imported>Salmoonlight at 21:10, 20 June 2025

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{{Politics of Iran}}
'''Iranian nationalism'''{{efn|{{bulletedlist|{{langx|fa|ملی‌گرایی ایرانی}}|{{langx|bal|راج دوستی ایرانی}}|{{langx|ku|نەتەوە پەروەریی ئێرانی}}|[[Gilaki language|Gilaki]] and {{langx|mzn|ایجانایی ایرانی}}|{{langx|az|ایران میلتچیلی‌یی|italic=no}}|{{langx|tk|ایرانؽڭ میلتچیل‌یگی|italic=no}}|{{langx|ar|القومية الإيرانية}}|{{langx|hy|ايراناكان آزگايناكاتھيون}}|{{langx|ady|يران ࢦپقپس}}}}}} is [[nationalism]] among the people of [[Iran]] and individuals whose national identity is Iranian. Iranian nationalism consists of political and social movements and sentiments centered around support for [[Iranian culture]], [[Iranian languages]] and [[history of Iran|history]], and a sense of pride in Iran and [[Iranian peoples|Iranian people]]. While national consciousness in Iran can be traced back centuries, nationalism has been a predominant determinant of Iranian attitudes mainly since the 20th century. <ref name=Iranian_nationalism>{{cite book |title=Nationalism In Iran: Updated through 1978 |last=Cottam |first=Richard W. |year=1979 |publisher=University of Pittsburgh Press |location=Pittsburg |isbn=0-8229-5299-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wHFXD9VV9t4C&q=iranian+nationalism&pg=PA89 |access-date=2011-01-31}}</ref>

Modern Iranian nationalism rose during the 1905 [[Persian Constitutional Revolution]], when an atmosphere of unity and Iranian patriotic sentiments began. During the [[Pahlavi dynasty]] between 1925 and 1979, Iranian nationalism experienced a resurgence due to the Pahlavi government's bolstering of patriotic sentiment.

==History==
{{Tone|date=March 2015}}
===Origins===
Iran's politics are first recorded in the twenties of the third century C.E. as an essential feature of [[Sasanian Empire|Sasanian]] propaganda.<ref name="GnoliIranica">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Gnoli |first=Gherardo |title=IRANIAN IDENTITY ii. PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD |encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Iranica |access-date=2011-09-11 |url=https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iranian-identity-ii-pre-islamic-period |url-status=bot: unknown |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111117041244/http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iranian-identity-ii-pre-islamic-period |archive-date=2011-11-17 }}</ref>

Third-century Iran was shaken by a conflict between [[universalism]] and [[nationalism]] that was most clearly manifested in the religious and cultural sphere. The outcome of this conflict is well known: the traditionalistic and nationalistic impulses gained the upper hand, and [[Manichaeism|Manichaean]] universalism succumbed to the nationalism of the [[Zoroastrianism|Zoroastrian]] [[Magi]]. Iranian identity, which up to that point had essentially consisted of cultural and religious nature, assumed a definite political value, placing Persia and the Persians at the center of the [[Sasanian Empire]], in other words, at the center of a state based on the twin powers of throne and altar and sustained by an antiquarian and archaizing ideology. This ideology became more and more accentuated during the Sassanian period, reaching its height in the long reign of [[Khosrow I]] (531–79 A.D.). Of course, economic and social factors favored the victory of the stronger classes in a society that was based mainly on a rural economy, namely the aristocratic landed and warrior classes and the Magian clergy.<ref name="GnoliIranica" />

==Shu'ubiyya==
{{Main|Shu'ubiyya}}
Iranian identity came under threat after the fall of the [[Sasanian Empire]] and the [[Muslim conquest of Persia]]. The term [[Shu'ubiyya]] refers to a response by Persian Muslims to the growing [[Arabization]] of [[Islam]] in the 9th and 10th centuries and discrimination against Iranian people by the occupiers. It was primarily concerned with preserving Persian culture and protecting Persian identity. Some of the famous Iranian Shu'ubi figures are [[Bashshar ibn Burd]], [[Ismail Nisa'i]], Zeyad e Ajam, [[Hissam ibn Ada]], [[Abulhassan Ali Mada'ini]], [[Abu Hatam Sajestani]], [[Ibrahim ibn Mamshad]] and [[Abu Abdullah Muhammad Marzbani]]. Many consider [[Ferdowsi]] a Shu'ubi poet.

