View source for Xi Jinping

{{Short description|Paramount leader of China since 2012}}
{{Family name hatnote|[[Xi (surname)|Xí]] ({{lang|zh-Hans|习|italic=no}})||lang=Chinese}}
{{Pp-move}}
{{Protection padlock|reason=Persistent [[WP:Vandalism|vandalism]]|small=yes}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=November 2023}}
{{Infobox officeholder
| honorific_prefix    = 
| name                = Xi Jinping
| native_name         = {{nobold|习近平}}
| native_name_lang    = zh-Hans-CN
| image               = Xi Jinping in Beijing on May 13, 2025 (cropped).jpg
| caption             = Xi in 2025
| office              = [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]]
| term_start          = 15 November 2012
| predecessor         = [[Hu Jintao]]
| office1             = [[President of China]]
| premier1            = {{ubl|[[Li Keqiang]]|[[Li Qiang]]}}
| vicepresident1      = {{ubl|[[Li Yuanchao]] (2013{{nbnd}}2018)|[[Wang Qishan]] (2018{{nbnd}}2023)|[[Han Zheng]] (2023{{nbnd}}present)}}
| term_start1         = 14 March 2013
| predecessor1        = Hu Jintao
| office2             = [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman of the Central Military Commission]]
| deputy2             = {{ubl|[[Fan Changlong]]|[[Xu Qiliang]]|[[Zhang Youxia]]|[[He Weidong]]}}
| term_start2         = {{ubl|'''Party Commission''': {{nowrap|15 November 2012}}|'''State Commission''': {{nowrap|14 March 2013}}}}
| predecessor2        = Hu Jintao
| office3             = [[Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission]]
| 1blankname3         = Chairman
| 1namedata3          = Hu Jintao
| alongside3          = [[Guo Boxiong]] & [[Xu Caihou]]
| term_start3         = {{ubl|'''Party Commission''': {{nowrap|18 October 2010}}|'''State Commission''': {{nowrap|28 October 2010}}}}
| term_end3           = {{ubl|'''Party Commission''': {{nowrap|15 November 2012}}|'''State Commission''': {{nowrap|14 March 2013}}}}
| office4             = [[Vice President of China]]
| president4          = Hu Jintao
| term_start4         = 15 March 2008
| term_end4           = 14 March 2013
| predecessor4        = [[Zeng Qinghong]]
| successor4          = Li Yuanchao
| birth_date          = {{Birth date and age|df=yes|1953|06|15}}
| birth_place         = Beijing, China
| party               = [[Chinese Communist Party|CCP]] (since 1974)
| spouse              = {{ubl|{{Marriage|[[Ke Lingling]]|1979|1982|end=divorced}}|{{Marriage|[[Peng Liyuan]]|1 September 1987}}}}
| children            = [[Xi Mingze]]
| residence           = [[Zhongnanhai]]
| education           = [[Tsinghua University]] ([[B. S.|BS]], [[LL.D.|LLD]])
| parents             = {{plainlist|
* [[Xi Zhongxun]]
* [[Qi Xin]]
}}
| relatives           = [[Qi Qiaoqiao]] (sister)
| signature           = Xi Jinping signature (2023).svg
| footnotes           = {{Collapsible list
|titlestyle = background-color:#FCF;text-align:center;
|title = Central institution membership{{discuss|date=January 2025}}
|bullets = on
| 2007–: [[17th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|17th]], [[18th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|18th]], [[19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|19th]], [[20th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|20th]] Politburo Standing Committee
| 2007–: [[17th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|17th]], [[18th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|18th]], [[19th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|19th]], [[20th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|20th]] Politburo
| 2007–2012: Secretary (first-ranked), 17th Central Secretariat
| 2002–: Full member, [[16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|16th]], [[17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|17th]], [[18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|18th]], [[19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|19th]], [[20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|20th]] Central Committee
| 1997–2002: Alternate member, [[15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|15th]] Central Committee
| 1998–: Delegate, [[9th National People's Congress|9th]], [[10th National People's Congress|10th]], [[11th National People's Congress|11th]], [[12th National People's Congress|12th]], [[13th National People's Congress|13th]], [[14th National People's Congress|14th]] National People's Congress
}}
----
{{Collapsible list
|titlestyle = background-color:#FCF;text-align:center;
|title = Leading Groups and Commissions
|bullets = on
| 2018–present: Director, [[Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission]]
| 2018–present: Director, [[Central Foreign Affairs Commission]]
| 2018–2023: Director, [[Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission]]
| 2018–present: Director, [[Central Comprehensive Law-based Governance Commission]]
| 2018–present: Director, [[Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission]]
| 2014–present: Leader, [[Central Leading Group for Military Reform|Leading Group for Defence and Military Reform]]
| 2014–2018: Leader, [[Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization|Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization]]
| 2013–present: Chairman, [[National Security Commission of the Chinese Communist Party|National Security Commission]]
| 2013–2018: Leader, [[Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs]]
| 2013–2018: Leader, [[Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms]]
| 2012–present: Leader, [[Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs]]
| 2012–2018: Leader, [[Central Foreign Affairs Commission|Foreign Affairs Leading Group]]
| 2007–2012: Leader Group for Party Building
| c. 2007–2012: Leader, Leading Group for Activities of Deepening the Study and Practice of the Outlook of Scientific Development
| 2007–2012: Leader, [[Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs]]
}}
----
{{Collapsible list
|titlestyle = background-color:#FCF; text-align:center;
|title = Other offices held
|bullets = on
| 2016–present: [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|Supreme Commander]], Joint Battle Command of the [[People's Liberation Army]]
| 2010–2013: Vice Chairman, State Central Military Commission
| 2010–2012: [[Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission|Vice Chairman, Party Central Military Commission]]
| 2008–2013: [[Vice President of China]]
| 2007–2012: President, [[Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Party School]]
| 2007: [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|Party Committee Secretary]], Shanghai municipality
| 2002–2007: Party Secretary, Zhejiang province, director, Standing Committee of the [[Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress]]
| 2002: Deputy Party Secretary & acting governor, Zhejiang province
| 1999–2002: Governor, Fujian province
| 1995–2002: [[Chinese Communist Party Deputy Committee Secretary|Deputy Party Secretary]], Fujian province
| 1990–1996: Party Secretary, [[Fuzhou]]
| 1990–1996: Chairman, Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress
| 1988–1990: Party Secretary, [[Ningde]]
| 1985–1988: Deputy Mayor, Xiamen
| 1983–1985: Party Secretary, [[Zhengding County]]
}}
----
{{center|'''[[Paramount leader|Paramount Leader of <br />the People's Republic of China]]'''<br />
{{flatlist|
* {{big|'''←'''}} [[Hu Jintao]]
* (''Current holder'')
}}
}}
| module              = {{Infobox scientist
  | embed = yes
  | thesis_title      = A Tentative Study on China's Rural Marketization
  | thesis_url        = https://archive.org/details/20220730_20220730_1031
  | thesis_year       = 2001
  | doctoral_advisor  = Liu Meixun ({{lang|zh|刘美珣}})
}}
| module2             = {{Listen |embed=yes|pos=center|filename=Xi's voice 2021.ogg|title=Xi Jinping's voice|type=speech|description=Recorded [[100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party|1 July 2021]]}}
| module3             = {{Infobox Chinese
| child = yes
| pic = Xi Jinping (Chinese characters).svg
| piccap = "Xi Jinping" in simplified (top) and traditional (bottom) Chinese characters
| picupright = 0.5
| s = 习近平 | t = 習近平
<!--Mandarin-->
| p = Xí Jìnpíng
| bpmf = ㄒㄧˊ ㄐㄧㄣˋ ㄆㄧㄥˊ
| w = {{tonesup|Hsi2 Chin4-pʻing2}}
| wyr = Syí Jìnpíng
| mps = Shí Jìn-píng
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|x|i|2|-|j|in|4|.|p|ing|2}}
<!--Hakka-->
| h = Sip<sup>6</sup> Kiun<sup>4</sup> Pin<sup>2</sup><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.hkilang.org/NEW_WEB/page/dictionary |title=Association for Conversation of Hong Kong Indigenous Languages Online Dictionary |date=1 July 2015 |website=hkilang.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150701164520/http://www.hkilang.org/NEW_WEB/page/dictionary|archive-date=1 July 2015 |access-date=12 September 2019}}</ref>
| phfs = Si̍p Khiun-phìn
<!--Yue/Cantonese-->
| y = Jaahp Gahn-pìhng
| ci = {{IPAc-yue|z|aap|6|-|g|an|6|.|p|ing|4}}
| j = Zaap6 Gan6-ping4
<!--Min-->
| poj = Si̍p Kīn-pêng
| tl = Si̍p Kīn-pîng
| bp = Síp Gîn-bíng
| buc = Sĭk Gê̤ṳng-ping
<!--Others-->
| lmz = Zih8 Jin6-bin6
| order = st
}}
| awards              = [[List of awards and honours received by Xi Jinping|Full list]]
| alt                 = Xi in 2024, wearing black suit, smiling
}}
{{Xi Jinping sidebar}}

'''Xi Jinping'''{{efn|{{IPAc-en|lang|ˈ|ʃ|iː|_|dʒ|ɪ|n|ˈ|p|ɪ|ŋ}} {{Respell|SHEE|_|jin|PING}}, or often {{IPAc-en|'|Z|i:}} {{respell|ZHEE}}; {{lang-zh|s=习近平|p=Xí Jìnpíng}}, pronounced {{IPAc-cmn|AUD|Xi Jinping.ogg|x|i|2|-|j|in|4|.|p|ing|2}}}} (born 15 June 1953) is a Chinese politician who has been the [[general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) and [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|chairman of the Central Military Commission]] (CMC), and thus the [[paramount leader]] of China, since 2012. Since 2013, Xi has also served as the seventh [[president of China]]. As a member of the fifth [[Generations of Chinese leadership|generation of Chinese leadership]], Xi is the first CCP general secretary born after the [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|establishment of the People's Republic of China]] (PRC).

The son of Chinese communist veteran [[Xi Zhongxun]], Xi was exiled to rural [[Yanchuan County]], Shaanxi Province, as a teenager following his father's purge during the [[Cultural Revolution]]. He lived in a [[yaodong]] in the village of Liangjiahe, where he joined the CCP after several failed attempts and worked as the local [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|party secretary]]. After studying [[chemical engineering]] at [[Tsinghua University]] as a [[Worker-Peasant-Soldier student|worker-peasant-soldier student]], Xi rose through the ranks politically in China's coastal provinces. Xi was [[governor of Fujian]] from 1999 to 2002, before becoming governor and party secretary of neighboring [[Politics of Zhejiang|Zhejiang]] from 2002 to 2007. Following the dismissal of the party secretary of Shanghai, [[Chen Liangyu]], Xi was transferred to replace him for a brief period in 2007. He subsequently joined the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo Standing Committee]] (PSC) of the CCP the same year and was the first-ranking secretary of the [[Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Secretariat]] in October 2007. In 2008, he was designated as [[Hu Jintao]]'s presumed [[Succession of power in China|successor]] as paramount leader. Towards this end, Xi was appointed the eighth [[Vice President of China|vice president]] and [[Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission|vice chairman of the CMC]]. He officially received the title of [[leadership core]] from the CCP in 2016.

While overseeing China's domestic policy, Xi has introduced far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and strengthen internal unity. His [[Anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping|anti-corruption campaign]] led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including former PSC member [[Zhou Yongkang]]. For the sake of promoting "[[common prosperity]]", Xi has enacted a series of policies designed to increase equality, overseen [[Targeted Poverty Alleviation|targeted poverty alleviation]] programs as part of the [[battle against poverty]] campaign, and directed a broad crackdown in 2021 against the tech and tutoring sectors. Furthermore, he has expanded support for [[State-owned enterprises of China|state-owned enterprises]] (SOEs), emphasized advanced manufacturing and tech development, advanced [[military-civil fusion]], and attempted to reform China's property sector. Following the onset of the [[COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China]], he initially presided over a [[zero-COVID]] policy from January 2020 to December 2022 before ultimately shifting towards a [[mitigation strategy]] after [[2022 COVID-19 protests in China|COVID-19 protests]] occurred in China.

Xi has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy, particularly with regard to [[China–United States relations|China's relations with the United States]], the [[nine-dash line]] in the [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|South China Sea]], and the [[Sino-Indian border dispute]]. Additionally, for the sake of advancing Chinese economic interests abroad, Xi has sought to expand China's influence in Africa and Eurasia by championing the [[Belt and Road Initiative]]. Xi presided over a deterioration in relations between Beijing and Taipei under Taiwanese president [[Tsai Ing-wen]], successor of [[Ma Ying-jeou]] whom Xi met in 2015. In 2020, Xi oversaw the passage of a [[2020 Hong Kong national security law|national security law in Hong Kong]], which clamped down on political opposition in the city, especially [[Pro-democracy camp (Hong Kong)|pro-democracy activists]].

Since coming to power, Xi's tenure has witnessed a significant increase in [[Censorship in China|censorship]] and [[Mass surveillance in China|mass surveillance]], a deterioration in [[Human rights in China|human rights]], including the [[Persecution of Uyghurs in China|persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang]], the rise of a [[Xi Jinping's cult of personality|cult of personality]] around his leadership, and the [[2018 amendment to the Constitution of China|removal]] of [[term limits]] for the presidency in 2018. Xi's political ideas and principles, known as [[Xi Jinping Thought]], have been incorporated into the [[Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party|party]] and [[Constitution of China|national constitutions]]. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, including new CCP committees on national security, economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the internet. In October 2022, Xi secured a third term as CCP General Secretary, and was re-elected state president for an unprecedented third term in March 2023.

{{TOC limit|3}}

==Early life and education==
Xi Jinping was born on 15 June 1953 in [[Beijing]],{{sfn|Wong|2023|p=21}} the third child of [[Xi Zhongxun]] and his second wife [[Qi Xin]]. After the [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|founding of the PRC]] in 1949, Xi's father held a series of posts, including the chief of the [[Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party]], [[Vice Premier of China|vice-premier]], and [[Vice Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress|vice chairperson of the National People's Congress]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/china-profile-xi-jinping/24764283.html|title=Profile: Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping|date=7 November 2012|publisher=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty]]|access-date=26 August 2013|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131019083336/http://www.rferl.org/content/china-profile-xi-jinping/24764283.html|archive-date=19 October 2013}}</ref> Xi had two older sisters, [[Qi Qiaoqiao]] (齐桥桥), born in 1949 and Qi An'an (齐安安), born in 1952.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/book/2009-04/28/content_11270872.htm |script-title=zh:與丈夫習仲勛相伴58年 齊心：這輩子無比幸福 |date=28 April 2009 |publisher=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |language=zh|trans-title=With her husband Xi Zhongxun for 58 years: very happy in this life|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130128102212/http://news.xinhuanet.com/book/2009-04/28/content_11270872.htm|archive-date=28 January 2013|access-date=18 March 2013}}</ref> Xi's father was from [[Fuping County, Shaanxi|Fuping County]], Shaanxi.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chan |first=Alfred L. |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/41435/chapter/352774284 |title=Xi Jinping: Political Career, Governance, and Leadership, 1953–2018 |date=2022-03-24 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-761525-6 |chapter=Childhood and Youth: Privilege and Trauma, 1953–1979 |chapter-url=https://academic.oup.com/book/41435/chapter/352774284 |access-date=12 January 2024 |archive-date=27 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240227172004/https://academic.oup.com/book/41435/chapter/352774284 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Xi went to [[Beijing Bayi School]],<ref>{{cite web|last=Takahashi|first=Tetsushi|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Beijing-Diary/Connecting-the-dots-of-the-Hong-Kong-law-and-veneration-of-Xi|title=Connecting the dots of the Hong Kong law and veneration of Xi|newspaper=[[Nikkei Shimbun]]|date=1 June 2002|access-date=23 October 2020|archive-date=3 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211203074351/https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Beijing-Diary/Connecting-the-dots-of-the-Hong-Kong-law-and-veneration-of-Xi|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="newyorker2" /> and then [[Beijing No. 25 Middle School|Beijing No. 25 School]],<ref>{{cite web |last1=Li |first1=Cheng |title=Xi Jinping's Inner Circle (Part 2: Friends from Xi's Formative Years) |url=https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44cl.pdf |access-date=15 July 2020 |website=[[Hoover Institution]] |publisher= |pages=6–22 |archive-date=26 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200926055927/https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44cl.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref> in the 1960s. He became friends with [[Liu He (politician)|Liu He]], who attended [[Beijing 101 Middle School|Beijing No. 101 School]] in the same district, and who later became China's vice premier and a close advisor to Xi after he became China's paramount leader.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/29/power-behind-the-thrones-10-movers-and-shakers-for-2020|title=The power behind the thrones: 10 political movers and shakers who will shape 2020|last=Tisdall|first=Simon|date=29 December 2019|work=[[The Guardian]]|access-date=16 January 2020|issn=0029-7712|author-link=Simon Tisdall|archive-date=5 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105032127/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/29/power-behind-the-thrones-10-movers-and-shakers-for-2020|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/blessed-by-xi-jinping-the-new-captain-of-chinas-economy-1519688592|title=Who Is 'Uncle He?' The Man in Charge of China's Economy|last=Wei|first=Lingling|date=27 February 2018|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|access-date=16 January 2020|archive-date=3 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211003102625/https://www.wsj.com/articles/blessed-by-xi-jinping-the-new-captain-of-chinas-economy-1519688592|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1963, when Xi was ten years old, his father was purged from the CCP and sent to work in a factory in [[Luoyang]], Henan.{{sfn|Bouée|2010|p=93}} In May 1966, the [[Cultural Revolution]] cut short Xi's secondary education when all secondary classes were halted for students to criticise and fight their teachers. Student militants ransacked the Xi family home and one of Xi's sisters, Xi Heping, "was persecuted to death".<ref>{{cite web |date=14 October 2013 |script-title=zh:习近平：＂我坚信我的父亲是一个大英雄＂ |trans-title=Xi Jinping: "I firmly believe my father is a great hero" |url=http://www.gapp.gov.cn/contents/2091/157500.shtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180305150646/http://www.gapp.gov.cn/contents/2091/157500.shtml |archive-date=5 March 2018 |access-date=6 March 2018 |publisher=[[State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television]] |language=zh |script-quote=zh:女儿习和平……在＂文化大革命＂中被迫害致死，是习仲勋难以抹去的心痛。|trans-quote=His daughter Xi Heping... was persecuted to death during the "Cultural Revolution", which is a heartache that Xi Zhongxun could not erase.}}</ref><ref name="Buckley-2015">{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-cultural-revolution.html |title=Cultural Revolution Shaped Xi Jinping, From Schoolboy to Survivor |last1=Buckley|first1=Chris |last2=Tatlow|first2=Didi Kirsten|date=24 September 2015 |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=6 March 2018|url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180305150638/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-cultural-revolution.html |archive-date=5 March 2018 |url-access=limited}}</ref>

Later, his mother was forced to publicly denounce his father, as he was paraded before a crowd as an enemy of the revolution. His father was later imprisoned in 1968 when Xi was aged 15. In 1968, Xi submitted an application to the Bayi School's Reform Committee and insisted on leaving Beijing for the countryside.<ref name="g605">{{cite book |last=Shi |first=Z. C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MKSRswEACAAJ |script-title=zh:习近平的七年知青岁月 |publisher=China Central Party School Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-7-5035-6163-4 |page={{page needed|date=November 2024}} |language=zh |trans-title=Xi Jinping's Seven Years as an Educated Youth |access-date=2024-08-18}}</ref> On 13 January 1969, they left Beijing and arrived in Liangjiahe Village, [[Yan'an]], Shaanxi, alongside [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Chairman]] [[Mao Zedong]]'s [[Down to the Countryside Movement]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzM2NTc1MjAwOA==.html |script-title=zh:不忘初心：是什么造就了今天的习主席?|date=30 January 2018|website=[[Youku]]|language=zh-Hans |trans-title=What Were His Original Intentions? The President Xi of Today |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180130204306/http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMzM2NTc1MjAwOA==.html |archive-date=30 January 2018 |access-date=30 January 2018}}</ref> The rural areas of Yan'an were very backward,<ref name="Page-2020">{{Cite news|last=Page|first=Jeremy|date=23 December 2020|title=How the U.S. Misread China's Xi: Hoping for a Globalist, It Got an Autocrat|language=en-US|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-globalist-autocrat-misread-11608735769|access-date=25 December 2020|issn=0099-9660|archive-date=24 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201224233237/https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-globalist-autocrat-misread-11608735769|url-status=live}}</ref> which created a big gap for Xi as a teenager. He once recalled that he had to overcome "five hurdles" ([[flea]], food, life, labor and thought hurdle),<ref name="j429">{{cite news |date=2022-05-23 |script-title=zh:《足迹》第1集：过＂五关＂有多难 |trans-title="Footprints" Episode 1: How difficult is it to pass the "Five Gates" |url=http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2022-05/23/c_1128675005.htm |access-date=2024-08-18 |website=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |language=zh |archive-date=18 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240818143438/http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2022-05/23/c_1128675005.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> and the experience led him to feel affinity with the rural poor.<ref name="Page-2020" /> After a few months, unable to stand rural life, he ran away to Beijing. He was arrested during a crackdown on deserters from the countryside and sent to a work camp to dig ditches. He later returned to the village, under the persuasion of his aunt Qi Yun and uncle Wei Zhenwu.<ref name="x837">{{cite news |date=2018-07-01 |script-title=zh:习近平的七年知青岁月 |trans-title=Xi Jinping's Seven Years as an Educated Youth |url=https://www.chinanews.com.cn/m/gn/2018/07-01/8552619.shtml |access-date=2024-08-18 |website=[[China News Service]] |language=zh |archive-date=18 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240818143603/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/m/gn/2018/07-01/8552619.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref> He worked as the [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|party secretary]] of Liangjiahe, where he lived in a [[yaodong|cave house]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lim |first=Louisa |date=9 November 2012 |title=For China's Rising Leader, A Cave Was Once Home |work=[[NPR]] |url=https://www.npr.org/2012/11/09/164684418/for-chinas-rising-leader-a-cave-was-once-home?t=1578589261050 |url-status=live |access-date=27 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180616053635/https://www.npr.org/2012/11/09/164684418/for-chinas-rising-leader-a-cave-was-once-home |archive-date=16 June 2018}}</ref>

He then spent a total of seven years in [[Yanchuan County|Yanchuan]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Demick|first1=Barbara|last2=Pierson|first2=David|date=14 February 2012|title=China's political star Xi Jinping is a study in contrasts|newspaper=[[Toronto Star]]|url=https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/02/14/chinas_political_star_xi_jinping_is_a_study_in_contrasts.html|url-status=live|access-date=24 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171013225355/https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/02/14/chinas_political_star_xi_jinping_is_a_study_in_contrasts.html|archive-date=13 October 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Matt Rivers |date=19 March 2018 |title=This entire Chinese village is a shrine to Xi Jinping |work=[[CNN]] |url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html |access-date=11 February 2021 |archive-date=26 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210226054335/https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html |url-status=live}}</ref> In 1973, Yanchuan County assigned Xi Jinping to Zhaojiahe Village in Jiajianping Commune to lead social education efforts.<ref name="b772" /> Due to his effective work and strong rapport with the villagers, the community expressed a desire to keep him there. However, after Liangjiahe Village advocated for his return, Xi went back in July that same year. Liang Yuming ({{lang|zh|梁玉明}}) and Liang Youhua ({{lang|zh|梁有华}}), the village branch secretaries, supported his application to the Chinese Communist Party.<ref name="k447">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4_4pDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA12 |script-title=zh:習近平如何改變中國 |publisher=Linghuo wenhua shiye youxiang gongsi |year=2014 |isbn=978-986-5721-05-3 |series=China Interpretation Series |page=12 |language=zh |trans-title=How Xi Jinping is changing China |access-date=2024-08-23}}</ref> Yet, due to his father, Xi Zhongxun, still facing political persecution, the application was initially blocked by higher authorities.<ref name="newyorker2">{{cite news |last1=Osnos |first1=Evan |author-link=Evan Osnos |date=30 March 2015 |title=Born Red |magazine=[[The New Yorker]] |url=http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red |url-status=live |access-date=11 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191004153259/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red |archive-date=4 October 2019}}</ref> Despite submitting ten applications, it wasn't until the new commune secretary, Bai Guangxing ({{lang|zh|白光兴}}), recognized Xi's capabilities that his application was forwarded to the CCP Yanchuan County Committee and approved in early 1974.<ref name="v256">{{cite book | last=Chan | first=A. L. | title=Xi Jinping: Political Career, Governance, and Leadership, 1953–2018 | publisher=Oxford University Press | year=2022 | isbn=978-0-19-761522-5 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HH1ZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 | access-date=2024-08-23 | page=33}}</ref> Around that time, as Liangjiahe village underwent leadership changes, Xi was recommended to become the Party branch chairman of the Liangjiahe Brigade.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/china_20180318_xi_jinping_profile.pdf |title=Xi Jinping 习近平 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]] |access-date=14 October 2021 |archive-date=27 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210927053240/https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/china_20180318_xi_jinping_profile.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Zy479_jx11YJ:www.aerospaceindia.org/Issue%2520Briefs/2010/25%2520October%25202010%2520-%2520CHINA%25E2%2580%2599S%2520NEXT%2520CHAIRMAN%25E2%2580%2594XI%2520JINPING.pdf+&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjpQjUAtfkdEgw0cxv3UMunFfoLBcy0_po2aPN4xvPoQ-K9lFpIdgtf7PAw5ebYoTd8NwaRSswzfWmws278UPehKckL3Zb0TXlci2R0HsZGceCYRpBiD6EfBrspdjUh8CZzwcMg&sig=AHIEtbRjgFp8BCiHybWUtaP2uVF8BVuVZA |title=China's Next Chairman – Xi Jinping |last=Ranade|first=Jayadva|date=25 October 2010|publisher=Centre for Air Power Studies|access-date=27 May 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130724125447/https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache%3AZy479_jx11YJ%3Awww.aerospaceindia.org%2FIssue%2520Briefs%2F2010%2F25%2520October%25202010%2520-%2520CHINA%25E2%2580%2599S%2520NEXT%2520CHAIRMAN%25E2%2580%2594XI%2520JINPING.pdf+&hl=en&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjpQjUAtfkdEgw0cxv3UMunFfoLBcy0_po2aPN4xvPoQ-K9lFpIdgtf7PAw5ebYoTd8NwaRSswzfWmws278UPehKckL3Zb0TXlci2R0HsZGceCYRpBiD6EfBrspdjUh8CZzwcMg&sig=AHIEtbRjgFp8BCiHybWUtaP2uVF8BVuVZA |archive-date=24 July 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

After taking office, Xi noted that [[Mianyang]], Sichuan was using [[biogas]] technology and, given the fuel shortages in his village, he traveled to Mianyang to learn about biogas digesters.<ref>{{cite book | last=Chan | first=A. L. | title=Xi Jinping: Political Career, Governance, and Leadership, 1953-2018 | publisher=Oxford University Press | year=2022 | isbn=978-0-19-761522-5 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HH1ZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA34 | access-date=2024-08-23 | page=34}}</ref> Upon returning, he successfully implemented the technology in Liangjiahe, marking a breakthrough in Shaanxi that soon spread throughout the region.<ref name="q526">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QjItAAAAMAAJ |script-title=zh:延川县志 |publisher=Shaanxi People's Publishing House |year=1999 |isbn=978-7-224-05262-6 |series=Shaanxi Local Chronicles Series |page=41 |language=zh |trans-title=Yanchuan County Annals |access-date=2024-08-23}}</ref> Additionally, he led efforts to drill wells for water supply, establish iron industry cooperatives, reclaim land, plant flue-cured tobacco, and set up sales outlets to address the village's production and economic challenges.<ref name="m580">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=r6NgAAAAIAAJ |script-title=zh:红墙内的子女们 |publisher=Yanbian University Press |year=1998 |isbn=978-7-5634-1080-4 |page=468 |language=zh |trans-title=Children Within the Red Wall |access-date=2024-08-23}}</ref><ref name="f125">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZQbWEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA76 |script-title=zh:缙麓别调（三） |publisher=Chongqing daxue dianzi yinxiang chubanshe |year=2021 |isbn=978-7-5689-2545-7 |page=76 |language=zh |trans-title=Jinlu Special Tune (Part 3) |access-date=2024-08-23}}</ref> In 1975, when Yanchuan County was allocated a spot at [[Tsinghua University]], the CCP Yanchuan County Committee recommended Xi for admission.<ref name="w795">{{cite book |last=Pengpeng |first=Z. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LqRV8BYikI0C&pg=PA619 |script-title=zh:谜一样的人生 |publisher=Zhu Peng Peng |isbn=978-0-9787999-2-2 |page=619 |language=zh |trans-title=A Mysterious Life |access-date=2024-08-23}}</ref> From 1975 to 1979, Xi studied [[chemical engineering]] at Tsinghua University as a [[Worker-Peasant-Soldier student|worker-peasant-soldier student]] in Beijing.<ref name="k525">{{cite book |author=Zhong |first1=Wen |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ImNcEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 |script-title=zh:习近平传 |last2=Zhang |first2=Jie |publisher=Bouden House |year=2022 |isbn=978-1-034-94892-6 |page=3 |language=zh |trans-title=Biography of Xi Jinping |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref>{{sfn|Simon|Cong|pp=28–29|2009}}

==Early political career==
=== Central Military Commission ===
After graduating in April 1979, Xi was assigned to the [[General Office of the State Council]] and the [[General Office of the Central Military Commission|General Office of the CCP Central Military Commission]], where he served as one of three secretaries to [[Geng Biao]],<ref name="j608">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yI1KAQAAIAAJ |title=耿飚传 |publisher=People's Liberation Army Press |year=2009 |isbn=978-7-5065-5904-1 |page= |language=zh |trans-title=Biography of Geng Biao |access-date=2024-08-30 |issue=v. 2}}</ref> a member of the [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Politburo]] and [[Minister of National Defense (China)|Minister of Defense]].<ref name="i815">{{cite book | last=Guo | first=X. | title=The Politics of the Core Leader in China: Culture, Institution, Legitimacy, and Power | publisher=Cambridge University Press | year=2019 | isbn=978-1-108-48049-9 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hm2MDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA363 | access-date=2024-08-30 | page=363}}</ref><ref name="newyorker2" />

=== Hebei ===
On 25 March 1982, Xi was appointed deputy party secretary of [[Zhengding County]] in Hebei.<ref name="r135">{{cite book | last=Li | first=C. | title=Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership | publisher=Brookings Institution Press | year=2016 | isbn=978-0-8157-2694-4 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3NKACwAAQBAJ&pg=PA338 | access-date=2024-08-30 | page=338}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Johnson |first=Ian |date=2012-09-30 |title=Elite and Deft, Xi Aimed High Early in China |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html |access-date=2023-04-04 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=30 September 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120930091232/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html |url-status=live}}</ref> Together with Lü Yulan ({{lang|zh|吕玉兰}}), the other deputy party secretary of Zhengding, Xi wrote a letter to the central government addressing the excessive requisitions that burdened local farmers.<ref name="k440">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Y36DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT59 |title=精准扶贫的辩证法 |publisher=Xiamen University Press |year=2018 |isbn=978-7-5615-6916-0 |page=59 |language=zh |trans-title=The Dialectics of Targeted Poverty Alleviation |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref> Their efforts successfully convinced the central government to reduce the annual requisition amount by 14 million kilograms.<ref name="b772">{{cite book |author= |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MZFBEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA61 |title=習近平扶貧故事 |publisher=Sino United Electronic Publishing Limited |year=2021 |isbn=978-988-8758-27-2 |pages=19–61 |language=zh |trans-title=Xi Jinping's Poverty Alleviation Story |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref> In 1983, Zhengding adjusted its agricultural structure, leading to a significant increase in farmers' incomes from 148 yuan to over 400 yuan in 1984,<ref name="g703">{{cite news |date=2018-02-08 |title=习近平同志当县委书记时就被认为是栋梁之才 |trans-title=Comrade Xi Jinping was considered a pillar of talent when he was the county party secretary |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-02/08/c_1122386142.htm |access-date=2024-08-30 |website=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |language=zh |archive-date=30 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240830144357/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-02/08/c_1122386142.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> thoroughly solving the county's economic issues.<ref name="p256">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=57EXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT12 |title=决战2020：拒绝贫困 |publisher=China Democracy and Legal System Publishing House |year=2016 |isbn=978-7-5162-1125-0 |page=12 |language=zh |trans-title=Decisive Battle of 2020: Say No to Poverty |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref>

