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		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Move 1 url. &lt;a href=&quot;/wiki143/index.php?title=User:GreenC/WaybackMedic_2.5&amp;amp;action=edit&amp;amp;redlink=1&quot; class=&quot;new&quot; title=&quot;User:GreenC/WaybackMedic 2.5 (page does not exist)&quot;&gt;Wayback Medic 2.5&lt;/a&gt; per &lt;a href=&quot;/wiki143/index.php?title=WP:URLREQ&amp;amp;action=edit&amp;amp;redlink=1&quot; class=&quot;new&quot; title=&quot;WP:URLREQ (page does not exist)&quot;&gt;WP:URLREQ#army.mil&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Other uses|Node (disambiguation){{!}}Node}}&lt;br /&gt;
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The &amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;end node problem&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039; arises when individual computers are used for sensitive work and/or temporarily become part of a trusted, well-managed network/cloud and then are used for more risky activities and/or join untrusted networks. (Individual computers on the periphery of networks/clouds are called end nodes.) End nodes often are not managed to the trusted network‘s high [[computer security]] standards.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Tim Fisher&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web | url=https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-node-4155598 | title=What Is a Node in a Computer Network: Your computer and printer are both network nodes | date=12 December 2018 | accessdate=24 December 2018 | author= Tim Fisher}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; End nodes often have weak/outdated software, weak security tools, excessive permissions, mis-configurations, questionable content and apps, and covert exploitations.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;Natalia Chrzanowska&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web | url=https://www.netguru.co/blog/pros-cons-use-node.js-backend | title=Why to Use Node.js: Pros and Cons of Choosing Node.js for Back-end Development | date=23 March 2017 | accessdate=24 December 2018 | author= Natalia Chrzanowska}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Cross contamination and unauthorized release of data from within a computer system becomes the problem.&lt;br /&gt;
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Within the vast cyber-ecosystem, these end nodes often attach transiently to one or more clouds/networks, some trustworthy and others not.  A few examples: a corporate desktop browsing the Internet, a corporate laptop checking company webmail via a coffee shop&amp;#039;s open [[Wi-Fi]] access point, a personal computer used to telecommute during the day and gaming at night, or app within a smartphone/tablet (or any of the previous use/device combinations).  Even if fully updated and tightly locked down, these nodes may ferry malware from one network (e.g. a corrupted webpage or an infected email message) into another, sensitive network.  Likewise, the end nodes may exfiltrate sensitive data (e.g. [[keystroke logging|log keystrokes]] or [[Screenshot|screen-capture]]).  Assuming the device is fully trustworthy, the end node must provide the means to properly [[authenticate]] the user.  Other nodes may impersonate trusted computers, thus requiring [[Trusted Platform Module|device authentication]]. The device and user may be trusted but within an untrustworthy environment (as determined by inboard sensors&amp;#039; feedback). Collectively, these risks are called the end node problem.  There are several remedies but all require instilling trust in the end node and conveying that trust to the network/cloud.&lt;br /&gt;
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==The cloud’s weakest link==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Cloud computing]] may be characterized as a vast, seemingly endless, array of processing and storage that one can rent from his or her computer.  Recent media attention {{When|date=February 2019}} has focused on the security within the cloud.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite web|title=How Secure Is Cloud Computing?|url=http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/23951/}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;  Many believe the real risk does not lie within a well monitored, 24-7-365 managed, full redundancy cloud host but in the many questionable computers that access the cloud.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |url=http://www.nets-find.net/Meetings/S09Meeting/Talks/clark.ppt |title=Architecture from the top down |access-date=2014-01-07 |archive-date=2021-08-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210813140541/http://www.nets-find.net/Meetings/S09Meeting/Talks/clark.ppt |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite web|title=VPN users: The weak link in network security?|url=http://www.builderau.com.au/strategy/businessmanagement/soa/VPN-users-The-weak-link-in-network-security-/0,339028271,320266862,00.htm|access-date=2010-02-06|archive-date=2009-05-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090511131913/http://www.builderau.com.au/strategy/businessmanagement/soa/VPN-users-The-weak-link-in-network-security-/0,339028271,320266862,00.htm|url-status=dead}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;  Many such clouds are [[FISMA]]-certified whereas the end nodes connecting to them rarely are configured to any standard.{{Citation needed|date=January 2013}}&lt;br /&gt;
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== Ever growing risk ==&lt;br /&gt;
From 2005 to 2009, the greatest and growing threats to personal and corporate data derived from exploits of users&amp;#039; personal computers. Organized cyber-criminals have found it more profitable to internally exploit the many weak personal and work computers than to attack through heavily fortified perimeters.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web|url=http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/databreachreport.pdf|title = Business Insights and Resources}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;  One common example is stealing small business&amp;#039;s online banking account access.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite news| url=http://content.usatoday.com/communities/technologylive/post/2010/03/cyberthieves-stealing--from-large-percentage-of-small-businesses/1 | work=USA Today | title=Cyberthieves stealing from large percentage of small businesses | date=9 March 2010}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Solutions ==&lt;br /&gt;
To eliminate the end node problem, only allow authenticated users on trusted remote computers in safe environments to connect to your network/cloud.  There are many ways to accomplish this with existing technology, each with different levels of trust.&lt;br /&gt;
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Many companies issue typical laptops and only allow those specific computers to remotely connect.  For example, the US Department of Defense only allows its remote computers to connect via [[VPN]] to its network (no direct Internet browsing) and uses [[two-factor authentication]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite web|title=Fort Sill Virtual Private Network (VPN) Policy|url=https://sill-www.army.mil/dhr/Admin_Svcs_Div/FS_Pubs/Regs/25-71.htm|access-date=2010-02-06|archive-date=2011-06-17|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110617013457/http://sill-www.army.mil/dhr/Admin_Svcs_Div/FS_Pubs/Regs/25-71.htm|url-status=live}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;  Some organizations use server-side tools to scan and/or validate the end node&amp;#039;s computer{{Citation needed|date=January 2013}}, such as communicating with the node&amp;#039;s [[Trusted Platform Module]] (TPM).&lt;br /&gt;
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A far higher level of trust can be obtained by issuing an [http://spi.dod.mil/docs/SEN_SKG_DS_20081024.doc immutable, tamper-resistant client]{{Dead link|date=March 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} with no local storage, allowing it to connect only after device and user authentication, remotely providing the OS and software (via [[Preboot Execution Environment|PXE]] or [[Etherboot]]), and then only providing remote desktop or browser access to sensitive data.&lt;br /&gt;
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A less expensive approach is to trust any hardware (corporate, government, personal, or public) but provide a known [[kernel (operating system)|kernel]] and software and require strong authentication of the user.  For example, the [[United States Department of Defense|DoD]]’s Software Protection Initiative&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;[http://spi.dod.mil DoD Software Protection Initiative] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100513172649/http://spi.dod.mil/ |date=2010-05-13 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; offers [[Lightweight Portable Security]], a [[LiveCD]] that boots only in RAM creating a pristine, non-persistent, end node while using [[Common Access Card]] software for authentication into DoD networks.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==See also==&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Host (network)]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Node (networking)]]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Secure end node]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
{{reflist}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Computer network security]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Operating system security]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[de:Netzwerkknoten]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>imported&gt;GreenC bot</name></author>
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