===Iranian Intermezzo===
{{Main|Iranian Intermezzo}}
The term [[Iranian Intermezzo]]{{efn|Such an obviously ''coined'' designation was introduced by [[Vladimir Minorsky]], "The Iranian Intermezzo", in ''Studies in Caucasian history'' (London, 1953) and has been taken up by [[Bernard Lewis]], among others, in his ''The Middle East: A brief history of the last 2,000 years'' (New York, 1995).}} represents a period in [[History of the Middle East|Middle Eastern history]] that saw the rise of various native Iranian Muslim dynasties on the [[Iranian Plateau]]. This term is noteworthy since it was an interlude between the decline of [[Abbasid Caliphate|Abbasid rule]] and the eventual emergence of the [[Seljuk dynasty|Seljuk Turks]] in the 11th century. The Iranian revival consisted of Iranian support based on Iranian territory and most significantly a revived Iranian national spirit and culture in an Islamic form.<ref>{{cite book|last=Lewis|first=Bernard|title=The Middle East: 2,000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day|pages=81–82}}</ref>

===Iranian-Shia identity under the Safavids===
{{Main|Safavid conversion of Iran from Sunnism to Shiism}}
Iran regained its political unity and was given a new distinct religious identity under the [[Safavid Iran|Safavids]]. [[Shia Islam]] became the official state religion and henceforth played an important role in the reconstruction of a new ethno-religious identity for the Iranian people. Furthermore, the rise of the Safavid empire coincided with the rise of the neighboring [[Ottoman Empire]] in [[West Asia]] and [[North Africa]] (and most importantly, for centuries Iran's geo-political as well as ideological arch-rival) and the [[Mughal Empire]] in [[India]], both adhering to [[Sunni Islam]]. The formation of these political entities helped create a distinct Iranian-Shia political identity among these polities. It also helped to expand the hegemony of the [[Persian language]] in much of the [[Muslim world]]. [[Persian literature]] was, apart from Iran and its territories stretching from the [[North Caucasus]] to the [[Persian Gulf]], produced from the [[Balkans]] to Central Asia and the [[Indian subcontinent]].<ref name="NagBUYI">{{cite encyclopedia
| last = Ashraf
| first = Ahmad
| title = IRANIAN IDENTITY iii. MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC PERIOD
| encyclopedia = Encyclopedia Iranica
| url = http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iranian-identity-iii-medieval-islamic-period
| access-date = 2012-02-08 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Matthee |first1=Rudi |title=Was Safavid Iran an Empire? |journal=Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient |date=2009 |volume=53 |issue=1–2 |page=244 |publisher=Brill|doi=10.1163/002249910X12573963244449 |s2cid=55237025 }}</ref><ref>Eaton, R. The Persian Cosmopolis. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. Retrieved 3 May. 2023, from https://oxfordre.com/asianhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-402. </ref>

===Qajar Era and the start of modern nationalism===
[[File:Map Iran 1900-en.png|thumb|Iran in the 19th century]]
[[File:State flag of Iran (1964–1980).svg|thumb|The state flag of the Imperial State of Iran most prominently used by Iranian expatriates]]
The modern Iranian national movement began in the late 19th century. This movement was in large part a reaction to [[The Great Game|19th-century European colonialism]] in the region, which led to the loss of [[Qajar dynasty|Qajar]] possessions in the [[Caucasus]].<ref>[[Patrick Clawson]] writes:
:''"Since the days of the [[Achaemenids]], the Iranians had the protection of geography. But high mountains and vast emptiness of the [[Iranian plateau]] were no longer enough to shield Iran from the Russian army or British navy. Both literally, and figuratively, Iran shrank. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Azerbaijan, Armenia, much of Georgia were Iranian, but by the end of the century, all this territory had been lost as a result of European military action. Iran translated her territorial losses into a sense of both victimization and a propensity to interpret European action through the lens of conspiracy. This in turn has helped shape Iranian nationalism into the twenty first century."'' {{cite book|last=Clawson|first=Patrick|title=Eternal Iran|url=https://archive.org/details/eternaliranconti00claw|url-access=limited|year=2005|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|location=New York|isbn=1-4039-6276-6|pages=[https://archive.org/details/eternaliranconti00claw/page/n41 31]–32|edition=[Online-Ausg.].|author2=Rubin, Michael |author-link2=Michael Rubin (historian) }}</ref> In the course of the 19th century, through the [[Russo-Persian War (1804–1813)]] and the [[Russo-Persian War (1826–1828)]] and the out-coming [[Treaty of Gulistan]] and [[Treaty of Turkmenchay]] of 1813 and 1828 respectively, [[Iran]] was forced to irrevocably cede swaths of its territory in the [[North Caucasus|North]] and [[Transcaucasia|South Caucasus]] comprising what is now [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]], [[Dagestan]], [[Azerbaijan]] and [[Armenia]] to the [[Russian Empire]].<ref>Timothy C. Dowling [https://books.google.com/books?id=KTq2BQAAQBAJ&dq=russo+persian+war+1804-1813&pg=PA728 ''Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond''] pp 728-729 ABC-CLIO, 2 dec. 2014 {{ISBN|1598849484}}</ref> These territories had made, for centuries, part of the concept of Iran until their loss.{{sfn|Fisher|Avery|Hambly|Melville|1991|p=329}}

