View source for Veto

{{Short description|Legal power to stop an official action, usually enactment of legislation}}
{{Other uses}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2024}}
[[File:President Ronald Reagan signing veto of defense authorization bill.jpg|thumb|270px|US President [[Ronald Reagan]] signing a veto of a bill]]

A '''veto''' is a legal power to unilaterally stop an official action. In the most typical case, a [[president (government title)|president]] or [[monarch]] vetoes a [[bill (law)|bill]] to stop it from becoming [[statutory law|law]]. In many countries, veto powers are established in the country's [[constitution]]. Veto powers are also found at other levels of government, such as in state, provincial or local government, and in international bodies.

Some vetoes can be overcome, often by a [[supermajority]] vote: [[Veto power in the United States|in the United States]], a two-thirds vote of the [[United States House of Representatives|House]] and [[United States Senate|Senate]] can override a presidential veto.<ref name="us-veto">[[Article One of the United States Constitution#Clause 2: From bills to law|Article I, Section 7, Clause 2]] of the [[United States Constitution]]</ref> Some vetoes, however, are absolute and cannot be overridden. For example, [[United Nations Security Council veto power|in the United Nations Security Council]], the five permanent members ([[China and the United Nations|China]], [[France and the United Nations|France]], [[Russia and the United Nations|Russia]], the [[United Kingdom and the United Nations|United Kingdom]], and the [[United States and the United Nations|United States]]) have an absolute veto over any Security Council [[United Nations resolution|resolution]].

In many cases, the veto power can only be used to prevent changes to the status quo. But some veto powers also include the ability to make or propose changes. For example, the [[Indian president]] can use an amendatory veto to propose amendments to vetoed bills.

The executive power to veto legislation is one of the main tools that the executive has in the [[legislative process]], along with the [[proposal power]].{{sfn|Palanza|Sin|2020|p=367}} It is most commonly found in [[presidential system|presidential]] and [[semi-presidential system]]s.<ref name="oecd-system"/> In [[parliamentary system]]s, the head of state often has either a weak veto power or none at all.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=5}} But while some political systems do not contain a formal veto power, all political systems contain veto players, people or groups who can use [[Power (social and political)|social and political power]] to prevent policy change.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}}

The word "veto" comes from the [[Latin]] for "I forbid". The concept of a veto originated with the [[Ancient Rome|Roman]] offices of [[Roman consul|consul]] and [[tribune of the plebs]]. There were two consuls every year; either consul could block military or civil action by the other. The tribunes had the power to unilaterally block any action by a [[Roman magistrate]] or the [[Senatus consultum|decrees]] passed by the [[Roman Senate]].<ref name="Spitzer">{{cite book |last=Spitzer |first=Robert J. |title=The presidential veto: touchstone of the American presidency |pages=1–2 |publisher=SUNY Press |year=2000 |isbn=978-0-88706-802-7}}</ref>

== History ==

=== Roman veto ===
[[File:Tiberius Gracchus.jpg|thumb|Tiberius Gracchus, Roman tribune]]
The institution of the veto, known to the Romans as the ''intercessio'', was adopted by the [[Roman Republic]] in the 6th century BC to enable the tribunes to protect the [[mandamus]] interests of the [[plebeians]] (common citizenry) from the encroachments of the [[Patrician (ancient Rome)|patricians]], who dominated the Senate. A tribune's veto did not prevent the senate from passing a bill but meant that it was denied the force of law. The tribunes could also use the veto to prevent a bill from being brought before the plebeian assembly. The consuls also had the power of veto, as decision-making generally required the assent of both consuls. If they disagreed, either could invoke the ''intercessio'' to block the action of the other. The veto was an essential component of the Roman conception of power being wielded not only to manage state affairs but to moderate and restrict the power of the state's high officials and institutions.<ref name="Spitzer" /> 

A notable use of the Roman veto occurred in the [[Gracchi brothers|Gracchan land reform]], which was initially spearheaded by the tribune [[Tiberius Gracchus]] in 133 BC. When Gracchus' fellow tribune [[Marcus Octavius]] vetoed the reform, the Assembly voted to remove him on the theory that a tribune must represent the interests of the plebeians. Later, senators outraged by the reform murdered Gracchus and several supporters, setting off a period of internal political violence in Rome.<ref>{{Cite book
  | isbn = 9781316061923
  | title = Law and Power in the Making of the Roman Commonwealth
  | author-first = Luigi 
  | author-last = Capogrossi Colognesi
  | publisher = Cambridge University Press
  | year = 2014
  | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=kMkZBQAAQBAJ
  | chapter = Tiberius Gracchus and the distribution of the ''ager publicus''
}}</ref>

=== Liberum veto ===
{{main|Liberum veto}}

In the constitution of the [[Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth]] in the 17th and 18th centuries, all bills had to pass the ''Sejm'' or "Seimas" (parliament) by [[unanimous]] consent, and if any legislator invoked the ''[[liberum veto]]'', this not only vetoed that bill but also all previous legislation passed during the session, and dissolved the legislative session itself. The concept originated in the idea of "Polish democracy" as any Pole of noble extraction was considered as good as any other, no matter how low or high his material condition might be. The more and more frequent use of this veto power paralyzed the power of the legislature and, combined with a string of weak figurehead kings, led ultimately to the [[Partitions of Poland|partitioning and the dissolution of the Polish state]] in the late 18th century.

=== Emergence of modern vetoes ===
[[File:P588 William III. giving his royal assent to the toleration act.jpg|thumb|[[William III of England]] granting royal assent to the [[Toleration Act 1688]] ]]

The modern executive veto derives from the European institution of [[royal assent]], in which the monarch's consent was required for bills to become law. This in turn had evolved from earlier royal systems in which laws were simply issued by the monarch, as was the case for example in England until the reign of [[Edward III of England|Edward III]] in the 14th century.{{sfn|Watson|1987|p=403}} In England itself, the power of the monarch to deny royal assent was not used after 1708, but it was used extensively in the British colonies. The heavy use of this power was mentioned in the [[U.S. Declaration of Independence]] in 1776.{{sfn|Watson|1987|p=404}}

Following the [[French Revolution]] in 1789, the royal veto was hotly debated, and hundreds of proposals were put forward for different versions of the royal veto, as either absolute, suspensive, or nonexistent.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | journal = Journal of the Western Society for French History
  | title = What was "Absolute" about the "Absolute veto"? Ideas of National Sovereignty and Royal Power in September 1789
  | author-first = Robert 
  | author-last = Blackman
  | volume = 32
  | year = 2004
  | hdl = 2027/spo.0642292.0032.008
 | url = http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.0642292.0032.008
}}</ref> With the adoption of the [[French Constitution of 1791]], King [[Louis XVI]] lost his absolute veto and acquired the power to issue a suspensive veto that could be overridden by a majority vote in two successive sessions of the Legislative Assembly, which would take four to six years.<ref name="longman-2014">{{Cite book
  | title = The Longman Companion to the French Revolution
  | author-first = Colin 
  | author-last = Jones
  | publisher = Routledge
  | year = 2014
  | page = 67
  | isbn = 9781317870807 
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=xcXKAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA67
}}</ref> With the abolition of the monarchy in 1792, the question of the French royal veto became moot.<ref name="longman-2014"/>

The presidential veto was conceived in by [[classical republicanism|republicans]] in the 18th and 19th centuries as a counter-majoritarian tool, limiting the power of a legislative majority.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|pp=12-13}} Some republican thinkers such as [[Thomas Jefferson]], however, argued for eliminating the veto power entirely as a relic of monarchy.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=13}} To avoid giving the president too much power, most early presidential vetoes, such as the [[veto power in the United States]], were qualified vetoes that the legislature could override.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=13}} But this was not always the case: the Chilean constitution of 1833, for example, gave that country's president an absolute veto.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=13}}

== Types ==
Most modern vetoes are intended as a check on the power of the government, or a [[branch of government]], most commonly the legislative branch. Thus, in governments with a [[separation of powers]], vetoes may be classified by the branch of government that enacts them: an executive veto, [[legislative veto]], or [[judicial veto]].

