Atlantic |edition=2nd |location=Stroud |publisher=The History Press |isbn=978-0-7524-6646-0}}
* {{cite book |last1=Milner |first1=Marc |authorlink=Marc Milner |year=2011 |title=Battle of the Atlantic |edition=2nd |location=Stroud |publisher=The History Press |isbn=978-0-7524-6646-0}}
* {{cite book |last=Tennant |first=Alan J. |title=British and Commonwealth Merchant Ship Losses to Axis Submarines 1939–1945 |publisher=Sutton |year=2001 |isbn=0750927607 }}
* Morison, Samuel Eliot. ''A History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II Vol. I: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 – May 1943''. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947.
* {{citation |title=U-Boat War |year=2001 |publisher=BFS Video |asin=B00005BGQZ }}. {{UPC|066805814440}}.
* {{cite book|last= Roskill |first= Stephen Wentworth |authorlink=Stephen Roskill |title=The War at Sea, 1939–1945 |volume=II The Period of Balance |series=[[History of the Second World War]] |location=London |publisher=HMSO |date= 1956}}
{{Refend}}
* Tennant, Alan J. ''British and Commonwealth Merchant Ship Losses to Axis Submarines 1939–1945'' Sutton (2001) {{ISBN|0750927607}}
 
* ''U-Boat War''. (2001). BFS Video. {{asin|B00005BGQZ}}. {{UPC|066805814440}}.
==Further reading==
{{Refbegin |30em |indent=yes}}
* {{citation |last=Bauer |first=E. |title=The History of the Second World War' }}{{ISBN missing |date=May 2025}}{{publisher missing |date=March 2025}}{{year missing |date=June 2025}}
* {{cite book |last=Behrens |first=C. B. A. |author-link=Betty Behrens |series=History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series |title=Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War  |year=1955 |publisher=HMSO and Longmans |location=London |oclc=557756251|url=https://archive.org/details/merchant-shipping-demands-of-war}}
* {{cite book |last=Ellis |first=John |title=The World War II Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for All the Combatants |location=London |publisher=Aurum Press |year=1993 |isbn=1854102540 }}
* {{cite book |last=Morison |first=Samuel Eliot |title=A History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II Vol. I: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 – May 1943 |location=Boston |publisher=Little, Brown |year=1947 }}
* {{cite book|last= Roskill |first= Stephen Wentworth |author-link=Stephen Roskill |title=The War at Sea, 1939–1945 |volume=II The Period of Balance |series=[[History of the Second World War]] |location=London |publisher=HMSO |date= 1956}}
{{Refend}}


== External links ==
== External links ==
Line 254: Line 258:


{{Authority control}}
{{Authority control}}
[[Category:1942 in Germany]]
[[Category:1942 in Germany]]
[[Category:1942 in military history]]
[[Category:1942 in military history]]

Latest revision as of 14:41, 20 June 2025

Template:Short description Template:Use American English Template:Use dmy dates

File:Allied tanker torpedoed.jpg
Template:SS torpedoed off Cape Hatteras by Template:GS, 26 March 1942

Script error: No such module "Military navigation". The Second Happy Time (Template:Langx; officially Script error: No such module "Lang". (Template:Dubious span), and also known among German submarine commanders as the "American Shooting Season"[1]) was a phase in the Battle of the Atlantic during which Axis submarines attacked merchant shipping and Allied naval vessels along the east coast of North America. The First Happy Time was in 1940–41 in the North Atlantic and North Sea. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941, and as a result their navies could begin the Second Happy Time.[2]

The Second Happy Time lasted from January 1942 to about August of that year and involved several German naval operations, including Operation Neuland. German submariners named it the "Happy Time" or the "Golden Time", as defense measures were weak and disorganized,Template:Sfnp and the U-boats were able to inflict massive damage with little risk. During this period, Axis submarines sank 609 ships totaling Template:Vague, against a loss of only 22 U-boats. This led to the loss of thousands of lives, mainly those of merchant mariners. Although fewer than the losses during the 1917 campaign of the First World War,Template:Sfnp those of this period equaled roughly one quarter of all ships sunk by U-boats during the entire Second World War.