As the secretary of the CCP Zhengding County Committee in July 1983,<ref name="d688">{{cite book |author= |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SRMnAAAAMAAJ |title=正定縣志 |publisher=China City Press |year=1992 |isbn=978-7-5074-0610-8 |pages=73–548 |language=zh |trans-title=Zhengding Chronicle |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref><ref name="k440" /> Xi initiated several development projects, including the development of "Nine Articles of Zhengding talents",<ref name="d688" /> the construction of Changshan Park,<ref name="p482">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AZBJAAAAMAAJ |title=青春岁月: 当代青年小报告文学选 |publisher=[[People's Literature Publishing House]] |year=1986 |page=62 |language=zh |trans-title=Youth Years: A Selection of Contemporary Youth Reportage |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref> the restoration of the [[Longxing Temple]], the formation of a tourism company, and the establishment of the Rongguo Mansion and Zhengding Table Tennis Base.<ref name="h057">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z-sXEQAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 |title=河北社会主义核心价值观培育践行报告 |publisher=[[Social Sciences Literature Press]] |year=2023 |isbn=978-7-5228-1618-0 |page=3 |language=zh |trans-title=Hebei's Report on the Cultivation and Practice of Socialist Core Values |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref> He also persuaded the China Teleplay Production Center to set the filming base of [[Dream of the Red Chamber (1987 TV series)|Dream of the Red Mansions]] in Zhengding and secured 3.5 million yuan to build Rongguo Mansion,<ref name="s517">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Vn9pAAAAIAAJ |title=紅色后代 |publisher=Chengdu Publishing House |year=1996 |isbn=978-7-80575-946-3 |page=286 |language=zh |trans-title=Red Offspring |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref> which significantly boosted the county's tourism industry, generating 17.61 million yuan in revenue that year.<ref name="d992">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YqFPAAAAIAAJ |title=血脉总相连: 中国名人后代大寻踪 |publisher=Beijing Yanshan Publishing House |year=1993 |isbn=978-7-5402-0658-1 |page=363 |language=zh |trans-title=Blood is Always Connected: Tracing the Descendants of Chinese Celebrities |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref> Additionally, Xi invited prominent figures such as [[Hua Luogeng]], [[Yu Guangyuan]], Pan Chengxiao to visit Zhengding,<ref name="v796">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gx8zAQAAIAAJ |title=河北青年 |publisher=Hebei Youth Magazine |year=1984 |page=5 |language=zh |trans-title=Hebei Youth |access-date=2024-08-30 |issue=nos. 1-9}}</ref> which eventually led to the development of the county's "semi-urban" strategy,<ref name="h057" /> leveraging its proximity to Shijiazhuang for diverse business growth.<ref name="f453">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pq8XEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT141 |title=决策论 |publisher=Beijing Book Co. Inc. |year=2018 |isbn=978-7-226-05307-2 |page=141 |language=zh |trans-title=Decision Theory |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref><ref name="q342">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SxsaEQAAQBAJ&pg=PT17 |title=社会的逻辑 |publisher=Peking University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-7-301-26916-9 |page=17 |language=zh |trans-title=The Logic of Society |access-date=2024-08-30}}</ref>

In September 1984, during a briefing session chaired by He Zai, the secretary-general of the [[Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Central Organization Department]], Xi Jinping's strategic vision and comprehensive understanding of Zhengding County's development were highlighted.<ref name="d652">{{cite news |date=2018-06-15 |title=习近平与人民日报的10个故事 |trans-title=10 stories about Xi Jinping and People's Daily |url=https://opinion.haiwainet.cn/n/2018/0615/c456318-31335689.html |access-date=2024-08-30 |website=Haiwai Net |language=zh |archive-date=30 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240830150708/https://opinion.haiwainet.cn/n/2018/0615/c456318-31335689.html |url-status=live }}</ref> He Zai, along with [[Wei Jianxing]], deputy head of the CCP Central Organization Department, communicated these findings to [[Hu Yaobang]], describing Xi as a leader with a strategic outlook and a strong alliance ideology between workers and peasants.<ref name="k053">{{cite news |date=2023-11-17 |title=中共元老何載逝世 曾薦習近平「棟樑之才」 |trans-title=He Zai, the veteran of the CCP, passed away. He once recommended Xi Jinping as a "pillar of talent" |url=https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20231117002407-260409 |access-date=2024-08-30 |work=[[China Times]] |language=zh |archive-date=30 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240830150706/https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20231117002407-260409 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="p946">{{cite news |date=2023-11-16 |title=104岁中共元老何载逝世 曾荐习近平"栋梁之才" |trans-title=He Zai, a 104-year-old CCP veteran, passed away. He once recommended Xi Jinping as a "pillar of talent" |url=https://www.singtao.ca/6452821/2023-11-16/news-104%E6%AD%B2%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E5%85%83%E8%80%81%E4%BD%95%E8%BC%89%E9%80%9D%E4%B8%96++%E6%9B%BE%E8%96%A6%E7%BF%92%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3%E3%80%8C%E6%A3%9F%E6%A8%91%E4%B9%8B%E6%89%8D%E3%80%8D/?variant=zh-cn&appedition=toronto |access-date=2024-08-30 |website=[[Sing Tao Daily (Canada)|Sing Tao Daily]] |language=zh |archive-date=30 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240830150707/https://www.singtao.ca/6452821/2023-11-16/news-104%E6%AD%B2%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E5%85%83%E8%80%81%E4%BD%95%E8%BC%89%E9%80%9D%E4%B8%96%20%20%E6%9B%BE%E8%96%A6%E7%BF%92%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3%E3%80%8C%E6%A3%9F%E6%A8%91%E4%B9%8B%E6%89%8D%E3%80%8D/?variant=zh-cn&appedition=toronto |url-status=live }}</ref> In 1985, Xi participated in a study tour on corn processing and traveled to [[Iowa]], US,<ref name="z177">{{cite book | last=Aoyagi | first=W.S.A. | title=History of Biodiesel - with Emphasis on Soy Biodiesel (1900-2017): Extensively Annotated Bibliography and Sourcebook | publisher=Soyinfo Center | year=2017 | isbn=978-1-928914-97-6 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FFU8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA262 | access-date=2024-08-30 | page=262}}</ref> to study agricultural production and corn processing technology.<ref name="o756">{{cite news |date=2015-09-23 |title=˭谁能想到石家庄食品协会主席成了中国领导人 |trans-title=Who would have thought that the chairman of Shijiazhuang Food Association would become the Chinese leader? |url=https://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/20150923/t20150923_519945574.shtml |access-date=2024-08-30 |website=[[China National Radio]] |language=zh |archive-date=30 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240830150923/https://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/20150923/t20150923_519945574.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="d652" /> During his visit to the U.S., the CCP Central Organization Department decided to transfer him to [[Xiamen]] as a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Xiamen Municipal Committee and as vice mayor.<ref name="k053" />

=== Fujian ===
Arriving in Xiamen as vice-mayor in June 1985, Xi drafted the first strategic plan for the development of the city, the Xiamen Economic and Social Development Strategy for 1985–2000.<ref name="u803">{{cite book |author=Zhang |first=Qizi |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=j0dsEAAAQBAJ&pg=PP9 |title=厦门城市治理体系和治理能力现代化研究 |publisher=[[Social Sciences Literature Press]] |year=2016 |isbn=978-7-5097-9562-0 |series=A series of achievements of inter-academy cooperation of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Xiamen |page=9 |language=zh |trans-title=Research on the modernization of Xiamen's urban governance system and governance capacity |access-date=2024-09-19}}</ref> From August, Along with helping to prepare [[Xiamen Airlines]],<ref name="m820">{{cite news |date=2024-07-25 |title=白鹭振翅 向风而行 |trans-title=Egrets flap their wings and fly into the wind |url=http://www.news.cn/politics/20240725/cd4283ccd3464fda884c56e0645a2b44/c.html |access-date=2024-09-19 |website=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |language=zh |archive-date=24 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240924011244/http://www.news.cn/politics/20240725/cd4283ccd3464fda884c56e0645a2b44/c.html |url-status=live }}</ref> the Xiamen Economic Information Center,<ref name="g215">{{cite news |date=2023-05-26 |title=习近平同志推动厦门经济特区建设发展的探索与实践 |trans-title=Comrade Xi Jinping's exploration and practice in promoting the construction and development of Xiamen Special Economic Zone |url=https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-06/23/content_5300679.htm |access-date=2024-09-19 |website=State Council of the People's Republic of China |language=zh}}</ref> and the Xiamen Special Administrative Region Road Project, etc., he oversaw the resolution for Yundang Lake's comprehensive treatments.<ref name="b381">{{cite news |date=2024-02-21 |title=时政长镜头丨筼筜回响 |trans-title=Long shot of current affairs丨Yuanlong Echo |url=https://www.stdaily.com/index/yaowen/202402/ba6fc81376314bb4b909bd7af8d64fd7.shtml |access-date=2024-09-19 |website=[[Science and Technology Daily]] |language=zh |archive-date=24 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240924011242/https://www.stdaily.com/index/yaowen/202402/ba6fc81376314bb4b909bd7af8d64fd7.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref> He married [[Peng Liyuan]] then in Xiamen.<ref name="z629">{{cite book | last=Kuhn | first=R.L. | title=How China's Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China's Past, Current and Future Leaders | publisher=Wiley | year=2011 | isbn=978-1-118-10425-5 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4j5UoOoQZCIC&pg=PA420 | access-date=2024-09-19 | page=420}}</ref><ref name="p383">{{cite book | last=Dillon | first=M. | title=China in the Age of Xi Jinping | publisher=Taylor & Francis | year=2021 | isbn=978-1-000-37096-6 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-EEiEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT93 | access-date=2024-09-19 | page=93}}</ref>

He started serving as the head of a region after being appointed just as the secretary of [[Ningde]] in September 1988.<ref name="c338">{{cite book | last=Brown | first=W.N. | title=Chasing the Chinese Dream: Four Decades of Following China's War on Poverty | publisher=Springer Nature Singapore | year=2021 | isbn=978-981-16-0654-0 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OzsxEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 | access-date=2024-09-19 | page=9}}</ref> Ningde's economy was far worse at that time than that of Fuzhou and Xiamen.<ref name="g505">{{cite book | last=Brown | first=W.N. | title=The Evolution of China's Anti-Poverty Strategies: Cases of 20 Chinese Changing Lives | publisher=Springer Nature Singapore | year=2022 | isbn=978-981-19-7281-2 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eVWbEAAAQBAJ&pg=PR6 | access-date=2024-09-19 | page=6}}</ref> Xi organized his work log and experience during his Ningde period into his book ''Getting out of Poverty'',<ref name="b584">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y5j-EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT74 |title=中国脱贫攻坚精神 |publisher=Huazhong University of Science and Technology Press |year=2021 |isbn=978-7-5680-6816-1 |page=74 |language=zh |trans-title=China's Spirit of Poverty Alleviation |access-date=2024-09-19}}</ref> and handled the local poverty eradicating efforts and local CCP building projects.<ref name="b250">{{cite book |author=Feng |first=Hexia |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D5n-EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT11 |title=中国的贫困治理 |publisher=[[Social Sciences Literature Press]] |year=2023 |isbn=978-7-5228-1509-1 |page=11 |language=zh |trans-title=Poverty Governance in China |access-date=2024-09-19}}</ref> The CCP Fujian Provincial Committee decided in May 1990 to assign Xi to [[Fuzhou City]] as the Municipal Committee Secretary.<ref name="o840">{{cite book | last=Lam | first=W. | title=Xi Jinping: The Hidden Agendas of China's Ruler for Life | publisher=Taylor & Francis | year=2023 | isbn=978-1-000-92583-8 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZELGEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 | access-date=2024-09-19 | page=21}}</ref>

In 1997, he was named an alternate member of the [[15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|15th CCP Central Committee]]. In 1999, he was promoted to the office of Vice Governor of Fujian, and became governor a year later. Xi proposed the concept of the Golden Triangle at Min River ({{lang-zh|闽江口金三角经济圈}}) and oversaw the construction of the Fuzhou 3820 Project Master Plan,<ref name="l369" /> which outlines Fuzhou City's growth strategy for 3, 8, and 20 years.<ref name="f182">{{cite book | author=《福州年鉴》编辑委员会 | title=福州年鉴 | publisher=中国统计出版社 | year=1995 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3YmzAAAAIAAJ | language=zh | access-date=2024-11-07 | page=16}}</ref> He concentrated on the development of [[Changle International Airport]], the Min River Water Transfer Project, the Fuzhou Telecommunication Hub, and [[Fuzhou Port]], among others. He concentrated on attracting Taiwanese and foreign investment,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/from-fujian-chinas-xi-offers-economic-olive-branch-to-taiwan/|title=From Fujian, China's Xi Offers Economic Olive Branch to Taiwan|last=Tiezzi|first=Shannon|date=4 November 2014|newspaper=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|language=en-US|url-access=limited|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160610145941/https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/from-fujian-chinas-xi-offers-economic-olive-branch-to-taiwan/|archive-date=10 June 2016|access-date=17 March 2016}}</ref> establishing Southwest TPV Electronics and Southeast Automobile in Fuzhou, and fostering [[Fuyao Glass]], [[Newland Digital Technology]] and other manufacturing firms.<ref name="o840" /> Furthermore, he rehabilitated local cultural landmarks, including as the [[Sanfang Qixiang]] in Fuzhou, advanced urban renewal initiatives, and effectively addressed the issue of poverty alleviation on [[Pingtan Island]]. In 1995, Xi Jinping was elevated to deputy secretary of the [[Fujian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] and served as [[Governor of Fujian]] from 1999 to 2002, during which he presented the notion of "[[Megalopolises in China|Megalopolises]]" and advocated for the inter-island growth strategy of Fuzhou and Xiamen, which motivated local officials to swiftly overcome the repercussions of the [[Lai Changxing|Yuanhua smuggling case]] ({{lang-zh|远华走私案}}) and adopt a new development strategy.<ref name="x752">{{cite book | title=驼铃: 大众文学| publisher=驼铃杂志社 | issue=172–177 | year=2000 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7No2AAAAIAAJ | language=zh | access-date=2024-11-07 | page=45}}</ref> Xi also oversaw the development of "Digital Fujian", including the province's complaint hotline into the "[[12345 hotline|12345 Citizen Service Platform]]," so enhancing organizational efficiency.<ref name="l369">{{cite book | last=Chan | first=A.L. | title=Xi Jinping: Political Career, Governance, and Leadership, 1953-2018 | publisher=Oxford University Press | year=2022 | isbn=978-0-19-761522-5 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HH1ZEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA547 | access-date=2024-11-07 | page=547}}</ref>

=== Zhejiang ===
In 2002, Xi left Fujian and took up leading political positions in neighbouring Zhejiang. He eventually took over as [[Fujian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|provincial Party Committee]] secretary after several months as acting governor, occupying a top provincial office for the first time in his career. In 2002, he was elected a full member of the [[16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|16th Central Committee]], marking his ascension to the national stage. While in Zhejiang, Xi presided over reported growth rates averaging 14% per year.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1068825/chinas-leadership-transition-xi-jinpings-time-zhejiang|title=Xi Jinping's time in Zhejiang: doing the business|last=Ho|first=Louise|date=25 October 2012|newspaper=[[South China Morning Post]]|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160429160349/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1068825/chinas-leadership-transition-xi-jinpings-time-zhejiang|archive-date=29 April 2016|access-date=9 December 2019}}</ref> During this period, Zhejiang increasingly transitioned away from heavy industry.<ref name=":Chatwin">{{Cite book |last=Chatwin |first=Jonathan |title=The Southern Tour: Deng Xiaoping and the Fight for China's Future |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |year=2024 |isbn=978-1-350-43571-1 |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=121}} His career in Zhejiang was marked by a tough and straightforward stance against corrupt officials. This earned him a name in the national media and drew the attention of China's top leaders.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://opinion.dwnews.com/news/2014-12-25/59626005.html |script-title=zh:习近平为官之道 拎着乌纱帽干事|last1=Wang|first1=Lei|date=25 December 2014|work=[[Duowei News]]|access-date=7 September 2019|language=zh-hans|trans-title=Xi Jinping's Governmental Path – Carries Official Administrative Posts|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150203225014/http://opinion.dwnews.com/news/2014-12-25/59626005.html|archive-date=3 February 2015}}</ref> Between 2004 and 2007, [[Li Qiang]] acted as Xi's chief of staff through his position as secretary-general of the [[Zhejiang Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Zhejiang Party Committee]], where they developed close mutual ties.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Tian |first1=Yew Lun |last2=Chen |first2=Laurie |last3=Cash |first3=Joe |date=11 March 2023 |title=Li Qiang, Xi confidant, takes reins as China's premier |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/li-qiang-xi-confidant-takes-reins-chinas-premier-2023-03-11/ |access-date=24 May 2023 |archive-date=24 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230524163326/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/li-qiang-xi-confidant-takes-reins-chinas-premier-2023-03-11/ |url-status=live}}</ref> During this period, Xi and Li drafted the [[Double Eight Strategy]], which listed eight comparative advantages of Zhejiang and eight corresponding actions to improve the province.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zheng |first=William |last2=Ren |first2=Daniel |date=23 October 2022 |title=China’s Li Qiang shakes off Shanghai Covid chaos to enter Communist Party inner circle |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3196959/chinas-li-qiang-shakes-shanghai-covid-chaos-enter-communist-party-inner-circle |access-date=27 June 2025 |work=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref>

=== Shanghai ===
Following the dismissal of [[Communist Party Secretary of Shanghai|Shanghai Party secretary]] [[Chen Liangyu]] in September 2006 due to a [[Shanghai pension scandal|social security fund scandal]], Xi was transferred to Shanghai in March 2007, where he was the party secretary there for seven months.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.sohu.com/20070324/n248946143.shtml|script-title=zh:习近平任上海市委书记 韩正不再代理市委书记|date=24 March 2007|work=[[Sohu]]|access-date=7 September 2019|language=zh-Hans|trans-title=Xi Jinping is Secretary of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee – Han Zheng is No Longer Acting Party Secretary|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071016061557/http://news.sohu.com/20070324/n248946143.shtml|archive-date=16 October 2007|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=15 November 2012 |title=China new leaders: Xi Jinping heads line-up for politburo |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |url-status=live |access-date=25 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190909102154/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |archive-date=9 September 2019}}</ref> In Shanghai, Xi avoided controversy and was known for strictly observing party discipline. For example, Shanghai administrators attempted to earn favour with him by arranging a special train to shuttle him between Shanghai and [[Hangzhou]] for him to complete handing off his work to his successor as Zhejiang party secretary [[Zhao Hongzhu]]. However, Xi reportedly refused to take the train, citing a loosely enforced party regulation that stipulated that special trains can only be reserved for "national leaders".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2013/07/201307110449.shtml#.VTxXVvnF_tU|script-title=zh:从上海到北京 习近平贴身秘书只有钟绍军|date=11 July 2013|work=[[Mingjing News]]|access-date=12 September 2019|language=zh-hans|trans-title=From Shanghai to Beijing, Zhong Shaojun Has Been Xi Jinping's Only Personal Secretary|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612141343/http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2013/07/201307110449.shtml#.VTxXVvnF_tU|archive-date=12 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> While in Shanghai, he worked on preserving unity of the local party organisation. He pledged there would be no 'purges' during his administration, despite the fact many local officials were thought to have been implicated in the Chen Liangyu corruption scandal.{{sfn|Lam|2015|p=56}} On most issues, Xi largely echoed the line of the central leadership.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-10-22/100034588.html |script-title=zh:新晋政治局常委: 习近平|date=22 October 2007|work=[[Caijing]]|access-date=12 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151222175301/http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-10-22/100034588.html|archive-date=22 December 2015|language=zh-hans|trans-title=Newly Appointed Member of Politburo Standing Committee: Xi Jinping}}</ref>

==Politburo Standing Committee==
[[File:President George W. Bush with Vice President Xi Jinping.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping greeting U.S. president [[George W. Bush]] in August 2008|left]]
[[File:Dmitry Medvedev in China 28 September 2010-6.jpeg|thumb|Xi Jinping with Russian president [[Dmitry Medvedev]] on 28 September 2010|left]]

Xi was appointed to the nine-man PSC at the [[17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|17th Party Congress]] in October 2007. He was ranked above [[Li Keqiang]], an indication that he was going to succeed Hu Jintao as China's [[Succession of power in China|next leader]]. In addition, Xi served in the CCP's [[Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Secretariat]]. This assessment was further supported at the [[11th National People's Congress]] in March 2008, when Xi was elected as vice president of the PRC.<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 March 2008 |title=Wen Jiabao re-elected China PM |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/3/16/wen-jiabao-re-elected-china-pm |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]] |language=en |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813171805/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/3/16/wen-jiabao-re-elected-china-pm |url-status=live}}</ref> Following his elevation, Xi held a broad range of portfolios. He was put in charge of the comprehensive preparations for the [[2008 Summer Olympics]] in Beijing, as well as being the central government's leading figure in Hong Kong and Macau affairs. In addition, he also became the new president of the [[Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Party School]] of the CCP, its cadre-training and ideological education wing. In the wake of the [[2008 Sichuan earthquake]], Xi visited disaster areas in [[Shaanxi]] and [[Gansu]]. He made his first foreign trip as vice president to North Korea, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen from 17 to 25 June 2008.<ref>{{cite web |date=5 June 2008 |title=Vice-President Xi Jinping to Visit DPRK, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Yemen |url=http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wsrc/t462294.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110723214209/http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wsrc/t462294.htm |archive-date=23 July 2011 |access-date=20 October 2010 |website=[[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] |publisher=}}</ref> After the Olympics, Xi was assigned the post of committee chair for the preparations of the [[60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China|60th Anniversary Celebrations]] of the founding of the PRC. He was also reportedly at the helm of a top-level CCP committee dubbed the [[6521 Project]], which was charged with ensuring social stability during a series of politically sensitive anniversaries in 2009.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/asia/10china.html|title=China's Leaders See a Calendar Full of Anniversaries, and Trouble|last=Wines|first=Michael|date=9 March 2009|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=8 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160721045913/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/asia/10china.html|archive-date=21 July 2016|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|url-access=limited}}</ref>

Xi's position as the apparent successor to become the paramount leader was threatened with the rapid rise of [[Bo Xilai]], the party secretary of [[Chongqing]] at the time. Bo was expected to join the PSC at the [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th Party Congress]], with most expecting that he would try to eventually maneuver himself into replacing Xi.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/d67b90f0-d140-11e1-8957-00144feabdc0|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221204/https://www.ft.com/content/d67b90f0-d140-11e1-8957-00144feabdc0|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Bo Xilai: power, death and politics|last=Anderlini|first=Jamil|date=20 July 2012|work=[[Financial Times]]|access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> Bo's policies in Chongqing inspired imitations throughout China and received praise from Xi himself during Xi's visit to Chongqing in 2010. Records of praises from Xi were later erased after he became paramount leader. Bo's downfall would come with the [[Wang Lijun incident]], which opened the door for Xi to come to power without challengers.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/19/the-resistible-rise-of-xi-jinping/|title=The Resistible Rise of Xi Jinping|last=Palmer|first=James|date=19 October 2017|work=[[Foreign Policy (magazine)|Foreign Policy]]|access-date=11 January 2020|archive-date=6 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200206195505/https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/19/the-resistible-rise-of-xi-jinping/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Xi is considered one of the most successful members of the [[Princelings]], a quasi-clique of politicians who are descendants of early Chinese Communist revolutionaries. Former prime minister of Singapore, [[Lee Kuan Yew]], when asked about Xi, said he felt he was "a thoughtful man who has gone through many trials and tribulations."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.newsweek.com/xi-jinping-chinas-new-boss-and-l-word-95021|title=Xi Jinping: China's New Boss And The 'L' Word|last=Ansfield|first=Jonathan|date=22 December 2007|work=[[Newsweek]]|access-date=20 October 2010|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100330064319/http://www.newsweek.com/id/81558|archive-date=30 March 2010}}</ref> Lee also commented: "I would put him in the [[Nelson Mandela]] class of persons. A person with enormous emotional stability who does not allow his personal misfortunes or sufferings affect his judgment. In other words, he is impressive."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://world.time.com/2007/11/19/chinas_nelson_mandela/|title=China's Nelson Mandela|last=Elegant|first=Simon|date=19 November 2007|magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]|access-date=8 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090728171010/http://china.blogs.time.com/2007/11/19/chinas_nelson_mandela/|archive-date=28 July 2009|url-status=live}}</ref> Former U.S. Treasury Secretary [[Henry Paulson]] described Xi as "the kind of guy who knows how to get things over the goal line."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aDpLoVnlKn6E&refer=home|title=China Appoints Xi Vice President, Heir Apparent to Hu|last=Elegant|first=Simon|date=15 March 2008|newspaper=[[Bloomberg News]]|url-access=limited|access-date=20 October 2010|archive-date=21 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121021142400/https://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aDpLoVnlKn6E&refer=home|url-status=live}}</ref> Australian prime minister [[Kevin Rudd]] said that Xi "has sufficient reformist, party and military background to be very much his own man."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/rudd-seeks-to-pre-empt-pms-china-white-paper-with-his-own-version/story-fn59niix-1226488505695|title=Rudd seeks to pre-empt PM's China white paper with his own version|last=Uren|first=David|date=5 October 2012|work=[[The Australian]]|access-date=8 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121122083821/http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/rudd-seeks-to-pre-empt-pms-china-white-paper-with-his-own-version/story-fn59niix-1226488505695|archive-date=22 November 2012}}</ref>

===Trips as Vice President===
In February 2009, in his capacity as vice president, Xi embarked on a tour of Latin America, visiting Mexico, Jamaica,<ref name="JIS-2009">{{cite news |date=15 February 2009 |title=Chinese VP Receives Key to the City of Montego Bay |publisher=Jamaica Information Service |url=http://jis.gov.jm/chinese-vp-receives-key-to-the-city-of-montego-bay/ |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190714065907/https://jis.gov.jm/chinese-vp-receives-key-to-the-city-of-montego-bay/ |archive-date=14 July 2019}}</ref> Colombia, Venezuela,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cctv.com/english/20090218/112381.shtml|title=Chinese VP praises friendly cooperation with Venezuela, Latin America|agency=Xinhua|date=18 February 2009|work=CCTV|access-date=20 October 2022|archive-date=21 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221021011922/http://www.cctv.com/english/20090218/112381.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> Brazil,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.china.org.cn/international/2009-02/20/content_17311463.htm|title=Xi Jinping proposes efforts to boost cooperation with Brazil |date=20 February 2009|website=[[China Daily]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110206063031/http://china.org.cn/international/2009-02/20/content_17311463.htm|archive-date=6 February 2011|access-date=11 September 2019}}</ref> and Malta, after which he returned to China.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/chinese-vice-president-begins-official-visit.245968|title=Chinese vice president begins official visit|date=22 February 2009|newspaper=[[Times of Malta]]|language=en-gb|access-date=11 September 2019|archive-date=3 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203050934/https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/chinese-vice-president-begins-official-visit.245968|url-status=live}}</ref> On 11 February 2009, while visiting Mexico, Xi spoke in front of a group of [[overseas Chinese]] and explained China's contributions during the international financial crisis, saying that it was "the greatest contribution towards the whole of human race, made by China, to prevent its 1.37&nbsp;billion people from hunger."{{efn|Original {{lang-zh|s=在国际金融风暴中, 中国能基本解决13亿人口吃饭的问题, 已经是对全人类最伟大的贡献|t=在國際金融風暴中, 中國能基本解決13億人口吃飯的問題, 已經是對全人類最偉大的貢獻}}|}} He went on to remark: "There are some bored foreigners, with full stomachs, who have nothing better to do than point fingers at us. First, China doesn't export revolution; second, China doesn't export hunger and poverty; third, China doesn't come and cause you headaches. What more is there to be said?"{{efn|Original: {{lang-zh|s=有些吃饱没事干的外国人, 对我们的事情指手画脚.中国一不输出革命, 二不输出饥饿和贫困, 三不折腾你们, 还有什么好说的?|t=有些吃飽沒事干的外國人, 對我們的事情指手畫腳.中國一不輸出革命, 二不輸出飢餓和貧困, 三不折騰你們, 還有什麽好說的?}}}}<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20090214-121872.html|title=Chinese VP blasts meddlesome foreigners|last=Sim|first=Chi Yin|date=14 February 2009|newspaper=[[AsiaOne]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110711171035/http://news.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20090214-121872.html|archive-date=11 July 2011|access-date=20 October 2010}}</ref> The story was reported on some local television stations. The news led to a flood of discussions on Chinese Internet forums and it was reported that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was caught off-guard by Xi's remarks, as the actual video was shot by some accompanying Hong Kong reporters and broadcast on Hong Kong TV, which then turned up on various Internet video websites.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAI1/4742366.shtml |script-title=zh:習近平出訪罵老外 外交部捏冷汗|last1=Lai|first1=Jinhong|date=18 February 2009|newspaper=[[United Daily News]]|access-date=27 February 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090221023838/http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAI1/4742366.shtml|archive-date=21 February 2009|language=zh-hans|trans-title=Xi Jinping Goes and Scolds at Foreigners, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cold Sweat}}</ref>
[[File:Xi Jinping Iowa house.jpg|thumb|right|The Muscatine, Iowa house where Xi stayed with an American family during a 1985 agricultural visit to the United States. The home was turned into a museum decades later.]]
In the [[European Union]], Xi visited Belgium, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania from 7 to 21 October 2009.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t622138.htm|title=A Journey of Friendship, Cooperation and Culture – Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun Sums Up Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's Trip to 5 European Countries|date=21 October 2009|publisher=[[Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations]]|access-date=11 September 2019|archive-date=3 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203050934/http://www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t622138.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> He visited Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, and Myanmar on his Asian trip from 14 to 22 December 2009.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3566.html|title=China's Cousin-Cousin Relations with Myanmar|last=Raman|first=B.|date=25 December 2009|publisher=South Asia Analysis Group|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100317074826/http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3566.html|archive-date=17 March 2010|url-status=usurped|access-date=14 February 2012}}</ref> He later visited the United States, Ireland and Turkey in February 2012. This visit included meeting with then U.S. president [[Barack Obama]] at the White House and vice president [[Joe Biden]] (with Biden as the official host);<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Bull |first1=Alister |author2=Chris Buckley |date=24 January 2012 |title=China leader-in-waiting Xi to visit White House next month |work=[[Reuters]] |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-xi-idUSTRE80N06E20120124 |access-date=28 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029201614/https://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-usa-china-xi-idUSTRE80N06E20120124 |archive-date=29 October 2013}}</ref> and stops in California and [[Iowa]]. In Iowa, he met with the family that previously hosted him during his 1985 tour as a [[Hebei]] provincial official.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/xi-jinping-of-china-makes-a-return-trip-to-iowa.html|title=Xi Jinping of China Makes a Return Trip to Iowa|last=Johnson|first=Kirk|date=15 February 2012|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=12 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190621114147/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/xi-jinping-of-china-makes-a-return-trip-to-iowa.html|archive-date=21 June 2019|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|url-access=limited}}</ref>

===Accession to top posts===
{{See also|Generations of Chinese leadership|Succession of power in China}}

A few months before his ascendancy to the party leadership, Xi disappeared from official media coverage and cancelled meetings with foreign officials for several weeks beginning on 1 September 2012, causing rumors.<ref name="newyorker2" /> He then reappeared on 15 September.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Beech |first=Hannah |date=15 September 2012 |title=China's Heir Apparent Xi Jinping Reappears in Public After a Two-Week Absence |url=https://world.time.com/2012/09/15/chinas-heir-apparent-xi-jinping-reappears-in-public-after-a-two-week-absence/ |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |language=en-US |issn=0040-781X |access-date=20 August 2022 |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814104509/https://world.time.com/2012/09/15/chinas-heir-apparent-xi-jinping-reappears-in-public-after-a-two-week-absence/ |url-status=live}}</ref> On 15 November 2012, Xi was elected to the posts of general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC by the [[18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|18th Central Committee of the CCP]]. This made him, formally the [[Leader of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP leader]], and informally, the [[paramount leader]] and also the first to be born after the founding of the PRC. The following day Xi led the new line-up of the PSC onto the stage in their first public appearance.<ref name="BBCconfirm2">{{cite news |date=17 November 2012 |title=China Confirms Leadership Change |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |access-date=15 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160729201558/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-20322288 |archive-date=29 July 2016}}</ref> The PSC was reduced from nine to seven, with Xi and Li Keqiang retaining their seats; the other five members were new.<ref>{{Cite news |date=15 November 2012 |title=Xi Jinping: China's 'princeling' new leader |newspaper=[[Hindustan Times]] |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/xi-jinping-china-s-princeling-new-leader/story-uKjI60ipqpRSEew3Zi7jzL.html |url-status=live |access-date=28 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181028230023/https://www.hindustantimes.com/world/xi-jinping-china-s-princeling-new-leader/story-uKjI60ipqpRSEew3Zi7jzL.html |archive-date=28 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Wong |first1=Edward |author-link=Edward Wong |date=14 November 2012 |title=Ending Congress, China Presents New Leadership Headed by Xi Jinping |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/asia/communists-conclude-party-congress-in-china.html?ref=asia&_r=0 |url-status=live |url-access=limited |access-date=16 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121208103006/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/asia/communists-conclude-party-congress-in-china.html?ref=asia&_r=0 |archive-date=8 December 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=FlorCruz |first1=Jaime A |last2=Mullen |first2=Jethro |date=16 November 2012 |title=After months of mystery, China unveils new top leaders |work=[[CNN]] |publisher= |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/14/world/asia/china-leadership-transition/index.html |url-status=live |access-date=16 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121115195006/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/14/world/asia/china-leadership-transition/index.html |archive-date=15 November 2012}}</ref> In a marked departure from the common practice of Chinese leaders, Xi's first speech as general secretary was plainly worded and did not include any political slogans or mention his predecessors.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Johnson |first1=Ian |date=15 November 2012 |title=A Promise to Tackle China's Problems, but Few Hints of a Shift in Path |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/asia/new-chinese-leader-offers-few-hints-of-a-shift-in-direction.html?pagewanted=all |url-status=live |url-access=limited |access-date=16 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140726121506/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/asia/new-chinese-leader-offers-few-hints-of-a-shift-in-direction.html?pagewanted=all |archive-date=26 July 2014}}</ref> Xi mentioned the aspirations of the average person, remarking, "Our people ... expect better education, more stable jobs, better income, more reliable social security, medical care of a higher standard, more comfortable living conditions, and a more beautiful environment." Xi also vowed to tackle corruption at the highest levels, alluding that it would threaten the CCP's survival; he was reticent about far-reaching economic reforms.<ref>{{cite news |date=15 November 2012 |title=Full text: China's new party chief Xi Jinping's speech |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586 |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190914232334/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586 |archive-date=14 September 2019}}</ref>