The initial objectives of these nationalists was to put an end to the feudalistic landholding system, governmental sloth and corruption, and the wholesale distribution of Iranian resources to foreigners.<ref name=Iranian_nationalism />

One of the principal and most noted forerunners of Iranian nationalism during the Qajar era was [[Mirza Fatali Akhundov]], born in the then-recently ceded territories in the Caucasus to a family of landowners originating in [[Azerbaijan (Iran)|Iranian Azerbaijan]].<ref name="Tadeusz">[[Tadeusz Swietochowski]], ''Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition'' (New York: Columbia University Press), 1995, page 27-28:</ref>

===Modern nationalism===
[[File:Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq.jpg|thumb|200px|[[Mohammad Mosaddegh]]]]
Modern nationalism in Iran dates back to 1905 when an almost bloodless [[Constitutional Revolution of Iran|constitutional revolution]] created Iran's first [[Islamic Consultative Assembly|parliament]]. [[Reza Shah]] helped shape Iranian nationalism by infusing it with a distinctly [[secular]] ideology and diminishing the influence of Islam on Iran. By integrating European legal policies in the place of Islamic courts, Shah reassured the efficiency of the state bureaucracy and promoted a strong sense of Iranian nationalism.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World Transformed 1945 to the Present|last=Hunt|first=Michael|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2014|isbn=9780199371020|location=New York|pages=279}}</ref> In 1935, Reza Shah asked foreign delegates and [[League of Nations]] to use the term Iran in formal correspondence. In addition, Reza Shah sought to change the names of various towns to honor pre-Islamic Persian kings and mythological heroes and to continue to reduce the power of the mullahs by seeking to [[modernize]] Iran. The Pahlavi dynasty thus was set irrevocably down the road towards infusing the country with a form of secular nationalism, a path that would eventually bring it into conflict with the country's clerical class.

Iranian nationalism was a deciding force in the 1951 movement to [[nationalization|nationalize]] Iran's oil wealth.

[[Mohammad Mosaddegh|Mossadegh]]'s goal of nationalizing Iran’s oil came into effect in the year 1951. By allowing Iran to have full power and control over their prime resource, the AIOC and other European programs participated in an international boycott which eventually caused a deter in [[Economy of Iran|Iran's economy]].<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World Transformed 1945 to the Present|last=Hunt|first=Michael|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2014|isbn=9780199371020|location=New York|pages=280–281}}</ref> After Mossadegh's deposition guided by help from the [[United States|U.S.]] and [[British Empire|Britain]], Reza Shah's son and successor [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]] retained control and used the increased gas prices to expand modernization in Iran.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World Transformed 1945 to the Present|last=Hunt|first=Michael|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2014|location=New York|pages=282}}</ref>

Iranian nationalist discourse often focuses on the pre-Islamic [[history of Iran]].<ref name="MRZ">{{Cite journal|last=Adib-Moghaddam|first=Arshin|title=Reflections on Arab and Iranian Ultra-Nationalism|year=2006|journal=Monthly Review Magazine|volume=11/06|url=http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/aam201106.html}}.</ref> In the 20th century, different aspects of this [[romantic nationalism]] would be referenced by both the [[Pahlavi dynasty|Pahlavi monarchy]], which employed titles such as ''[[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Āryāmehr]]'' ('Light of the [[Arya (Iran)|Aryans]]'), and by some leaders of the Islamic Republic that followed it.<ref name="Keddie">{{Cite book|last1=Keddie|first1=Nikki R.|last2=Richard|first2=Yann|title=Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution|year=2006|publisher=[[Yale University Press]]|isbn=0-300-12105-9|pages=[https://archive.org/details/moderniranrootsr00kedd/page/178 178f.]|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/moderniranrootsr00kedd/page/178}}.</ref>

Despite the secular tendencies of the vast majority of Iranian nationalists, there is a grouping called the [[Religious-Nationalists|Religious Nationalists]] who are Iranian nationalists but also religious Muslims.