However, other types of veto power have safeguarded other interests. The denial of [[royal assent]] by governors in the British colonies, which continued well after the practice had ended in Britain itself, served as a check by one level of government against another.{{sfn|Watson|1987|p=403}} Vetoes may also be used to safeguard the interests of particular groups within a country. The veto power of the ancient Roman tribunes protected the interests of one social class (the plebeians) against another (the patricians).{{sfn|Watson|1987|p=402}} In the transition from [[apartheid]], a "white veto" to protect the interests of [[white South Africans]] was proposed but not adopted.<ref>{{Cite news
  | url =  https://www.newsweek.com/apartheid-ash-heap-191424
  | access-date = 2022-06-17
  | title = Apartheid on the Ash Heap
  | author =  Joe Contreras
  | work = Newsweek 
  | date = 1993-11-28
}}</ref> More recently, [[indigenous veto]]es over industrial projects on indigenous land have been proposed following the 2007 [[Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples]], which requires the "free, prior and informed consent" of indigenous communities to development or resource extraction projects on their land. However, many governments have been reluctant to allow such a veto.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | title = Indigenous Veto Power in Bolivia
  | author-first = Jessie 
  | author-last = Shaw
  | pages = 231–238
  | year = 2017
  | doi = 10.1080/10402659.2017.1308737
  | journal = Peace Review
| volume = 29 
 | issue = 2 
 | s2cid = 149072601 
 }}</ref>

Vetoes may be classified by whether the vetoed body can override them, and if so, how. An absolute veto cannot be overridden at all. A qualified veto can be overridden by a [[supermajority]], such as two-thirds or three-fifths. A suspensory veto, also called a suspensive veto, can be overridden by a simple majority, and thus only delays the law from coming into force.<ref>{{cite book
  | title = Black's Law Dictionary
  | editor-first = Bryan
  | editor-last = Garner
  | page = 4841
  | edition = 8th
  | year = 2004
}}</ref>

=== Types of executive vetoes ===
[[File:President William J. Clinton Signing Line Item Veto Letters - NARA - 77861673.jpg|thumb|right|US President [[Bill Clinton]] signing cancellation letters related to his [[line-item veto in the United States|line-Item vetoes]] for the [[Balanced Budget Act of 1997]] ]]

A package veto, also called a "block veto" or "full veto", vetoes a [[legislative act]] as a whole. Conversely, a partial veto, also called a [[line-item veto]], allows the executive to object only to some specific part of the law while allowing the rest to stand. An executive with a partial veto has a stronger negotiating position than an executive with only a package veto power.<ref name="oecd-system"/>
{{anchor|Amendatory veto}}<!-- redirect target from [[Amendatory veto]] -->
An amendatory veto or amendatory observation returns legislation to the legislature with proposed amendments, which the legislature may either adopt or override. The effect of legislative inaction may vary: in some systems, if the legislature does nothing, the vetoed bill fails, while in others, the vetoed bill becomes law. Because the amendatory veto gives the executive a stronger role in the legislative process, it is often seen as a marker of a particularly strong veto power.

Some veto powers are limited to budgetary matters (as with line-item vetoes in some US states, or the financial veto in New Zealand).{{sfn|NCSL|1998|p=6-29}} Other veto powers (such as in Finland) apply only to non-budgetary matters; some (such as in South Africa) apply only to constitutional matters. A veto power that is not limited in this way is known as a "policy veto".<ref name="oecd-system"/>

One type of budgetary veto, the reduction veto, which is found in several US states, gives the executive the authority to reduce budgetary appropriations that the legislature has made.{{sfn|NCSL|1998|p=6-29}} When an executive is given multiple different veto powers, the procedures for overriding them may differ. For example, in the US state of Illinois, if the legislature takes no action on a reduction veto, the reduction simply becomes law, while if the legislature takes no action on an amendatory veto, the bill dies.<ref>{{Cite web
  | url = https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/glossary.asp#V
  | access-date = 2022-06-18
  | title = Legislative Glossary
  | publisher = Illinois General Assembly
  | archive-date = 24 May 2024
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20240524113700/https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/glossary.asp#V
  | url-status = dead
  }}</ref>

A [[pocket veto]] is a veto that takes effect simply by the executive or head of state taking no action. In the United States, the pocket veto can only be exercised near the end of a legislative session; if the deadline for presidential action passes ''during'' the legislative session, the bill will simply become law.{{sfn|Watson|1987|p=407}} The legislature cannot override a pocket veto.{{sfn|Palanza|Sin|2020|p=367}}

Some veto powers are limited in their subject matter. A constitutional veto only allows the executive to veto bills that are [[unconstitutional]]; in contrast, a "policy veto" can be used wherever the executive disagrees with the bill on policy grounds.<ref name="oecd-system">{{Cite web
  | url = https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/025c3909-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/025c3909-en
  | access-date = 2022-06-13
  | title = 4. System of government
  | work = Constitutions in OECD Countries: A Comparative Study : Background Report in the Context of Chile's Constitutional Process
  | archive-date = 13 April 2022
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220413005753/https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/025c3909-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/025c3909-en
  | url-status = dead
  }}</ref> Presidents with constitutional vetoes include those of Benin and South Africa.

=== Legislative veto ===
{{main|Legislative veto}}

A legislative veto is a veto power exercised by a legislative body. It may be a veto exercised by the legislature against an action of the executive branch, as in the case of the [[legislative veto in the United States]], which is found in 28 US states.<ref>{{Cite web
  | url = https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-legislative-oversight.aspx
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
  | title = Separation of Powers: Legislative Oversight
  | publisher = National Conference of State Legislatures
  | archive-date = 10 May 2023
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230510214353/https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-legislative-oversight.aspx
  | url-status = dead
  }}</ref> It may also be a veto power exercised by one chamber of a [[bicameral legislature]] against another, such as was formerly held by members of the [[Senate of Fiji]] appointed by the [[Great Council of Chiefs]].<ref>{{Cite journal
  | title =  A tale of three constitutions: Ethnicity and politics in Fiji
  | author1-first = Yash 
  | author1-last = Ghai
  | author2-first = Jill 
  | author2-last = Cottrell
  | journal = International Journal of Constitutional Law
  | volume = 5
  | issue = 4
  | year = 2007
  | pages = 639–669
  | doi = 10.1093/icon/mom030| doi-access = free
  }}</ref>

=== Veto over candidates ===
In certain political systems, a particular body is able to exercise a veto over candidates for an elected office. This type of veto may also be referred to by the broader term "[[vetting]]".

Historically, certain European Catholic monarchs were able to veto candidates for the [[papacy]], a power known as the ''[[jus exclusivae]]''. This power was used for the last time in 1903 by [[Franz Joseph I of Austria]].<ref>{{Cite book
  | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=eBZFL5fzwawC&pg=PA35
  | page = 35
  | isbn = 9781402729546
  | title = Selecting the Pope: Uncovering the Mysteries of Papal Elections
  | author-first = Greg 
  | author-last = Tobin
  | publisher = Sterling Publishing Company
  | year = 2009
}}</ref>

In Iran, the [[Guardian Council]] has the power to approve or disapprove candidates, in addition to its veto power over legislation.

In China, following a pro-democracy landslide in the [[2019 Hong Kong local elections]], in 2021 the [[National People's Congress]] approved [[2021 Hong Kong electoral changes|a law]] that gave the [[Candidate Eligibility Review Committee]], appointed by the [[Chief Executive of Hong Kong]], the power to veto candidates for the [[Hong Kong Legislative Council]].<ref>{{Cite news
  | url =  https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3141117/hong-kong-electoral-changes-powerful-vetting-committee-will
  | access-date = 2022-06-13
  | title = Hong Kong electoral changes: powerful vetting committee that will review hopefuls in coming polls holds first meeting
  | newspaper = South China Morning Post
  | author-first = Christy 
  | author-last = Leung
  | date = 2021-07-14
}}</ref>

== Balance of powers ==
{{main|Balance of powers}}

In presidential and semi-presidential systems, the veto is a legislative power of the presidency, because it involves the president in the process of making law. In contrast to proactive powers such as the [[proposal power|ability to introduce legislation]], the veto is a reactive power, because the president cannot veto a bill until the legislature has passed it.{{sfn|Croissant|2003|p=72}}

Executive veto powers are often ranked as comparatively "strong" or "weak". A veto power may be considered stronger or weaker depending on its scope, the time limits for exercising it and requirements for the vetoed body to override it. In general, the greater the majority required for an override, the stronger the veto.<ref name="oecd-system"/>

Partial vetoes are less vulnerable to override than package vetoes,<ref name="metcalf-2000">{{Cite journal
  | author-first = Lee Kendall
  | author-last = Metcalf
  | year = 2000
  | title = Measuring Presidential Power
  | journal = Comparative Political Studies
  | volume = 33
  | issue = 5
  | page = 670 
  | doi = 10.1177/0010414000033005004 
  | s2cid = 154874901
 }}</ref> and political scientists who have studied the matter have generally considered partial vetoes to give the executive greater power than package vetoes.{{sfn|Palanza|Sin|2020|p=375}} However, empirical studies of the line-item veto in US state government have not found any consistent effect on the executive's ability to advance its agenda.{{sfn|Palanza|Sin|2020|p=374}} Amendatory vetoes give greater power to the executive than deletional vetoes, because they give the executive the power to move policy closer to its own preferred state than would otherwise be possible.{{sfn|Palanza|Sin|2020|p=382}} But even a suspensory package veto that can be overridden by a simple majority can be effective in stopping or modifying legislation. For example, in Estonia in 1993, president [[Lennart Meri]] was able to successfully obtain amendments to the proposed Law on Aliens after issuing a suspensory veto of the bill and proposing amendments based on expert opinions on European law.<ref name="metcalf-2000"/> <!-- An amendatory veto... -->

== Worldwide ==
[[File:UN-Sicherheitsrat - UN Security Council - New York City - 2014 01 06.jpg|thumb|United Nations Security Council meeting room]]

Globally, the executive veto over legislation is characteristic of [[presidential system|presidential]] and [[semi-presidential system]]s, with stronger veto powers generally being associated with stronger presidential powers overall.<ref name="oecd-system"/> In [[parliamentary system]]s, the veto power of the head of state is typically weak or nonexistent.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=5}} In particular, in [[Westminster system]]s and most [[constitutional monarchies]], the power to veto legislation by withholding [[royal assent]] is a rarely used [[reserve power]] of the monarch. In practice, the Crown follows the convention of exercising its prerogative on the advice of parliament.