In December 2012, Xi visited [[Guangdong]] in his first trip outside Beijing since taking the general secretaryship. The overarching theme of the trip was to call for further economic reform and a strengthened military. Xi visited the statue of Deng Xiaoping and his trip was described as following in the footsteps of [[Deng Xiaoping#Resignation and 1992 southern tour|Deng's own southern trip in 1992]], which provided the impetus for further economic reforms in China after conservative party leaders stalled many of Deng's reforms in the aftermath of the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]]. On his trip, Xi consistently alluded to his signature slogan, the "Chinese Dream". "This dream can be said to be the dream of a strong nation. And for the military, it is a dream of a strong military," Xi told sailors.<ref>{{cite news |last=Page |first=Jeremy |date=13 March 2013 |title=New Beijing Leader's 'China Dream' |newspaper=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324128504578348774040546346 |url-status=live |access-date=8 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191011195356/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324128504578348774040546346 |archive-date=11 October 2019}}</ref> Xi's trip was significant in that he departed from the established convention of Chinese leaders' travel routines in multiple ways. Rather than dining out, Xi and his entourage ate regular hotel buffet. He travelled in a large van with his colleagues rather than a fleet of limousines, and did not restrict traffic on the parts of the highway he travelled.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Chen |first1=Zhuang |date=10 December 2012 |title=The symbolism of Xi Jinping's trip south |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20662947 |url-status=live |access-date=22 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140708094339/http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20662947 |archive-date=8 July 2014}}</ref>

Xi was elected president on 14 March 2013, in a confirmation vote by the [[12th National People's Congress]] in Beijing. He received 2,952 for, one vote against, and three abstentions.<ref name="BBCconfirm2" /> He replaced Hu Jintao, who retired after serving two terms.<ref>{{cite news |last=Demick |first=Barbara |author-link=Barbara Demick |date=3 March 2013 |title=China's Xi Jinping formally assumes title of president |newspaper=[[Los Angeles Times]] |url=http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-xi-presidency-20130313,0,1240600.story |url-status=live |access-date=16 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130316021753/http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-xi-presidency-20130313,0,1240600.story |archive-date=16 March 2013}}</ref> On 17 March, Xi and his new ministers arranged a meeting with the [[Leung Chun-ying as Chief Executive of Hong Kong|chief executive of Hong Kong]], [[CY Leung]], confirming his support for Leung.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Cheung |first1=Tony |last2=Ho |first2=Jolie |date=17 March 2013 |title=CY Leung to meet Xi Jinping in Beijing and explain cross-border policies |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1192587/cy-leung-meet-xi-jinping-beijing-and-explain-cross-border-policies |url-status=live |access-date=16 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130318073700/http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1192587/cy-leung-meet-xi-jinping-beijing-and-explain-cross-border-policies |archive-date=18 March 2013}}</ref> Within hours of his election, Xi discussed [[cyber security]] and North Korea with U.S. President Barack Obama over the phone. Obama announced the visits of treasury and state secretaries [[Jack Lew]] and [[John F. Kerry]] to China the following week.<ref>{{cite news |date=15 March 2013 |title=China names Xi Jinping as new president |website=Inquirer.net |agency=[[Agence France-Presse]] |url=http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/373967/china-names-xi-jinping-as-new-president |url-status=live |access-date=16 March 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130317020402/http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/373967/china-names-xi-jinping-as-new-president |archive-date=17 March 2013}}</ref>

==General Secretaryship==
{{Main|General secretaryship of Xi Jinping}}

===Consolidation of power===
{{See also|Xi Jinping faction}}
[[File:抗战胜利70周年阅兵演练.jpg|thumb|Portrait of Xi in Beijing, September 2015]]

Political observers have called Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Chairman Mao Zedong, especially since the ending of presidential two-term limits in 2018.<ref name="PhillipsGuardian2">{{Cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=24 October 2017 |title=Xi Jinping becomes most powerful leader since Mao with China's change to constitution |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/xi-jinping-mao-thought-on-socialism-china-constitution |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171024053607/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/xi-jinping-mao-thought-on-socialism-china-constitution |archive-date=24 October 2017 |access-date=24 October 2017 |work=[[The Guardian]] |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=24 October 2017 |title=China elevates Xi to most powerful leader in decades |url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-congress-xi-jinping-1.4368588 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180501062515/http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-congress-xi-jinping-1.4368588 |archive-date=1 May 2018 |access-date=22 June 2018 |work=[[CBC News]] |publisher=}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=24 October 2017 |title=China elevates Xi Jinping's status, making him the most powerful leader since Mao |url=https://www.independent.ie/world-news/china-elevates-xi-jinpings-status-making-him-the-most-powerful-leader-since-mao-36256294.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622220327/https://www.independent.ie/world-news/china-elevates-xi-jinpings-status-making-him-the-most-powerful-leader-since-mao-36256294.html |archive-date=22 June 2018 |access-date=22 June 2018 |work=[[Irish Independent]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Collins |first1=Stephen |date=9 November 2017 |title=Xi's up, Trump is down, but it may not matter |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/08/politics/president-donald-trump-xi-jinping-china/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180623004701/https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/08/politics/president-donald-trump-xi-jinping-china/index.html |archive-date=23 June 2018 |access-date=22 June 2018 |work=[[CNN]] |publisher=}}</ref> Xi has departed from the [[collective leadership]] practices of post-Mao predecessors. He has centralised his power and created working groups with himself at the head to subvert government bureaucracy, making himself become the unmistakable central figure of the administration.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Holtz |first1=Michael |date=28 February 2018 |title=Xi for life? China turns its back on collective leadership. |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624035940/https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2018/0228/Xi-for-life-China-turns-its-back-on-collective-leadership |archive-date=24 June 2018 |access-date=23 June 2018 |work=[[The Christian Science Monitor]]}}</ref> In the opinion of at least one political scientist, Xi "has surrounded himself with cadres he met while stationed on the coast, Fujian and [[Shanghai]] and in Zhejiang."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Andrésy |first1=Agnès |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F6jTCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA88 |title=Xi Jinping: Red China, The Next Generation |date=2015 |publisher=UPA |isbn=978-0-7618-6601-5 |page=88 |access-date=22 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240711081521/https://books.google.com/books?id=F6jTCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA88 |archive-date=11 July 2024 |url-status=live}}</ref>

Observers have said that Xi has seriously diluted the influence of the once-dominant "[[Tuanpai]]," also called the Youth League Faction, which were CCP officials who rose through the Communist Youth League (CYLC).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Pollard |first=Martin |date=26 October 2022 |title=China's Xi deals knockout blow to once-powerful Youth League faction |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-deals-knockout-blow-once-powerful-youth-league-faction-2022-10-26/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230524163327/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-deals-knockout-blow-once-powerful-youth-league-faction-2022-10-26/ |archive-date=24 May 2023 |access-date=24 May 2023 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref> He criticized the cadres of the CYLC, saying that [these cadres] can't talk about science, literature and art, work or life [with young people]. All they can do is just repeat the same old bureaucratic, stereotypical talk."<ref>{{cite news |last=Gan |first=Nectar |date=23 September 2017 |title=Latest Xi Jinping book gives clues on decline of Communist Party's youth wing |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2112461/latest-xi-jinping-book-gives-clues-decline-communist?mc_cid=1f9bc1ec42&mc_eid=1f9d28130a |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171014163041/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2112461/latest-xi-jinping-book-gives-clues-decline-communist?mc_cid=1f9bc1ec42&mc_eid=1f9d28130a |archive-date=14 October 2017 |access-date=8 October 2017 |newspaper=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref>

In 2018, the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC) passed [[2018 amendment to the Constitution of China|constitutional amendments]] including removal of term limits for the president and vice president, the creation of a [[National Supervisory Commission]], as well as enhancing the central role of the CCP.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shi |first1=Jiangtao |last2=Huang |first2=Kristin |date=26 February 2018 |title=End to term limits at top 'may be start of global backlash for China' |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134791/end-term-limits-top-may-be-start-global-backlash-china |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227155138/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134791/end-term-limits-top-may-be-start-global-backlash-china |archive-date=27 February 2018 |access-date=28 February 2018 |work=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=4 March 2018 |title=Xi Jinping's power play: from president to China's new dictator? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/04/xi-jinping-from-president-to-china-new-dictator |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180304005848/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/04/xi-jinping-from-president-to-china-new-dictator |archive-date=4 March 2018 |access-date=4 March 2018 |website=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref> Xi was reappointed as president, now without term limits,<ref>{{cite news |last=Wen |first=Philip |date=17 March 2018 |title=China's parliament re-elects Xi Jinping as president |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xi/chinas-parliament-re-elects-xi-jinping-as-president-idUSKCN1GT03C |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180317042406/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-xi/chinas-parliament-re-elects-xi-jinping-as-president-idUSKCN1GT03C |archive-date=17 March 2018 |access-date=17 March 2018 |publisher=[[Reuters]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Bodeen |first1=Christopher |date=17 March 2018 |title=Xi reappointed as China's president with no term limits |url=https://apnews.com/78ea5b0646564a6eb98d9d20d5fbcbb6 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180317190611/https://apnews.com/78ea5b0646564a6eb98d9d20d5fbcbb6 |archive-date=17 March 2018 |access-date=17 March 2018 |publisher=[[Associated Press]]}}</ref> while Li Keqiang was reappointed premier.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Zhou |first1=Xin |date=18 March 2018 |title=Li Keqiang endorsed as China's premier; military leaders confirmed |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2137707/li-keqiang-endorsed-chinas-premier-while-military-commission |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190827155325/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2137707/li-keqiang-endorsed-chinas-premier-while-military-commission |archive-date=27 August 2019 |access-date=7 September 2019 |newspaper=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref> According to the ''[[Financial Times]]'', Xi expressed his views of constitutional amendment at meetings with Chinese officials and foreign dignitaries. Xi explained the decision in terms of needing to align two more powerful posts—general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC—which have no term limits. However, Xi did not say whether he intended to be party general secretary, CMC chairman and state president, for three or more terms.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Mitchell |first1=Tom |date=7 September 2019 |title=China's Xi Jinping says he is opposed to life-long rule |url=https://www.ft.com/content/2b449400-413a-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180417192157/https://www.ft.com/content/2b449400-413a-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b |archive-date=17 April 2018 |access-date=17 April 2018 |newspaper=[[Financial Times]] |quote=President insists term extension is necessary to align government and party posts}}</ref>

In its sixth plenary session in November 2021, CCP adopted a [[Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century|historical resolution]], a kind of document that evaluated the party's history. This was the third of its kind after ones adopted by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Cat |date=7 November 2021 |title=The significance of Xi Jinping's upcoming 'historical resolution' |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3154996/xi-jinpings-historical-resolution-what-it-and-why-it-important |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810013800/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3154996/xi-jinpings-historical-resolution-what-it-and-why-it-important |archive-date=10 August 2022 |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Ni |first=Vincent |date=11 November 2021 |title=Chinese Communist party elevates Xi's status in 'historical resolution' |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/11/chinese-communist-party-elevates-xi-jinping-status-historical-resolution |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220625192901/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/11/chinese-communist-party-elevates-xi-jinping-status-historical-resolution |archive-date=25 June 2022 |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=[[The Guardian]] |language=en}}</ref> In comparison with the other historical resolutions, Xi's one did not herald a major change in how the CCP evaluated its history.<ref>{{Cite news |author1=Wong, Chun Han |author2=Zhai, Keith |date=17 November 2021 |title=How Xi Jinping Is Rewriting China's History to Put Himself at the Center |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-xi-jinping-is-rewriting-chinas-history-to-put-himself-at-the-center-11637157022 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220810135113/https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-xi-jinping-is-rewriting-chinas-history-to-put-himself-at-the-center-11637157022 |archive-date=10 August 2022 |access-date=11 August 2022 |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |language=en-US |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> To accompany the historical resolution, the CCP promoted the terms [[Two Establishes]] and [[Two Upholds]], calling the CCP to unite around and protect Xi's core status within the party.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Bandurski |first=David |date=8 February 2022 |title=Two Establishes |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/two-establishes/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220729191420/https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/two-establishes/ |archive-date=29 July 2022 |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US}}</ref>[[File:Xi Jinping leads CPC leadership in meeting the press.webm|thumb|Xi Jinping and other members of the [[20th Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|20th Politburo Standing Committee]] meeting the press, October 2022]]The [[20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]], held between 16 and 22 October 2022, has overseen amendments in the [[Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP constitution]] and the re-election of Xi as general secretary of the CCP and chairman of the CMC for a third term, with the overall result of the Congress being further strengthening of Xi's power.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Davidson |first1=Helen |last2=Graham-Harrison |first2=Emma |date=23 October 2022 |title=China's leader Xi Jinping secures third term and stacks inner circle with loyalists |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/23/xi-jinping-to-rule-china-for-precedent-breaking-third-term |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023041913/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/23/xi-jinping-to-rule-china-for-precedent-breaking-third-term |archive-date=23 October 2022 |access-date=23 October 2022 |work=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref> Xi's re-election made him the first [[Leader of the Chinese Communist Party|party leader]] since Mao Zedong to be chosen for a third term, though Deng Xiaoping ruled the country informally for a longer period (1978-1989).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wingfield-Hayes |first=Rupert |date=23 October 2022 |title=Xi Jinping's party is just getting started |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63225277 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230317004249/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63225277 |archive-date=17 March 2023 |access-date=23 October 2022 |work=[[BBC News]] |language=en-GB}}</ref> The new Politburo Standing Committee elected just after the CCP Congress was filled almost completely with people close to Xi, with four out of the seven members of the previous PSC stepping down.<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 October 2022 |title=Shake-up at the top of China's Communist Party as Xi Jinping starts new term |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3196911/shake-top-chinas-communist-party-xi-jinping-starts-new-term |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221022234719/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3196911/shake-top-chinas-communist-party-xi-jinping-starts-new-term |archive-date=22 October 2022 |access-date=23 October 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref> Xi was further unanimously re-elected as the PRC president and chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission on 10 March 2023 during the opening of the [[14th National People's Congress]], and surpassed his predecessors [[Jiang Zemin]] and [[Hu Jintao]] in [[List of voting results of the National People's Congress|voting results]].<ref>{{Cite news |title=Xi Jinping unanimously elected Chinese president, PRC CMC chairman |url=https://english.news.cn/20230310/0fb19441ee4145a588911118edd300a3/c.html |date=10 March 2023 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230310033619/https://english.news.cn/20230310/0fb19441ee4145a588911118edd300a3/c.html |archive-date=10 March 2023 |access-date=10 March 2023 |work=[[Xinhua News Agency]]}}</ref> At the same time, Xi ally [[Li Qiang]] succeeded Li Keqiang as the Premier.

===Cult of personality===
{{Main|Xi Jinping's cult of personality}}

Xi has had a [[cult of personality]] constructed around himself since entering office<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 September 2014 |title=The power of Xi Jinping |url=https://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882-cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-what-will-he-do-his-political |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107055514/https://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882-cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-what-will-he-do-his-political |archive-date=7 November 2017 |access-date=20 September 2017 |newspaper=[[The Economist]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Jiayang |first1=Fan |last2=Taisu |first2=Zhang |author-link2=Taisu Zhang |last3=Ying |first3=Zhu |date=8 March 2016 |title=Behind the Personality Cult of Xi Jinping |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/08/the-personality-cult-of-xi-jinping-china-leader-communist-party/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190726173241/https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/08/the-personality-cult-of-xi-jinping-china-leader-communist-party/ |archive-date=26 July 2019 |access-date=26 July 2019 |newspaper=[[Foreign Policy (magazine)|Foreign Policy]] |language=en-US}}</ref> with books, cartoons, pop songs and dance routines honouring his rule.<ref name="PhilGuard12">{{Cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=19 September 2015 |title=Xi Jinping: Does China truly love 'Big Daddy Xi' – or fear him? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/19/xi-jinping-does-china-truly-love-big-daddy-xi-or-fear-him |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190427001038/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/19/xi-jinping-does-china-truly-love-big-daddy-xi-or-fear-him |archive-date=27 April 2019 |access-date=31 August 2017 |work=[[The Guardian]] |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> Following Xi's ascension to the [[leadership core]] of the CCP, he had been referred to as ''Xi Dada'' ({{lang-zh|s=习大大|labels=no}}, Uncle or Papa Xi),<ref name="PhilGuard12" /><ref>{{cite news |last1=Blanchard |first1=Ben |date=28 October 2016 |title=All hail the mighty uncle – Chinese welcome Xi as the 'core' |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSKCN12S0AA |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624010629/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSKCN12S0AA |archive-date=24 June 2018 |access-date=23 June 2018 |work=[[Reuters]] |publisher=}}</ref> though this stopped in April 2016.<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 April 2015 |title=Xi's Nickname Becomes Out of Bounds for China's Media |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-28/no-more-big-daddy-xi-as-china-s-spin-doctors-revise-playbook |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012225210/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-28/no-more-big-daddy-xi-as-china-s-spin-doctors-revise-playbook |archive-date=12 October 2022 |access-date=11 August 2022 |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |language=en}}</ref> The village of Liangjiahe, where Xi was sent to work, is decorated with propaganda and murals extolling the formative years of his life.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Rivers |first1=Matt |date=19 March 2018 |title=This entire Chinese village is a shrine to Xi Jinping |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624010733/https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/19/asia/china-xi-jinping-village-intl/index.html |archive-date=24 June 2018 |access-date=23 June 2018 |work=[[CNN]] |publisher=}}</ref> The [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP's Politburo]] named Xi Jinping ''lingxiu'' ({{lang-zh|s=领袖|labels=no}}), a reverent term for "leader" and a title previously only given to Mao Zedong and his immediate successor [[Hua Guofeng]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gan |first=Nectar |date=28 December 2017 |title=Why China is reviving Mao's grandiose title for Xi Jinping |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2117421/xi-jinpings-latest-grandiose-title-aims-take |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190724182232/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2117421/xi-jinpings-latest-grandiose-title-aims-take |archive-date=24 July 2019 |access-date=26 July 2019 |newspaper=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=17 February 2018 |title=Xi Jinping is no longer any old leader |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2018/02/17/xi-jinping-is-no-longer-any-old-leader |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190724182222/https://www.economist.com/china/2018/02/17/xi-jinping-is-no-longer-any-old-leader |archive-date=24 July 2019 |access-date=26 July 2019 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shepherd |first1=Christian |last2=Wen |first2=Philip |date=20 October 2017 |title=With tears and song, China welcomes Xi as great, wise leader |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-idUSKBN1CO0AV |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190726171857/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-idUSKBN1CO0AV |archive-date=26 July 2019 |access-date=26 July 2019 |work=[[Reuters]] |publisher= |language=en}}</ref> He is also sometimes called the "pilot at the helm" ({{lang-zh|s=领航掌舵|labels=no}}).<ref>{{Cite web |last=Qian |first=Gang |date=2 November 2020 |title=A Brief History of the Helmsmen |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/11/02/a-brief-history-of-the-helmsman/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220816101848/https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/11/02/a-brief-history-of-the-helmsman/ |archive-date=16 August 2022 |access-date=16 August 2022 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US}}</ref> On 25 December 2019, the Politburo officially named Xi as "People's Leader" ({{lang-zh|s=人民领袖|labels=no|c=|t=|p=rénmín lǐngxiù}}), a title only Mao had held previously.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Nakazawa |first=Katsuji |date=9 January 2020 |title=China crowns Xi with special title, citing rare crisis |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-crowns-Xi-with-special-title-citing-rare-crisis |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200109211043/https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-crowns-Xi-with-special-title-citing-rare-crisis |archive-date=9 January 2020 |access-date=10 January 2020 |work=[[Nikkei Asian Review]]}}</ref>

===Anti-corruption campaign===
{{main|Anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping}}
{{Quote box
| quote = "To speak the truth" means to focus on the nature of things, to speak frankly, and follow the truth. This is an important embodiment of a leading official's characteristics of truth seeking, embodying justice, devotion to public interests, and uprightness. Moreover, he highlighted that the premise of telling the truth is to listen to the truth.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in 2012<ref>{{cite book | title=Narrating China's Governance | chapter=Stories of Incorrupt Government: "The Corruption and Unjustness of Officials Give Birth to the Decline of Governance" | publisher=Springer Singapore | publication-place=Singapore | date=20 Nov 2019 | isbn=978-981-329-177-5 | doi=10.1007/978-981-32-9178-2_1 | pages=3–39 | last1=People's Daily | first1=Department of Commentary}}</ref>
| align = right
| width = 25em
}}
Xi vowed to crack down on corruption immediately after he ascended to power. In his inaugural speech as general secretary, Xi mentioned that fighting corruption was one of the toughest challenges for the party.<ref>{{cite news |date=15 November 2012 |title=Xi Jinping's inaugural Speech |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586 |url-status=live |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190914232334/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20338586 |archive-date=14 September 2019}}</ref> A few months into his term, Xi outlined the [[Eight-point Regulation]], listing rules intended to curb corruption and waste during official party business; it aimed at stricter discipline on the conduct of officials. Xi vowed to root out "tigers and flies," that is, high-ranking officials and ordinary party functionaries.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-imposes-austerity-measures-on-chinas-elite.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0|title=Elite in China Face Austerity Under Xi's Rule|last=Jacobs|first=Andrew|date=27 March 2013|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130054920/https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-imposes-austerity-measures-on-chinas-elite.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0|archive-date=30 November 2018|author-link=Andrew Jacobs (journalist)}}</ref>

Xi initiated cases against former CMC vice chairmen [[Xu Caihou]] and [[Guo Boxiong]], former PSC member and security chief [[Zhou Yongkang]] and former Hu Jintao chief aide [[Ling Jihua]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-03/china-s-xi-broadens-graft-crackdown-to-boost-influence.html|title=President Xi's Anti-Corruption Campaign Biggest Since Mao|last=Oster|first=Shai|date=4 March 2014|publisher=[[Bloomberg News]]|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141209164917/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-03/china-s-xi-broadens-graft-crackdown-to-boost-influence.html|archive-date=9 December 2014|author-link=Shai Oster}}</ref> Along with new disciplinary chief [[Wang Qishan]], Xi's [[General secretaryship of Xi Jinping|administration]] spearheaded the formation of "centrally-dispatched inspection teams". These were cross-jurisdictional squads whose task was to gain understanding of the operations of provincial and local party organizations, and enforce party discipline mandated by Beijing. Work teams had the effect of identifying and initiating investigations of high-ranking officials. Over one hundred provincial-ministerial level officials were implicated during a nationwide anti-corruption campaign. These included former and current regional officials, leading figures of state-owned enterprises and central government organs, and generals. Within the first two years of the campaign alone, over 200,000 officials received warnings, fines, and demotions.{{sfn|Heilmann|2017|pp=62–75}}

The campaign has led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including members of the PSC.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43160&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=d5d24d2f82c5981963c0180d300e62cd#.VOOBN_nF9uM|title=China's Soft-Power Deficit Widens as Xi Tightens Screws Over Ideology|date=5 December 2014|access-date=7 September 2019|publisher=[[Brookings Institution]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304041925/http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43160&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=d5d24d2f82c5981963c0180d300e62cd#.VOOBN_nF9uM|archive-date=4 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Xi's anti-corruption campaign is seen by critics, such as ''[[The Economist]]'', as a political tool to remove potential opponents and consolidate power.<ref>{{Cite news |date=22 October 2017 |title=Charting China's 'great purge' under Xi |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162 |access-date=7 January 2022 |archive-date=6 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210606041942/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=11 December 2014 |title=Tiger in the net |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2014/12/11/tiger-in-the-net |access-date=17 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=17 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220817202459/https://www.economist.com/china/2014/12/11/tiger-in-the-net |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi's establishment of a new anti-corruption agency, the National Supervision Commission, ranked higher than the supreme court, has been described by [[Amnesty International]] as a "systemic threat to human rights" that "places tens of millions of people at the mercy of a secretive and virtually unaccountable system that is above the law."<ref>{{cite news |title=China's former military chief of staff jailed for life for corruption |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/20/chinas-former-military-chief-of-staff-jailed-for-life-for-corruption |access-date=13 September 2019 |work=[[The Guardian]]|date=20 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191010131232/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/20/chinas-former-military-chief-of-staff-jailed-for-life-for-corruption |archive-date=10 October 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=20 March 2018 |title=China's anti-corruption campaign expands with new agency |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-43453769 |url-status=live |access-date=13 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190924060145/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-43453769 |archive-date=24 September 2019}}</ref> As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials have been prosecuted.<ref name="Jin-2023">{{Cite book |last=Jin |first=Keyu |author-link=Keyu Jin |title=The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism |date=2023 |publisher=Viking |isbn=978-1-9848-7828-1 |location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|page=129}} In January 2018, the Xi launched a three-year [[Special Campaign to Crack Down on Organized Crime and Eliminate Evil]] that lasted until 2020.<ref name=":04">{{Cite web |last=Greitens |first=Sheena Chestnut |date=2020-09-02 |title=The Saohei Campaign, Protection Umbrellas, and China’s Changing Political-Legal Apparatus |url=https://www.prcleader.org/post/the-saohei-campaign-protection-umbrellas-and-china-s-changing-political-legal-apparatus |access-date=2025-03-19 |website=China Leadership Monitor |language=en}}</ref> After the special campaign exposed problems in the legal system, the CCP announced a campaign to [[Education and Rectification of the Political and Legal Teams|educate and rectify the political and legal teams]] in July 2020.<ref name=":022">{{Cite news |last=Zheng |first=William |date=17 July 2020 |title=Chinese official leading security purge ‘may be on fast track to promotion’, analysts say |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3093711/chinese-official-leading-security-purge-may-be-fast-track |access-date=17 December 2023 |work=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-10-13 |title=把扫黑除恶专项斗争不断推向深入 |trans-title=Continue to deepen the special campaign against organized crime and evil |url=http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zt/content/2019-10/13/content_8015733.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200930193710/http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zt/content/2019-10/13/content_8015733.htm |archive-date=2020-09-30 |accessdate=2020-10-27 |website=[[Legal Daily]] |publisher=}}</ref>

Xi has overseen significant reforms of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), CCP's highest [[internal control]] institution.<ref name="xinj">{{cite news |date=13 June 2014 |title=31个省级纪委改革方案获批复 12省已完成纪委"重建" |trans-title=31 Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection Reform Plans Approved 12 Provinces Have Completed "Reconstruction" |work=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/13/c_126612534.htm |access-date=7 January 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140703204141/http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/13/c_126612534.htm |archive-date=3 July 2014}}</ref> He and CCDI Secretary Wang Qishan further institutionalized CCDI's independence from the day-to-day operations of the CCP, improving its ability to function as a ''bona fide'' control body.<ref name="xinj" /> According to ''The Wall Street Journal'', anti-corruption punishment to officials at or above the vice ministerial level need approval from Xi.<ref name="Chin-2021">{{Cite news |last=Chin |first=Josh |date=15 December 2021 |title=Xi Jinping's Leadership Style: Micromanagement That Leaves Underlings Scrambling |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinpings-leadership-style-micromanagement-that-leaves-underlings-scrambling-11639582426 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813143342/https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinpings-leadership-style-micromanagement-that-leaves-underlings-scrambling-11639582426 |url-status=live}}</ref> ''The Wall Street Journal'' said that when he wants to neutralize a political rival, he asks inspectors to prepare pages of evidence. It also said he authorizes investigations on close associates of a high-ranking politician, to replace them with his proteges and puts rivals in less important positions to separate them from their political bases. Reportedly, these tactics have even been used against Wang Qishan, Xi's close friend.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Chun Han |date=16 October 2022 |title=Xi Jinping's Quest for Control Over China Targets Even Old Friends |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-china-anticorruption-11665925166 |access-date=17 October 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=16 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221016230010/https://www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-china-anticorruption-11665925166 |url-status=live}}</ref>

According to [[sinologist]] [[Wang Gungwu]], Xi inherited a party that was faced with pervasive corruption.<ref name="Jesus College-2021">{{Cite web |date=19 March 2021 |title=China re-connects: joining a deep-rooted past to a new world order |url=https://www.jesus.cam.ac.uk/articles/china-re-connects-joining-deep-rooted-past-new-world-order |access-date=2023-02-11 |website=[[Jesus College, Cambridge]] |language=en |archive-date=11 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230211132318/https://www.jesus.cam.ac.uk/articles/china-re-connects-joining-deep-rooted-past-new-world-order |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Wang |first=Gungwu |author-link=Wang Gungwu |date=7 September 2019 |title=Ancient past, modern ambitions: historian Wang Gungwu's new book on China's delicate balance |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3026041/ancient-past-modern-ambitions-historian-wang-gungwus-new-book |access-date=11 February 2023 |archive-date=11 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230211175223/https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3026041/ancient-past-modern-ambitions-historian-wang-gungwus-new-book |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi believed corruption at the higher levels of the CCP put the party and country at risk of collapse.<ref name="Jesus College-2021" /> Wang adds that Xi has a belief that only the CCP is capable of governing China, and that its collapse would be disastrous for the Chinese people. Xi and the new generational leaders reacted by launching the anti-corruption campaign to eliminate corruption at the higher levels of the government.<ref name="Jesus College-2021" />

===Censorship===
{{Main|Censorship in China|Internet censorship in China}}
Since Xi became general secretary, censorship has stepped up.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-communist-party-unveils-new-leadership-with-no-obvious-successor-to-xi-jinping/2017/10/25/efe67876-b8fc-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html|title=China's Xi Jinping unveils his top party leaders, with no successor in sight|last=Denyer|first=Simon|date=25 October 2017|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|access-date=25 October 2017|quote=Censorship has been significantly stepped up in China since Xi took power.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190813203127/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-communist-party-unveils-new-leadership-with-no-obvious-successor-to-xi-jinping/2017/10/25/efe67876-b8fc-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html|archive-date=13 August 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|ref=none|url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown|title=The great firewall of China: Xi Jinping's internet shutdown|last=Economy|first=Elizabeth|author-link=Elizabeth Economy|date=29 June 2018|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191010172129/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown|archive-date=10 October 2019|access-date=4 November 2019|quote=Before Xi Jinping, the internet was becoming a more vibrant political space for Chinese citizens. But today the country has the largest and most sophisticated online censorship operation in the world.}}</ref> At the [[Symposium on News Reporting and Public Opinion]] in 2016, Xi stated that "[[Party media takes the party's last name|party and government-owned media must hold the family name of the party]]" and that the state media "must embody the party's will, safeguard the party's authority".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Zhuang |first=Pinghui |date=19 February 2016 |title=China's top party mouthpieces pledge 'absolute loyalty' as president makes rare visits to newsrooms |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1914136/chinas-top-party-mouthpieces-pledge-absolute-loyalty |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=31 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331170900/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1914136/chinas-top-party-mouthpieces-pledge-absolute-loyalty |url-status=live}}</ref>  Chairing the 2018 China Cyberspace Governance Conference, Xi committed to "fiercely crack down on criminal offenses including hacking, telecom fraud, and violation of citizens' privacy."<ref>{{cite news |date=21 April 2018 |title=Xi outlines blueprint to develop China's strength in cyberspace |url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/21/c_137127374.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180421162040/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/21/c_137127374.htm |archive-date=21 April 2018 |access-date=22 April 2018 |work=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |publisher=}}</ref>

His administration has overseen more Internet restrictions imposed, and is described as being "stricter across the board" on speech than previous administrations.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/06/03/tiananmen-censorship-reflects-crackdown-under-xi-jinping|title=Tiananmen Censorship Reflects Crackdown Under Xi Jinping|last=Risen|first=Tom|date=3 June 2014|work=[[U.S. News & World Report]]|access-date=8 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190411190520/https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/06/03/tiananmen-censorship-reflects-crackdown-under-xi-jinping|archive-date=11 April 2019}}</ref> Xi has taken a strong stand to control internet usage inside China, including [[Google]] and [[Facebook]],{{sfn|Bougon|pp=157–65|2018}} advocating Internet censorship under the concept of [[Network sovereignty|internet sovereignty]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Tiezzi|first=Shannon|date=24 June 2014|title=China's 'Sovereign Internet'|language=en-US|work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-sovereign-internet/|url-status=live|access-date=4 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170804053110/https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-sovereign-internet/|archive-date=4 August 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Ford|first=Peter|date=18 December 2015|title=On Internet freedoms, China tells the world, 'leave us alone'|work=[[The Christian Science Monitor]]|url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/1218/On-Internet-freedoms-China-tells-the-world-leave-us-alone|url-status=live|access-date=4 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170804055927/https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/1218/On-Internet-freedoms-China-tells-the-world-leave-us-alone|archive-date=4 August 2017|issn=0882-7729}}</ref> The [[censorship of Wikipedia]] has been stringent; in April 2019, all versions of Wikipedia were blocked.<ref>{{cite news|date=14 May 2019|title=Wikipedia blocked in China in all languages|publisher=[[BBC News]]|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48269608|url-status=live|access-date=15 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190515001341/https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48269608|archive-date=15 May 2019}}</ref> Likewise, the situation for users of [[Sina Weibo|Weibo]] has been described as a change from fearing one's account would be deleted, to fear of arrest.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/china-xi-jinping-crackdown-liberal-academics-minor-cultural-revolution|title='It's getting worse': China's liberal academics fear growing censorship|last=Phillips|first=Tom|date=6 August 2015|work=[[The Guardian]]|access-date=8 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190918070042/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/china-xi-jinping-crackdown-liberal-academics-minor-cultural-revolution|archive-date=18 September 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

A law enacted in 2013 authorized a three-year prison term for bloggers who shared more than 500 times any content considered "defamatory".<ref name="Grigg2">{{cite news|url=http://www.afr.com/technology/social-media/how-china-stopped-its-bloggers-20150701-gi34za|title=How China stopped its bloggers|last=Grigg|first=Angus|date=4 July 2015|newspaper=[[The Australian Financial Review]]|access-date=8 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180626001441/https://www.afr.com/technology/social-media/how-china-stopped-its-bloggers-20150701-gi34za|archive-date=26 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> The State Internet Information Department summoned influential bloggers to a seminar to instruct them to avoid writing about politics, the CCP, or making statements contradicting official narratives. Many bloggers stopped writing about controversial topics, and Weibo went into decline, with much of its readership shifting to [[WeChat]] users speaking to limited social circles.<ref name="Grigg2" />

