http://debianws.lexgopc.com/wiki143/index.php?action=history&feed=atom&title=Research_programResearch program - Revision history2026-05-06T00:48:21ZRevision history for this page on the wikiMediaWiki 1.43.1http://debianws.lexgopc.com/wiki143/index.php?title=Research_program&diff=6893898&oldid=previmported>Carchasm: added Category:Concepts in the philosophy of science using HotCat2023-05-30T22:48:50Z<p>added <a href="/wiki143/index.php?title=Category:Concepts_in_the_philosophy_of_science&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Category:Concepts in the philosophy of science (page does not exist)">Category:Concepts in the philosophy of science</a> using <a href="/wiki143/index.php?title=WP:HC&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="WP:HC (page does not exist)">HotCat</a></p>
<p><b>New page</b></p><div>{{short description|Professional network conducting research}}<br />
{{Use American English|date=October 2020}}<br />
A '''research program''' ([[British English]]: '''research programme''') is a professional network of scientists conducting [[basic research]]. The term was used by [[philosophy of science|philosopher of science]] [[Imre Lakatos]] to blend and revise the [[normative]] model of science offered by [[Karl Popper]]'s ''[[The Logic of Scientific Discovery]]'' (with its idea of [[falsifiability]]) and the descriptive model of science offered by [[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' (with its ideas of [[normal science]] and [[paradigm shift]]s).<ref>Imre Lakatos, auth, John Worrall & Gregory Currie, eds, [https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Methodology_of_Scientific_Research_P.html?id=RRniFBI8Gi4C ''The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers''] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)</ref> Lakatos found falsificationism impractical and often not practiced, and found normal science—where a paradigm of science, mimicking an exemplar, extinguishes differing perspectives—more [[monopoly|monopolistic]] than actual.<br />
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Lakatos found that many research programs coexisted. Each had a ''hard core'' of theories immune to revision, surrounded by a ''protective belt'' of malleable theories.<ref name=Bechtel>{{cite book |last1=Bechtel |first1=William |author-link1=William Bechtel |title=Philosophy of science: an overview for cognitive science |date=1988 |publisher=L. Erlbaum |location=Hillsdale, New Jersey |isbn=9780805802214 |oclc=875311964 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1ZxcAgAAQBAJ}}, ch 4 "Post-positivist philosophy of science", subch "Lakatosian research programmes", pp 60-63</ref> A research programme vies against others to be most ''progressive''.<ref name=Bechtel/> Extending the research program's theories into new domains is ''theoretical progress'', and experimentally corroborating such is ''empirical progress'', always refusing falsification of the research program's hard core.<ref name=Bechtel/> A research program might ''degenerate''—lose progressiveness—but later return to progressiveness.<ref name=Bechtel/><br />
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==References==<br />
{{Reflist}}<br />
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== Examples ==<br />
* [http://www.globalchange.gov/ United States Global Change Research Program]<br />
* [http://wcrp.wmo.int/ World Climate Research Programme]<br />
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[[Category:Research|program]]<br />
[[Category:Concepts in the philosophy of science]]<br />
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