Historian Michael Gannon called it "America's Second Pearl Harbor"Template:Quote without source and placed the blame for the nation's failure to respond quickly to the attacks on the inaction of Admiral Ernest J. King, commander-in-chief of the United States Navy (USN). As King also refused British offers to provide the US navy with their own ships, the belated institution of a convoy system was in large part due to a severe shortage of suitable escort vessels, without which convoys were seen as actually more vulnerable than lone ships.[3]

Background

German intentions

Upon Germany's declaration of war on the United States on 11 December 1941 just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the US was, on paper at least, in a fortunate position. Where the other combatants on the Allied side had already lost thousands of trained sailors and airmen, and were experiencing shortages of ships and aircraft, the US was at full strength (save for its recent losses at Pearl Harbor). The US had the opportunity to learn about modern naval warfare by observing the conflicts in the North Sea and the Mediterranean, and through a close relationship with the United Kingdom. The USN had already gained significant experience in countering U-boats in the Atlantic, particularly from April 1941 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt extended the "Pan-American Security Zone" east almost as far as Iceland. The United States had massive manufacturing capacity and a favorable geographical position from a defensive point of view: the port of New York, for example, was Template:Convert to the west of the U-boat bases in Brittany.

U-boat commander Script error: No such module "Lang". Karl Dönitz saw the entry of the US into the war as a golden opportunity to strike heavy blows in the tonnage war and Hitler ordered an assault on America on 12 December 1941. The standard Type VII submarine had insufficient range to patrol off the coast of North America (although, in due time, Type VII submarines were successfully able to patrol off the eastern seaboard of North America, due to refueling, rearming, and resupply logistical support by Type XIV submarine tender); the only suitable weapons he had on hand were the larger Type IX.Template:Sfnp These were less maneuverable and slower to submerge, making them much more vulnerable than the Type VIIs. They were also fewer in number.

American deficiencies

File:Noblackout.gif
Animation simulating a tanker silhouetted against lights of a city. When partial blackouts were introduced towards the middle of 1942, skyglow continued to be a problem in coastal cities.

The American response in early 1942 was hampered by poor organization and doctrine, and a lack of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, ships, and personnel.

The USN entered the war without the equivalent of the British Template:Sclass sloop or the Template:Sclass2 despite previous involvement in the Atlantic (see Template:USS.) The massive new naval construction program prioritized other types of ships. Fleet destroyers did not have the qualities for ASW; the ideal ASW escort had relatively low speed; carried a large number of depth charges; was highly maneuverable; and had long endurance.Script error: No such module "Unsubst". The 50 World War I-era destroyers transferred to Britain in the 1941 Destroyers for Bases Agreement would have been poor ASW escorts, even had they been retained, due to poor maneuverability.Template:Sfnp

The USN had some destroyers available on the east coast at the time of the first attacks. It had previously recalled at least 25 Atlantic Convoy Escort Command Destroyers, including seven at anchor in New York Harbor. It initially refused to use them as escorts even as losses mounted.Template:Sfnp When the first destroyers were finally released, their employment was hampered by poor doctrine. They were assigned to offensive patrols rather than escorting convoys due to public and political pressure. As late as March, USN escort doctrine was aggressive with an emphasis on destroying attackers, rather than stopping losses.Template:SfnpScript error: No such module "Unsubst". The option of pressing small civilian ships into service as rudimentary convoy escorts in early 1942 was not exercised.[4]Script error: No such module "Unsubst".

Even if escorts had been available, the USN was unprepared to perform "Naval Control of Shipping" (NCS), the control and tracking of shipping (in convoy or sailing independently), although it had already received the reference material from Canada. Without escorts, the US could not take advantage of the existing Allied NCS. For shipping in the western Atlantic north of the equator, NCS was handled by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) since the start of the war; the RCN only passed the responsibility to the USN in July 1942.[4]

Operationally, the USN's ASW effort was fragmented. In theory, Admiral King was responsible for coordinating all ASW activities, including the development of doctrine. In practice, King's many other responsibilities prevented him from doing an adequate job. Therefore, the three Atlantic operational commands – the Atlantic Fleet, the Eastern Sea Frontier, and the Gulf Sea Frontier – were left to develop their own ASW tactics individually.[5]Script error: No such module "Unsubst". The issue was not resolved until May 1943 with the formation of the United States Tenth Fleet.[6]Script error: No such module "Unsubst".