=== International bodies ===
* {{flag|United Nations}}: The five permanent members of the [[United Nations Security Council]] have an absolute veto over Security Council resolutions, except for procedural matters.<ref name="un-27">{{Cite web
  | title = Charter of the United Nations: Chapter V – The Security Council: Article 27
  | url = https://legal.un.org/repertory/art27.shtml
  | access-date = 2022-06-15
  | work = Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs
  | publisher = United Nations
}}</ref> Every permanent member has used this power at some point.<ref name="un-voting">{{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/voting-system
  | access-date = 2022-06-15
  | title = Voting System 
  | publisher =  United Nations Security Council
  | quote = All five permanent members have exercised the right of veto at one time or another. If a permanent member does not fully agree with a proposed resolution but does not wish to cast a veto, it may choose to abstain, thus allowing the resolution to be adopted if it obtains the required number of nine favourable votes.
}}</ref> A permanent member that wants to disagree with a resolution, but not to veto it, can abstain.<ref name="un-voting"/> The first country to use the latter power was the [[USSR]] in 1946, after its amendments to a resolution regarding the withdrawal of British troops from Lebanon and Syria were rejected.<ref>{{Cite web
  | url = https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.23
  | title = Twenty-Third Meeting
  | date = 1946-02-16
  | access-date = 2022-06-15
  | publisher = United Nations
}}</ref>{{further|United Nations Security Council veto power}}
* {{flag|European Union}}:  The members of the [[Council of the European Union|EU Council]] have veto power in certain areas, such as foreign policy and the accession of a new member state, due to the requirement of unanimity in these areas. For example, Bulgaria has used this power to block [[Accession of North Macedonia to the European Union|accession talks for North Macedonia]],<ref>{{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/bulgaria-sets-3-conditions-for-lifting-north-macedonia-veto/
  | access-date = 2022-06-15
  | title = Bulgaria sets 3 conditions for lifting North Macedonia veto
  | work = EURACTIV.com
  | author = Krassen Nikolov
  | date = 2022-06-09
}}</ref> and in the 1980s, the United Kingdom (then a member of the EU's precursor, the [[European Economic Community|EEC]]) secured the [[UK rebate]] by threatening to use its veto power to stall legislation.<ref>{{Cite book
  | title = Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union
  | author-first = Jonathan B. 
  | author-last = Slapin
  | year = 2011
  | publisher = University of Michigan Press
  | doi = 10.2307/j.ctt1qv5nfq
  | url = https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1qv5nfq
  | page =  123
  | isbn = 9780472117932
  | chapter = Exit Threats, Veto Rights, and Integration
| jstor = j.ctt1qv5nfq 
 }}</ref> In addition, when the [[Parliament of the European Union|Parliament]] and Council delegate legislative authority to the [[European Commission|Commission]], they can provide for a [[legislative veto]] over regulations that the Commission issues under that delegated authority.<ref>{{Cite web
  | url =  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E290:en:HTML
  | access-date = 2022-06-15
  | work = EUR-Lex
  | title =  Article 290 
}}</ref><ref name="schuetze-2011">{{Cite journal
  | title = 'Delegated' Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis 
  | author-first = Robert 
  | author-last = Schütze 
  |journal = The Modern Law Review 
  | date = September 2011
  | volume = 74
  | issue = 5
  | pages = 661–693 
 | doi = 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2011.00866.x 
 | jstor = 41302774 
 | s2cid = 219376667 
 | url = https://www.jstor.org/stable/41302774| url-access = subscription}}</ref> This power was first introduced in 2006 as "regulatory procedure with scrutiny", and since 2009 as "delegated acts" under the [[Lisbon Treaty]].<ref name="dearth">{{Cite web
  | url =  https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/10/25/a-dearth-of-legislative-vetoes/
  | access-date = 2022-06-15
  | title = A dearth of legislative vetoes: Why the Council and Parliament have been reluctant to veto Commission legislation
  | author1-first = Michael K.
  | author1-last = Kaeding
  | author2-first = Kevin M.
  | author2-last = Stack
  | date = 2016-10-25
}}</ref> This legislative veto power has been used sparingly: from 2006 to 2016, the Parliament issued 14 vetoes and the Council issued 15.<ref name="dearth"/>{{further|Voting in the Council of the European Union|European Union legislative procedure}}

=== Africa ===
[[File:Africa just countries.svg|thumb|Africa]]
*{{flag|Benin}}: The [[President of Benin|president]] can return legislation to the [[National Assembly of Benin|National Assembly]] for reconsideration within 15 days (or 5 days if the legislation is declared urgent).{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=19}} The National Assembly can override the veto by passing the legislation once again by an [[absolute majority]].{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=19}}<ref name="benin-57">{{Cite constitution | polity = Benin | date = 1990 | article = 57}}</ref> If the president then vetoes the legislation a second time, the National Assembly can ask the [[Constitutional Court of Benin|Constitutional Court]] to rule on its constitutionality. If the Court rules that the legislation is constitutional, it becomes law.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=33}}<ref name="benin-57"/> If the president neither approves nor returns legislation within the prescribed 15- or 5-day period, this operates as a veto, and the National Assembly can petition the Court to declare the law constitutional and effective.<ref name="benin-57"/> This occurred for example in 2008, when [[Boni Yayi|President Yayi]] did not take action on a bill that would set an end date to the "exceptional measures" by which he had kept the National Assembly in session. After pocket-vetoing the bill in this way, the president petitioned the Court for constitutional review.<ref name="dcc08-171"/> The Court ruled that once the deadline for presidential action had passed, only the National Assembly could petition for review, which it did (and prevailed).<ref name="dcc08-171">{{Cite web
  | url = https://courconstitutionnellebenin.bj/old/upload/decision/DCC08-171.pdf
  | language = French
  | access-date = 2022-06-14
  | title = DCC08-171
  | date = 2008-12-04
  | author = Constitutional Court of Benin
  | archive-date = 19 June 2022
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220619063256/https://courconstitutionnellebenin.bj/old/upload/decision/DCC08-171.pdf
  | url-status = dead
  }}</ref>{{further|Politics of Benin}}
*{{flag|Cameroon}}: The [[President of Cameroon|president]] has the power to send bills back to the [[Parliament of Cameroon|Parliament]] for a second reading.<ref name="cameroon-19">{{cite constitution | polity = Cameroon | date =2008 | article = 19}}</ref> This power must be exercised within 15 days.<ref>{{Cite constitution| polity = Cameroon | date = 2008 | article = 31}}</ref> On second reading the bill must be passed by an [[absolute majority]] to become law.<ref name="cameroon-19"/>{{further|Government of Cameroon}}
*{{flag|Liberia}}: The [[President of Liberia|president]] has package, line item and pocket veto powers under Article 35 of the 1986 [[Constitution of Liberia|Constitution]]. The President has twenty days to sign a bill into law, but may veto either the entire bill or parts of it, after which the [[Legislature of Liberia|Legislature]] must re-pass it with a two-thirds majority of both houses. If the President does not sign a bill within twenty days and the Legislature adjourns, the bill fails.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=8}}{{further|Politics of Liberia}}
*{{flag|South Africa}}: The [[President of South Africa|president]] has a weak constitutional veto.<ref>{{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2019-11-21-no-sir-the-president-does-not-have-the-power-to-veto-the-copyright-bill/
  | access-date = 2022-06-13
  | title = No Sir, the president does not have the power to veto the Copyright Bill
  | author = [[Pierre de Vos]]
  | date = 2019-11-20
}}</ref> The president can return a bill to the [[National Assembly of South Africa|National Assembly]] if the president has reservations about the bill's constitutionality.<ref name="south-africa-79">{{Cite constitution | polity = South Africa | date = 2012 | article = 79}}</ref> If the National Assembly passes the bill a second time, the president must either sign it or refer it to the [[Constitutional Court of South Africa]] for a final decision on whether the bill is constitutional.<ref name="south-africa-79"/> If there are no constitutional concerns, the president's assent to legislation is mandatory.{{further|Politics of South Africa}}
*{{flag|Uganda}}: The [[President of Uganda|president]] has package veto and item veto powers.<ref name="uganda-91">{{Cite constitution | polity = Uganda | date = 2017 | article = 91}}</ref> This power must be exercised within 30 days of receiving the legislation.<ref name="uganda-91"/> The first time the president returns a bill to the [[Parliament of Uganda|Parliament]], the Parliament can pass it again by a simple majority vote. If the president returns it a second time, the Parliament can override the veto with a two-thirds vote.<ref name="uganda-91"/> This occurred for example in the passage of the Income Tax Amendment Act 2016, which exempted legislators' allowances from taxation.<ref>{{Cite news
  | url =  https://www.independent.co.ug/kadaga-income-tax-amendment-bill-now-law/
  | access-date = 2022-06-13
  | title = KADAGA: Income Tax Amendment Bill is now law
  | newspaper = The Independent|location=Uganda
  | date = 2016-12-22
}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book
  | chapter = Interaction Between MPs and Civil Society Is Needed
  | author-first = Agnes 
  | author-last = Titriku
  | editor = R. Stapenhurst 
  | display-editors = etal 
  | title = Anti-Corruption Evidence, Studies in Public Choice 34
  | doi = 10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_5
| s2cid = 198750839 
 }}</ref>{{further|Politics of Uganda}}
*{{flag|Zambia}}: Under the 1996 constitution, the [[President of Zambia|president]] had an absolute pocket veto: if he neither assented to legislation nor returned it to parliament for a potential override, it was permanently dead.{{sfn|Bulmer|2017|p=31}} This unusual power was eliminated in a general reorganization of the Constitution's legislative provisions in 2016.<ref>{{Cite web
  | url = https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/bills/National%20Assembly%20Bill%2017-2015.PDF
  | year = 2015
  | title = The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) (N.A.B. 17, 2015)
  | publisher = Parliament of Zambia
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160109092321/https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/bills/National%20Assembly%20Bill%2017-2015.PDF
  | archive-date = 9 January 2016
  | url-status = live
}}</ref><ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Zambia | date = 2016 | article = 66}}</ref>{{further|Politics of Zambia}}