=== Ethnic discontent ===
Iran's 2016 parliamentary elections saw the reformists' victory, signalling support for President [[Hassan Rouhani]]'s moderate government and the nuclear deal. However, the campaign also focused on addressing the demands of Iran's ethnic minorities, who make up 40-50% of the population. The five major ethnic groups—[[Iranian Azerbaijanis|Azeris]], [[Kurds]], [[Iranian Arabs|Arabs]], [[Baloch people|Baluchis]], and Turkmen—have a long history of political struggle for their rights, and many of them are Sunni, in contrast to the country's Shia majority.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Saleh |first=Alam |date=2016-03-01 |title=Iran’s cynical pandering to its ethnic minorities will do it no good |url=https://theconversation.com/irans-cynical-pandering-to-its-ethnic-minorities-will-do-it-no-good-55089 |access-date=2024-12-11 |website=The Conversation |language=en-US}}</ref>

Ethnic grievances have been a prominent feature in election rhetoric, with candidates using sharper language to mobilize minority communities. While previous leaders, such as [[Mohammad Khatami|President Khatami]] in 1997, promised civil rights for all Iranians, these promises often remained unfulfilled, widening the gap between minorities' expectations and their realities.<ref name=":0"/>

This pattern of ethnic politicking has undermined Iran by creating divisions between [[ethnic groups]] and political factions. The [[Ethnicities in Iran|country’s ethnic diversity]] is also seen as a national security threat, with minority groups living near or across borders, especially in the context of Iran's sectarian rivalry with Sunni-majority [[Saudi Arabia]]. Despite many of these groups' demands being legally recognized, Iran’s ethnic policies are ultimately shaped by the [[Supreme National Security Council]], not elected officials.<ref name=":0"/>

If Iran continues to make promises to ethnic groups during elections without follow-through, the long-term damage to ethnic relations and the country's democracy could be severe. Addressing ethnic discontent is essential for maintaining national unity and stability.<ref name=":0"/>

Alex Shams, colomonist and writer of [[Ajam Media Collective]], explored the complexities of [[Ethnicities in Iran|Iranian and Persian identities]], addressing the question, "Are you [[Iranian peoples|Iranian]] or [[Persians|Persian]], and what’s the difference?" Initially, Shams viewed "[[Persians|Persian]]" as a politically and socially convenient term for [[Ethnicities in Iran|Iranians]], often used to dissociate from the [[Islamic republic|Islamic Republic]] or to evoke exotic appeal. However, a conversation with an Iranian-American of Azeri-Bakhtiari heritage highlighted the ethnic diversity within Iran, revealing that not all Iranians identify as [[Persians|Persian]]. While Persians, whose mother tongue is [[Persian language|Persian]] (Farsi), make up about half of Iran's population, the rest includes a [[Ethnicities in Iran|mosaic of ethnic and linguistic minorities]], such as [[Iranian Azerbaijanis|Azeris]], [[Iranian Arabs|Arabs]], [[Kurds]], and [[Baloch people|Balochs]], among others.<ref name=":33">{{Cite web |last=Shams |first=Alex |date=2012-05-18 |title=A "Persian" Iran?: Challenging the Aryan Myth and Persian Ethnocentrism |url=https://ajammc.com/2012/05/18/a-persian-iran-challenging-the-aryan-myth-and-persian-ethnocentrism/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240914152615/https://ajammc.com/2012/05/18/a-persian-iran-challenging-the-aryan-myth-and-persian-ethnocentrism/ |archive-date=2024-09-14 |access-date=2024-11-29 |website=Ajam Media Collective |language=en-US}}</ref>

Shams critiques the erasure of this diversity, tracing its roots to Persian nationalism fostered under Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 20th century. Reza Shah centralized power by crafting a Persian-centric national identity, banning non-Persian languages, and co-opting Aryanist ideologies, which linked Persian identity to a pseudo-scientific racial hierarchy. This framework marginalized ethnic minorities and ignored the historical diversity of the Persian Empire, which was unified by imperial structures rather than ethnicity.<ref name=":33"/>