British experience in the first two years of World War II, which included the massive losses incurred to their shipping during the First Happy Time confirmed that ships sailing in convoy – with or without escort – were far safer than ships sailing alone. The British recommended that merchant ships should avoid obvious standard routings wherever possible; navigational markers, lighthouses, and other aids to the enemy should be removed, and a strict coastal blackout be enforced. In addition, any available air and sea forces should perform daylight patrols to restrict the U-boats' flexibility. For several months, none of the recommendations were followed. Coastal shipping continued to sail along marked routes and burn normal navigation lights. Boardwalk communities ashore were only 'requested' to 'consider' turning their illuminations off on 18 December 1941, but not in the cities; they did not want to offend the tourism, recreation and business sectors.Template:Sfnp

The primary target area was the Eastern Sea Frontier, commanded by Rear-Admiral Adolphus Andrews and covering the area from Maine to North Carolina. Andrews had practically no modern forces to work with: on the water he commanded seven Coast Guard cutters, four converted yachts, three 1919-vintage patrol boats, two gunboats dating back to 1905, and four wooden submarine chasers. About 100 aircraft were available, but these were short-range models only suitable for training. As a consequence of the traditionally antagonistic relationship between the USN and the Army Air Forces, all larger aircraft remained under USAAF control, and in any case the USAAF was neither trained nor equipped for ASW.Template:Sfnp

Campaign

Opening moves

Immediately after war was declared on the United States, Dönitz began to implement Operation Paukenschlag (often translated as "drumbeat" or "drumroll",Template:Sfnp and literally as "timpani beat"). Only six of the twenty operational Type IX boats were available, and one of those six encountered mechanical trouble. This left just five long-range submarines for the opening moves of the campaign.Template:Sfnp

Loaded with the maximum possible amounts of fuel, food and ammunition, the first of the five Type IXs left Lorient in France on 18 December 1941, the others following over the next few days. Each carried sealed orders to be opened after passing 20°W, which directed them to different parts of the North American coast. No charts or sailing directions were available: Kapitänleutnant Reinhard Hardegen of Template:GS, for example, was provided with two tourist guides to New York, one of which contained a fold-out map of the harbor.Template:Sfnp

Each U-boat made routine signals on exiting the Bay of Biscay, which were picked up by the British Y service and plotted in Rodger Winn's London Submarine Tracking Room, which were then able to follow the progress of the Type IXs across the Atlantic, and cable an early warning to the RCN. Working on the slimmest of evidence, Winn correctly deduced the target area and passed a detailed warning to Admiral King,Template:Sfnp of a "heavy concentration of U-boats off the North American seaboard", including the five boats already on station and further groups that were in transit, 21 U-boats in all. Rear-Admiral Edwin T. Layton of the US Combined Operations and Intelligence Center then informed the responsible area commanders, but little or nothing else was done.Template:Sfnp

On 12 January 1942, Admiral Andrews was warned that "three or four U-boats" were about to commence operations against coastal shipping (in fact, there were indeed three),Template:Sfnp but he refused to institute a convoy system on the grounds that this would only provide the U-boats with more targets.

When Template:GS sank the 9,500-ton Norwegian tanker Norness within sight of Long Island in the early hours of 14 January, no warships were dispatched to investigate, allowing the U-123 to sink the 6,700-ton British tanker Coimbra off Sandy Hook on the following night before proceeding south towards New Jersey. By this time there were 13 destroyers idle in New York Harbor, yet none were employed to deal with the immediate threat, and over the following nights U-123 was presented with a succession of easy targets, most of them burning navigation lamps. At times, U-123 was operating in coastal waters that were so shallow that they barely allowed it to conceal itself, let alone evade a depth charge attack.

Operation Drumbeat

The first attack wave, Operation Drumbeat, consisted of five Type IX boats. Their first victory upon arriving in the coastal region of North America was the Canadian freighter Cyclops, sunk on 12 January off Nova Scotia. According to Robert Fisher, 26 more ships were sunk in the following nine days.Template:Sfnp The boats cruised along the coast, safely submerged through the day, and surfacing at night to pick off merchant vessels outlined against the lights of the cities.