=== Americas ===
[[File:Amerika.PNG|thumb|The Americas]]
* {{flag|Brazil}}: The [[President of Brazil|President of the Republic]] is entitled to veto, entirely or partially, any bill which passes both houses of the [[National Congress of Brazil|National Congress]], exceptions made to [[Constitution of Brazil|constitutional amendments]] and congressional decrees. The partial veto can involve the entirety of paragraphs, articles or items, not being allowed to veto isolated words or sentences. National Congress has the right to override the presidential veto if the majority of members from each of both houses agree to, that is, 257 [[Chamber of Deputies of Brazil|deputies]] and 41 [[Federal Senate of Brazil|senators]]. If these numbers are not met, the presidential veto stands.<ref>[https://www.congressonacional.leg.br/materias/vetos/entenda-a-tramitacao-do-veto "Entenda a tramitação do veto"] [Understand the processing of a veto]. National Congress of Brazil. Accessed 15 October 2022.</ref>{{further|Government of Brazil}}
* {{flag|Canada}}: The [[King-in-Council]] (in practice the [[Cabinet of the United Kingdom]]) might instruct the [[Governor General of Canada|governor general]] to withhold the king's assent, allowing the sovereign two years to disallow the bill, thereby vetoing it.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Canada | date = 1867 | article = 53}}</ref> Last used in 1873, the power was effectively nullified diplomatically and politically by the [[Balfour Declaration of 1926]], and legally by the [[Statute of Westminster 1931]]. At the province level, [[lieutenant governor (Canada)|lieutenant governors]] can reserve royal assent to provincial bills for consideration by the [[Cabinet of Canada|federal cabinet]]. This clause was last invoked in 1961 by the lieutenant governor of Saskatchewan.<ref>Jackson, Michael. [http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/bastedo_frank_lindsay_1886-1973.html "Bastedo, Frank Lindsay (1886–1973)"]. ''Encyclopedia of Saskatachewan''. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130524112727/http://esask.uregina.ca/entry/bastedo_frank_lindsay_1886-1973.html |date=24 May 2013 }}. Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina.</ref> In addition, the Governor General in Council (federal cabinet) may disallow an enactment of a provincial legislature within one year of its passage. {{further|Disallowance and reservation in Canada}}
*{{flag|Dominican Republic}}: The [[President of the Dominican Republic|president]] has only a package veto ({{lang|es|observación a la ley}}), which must be exercised within 10 days after the legislation is passed.<ref name="dr-102">{{cite constitution | article = 102 | polity = the Dominican Republic | date = 2015}}</ref> The veto must include a rationale.<ref name="dr-102"/> If both chambers of the [[Congress of the Dominican Republic]] vote to override the veto, the bill becomes law.<ref name="dr-102"/>{{further|Government of the Dominican Republic}}
*{{flag|Ecuador}}: The [[president of Ecuador|president]] has powers of package veto and amendatory veto ({{lang|es|veto parcial}}).{{sfn|Tsebelis|Alemán|2005|p=406}} The president must issue a veto within 10 days after the bill is passed. The [[National Assembly (Ecuador)|National Assembly]] can override an amendatory veto by a two-thirds majority of all members, but if it does not do so within 30 days of the veto, the legislation becomes law with the president's amendments.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Alemán|2005|p=406}}<ref>{{Cite journal
  | author1-last = Basabe-Serrano
  | author1-first = Santiago
  | author2-last = Huertas-Hernández
  | author2-first = Sergio
  | year = 2020
  | title = Legislative override and particularistic bills in unstable democracies: Ecuador in comparative perspective
  | journal = The Journal of Legislative Studies
  | volume = 27
  | issue = 2
  | page = 15
  | ref = {{harvid|Basabe-Serrano|2020}}
  | doi = 10.1080/13572334.2020.1810902
| s2cid = 224949744
 }}</ref> The National Assembly overrides approximately 20% of amendatory vetoes.{{sfn|Basabe-Serrano|2020|pp=6–7}} The legislature must wait for a year before overriding a package veto.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Alemán|2005|p=406}}{{further|Government of Ecuador}}
*{{flag|El Salvador}}: The [[president of El Salvador|president]] has both package veto and amendatory veto powers, which must be exercised within eight days of the legislation being passed by the [[Legislative Assembly of El Salvador|Legislative Assembly]].{{sfn|Tsebelis|Alemán|2005|p=405}} If the Legislative Assembly does not vote on an amendatory veto, the legislation fails. The Legislative Assembly can either accept or override an amendatory veto by a simple majority. Overriding a block veto requires a two-thirds supermajority.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Alemán|2005|p=405}}{{further|Government of El Salvador}}
*{{flag|Mexico}}: The [[president of Mexico|president]] has both package veto and amendatory veto powers, which must be exercised within ten days of the legislation being passed by the [[Congress of the Union]].{{sfn|Tsebelis|Alemán|2005|p=405}} Congress may override either type of veto by a two-thirds majority of voting members in each chamber.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Alemán|2005|p=405}} However, in the case of an amendatory veto, Congress must first consider whether to accept the proposed amendments, which it may do by a simple majority of both chambers.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Alemán|2005|pp=405, 420}}{{further|Government of Mexico}}
* {{flag|United States}}: At the federal level, the [[President of the United States|president]] may veto bills passed by Congress, and Congress may override the veto by a two-thirds vote of each chamber.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = the United States | date = 1789 | article = I | section = 7 }}</ref> A [[line-item veto]] was briefly enacted in the 1990s, but was declared an unconstitutional violation of the [[separation of powers]] by the Supreme Court. At the state level, all 50 state governors have a full veto, similar to the presidential veto.<ref name="ncsl-executive">{{Cite web
  | url = https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-executive-veto-powers.aspx
  | access-date = 2022-06-11
  | title = Separation of Powers – Executive Veto Powers
  | author = National Conference of State Legislatures
  | quote = Every state constitution empowers the governor to veto an entire bill passed by the legislature.
  | archive-date = 28 June 2022
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220628181121/https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/separation-of-powers-executive-veto-powers.aspx
  | url-status = dead
  }}</ref> Many state governors also have additional kinds of vetoes, such as amendatory, line-item, and reduction vetoes.<ref name="ncsl-executive"/> Gubernatorial veto powers vary in strength. The president and some state governors have a "[[pocket veto]]", in that they can delay signing a bill until after the legislature has adjourned, which effectively kills the bill without a formal veto and without the possibility of an override.{{sfn|Watson|1987|p=407}}<ref>{{Cite book
  | title = Inside the Legislative Process
  | url = https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/inside-the-legislative-process.aspx#GenlProcedures
  | chapter = The Veto Process
  | chapter-url = https://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ilp/98tab6pt3.pdf
  | publisher = National Conference of State Legislatures
  | year = 1998
  | pages = 6–31
  | ref = {{harvid|NCSL|1998}}
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20100115021825/https://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ilp/98tab6pt3.pdf
  | archive-date = 15 January 2010
  | url-status = live
}}</ref>{{further|Veto power in the United States|Line-item veto in the United States|Legislative veto in the United States}}