=== Economy and technology ===
{{Main|Economy of China}}{{See also|Xi Jinping Thought on Economy}}
Xi was initially seen as a market reformist,<ref name="Whyte-2021">{{Cite journal |last=Whyte |first=Martin K. |date=15 March 2021 |title=China's economic development history and Xi Jinping's "China dream:" an overview with personal reflections |journal=Chinese Sociological Review |volume=53 |issue=2 |pages=115–134 |doi=10.1080/21620555.2020.1833321 |s2cid=228867589 |issn=2162-0555|doi-access=free}}</ref> and a central committee under him announced "market forces" would begin to play a "decisive" role in allocating resources.<ref name="brook2" /> This meant that the state would gradually reduce its involvement in the distribution of capital, and restructure [[State-owned enterprises of China|state-owned enterprises]] (SOEs) to allow further competition, potentially by attracting foreign and private sector players in industries previously highly regulated. This policy aimed to address the bloated state sector that had unduly profited from re-structuring by purchasing assets at below-market prices, assets no longer being used productively. Xi launched the [[Shanghai Free-Trade Zone]] in 2013, which was seen as part of the economic reforms.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Denyer |first=Simon |date=25 August 2013 |title=Creeping reforms as China gives Shanghai Free Trade Zone go-ahead |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/creeping-reforms-as-china-gives-shanghai-free-trade-zone-go-ahead/2013/08/25/95f66472-0bf7-11e3-89fe-abb4a5067014_story.html |access-date=4 January 2023 |archive-date=3 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230603015413/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/creeping-reforms-as-china-gives-shanghai-free-trade-zone-go-ahead/2013/08/25/95f66472-0bf7-11e3-89fe-abb4a5067014_story.html |url-status=live}}</ref> However, by 2017, Xi's promise of economic reforms was said to have stalled by experts.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Bradsher |first2=Keith |date=4 March 2017 |title=Xi Jinping's Failed Promises Dim Hopes for Economic Change in 2nd Term |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-economic-reform.html |access-date=22 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=22 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220822135411/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-economic-reform.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Whyte-2021" /> In 2015, the [[2015–2016 Chinese stock market turbulence|Chinese stock market bubble popped]], which led Xi to use state forces to fix it.{{Sfn|Wong|2023|p=146}} From 2012 to 2022, the share of the market value of private sector firms in China's top listed companies increased from 10% to over 40%.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last1=Orlik |first1=Tom |last2=Hancock |first2=Tom |date=3 March 2023 |title=What Wall Street Gets Wrong About Xi Jinping's New Money Men |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-03-03/xi-s-new-money-men-worry-investors-but-could-push-chinese-economic-reform?srnd=premium&leadSource=uverify%20wall |access-date=4 March 2023 |archive-date=11 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240711081522/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-03-03/xi-s-new-money-men-worry-investors-but-could-push-chinese-economic-reform?srnd=premium&leadSource=uverify%20wall |url-status=live }}</ref> He has overseen the relaxation of restrictions on [[foreign direct investment]] (FDI) and increased cross-border holdings of stocks and bonds.<ref name=":0" />

Xi has increased state control over the economy, voicing support for SOEs,<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2166261/chinese-president-xi-jinpings-show-support-state-owned-firms|title=Chinese President Xi Jinping's show of support for state-owned firms 'no surprise', analysts say|last1=Wang|first1=Orange|date=28 September 2018|work=[[South China Morning Post]]|access-date=31 January 2020|last2=Leng|first2=Sidney|archive-date=9 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201109022556/https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2166261/chinese-president-xi-jinpings-show-support-state-owned-firms|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Whyte-2021" /> while also supporting the private sector.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2166108/xi-jinping-reassures-chinas-state-owned-enterprises-and-private|title=Xi says it's wrong to 'bad mouth' China's state firms... but country needs private sector as well|last=Gan|first=Nectar|date=28 September 2018|work=[[South China Morning Post]]|access-date=31 January 2020|archive-date=31 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200131193729/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2166108/xi-jinping-reassures-chinas-state-owned-enterprises-and-private|url-status=live}}</ref> CCP control of SOEs has increased, while limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs were undertaken.{{sfn|Pieke|Hofman|2022|p=48}} Under Xi, "government guidance funds," public-private investment funds set up by or for government bodies, have raised more than $900 billion for early funding to companies that work in sectors the government deems as strategic.<ref name="Lockett-2022">{{Cite news |last=Lockett |first=Hudson |date=2022-06-12 |title=How Xi Jinping is reshaping China's capital markets |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/d5b81ea0-5955-414c-b2eb-886dfed4dffe |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221237/https://www.ft.com/content/d5b81ea0-5955-414c-b2eb-886dfed4dffe |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=2022-11-21}}</ref> His administration made it easier for banks to issue [[Mortgage loan|mortgages]], increased foreign participation in the bond market, and increased the national currency [[Renminbi|renminbi's]] global role, helping it to join [[International Monetary Fund|IMF's]] basket of [[Special drawing rights|special drawing right]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/business/china-xi-jinping-economic-reform-scorecard.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170305071055/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/business/china-xi-jinping-economic-reform-scorecard.html |archive-date=5 March 2017 |url-access=limited |url-status=live|title=China and Economic Reform: Xi Jinping's Track Record|last=Bradsher|first=Keith|date=4 March 2017|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=31 January 2020|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In 2018, he promised to continue reforms but warned nobody "can dictate to the Chinese people."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/658e78ce-0287-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221207/https://www.ft.com/content/658e78ce-0287-11e9-99df-6183d3002ee1|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Xi says no one can 'dictate to the Chinese people'|last=Wildau|first=Gabriel|date=18 December 2018|work=[[Financial Times]]|access-date=31 January 2020}}</ref>

China's economy has grown under Xi, doubling from $8.5 trillion in 2012 to $17.8 trillion in 2023,<ref>{{Cite web |title=GDP (current US$) – China {{!}} Data |url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190906052638/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN |archive-date=6 September 2019 |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[World Bank]]}}</ref> while China's nominal GDP per capita surpassed the world average in 2021,<ref>{{cite web |author= |date=April 2023 |title=World Economic Outlook Database, April 2023 |url=https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413194731/https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2023/April |archive-date=13 April 2023 |access-date=16 May 2023 |website=[[International Monetary Fund]] |publisher=}}</ref> though growth has slowed from 7.9% in 2012 to 5.2% in 2023.<ref>{{Cite web |title=GDP growth (annual %) – China {{!}} Data |url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813205801/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN |archive-date=13 August 2022 |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[World Bank]]}}</ref> Xi has stressed the importance of "high-quality growth" rather than "inflated growth."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hui |first=Mary |date=16 February 2022 |title=What China means when it says it wants "high quality" GDP growth |url=https://qz.com/2119395/what-china-means-by-high-quality-economic-growth/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813205819/https://qz.com/2119395/what-china-means-by-high-quality-economic-growth/ |archive-date=13 August 2022 |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[Quartz (publication)|Quartz]] |language=en}}</ref> He has stated China has abandoned a growth-at-all-costs strategy which Xi refers to as "GDP heroism."{{Sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=22}} Instead, Xi said other social issues such as environmental protection are important.{{Sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=22}} Xi has made eradicating extreme poverty through [[Targeted Poverty Alleviation|targeted poverty alleviation]] a key goal.<ref>{{Cite news |date=25 February 2021 |title=Xi Puts His Personal Stamp on China's Fight Against Poverty |language=en |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-25/china-s-xi-puts-personal-stamp-on-nation-s-fight-against-poverty |access-date=14 August 2022 |archive-date=18 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220218100001/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-25/china-s-xi-puts-personal-stamp-on-nation-s-fight-against-poverty |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2015, he launched the [[battle against poverty]],<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bandurski |first=David |date=2021-01-29 |title=Propaganda Soars Into Orbit |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/2021/01/29/propaganda-soars-into-orbit/ |access-date=2025-03-29 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US}}</ref> which concluded by 2021, when Xi declared a "complete victory" over extreme poverty, saying nearly 100 million have been lifted out of poverty under his tenure, though some experts said China's [[poverty threshold]] was lower than that of the [[World Bank]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=25 February 2021 |title=China's Xi declares victory in ending extreme poverty |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56194622 |access-date=14 August 2022 |archive-date=28 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220728095225/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56194622 |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2020, premier Li Keqiang, citing the [[National Bureau of Statistics of China|National Bureau of Statistics]] (NBS) said that China still had 600 million people living with less than 1000 yuan ($140) a month, although ''The Economist'' said the methodology NBS used was flawed.<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 June 2020 |title=China's poverty line is not as stingy as commentators think |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |location=Hong Kong |url=https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/06/18/chinas-poverty-line-is-not-as-stingy-as-commentators-think |access-date=14 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814221948/https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/06/18/chinas-poverty-line-is-not-as-stingy-as-commentators-think |url-status=live}}</ref> When Xi took office in 2012, 54% of people in China were living on less than $6.85 per day, in 2021 this had fallen to 17%.<ref>{{cite web |title=World Bank Open Data |url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.UMIC?locations=CN |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240414183532/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.UMIC |archive-date=14 April 2024 |access-date=12 January 2024}}</ref>

Xi has circulated a policy called [[dual circulation]], meaning reorienting the economy towards domestic consumption while remaining open to foreign trade and investment.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Lingling |date=12 August 2020 |title=China's Xi Speeds Up Inward Economic Shift |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-speeds-up-inward-economic-shift-11597224602 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813205801/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-speeds-up-inward-economic-shift-11597224602 |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi has prioritised boosting [[productivity]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=14 August 2021 |title=China's future economic potential hinges on its productivity |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/08/14/chinas-future-economic-potential-hinges-on-its-productivity |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812223255/https://www.economist.com/briefing/2021/08/14/chinas-future-economic-potential-hinges-on-its-productivity |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi has attempted to reform the property sector to combat the steep increase in prices and cut the economy's dependence on it.<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 July 2021 |title=China's Escalating Property Curbs Point to Xi's New Priority |language=en |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-27/china-s-escalating-property-curbs-underline-xi-s-new-priority |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=28 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221128122733/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-27/china-s-escalating-property-curbs-underline-xi-s-new-priority |url-status=live}}</ref> In the 19th CCP National Congress, Xi declared "[[houses are for living, not for speculation]]."<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 October 2017 |title=Housing Should Be for Living In, Not for Speculation, Xi Says |language=en |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-18/xi-renews-call-housing-should-be-for-living-in-not-speculation |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=25 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220425013308/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-18/xi-renews-call-housing-should-be-for-living-in-not-speculation |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2020, Xi's government formulated the "[[three red lines]]" policy that aimed to deleverage the heavily indebted property sector.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Lin |first1=Andy |last2=Hale |first2=Thomas |last3=Hudson |first3=Hudson |date=8 October 2021 |title=Half of China's top developers crossed Beijing's 'red lines' |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/d5803d64-5cc5-46f0-bed0-1bc207440f9c |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221223/https://www.ft.com/content/d5803d64-5cc5-46f0-bed0-1bc207440f9c |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=11 August 2022}}</ref> Xi has supported a [[property tax]], for which he has faced resistance from members of the CCP.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Lingling |date=19 October 2021 |title=In Tackling China's Real-Estate Bubble, Xi Jinping Faces Resistance to Property-Tax Plan |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-tackling-chinas-real-estate-bubble-xi-jinping-faces-resistance-to-property-tax-plan-11634650751 |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=8 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220808195428/https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-tackling-chinas-real-estate-bubble-xi-jinping-faces-resistance-to-property-tax-plan-11634650751 |url-status=live}}</ref> His administration pursued a debt-deleveraging campaign, seeking to slow and cut the unsustainable amount of debt China has accrued during its growth.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tran |first=Hung |date=14 March 2023 |title=China's debt-reduction campaign is making progress, but at a cost |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/chinas-debt-reduction-campaign-is-making-progress-but-at-a-cost/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314200320/https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/chinas-debt-reduction-campaign-is-making-progress-but-at-a-cost/ |archive-date=14 March 2023 |access-date=14 March 2023 |website=[[Atlantic Council]]}}</ref> Since 2021, China has faced a [[Chinese property sector crisis (2020–present)|property sector crisis]], with decreasing house prices, shrinking of the real estate sector and bankruptcies of many property developers, partially as a result of Xi's efforts to decrease the sector's role in the Chinese economy.<ref>{{Cite news |date=23 August 2023 |title=China’s Debt-Fueled Housing Market Is Having a Meltdown, Again |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-23/china-real-estate-market-crisis-is-another-mess-for-xi-jinping |access-date=1 February 2025 |work=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref>

Xi has heavily emphasized the role of advanced manufacturing and technology development to drive China's future economic growth.<ref>{{Cite news |last=White |first=Edward |last2=Leng |first2=Cheng |date=2024-03-27 |title=Will Xi’s manufacturing plan be enough to rescue China’s economy? |url=https://www.ft.com/content/ae517907-0244-4344-ad0a-1d029c03555b |access-date=2025-02-01 |work=[[Financial Times]]}}</ref> Xi's administration has promoted [[Made in China 2025]] plan that aims to make China self-reliant in key technologies, although publicly China de-emphasised this plan due to the outbreak of a [[China–United States trade war]]. Since the outbreak of the trade war in 2018, Xi has revived calls for "self-reliance," especially on technology.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Fifield |first=Anna |date=2 November 2018 |title=As China settles in for trade war, leader Xi emphasizes 'self reliance' |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-china-settles-in-for-trade-war-leader-xi-emphasizesself-reliance/2018/11/01/2961b2b2-d8de-11e8-9559-712cbf726d1c_story.html |access-date=31 January 2020 |archive-date=31 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200131193728/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-china-settles-in-for-trade-war-leader-xi-emphasizesself-reliance/2018/11/01/2961b2b2-d8de-11e8-9559-712cbf726d1c_story.html |url-status=live}}</ref> Domestic spending on R&D has significantly increased, surpassing the European Union (EU) and reaching a record $564 billion in 2020.<ref name=":8" /> The Chinese government has supported technology companies like [[Huawei]] through grants, tax breaks, credit facilities and other assistance, enabling their rise, leading to US countermeasures.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yap |first=Chuin-Wei |date=25 December 2019 |title=State Support Helped Fuel Huawei's Global Rise |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736 |access-date=16 September 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=25 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191225174935/https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736 |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2023, Xi put forward [[new productive forces]], this refers to a new form of productive forces derived from continuous sci-tech breakthroughs and innovation that drive strategic emerging and future industries in a more intelligent [[Information Age|information era]].<ref name=":02">{{Cite news |last=Yu |first=Evelyn |date=5 March 2024 |title=Xi Wants ‘New Productive Forces’ to Fit Local Conditions |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-05/xi-wants-new-productive-forces-to-be-based-on-local-conditions |access-date=1 May 2024 |work=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref> Xi has been involved in the development of [[Xiong'an]], a [[New areas|new area]] announced in 2017, planned to become a major metropolis near Beijing; the relocation aspect is estimated to last until 2035 while it is planned to developed into a "modern socialist city" by 2050.<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 May 2023 |title=Xiongan is Xi Jinping's pet project |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/18/xiongan-is-xi-jinpings-pet-project |access-date=19 May 2023 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=19 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230519023705/https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/18/xiongan-is-xi-jinpings-pet-project |url-status=live}}</ref> Under Xi, China made rapid advances in key technological areas, becoming a world leader in tech such as [[Plug-in electric vehicles in China|electric vehicles]], [[Lithium batteries in China|lithium batteries]] and solar panels.<ref>{{Cite news |date=30 October 2024 |title=US Efforts to Contain Xi’s Push for Tech Supremacy Are Faltering |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-us-china-containment/ |access-date=1 February 2025 |work=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref>

{{Quote box
| quote = Common prosperity is an essential requirement of socialism and a key feature of Chinese-style modernization. The common prosperity we are pursuing is for all, affluence both in material and spiritual life, but not for a small portion nor for uniform egalitarianism.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in 2021<ref name="Caixin Global-2021" />
| align = right
| width = 25em
}}

In 2020, ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]'' reported that Xi ordered a halt to [[Ant Group]]'s [[initial public offering]] (IPO), in reaction to its founder [[Jack Ma]] criticizing government regulation in finance.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Jing Yang and Lingling |date=12 November 2020 |title=China's President Xi Jinping Personally Scuttled Jack Ma's Ant IPO |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-president-xi-jinping-halted-jack-ma-ant-ipo-11605203556 |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201113061215/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-president-xi-jinping-halted-jack-ma-ant-ipo-11605203556 |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi's administration has overseen a decrease in offshore IPOs by Chinese companies, with most Chinese IPOs taking place either in Shanghai or Shenzhen {{As of|2022|lc=y}}, and has increasingly directed funding to IPOs of companies that works in sectors it deems as strategic, including electric vehicles, [[Biotechnology industry in China|biotechnology]], [[Renewable energy in China|renewable energy]], [[Artificial intelligence industry in China|artificial intelligence]], [[Semiconductor industry in China|semiconductors]] and other high-technology manufacturing.<ref name="Lockett-2022" />

Since 2021, Xi has promoted the term "[[common prosperity]]," which he defined as an "essential requirement of socialism," described as affluence for all and said entailed reasonable adjustments to excess incomes.<ref name="Caixin Global-2021">{{Cite web |date=19 October 2021 |title=Full Text: Xi Jinping's Speech on Boosting Common Prosperity – Caixin Global |url=https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-10-19/full-text-xi-jinpings-speech-on-boosting-common-prosperity-101788302.html |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=[[Caixin Global]] |language=en |archive-date=30 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221030001458/https://www.caixinglobal.com/2021-10-19/full-text-xi-jinpings-speech-on-boosting-common-prosperity-101788302.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Hass |first=Ryan |date=9 September 2021 |title=Assessing China's "common prosperity" campaign |language=en-US |work=[[Brookings Institution]] |url=https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/09/assessing-chinas-common-prosperity-campaign/ |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=3 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220703091105/https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/09/09/assessing-chinas-common-prosperity-campaign/ |url-status=live}}</ref> Common prosperity has been used as the justification for [[2020–2021 Xi Jinping Administration reform spree|large-scale crackdowns and regulations]] towards the perceived "excesses" of several sectors, most prominently tech and tutoring industries.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shen |first1=Samuel |last2=Ranganathan |first2=Vidya |date=3 November 2021 |title=China stock pickers reshape portfolios on Xi's 'common prosperity' |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-stock-pickers-reshape-portfolios-xis-common-prosperity-2021-11-02/ |access-date=11 August 2022 |archive-date=8 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220808115133/https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-stock-pickers-reshape-portfolios-xis-common-prosperity-2021-11-02/ |url-status=live}}</ref> Actions taken include fining large tech companies<ref>{{cite news |last1=Moore |first1=Elena |date=10 April 2021 |title=China Fines Alibaba $2.8 Billion For Breaking Anti-Monopoly Law |language=en |publisher=[[NPR]] |url=https://www.npr.org/2021/04/10/986112628/china-fines-alibaba-2-8-billion-for-breaking-anti-monopoly-law |access-date=16 September 2021 |archive-date=16 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210916024333/https://www.npr.org/2021/04/10/986112628/china-fines-alibaba-2-8-billion-for-breaking-anti-monopoly-law |url-status=live}}</ref> and passing laws such as the [[Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China|Data Security Law]]. China introduced severe restrictions on private tutoring companies, effectively destroying the whole industry.<ref>{{Cite news |date=12 August 2021 |title=China's Education Crackdown Pushes Costly Tutors Underground |language=en |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-12/china-s-education-crackdown-pushes-costly-tutors-underground |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=24 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220324173146/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-12/china-s-education-crackdown-pushes-costly-tutors-underground |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi opened a [[Beijing Stock Exchange|new stock exchange]] in Beijing targeted for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).<ref>{{Cite news |date=15 November 2021 |title=Trading kicks off on Beijing Stock Exchange, 10 stocks surge |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trading-kicks-off-beijing-stock-exchange-10-stocks-surge-2021-11-15/ |access-date=22 August 2022 |archive-date=27 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211127204552/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trading-kicks-off-beijing-stock-exchange-10-stocks-surge-2021-11-15/ |url-status=live}}</ref> There have been other cultural regulations including restrictions on minors playing video games and crackdowns on celebrity culture.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Stevenson |first1=Alexandra |last2=Chien |first2=Amy Chang |last3=Li |first3=Cao |date=27 August 2021 |title=China's Celebrity Culture Is Raucous. The Authorities Want to Change That. |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/27/business/media/china-celebrity-culture.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812152735/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/27/business/media/china-celebrity-culture.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=30 August 2021 |title=China Tightens Limits for Young Online Gamers and Bans School Night Play |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/30/business/media/china-online-games.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=18 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818212528/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/30/business/media/china-online-games.html |url-status=live}}</ref> The push for common prosperity has also included salary and bonus cuts, especially across the financial sector,<ref>{{Cite news |date=15 November 2022 |title=China Bankers Face Deeper Pay Cuts in ‘Common Prosperity’ Push |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-15/china-bankers-face-deeper-pay-cuts-in-common-prosperity-push |access-date=1 February 2025 |work=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=27 February 2024 |title=Xi Crackdown on ‘Hedonistic’ Bankers Fuels Industry Brain Drain |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-26/xi-crackdown-on-hedonistic-bankers-fuels-industry-brain-drain |access-date=1 February 2025 |work=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref> as well as crackdowns on wealth flaunting.<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 June 2024 |title=China doesn’t want people flaunting their wealth |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2024/06/20/china-doesnt-want-people-flaunting-their-wealth |access-date=2025-02-01 |work=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>

===Reforms===
In November 2013, at the conclusion of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, the Communist Party delivered a far-reaching reform agenda that alluded to changes in both economic and social policy. Xi signaled at the plenum that he was consolidating control of the massive internal security organization that was formerly the domain of Zhou Yongkang.<ref name="brook2">{{cite news |last1=Kroeber |first1=Arthur R. |date=17 November 2013 |title=Xi Jinping's Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in China |work=[[Brookings Institution]] |publisher= |url=http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber |url-status=live |access-date=21 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140727211348/http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber |archive-date=27 July 2014}}</ref> A new National Security Commission was formed with Xi at its helm, which commentators have said would help Xi consolidate over national security affairs.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wuthnow |first=Joel |date=30 June 2016 |title=China's Much-Heralded NSC Has Disappeared |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/30/chinas-much-heralded-national-security-council-has-disappeared-nsc-xi-jinping/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190825180323/https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/30/chinas-much-heralded-national-security-council-has-disappeared-nsc-xi-jinping/ |archive-date=25 August 2019 |access-date=25 August 2019 |newspaper=[[Foreign Policy (magazine)|Foreign Policy]] |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lampton |first=David M. |date=3 September 2015 |title=Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: policy coordination and political power |journal=Journal of Contemporary China |volume=24 |issue=95 |pages=759–777 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2015.1013366 |issn=1067-0564 |s2cid=154685098 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

The [[Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms]]—another ''ad hoc'' policy coordination body led by Xi upgraded to a commission in 2018—was also formed to oversee the implementation of the reform agenda.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Jun |first=Mai |date=21 March 2018 |title=China unveils bold overhaul to tighten Communist Party control |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138291/china-unveils-bold-overhaul-tighten-communist-party |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813171805/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2138291/china-unveils-bold-overhaul-tighten-communist-party |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Keck |first1=Zachary |date=7 January 2014 |title=Is Li Keqiang Being Marginalized? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/is-li-keqiang-being-marginalized/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181029152046/https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/is-li-keqiang-being-marginalized/ |archive-date=29 October 2018 |access-date=7 September 2019 |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]}}</ref> Termed "comprehensive deepening reforms" ({{lang-zh|labels=no|s=全面深化改革|p=quánmiàn shēnhuà gǎigé}}), they were said to be the most significant since Deng Xiaoping's 1992 Southern Tour. The plenum also announced economic reforms and resolved to abolish the ''[[laogai]]'' system of "[[Re-education through labor|re-education through labour]]," which was largely seen as a blot on China's human rights record. The system has faced significant criticism for years from domestic critics and foreign observers.<ref name="brook2" /> In January 2016, a [[two-child policy]] replaced the [[one-child policy]],<ref>{{cite news|last=Sridahan|first=Vasudevan|date=27 December 2015|title=China formally abolishes decades-old one-child policy|newspaper=[[International Business Times]]|url=http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-formally-abolishes-decades-old-one-child-policy-1535006|url-status=live|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224908/https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-formally-abolishes-decades-old-one-child-policy-1535006|archive-date=28 August 2019}}</ref> which was in turn was replaced with a [[three-child policy]] in May 2021.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wee |first=Sui-Lee |date=31 May 2021 |title=China Says It Will Allow Couples to Have 3 Children, Up From 2 |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=4 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211104064050/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html |url-status=live}}</ref> In July 2021, all family size limits as well as penalties for exceeding them were removed.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Cheng |first=Evelyn |date=21 July 2021 |title=China scraps fines, will let families have as many children as they'd like |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/21/china-scraps-fines-for-families-violating-childbirth-limits.html |access-date=29 April 2022 |website=[[CNBC]] |language=en |archive-date=28 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230128131149/https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/21/china-scraps-fines-for-families-violating-childbirth-limits.html |url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Political reforms ====
{{See also|Neoauthoritarianism (China)}}
Xi's administration taken a number of changes to the structure of the CCP and state bodies, especially in a large overhaul in 2018. Beginning in 2013, the CCP under Xi has created a series of Central Leading Groups: supra-ministerial steering committees, designed to bypass existing institutions when making decisions, and ostensibly make policy-making a more efficient process. Xi was also believed to have diluted the authority of premier Li Keqiang, taking authority over the economy which has generally been considered to be the domain of the premier.<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 September 2020 |title=Li Keqiang: China's marginalised premier |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19870221 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221017104619/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-19870221 |archive-date=17 October 2022 |access-date=17 October 2022 |work=[[BBC News]] |language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Wei |first=Lingling |date=11 May 2022 |title=China's Forgotten Premier Steps Out of Xi's Shadow as Economic Fixer |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-premier-li-keqiang-xi-jinping-11652277107 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230531130648/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-premier-li-keqiang-xi-jinping-11652277107 |archive-date=31 May 2023 |access-date=17 October 2022 |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |language=en-US |issn=0099-9660}}</ref>

February 2014 oversaw the creation of the [[Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission|Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization]] with Xi as its leader. The State Internet Information Office (SIIO), previously under the [[State Council Information Office]] (SCI), was transferred to the central leading group and renamed in English into the Cyberspace Administration of China.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Attrill |first1=Nathan |last2=Fritz |first2=Audrey |date=24 November 2021 |title=China's cyber vision: How the Cyberspace Administration of China is building a new consensus on global internet governance |url=https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2021-11/Chinas%20cyber%20vision.pdf?VersionId=M0ePH4Ij3w7WRJrLlhyxVvt269MWSYOs |access-date=29 December 2022 |website=[[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]] |archive-date=29 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221229145556/https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2021-11/Chinas%20cyber%20vision.pdf?VersionId=M0ePH4Ij3w7WRJrLlhyxVvt269MWSYOs |url-status=live}}</ref> As part of managing the financial system, the [[Financial Stability and Development Committee]], a State Council body, was established in 2017. Chaired by vice premier [[Liu He (politician)|Liu He]] during its existence, the committee was disestablished by the newly established Central Financial Commission during the 2023 Party and state reforms.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Chen |first1=Laurie |last2=Tang |first2=Ziyi |date=16 March 2023 |title=China to create powerful financial watchdog run by Communist Party |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-create-powerful-financial-watchdog-run-by-communist-party-2023-03-16/ |access-date=17 March 2023 |archive-date=16 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230316162813/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-create-powerful-financial-watchdog-run-by-communist-party-2023-03-16/ |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi has increased the role of the [[Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission]] at the expense of the [[State Council of the People's Republic of China|State Council]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mitchell |first=Tom |date=25 July 2016 |title=Xi's China: The rise of party politics |url=https://www.ft.com/content/57371736-4b69-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221251/https://www.ft.com/content/57371736-4b69-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a |archive-date=11 December 2022 |access-date=31 January 2020 |work=[[Financial Times]]}}</ref>

2018 has seen the [[deepening the reform of the Party and state institutions]]. In that year, several [[Leading Small Group|central leading groups]] including [[Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission|reform]], cyberspace affairs, [[Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission|finance and economics]]. and [[Central Foreign Affairs Commission|foreign affairs]] were upgraded to commissions.<ref name="Buckley-2018">{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2018-03-21 |title=China Gives Communist Party More Control Over Policy and Media |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/china-communist-party-xi-jinping.html |access-date=2022-12-29 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=12 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211112211222/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/china-communist-party-xi-jinping.html |url-status=live}}</ref> The powers of the Central Propaganda Department was strengthened, which now oversaw the newly established [[China Media Group]] (CMG).<ref name="Buckley-2018" /> Two State Council departments. one dealing with [[Overseas Chinese Affairs Office|overseas Chinese]], and other one dealing with [[State Administration for Religious Affairs|religious affairs]], were merged into the [[United Front Work Department]] of the CCP while another commission dealing with [[National Ethnic Affairs Commission|ethnic affairs]] was brought under formal UFWD leadership.<ref name="Buckley-2018" /> In 2020, all elections at all levels of the [[System of people's congress|people's congress system]] and NPC were mandated to adhere to the leadership of the CCP.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hao |first1=Mingsong |last2=Ke |first2=Xiwang |date=5 July 2023 |title=Personal Networks and Grassroots Election Participation in China: Findings from the Chinese General Social Survey |journal=[[Journal of Chinese Political Science]] |language=en |volume=29 |issue=1 |pages=159–184 |doi=10.1007/s11366-023-09861-3 |issn=1080-6954 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

2023 has seen further reforms to the CCP and state bureaucracy called the [[plan on reforming Party and state institutions]], which included the strengthening of Party control over the financial and technology domains.<ref name=":4">{{Cite news |last1=Wong |first1=Chun Han |last2=Zhai |first2=Keith |date=16 March 2023 |title=China's Communist Party Overhaul Deepens Control Over Finance, Technology |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-communist-party-overhaul-deepens-control-over-finance-technology-6acdd43c?mod=world_lead_pos5 |access-date=16 March 2023 |archive-date=16 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230316221649/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-communist-party-overhaul-deepens-control-over-finance-technology-6acdd43c?mod=world_lead_pos5 |url-status=live}}</ref> This included the creation of two CCP bodies for overseeing finance; the [[Central Financial Commission]] (CFC), as well as the revival of the [[Central Financial Work Commission]] (CFWC) that was previously dissolved in 2002.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, a new CCP [[Central Science and Technology Commission]] would be established to broadly oversee the technology sector, while a newly created [[Society Work Department]] was tasked with CCP interactions with several sectors, including civic groups, chambers of commerce and industry groups, as well as handling public petition and grievance work.<ref name=":4" /> Regulatory bodies saw large overhauls.<ref>{{Cite news |date=7 March 2023 |title=China Overhauls Financial Regulatory Regime to Control Risks |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-07/china-to-set-up-enlarged-financial-regulatory-authority |access-date=17 March 2023 |archive-date=4 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404200523/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-07/china-to-set-up-enlarged-financial-regulatory-authority |url-status=live}}</ref> Several regulatory responsibilities were also transferred from the [[People's Bank of China]] (PBoC) to another regulatory body, while the PBoC reopened offices around the country that were closed in a previous reorganization.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Bradsher |first1=Keith |last2=Che |first2=Chang |date=2023-03-10 |title=Why China Is Tightening Its Oversight of Banking and Tech |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/09/business/china-peoples-congress-financial-regulation.html |access-date=2023-03-16 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=16 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230316221649/https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/09/business/china-peoples-congress-financial-regulation.html |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2024, the CCP's role was strengthened further with the State Council regulations amended to add a clause about following CCP ideology and policies.<ref>{{Cite news |date=March 11, 2024 |title=China passes law granting Communist Party more control over cabinet |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-passes-law-granting-communist-party-more-control-over-cabinet-2024-03-11/ |access-date=March 11, 2024 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref>

====Legal reforms====
{{see also|Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law}}{{Quote box
| quote = Efforts should be made to enable the people to see that justice is served in every judicial case.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in November 2020<ref>{{cite web | title=习近平出席中央全面依法治国工作会议并发表重要讲话 | website=Chinadaily.com.cn | date=18 Nov 2020 | url=https://language.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202011/18/WS5fb4ad35a31024ad0ba94eb8.html | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119151727/https://language.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202011/18/WS5fb4ad35a31024ad0ba94eb8.html | archive-date=19 Jan 2021 | url-status=live | access-date=21 Sep 2023}}</ref>
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The party under Xi announced a raft of [[Law reform|legal reforms]] at the Fourth Plenum held in the fall 2014, and he called for "[[Rule of law in China|Chinese socialistic rule of law]]" immediately afterwards. The party aimed to reform the legal system, which had been perceived as ineffective at delivering justice and affected by corruption, local government interference and lack of constitutional oversight. The plenum, while emphasizing the absolute leadership of the party, also called for a greater role of the constitution in the affairs of state and a strengthening of the role of the National People's Congress Standing Committee in interpreting the constitution.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1623286/communist-party-pledges-greater-role-constitution-rights-fourth-plenum|title=Communist Party pledges greater role for constitution, rights in fourth plenum|last1=Zhou|first1=Laura|date=24 October 2014|work=[[South China Morning Post]]|access-date=7 September 2019|last2=Huang|first2=Cary|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181030035405/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1623286/communist-party-pledges-greater-role-constitution-rights-fourth-plenum|archive-date=30 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> It also called for more transparency in legal proceedings, more involvement of ordinary citizens in the legislative process, and an overall "professionalization" of the legal workforce. The party also planned to institute cross-jurisdictional circuit legal tribunals as well as giving provinces consolidated administrative oversight over lower level legal resources, which is intended to reduce local government involvement in legal proceedings.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Doyon |first1=Jerome |last2=Winckler |first2=Hugo |date=20 November 2014 |title=The Fourth Plenum, Party Officials and Local Courts |work=[[Jamestown Foundation]] |publisher= |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-fourth-plenum-party-officials-and-local-courts/ |access-date=7 September 2019 |archive-date=18 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200518221059/https://jamestown.org/program/the-fourth-plenum-party-officials-and-local-courts/ |url-status=live}}</ref>