When the first wave of U-boats returned to port through the early part of February, Dönitz wrote that each commander;Template:Quote without source

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had such an abundance of opportunities for attack that he could not by any means utilize them all: there were times when there were up to ten ships in sight, sailing with all lights burning on peacetime courses.

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The RCN immediately organized coastal convoys when Drumbeat began despite the difficulty in finding escorts. 37 ships were lost in January and February, and only 11 in March and April. The RCN noted that by March and April the U-boats preferred hunting in US waters.Template:Sfnp

U-boats in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico

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File:Pennsylvania Sun.jpg
The tanker Pennsylvania Sun torpedoed by Template:GS on 15 July 1942 (was saved and returned to service in 1943).

The second wave of Type IX boats had arrived in North American waters, and the third wave (Operation Neuland) had reached its patrol area off the oil ports of the Caribbean. With such easy pickings and all Type IX boats already committed, Dönitz began sending shorter-range Type VIIs to the US East Coast as well. This required extraordinary measures: cramming every conceivable space with provisions, some even filling the fresh water tanks with diesel oil, and crossing the Atlantic at very low speed on a single engine to conserve fuel.

In the United States there was still no concerted response to the attacks. Responsibility rested with Admiral King, but he was preoccupied with the Japanese onslaught in the Pacific. Admiral Andrews' North Atlantic Coastal Frontier was expanded to take in South Carolina and renamed the Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF), but most of the ships and aircraft needed remained under the command of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, who was often at sea and unavailable to make decisions. Rodger Winn's detailed weekly U-boat situation reports from the Submarine Tracking Room in London were available but ignored.Script error: No such module "Unsubst". By April, Allied forces along the US east coast included 80 small patrol ships in the USN Eastern Sea Frontier, 160 US aircraft, 24 RN ASW trawlers, and one British Coastal Command squadron. By British and Canadian standards these were enough to begin convoying, but no comprehensive convoy system was implemented that month.[7] Instead, on 1 April the US implemented a partial convoy system where convoys moved along the coast in short hops, moving during daytime and stopping in protected anchorages during nights; these were slow and ineffective.Template:Sfnp[7]

Coastal forces were reinforced from the Mid-Ocean Escort Force (MOEF) before March. The US contribution to the MOEF fell to part of one group. Five RCN corvettes were withdrawn to escort the new Boston-Halifax convoys, the first convoys along the American seaboard.[8] In April, a Royal Navy (RN) group redeployed to the Caribbean to defend tankers.[7] The RCN attempted to reinforce the MOEF by using training ships in supporting roles.[8]

Allied tanker losses were alarming. Losses along the North American coast and in the Caribbean accounted for most of the 73 American tankers lost in the first half of 1942, and 22 British tankers lost in March; three out of the four largest Canadian tankers were also lost from February to May. In March, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill urged the USN to organize coastal convoys, to little effect. The next month, British tankers from the Caribbean avoided the US coast and sailed east to Freetown in Africa,Template:Sfnp while between 16 and 29 April the US ordered US and Caribbean coastal waters closed to commercial tanker movement.Template:Sfnp On 26 April, the US agreed to allow Britain to redeploy a MOEF group to establish Caribbean convoys, but the US refused to start its own Caribbean convoys or to provide escorts.Template:Sfnp

Eastern Canada was dependent on imported oil from the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.Template:Sfnp The crisis led to gasoline rationing on 1 April, and the potential consequences of the US-ordered halt to tanker movements were severe. On 28 April, the RCN started ad hoc convoys to bring Canadian and Canadian-charted tankers trapped in the US and the Caribbean back to Halifax. On 1 May, the Government of Canada insisted that Canadian tankers be escorted, leading the RCN to organize formal convoys to the Caribbean through US coastal waters.Template:Sfnp The RCN had only enough escorts to run convoys from Halifax to Trinidad (coded as TH); the loss of supply from other regional suppliers had to be accepted.Template:Sfnp In July, Trinidad was replaced by Aruba to accommodate British tanker movement. From May to August, fourteen convoysTemplate:Sndincluding 76 tankers and Template:Convert of oilTemplate:Sndwere run without a single ship lost. The convoys were discontinued in August with the advent of the US's comprehensive convoying system.Template:Sfnp Canada also began convoys between Nova Scotia and Quebec City in May.[9]