=== Asia ===
[[File:Map of Asia.png|thumb|Asia]]
* {{flag|China}}: Under the [[Constitution of the People's Republic of China|Constitution]], the [[National People's Congress]] can nullify regulations enacted by the [[State Council of the People's Republic of China|State Council]]. The State Council and [[President of the People's Republic of China|president]] do not have a veto power.<ref name="china-qa">{{Cite web
  | url =  http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/Q&A/161688.htm
  | access-date = 2022-06-11
  | title = China Questions and Answers -- china.org.cn
  | author = China Internet Information Center
  | quote = Administrative regulations shall not contravene laws adopted by the NPC, local regulations shall not contravene laws and administrative regulations, and the NPC has the power to annul administrative regulations and local regulations that contravene the laws it has made. 
}}</ref>{{further|Government of China}}
*{{flag|Georgia}}: The [[president of Georgia|president]] can return a bill to the [[Parliament of Georgia|parliament]] with proposed amendments within two weeks of receiving the bill.<ref name="georgia-46">{{cite constitution | article= 46 | polity= Georgia (country) | date= 2018}}</ref> Parliament must first vote on the proposed amendments, which can be adopted by the same majority as for the original legislation (for ordinary legislation, a simple majority vote).<ref name="georgia-46"/> If Parliament does not adopt the amendments, it can override the veto by passing the original bill by an [[absolute majority]].<ref name="georgia-46"/> Before the constitutional reforms of the 2010s, the president had both a package veto and an amendatory veto, which could be overridden only with a 3/5 majority.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|p=1179}} {{further|Politics of Georgia (country)}}
* {{flag|India}}: The [[President of India|president]] has three veto powers: absolute, suspension, and pocket. The president can send the bill back to parliament for changes, which constitutes a limited veto that can be overridden by a simple majority. But the bill reconsidered by the parliament becomes a law with or without the president's assent after 14 days. The president can also take no action indefinitely on a bill, sometimes referred to as a pocket veto. The president can refuse to assent, which constitutes an absolute veto. But the absolute veto can be exercised by the President only once in respect of a bill. If the President refuses to provide his assent to a bill and sends it back to Parliament, suggesting his recommendations or amendments to the bill and the Parliament passes the bill again with or without such amendments, the president is obligated to assent to the bill.<ref>Article 111 of the [[Constitution of India]]</ref><ref name="intro india">{{cite book | title=Introduction to the Constitution of India |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=srDytmFE3KMC&pg=PA145 | publisher=Prentice-Hall of India Learning Pvt. Ltd. | author=Sharma, B.k. | year=2007 | location=New Delhi | page=145 | isbn=978-81-203-3246-1}}</ref><ref name="india times">{{cite news | url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/education/The-Presidents-role/articleshow/20154333.cms | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120616231317/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2002-08-26/education/27323497_1_powers-impeachment-resolution | url-status=live | archive-date=16 June 2012 | title=The President's role | date=26 August 2002 | access-date=4 January 2012 | work=[[The Times of India]] | author=Gupta, V. P.}}</ref>{{further|President of India#Important presidential interventions in the past}}
*{{flag|Indonesia}}: Express presidential veto powers were removed from the Constitution in the 2002 democratization reforms.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | author1-first = Simon 
  | author1-last = Butt 
  | author2-first = Tim 
  | author2-last = Lindsey
  | title = Economic Reform when the Constitution Matters: Indonesia's Constitutional Court and Article 33 
 | year = 2008
  | journal = Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies
  | volume = 44
  | issue = 2
  | pages = 239–262
  | doi = 10.1080/00074910802169004
| s2cid = 154149905 
 }}</ref> The [[President of Indonesia|president]] can however enact a "regulation in lieu of law" (''Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang'' or ''perppu''), which temporarily blocks a law from taking effect.<ref name="setiawan-2022"/> The [[People's Representative Council]] (DPR) can revoke such a regulation in its next session.<ref name="indonesia-22">{{cite constitution | article= 22 | polity= Indonesia | date= 2022}}</ref> In addition, the [[Constitution of Indonesia|Constitution]] requires that legislation be jointly approved by the president and the DPR. The president thus can effectively block a bill by withholding approval.<ref name="setiawan-2022">{{Cite book
  | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=6h9iEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT42
  | isbn = 9780429860935
  | title = Politics in Contemporary Indonesia: Institutional Change, Policy Challenges and Democratic Decline
  | author1-first = Ken M.P 
  | author1-last = Setiawan
  | author2-first = Dirk 
  | author2-last = Tomsa
  | publisher = Routledge
  | year = 2022
}}</ref> Whether these presidential powers constitute a "veto" has been disputed, including by former Constitutional Court justice [[Patrialis Akbar]].<ref>{{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.merdeka.com/politik/adakah-hak-veto-presiden-dalam-sistem-ketatanegaraan.html
  | access-date = 2022-06-13
  | title = Adakah hak veto presiden dalam sistem ketatanegaraan? 
  | work = merdeka.com
  | author = Sri Wiyanti
  | date = 2014-10-10
  | language = Indonesian
}}</ref>{{further|Politics of Indonesia}}
* {{flag|Iran}}: The [[Guardian Council]] has the authority to veto bills passed by the [[Islamic Consultative Assembly]].<ref name="iran-portal">{{Cite web
  | url =  https://irandataportal.syr.edu/the-guardian-council
  | access-date = 2022-06-11
  | title = The Guardian Council
  | work = Iran Social Science Data Portal
  | quote = The Guardian Council has three constitutional mandates: a) it has veto power over legislation passed by the parliament (Majles);
}}</ref> This veto power can be based on the legislation being contrary to the constitution or contrary to Islamic law. A constitutional veto requires a majority of the Guardian Council's members, while a veto based on Islamic law requires a majority of its [[Faqih|fuqaha]] members.<ref>{{Cite constitution| polity = Iran | date = 1989 | article = 94, 96}}</ref> The Guardian Council also has veto power over candidates for various elected offices.<ref name="iran-portal"/>{{further|Government of Iran}}
*{{flag|Japan}}: There is no veto at the national level, as Japan has a [[parliamentary system]] and the [[Constitution of Japan|constitution]] does not give the [[Emperor of Japan|emperor]] authority to refuse to promulgate a law.<ref>{{Cite constitution|polity=Japan|date=1947|article=7}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal
  | author-last = Herzog
  | author-first = Peter J.
  | year = 1951
  | title = Political Theories in the Japanese Constitution
  | journal = Monumenta Nipponica
  | volume = 7
  | issue = 1/2
  | page = 11
  | doi = 10.2307/2382947
  | jstor = 2382947
 | quote = There is no veto power against the legislature-unless at some future time the Emperor's "non-governmental" ceremonial functions enumerated in Article 7 were construed as discretionary.
}}</ref> Under the [[Local Autonomy Act]] of 1947, however, the executive of a prefectural or municipal government can veto local legislation. If the executive believes the legislation is unlawful, the executive is required to veto it.<ref>{{Cite web
  | title = Japan: Local Autonomy Is a Central Tenet to Good Governance
  | author1-first = Seth B.
  | author1-last = Benjamin
  | author2-first = Jason
  | author2-last = Grant
  | date = 2022-03-29
  | url =  https://icma.org/articles/article/japan-local-autonomy-central-tenet-good-governance
  | access-date = 2022-06-21
}}</ref> The local assembly can override this veto by a 2/3 vote.<ref name="shimizutani-2010">{{Cite journal 
  | title = Local Government in Japan: New Directions in Governance toward Citizens' Autonomy
  | journal = Asia-Pacific Review
  | author-first = Satoshi 
  | author-last = Shimizutani
  | page = 114
  | year = 2010
  | volume = 17
 | issue = 2
 | doi = 10.1080/13439006.2010.531115 
| s2cid = 154999192
 }}</ref>{{further|Politics of Japan|Local Autonomy Act}}
* {{flag|South Korea}}: The [[President of South Korea|president]] can return a bill to the [[National Assembly of South Korea|National Assembly]] for "reconsideration" (재의).<ref>{{cite constitution |article= 53|clause= |section= 2|polity= South Korea|date= 1987}}</ref> Partial and amendatory vetoes are expressly forbidden.<ref>{{cite constitution |article= 53|clause= |section= 3|polity= South Korea|date= 1987}}</ref> The National Assembly can override the veto by a 2/3 majority of the members present.<ref>{{cite constitution |article= 53|clause= |section= 4|polity= South Korea|date= 1987}}</ref> Such overrides are rare: when the National Assembly overrode president [[Roh Moo-hyun]]'s veto of a corruption investigation in 2003, it was the first override in 49 years.<ref>{{Cite book
  | author = Young Whan Kihl
  | year = 2015
  | title = Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture
  | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=IWqsBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA305
  | page = 305
  | publisher = Routledge
  | isbn = 9781317453321
}}</ref>{{further|Government of South Korea}}
*{{flag|Philippines}}: The [[president of the Philippines|president]] may refuse to sign a bill, sending the bill back to the house where it originated along with his objections. [[Congress of the Philippines|Congress]] can override the veto via a 2/3 vote with both houses voting separately, after which the bill becomes law.<ref name="rose-ackerman-2011">{{Cite journal
  | author1-first = Susan 
  | author1-last = Rose-Ackerman
  | author2-first = Diane A. 
  | author2-last = Desierto
  | author3-first = Natalia 
  | author3-last = Volosin
  | year = 2011
  | title = Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and Philippines
  | volume = 29 
  | journal = Berkeley Journal of International Law
  | page = 282
}}</ref> The president may also exercise a [[line-item veto]] on [[money bill]]s.<ref name="rose-ackerman-2011"/> The president does not have a pocket veto: once the bill has been received by the president, the chief executive has thirty days to veto the bill. Once the thirty-day period expires, the bill becomes law as if the president had signed it.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = the Philippines | date = 1987 | article = VI | section = 27}}</ref>{{further|Politics of the Philippines}}
*{{flag|Uzbekistan}}: The [[president of Uzbekistan|president]] has a package veto and an amendatory veto.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|p=1166}} The Legislative Chamber of the [[Oliy Majlis]] can override either type of veto by a 2/3 vote.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|p=1166}} In the case of a package veto, if the veto is not overridden, the bill fails.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|p=1166}} In the case of an amendatory veto, if the veto is not overridden, the bill becomes law as amended.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|pp=1166, 1181}} The Senate of the Oliy Majlis has a veto over legislation passed by the Legislative Chamber, which the Legislative Chamber can likewise override by a 2/3 vote.<ref>{{cite constitution | article= 84 | polity= Uzbekistan | date= 1992}}</ref>{{further|Politics of Uzbekistan}}