====Military reforms====
{{see also|Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|2015 People's Republic of China military reform|Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military}}Since taking power in 2012, Xi has undertaken an overhaul of the [[People's Liberation Army]], including both political reform and its modernization.<ref name="Lague-2019">{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-xi/|title=How China is replacing America as Asia's military titan|last1=Lague|first1=David|date=23 April 2019|work=[[Reuters]]|access-date=10 January 2020|last2=Lim|first2=Benjamin Kang|archive-date=21 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121184056/https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-xi/|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Military-civil fusion]] has advanced under Xi.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bitzinger |first=Richard A. |date=2021 |title=China's Shift from Civil-Military Integration to Military-Civil Fusion |url= |journal=Asia Policy |language=en |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=5–24 |doi=10.1353/asp.2021.0001 |s2cid=234121234 |issn=1559-2960}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=B. Kania |first1=Elsa |last2=Laskai |first2=Lorand |date=28 January 2021 |title=Myths and Realities of China's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy |url=https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy |website=[[Center for a New American Security]] |jstor=resrep28654 |jstor-access=free |access-date=30 August 2022 |archive-date=16 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230216154559/https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi has been active in his participation in military affairs, taking a direct hands-on approach to military reform. In addition to being the Chairman of the CMC and leader of the [[Central Leading Group for Military Reform]] founded in 2014 to oversee comprehensive military reforms, Xi has delivered numerous high-profile pronouncements vowing to clean up malfeasance and complacency in the military. Xi has repeatedly warned that the depoliticization of the PLA from the CCP would lead to a collapse similar to that of the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Fifield |first=Anna |author-link=Anna Fifield |date=29 September 2019 |title=China's Communist Party has one more reason to celebrate – a year longer in power than the U.S.S.R. |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-communist-party-has-one-more-reason-to-celebrate--a-year-longer-in-power-than-the-soviet-union/2019/09/28/993bb832-dfc0-11e9-be7f-4cc85017c36f_story.html |access-date=31 January 2020 |archive-date=1 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200201101821/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-communist-party-has-one-more-reason-to-celebrate--a-year-longer-in-power-than-the-soviet-union/2019/09/28/993bb832-dfc0-11e9-be7f-4cc85017c36f_story.html |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi held the New Gutian Conference in 2014, gathering China's top military officers, re-emphasizing the principle of "the party has absolute control over the army" first established by Mao at the 1929 [[Gutian Congress]].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://china.dwnews.com/news/2014-11-04/59616798.html|last1=Meng|first1=Chuan|date=4 November 2014|work=[[Duowei News]]|access-date=8 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150121184703/http://china.dwnews.com/news/2014-11-04/59616798.html|archive-date=21 January 2015|language=zh-hans|script-title=zh:习近平军中"亮剑" 新古田会议一箭多雕|trans-title=Xi Jinping And Central Army's New "Bright Sword" Conference In Gutian Killed Many Birds With Only A Single Stone}}</ref>

{{Quote box
| quote = In the USSR, where the military was depoliticized, separated from the party and nationalized, the party was disarmed. When the Soviet Union came to crisis point, a big party was gone just like that. Proportionally, the Soviet Communist Party had more members than we do, but nobody was man enough to stand up and resist.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech<ref name=":12aa">{{Cite news |last=Grammaticas |first=Damian |date=14 March 2013 |title=President Xi Jinping: A man with a dream |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21790384 |access-date=31 January 2020 |archive-date=20 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200520161800/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21790384 |url-status=live}}</ref>
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Xi announced a reduction of 300,000 troops from the PLA in 2015, bringing its size to 2 million troops. Xi described this as a gesture of peace, while analysts such as Rory Medcalf have said that the cut was done to reduce costs as well as part of PLA's modernization.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150902221802/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html |archive-date=2 September 2015 |url-access=limited |url-status=live|title=China Announces Cuts of 300,000 Troops at Military Parade Showing Its Might|last1=Wong|first1=Edward|date=2 September 2015|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=10 January 2020|last2=Perlez|first2=Jane|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331|last3=Buckley|first3=Chris}}</ref> In 2016, he reduced the number of [[Theater command|theater commands of the PLA]] from seven to five.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/its-official-chinas-military-has-5-new-theater-commands/|title=It's Official: China's Military Has 5 New Theater Commands|last=Tiezzi|first=Shannon|date=2 February 2016|work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|access-date=10 January 2020|archive-date=6 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806062854/https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/its-official-chinas-military-has-5-new-theater-commands/|url-status=live}}</ref> He has also abolished the four autonomous [[People's Liberation Army General Political Department|general departments]] of the PLA, replacing them with 15 agencies directly reporting to the CMC.<ref name="Lague-2019" /> Two new branches of the PLA were created under his reforms, the [[People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force|Strategic Support Force]]<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-force-for-innovation/|title=China's Strategic Support Force: A Force for Innovation?|last=Kania|first=Elsa|date=18 February 2017|work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|access-date=31 January 2020|archive-date=11 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111233353/https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/chinas-strategic-support-force-a-force-for-innovation/|url-status=live}}</ref> and the Joint Logistics Support Force.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Blanchard |first=Ben |date=14 September 2016 |title=China sets up new logistics force as part of military reforms |work=[[Reuters]] |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-idUSKCN11K05F |access-date=31 January 2020 |archive-date=24 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201224052700/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-idUSKCN11K05F |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2018, the PAP was placed under the sole control of the CMC; the PAP was previously under the joint command of the CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security.<ref>{{cite book |last=Wuthnow |first=Joel |url=https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf |title=China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform |date=16 April 2019 |publisher=Institute for National Strategic Studies |location=Washington |access-date=3 October 2019 |archive-date=4 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200704193636/https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref>{{rp|15}}

On 21 April 2016, Xi was named [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|commander-in-chief]] of the country's new Joint Operations Command Center of the PLA.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/21/xi-jinping-named-commander-in-chief-chinese-state-media|title=Xi Jinping named as 'commander in chief' by Chinese state media|date=21 April 2016|work=[[The Guardian]]|access-date=25 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160425012825/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/21/xi-jinping-named-commander-in-chief-chinese-state-media|archive-date=25 April 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/chinese-president-xi-jinping-commander-in-chief-military-armed-forces-a6997396.html|title=Chinese President Xi Jinping named as military's 'commander-in-chief'|last1=Kayleigh|first1=Lewis|date=23 April 2016|work=[[The Independent]]|access-date=25 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160427091000/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/chinese-president-xi-jinping-commander-in-chief-military-armed-forces-a6997396.html|archive-date=27 April 2016}}</ref> Some analysts interpreted this move as an attempt to display strength and strong leadership and as being more "political than military."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/84000/20160422/president-xi-jinping-is-new-commander-in-chief-of-the-military.htm|title=President Xi Jinping is New Commander-in-Chief of the Military|last1=Sison|first1=Desiree|date=22 April 2016|work=China Topix|access-date=25 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160423120421/http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/84000/20160422/president-xi-jinping-is-new-commander-in-chief-of-the-military.htm|archive-date=23 April 2016}}</ref> According to Ni Lexiong, a military affairs expert, Xi "not only controls the military but also does it in an absolute manner, and that in wartime, he is ready to command personally."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/perspectives/china-s-xi-moves-to-take-more-direct-command-over/article_b5e96afb-97e6-533e-b33e-db5beab72bf3.html|title=China's Xi moves to take more direct command over military|date=24 April 2016|work=[[Columbia Daily Tribune]]|access-date=25 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160425105101/http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/perspectives/china-s-xi-moves-to-take-more-direct-command-over/article_b5e96afb-97e6-533e-b33e-db5beab72bf3.html|archive-date=25 April 2016}}</ref> According to a [[University of California, San Diego]] expert on Chinese military, Xi "has been able to take political control of the military to an extent that exceeds what Mao and Deng have done."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/world/asia/xi-jinping-military-china-purge.html|title=Xi Jinping Presses Military Overhaul, and Two Generals Disappear|last1=Buckley|first1=Chris|date=11 October 2017|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=26 October 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171025083913/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/world/asia/xi-jinping-military-china-purge.html|archive-date=25 October 2017|last2=Myers|first2=Steven Lee}}</ref>

Under Xi, [[Military budget of China|China's official military budget]] has more than doubled,<ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last1=Han |first1=Chen |last2=Allen-Ebrahimian |first2=Bethany |date=2022-10-15 |title=What China looks like after a decade of Xi Jinping's rule |url=https://www.axios.com/2022/10/15/china-party-congress-2022-xi-jinping-third-term |access-date=2023-04-19 |website=[[Axios (website)|Axios]] |language=en |archive-date=19 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230419151133/https://www.axios.com/2022/10/15/china-party-congress-2022-xi-jinping-third-term |url-status=live}}</ref> reaching a record $246 billion in 2025.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chen |first=Laurie |last2=Torode |first2=Greg |date=5 March 2025 |title=China maintains defence spending increase at 7.2% amid roiling geopolitical tensions |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-maintains-defence-spending-increase-72-2025-03-05/ |access-date=31 March 2025 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref> Though predating Xi, his administration has taken a more assertive stance towards maritime affairs, and has boosted CCP control over the maritime security forces.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Miura |first=Kacie |title=The Domestic Sources of China's Maritime Assertiveness Under Xi Jinping |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Miura_The%20Domestic%20Sources%20of%20China%27s%20Maritime%20Assertiveness%20Under%20Xi%20Jinping.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230519151838/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Miura_The%20Domestic%20Sources%20of%20China%27s%20Maritime%20Assertiveness%20Under%20Xi%20Jinping.pdf |archive-date=19 May 2023 |access-date=19 May 2023 |website=[[Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]]}}</ref> The [[People's Liberation Army Navy|PLA Navy]] has grown rapidly under Xi, with China adding more warships, submarines, support ships and major amphibious vessels than the entire number of ships under the United Kingdom navy between 2014 and 2018.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Lague |first1=David |last2=Kang Lim |first2=Benjamin |date=30 April 2019 |title=China's vast fleet is tipping the balance in the Pacific |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/ |access-date=19 April 2023 |archive-date=16 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220516230034/https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/ |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2017, China established the navy's first [[People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti|overseas base in Djibouti]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sun |first1=Degang |last2=Zoubir |first2=Yahia H. |date=2021-07-04 |title=Securing China's 'Latent Power': The Dragon's Anchorage in Djibouti |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary China]] |language=en |volume=30 |issue=130 |pages=677–692 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2020.1852734 |issn=1067-0564 |s2cid=229393446}}</ref> Xi has also undertaken an expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, with him calling China to "establish a strong system of strategic deterrence." The [[Federation of American Scientists]] (FAS) has estimated China's total amount of nuclear arsenals to be 410 in 2023, with the [[United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] estimating that China's arsenal could reach 1,000 by 2030.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Jacobs |first1=Andrew |last2=Perlez |first2=Jane |date=2017-02-25 |title=U.S. Wary of Its New Neighbor in Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html |access-date=2023-04-19 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=14 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170514232101/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Foreign policy===
{{See also|Foreign policy of Xi Jinping|Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy|List of international trips made by Xi Jinping}}[[File:President Biden met with Xi Jinping before the 2022 G20 Bali Summit.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping with US President [[Joe Biden]] at the [[2022 G20 Bali summit|17th G20 in Bali]], November 2022]] [[File:2017 G20 Hamburg summit leaders group photo.jpg|thumb|World leaders assemble for "family photo" at [[2017 G20 Hamburg summit|G20 summit]] in Hamburg.]]Xi has taken a harder line on security issues as well as foreign affairs, projecting a more [[Chinese nationalism|nationalistic]] and assertive China on the world stage.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Xi Jinping has nurtured an ugly form of Chinese nationalism |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2022/07/13/xi-jinping-has-nurtured-an-ugly-form-of-chinese-nationalism |access-date=11 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220811010009/https://www.economist.com/china/2022/07/13/xi-jinping-has-nurtured-an-ugly-form-of-chinese-nationalism |url-status=live}}</ref> His political program calls for a China more united and confident of its own value system and political structure.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1586307/xi-jinping-rules-out-western-style-political-reform-china?page=all|title=Xi Jinping rules out Western-style political reform for China|last1=Meng|first1=Angela|date=6 September 2014|work=[[South China Morning Post]]|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180818085415/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1586307/xi-jinping-rules-out-western-style-political-reform-china?page=all|archive-date=18 August 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> Foreign analysts and observers have frequently said that Xi's main foreign policy objective is to restore China's position on the global stage as a [[great power]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=26 February 2018 |title=Xi Jinping Thought Explained: A New Ideology for a New Era |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=31 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221031175407/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":12aa" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Barrass |first1=Gordon |last2=Inkster |first2=Nigel |date=2 January 2018 |title=Xi Jinping: The Strategist Behind the Dream |journal=Survival |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages=41–68 |doi=10.1080/00396338.2018.1427363 |s2cid=158856300 |issn=0039-6338}}</ref> Xi advocates "baseline thinking" in China's foreign policy: setting explicit red lines that other countries must not cross.<ref name="Zhao-2023">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |page=86 |doi=10.1515/9781503634152 |oclc=1331741429 |author-link=Suisheng Zhao}}</ref> In the Chinese perspective, these tough stances on baseline issues reduce strategic uncertainty, preventing other nations from misjudging China's positions or underestimating China's resolve in asserting what it perceives to be in its national interest.<ref name="Zhao-2023" /> Xi stated during the 20th CCP National Congress that he wanted to ensure China "leads the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence" by 2049.<ref>{{Cite news |date=26 October 2022 |title=Xi's Vow of World Dominance by 2049 Sends Chill Through Markets |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill-through-markets |access-date=14 March 2023 |archive-date=18 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221118215004/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-26/xi-s-vow-of-world-dominance-by-2049-sends-chill-through-markets |url-status=live}}</ref>

Xi has promoted [[major-country diplomacy]], stating that China is already a "big power" and breaking away from previous Chinese leaders who had a more precautious diplomacy.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hu |first=Weixing |date=2 January 2019 |title=Xi Jinping's 'Major Country Diplomacy': The Role of Leadership in Foreign Policy Transformation |journal=Journal of Contemporary China |volume=28 |issue=115 |pages=1–14 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2018.1497904 |s2cid=158345991 |issn=1067-0564}}</ref> He has adopted a hawkish foreign policy posture called "[[wolf warrior diplomacy]],"<ref>{{Cite web |last=Auto |first=Hermes |date=5 April 2021 |title=China's 'wolf warrior' diplomats back to howl at Xinjiang critics |url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-back-to-howl-at-xinjiang-critics |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=[[The Straits Times]] |language=en |archive-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220811202130/https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats-back-to-howl-at-xinjiang-critics |url-status=live}}</ref> while his foreign policy thoughts are collectively known as [[Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy]]."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Bishop |first=Bill |date=8 March 2019 |title=Xi's thought on diplomacy is "epoch-making" |url=https://www.axios.com/2019/03/08/xis-diplomacy-epoch-making |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=[[Axios (website)|Axios]] |language=en |archive-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220811202130/https://www.axios.com/2019/03/08/xis-diplomacy-epoch-making |url-status=live}}</ref> In October 2020, he said that "[[the East is rising and the West is declining]]", saying that the power of the Western world was in decline and their COVID-19 response was an example of this, and that China was entering a period of opportunity because of this.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=3 March 2021 |title='The East Is Rising': Xi Maps Out China's Post-Covid Ascent |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/asia/xi-china-congress.html |access-date=12 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812104749/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/world/asia/xi-china-congress.html |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi has frequently alluded to [[Community of Common Destiny|community with a shared future for mankind]], which Chinese diplomats have said doesn't imply an intention to change the international order,<ref>{{cite journal |last=Zhang |first=Denghua |date=May 2018 |title=The Concept of 'Community of Common Destiny' in China's Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implications |journal=Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=196–207 |doi=10.1002/app5.231 |doi-access=free|hdl=1885/255057 |hdl-access=free | issn=2050-2680 }}</ref> but which foreign observers say China wants a new order that puts it more at the centre.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Tobin |first=Liza |date=2018 |others=The University Of Texas At Austin, The University Of Texas At Austin |title=Xi's Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and Its Allies (November 2018) |url=https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/ |journal=Texas National Security Review |language=en |doi=10.26153/TSW/863 |doi-access=free |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813212508/https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/ |url-status=live}}</ref> Under Xi, China has, along with Russia, also focused on increasing relations with the [[Global North and Global South|Global South]] in order to blunt the effect of [[International sanctions during the Russian invasion of Ukraine|international sanctions]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Seib |first=Gerald F. |date=15 July 2022 |title=Putin and Xi's Bet on the Global South |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-and-xis-bet-on-the-global-south-11657897521 |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=21 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220821143216/https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-and-xis-bet-on-the-global-south-11657897521 |url-status=live}}</ref>

[[File:Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping having tea at the garden of Zhongnanhai (2024-05-16) 2.jpg|thumb|Xi having tea with [[Vladimir Putin]] in the garden of [[Zhongnanhai]] during Putin's visit to China in May 2024]]
Xi has put an emphasis on increasing China's "international discourse power" ({{lang-zh|s=国际话语权|labels=no}}) to create a more favorable global opinion of China in the world.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Jones |first=Hugo |date=24 November 2021 |title=China's Quest for Greater 'Discourse Power' |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/chinas-quest-for-greater-discourse-power/ |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |language=en-US |archive-date=29 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220829000458/https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/chinas-quest-for-greater-discourse-power/ |url-status=live}}</ref> In this pursuit, Xi has emphasised the need to "[[Telling China's stories well|tell China's stories well]]", meaning expanding China's external propaganda ({{lang-zh|s=外宣|labels=no}}) and communications.<ref>{{Cite web |date=16 April 2021 |title=Telling China's Story Well |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/telling-chinas-story-well/ |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US |archive-date=28 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220828224140/https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/telling-chinas-story-well/ |url-status=live}}</ref> Xi has expanded the focus and scope of the [[United front (China)|united front]], which aims to consolidate support for CCP in non-CCP elements both inside and outside China, and has accordingly expanded the United Front Work Department.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Kynge |first1=James |author-link=James Kynge |last2=Hornby |first2=Lucy |last3=Anderlini |first3=Jamil |date=26 October 2017 |title=Inside China's secret 'magic weapon' for worldwide influence |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221240/https://www.ft.com/content/fb2b3934-b004-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4 |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=21 August 2022}}</ref> Xi has unveiled the [[Global Development Initiative]] (GDI), the [[Global Security Initiative]] (GSI), and the [[Global Civilization Initiative|Global Civilisation Initiative]] (GCI), in 2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively, aiming to increase China's influence in the international order.<ref>{{Cite news |date=9 June 2022 |title=China's Global Development Initiative is not as innocent as it sounds |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2022/06/09/chinas-global-development-initiative-is-not-as-innocent-as-it-sounds |access-date=7 March 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306172739/https://www.economist.com/china/2022/06/09/chinas-global-development-initiative-is-not-as-innocent-as-it-sounds |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Yao |first1=Kevin |last2=Tian |first2=Yew Lun |date=22 April 2022 |title=China's Xi proposes 'global security initiative', without giving details |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-unilateral-sanctions-will-not-work-2022-04-21/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=5 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220805003810/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-says-unilateral-sanctions-will-not-work-2022-04-21/ |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite news |last=Cai |first=Jane |date=12 June 2023 |title=How China's Xi Jinping promotes mix of Marxism and traditional culture to further Communist Party and 'Chinese dream' |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3223805/how-chinas-xi-jinping-promotes-mix-marxism-and-traditional-culture-further-communist-party-and |access-date=12 June 2023 |archive-date=12 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230612111635/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3223805/how-chinas-xi-jinping-promotes-mix-marxism-and-traditional-culture-further-communist-party-and |url-status=live}}</ref>

During the Xi administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant.<ref name=":Tsang&Cheung">{{Cite book |last1=Tsang |first1=Steve |author-link=Steve Chang |title=The Political Thought of Xi Jinping |last2=Cheung |first2=Olivia |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=978-0-19-768936-3}}</ref>{{Rp|page=188}} Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers," and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change.<ref name=":Tsang&Cheung" />{{Rp|page=188}}

==== Africa ====
During Xi's administration, China has maintained cordial relationships with each Africa government except [[Eswatini]], which recognizes Taiwan but not the PRC.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last1=Shinn |first1=David H. |author-link=David H. Shinn |title=China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement |last2=Eisenman |first2=Joshua |date=2023 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21001-0 |location=New York}}</ref> Under Xi, China has cut back lending to Africa after fears that African countries couldn't repay their debts to China.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hille |first1=Kathrin |last2=Pilling |first2=David |date=11 January 2022 |title=China applies brakes to Africa lending |url=https://www.ft.com/content/64b4bcd5-032e-4be5-aa3b-e902f5b1345e |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211/https://www.ft.com/content/64b4bcd5-032e-4be5-aa3b-e902f5b1345e |archive-date=11 December 2022 |access-date=21 August 2022 |work=[[Financial Times]]}}</ref> Xi has also promised that China would write off debts of some African countries.<ref>{{Cite web |last=He |first=Laura |date=19 June 2020 |title=China is promising to write off some loans to Africa. It may just be a drop in the ocean |url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/19/economy/china-xi-jinping-africa-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200707050058/https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/19/economy/china-xi-jinping-africa-intl-hnk/index.html |archive-date=7 July 2020 |access-date=21 August 2022 |website=[[CNN]]}}</ref>

==== Asia ====
Under Xi, China initially took a more critical stance on North Korea due to [[North Korea and weapons of mass destruction|its nuclear tests]].<ref name="chengli232">{{cite news |last1=Li |first1=Cheng |date=26 September 2014 |title=A New Type of Major Power Relationship? |url=http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2014/09/26-new-type-power-relationship-li |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160708161643/http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2014/09/26-new-type-power-relationship-li |archive-date=8 July 2016 |access-date=7 September 2019 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]]}}</ref> However, starting in 2018, the relations started to improve due to [[Kim–Xi meetings|meetings between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.]]<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shi |first1=Jiangtao |last2=Chan |first2=Minnie |last3=Zheng |first3=Sarah |date=27 March 2018 |title=Kim's visit evidence China, North Korea remain allies, analysts say |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2139178/rumours-china-and-north-korea-were-no-longer-allies-put |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190725192608/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2139178/rumours-china-and-north-korea-were-no-longer-allies-put |archive-date=25 July 2019 |access-date=26 August 2019 |newspaper=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref> Xi has initially improved relationships with South Korea,<ref name="chengli23">{{cite news |last1=Li |first1=Cheng |date=26 September 2014 |title=A New Type of Major Power Relationship? |url=http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2014/09/26-new-type-power-relationship-li |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160708161643/http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2014/09/26-new-type-power-relationship-li |archive-date=8 July 2016 |access-date=7 September 2019 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]]}}</ref> and the two countries signed a [[China–South Korea Free Trade Agreement|free-trade agreement]] in December 2015.<ref name=":22">{{Cite news |last=Kim |first=Bo-eun |date=26 July 2022 |title=China, South Korea renew service sector talks, opening up a 'win-win for both economies' |url=https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3186792/china-south-korea-renew-service-sector-talks-opening-win-win |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314194644/https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3186792/china-south-korea-renew-service-sector-talks-opening-win-win |archive-date=14 March 2023 |access-date=14 March 2023 |work=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref> Starting in 2017, China's relationship with South Korea soured over the [[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense|Terminal High Altitude Area Defence]] (THAAD), a missile defense system, purchase of the latter, but improved after South Korea halted purchase of the THAAD.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Park |first=Chan-kyong |date=26 January 2021 |title=Xi charms Moon as China and US compete for an ally in South Korea |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3119363/xi-charms-moon-china-and-us-compete-ally-south-korea |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210321171514/https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3119363/xi-charms-moon-china-and-us-compete-ally-south-korea |archive-date=21 March 2021 |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref> China–Japan relations have initially soured under Xi's administration; the most thorny issue between the two countries remains the dispute over the [[Senkaku islands]], which China calls Diaoyu.<ref name="osawa22">{{cite news |last1=Osawa |first1=Jun |date=17 December 2013 |title=China's ADIZ over the East China Sea: A "Great Wall in the Sky"? |url=http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160714181744/http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identification-zone-osawa |archive-date=14 July 2016 |access-date=7 September 2019 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]]}}</ref> However, the relations later started to improve, with Xi being invited to visit in 2020,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Albert |first=Eleanor |date=16 March 2019 |title=China and Japan's Rapprochement Continues – For Now |url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/china-and-japans-rapprochement-continues-for-now/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705150016/https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/china-and-japans-rapprochement-continues-for-now/ |archive-date=5 July 2022 |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=The Diplomat |language=en-US}}</ref> though the trip was later delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Kelly |first=Tim |date=28 February 2021 |title=China's Xi will not make a state visit to Japan this year -Sankei |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-japan-china-xi-idUKKCN2AS0SU |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812112359/https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-japan-china-xi-idUKKCN2AS0SU |archive-date=12 August 2022 |access-date=12 August 2022 |work=[[Reuters]] |language=en}}</ref>

Since Xi came to power, China has been rapidly building and militarizing islands in the South China Sea, a decision ''[[Study Times]]'' of the [[Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party]] said was personally taken by Xi.<ref name="Liu-2009">{{cite web |date=May 2009 |title=Journal of Current Chinese Affairs |url=http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=%2Fcontent%2Fias%2Farchiv%2Fcds%2Fcds_0905.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120217211144/http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=%2Fcontent%2Fias%2Farchiv%2Fcds%2Fcds_0905.pdf |archive-date=17 February 2012 |access-date=20 October 2010 |website=giga-hamburg.de}}</ref> Relations between China and India had ups and downs under Xi, later deteriorating due to various factors. The two countries had a [[2013 Depsang standoff|standoff in Depsang]] in 2013,<ref>{{Cite news |date=6 May 2013 |title=India says China agrees retreat to de facto border in faceoff deal |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-china-idUSBRE9440B220130506 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924181040/http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/06/us-india-china-idUSBRE9440B220130506 |archive-date=24 September 2015 |access-date=29 August 2022 |work=[[Reuters]] |language=en}}</ref> and [[2017 China–India border standoff|again had a standoff]] over a Chinese construction of a road in [[Doklam]], a territory both claimed by [[Bhutan]], India's ally, and China, in 2017.<ref>{{Cite news |date=3 July 2017 |title=China says India violates 1890 agreement in border stand-off |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-idUSKBN19O109 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170815072409/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-india-idUSKBN19O109 |archive-date=15 August 2017 |access-date=29 August 2022 |work=[[Reuters]] |language=en}}</ref> The most serious crisis in the relationship came when the two countries had a [[2020–2021 China–India skirmishes|deadly clash in 2020]] at the [[Line of Actual Control]], leaving some soldiers dead.<ref>{{cite news |last=Janjua |first=Haroon |date=10 May 2020 |title=Chinese and Indian troops injured in border brawl |url=https://www.thetimes.com/world/asia/article/chinese-and-indian-troops-injured-in-border-brawl-3gsfwp37r |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200512042352/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinese-and-indian-troops-injured-in-border-brawl-3gsfwp37r |archive-date=12 May 2020 |access-date=12 May 2020 |newspaper=[[The Times]] |issn=0140-0460}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=11 May 2020 |title=Indian and Chinese soldiers injured in cross-border fistfight, says Delhi |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/indian-and-chinese-soldiers-injured-in-cross-border-fistfight-says-delhi |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200512035152/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/indian-and-chinese-soldiers-injured-in-cross-border-fistfight-says-delhi |archive-date=12 May 2020 |access-date=12 May 2020 |work=[[The Guardian]] |issn=0261-3077 |agency=Agence France-Presse}}</ref> While China has historically been wary of getting closer to the [[Middle East]] countries, Xi has changed this approach, getting closer to both Iran and Saudi Arabia.<ref name="Vohra-2022">{{Cite web |last=Vohra |first=Anchal |date=1 February 2022 |title=Xi Jinping Has Transformed China's Middle East Policy |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/xi-jinping-has-transformed-chinas-middle-east-policy/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220908141215/https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/01/xi-jinping-has-transformed-chinas-middle-east-policy/ |archive-date=8 September 2022 |access-date=8 September 2022 |website=[[Foreign Policy]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

==== Europe ====
China's efforts under Xi has been for the European Union (EU) to stay in a neutral position in their contest with the U.S.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Bradsher |first2=Keith |date=15 April 2022 |title=Faced With a Changed Europe, China Sticks to an Old Script |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/world/asia/china-europe-russia-ukraine.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813163209/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/15/world/asia/china-europe-russia-ukraine.html |archive-date=13 August 2022 |access-date=13 August 2022 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> China and the EU announced the [[Comprehensive Agreement on Investment]] (CAI) in 2020, although the deal was later frozen due to mutual sanctions over Xinjiang.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Miller |first=Michael E. |title=China says Macron and Merkel support reviving E.U.-China investment pact. Not so fast. |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/06/china-europe-investment-uyghurs/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210926205033/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/06/china-europe-investment-uyghurs/ |archive-date=26 September 2021 |access-date=13 August 2022 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> Xi has cultivated [[China–Russia relations|stronger relations with Russia]], particularly in the wake of the [[2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine|Ukraine crisis]] of 2014.<ref name="russia222">{{cite news |last1=Baker |first1=Peter |date=8 November 2014 |title=As Russia Draws Closer to China, U.S. Faces a New Challenge |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/world/vladimir-putin-xi-jinping-form-closer-ties.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224309/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/world/vladimir-putin-xi-jinping-form-closer-ties.html |archive-date=28 August 2019 |access-date=7 September 2019 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> During the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]], Xi expressed opposition to [[International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War|sanctions against Russia]]<ref>{{cite news |last=Ng |first=Teddy |date=2 April 2022 |title=Chinese President Xi Jinping warns it could take decades to repair economic damage caused by Ukraine crisis |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3172860/chinese-president-xi-jinping-warns-it-could-take-decades |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220515081918/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3172860/chinese-president-xi-jinping-warns-it-could-take-decades |archive-date=15 May 2022 |access-date=12 August 2022 |work=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref> and asserted China's [[China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine|support for Russia]] on issues of sovereignty and security, but also said China is committed to respecting "the territorial integrity of all countries",<ref>{{Cite web |date=21 April 2022 |title=China's Xi Says International Disputes Should be Resolved Via Dialogue, Not Sanctions |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-xi-says-international-disputes-should-be-resolved-via-dialogue-not-sanctions/6538799.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220724021113/https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-xi-says-international-disputes-should-be-resolved-via-dialogue-not-sanctions/6538799.html |archive-date=24 July 2022 |access-date=12 August 2022 |website=[[Voice of America]] |language=en}}</ref> while China has cast itself as a neutral party.<ref name="Xi-Putin">{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Myers |first2=Steven Lee |date=7 March 2022 |title='No Wavering': After Turning to Putin, Xi Faces Hard Wartime Choices for China |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/world/asia/putin-ukraine-china-xi.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220310022327/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/world/asia/putin-ukraine-china-xi.html |archive-date=10 March 2022 |access-date=5 April 2022 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

==== United States ====
Xi has called China–United States relations in the contemporary world a "new type of great-power relations", a phrase the [[Presidency of Barack Obama|Obama administration]] had been reluctant to embrace.<ref name="nikkei2">{{cite news |last1=Hiroyuki |first1=Akita |date=22 July 2014 |title=A new kind of 'great power relationship'? No thanks, Obama subtly tells China |url=http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/A-new-kind-of-great-power-relationship-No-thanks-Obama-subtly-tells-China |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141111181321/http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/A-new-kind-of-great-power-relationship-No-thanks-Obama-subtly-tells-China |archive-date=2014-11-11 |access-date=11 November 2014 |newspaper=Nikkei Asian Review}}</ref> Xi has indirectly spoken out critically on the U.S. "strategic pivot" to Asia.<ref name="blan2">{{cite news |last=Blanchard |first=Ben |date=3 July 2014 |title=With one eye on Washington, China plots its own Asia 'pivot' |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-idUSKBN0F82GX20140703 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151006010842/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/03/us-china-diplomacy-idUSKBN0F82GX20140703 |archive-date=6 October 2015 |access-date=7 September 2019 |newspaper=Reuters}}</ref> Relations with the U.S. soured after Donald Trump became president in 2017.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Brown |first=Adrian |date=12 May 2019 |title=China-US trade war: Sino-American ties being torn down brick by brick |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2019/05/china-trade-war-sino-american-ties-torn-brick-brick-190512132227395.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190904140940/https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/asia/2019/05/china-trade-war-sino-american-ties-torn-brick-brick-190512132227395.html |archive-date=4 September 2019 |access-date=19 October 2019 |publisher=[[Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]]}}</ref> Since 2018, U.S. and China have been engaged in an escalating trade war.<ref>{{cite news |last=Swanson |first=Ana |date=5 July 2018 |title=Trump's Trade War With China Is Officially Underway |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180712201844/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html |archive-date=12 July 2018 |access-date=26 May 2019 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> In 2020, the relations further deteriorated due to the COVID-19 pandemic.<ref>{{Cite news |date=26 March 2020 |title=Relations between China and America are infected with coronavirus |url=https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/03/26/relations-between-china-and-america-are-infected-with-coronavirus |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200330025047/https://www.economist.com/united-states/2020/03/26/relations-between-china-and-america-are-infected-with-coronavirus |archive-date=30 March 2020 |access-date=14 August 2022 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>