The search for Allied tankers and the support of Template:GS, a Type XIV, pushed the U-boat offensive into the Gulf of Mexico.Template:Sfnp On 21 April, U-459 was 600 miles north-west of Bermuda; it refuelled fourteen U-boats through 6 May, including Type VIIs, headed for the Gulf and the Caribbean. In May, they sank 115 ships (of which 101 were steaming independently), about half being in the Gulf, with half of that tonnage being tankers. In June, they sank 122 ships, of which 108 were sailing independently. The Gulf Sea Frontier, formed in early February, had barely any resources and was ineffective.[10]

US convoys arrive

The first organized US coastal convoy sailed on 14 May 1942 from Hampton Roads for Key West; convoys eventually extended to Halifax.Template:Sfnp The US sought another 15 to 20 corvettes from Britain.Template:Sfnp By this time, two British escort groups were already in the Caribbean and the MOEF was under strain. Nonetheless, Britain and Canada responded to US requests by reducing the size of the remaining MOEF groups. The MOEF and the RCN had no further slack. The RCN struggled to meet its commitments even with 90% of its escort fleet being operational, as opposed to being used for training or being refitted;[9] the negative effects of this over-extension would be felt well into 1943.[11] By comparison the RN escort fleet was merely two-thirds operational.[9] The weakening of MOEF contributed to difficulties in the mid-Atlantic in August.[8]

The US convoy system effectively brought the crisis to an end. By early-July most U-boats only operated along the perimeter of the Caribbean. German attention returned to the mid-Atlantic.Template:Sfnp

Losses

Allies

File:Benson3 big.jpg
SS Byron D. Benson torpedoed on 4 April 1942 east of Southern Shores, North Carolina.

Germany

References

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Sources

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Further reading

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External links

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  1. Miller, Nathan: War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II. Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 295. Template:ISBN
  2. Duncan Redford; Philip D. Grove (2014). The Royal Navy: A History Since 1900. I.B. Tauris. p. 182
  3. Timothy J. Ryan and Jan M. Copes To Die Gallantly – The Battle of the Atlantic, 1994 Westview Press, Chapter 7.
  4. a b Template:Harvb, "The establishment of a convoy system..."
  5. Template:Harvb, "The U-boat campaign in American waters..."
  6. Template:Harvb, "His moves did not go unnoticed."
  7. a b c Template:Harvb, "In the spring of 1942, the possibility of future problems..."
  8. a b c Template:Harvb, "Mid-ocean escort forces were further squeezed..."
  9. a b c Template:Harvb, "While Hecht was chasing convoys in the mid-ocean..."
  10. Template:Harvb, "As U-boat attacks spilled into the Gulf of Mexico..."
  11. Template:Harvb, "By late summer 1942, the RCN was over extended..."
  12. a b c Cressman (2000) p. 85
  13. a b c d e Cressman (2000) p. 86
  14. a b c d e f g h i Cressman (2000) p. 87
  15. a b c d e f Cressman (2000) p. 88
  16. a b c d e f Cressman (2000) p. 89
  17. a b Cressman (2000) p. 90
  18. a b c d e f Cressman (2000) p. 91
  19. a b Cressman (2000) p. 92
  20. Cressman (2000) p. 93
  21. a b c d e f Cressman (2000) p. 94
  22. a b c d Cressman (2000) p. 95
  23. a b c d Cressman (2000) p. 96
  24. Cressman (2000) p. 97
  25. a b Cressman (2000) p. 98
  26. a b Cressman (2000) p. 99
  27. a b Cressman (2000) p. 100
  28. a b c Cressman (2000) p. 103
  29. Cressman (2000) p. 106
  30. Cressman (2000) p. 108
  31. Cressman (2000) p. 109
  32. Cressman (2000) p. 110
  33. Cressman (2000) p. 112
  34. Script error: No such module "citation/CS1".
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