=== Europe ===
[[File:Europe ISO 3166-1.svg|thumb|Europe]]
European countries in which the executive or head of state does not have a veto power include [[Slovenia]] and [[Luxembourg]], where the power to withhold royal assent was [[Royal assent#Luxembourg|abolished]] in 2008.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | title =  Luxembourg: Parliament abolishes royal confirmation of laws
  | author-first = Luc 
  | author-last = Frieden
  | journal = International Journal of Constitutional Law
  | volume = 7
  | issue = 3
  | date = July 2009
  | pages = 539–543
  | doi = 10.1093/icon/mop021
| doi-access = free
  }}</ref> Countries that have some form of veto power include the following:
*{{flag|Czech Republic}}: The [[president of the Czech Republic]] has a suspensory veto power over a law passed by the [[Parliament of the Czech Republic|Parliament]] within 15 days with notes (president cannot veto [[Constitutional act of the Czech Republic|laws changing constitution]]).<ref>Constitution of the Czech Republic, Art. 50 and 62</ref> [[Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic|Chamber of Deputies]] can override it by an absolute majority of all deputies. Also Chamber of Deputies can by same majority override if [[Senate of the Czech Republic|Senate]] rejects law previously approved by Chamber of Deputies. Same procedure applies for Senate amendments to the law approved by Chamber of Deputies.<ref>Constitution of the Czech Republic, Art. 47</ref>{{further|Politics of the Czech Republic}}
*{{flag|Estonia}}: The [[president of Estonia|president]] may effectively veto a law adopted by the [[Riigikogu]] (legislature) by sending it back for reconsideration. The president must exercise this power within 14 days of receiving the law.<ref name="estonia-107"/> The Riigikogu, in turn, may override this veto by passing the unamended law again by a simple majority.{{sfn|Köker|2015|p=158}}<ref name="estonia-107">{{Cite constitution | polity = Estonia | article = 107 | date = 2015}}</ref> After such an override (but only then), the president may ask the [[Supreme Court of Estonia|Supreme Court]] to declare the law unconstitutional.{{sfn|Köker|2015|p=157}}<ref name="estonia-107"/> If the Supreme Court rules that the law does not violate the [[Constitution of Estonia|Constitution]], the president must promulgate the law.<ref name="estonia-107"/> From 1992 to 2010, the president exercised the veto on 1.6% of bills (59 in all), and applied for constitutional review of 11 bills (0.4% in all).{{sfn|Köker|2015|pp=86, 88}}{{further|Politics of Estonia}}
*{{flag|Finland}}: The [[president of Finland|president]] has a suspensive veto, but can only delay the enactment of legislation by three months.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | author-last = Paloheimo
  | author-first = Heikki
  | year = 2003
  | title = The Rising Power of the Prime Minister in Finland
  | journal = Scandinavian Political Studies
  | volume = 26
  | issue = 3
  | pages = 219–243
  |doi = 10.1111/1467-9477.00086 
}}</ref> The president has had a veto power of some kind since [[Finnish independence]] in 1919,<ref>{{Cite book
  | author1-last = Raunio
  | author1-first = Taupio
  | author2-last = Sedelius
  | author2-first = Thomas
  | year = 2020
  | title = Semi-Presidential Policy-Making in Europe
  | page = 57
  | doi = 10.1007/978-3-030-16431-7
  | isbn = 978-3030164331
| s2cid = 198743002
 }}</ref> but this power was greatly curtailed by the constitutional reforms of 2000.{{further|Politics of Finland}}
*{{flag|France}}: The [[president of France|president]] has a suspensive veto: the president can require the [[National Assembly (France)|National Assembly]] to reopen debate on a bill that it has passed, within 15 days of being presented with the bill.<ref>{{Cite constitution|polity=France|date=2008|article=10}}</ref> Aside from that, the president can only refer bills to the [[Constitutional Council (France)|Constitutional Council]], a power shared with the prime minister and the presidents of both houses of the National Assembly.<ref>{{Cite constitution|polity=France|date=2008|article=61}}</ref> Upon receiving such a referral, the Constitutional Council can strike down a bill before it has been promulgated as law, which has been interpreted as a form of constitutional veto.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | author-last = Brouard
  | author-first = Sylvain
  | year = 2009
  | title = The Politics of Constitutional Veto in France: Constitutional Council, Legislative Majority and Electoral Competition
  | journal = West European Politics
  | volume = 32
  | issue = 2
  | pages = 384–403
  | doi = 10.1080/01402380802670719
 | s2cid = 154741100
 }}</ref>{{further|Politics of France}}
*{{Flag|Germany}}: The [[President of Germany|federal president of Germany]] has to sign a bill in order for it to become law.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (in German). Article 82. |title=}}</ref> This gives him a ''[[de facto]]'' veto power over [[legislation]]. However this power has been used only nine times since the founding of the [[Germany|federal Republic]] and is largely considered to be a ceremonial power.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2006-12-08 |title=Bundespräsidenten: Das achte Nein |language=de |work=Der Spiegel |url=https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundespraesidenten-das-achte-nein-a-453425.html |access-date=2023-08-02 |issn=2195-1349}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Janisch |first=Wolfgang |date=2020-10-08 |title=Das könnt ihr besser |url=https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/hate-speech-gesetz-das-koennt-ihr-besser-1.5059141 |access-date=2023-08-02 |website=Süddeutsche.de |language=de}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2021-04-01 |title=Hasskriminalität: Gesetz gegen Onlinehetze tritt Ostern in Kraft |language=de |work=Der Spiegel |url=https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/hasskriminalitaet-gesetz-gegen-online-hetze-tritt-ostern-in-kraft-a-30ed56dc-5a72-4bef-bd77-84eb66994da7 |access-date=2023-08-02 |issn=2195-1349}}</ref>{{Further|Politics of Germany}}
*{{flag|Hungary}}: The [[president of Hungary|president]] has two options to veto a bill: submit it to the [[Constitutional Court of Hungary|Constitutional Court]] if he or she suspects that it violates the constitution or send it back to the [[National Assembly (Hungary)|National Assembly]] and ask for a second debate and vote on the bill. If the court rules that the bill is constitutional, the president must sign it.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Hungary | date = 2016 | article = 6}}</ref> Likewise, if the president has returned the bill to the National Assembly and it is passed a second time by a simple majority, it becomes law.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|p=1164}}{{further|Politics of Hungary}}
*{{flag|Iceland}}: The [[president of Iceland|president]] may refuse to sign a bill, which is then put to [[referendum]]. This right was not exercised until 2004, by President [[Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson]], who also refused to sign two other bills related to the [[Icesave dispute]].<ref name="grimsson">{{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.icelandreview.com/news/olafur-ragnar-grimsson-will-not-run-again-president-iceland/
  | access-date = 2022-06-18
  | title = Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson Will not Run Again for President of Iceland
  | date = 2012-01-01
  | quote = He was the first president to use the presidential veto power he has according to the constitution.
}}</ref> Two of these vetoes resulted in referendums.<ref name="grimsson"/>{{further|Politics of Iceland}}
*{{flag|Ireland}}: The [[president of Ireland|president]] may refer a bill to the [[Supreme Court of Ireland|Supreme Court]] to test its constitutionality, after consulting the [[Council of State (Ireland)|Council of State]]. If it is judged constitutional the President must sign it into law. From 1990 to 2012, this power was used an average of once every three years.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | title = The President of Ireland in Comparative Perspective
  | author-first = Robert 
  | author-last = Elgie
  | pages = 502–521 
  | year = 2012
  | journal = Irish Political Studies
  | volume = 27 
 | issue = 4 
 | doi = 10.1080/07907184.2012.734445 
  | s2cid = 28754294 
 | url = https://doras.dcu.ie/20743/1/President_in_Comparative_Perspective_Elgie_final.pdf
  | access-date = 2022-06-18
}}</ref> The president may also, on receipt of a petition signed by a majority of [[Seanad Éireann]] (the upper house of parliament) and a third of [[Dáil Éireann]] (the lower house of parliament), after consulting the Council of State, decline to sign a bill "of such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be ascertained" in an [[ordinary referendum]] or a new Dáil reassembling after a general election held within eighteen months.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Ireland | date = 2019 | article = 27 | section = 1}}</ref> This latter power has never been used because the government of the day almost always commands a majority of the Seanad, preventing the third of the Dáil that usually makes up the opposition from combining with it.<ref>{{Cite news
  | url =  https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/article-27-comes-with-a-catch-22-that-makes-it-unworkable-1.128575
  | access-date = 2022-06-18
  | title = Article 27 comes with a Catch-22 that makes it unworkable
  | newspaper = The Irish Times
  | author-first = Gerard
  | author-last = Hogan
  | author-link = Gerard Hogan
  | date = 1997-11-20
}}</ref>