===National security===
Xi has devoted a large amount of work towards national security, calling for a "[[Holistic national security|holistic national security architecture]]" that encompasses "all aspects of the work of the party and the country."<ref>{{Cite news |date=30 December 2020 |title=Xi Sees Threats to China's Security Everywhere Heading Into 2021 |language=en |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-30/xi-sees-threats-to-china-s-security-everywhere-heading-into-2021 |access-date=21 August 2022 |archive-date=6 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210706110907/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-30/xi-sees-threats-to-china-s-security-everywhere-heading-into-2021 |url-status=live }}</ref> He introduced the holistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security."<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Shinn |first1=David H. |title=China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement |last2=Eisenman |first2=Joshua |date=2023 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21001-0 |location=New York |author-link=David H. Shinn}}</ref>{{Rp|page=3}} During a private talk with U.S. president Obama and vice president Biden, he said that China had been a target of "[[colour revolution]]s," foreshadowing his focus on national security.<ref name="Buckley-2022">{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Myers |first2=Steven Lee |date=6 August 2022 |title=In Turbulent Times, Xi Builds a Security Fortress for China, and Himself |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/06/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-security.html |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=7 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220807000022/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/06/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-security.html/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Since its creation by Xi, the National Security Commission has established local security committees, focusing on dissent.<ref name="Buckley-2022" /> In the name of national security, Xi's government has passed numerous laws including a [[Counterespionage Law of the People's Republic of China|counterespionage law]] in 2014,<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 November 2014 |title=China passes counter-espionage law |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-lawmaking-spy-idUSKBN0IL2N520141101 |access-date=21 August 2022 |archive-date=3 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200703084848/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-lawmaking-spy-idUSKBN0IL2N520141101 |url-status=live }}</ref> [[National Security Law of the People's Republic of China|national security]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Chun Han |date=1 July 2015 |title=China Adopts Sweeping National-Security Law |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-adopts-sweeping-national-security-law-1435757589 |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813073827/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-adopts-sweeping-national-security-law-1435757589 |url-status=live }}</ref> and a [[Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China|counterterrorism law]] in 2015,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Blanchard |first=Ben |date=28 December 2015 |title=China passes controversial counter-terrorism law |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKBN0UA07220151228 |access-date=21 August 2022 |archive-date=24 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200424234111/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKBN0UA07220151228 |url-status=live }}</ref> a [[Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China|cybersecurity law]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wagner |first=Jack |date=1 June 2017 |title=China's Cybersecurity Law: What You Need to Know |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-need-to-know/ |access-date=21 August 2022 |archive-date=12 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181212184441/https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/chinas-cybersecurity-law-what-you-need-to-know/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and a law restricting foreign [[Non-governmental organization|NGOs]] in 2016,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Edward |date=28 April 2015 |title=Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 Foreign Organizations |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/asia/china-foreign-ngo-law.html |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=4 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200604091747/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/asia/china-foreign-ngo-law.html |url-status=live }}</ref> a [[National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China|national intelligence law]] in 2017,<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 June 2017 |title=China passes tough new intelligence law |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-lawmaking-idUSKBN19I1FW |access-date=21 August 2022 |archive-date=8 July 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170708131558/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-lawmaking-idUSKBN19I1FW |url-status=live }}</ref> and a data security law in 2021.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Haldane |first=Matt |date=1 September 2021 |title=What China's new data laws are and their impact on Big Tech |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3147040/what-chinas-new-data-laws-are-and-their-impact-big-tech |access-date=21 August 2022 |archive-date=21 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220821205207/https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3147040/what-chinas-new-data-laws-are-and-their-impact-big-tech |url-status=live }}</ref> Under Xi, [[Mass surveillance in China|China's mass surveillance network]] has dramatically grown, with comprehensive profiles being built for each citizen.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Mozur |first1=Paul |last2=Xiao |first2=Muyi |last3=Liu |first3=John |date=26 June 2022 |title='An Invisible Cage': How China Is Policing the Future |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/25/technology/china-surveillance-police.html |access-date=21 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=25 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220725021212/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/25/technology/china-surveillance-police.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Hong Kong===
{{See also|Conservatism in Hong Kong#National security law and autocratisation}}
[[File:2019-10-01 Demonstration Hong Kong 11.jpg|thumb|[[2019–20 Hong Kong protests|Hong Kong protesters]] throw eggs at Xi Jinping's portrait on [[National Day of the People's Republic of China|National Day]].]]During his leadership, Xi has supported and pursued a greater political and economic integration of [[Hong Kong]] to mainland China, including through projects such as the [[Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge]].<ref name="Bland-2018">{{Cite news |last=Bland |first=Ben |date=2 September 2018 |title=Greater Bay Area: Xi Jinping's other grand plan |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/fe5976d8-ab81-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221214/https://www.ft.com/content/fe5976d8-ab81-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> He has pushed for the [[Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area|Greater Bay Area]] project, which aims to integrate Hong Kong, Macau, and nine other cities in Guangdong.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |date=2024-03-03 |title=Young Hong Kongers Who Defied Xi Are Now Partying in China |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-03-03/young-hong-kongers-who-defied-xi-are-now-partying-in-china |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240318022916/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-03-03/young-hong-kongers-who-defied-xi-are-now-partying-in-china |archive-date=2024-03-18 |website=[[Bloomberg L.P.|Bloomberg]]}}</ref><ref name="Bland-2018" /> Xi's integration efforts have led to decreased freedoms and the weakening of Hong Kong's distinct identity from mainland China.<ref name=":7" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Yu |first=Verna |date=5 November 2019 |title=China signals desire to bring Hong Kong under tighter control |work=[[The Guardian]] |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/05/chinas-xi-jinping-expresses-high-degree-of-trust-in-hong-kongs-carrie-lam |access-date=11 January 2020 |archive-date=12 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112000411/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/05/chinas-xi-jinping-expresses-high-degree-of-trust-in-hong-kongs-carrie-lam |url-status=live }}</ref> Many of the views held by the central government and eventually implemented in Hong Kong were outlined in a white paper published by the State Council in 2014 named ''[[The Practice of the 'One Country, Two Systems' Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region]]'', which outlined that the China's central government has "comprehensive jurisdiction" over Hong Kong.<ref name="Buckley-2021b">{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Wang |first2=Vivian |last3=Ramzy |first3=Austin |date=28 June 2021 |title=Crossing the Red Line: Behind China's Takeover of Hong Kong |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/china-hong-kong-security-law.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813084412/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/china-hong-kong-security-law.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Under Xi, the Chinese government also declared the [[Sino-British Joint Declaration]] to be legally void.<ref name="Buckley-2021b" />

In August 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) made a [[2014 NPCSC Decision on Hong Kong|decision]] allowing universal suffrage for the [[2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive election|2017 election]] of the [[Chief Executive of Hong Kong|chief executive of Hong Kong]], also requiring the candidates to "love the country, and love Hong Kong," as well as other measures that ensured the Chinese leadership would be the ultimate decision-maker on the selection, leading to [[2014 Hong Kong protests|protests]],<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |last2=Forsythe |first2=Michael |date=2014-08-31 |title=China Restricts Voting Reforms for Hong Kong |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/world/asia/hong-kong-elections.html |access-date=2023-03-18 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=27 February 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150227110910/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/world/asia/hong-kong-elections.html?_r=0 |url-status=live }}</ref> and the eventual rejection of the reform bill in the Legislative Council due to a walk-out by the [[Pro-Beijing camp (Hong Kong)|pro-Beijing camp]] to delay to vote.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chan |first=Wilfred |date=19 June 2015 |title=Hong Kong legislators reject China-backed reform bill |work=[[CNN]] |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/18/asia/hong-kong-reform-vote/index.html |access-date=19 March 2023 |archive-date=19 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230319001757/https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/18/asia/hong-kong-reform-vote/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In the 2017 chief executive election, [[Carrie Lam]] was victorious, reportedly with the endorsement of the CCP Politburo.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Cheng |first=Kris |date=7 February 2017 |title=Carrie Lam is the only leadership contender Beijing supports, state leader Zhang Dejiang reportedly says |work=[[Hong Kong Free Press]] |url=https://hongkongfp.com/2017/02/07/carrie-lam-is-the-only-leadership-contender-beijing-supports-state-leader-zhang-dejiang-reportedly-says/ |access-date=19 March 2023 |archive-date=11 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240711081540/https://hongkongfp.com/2017/02/07/carrie-lam-is-the-only-leadership-contender-beijing-supports-state-leader-zhang-dejiang-reportedly-says/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Xi has supported the [[Government of Hong Kong|Hong Kong Government]] and Carrie Lam against the protesters in the [[2019–2020 Hong Kong protests]], which broke out after a [[2019 Hong Kong extradition bill|proposed bill]] that would allow extraditions to China.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sin |first1=Noah |last2=Kwok |first2=Donny |date=16 December 2019 |title=China's Xi vows support for Hong Kong leader during 'most difficult' time |publisher=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests/chinas-xi-vows-support-for-hong-kong-leader-during-most-difficult-time-idUSKBN1YK025 |access-date=11 January 2020 |archive-date=12 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201112040524/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests/chinas-xi-vows-support-for-hong-kong-leader-during-most-difficult-time-idUSKBN1YK025 |url-status=live }}</ref> He has defended the [[Hong Kong Police Force|Hong Kong police's]] use of force, saying that "We sternly support the Hong Kong police to take forceful actions in enforcing the law, and the Hong Kong judiciary to punish in accordance with the law those who have committed violent crimes."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zhou |first=Laura |date=14 November 2019 |title=Xi Jinping again backs Hong Kong police use of force in stopping unrest |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3037811/xi-jinping-again-backs-hong-kong-police-use-force-stopping |access-date=11 January 2020 |archive-date=22 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201122130444/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3037811/xi-jinping-again-backs-hong-kong-police-use-force-stopping |url-status=live }}</ref> While visiting [[Macau]] on 20 December 2019 as part of the 20th anniversary of its return to China, Xi warned of foreign forces interfering in Hong Kong and Macau,<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 December 2019 |title=China's Xi warns of 'foreign forces' at Macao anniversary |publisher=[[Deutsche Welle]] |url=https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-xi-warns-of-foreign-forces-at-macao-anniversary/a-51747054 |access-date=11 January 2020 |archive-date=11 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200111192031/https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-xi-warns-of-foreign-forces-at-macao-anniversary/a-51747054 |url-status=live }}</ref> while also hinting that Macau could be a model for Hong Kong to follow.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Siu |first1=Phila |last2=Cheung |first2=Gary |date=19 December 2019 |title=Xi Jinping seen as indirectly lecturing Hong Kong as he tells Macau residents to make 'positive voices' heard and resolve problems with rationality |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3042846/macau-handover-anniversary-xi-jinping-tells-residents-make |access-date=11 January 2020 |archive-date=11 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200111192029/https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3042846/macau-handover-anniversary-xi-jinping-tells-residents-make |url-status=live }}</ref>[[File:庆祝香港回归祖国25周年大会暨香港特别行政区第六届政府就职典礼 20220701-4.png|thumb|Xi swearing in John Lee as chief executive during the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China]]

In 2020, the NPCSC passed a [[2020 Hong Kong national security law|national security law]] in Hong Kong that dramatically expanded government clampdown over the opposition in the city; amongst the measures were the dramatic restriction on political opposition and the creation of a [[Office for Safeguarding National Security of the CPG in the HKSAR|central government office]] outside Hong Kong jurisdiction to oversee the enforcement of the law.<ref name="Buckley-2021b" /> This was seen as the culmination of a long-term project under Xi to further closely integrate Hong Kong with the mainland.<ref name="Buckley-2021b" /> Xi visited Hong Kong as Chinese leader in 2017 and 2022, in the 20th and 25th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong respectively.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Yip |first1=Martin |last2=Fraser |first2=Simon |date=30 June 2022 |title=China's President Xi arrives in Hong Kong for handover anniversary |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-61991980 |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813114744/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-61991980 |url-status=live }}</ref> In [[2022 Xi Jinping visit to Hong Kong|his 2022 visit]], he swore in [[John Lee Ka-chiu|John Lee]] as chief executive, a former police officer that was backed by the Chinese government to expand control over the city.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ioanes |first=Ellen |date=2 July 2022 |title=Xi Jinping asserts his power on Hong Kong's handover anniversary |work=[[Vox (website)|Vox]] |url=https://www.vox.com/2022/7/2/23192550/xi-hong-kong-john-lee-china |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813114742/https://www.vox.com/2022/7/2/23192550/xi-hong-kong-john-lee-china |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Chan |first1=Ho-him |last2=Riordan |first2=Primrose |date=8 May 2022 |title=Beijing-backed hardliner John Lee chosen as Hong Kong's next leader |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/a6466afa-0981-4a82-9787-8c630651d44f |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221231/https://www.ft.com/content/a6466afa-0981-4a82-9787-8c630651d44f |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=13 August 2022}}</ref>

=== Taiwan ===
{{Further|Cross-Strait relations|Ma–Xi meeting}}
[[File:2015 Ma–Xi Meeting 08.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping met with then-Taiwanese president [[Ma Ying-jeou]] in November 2015 in their capacity as the leader of mainland China and Taiwan respectively.]]
In November 2015, Xi met with Taiwanese president [[Ma Ying-jeou]], which marked the first time the political leaders of both sides of the [[Taiwan Strait]] have met since the end of the [[Chinese Civil War]] in mainland China in 1950.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Perlez |first1=Jane |last2=Ramzy |first2=Austin |date=4 November 2015 |title=China, Taiwan and a Meeting After 66 Years |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/leaders-of-china-and-taiwan-to-meet-for-first-time-since-1949.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170903072421/https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/leaders-of-china-and-taiwan-to-meet-for-first-time-since-1949.html |archive-date=3 September 2017 |access-date=1 November 2017 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> Xi said that China and Taiwan are "[[Zhonghua minzu|one family]]" that cannot be pulled apart.<ref>{{Cite news |date=7 November 2015 |title=One-minute handshake marks historic meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou |url=https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/one-minute-handshake-marks-historic-meeting-between-xi-jinping-and-ma-ying-jeou |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190905182113/https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/one-minute-handshake-marks-historic-meeting-between-xi-jinping-and-ma-ying-jeou |archive-date=5 September 2019 |access-date=5 September 2019 |work=[[The Straits Times]]}}</ref> However, the relations started deteriorating after [[Tsai Ing-wen]] of the [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP) won the [[2016 Taiwanese presidential election|presidential elections in 2016]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Huang |first=Kristin |date=15 June 2021 |title=Timeline: Taiwan's relations with mainland China under Tsai Ing-wen |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3137231/timeline-cross-strait-relations-under-taiwans-president-tsai |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=23 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240923015416/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3137231/timeline-cross-strait-relations-under-taiwans-president-tsai |url-status=live }}</ref>

In the 19th Party Congress held in 2017, Xi reaffirmed six of the nine principles that had been affirmed continuously since the 16th Party Congress in 2002, with the notable exception of "Placing hopes on the [[People of Taiwan|Taiwan people]] as a force to help bring about [[Chinese unification|unification]]".<ref name="Brookings R.C. Bush2">{{Cite news |last=Bush |first=Richard C. |date=19 October 2017 |title=What Xi Jinping said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress |url=https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/19/what-xi-jinping-said-about-taiwan-at-the-19th-party-congress/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180708013012/https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/19/what-xi-jinping-said-about-taiwan-at-the-19th-party-congress/ |archive-date=8 July 2018 |access-date=8 July 2018 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]]}}</ref> According to the [[Brookings Institution]], Xi used stronger language on potential [[Taiwan independence movement|Taiwan independence]] than his predecessors towards previous DPP governments in Taiwan. Xi said that "we will never allow any person, any organisation, or any political party to split any part of the Chinese territory from China at any time at any form."<ref name="Brookings R.C. Bush2" />

In January 2019, Xi Jinping called on Taiwan to reject its formal independence from China, saying: "We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means." Those options, he said, could be used against "external interference". Xi also said that they "are willing to create broad space for peaceful reunification, but will leave no room for any form of separatist activities."<ref>{{cite news |last=Kuo |first=Lily |date=2 January 2019 |title='All necessary means': Xi Jinping reserves right to use force against Taiwan |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190822114526/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan |archive-date=22 August 2019 |access-date=7 September 2019 |work=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Griffiths |first=James |date=2 January 2019 |title=Xi warns Taiwan independence is 'a dead end' |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/02/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-tsai-intl/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191003215248/https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/02/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-tsai-intl/ |archive-date=3 October 2019 |access-date=7 September 2019 |work=[[CNN]] |publisher=}}</ref> President Tsai responded to the speech by saying Taiwan would not accept a [[one country, two systems]] arrangement with the mainland, while stressing the need for all cross-strait negotiations to be on a government-to-government basis.<ref>{{cite news |last=Lee |first=Yimou |date=2 January 2019 |title=Taiwan president defiant after China calls for reunification |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-president/taiwan-president-defiant-after-china-calls-for-reunification-idUSKCN1OW0FN |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190929044514/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-president/taiwan-president-defiant-after-china-calls-for-reunification-idUSKCN1OW0FN |archive-date=29 September 2019 |access-date=7 September 2019 |publisher=[[Reuters]]}}</ref>

===Human rights===
{{main|Human rights in China|Antireligious campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party}}

According to the [[Human Rights Watch]], Xi has "started a broad and sustained offensive on human rights" since he became leader in 2012.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/china-and-tibet|title=World Report 2018: Rights Trends in China|chapter=China: Events of 2017 |date=9 January 2018|publisher=[[Human Rights Watch]]|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828203028/https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/china-and-tibet|archive-date=28 August 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref> The HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst level since the Tiananmen Square massacre."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-repression-freedom-police-censorship-tiananmen-square-human-rights-watch-a8732501.html|title=Repression in China at worst level since Tiananmen Square, HRW warns|last=Withnall|first=Adam|date=17 January 2019|newspaper=[[The Independent]]|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190524133120/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-repression-freedom-police-censorship-tiananmen-square-human-rights-watch-a8732501.html|archive-date=24 May 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref> Since taking power, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds being detained.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/b4de464a-7242-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221247/https://www.ft.com/content/b4de464a-7242-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=China widens crackdown against grassroot activists|date=9 May 2019|work=[[Financial Times]]|access-date=11 January 2020}}</ref> He presided over the [[709 crackdown]] on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-39974953|title=Wang Quanzhang: The lawyer who simply vanished|last=Sudworth|first=John|date=22 May 2017|publisher=[[BBC News]]|access-date=11 January 2020|archive-date=7 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211107070034/https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-39974953|url-status=live}}</ref> His term has seen the arrest and imprisonment of activists such as [[Xu Zhiyong]], as well as numerous others who identified with the [[New Citizens' Movement]]. Prominent legal activist [[Pu Zhiqiang]] of the [[Weiquan movement]] was also arrested and detained.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/419842/chinese-dream-turns-sour-for-activists-under-xi-jinping|title=Chinese dream turns sour for activists under Xi Jinping|date=10 July 2014|newspaper=[[Bangkok Post]]|access-date=17 July 2014|archive-date=13 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200813235059/https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/419842/chinese-dream-turns-sour-for-activists-under-xi-jinping|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2017, the local government of the [[Jiangxi|Jiangxi province]] told [[Christianity in China|Christians]] to replace their pictures of [[Jesus]] with Xi Jinping as part of a general campaign on unofficial churches in the country.<ref name="scmpJesus">{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2119699/praise-xi-jinping-not-jesus-escape-poverty-christian|title=Replace pictures of Jesus with Xi to escape poverty, Chinese villagers urged|last=Gan|first=Nectar|date=14 November 2017|newspaper=[[South China Morning Post]]|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190717174448/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2119699/praise-xi-jinping-not-jesus-escape-poverty-christian|archive-date=17 July 2019|access-date=26 July 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/14/jesus-wont-save-you-president-xi-jinping-will-chinese-christians-told/|title=Jesus won't save you – President Xi Jinping will, Chinese Christians told|last=Denyer|first=Simon|date=14 November 2017|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531100111/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/14/jesus-wont-save-you-president-xi-jinping-will-chinese-christians-told/|archive-date=31 May 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/28/we-are-scared-but-we-have-jesus-china-and-its-war-on-christianity|title='We are scared, but we have Jesus': China and its war on Christianity|last=Haas|first=Benjamin|date=28 September 2018|work=[[The Guardian]]|access-date=7 September 2019|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190823155226/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/28/we-are-scared-but-we-have-jesus-china-and-its-war-on-christianity|archive-date=23 August 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> According to local social media, officials "transformed them from believing in religion to believing in the party."<ref name="scmpJesus" /> According to activists, "Xi is waging the most severe systematic [[Christianity in China#Restrictions and international interest|suppression of Christianity]] in the country since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982," and according to pastors and a group that monitors religion in China, has involved "destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and ordering followers to sign papers renouncing their faith."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.apnews.com/c09b2ee4b71540c8a7fd6178820c5970|title=Group: Officials destroying crosses, burning bibles in China|last=Bodeen|first=Christopher|date=10 September 2018|publisher=[[Associated Press]]|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191008144601/https://www.apnews.com/c09b2ee4b71540c8a7fd6178820c5970|archive-date=8 October 2019}}</ref>

Under Xi, the CCP has embraced assimilationist policies towards ethnic minorities, scaling back [[Affirmative action in China|affirmative action]] in the country by 2019,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lau |first=Mimi |date=5 December 2019 |title=From Xinjiang to Ningxia, China's ethnic groups face end to affirmative action in education, taxes, policing |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3040577/chinas-ethnic-groups-face-end-affirmative-action-education |access-date=14 March 2023 |archive-date=23 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230923224656/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3040577/chinas-ethnic-groups-face-end-affirmative-action-education |url-status=live }}</ref> and scrapping a wording in October 2021 that guaranteed the rights of minority children to be educated in their native language, replacing it with one that emphasized teaching the national language.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zhai |first=Keith |date=8 October 2021 |title=China's Communist Party Formally Embraces Assimilationist Approach to Ethnic Minorities |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-communist-party-formally-embraces-assimilationist-approach-to-ethnic-minorities-11633702544 |access-date=14 March 2023}}</ref> In 2020, [[Chen Xiaojiang]] was appointed as head of the [[National Ethnic Affairs Commission]], the first Han Chinese head of the body since 1954.<ref>{{cite news |author1=Linda, Lew |date=19 December 2020 |title=China puts Han official in charge of ethnic minority affairs as Beijing steps up push for integration |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3114638/china-puts-han-official-charge-ethnic-minority-affairs-beijing |access-date=9 October 2021 |archive-date=21 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201221205105/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3114638/china-puts-han-official-charge-ethnic-minority-affairs-beijing |url-status=live }}</ref> On 24 June 2022, [[Pan Yue (politician)|Pan Yue]], another Han Chinese, became the head of the commission, with him reportedly holding assimilationist policies toward ethnic minorities.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Aaron |first=Glasserman |date=2 March 2023 |title=China's Head of Ethnic Affairs Is Keen to End Minority Culture |work=[[Foreign Policy]] |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/02/china-minorities-uyghur-racism/ |access-date=12 March 2023 |archive-date=12 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230312191637/https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/02/china-minorities-uyghur-racism/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Xi outlined his official views relations between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities by saying "[n]either [[Han chauvinism]] nor [[local ethnic chauvinism]] is conducive to the development of a community for the Chinese nation."<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 August 2021 |title=Xi Focus: Xi stresses high-quality development of Party's work on ethnic affairs |work=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |url=http://www.news.cn/english/2021-08/28/c_1310154568.htm |access-date=19 March 2023 |archive-date=11 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240711081527/http://www.news.cn/english/2021-08/28/c_1310154568.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Xinjiang ====
{{main|Persecution of Uyghurs in China}}
[[File:Xi Jinping Entrance Hall at the XUAR Museum.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping's picture at the entrance hall of the [[Xinjiang Museum]] in [[Ürümqi]], August 2018]]
Following several terrorist attacks in [[Xinjiang]] in 2013 and 2014, the CCP leaders held a secret meeting to find a solution to the attacks,<ref name=":5">{{Cite magazine |last=Khatchadourian |first=Raffi |date=5 April 2021 |title=Surviving the Crackdown in Xinjiang |magazine=[[The New Yorker]] |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang |access-date=19 March 2023 |archive-date=10 April 2021 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20210410193233/https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang |url-status=live }}</ref> leading to Xi to launch the [[Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism]] in 2014, which involved mass detention, and surveillance of ethnic [[Uyghurs]] there.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221202/https://www.ft.com/content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77|archive-date=11 December 2022|url-access=subscription|url-status=live|title=Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China's war on Uighur culture|last=Shepherd|first=Christian|date=12 September 2019|work=[[Financial Times]]|access-date=19 January 2020}}</ref><ref name="Ramzy-2019" /> The campaign included the detainment of 1.8 million people in [[Xinjiang internment camps|internment camps]], mostly Uyghurs but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, by 2020,<ref name=":5" /> and a birth suppression campaign that led to a large drop in the Uyghur birth rate by 2019.<ref>{{cite news |date=28 June 2020 |title=China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization |publisher=[[Associated Press]] |url=https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c |url-status=live |access-date=18 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201216200613/https://apnews.com/article/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c |archive-date=16 December 2020}}</ref> Human rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as "concentration camps," where Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's majority [[Han Chinese|ethnic Han]] society.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/11/more-than-20-ambassadors-condemn-chinas-treatment-of-uighurs-in-xinjiang|title=More than 20 ambassadors condemn China's treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang|date=11 July 2019|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190711031342/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/11/more-than-20-ambassadors-condemn-chinas-treatment-of-uighurs-in-xinjiang|archive-date=11 July 2019|access-date=11 July 2019}}</ref> This program has been called a genocide by western observers, while [[UN Human Rights Office report on Xinjiang|a report]] by the [[Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights|UN Human Rights Office]] said they may amount to crimes against humanity.<ref>{{cite news |date=10 December 2021 |title=China's Xi responsible for Uyghur 'genocide', unofficial tribunal says |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-responsible-uyghur-genocide-unofficial-tribunal-says-2021-12-10/ |access-date=24 October 2022 |archive-date=24 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221024104722/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-responsible-uyghur-genocide-unofficial-tribunal-says-2021-12-10/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=1 September 2022 |title=U.N. says China may have committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/outgoing-un-human-rights-chief-says-serious-human-rights-violations-committed-2022-08-31/ |access-date=24 October 2022 |archive-date=26 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221126235118/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/outgoing-un-human-rights-chief-says-serious-human-rights-violations-committed-2022-08-31/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[Xinjiang papers|Internal Chinese government documents]] leaked to the press in November 2019 showed that Xi personally ordered a security crackdown in Xinjiang, saying that the party must show "absolutely no mercy" and that officials use all the "weapons of the [[people's democratic dictatorship]]" to suppress those "infected with the virus of extremism."<ref name="Ramzy-2019">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|title='Absolutely No Mercy': Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|last2=Buckley|first2=Chris|date=16 November 2019|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=6 December 2019|archive-date=8 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200108214926/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.hongkongfp.com/2020/01/19/huaweis-human-rights-record-needs-scrutiny-britain-signs-5g-contracts/|title=Huawei's human rights record needs scrutiny before Britain signs 5G contracts|last=Tugendhat|first=Tom|date=19 January 2020|newspaper=[[Hong Kong Free Press]]|access-date=19 January 2020|archive-date=11 July 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240711081528/https://hongkongfp.com/2020/01/19/huaweis-human-rights-record-needs-scrutiny-britain-signs-5g-contracts/|url-status=live}}</ref> The papers also showed that Xi repeatedly discussed about [[Islamic extremism]] in his speeches, likening it to a "virus" or a "drug" that could be only addressed by "a period of painful, interventionary treatment."<ref name="Ramzy-2019" /> However, he also warned against the discrimination against Uyghurs and rejected proposals to eradicate [[Islam in China]], calling that kind of viewpoint "biased, even wrong."<ref name="Ramzy-2019" /> Xi's exact role in the building of internment camps has not been publicly reported, though he's widely believed to be behind them and his words have been the source for major justifications in the crackdown in Xinjiang.<ref name="Economist-2022a" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Chin |first=Josh |date=30 November 2021 |title=Leaked Documents Detail Xi Jinping's Extensive Role in Xinjiang Crackdown |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/leaked-documents-detail-xi-jinpings-extensive-role-in-xinjiang-crackdown-11638284709 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=12 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220812142807/https://www.wsj.com/articles/leaked-documents-detail-xi-jinpings-extensive-role-in-xinjiang-crackdown-11638284709 |url-status=live }}</ref>

During a four-day visit to Xinjiang in July 2022, Xi urged local officials to always listen to the people's voices<ref>{{Citation |title=Momen Langka! Presiden China Xi Jinping Kunjungi Kampung Muslim Uighur |date=July 19, 2022 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Se2h1pyAjKw |publisher=[[Kompas TV]] |language=en |quote=Selama 4 hari, Xi Jinping mengunjungi sejumlah situs di Xinjiang termasuk perkebunan kapas, zona perdagangan dan museum. Penduduk Uighur pun menyambut Presiden Xi Jinping. Dalam kunjungannya, Xi mendesak agar pejabat Xinjiang selalu mendengarkan suara rakyat demi memenangkan hati dan membuat rakyat bersatu. |via=Youtube |access-date=7 March 2024 |archive-date=7 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240307204442/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Se2h1pyAjKw |url-status=live }}</ref> and to do more in preservation of ethnic minority culture.<ref>{{Citation |title=China's President Xi visits far western Xinjiang region for first time in 8 years |date=July 15, 2022 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0Q2iq_HVFs&t=42s |publisher=[[SCMP]] |language=en |via=Youtube |access-date=7 March 2024 |archive-date=7 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240307204440/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0Q2iq_HVFs&t=42s |url-status=live }}</ref> He also inspected the [[Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps]] and praised its "great progress" in reform and development.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-15 |title=Xi Jinping visits Xinjiang for first time since crackdown |url=https://www.dw.com/en/china-xi-jinping-visits-xinjiang-for-first-time-since-uyghur-crackdown/a-62481343 |website=[[Deutsche Welle]] |language=en}}</ref> During another visit to Xinjiang in August 2023, Xi said in a speech that the region was "no longer a remote area" and should open up more for [[Tourism in Xinjiang|tourism]] to attract domestic and foreign visitors.<ref>{{Cite web |last=ONG HAN SEAN |date=20 November 2023 |title=China's Xinjiang: A marvel of wild beauty and a land full of culture and charm |url=https://www.thestar.com.my/lifestyle/travel/2023/11/20/xinjiang-is-a-land-that039s-full-of-culture-colour-and-charm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231120143603/https://www.thestar.com.my/lifestyle/travel/2023/11/20/xinjiang-is-a-land-that039s-full-of-culture-colour-and-charm |archive-date=20 November 2023 |website=[[The Star (Malaysia)|The Star]] |language=en |quote=Our visit came on the heels of Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Ürümqi, where he reportedly stressed on the positive promotion of the region to show an open and confident Xinjiang. Xi also called for Xinjiang to be opened more widely for tourism to encourage visits from domestic and foreign tourists.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-09-11 |title=China: How is Beijing whitewashing its Xinjiang policy? |url=https://www.dw.com/en/china-how-is-beijing-whitewashing-its-xinjiang-policy/a-66779242 |access-date=2024-03-07 |website=[[Deutsche Welle]] |language=en |quote=But amid growing global attention on Xinjiang, China has been eager to portray the region as a "success story" by welcoming more tourists. In a speech that he made while visiting the region last month, Xi said Xinjiang was "no longer a remote area" and should open up more to domestic and foreign tourism. |archive-date=7 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240307204440/https://www.dw.com/en/china-how-is-beijing-whitewashing-its-xinjiang-policy/a-66779242 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===COVID-19 pandemic===
{{See also|Chinese government response to COVID-19|COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China}}On 20 January 2020, Xi commented for the first time on the emerging [[COVID-19 pandemic]] in Wuhan, and ordered "efforts to curb the spread" of the virus.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Griffiths |first=James |date=17 February 2020 |title=Did Xi Jinping know about the coronavirus outbreak earlier than first suggested? |url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/17/asia/china-coronavirus-xi-jinping-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[CNN]] |archive-date=23 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230623151800/https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/17/asia/china-coronavirus-xi-jinping-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> He gave premier Li Keqiang some responsibility over the COVID-19 response, in what has been suggested by ''The Wall Street Journal'' was an attempt to potentially insulate himself from criticism if the response failed.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Page |first=Jeremy |date=27 January 2020 |title=China's Xi Gives His No. 2 a Rare Chance to Shine in Coronavirus Fight, With Risks for Both |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-gives-his-no-2-a-rare-chance-to-shine-in-coronavirus-fight-with-risks-for-both-11580138767 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=30 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200130154514/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-gives-his-no-2-a-rare-chance-to-shine-in-coronavirus-fight-with-risks-for-both-11580138767 |url-status=live }}</ref> The government initially responded to the pandemic with a lockdown and censorship, with the initial response causing widespread backlash within China.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Griffiths |first=James |title=Wuhan is the latest crisis to face China's Xi, and it's exposing major flaws in his model of control |url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/23/asia/wuhan-china-coronavirus-sars-response-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=[[CNN]] |date=24 January 2020 |archive-date=8 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200208194710/https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/23/asia/wuhan-china-coronavirus-sars-response-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> He met with [[Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus]], the director-general of the World Health Organization (WHO), on 28 January.<ref name="Steger-2020">{{Cite web |last=Steger |first=Isabella |date=10 February 2020 |title=Xi Jinping emerges to meet the people for the first time in China's coronavirus outbreak |url=https://qz.com/1799914/xi-jinping-appears-in-public-after-long-absence-during-coronavirus/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[Quartz (publication)|Quartz]] |language=en |archive-date=1 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220901093801/https://qz.com/1799914/xi-jinping-appears-in-public-after-long-absence-during-coronavirus/ |url-status=live }}</ref> ''[[Der Spiegel]]'' reported that in January 2020 Xi pressured Tedros Adhanom to hold off on issuing a [[Public health emergency of international concern|global warning]] about the outbreak of COVID-19 and hold back information on human-to-human transmission of the virus, allegations denied by the WHO.<ref>{{cite news |date=10 May 2020 |title=WHO dementiert Telefongespräch mit Chinas Präsident |language=de |website=[[Der Spiegel]] |url=https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/corona-ausbruch-who-dementiert-telefongespraech-mit-chinas-praesident-a-37678f1c-6960-453c-a317-8ef9feed8b7c |access-date=14 May 2020 |archive-date=14 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200514025329/https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/corona-ausbruch-who-dementiert-telefongespraech-mit-chinas-praesident-a-37678f1c-6960-453c-a317-8ef9feed8b7c |url-status=live }}</ref> On 5 February, Xi met with Cambodian prime minister [[Hun Sen]] in Beijing, the first foreign leader allowed into China since the outbreak.<ref name="Steger-2020" /> After the COVID-19 outbreak got under control in Wuhan, Xi visited the city on 10 March.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Yew |first1=Lun Tian |last2=Se |first2=Young Lee |date=10 March 2022 |title=Xi visits Wuhan, signaling tide turning in China's coronavirus battle |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-idUSKBN20X01F |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813191157/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-idUSKBN20X01F |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:Sergio Mattarella and Xi Jinping 2019.jpg|left|thumb|225x225px|Italian president [[Sergio Mattarella]] with Xi in March 2019]]