The [[Iranian revolution|Islamic Revolution of 1979]] shifted Iranian identity from secular Persian nationalism to Shia religious identity,<ref name=":33"/> this is why the terms [[Shia Islam|Shia]], [[Persians|Persian]], and [[Demographics of Iran|Iranian]] in [[Arab states of the Persian Gulf]] (where [[Ajam of Bahrain|Bahraini Ajams]], [['Ajam of Kuwait|Kuwaiti Ajams]], [[Iranians in Qatar|Qatari]], and [[Iranians in the United Arab Emirates|Emirati Iranian]] people of [[Ethnicities in Iran|Iranian origins]] live) are often conflated, even by Sunni [[Achomi people|Achums]].<ref name=":23">{{Cite web |title=إلى إسماعيل أكبري... افتخر بعجميّتك ولا تبالي |trans-title=To Ismael Akbari... be proud of your Ajaminess and don't care |url=http://bahrainmirror.com/news/55252.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190902234844/http://bahrainmirror.com/news/55252.html |archive-date=2019-09-02 |access-date=2024-09-10 |website=مرآة البحرين |language=ar}}</ref> While it offered greater inclusion for Shia Muslims regardless of ethnicity, it marginalized religious minorities and secular individuals. Ethnic minorities, such as Azeris and Kurds, gained some linguistic freedoms, but Persian ethnocentrism and Aryanist ideologies persisted, particularly in diaspora communities seeking validation from Western perceptions.<ref name=":33"/>

Shams argues that these exclusivist identities undermine Iran's cultural diversity and hinder the possibility of an inclusive, egalitarian society. Instead, he calls for recognition of Iran's multi-ethnic and multicultural heritage as essential to its national identity.<ref name=":33"/>

== Nationalist parties of Iran ==
;Active parties
*[[Pan-Iranist Party]] (founded 1941; banned, operating inside [[Iran]])
*[[National Front (Iran)|National Front]] (founded 1949; banned, operating inside Iran)
** [[Iran Party]] (founded 1944; banned, operating inside Iran)
** [[Party of the Iranian People]] (founded 1949; banned, operating inside Iran)
* [[Nation Party of Iran]] (founded 1951; banned, operating inside Iran)
* [[Freedom Movement of Iran]] (founded 1961; banned, operating inside Iran)
* [[Marze Por Gohar]] (founded 1998; banned, exiled)
* [[Council of Nationalist-Religious Activists of Iran]] (founded 2000; banned, operating inside Iran)
;Historic parties
* [[Society for the Progress of Iran]] (1909–1911)
* [[Revival Party]] (1920–1927)
* [[Iran-e-No Party]] (1927)
* [[Progress Party (Iran)|Progress Party]] (1927–1932)
* [[Motherland Party (Iran)|Motherland Party]] (1940–1946)
* [[Justice Party (Iran)|Justice Party]] (1941–1946)
* [[Azure Party]] (1942–1953)
* [[National Will Party]] (1943–1951)
* [[Movement of God-Worshipping Socialists]] (1943–1960)
* [[Democrat Party of Iran]] (1946–1984)
* [[Aria Party]] (1946–1953)
* [[Iran Unity Party]] (1946–1948)
* [[Society of Muslim Warriors]] (1948–1955)
* [[Third Force (Iran)|Third Force]] (1948–1960)
* [[SUMKA|National Socialist Workers Party of Iran]] (1952–1953)
* [[Nationalists’ Party]] (1957–1963)
* [[League of Iranian Socialists]] (1960–1982)
* [[JAMA (Iranian Party)|The Liberation Movement of People of Iran]] (1964–1988)
* [[National Democratic Front (Iran)|National Democratic Front]] (1979–1981)
* [[Iranians' Party]] (1970–1975)
* [[Rastakhiz Party]] (1975–1979)

== See also ==
* [[Pan-Iranism]]
* [[Greater Iran]]

==Notes==
{{Notelist}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Sources==
* {{cite book | last1 = Fisher | first1 = William Bayne | last2 = Avery | first2= P. | last3 = Hambly | first3 = G. R. G | last4 = Melville | first4 = C. | title = The Cambridge History of Iran | volume = 7 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=H20Xt157iYUC&q=agha+muhammad+khan+invade+georgia | publisher = [[Cambridge University Press]] | location = Cambridge | year = 1991 | isbn = 0521200954 }}

==Further reading==
* {{cite book |last1=Zia-Ebrahimi |first1=Reza |title=The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation |date=2016 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0231175760}}

{{Ethnic nationalism}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Iranian Nationalism}}
[[Category:Iranian nationalism| ]]
[[Category:Politics of Iran|Nationalism]]

Iranian nationalism - Revision history

imported>Salmoonlight at 21:10, 20 June 2025