The President of Ireland does not possess the power to veto a bill. Article 26 simply involves an exploration of a bill's constitutionality, while Article 27 simply adjusts the process of lawmaking to include a consultation with the people either in a referendum or general election. In both cases the final decision is made by someone else, the Supreme Court or the people. No one action by a president can kill a bill.{{further|Politics of Ireland}}
*{{flag|Italy}}: The [[president of Italy|president]] may request a second deliberation of a bill passed by the [[Italian Parliament]] before it is promulgated. This is a very weak form of veto as the parliament can override the veto by an ordinary majority.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | title = The Italian Presidency: Constitutional Role and Political Practice
  | author-first = Stephen P. 
  | author-last = Koff
  | journal = Presidential Studies Quarterly
  | volume = 12
  | issue = 3
  | year = 1982
  | pages = 341
  | jstor = 27547832 
 |url = https://www.jstor.org/stable/27547832 }}</ref> While such a limited veto cannot thwart the will of a determined parliamentary majority, it may have a delaying effect and may cause the parliamentary majority to reconsider the matter.  The president also has the power to veto appointments of ministers in the [[government of Italy]], as for example president [[Sergio Mattarella]] did in vetoing the appointment of [[Paolo Savona]] as finance minister in 2018.<ref>{{Cite news
  | newspaper = TheLocal.it
  | url =  https://www.thelocal.it/20180529/italy-president-sergio-matterella-statement-english/
  | access-date = 2022-06-18
  | title =   Here's how Italy's president explains his controversial veto
  | author = The Local Italy
  | date = 2018-05-29
}}</ref>{{further|Politics of Italy}}
*{{flag|Latvia}}: The [[president of Latvia|president]] may suspend a bill for a period of two months, during which it may be referred to the people in a referendum if one-tenth of the electorate requests a referendum.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Latvia | article = 72 | date = 2016}}</ref> The president may also return a document to the [[Saeima]] for reconsideration, but only once.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Latvia | article = 71 | date = 2016}}</ref> Notably, in 1999, president [[Vaira Vike-Freiberga]] returned the Latvian State Language Law to the Saeima, even though the law had passed by an overwhelming majority the first time; the president used the suspensory veto to point out legal problems with the law, which resulted in amendments to bring it into line with European legal standards.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|pp=1172-1173}}{{further|Politics of Latvia}}
*{{flag|Poland}}: The [[president of Poland|president]] may either submit a bill to the [[Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland|Constitutional Tribunal]] if they suspect that the bill is unconstitutional or send it back to the [[Sejm of the Republic of Poland|Sejm]] for reconsideration.<ref name="poland-122">{{Cite constitution|polity=Poland|date=1997|article=122}}</ref> These two options are exclusive: the president must choose one or the other.<ref name="poland-122"/> If president has referred a law to the Constitutional Tribunal and the tribunal says that the bill is constitutional, the president must sign it. If the president instead returns the bill to the Sejm in a standard package veto, the Sejm can override the bill by a three-fifths majority of members present (at least half of all members have to be present).{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|p=1178}}{{further|Politics of Poland}}
*{{flag|Portugal}}: The [[president of Portugal|president]] may refuse to sign a bill or refer it, or parts of it, to the [[Portuguese Constitutional Court|Constitutional Court]].<ref name="oecd-system"/> If the bill is declared unconstitutional, the president is required to veto it, but the [[Assembly of the Republic (Portugal)|Assembly of the Republic]] can override this veto by a two-thirds majority.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Portugal | date = 2005 | article = 278-279}}</ref> If the president vetoes a bill that has not been declared unconstitutional, the [[Assembly of the Republic (Portugal)|Assembly of the Republic]] may pass it a second time, in which case it becomes law. However, in Portugal presidential vetoes typically result in some change to the legislation.<ref>{{Cite journal
  | author1-first = Jorge M. 
  | author1-last = Fernandes 
  | author2-first = Carlos 
  | author2-last = Jalali
  | year = 2016
  | title = A Resurgent Presidency? Portuguese Semi-Presidentialism and the 2016 Elections
  | journal = South European Society and Politics
  | volume = 22 
 | pages = 121–138 
 | doi = 10.1080/13608746.2016.1198094
| s2cid = 156761976 
 }}</ref> The president also has an absolute veto over [[decree-law]]s issued by the [[government of Portugal]].<ref>{{Cite journal
  | author-last =  Santos Botelho
  | author-first = Catarina
  | year = 2020
  | title = COVID-19 and stress on fundamental rights in Portugal: An intermezzo between the state of exception and constitutional normality
  |journal = Revista Catalana de Dret Públic
  | issue = Número Especial
 | page = 188
  | doi = 10.2436/rcdp.i0.2020.3553
}}</ref> In an [[Autonomous Regions of Portugal|autonomous region]] such as the [[Azores]], the [[Representative of the Republic]] has the power to veto legislation, which the regional assembly can override by an absolute majority, and also holds the same constitutional veto power that the president has nationally.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Portugal | date = 2005 | article = 233}}</ref>{{further|Politics of Portugal}}
*{{flag|Spain}}: The [[Constitution of Spain|Constitution]] states that "Within two months after receiving the text, the [[Senate of Spain|Senate]] may, by a message stating the reasons for it, adopt a veto or approve amendments thereto. The veto must be adopted by overall majority".<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Spain | date = 1978 | article = 90 |section = 1}}</ref> A Senate veto can be overridden by an [[absolute majority]] vote of the [[Congress of Deputies]].<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Spain | date = 1978 | article = 90 |section = 2}}</ref> In addition, the [[Government of Spain|government]] can block a bill before passage if it entails government spending or loss of revenue.<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Spain | date = 1978 | article = 134 |section = 6}}</ref> This prerogative is commonly called {{lang|es|veto presupuestario}} ("budget veto").<ref>[https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=6874651 Delgado Ramos, David. University of La Rioja] The Government budget veto (Spanish)</ref>{{further|Politics of Spain|Royal assent#Spain}}
* {{flag|Ukraine}}: The [[president of Ukraine|president]] may refuse to sign a bill and return it to the [[Verkhovna Rada]] with proposed amendments. The Verkhovna Rada may override a veto by a two-thirds majority. If the veto is not overridden, the President's amendments are subjected to an up-or-down vote; if they attract at least 50% support from the legislators, the bill is adopted with the amendments; if not, the bill fails.{{sfn|Tsebelis|Rizova|2007|p=1171}}{{further|Politics of Ukraine}}
* {{flag|United Kingdom}}: The [[British monarch|monarch]] has two methods of vetoing a bill. Any bill that has been passed by both the [[House of Commons (UK)|House of Commons]] and the [[House of Lords]] becomes law only when formally approved by the monarch (or their official representative), in a procedure known as royal assent. Legally, the monarch can withhold that consent, thereby vetoing the bill. This power was last exercised in 1708 by [[Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] to block the [[Scottish Militia Bill 1708]]. The monarch has additional veto powers over bills which affect the [[Royal prerogative in the United Kingdom|royal prerogative]], such as the war prerogative, or the monarch's personal affairs (such as royal incomes or hereditary property). By convention, those bills require [[King's Consent|king's consent]] before they may even be debated by Parliament, as well as royal assent if they are passed. King's consent is not obsolete and is occasionally withheld, though now only on the advice of the [[cabinet of the United Kingdom|cabinet]]. An example was the [[Military Action Against Iraq (Parliamentary Approval) Bill]] in 1999, which received a [[first reading]] under the [[Ten Minute Rule]], but was denied queen's consent for a [[second reading]].<ref>{{Cite journal
  | title = Parliament and the War Prerogative in the United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining Variations in Institutional Change and Legislative Control
  | author-first = Philippe 
  | author-last = Lagassé
  | journal = Parliamentary Affairs
  | volume = 70
  | issue = 2
  | date = April 2017
  | pages = 280–300
  | doi = 10.1093/pa/gsw029
| doi-access = free
  }}</ref>
** {{flag|Scotland}}, {{flag|Wales}}, and {{flag|Northern Ireland}}: Powers exist under the section 35 of the [[Scotland Act 1998]], section 114 of the [[Government of Wales Act 2006]], and section 14 of the [[Northern Ireland Act 1998]] that allow the responsible cabinet minister in Westminster to refuse a bill that has been passed by the [[Scottish Parliament]], [[Senedd]], or [[Northern Ireland Assembly]], respectively, from proceeding to royal assent, if they believe that the bill modifies and has adverse effects on legislation that is [[Devolved, reserved and excepted matters|reserved]] to the [[Parliament of the United Kingdom]] to solely legislate on. This power has only been used once, to veto the [[Gender Recognition Reform (Scotland) Bill]] in 2023.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Torrance |first=David |date=16 January 2023 |title=Section 35 of the Scotland Act and vetoing devolved legislation |url=https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/section-35-of-the-scotland-act-and-vetoing-devolved-legislation/ |website=[[House of Commons Library]]}}</ref>{{further|Royal assent#United Kingdom|King's Consent|Politics of the United Kingdom}}