After getting the outbreak in Wuhan under control, Xi has favoured what has officially been termed "dynamic [[Zero-COVID|zero-COVID policy]]"<ref>{{Cite web |last=Cao |first=Desheng |title=Xi: Dynamic zero-COVID policy works |url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/30/WS62bcd80ea310fd2b29e6962b.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=[[China Daily]]}}</ref> that aims to control and suppress the virus as much as possible within the country's borders. This has involved local lockdowns and mass-testing.<ref name="Wong-2022">{{Cite news |last=Wong |first=Chun Han |date=25 July 2022 |title=China's Zero-Covid Policy Drags on Vaccination Drive |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-zero-covid-policy-drags-on-vaccination-drive-11658745899 |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=11 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240711082025/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-zero-covid-policy-drags-on-vaccination-drive-11658745899 |url-status=live }}</ref> While initially credited for China's suppression of the COVID-19 outbreak, the policy was later criticized by foreign and some domestic observers for being out of touch with the rest of the world and taking a heavy toll on the economy.<ref name="Wong-2022" /> This approach has especially come under criticism during a 2022 lockdown on Shanghai, which forced millions to their homes and damaged the city's economy,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Davidson |first=Helen |date=10 June 2022 |title=Xi Jinping says 'persistence is victory' as Covid restrictions return to Shanghai and Beijing |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/xi-jinping-says-persistence-is-victory-as-covid-restrictions-return-to-shanghai-and-beijing |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=[[The Guardian]] |language=en |archive-date=11 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240711082026/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/10/xi-jinping-says-persistence-is-victory-as-covid-restrictions-return-to-shanghai-and-beijing |url-status=live }}</ref> denting the image of [[Li Qiang]], close Xi ally and Party secretary of the city.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hadano |first1=Tsukasa |last2=Doi |first2=Noriyuki |date=29 June 2022 |title=Xi ally Li Qiang keeps Shanghai party chief job, but star fades |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Xi-ally-Li-Qiang-keeps-Shanghai-party-chief-job-but-star-fades |access-date=29 August 2022 |work=[[Nikkei Asia]] |language=en-GB |archive-date=1 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220901143524/https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Xi-ally-Li-Qiang-keeps-Shanghai-party-chief-job-but-star-fades |url-status=live }}</ref> Conversely, Xi has said that the policy was designed to protect people's life safety.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Cai |first1=Jane |last2=Tang |first2=Frank |date=29 June 2022 |title=China to press on with 'zero Covid', despite economic risks: Xi |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3183550/china-press-zero-covid-despite-economic-risks-president-xi |access-date=13 August 2022 |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813082557/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3183550/china-press-zero-covid-despite-economic-risks-president-xi |url-status=live }}</ref> On 23 July 2022, the [[National Health Commission]] reported that Xi and other top leaders have taken the local COVID-19 vaccines.<ref>{{Cite news |date=23 July 2022 |title=Covid in China: Xi Jinping and other leaders given domestic vaccine |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-62279377 |access-date=13 August 2022 |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813191157/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-62279377 |url-status=live }}</ref>

At the 20th CCP Congress, Xi confirmed the continuation of the zero-COVID policy,<ref>{{cite news |last=McDonell |first=Stephen |date=16 October 2022 |title=Xi Jinping speech: Zero-Covid and zero solutions |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63274391 |access-date=11 November 2022 |archive-date=11 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221111235314/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-63274391 |url-status=live }}</ref> stating he would "unswervingly" carry out "dynamic zero-COVID" and promising to "resolutely win the battle,"<ref>{{Cite news |date=17 December 2022 |title=Xi Jinping tied himself to zero-Covid. Now he keeps silent as it falls apart |work=[[CNN]] |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/16/china/china-zero-covid-uturn-xi-jinping-intl-hnk-mic/index.html |access-date=16 December 2022 |archive-date=16 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221216085906/https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/16/china/china-zero-covid-uturn-xi-jinping-intl-hnk-mic/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> though China started a limited easing of the policies in the following weeks.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Ramzy |first=Austin |date=11 November 2022 |title=China Eases Zero-Covid Rules as Economic Toll and Frustrations Mount |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-eases-some-covid-19-rules-even-as-cases-pass-10-000-11668150369 |access-date=11 November 2022 |archive-date=11 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221111073602/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-eases-some-covid-19-rules-even-as-cases-pass-10-000-11668150369 |url-status=live }}</ref> In November 2022, [[2022 COVID-19 protests in China|protests]] broke out against China's COVID-19 policies, with a [[2022 Ürümqi fire|fire in a high-rise apartment building in Ürümqi]] being the trigger.<ref name="Che-2022">{{Cite news |last1=Che |first1=Chang |last2=Buckley |first2=Chris |last3=Chien |first3=Amy Chang |last4=Dong |first4=Joy |date=2022-12-05 |title=China Stems Wave of Protest, but Ripples of Resistance Remain |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/asia/china-covid-protests.html |access-date=2022-12-05 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=5 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221205145355/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/asia/china-covid-protests.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The protests were held in multiple major cities, with some of the protesters demanding the end of Xi's and the CCP's rule.<ref name="Che-2022" /> The protests were mostly suppressed by December,<ref name="Che-2022" /> though the government further eased COVID-19 restrictions in the time since.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Olcott |first1=Eleanor |last2=Mitchell |first2=Tom |date=4 December 2022 |title=Chinese cities ease Covid restrictions following nationwide protests |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/bfbc7afb-3994-4e4c-b649-ca791675b296 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221218/https://www.ft.com/content/bfbc7afb-3994-4e4c-b649-ca791675b296 |archive-date=11 December 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=5 December 2022}}</ref> On 7 December 2022, China announced large-scale changes to its COVID-19 policy, including allowing quarantine at home for mild infections, reducing of [[Polymerase chain reaction|PCR testing]], and decreasing the power of local officials to implement lockdowns.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Che |first1=Chang |last2=Chien |first2=Amy Chang |last3=Stevenson |first3=Alexandra |date=2022-12-07 |title=What Has Changed About China's 'Zero Covid' Policy |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/07/world/asia/china-zero-covid-changes.html |access-date=2022-12-08 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

===Environmental policy===
{{See also|Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization|Environmental policy in China}}

Xi identifies environmental protection as one of China's five major priorities for national progress.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=David Daokui |author-link=David Daokui Li |title=China's World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict |date=2024 |publisher=[[W. W. Norton & Company]] |isbn=978-0-393-29239-8 |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=164}} Xi has popularized a metaphor of "two mountains" to emphasize the importance of environmental protection.<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=164}} The concept is that a mountain made of gold or silver is valuable, but [[Clear waters and green mountains|green mountains with clear waters are more valuable]].<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=164}} The slogan's meaning is that economic development priorities must also provide for economic protection.<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=164}}

In September 2020, Xi announced that China will "strengthen its 2030 climate target (NDC), peak emissions before 2030 and aim to achieve [[carbon neutrality]] before 2060."<ref name="CAT-2020" /> If accomplished, this would lower the expected rise in global temperature by 0.2–0.3&nbsp;°C – "the biggest single reduction ever estimated by the Climate Action Tracker."<ref name="CAT-2020">{{cite web |date=23 September 2020 |title=China going carbon neutral before 2060 would lower warming projections by around 0.2 to 0.3 degrees C |url=https://climateactiontracker.org/press/china-carbon-neutral-before-2060-would-lower-warming-projections-by-around-2-to-3-tenths-of-a-degree/ |access-date=27 September 2020 |website=[[Climate Action Tracker]]}}</ref> Xi mentioned the link between the COVID-19 pandemic and nature destruction as one of the reasons for the decision, saying that "Humankind can no longer afford to ignore the repeated warnings of nature."<ref>{{cite news |date=23 September 2020 |title=China, the world's top global emitter, aims to go carbon-neutral by 2060 |work=[[ABC News (Australia)|ABC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-23/china-world-top-global-emitter-aims-carbon-neutral-by-2060/12691974 |access-date=29 September 2020}}</ref> On 27 September, Chinese scientists presented a detailed plan how to achieve the target.<ref>{{cite news |date=29 September 2020 |title=China's top climate scientists unveil road map to 2060 goal |newspaper=[[The Japan Times]] |agency=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/09/29/asia-pacific/science-health-asia-pacific/china-climate-change-road-map-2060/ |access-date=29 September 2020}}</ref> In September 2021, Xi announced that China will not build "coal-fired power projects abroad, which was said to be potentially "pivotal" in reducing emissions. The Belt and Road Initiative did not include financing such projects already in the first half of 2021.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Brant |first1=Robin |date=22 September 2021 |title=China pledges to stop building new coal energy plants abroad |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58647481 |access-date=29 September 2021}}</ref>

Xi Jinping did not attend [[2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference|COP26]] personally. However, a Chinese delegation led by climate change envoy [[Xie Zhenhua (politician)|Xie Zhenhua]] did attend.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Faulconbridge |first=Guy |date=15 October 2021 |title=China's Xi will not attend COP26 in person, UK PM Johnson told |work=[[Reuters]] |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/chinas-xi-snub-cop26-uk-pm-johnson-told-times-2021-10-15/ |access-date=20 August 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Harvey |first=Fiona |author-link=Fiona Harvey |date=10 November 2021 |title=China's top Cop26 delegate says it is taking 'real action' on climate targets |url=https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/10/chinas-top-cop26-delegate-says-it-is-taking-real-action-on-climate-targets |access-date=11 November 2022 |work=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref> During the conference, the United States and China agreed on a framework to reduce [[GHG emission]] by co-operating on different measures.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Volcovici |first1=Valeria |last2=James |first2=William |last3=Spring |first3=Jake |date=11 November 2021 |title=U.S. and China unveil deal to ramp up cooperation on climate change |work=[[Reuters]] |publisher= |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/china-us-make-joint-statement-cop26-climate-summit-2021-11-10 |access-date=11 November 2021}}</ref>

===Governance style===
Known as a very secretive leader, little is known publicly about how Xi makes political decisions, or how he came to power.<ref name="Economist-2022b">{{Cite news |date=28 September 2022 |title=An investigation into what has shaped Xi Jinping's thinking |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/09/28/an-investigation-into-what-has-shaped-xi-jinpings-thinking |access-date=30 September 2022 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref><ref name="Myers-2018">{{Cite news |last=Myers |first=Steven Lee |date=5 March 2018 |title=Behind Public Persona, the Real Xi Jinping Is a Guarded Secret |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-leader.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Xi's speeches generally get released months or years after they are made.<ref name="Economist-2022b" /> Xi has also never given a press conference since becoming paramount leader, except in rare joint press conferences with foreign leaders.<ref name="Economist-2022b" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=McGregor |first=Richard |date=21 August 2022 |title=Xi Jinping's Radical Secrecy |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/08/china-xi-jinping-biography-opacity/671195/ |access-date=21 August 2022 |website=[[The Atlantic]] |language=en}}</ref> ''The Wall Street Journal'' reported that Xi prefers micromanaging in governance, in contrast to previous leaders such as Hu Jintao who left details of major policies to lower-ranking officials.<ref name="Chin-2021" /> Reportedly, ministerial officials try to get Xi's attention in various ways, with some creating slide shows and audio reports. ''The Wall Street Journal'' also reported that Xi created a performance-review system in 2018 to give evaluations on officials on various measures, including loyalty.<ref name="Chin-2021" /> According to ''The Economist'', Xi's orders have generally been vague, leaving lower level officials to interpret his words.<ref name="Economist-2022a">{{Cite news |title=Even in secret, China's leaders speak in code |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2022/01/01/even-in-secret-chinas-leaders-speak-in-code |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency said that Xi "personally reviews every draft of major policy documents" and "all reports submitted to him, no matter how late in the evening, were returned with instructions the following morning."<ref name="Blachard-2017">{{Cite news |last=Blachard |first=Ben |date=17 November 2017 |title=Glowing profile cracks door open on private life of China's Xi |language=en |publisher=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSKBN1DH0GA |access-date=9 December 2019}}</ref> With regard to behavior of Communist Party members, Xi emphasizes the "Two Musts" (members must not be arrogant or rash and must keep their hard-working spirit) and the "Six Nos" (members must say no to formalism, bureaucracy, gift-giving, luxurious birthday celebrations, hedonism, and extravagance).{{Sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=52}} Xi called for officials to practice [[Self-criticism (Marxism–Leninism)|self-criticism]] which, according to observers, is in order to appear less corrupt and more popular among the people.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Forde |first1=Brendan |date=9 September 2013 |title=China's 'Mass Line' Campaign |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/chinas-mass-line-campaign-2/ |url-status=live |access-date=23 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624035650/https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/chinas-mass-line-campaign-2/ |archive-date=24 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Levin |first1=Dan |date=20 December 2013 |title=China Revives Mao-Era Self-Criticism, but This Kind Bruises Few Egos |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/asia/china-revives-mao-era-self-criticism-but-this-kind-bruises-few-egos.html |url-status=live |access-date=23 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624010400/https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/asia/china-revives-mao-era-self-criticism-but-this-kind-bruises-few-egos.html |archive-date=24 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Tiezzi |first1=Shannon |date=27 December 2013 |title=The Mass Line Campaign in the 21st Century |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-line-campaign-in-the-21st-century/ |url-status=live |access-date=23 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624010506/https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-line-campaign-in-the-21st-century/ |archive-date=24 June 2018}}</ref> According to Japanese diplomat [[Hideo Tarumi]], who served as the Japanese ambassador to China, Xi has engaged in heavy process of centralization in order to maintain the legitimacy of the rule of Chinese Communist Party.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/ambassador-memoir-02152024173555.html|title= China's Xi appeared 'humble' but now rules supreme, ambassador says|first=Chi Chun|last=Lee|newspaper=Radio Free Asia|date=2024-02-15|access-date=2024-04-22}}</ref>

==Political positions==
{{further|Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party}}
{{Quote box
| quote =A party and its authority rests on winning the hearts and minds of the people. What the public opposes and hates, we must address and resolve.{{pb}} [M]aterial and cultural needs grown; demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment are also increasing each day.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in 2017<ref name="voa2017oct">{{cite web | last=Ide | first=Bill | title=Xi Lays Out New Vision for Communist China | website=Voice of America | date=18 Oct 2017 | url=https://www.voanews.com/a/xi-jinping-opens-national-congress/4075475.html | access-date=30 Jul 2024}}</ref>
| align = right
| width = 25em
}}

===Chinese Dream===
{{main|Chinese Dream}}
[[File:Lujiazui 2016.jpg|thumb|According to ''[[Qiushi]]'', the Chinese Dream is about Chinese prosperity, collective effort, socialism, and national glory.]]

Xi and CCP ideologues coined the phrase "Chinese Dream" to describe his overarching plans for China as its leader. Xi first used the phrase during a high-profile visit to the [[National Museum of China]] on 29 November 2012, where he and his [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Standing Committee]] colleagues were attending a "national revival" exhibition. Since then, the phrase has become the signature political slogan of the Xi era.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/05/04/xi-jinping-and-the-chinese-dream|title=Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream|date=4 May 2013|newspaper=[[The Economist]]|access-date=12 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160510092423/http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-should-serve-his-people-not-nationalist-state-xi-jinping|archive-date=10 May 2016|issn=0013-0613}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9935609/Xi-Jinping-calls-for-a-Chinese-Dream.html|title=Xi Jinping calls for a Chinese dream|last1=Moore|first1=Malcolm|date=17 March 2013|work=[[The Daily Telegraph]]|access-date=20 March 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130320072154/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9935609/Xi-Jinping-calls-for-a-Chinese-Dream.html|archive-date=20 March 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> The origin of the term "Chinese Dream" is unclear. While the phrase has been used before by journalists and scholars,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/todays-china-notes-dreams-obstacles/275544/|title=Today's China Notes: Dreams, Obstacles|last=Fallows|first=James|date=3 May 2013|work=[[The Atlantic]]|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180712023142/https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/todays-china-notes-dreams-obstacles/275544/|archive-date=12 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> some publications have posited the term likely drew its inspiration from the concept of the [[American Dream]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/05/chinese-dream-0|title=The role of Thomas Friedman|last=M.|first=J.|date=6 May 2013|newspaper=[[The Economist]]|access-date=12 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171028145059/https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/05/chinese-dream-0|archive-date=28 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> ''The Economist'' noted the abstract and seemingly accessible nature of the concept with no specific overarching policy stipulations may be a deliberate departure from the jargon-heavy ideologies of his predecessors.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-quick-consolidate-his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his|title=Chasing the Chinese dream |date=4 May 2013|newspaper=[[The Economist]]|access-date=12 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161028080732/http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-quick-consolidate-his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his|archive-date=28 October 2016|issn=0013-0613}}</ref> Xi has linked the "Chinese Dream" with the phrase "[[great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation]]."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tao |first=Xie |date=14 March 2014 |title=Opinion: Is the Chinese dream fantasy or reality? |url=https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/14/world/asia/chinese-dream-anniversary-xi-jinping-president/index.html |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=[[CNN]]}}</ref>

===Culture===
{{See also|Xi Jinping Thought on Culture}}
In recent years, top political leaders of the CCP such as Xi have overseen the rehabilitation of ancient Chinese philosophical figures like [[Han Fei]] into the mainstream of Chinese thought alongside [[Confucianism]]. At a meeting with other officials in 2013, he quoted [[Confucius]], saying "he who rules by virtue is like the Pole Star, it maintains its place, and the multitude of stars pay homage." While visiting [[Shandong]], the birthplace of Confucius, in November, he told scholars that the Western world was "suffering a crisis of confidence" and that the CCP has been "the loyal inheritor and promoter of China's outstanding [[Traditional Chinese culture|traditional culture]]."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/leader-taps-into-chinese-classics-in-seeking-to-cement-power.html|title=Leader Taps into Chinese Classics in Seeking to Cement Power|last=Buckley|first=Chris|date=12 October 2014|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190912091736/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/leader-taps-into-chinese-classics-in-seeking-to-cement-power.html|archive-date=12 September 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref>

According to several analysts, Xi's leadership has been characterised by a resurgence of the ancient political philosophy [[Legalism (Chinese philosophy)|Legalism]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schneider |first1=David K. |title=China's New Legalism |journal=The National Interest |date=2016 |issue=143 |pages=19–25 |doi= |jstor=26557304}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Sam |title=Why Xi Jinping's China is Legalist, Not Confucian |url=https://chinachannel.org/2018/06/29/legalism/ |website=China Channel |date=29 June 2018 |access-date=24 November 2020 |archive-date=7 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201107225951/https://chinachannel.org/2018/06/29/legalism/ }}</ref><ref name="tdma" /> Han Fei gained new prominence with favourable citations; one sentence of Han Fei's that Xi quoted appeared thousands of times in official Chinese media at the local, provincial, and national levels.<ref name="tdma">{{cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/is-chinas-machiavelli-now-its-most-important-political-philosopher/|title=Is 'China's Machiavelli' Now Its Most Important Political Philosopher?|last=Mitchell|first=Ryan Mi|date=16 January 2015|newspaper=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190912091739/https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/is-chinas-machiavelli-now-its-most-important-political-philosopher/|archive-date=12 September 2019|access-date=7 September 2019}}</ref> Xi has additionally supported the [[Neo-Confucianism|Neo-Confucian]] philosopher [[Wang Yangming]], telling local leaders to promote him.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Johnson |first=Ian |date=18 October 2017 |title=Forget Marx and Mao. Chinese City Honors Once-Banned Confucian. |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-guiyang-wang-yangming-confucian.html |access-date=13 August 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Xi has seemingly adopted a [[socially conservative]] view since he began his third leadership in 2022, calling for "a new marriage and childbirth culture, strengthen guidance of young people’s views on marriage, parenthood and family".<ref>{{cite magazine |date=31 October 2023 |title=Facing Population Decline, China's Xi Promotes 'Childbirth Culture' for Women |url=https://time.com/6330091/china-population-xi-childbirth-culture/ |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref>

Since the [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th Party Congress]], Xi  has emphasized utilizing red resources, telling red stories, and inheriting red genes.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Ying |title=Red Ink: A History of Printing and Politics in China |publisher=Royal Collins Press |year=2024 |isbn=9781487812737}}</ref>{{Rp|page=xii}} On 15 October 2014, Xi Jinping emulated the [[Yan'an Forum]] with his 'Speech at the Forum on Literature and Art.'<ref name=":13">{{Cite book |last=Sorace |first=Christian |title=Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi |date=2019 |publisher=[[Australian National University Press]] |isbn=978-1-76046-249-9 |location=Acton, Australia |chapter=Aesthetics}}</ref>{{Rp|page=15}} Consistent with Mao's view in the Yan'an Talks, Xi believes works of art should be judged by political criteria.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=16}} In 2021, Xi quoted the Yan'an Talks during the opening ceremony of the 11th National Congress of the [[China Federation of Literary and Art Circles]] and the 10th National Congress of the [[China Writers Association|Chinese Writers Association]].{{Sfn|Marquis|Qiao|2022|p=174}} According to Xi, art should be judged by political criteria.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=16}} This view rejects the concept of [[Art for art's sake|art-for-art's-sake]] and contends that art should serve the goal of national rejuvenation.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=16}} Xi criticizes market-driven art which he deems sensationalist, particularly works which "exaggerate society's dark side" for profit.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=16}} He ordered the arts industry to "tell China's stories and spread Chinese voices to strengthen the country's international communication capacity."<ref>{{cite web |author1=Joyce Cheng |author2=Bang Xiao |date=2022-07-31 |title=Globally acclaimed author Yan Geling considering giving up writing in native Chinese over censorship |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-07-31/author-yan-geling-criticises-beijing-censorship/101276516 |work=[[Australian Broadcasting Corporation|ABC]]}}</ref> Xi states that Chinese writers should follow the Party's leadership, serve the cause of socialism, and "let people see the good, feel hope, [and] have dreams".<ref name=":023">{{Cite book |last=Tu |first=Hang |title=Sentimental Republic: Chinese Intellectuals and the Maoist Past |publisher=[[Harvard University Asia Center]] |year=2025 |isbn=9780674297579}}</ref>{{Rp|page=252}}

Xi has also overseen a revival of traditional Chinese culture, breaking from the CCP's previous path, which had often attacked it.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/china/2017/08/17/the-communist-party-is-redefining-what-it-means-to-be-chinese|title=The Communist Party is redefining what it means to be Chinese|date=17 August 2017|newspaper=[[The Economist]]|access-date=23 January 2020}}</ref> He has called traditional culture the "soul" of the nation and the "foundation" of the CCP's culture.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zi |first=Yang |date=6 July 2016 |title=Xi Jinping and China's Traditionalist Restoration |work=[[The Jamestown Foundation]] |publisher= |url=https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinping-chinas-traditionalist-restoration/ |access-date=23 January 2020}}</ref> Xi has also called for integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with China's traditional culture.<ref name=":12" /> [[Hanfu]], the traditional dress of Han Chinese, has seen a revival under him, associated with the revival of traditional culture.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.afr.com/life-and-luxury/fashion-and-style/why-its-hip-to-be-oldfashioned-in-china-20181129-h18hql|title=China's 'Hanfu' movement is making it hip to be old-fashioned. Here's why.|last=Buckley|first=Chris|date=30 November 2018|work=[[The Australian Financial Review]]|access-date=23 January 2020}}</ref> He has established the "[[Four Confidences|four matters of confidence]]," which has later been added to the CCP constitution, calling for CCP members, government officials and the Chinese people to be "confident in our chosen path, confident in our guiding theories, confident in our political system, and confident in our culture." He has unveiled Global Civilisation initiative in 2023, calling for "respecting the diversity of civilisations, advocating the common values of humanity, valuing the inheritance and innovation of civilisations, and strengthening international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation".<ref name=":12" /> Xi supports a socialist artistic revival, including the promotion of patriotic art and red classics.<ref name=":023" />{{Rp|page=253}}

===Ideology===
{{See also|Eight-point Regulation}}

Xi has said that "only socialism can save China."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tian |first=Yew Lun |date=9 September 2021 |title=Analysis: Unleashing reforms, Xi returns to China's socialist roots |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/unleashing-reforms-xi-returns-chinas-socialist-roots-2021-09-09/ |access-date=17 September 2022}}</ref> Xi has also declared [[socialism with Chinese characteristics]] to be the "only correct path to realize national rejuvenation."<ref>{{Cite web |date=9 October 2021 |title=Socialism with Chinese characteristics only correct path toward national rejuvenation: Xi |url=http://ex.chinadaily.com.cn/exchange/partners/82/rss/channel/www/columns/np4922/stories/WS61610570a310cdd39bc6dcc1.html |access-date=17 September 2022 |website=[[China Daily]]}}</ref> According to [[BBC News]], while the CCP was perceived to have abandoned its communist ideology since it initiated [[Reform and opening up|economic reforms]] in the 1970s, Xi is believed by some observers to be more believing in the "idea of a communist project,"<ref>{{Cite news |last=McDonell |first=Stephen |date=22 September 2021 |title=Changing China: Xi Jinping's effort to return to socialism |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-58579831 |access-date=17 September 2022}}</ref> being described as a [[Marxist–Leninist]] by former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Rudd |first=Kevin |author-link=Kevin Rudd |date=10 October 2022 |title=The World According to Xi Jinping |language=en-US |work=[[Foreign Affairs]] |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/world-according-xi-jinping-china-ideologue-kevin-rudd |access-date=12 October 2022}}</ref> Xi's emphasis on prioritizing ideology has included re-asserting the Party's goal of eventually [[Socialist mode of production|realizing communism]] and reprimanding those who dismiss communism as impractical or irrelevant.{{sfn|Pieke|Hofman|2022|p=48}} Xi described the communist ideal as the "calcium" in a Party member's spine, without which the Party member would suffer the "osteoporosis" of political decay and be unable to stand upright.{{sfn|Pieke|Hofman|2022|p=48}}

Subscribing to the view that socialism will eventually triumph over capitalism, Xi has said "Marx and Engels's [[Dialectical materialism|analysis of the basic contradictions]] of [[Capitalist mode of production (Marxist theory)|capitalist society]] is not outdated, nor is the [[historical materialism|historical materialist view]] that capitalism is bound to die out and socialism bound to win."<ref name="Hancock-2022">{{Cite web |last=Hancock |first=Tom |date=6 June 2022 |title=Marxism Makes a Comeback in China's Crackdown on 'Disorderly Capital' |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-06-06/marxism-makes-a-comeback-in-china-s-crackdown-on-disorderly-capital |access-date=17 September 2022 |website=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref> Xi has overseen the increase of "Socialist Political Economy With Chinese Characteristics" as a major study topic for academics in China, aiming to decrease the influence of Western-influenced economics.<ref name="Hancock-2022" /> Though he has called a stop to what he considers to be "disorderly expansion of capital," he has also said that "it is necessary to stimulate the vitality of capital of all types, including nonpublic capital, and give full play to its positive role."<ref name="Hancock-2022" />

{{Quote box
| quote = China's success proves that socialism is not dead. It is thriving. Just imagine this: had socialism failed in China, had our communist party collapsed like the party in the Soviet Union, then global socialism would lapse into a long dark age. And communism, like Karl Marx once said, would be a haunting spectre lingering in limbo.
| source = — Xi Jinping during a speech in 2018<ref name=":12bb" />
| align = right
| width = 25em
}}

Xi has supported greater CCP control over the PRC, saying "government, the military, society and schools, north, south, east and west – [[The Party leads everything|the party leads them all]]."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gan |first=Nectar |date=25 October 2017 |title=The Communist Party's tighter grip on China in 16 characters |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116836/xi-jinping-thought-communist-partys-tighter-grip-china |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref> During the [[100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party|100th anniversary of the CCP]] in 2021, he said that "without the Communist Party of China, there would be no new China and no national rejuvenation," and that "the leadership of the Party is the defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics and constitutes the greatest strength of this system."<ref>{{Cite web |date=1 July 2021 |title=Full text of Xi Jinping's speech on the CCP's 100th anniversary |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Full-text-of-Xi-Jinping-s-speech-on-the-CCP-s-100th-anniversary |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=[[Nikkei Asia]] |language=en-GB}}</ref> He has said that China, despite many setbacks, has achieved great progress under the CCP, saying that "socialism with Chinese characteristics has become the standard-bearer of 21st-century socialist development."<ref name=":12bb">{{Cite web |last=Zheng |first=William |date=16 September 2022 |title=Xi article gives insight into China's direction ahead of party congress |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3192677/xi-article-gives-insight-chinas-direction-ahead-party-congress |access-date=17 September 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref> However, he has also warned that it will take a long time for China under the CCP to complete its rejuvenation, and during this timeframe, party members must be vigilant to not let CCP rule collapse.<ref name=":12bb" /> Xi has spoken out against "[[historical nihilism]]," meaning historical viewpoints that challenge the official line of the CCP.{{Sfn|Wong|2023|p=181}} Xi said that one of the reasons for the [[Dissolution of the Soviet Union|collapse of the Soviet Union]] has been historical nihilism.<ref>{{Cite news |title=China is struggling to keep control over its version of the past |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2016/10/29/china-is-struggling-to-keep-control-over-its-version-of-the-past |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180714135236/https://www.economist.com/china/2016/10/29/china-is-struggling-to-keep-control-over-its-version-of-the-past |archive-date=14 July 2018 |access-date=13 August 2022 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>

Xi has ruled out a [[multi-party system]] for China, saying that "constitutional monarchy, imperial restoration, parliamentarism, a multi-party system and a presidential system, we considered them, tried them, but none worked."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2 April 2014 |title=Xi says multi-party system didn't work for China |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSBREA3107S20140402 |access-date=13 August 2022}}</ref> However, Xi considers China to be a [[Democracy in China|democracy]], saying that "China's [[socialist democracy]] is the most comprehensive, genuine and effective democracy."<ref name="Drinhausen-2009">{{Cite web |title=Democracy |url=https://decodingchina.eu/democracy/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=Decoding China |date=4 February 2021 |language=en-US}}</ref> China's definition of democracy is different from [[liberal democracies]] and is rooted in Marxism–Leninism, and is based on the phrases people's democratic dictatorship and [[democratic centralism]].<ref name="Drinhausen-2009" /> Xi has additionally coined the term whole-process people's democracy which he said was about having "the people as masters."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Chen |first=Stella |date=23 November 2021 |title=Whole-Process Democracy |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/whole-process-democracy/ |access-date=13 August 2022 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US}}</ref> Foreign analysts and observers have widely disputed that China is a democracy, saying that it is a one-party authoritarian state and Xi an authoritarian leader.{{refn|name=dictatorandauthoritarian|<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brady|first=Anne-Marie|date=2015|title=China's Foreign Propaganda Machine|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/journal_of_democracy/v026/26.4.brady.html|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=26|issue=4|pages=51–59|doi=10.1353/jod.2015.0056|s2cid=146531927|issn=1086-3214|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Amako|first=Satoshi|date=2 January 2018|title=China's authoritarian path to development: is democratization possible?, by Liang Tang, Abingdon, Routledge, 2017, 263pp., {{text|ISBN}}: 978-1-138-01647-7|journal=Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies|volume=7|issue=1|pages=81–83|doi=10.1080/24761028.2018.1483700|issn=2476-1028|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Tung|first=Hans H.|title=Economic Growth and Endogenous Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Reform China|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2019|isbn=978-3-030-04828-0|location=|pages=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Howell|first1=Jude|last2=Pringle|first2=Tim|date=2019|title=Shades of Authoritarianism and State–Labour Relations in China|journal=British Journal of Industrial Relations|language=en|volume=57|issue=2|pages=223–246|doi=10.1111/bjir.12436|s2cid=158485609|issn=1467-8543|url=https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/29847/1/Howell%20and%20Pringle_Shades%20of%20Authoritarianism_British_Journal_of_Industrial_Relations.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Düben|first=Björn Alexander|date=3 March 2020|title=Xi Jinping and the End of Chinese Exceptionalism|journal=Problems of Post-Communism|volume=67|issue=2|pages=111–128|doi=10.1080/10758216.2018.1535274|s2cid=158657283|issn=1075-8216}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Tung|first=Hans H.|title=Economic Growth and Endogenous Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Reform China|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2019|isbn=978-3-030-04828-0}}</ref>}} Xi has sometimes referred to as "[[Traditionalist conservatism|traditionalist]]" or "[[Conservatism in China#Neoauthoritarianism|neo-authoritarian]]".<ref>{{cite book |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Penguin_History_of_Modern_China/8t6VLxjTZ2IC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=%22Neo+Authoritarian%22+%22Xi%22&pg=RA2-PR32 |title=The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 - 2009 |date=May 29, 2008 |publisher=Penguin Books Limited |editor=Jonathan Fenby |page=xxxii |quote=Wang Huning, had fashioned the neo-authoritarian creed Xi was busy putting into practice.}}</ref><ref name="Yang">{{Cite news |last=Zi |first=Yang |date=July 6, 2016 |title=Xi Jinping and China's Traditionalist Restoration |url=https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinping-chinas-traditionalist-restoration/ |access-date=June 22, 2024 |work=The Jamestown Foundation}}</ref><ref name="Jane">{{Cite news |last=Cai |first=Jane |date=June 12, 2023 |title=How China's Xi Jinping promotes mix of Marxism and traditional culture to further Communist Party and 'Chinese dream' |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3223805/how-chinas-xi-jinping-promotes-mix-marxism-and-traditional-culture-further-communist-party-and |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230612111635/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3223805/how-chinas-xi-jinping-promotes-mix-marxism-and-traditional-culture-further-communist-party-and |archive-date=June 12, 2023 |access-date=June 22, 2024 |work=South China Morning Post}}</ref> Xi has additionally rejected [[Westernization|Westernisation]] as the only way to modernize, instead promoting what he says is "[[Chinese-style modernization|Chinese-style modernisation]]."<ref>{{Cite news |date=8 February 2023 |title=Xi Rejects Westernization in Show of Faith in Self Reliance |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-08/xi-calls-for-china-s-modernization-path-to-surpass-capitalism |access-date=10 February 2023}}</ref> He has identified five concepts as part of Chinese-style modernisation, including modernisation of a huge population, common prosperity, material and cultural-ethical advancement, harmony between humanity and nature, and peaceful development.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Xi |first=Jinping |date=16 October 2022 |title=Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects |work=[[Qiushi]] |url=http://en.qstheory.cn/2023-01/06/c_845251.htm |access-date=10 February 2023}}</ref> 

====Xi Jinping Thought====
{{main|Xi Jinping Thought}}
[[File:A political slogan on the wall in Longhua District, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China, picture1.jpg|thumb|A billboard promoting [[Xi Jinping Thought]] in [[Shenzhen]]]]

In September 2017, the CCP Central Committee decided that Xi's political philosophies, generally referred to as "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," would become part of the Party Constitution.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/18/c_1121683516.htm|script-title=zh:中共中央政治局召开会议 研究拟提请党的十八届七中全会讨论的文件-新华网|last1=Liu|first1=Xiaodong|last2=Chen|first2=Yu|date=18 September 2017|publisher=[[Xinhua News Agency]]|language=zh-hans|trans-title=The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Convened to Study the Documents to be Submitted to the Seventh Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011094706/http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-09/18/c_1121683516.htm|archive-date=11 October 2017|access-date=4 October 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2017/09/party-constitution-amendment-signal-xis-power/|title=CCP Constitution Amendment May Signal Xi's Power – China Digital Times (CDT)|last=Rudolph|first=Josh|date=19 September 2017|work=[[China Digital Times]] (CDT)|access-date=4 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171003234252/http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2017/09/party-constitution-amendment-signal-xis-power/|archive-date=3 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> Xi first made mention of the "Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" in his opening day speech delivered to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. His Politburo Standing Committee colleagues, in their own reviews of Xi's keynote address at the Congress, prepended the name "Xi Jinping" in front of "Thought."<ref name="xithought2">{{cite news|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/19/c_136689808.htm|title=CPC creates Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era|last1=Zhang|first1=Ling|date=18 October 2017|work=[[Xinhua News Agency]]|access-date=19 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018195301/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/19/c_136689808.htm|archive-date=18 October 2017}}</ref> On 24 October 2017, at its closing session, the 19th Party Congress approved the incorporation of Xi Jinping Thought into the Constitution of the CCP,<ref name="PhillipsGuardian2" /> while in March 2018, the National People's Congress changed the state constitution to include Xi Jinping Thought.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ken |first=Suzuki |date=27 November 2018 |title=China's New "Xi Jinping Constitution": The Road to Totalitarianism |url=https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a05803/ |access-date=11 August 2022 |website=nippon.com |language=en}}</ref>

[[File:201901 Xi Jinping's books at Shanghai Library.jpg|left|thumb|''[[The Governance of China]]'' in different languages presented at [[Shanghai Library]]]]

Xi himself has described the Thought as part of the broad framework created around socialism with Chinese characteristics, a term coined by Deng Xiaoping that places China in the [[primary stage of socialism]]. In official party documentation and pronouncements by Xi's colleagues, the Thought is said to be a continuation of [[Marxism–Leninism]], [[Mao Zedong Thought]], [[Deng Xiaoping Theory]], the [[Three Represents]], and the [[Scientific Outlook on Development]], as part of a series of guiding ideologies that embody "Marxism adopted to Chinese conditions" and contemporary considerations.<ref name="xithought2" /> It has additionally been described as the "21st century Marxism" by two professors in the Central Party School of the CCP.<ref name="Page-2020" /> [[Wang Huning]], a top political adviser and a close ally of Xi, has been described as pivotal to developing Xi Jinping Thought.<ref name="Page-2020" /> The concepts and context behind Xi Jinping Thought are elaborated in Xi's ''[[The Governance of China]]'' book series, published by the [[Foreign Languages Press]] for an international audience. Volume one was published in September 2014, followed by volume two in November 2017.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/07/c_136733705.htm|title=Second volume of Xi's book on governance published|last=Yang|first=Yi|date=7 November 2017|publisher=[[Xinhua News Agency]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171206143920/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/07/c_136733705.htm|archive-date=6 December 2017|access-date=6 December 2017}}</ref> ''[[Xuexi Qiangguo]]'', an app for teaching Xi Jinping Thought had become the most popular smartphone app in China in 2019, as the CCP launched a new campaign that calls on its cadres to immerse themselves in the political doctrine every day.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/2186037/chinas-most-popular-app-propaganda-tool-teaching-xi-jinping-thought|title=China's most popular app is a propaganda tool teaching Xi Jinping Thought|last=Huang|first=Zheping|date=14 February 2019|work=[[South China Morning Post]]|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190920105809/https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-social/article/2186037/chinas-most-popular-app-propaganda-tool-teaching-xi-jinping-thought|archive-date=20 September 2019}}</ref>

==Personal life==
===Family===
[[File:Peng Liyuan, Xi Jinping and Barack Obama in the Lincoln Bedroom.jpg|thumb|Xi Jinping, [[Peng Liyuan]] and U.S. president [[Barack Obama]] in the Lincoln Bedroom]]
Xi's first marriage was to [[Ke Lingling]], the daughter of [[Ke Hua]], China's ambassador to the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. They divorced within a few years.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/07/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-profile/index.html|title=Xi Jinping: From 'sent-down youth' to China's top|last=Yuan|first=Elizabeth|date=8 November 2012|publisher=[[CNN]]|access-date=8 November 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121108195546/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/07/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-profile/index.html|archive-date=8 November 2012}}</ref> The two were said to fight "almost every day," and after the divorce, Ke moved to England.<ref name="newyorker2" /> In 1987, Xi married the prominent Chinese folk singer Peng Liyuan.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-oct-23-fg-chileaders23-story.html|title=China's 'fifth generation' of leaders reflects nation's shifts|last=Magnier|first=Mark|date=23 October 2007|work=[[Los Angeles Times]]|access-date=21 December 2009|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110823133224/http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/23/world/fg-chileaders23|archive-date=23 August 2011}}</ref> Xi and Peng were introduced by friends as many Chinese couples were in the 1980s. Xi was reputedly academic during their courtship, inquiring about singing techniques.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/02/13/peng-liyuan-meet-chinas-folk-song-singing-first-lady-in-waiting/|title=Meet China's Folk Star First Lady-in-Waiting|last=Page|first=Jeremy|date=12 February 2012|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|access-date=7 November 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120511045002/http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/02/13/peng-liyuan-meet-chinas-folk-song-singing-first-lady-in-waiting/|archive-date=11 May 2012}}</ref> Peng Liyuan, a [[Celebrity|household name]] in China, was better known to the public than Xi until his political elevation. The couple frequently lived apart due largely to their separate professional lives. Peng has played a much more visible role as China's "first lady" compared to her predecessors; for example, Peng hosted U.S. First Lady [[Michelle Obama]] on her high-profile visit to China in March 2014.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://time.com/33164/michelle-obama-china-beijing-peng-liyuan/|title=Michelle Obama Tours Beijing With China's First Lady|last1=Beech|first1=Hannah|date=21 March 2014|newspaper=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]|access-date=17 July 2014|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140626122108/http://time.com/33164/michelle-obama-china-beijing-peng-liyuan/|archive-date=26 June 2014}}</ref>

Xi and Peng have a daughter named [[Xi Mingze]], who graduated from [[Harvard University]] in the spring of 2015. While at Harvard, she used a pseudonym and studied Psychology and English.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-did-chinas-first-daughter-find-in-america|title=What Did China's First Daughter Find in America?|last=Osnos|first=Evan|date=6 April 2015|magazine=[[The New Yorker]]|access-date=29 October 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181030035420/https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-did-chinas-first-daughter-find-in-america|archive-date=30 October 2018}}</ref> Xi's family has a home in [[Jade Spring Hill]], a garden and residential area in north-western Beijing run by the CMC.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hundreds-02202015111702.html|title=Beijing Police Detain Hundreds For Trying to Visit Chinese Leaders Over New Year|last=Qiao|first=Long|date=20 February 2015|publisher=[[Radio Free Asia]]|access-date=1 March 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180301164338/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hundreds-02202015111702.html|archive-date=1 March 2018}}</ref>

In June 2012, [[Bloomberg News]] reported that members of Xi's extended family have substantial business interests, although there was no evidence he had intervened to assist them.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/xi-jinping-millionaire-relations-reveal-fortunes-of-elite.html|title=Xi Jinping Millionaire Relations Reveal Fortunes of Elite|last1=Bennett|first1=Amanda|date=29 June 2012|publisher=[[Bloomberg News]]|access-date=11 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120704222305/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/xi-jinping-millionaire-relations-reveal-fortunes-of-elite.html|archive-date=4 July 2012|last2=Hirschberg|first2=Peter}}</ref> The Bloomberg News website was blocked in [[mainland China]] in response to the article.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/29/china-bloomberg-xi-jinping|title=China blocks Bloomberg for exposing financial affairs of Xi Jinping's family|last=Branigan|first=Tania|date=29 June 2012|newspaper=[[The Guardian]]|access-date=11 September 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131120041457/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/29/china-bloomberg-xi-jinping|archive-date=20 November 2013}}</ref> Since Xi embarked on an anti-corruption campaign, ''The New York Times'' reported members of his family were selling their corporate and real estate investments beginning in 2012.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/world/asia/chinas-president-xi-jinping-investments.html|title=As China's Leader Fights Graft, His Relatives Shed Assets|last1=Forsythe|first1=Michael|date=17 June 2012|work=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=16 July 2014|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140716105611/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/world/asia/chinas-president-xi-jinping-investments.html|archive-date=16 July 2014|url-access=registration}}</ref> Relatives of highly placed Chinese officials, including seven current and former senior leaders of the Politburo of the CCP, have been named in the [[Panama Papers]], including [[Deng Jiagui]],<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/04/the-panama-papers-are-super-awkward-for-beijing/|title=The Panama Papers are super awkward for Beijing|last1=Rauhala|first1=Emily|date=4 April 2016|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|url-access=limited|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160421044242/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/04/the-panama-papers-are-super-awkward-for-beijing/|archive-date=21 April 2016}}</ref> Xi's brother-in-law. Deng had two [[Shell corporation|shell companies]] in the [[British Virgin Islands]] while Xi was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, which became dormant by the time Xi became general secretary of the CCP in November 2012.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/04/world/xi-jinpings-family-linked-panama-papers|title=Xi Jinping's family linked to Panama Papers|last=Schmitz|first=Rob|date=4 April 2016|newspaper=[[Marketplace (radio program)|Marketplace]]|access-date=6 April 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407224017/http://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/04/world/xi-jinpings-family-linked-panama-papers|archive-date=7 April 2016}}</ref>

===Personality===
Peng described Xi as hardworking and down-to-earth: "When he comes home, I've never felt as if there's some leader in the house. In my eyes, he's just my husband."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/leadership/html/6.stm|title=China's Leaders|publisher=[[BBC News]]|access-date=26 August 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130808233513/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/leadership/html/6.stm|archive-date=8 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1992, ''[[The Washington Post]]'' journalist Lena H. Sun had an interview with Xi, then CCP secretary of Fuzhou; Sun described Xi as considerably more at ease and confident than many officials his age, and said that he talked without consulting notes.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sun |first=Lena H. |date=8 June 1992 |title=Post for a 'princeling' |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/06/08/post-for-a-princeling/3acd443c-37e3-45ff-9103-3a9f8b0a64ea/ |access-date=12 June 2023}}</ref> He was described in a 2011 ''The Washington Post'' article by those who know him as "pragmatic, serious, cautious, hard-working, down to earth and low-key." He was described as a good hand at problem solving and "seemingly uninterested in the trappings of high office."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/xi-jinping-likely-chinas-next-leader-called-pragmatic-low-key/2011/08/15/gIQA5W83GJ_story.html|title=Xi Jinping, likely China's next leader, called pragmatic, low-key|last=Richburg|first=Keith B.|date=15 August 2011|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|access-date=7 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191029173940/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/xi-jinping-likely-chinas-next-leader-called-pragmatic-low-key/2011/08/15/gIQA5W83GJ_story.html|archive-date=29 October 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> The Chinese state media has also cast him as a fatherly figure and a man of the people, determined to stand up for Chinese interests.<ref name="Myers-2018" />

===Soccer===
Xi is an avid soccer fan.<ref name="soccer">{{cite web|url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202310/10/WS65250929a31090682a5e7bf1.html|title=Xi shows off his football skill|work=[[China Daily]]|date=2023-10-10}}</ref> While working in Hebei, it was reported that Xi often asked his friend [[Nie Weiping]], a professional [[Go (game)|Go]] player, for soccer tickets.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-10/11/content_18723212_6.htm|title=What saddens President Xi Jinping?|work=[[China Daily]]|date=2014-10-11}}</ref> During a visit to [[Republic of Ireland|Ireland]] in 2012 as China's vice-president, Xi showcased his soccer technique at [[Croke Park]].<ref name="soccer" /> In 2011, Xi outlined a vision to turn China from a footballing minnow to a soccer superpower. He outlined a three-stage plan for the national team: to qualify for another [[FIFA World Cup|World Cup]], to host a World Cup and to win a World Cup.<ref name="foot">{{cite web |author1=Andrew McNicol |author2=Andrew Raine |date=2023-04-07 |title=Xi Jinping wanted China to be a global soccer power. What went wrong? |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/07/china/xi-jinping-china-football-dream-fail-intl-hnk-dst/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240712102342/https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/07/china/xi-jinping-china-football-dream-fail-intl-hnk-dst/index.html |archive-date=2024-07-12 |work=[[CNN]]}}</ref> In 2015, Xi approved China's 50-point plan for the sport, which included including soccer in the national school curriculum and setting up 50,000 soccer schools in the country by 2025.<ref>{{cite web|author=Tariq Panja|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/29/sports/soccer/china-soccer.html|title=China's Soccer Experiment Was a Flop. Now It May Be Over.|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=2023-03-29}}</ref> However, according to [[CNN]], "poor financial decisions and alleged high-level corruption coupled with a [[COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China|three-year pandemic]] have left the sport in tatters".<ref name="foot" /> In 2023, Xi said he is "not so sure" of the abilities of the national team.<ref>{{cite web |date=2023-11-19 |title=Xi says 'not so sure' of Chinese football team's abilities |url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/china-xi-not-so-sure-football-team-abilities-world-cup-3931906 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231214013447/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/china-xi-not-so-sure-football-team-abilities-world-cup-3931906 |archive-date=2023-12-14 |work=[[CNA (TV network)|Channel NewsAsia]]}}</ref>

=== Interests ===
Unlike previous Chinese leaders, Chinese state media has given a more encompassing view of Xi's private life, although still strictly controlled. According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi would swim one kilometer and walk every day as long as there was time, and is interested in foreign writers, especially Russian.<ref name="Blachard-2017" /> Some of his favorite foreign authors include [[Leo Tolstoy]], [[Mikhail Sholokhov]],<ref>{{Cite web |title=A look at what's on Chinese President Xi Jinping's shelves |url=https://www.usfq.edu.ec/sites/default/files/inline-files/a-look-at-whats-on-chinese-president-xi-jinpings-shelves.pdf |website=[[Universidad San Francisco de Quito]] |quote=Xi Jinping talks about Western literature [...] "Dostoevsky is the deepest Russian writer, while Tolstoy is the widest. Comparing two of them, I prefer Tolstoy." "I like Sholokhov very much. His And Quiet Flows the Don reflects the changes of the time very deeply."}}</ref> [[Victor Hugo]], [[Honoré de Balzac]], [[Johann Wolfgang von Goethe]] and [[Jack London]]. Xi reportedly invoked ''[[What Is to Be Done? (novel)|What Is to Be Done?]]'' by [[Nikolay Chernyshevsky]] as a guide during the [[16th BRICS summit]].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Garnaut |first1=John |last2=Chetwin |first2=Sam |date=2024-12-15 |title=This Unreadable Russian Novel Drives Xi's Struggle Against America |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/15/opinion/china-brics-xi-jinping-trump.html |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241215061246/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/15/opinion/china-brics-xi-jinping-trump.html |archive-date=2024-12-15 |access-date=2024-12-15 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en}}</ref> Xi is reported to also like films and TV shows such as ''[[Saving Private Ryan]]'',<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=8 February 2012 |title=China leader-in-waiting carries heavy political baggage to U.S. |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-xi-idUSTRE8170FZ20120208 |access-date=29 August 2022 |work=[[Reuters]] |language=en |quote=At a 2007 dinner with the U.S. ambassador to Beijing, Xi mentioned his affection for Hollywood films, including World War II stories such as "Saving Private Ryan," according to U.S. diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks.}}</ref> ''[[Sleepless in Seattle]]'', ''[[The Godfather]]''<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-10-19 |title=Xi Jinping: the making of a dictator |url=https://www.economist.com/1843/2022/10/19/xi-jinping-the-making-of-a-dictator |archive-url=https://archive.today/20221020045843/https://www.economist.com/1843/2022/10/19/xi-jinping-the-making-of-a-dictator |archive-date=2022-10-20 |access-date=2024-05-03 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613 |quote=He likes football, claims to swim 1,000 metres a day and is a fan of "Sleepless in Seattle", "The Godfather" and "Saving Private Ryan".}}</ref> and ''[[Game of Thrones]]'',<ref>{{cite news |date=28 April 2019 |title=Xi Jinping shows his love of Game of Thrones but warns reality must not mirror fantasy |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3007991/xi-jinping-shows-his-love-game-thrones-warns-reality-must-not |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190505041030/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3007991/xi-jinping-shows-his-love-game-thrones-warns-reality-must-not |archive-date=5 May 2019 |access-date=5 May 2019 |work=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref> and he has praised Chinese independent film-maker [[Jia Zhangke]].<ref>{{cite news |last=Branigan |first=Tania |date=13 February 2012 |title=The Guardian profile: Xi Jinping |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/13/xi-jinping-profile-china |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131106055944/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/13/xi-jinping-profile-china |archive-date=6 November 2013 |access-date=14 February 2012 |newspaper=[[The Guardian]] |location=UK}}</ref>

==Public image==
It is hard to gauge the opinion of the Chinese public on Xi, as no independent surveys exist in China and social media is heavily censored.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lin |first=Liza |date=13 October 2022 |title=Do Chinese People Like Xi Jinping? You Won't Find an Easy Answer Online |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-do-chinese-people-think-of-xi-jinping-its-very-hard-to-tell-11665664627 |access-date=17 October 2022 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> However, he is believed to be widely popular in the country.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Phillips |first=Tom |date=14 October 2017 |title=Chairman Xi crushes dissent but poor believe he's making China great |language=en-GB |work=[[The Guardian]] |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/xi-jinping-crushes-dissent-but-making-china-great-again |url-status=live |access-date=26 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190826122356/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/14/xi-jinping-crushes-dissent-but-making-china-great-again |archive-date=26 August 2019 |issn=0029-7712}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Zhou |first1=Christina |last2=Mantesso |first2=Sean |date=6 March 2019 |title='No room for mercy in this system': Xi Jinping's rise from cave dweller to post-modern chairman |language=en-AU |work=[[ABC News (Australia)]] |publisher= |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-06/the-astonishing-rise-of-chinese-president-xi-jinping/10794486 |url-status=live |access-date=26 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190826051002/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-06/the-astonishing-rise-of-chinese-president-xi-jinping/10794486 |archive-date=26 August 2019}}</ref> According to a 2014 poll co-sponsored by the [[John F. Kennedy School of Government|Harvard Kennedy School's]] [[Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation]], Xi ranked 9 out of 10 in domestic approval ratings.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-worlds-most-popular-leader-chinas-president-xi/|title=The World's Most Popular Leader: China's President Xi|last=Tiezzi|first=Shannon|date=20 December 2014|newspaper=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|language=en-US|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191027062238/https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-worlds-most-popular-leader-chinas-president-xi/|archive-date=27 October 2019|access-date=27 October 2019}}</ref> A [[YouGov]] poll released in July 2019 found that about 22% of people in mainland China list Xi as the person they admire the most, a plurality, although this figure was less than 5% for residents of Hong Kong.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2019/07/18/2019-worlds-most-admired|title=Michelle Obama is the world's most admired woman|last=Smith|first=Matthew|date=18 July 2019|website=[[YouGov]]|language=en-us|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190729151150/https://today.yougov.com/topics/international/articles-reports/2019/07/18/2019-worlds-most-admired|archive-date=29 July 2019|access-date=17 August 2019}}</ref>

In the spring of 2019, the Pew Research Center made a survey on confidence on Xi Jinping among six-country medians based on Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and South Korea, which indicated that a median 29% have confidence in Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs, meanwhile a median of 45% have no confidence; these numbers are slightly higher than those of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (23% confidence, 53% no confidence).<ref>{{cite news |last1=Silver |first1=Laura |last2=Devlin |first2=Kat |last3=Huang |first3=Christine |date=5 December 2019 |title=China's Economic Growth Mostly Welcomed in Emerging Markets, but Neighbors Wary of Its Influence |publisher=[[Pew Research Center]] |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/chinas-economic-growth-mostly-welcomed-in-emerging-markets-but-neighbors-wary-of-its-influence/ |access-date=4 August 2020}}</ref> A poll by [[Politico]] and [[Morning Consult]] in 2021 found that 5% of Americans have a favorable opinion of Xi, 38% unfavorable, 17% no opinion and 40%, a plurality, never hearing of him.<ref>{{Cite web |date=19–22 March 2021 |title=National Tracking Poll #2103129 |url=https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000178-6298-d5c9-ab7c-e79a8aa50000 |access-date=29 August 2022 |website=Morning Consult and Politico}}</ref>

In 2017, ''The Economist'' named him the most powerful person in the world.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/10/14/xi-jinping-has-more-clout-than-donald-trump-the-world-should-be-wary|title=Xi Jinping has more clout than Donald Trump. The world should be wary|date=14 October 2017|newspaper=[[The Economist]]|access-date=11 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190918133802/https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/10/14/xi-jinping-has-more-clout-than-donald-trump-the-world-should-be-wary|archive-date=18 September 2019|issn=0013-0613|url-access=subscription}}</ref> In 2018, ''[[Forbes]]'' ranked him as [[Forbes list of the World's Most Powerful People|the most powerful and influential person in the world]], replacing [[President of Russia|Russian President]] Vladimir Putin, who had been ranked so for five consecutive years.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2018/05/08/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2018/#7e7884216c47|title=The World's Most Powerful People 2018|last1=Ewalt|first1=David M.|date=31 May 2018|work=[[Forbes]]|access-date=7 September 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180509222602/https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2018/05/08/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2018/#7e7884216c47|archive-date=9 May 2018|author-link=David McWalter}}</ref> Since 2013, [[Reporters Without Borders]], an international non-profit and non-governmental organization with the stated aim of safeguarding the right to freedom of information, included Xi among the list of [[press freedom predator]]s.<ref>{{cite web |author= |date=17 November 2016 |title=Xi Jinping |url=https://rsf.org/en/predator/xi-jinping |access-date=1 November 2021 |website=[[Reporters Without Borders]] |publisher=}}</ref>

==Selected works==
{{main|Bibliography of Xi Jinping}}
*{{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=[[The Governance of China]]|volume=I|year=2014|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=978-7-119-09057-3}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=[[General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series]]|volume=I|year=2014|publisher=People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House|location=Beijing|isbn=978-7-119-09057-3}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=General Secretary Xi Jinping important speech series|volume=II|year=2016|publisher=People's Publishing House & Study Publishing House|location=Beijing|isbn=978-7-5147-0628-4}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=The Governance of China|volume=II|year=2017|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=978-7-119-11164-3 }}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=The Governance of China|volume=III|year=2020|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=978-7-119-12411-7 }}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=On History of the Communist Party of China|volume=|year=2021|publisher=Central Party Literature Press|location=Beijing|isbn=978-7-5073-4803-3}}
* {{cite book|last=Xi|first=Jinping|author-mask=|title=The Governance of China|volume=IV|year=2022|publisher=Foreign Languages Press|location=Beijing|isbn=978-7-119-13094-1 }}

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

==References==
===Citations===
{{reflist}}

===Works cited===
{{refbegin|40em}}
* {{Cite book|title=China's Management Revolution: Spirit, Land, Energy|last=Bouée|first=Charles-Edouard|publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]]|year=2010|isbn=978-0-230-28545-3|author-link=Charles-Édouard Bouée}}
* {{cite book|title=China's Emerging Technological Edge: Assessing the Role of High-End Talent|last1=Simon|first1=Denis Fred|last2=Cong|first2=Cao|year=2009|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|isbn=978-0-521-88513-3}}
* {{cite book|title=Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, or Retrogression?|last=Lam|first=Willy|year=2015|publisher=[[Routledge]]|isbn=978-0-7656-4209-7|author-link=Willy Lam}}
* {{Cite book|title=China's Political System|last=Heilmann|first=Sebastian|publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]]|year=2017|isbn=978-1-4422-7734-2|author-link=Sebastian Heilmann}}
* {{Cite book|title=Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping|last=Bougon|first=François|year=2018|publisher=[[C. Hurst & Co.]]|isbn=978-1-84904-984-9}}
* {{cite book|title=Handbook of the Politics of China|last=Goodman|first=David S. G.|year=2015|publisher=Edward Elga|isbn=978-1-78254-437-1|author-link=David S. G. Goodman}}
* {{cite book|title=The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State|last=Economy|first=Elizabeth C.|year=2018|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|isbn=978-0-19-086607-5|author-link=Elizabeth Economy}}
* {{cite book |title=CPC Futures: The New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics |date=2022 |publisher=[[National University of Singapore Press]] |isbn=978-981-18-5206-0 |location=Singapore |doi=10.56159/eai.52060 |oclc=1354535847 |doi-access=free|editor-last1=Pieke |editor-last2=Hofman |editor-first1=Frank N. |editor-first2=Bert |editor1-link=Frank N. Pieke}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |author-link=Christopher Marquis |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=2022 |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |others=Kunyuan Qiao |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |oclc=1348572572}}
* {{cite book |title=Party of One: The Rise of Xi Jinping and China's Superpower Future |date=2023 |publisher=[[Simon & Schuster]] |isbn=978-1-9821-8573-2 |page=48 |last=Wong|first=Chun Han}}

{{refend}}

==Further reading==
{{Library resources box}}
{{refbegin|30em}}
* {{cite journal|last1=Bulman|first1=David J.|last2=A. Jaros|first2=Kyle|title=Localism in retreat? Central-provincial relations in the Xi Jinping era|journal=Journal of Contemporary China|date=2021|volume=30|issue=131|pages=697–716|doi=10.1080/10670564.2021.1889228|s2cid=233928573|ref=none}}
* {{cite journal|last=Denton|first=Kirk|title=China Dreams and the 'Road to Revival|journal=Current Events in Historical Perspective|url=http://origins.osu.edu/article/china-dreams-and-road-revival|volume=8|date=2014|issue=3|pages=–1–12|ref=none}}
* {{cite journal|last=Economy|first=Elizabeth C.|title=China's New Revolution: The Reign of Xi Jinping|url=http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2018_MayJune_ForeignAffairs_ChinasNewRevolution.pdf|journal=Foreign Affairs|volume=97|date=2018|page=60|ref=none}}

* Esarey, Ashley; and Rongbin Han, eds. ''The Xi Jinping Effect'' (University of Washington Press, 2024) [https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=61434 online review of this book from H-DIPLO)]
* {{cite journal|last1=Foot|first1=Rosemary|first2=Amy|last2=King|title=Assessing the deterioration in China–US relations: US governmental perspectives on the economic-security nexus|journal=China International Strategy Review|year=2019|volume=1|pages=1–12 |doi=10.1007/s42533-019-00005-y|s2cid=195241090|ref=none |doi-access=free}}
* {{cite journal |last=Cabestan |first=Jean-Pierre |title=China's foreign and security policy institutions and decision-making under Xi Jinping |journal=British Journal of Politics and International Relations |year=2020 |page=1369148120974881|ref=none}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Dhar |first1=Bablu Kumar |last2=Mahazan |first2=Mutalib |title=Leadership of Xi Jinping behind Unstoppable Sustainable Economic Growth of China |journal=International Journal of Organizational Leadership |volume=9 |year=2020 |pages=39–47 |url=https://ijol.cikd.ca/article_60489_172f6b43f678a11b44043906eaafc1bc.pdf |ref=none }}
* {{cite journal |author1-link=Avery Goldstein |last=Goldstein |first=Avery |title=China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance |journal=International Security |volume=45 |issue=1 |year=2020 |pages=164–201 |doi=10.1162/isec_a_00383 |s2cid=220633947 |url=https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/45/1/164/1860463/isec_a_00383.pdf |ref=none }}
* {{cite news |last=Johnson |first=Ian |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120930091232/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/asia/aiming-for-top-xi-jinping-forged-ties-early-in-china.html |archive-date=30 September 2012 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |title=Changing of the Guard: Elite and Deft, Xi Aimed High Early in China |date=29 September 2012 |work=The New York Times |ref=none }}
* {{cite book |last=McGregor |first=Richard |title=Xi Jinping: The Backlash |publisher=Penguin Books Australia |year=2019 |isbn=978-1-76089-304-0 |ref=none}}
** includes McGregor, Richard. "Xi Jinping's Quest to Dominate China." ''Foreign Affairs'' 98 (Sept 2019): 18+.
* Magnus, George. ''Red Flags: Why Xi's China is in Danger'' (Yale UP, 2018).
* {{Cite book|last=Li|first=Cheng|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3NKACwAAQBAJ|title=Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership|date=2016|publisher=Brookings Institution Press|isbn=978-0-8157-2694-4|language=en}}
* {{cite journal |last=Mulvad |first=Andreas Møller |title=Xiism as a hegemonic project in the making: Sino-communist ideology and the political economy of China's rise |journal=Review of International Studies |volume=45 |issue=3 |year=2019 |pages=449–470|doi=10.1017/S0260210518000530 |s2cid=150473371 |ref=none}}
* {{cite news |author-link=Evan Osnos |last=Osnos |first=Evan |url=http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/02/chinas-valentines-day-in-washington.html |title=China's Valentine's Day in Washington |magazine=The New Yorker |date=14 February 2012 |ref=none }} Review of comment accompanying Xi's visit.
* {{cite news |author-link=Evan Osnos |last=Osnos |first=Evan |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red |title=Born Red: How Xi Jinping, an unremarkable provincial administrator, became China's most authoritarian leader since Mao |magazine=The New Yorker |date=30 March 2015 |ref=none }} Describes Xi Jinping's life.
* [[Evan Osnos|Osnos, Evan]], "China's Age of Malaise: Facing a grim economy, disillusioned youth, and fleeing entrepreneurs, Xi Jinping turns to the past," ''[[The New Yorker]]'', 30 October 2023, pp.&nbsp;34–45. "Xi [...] has abandoned Deng [Xiaoping]'s 'courageous experiments' and ushered [China] into a straitened new age." (p.&nbsp;34.) "Year by year, Xi appears more at home in the world of the man he calls his 'best and closest friend,' [[Vladimir Putin]]." (p.&nbsp;36.) "Can Xi's China still manage the pairing of [[autocracy]] and [[capitalism]]?" (p.&nbsp;37.) "At his core, a longtime observer told me, Xi is 'Mao with money.'" (p.&nbsp;38.) "Xi [has] got[ten] rid of anyone with power, [an] entrepreneur said: 'If you have influence, you have power. If you have capital, you have power.'" (p.&nbsp;40.)
* {{cite journal|last=Smith|first=Stephen N.|title=Harmonizing the periphery: China's neighborhood strategy under Xi Jinping|journal=Pacific Review|volume=34|date=2021|issue=1|pages=56–84|doi=10.1080/09512748.2019.1651383|s2cid=202329851|ref=none}}
* {{cite journal |last=Vogel |first=Ezra |title=The Leadership of Xi Jinping: A Dengist Perspective |journal=Journal of Contemporary China |year=2021 |volume=30 |issue=131 |pages=693–696|doi=10.1080/10670564.2021.1884955 |ref=none|doi-access=free }}
* {{cite journal |last=Zhang |first=Feng |title=The Xi Jinping Doctrine of China's International Relations |journal=Asia Policy |volume=14 |issue=3 |year=2019 |url=https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P4-2275866529/the-xi-jinping-doctrine-of-china-s-international-relations |ref=none |access-date=4 September 2019 |archive-date=4 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190904061419/https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P4-2275866529/the-xi-jinping-doctrine-of-china-s-international-relations }}
{{refend}}

==External links==
{{sister project links|c=Category:Xi Jinping|n=y|q=yes|s=yes|d=yes|b=no|v=no|voy=no|m=no|mw=no|wikt=no|species=no}}
* [http://www.chinavitae.com/biography_display.php?id=303 Biography] at Chinavitae.com
* {{C-SPAN|1028978}}
* [http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/xi-jinping/ Xi Jinping] collected news and commentary at the [[China Digital Times]]
* {{Guardian topic}}
* {{NYTtopic|people/x/xi_jinping}}
* [https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01nnw8l Xi Jinping 2012 profile] on [[BBC Radio Four]]
* {{cite episode|title=China, the U.S. & the Rise of Xi Jinping|series=Frontline|series-link=Frontline (American TV program)|network=[[PBS]]|station=[[WGBH-TV|WGBH]]|date=November 26, 2024|season=43|number=6|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/china-the-u-s-the-rise-of-xi-jinping/|access-date=November 27, 2024}}

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[[Category:People's Republic of China politicians from Beijing]]
[[Category:Persecution of Christians]]
[[Category:Persecution of Uyghurs]]
[[Category:Philosophers from Beijing]]
[[Category:Political office-holders in Hebei]]
[[Category:Presidents of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Recipients of Grand Collar of Palestine]]
[[Category:Recipients of the Olympic Order]]
[[Category:Recipients of Order of Friendship of Uzbekistan]]
[[Category:Recipients of the Order of the Liberator General San Martin]]
[[Category:Secretaries of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:Sent-down youths]]
[[Category:Tsinghua University alumni]]
[[Category:Vice presidents of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Victims of the Cultural Revolution]]