=== Oceania ===
[[File:Oceania without Asian country codes.jpg|thumb|Oceania]]
* {{flag|Australia}}: According to the [[Australian Constitution]] (sec. 59), the [[Monarchy of Australia|monarch]] may veto a bill that has been given royal assent by the [[governor-general of Australia|governor-general]] within one year of the legislation being assented to.<ref name="gov.au">{{cite web |url=http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/item.asp?dID=25 |title=Documenting Democracy |publisher=Foundingdocs.gov.au |date=9 October 1942 |access-date=2012-08-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110601205107/http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/item.asp?dID=25 |archive-date=1 June 2011 |url-status=dead}}</ref> This power has never been used. The Australian governor-general himself or herself has, in theory, the power to veto, or more technically, withhold assent to, a bill passed by both houses of the [[Australian Parliament]], and contrary to the advice of the prime minister.<ref name="hamer">{{Cite web |last=Hamer |first=David |author-link=David Hamer |year=2002 |work=Can Responsible Government Survive in Australia? |title=Curiously ill-defined – the role of the head of state |publisher=Australian Government – Department of the Senate |location=Canberra |orig-year=1994, University of Canberra |url=http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/~/~/link.aspx?_id=9495A9BDD2964D7DB682C13BFA5D4D1A&_z=z |access-date=1 November 2015}}</ref> However, in matters of assent to legislation, the governor-general is advised by parliament, not by the government. Consequently, when a minority parliament passes a bill against the wishes of the government, the government could resign, but cannot advise a veto.<ref name="hamer" /><ref>{{cite web|url=https://theconversation.com/why-a-government-would-be-mad-to-advise-the-refusal-of-royal-assent-to-a-bill-passed-against-its-will-110501|title=Why a government would be mad to advise the refusal of royal assent to a bill passed against its will|last= Twomey | first=Anne|editor-first1=Amanda |editor-last1=Dunn |date=28 January 2019 |doi=10.64628/AA.9cyxhsqws }}</ref> Since 1986, the individual states of Australia are fully independent entities. Thus, the Crown may not veto (nor the UK Parliament overturn) any act of a state governor or state legislature. State constitutions determine what role the state's governor plays. In general, the governor exercises the powers the sovereign would have; in all states and territories, the governor's (or, for territories, administrator's) assent is required for a bill to become law, except the [[Australian Capital Territory]], which has no administrator.<ref>{{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.moadoph.gov.au/blog/what-does-a-state-governor-do/
  | access-date = 2022-06-19
  | title = What does a state governor do?
  | publisher = Museum of Australian Democracy at Old Parliament House
  | author = Campbell Rhodes
  | date = 2018-04-30
}}</ref>{{further|Politics of Australia}}
*{{flag|Federated States of Micronesia}}: The [[President of the Federated States of Micronesia|President]] can disapprove legislation passed by the [[Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia|Congress]].<ref name="fsom-ix-22">{{cite constitution
| article = IX
| section = 22
| polity = the Federated States of Micronesia
| date = 1979
}}</ref> The veto must be exercised within 10 days, or 30 days if the Congress is not in session.<ref name="fsom-ix-22"/> The Congress can override the veto by a three-fourths vote of the four state delegations, with each state delegation casting one vote.<ref name="fsom-ix-2q">{{cite constitution
| article = IX
| section = 2(q)
| polity = the Federated States of Micronesia
| date = 1979
}}</ref>{{further|Politics of the Federated States of Micronesia}}
*{{flag|Fiji}}: Under the 2013 [[Constitution of Fiji|Constitution]], the [[President of Fiji|President]] has no authority to veto legislation that has been passed by the [[Parliament of Fiji|Parliament]]. Under the previous bicameral constitutions, the appointed [[Senate of Fiji|Senate]] had veto powers over legislation passed by the elected lower house. {{further|Politics of Fiji}}
*{{flag|New Zealand}}: Under the Standing Orders of the [[New Zealand House of Representatives|House of Representatives]], the [[New Zealand Government|Government]] has a [[financial veto]], under which it can block bills, amendments and motions that would have more than a minor impact on the Government's fiscal aggregates.<ref>{{Cite web
  | url =  https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-business-units/cabinet-office/supporting-work-cabinet/cabinet-manual/7-executive-legislation-11
  | access-date = 2022-06-12
  | title = Crown's financial veto
  | publisher = Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
  | work = Cabinet Manual
  | quote = Crown's financial veto
}}</ref> Bills can be subjected to a financial veto only on third reading, when they have been finalized, but before they have been passed.<ref name="mcgee">{{Cite book
  | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=ENgvEAAAQBAJ
  | title = Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand
  | first = David 
  | last = McGee
  | date = May 2021
 | publisher = Oratia Media
 | isbn = 9780947506247
 }}</ref> The financial veto system was introduced in 1996.<ref name="mcgee"/>{{further|Politics of New Zealand}}
*{{flag|Tonga}}: The [[Constitution of Tonga|constitution]] empowers the [[List of monarchs of Tonga|King]] to withhold royal assent from bills adopted by the [[Legislative Assembly of Tonga|Legislative Assembly]].<ref>{{Cite constitution | polity = Tonga | date = 1978 | article = 41, 68 |section = 2}}</ref> In November 2011, the assembly adopted a bill that reduced the possible criminal sentences for the illicit possession of firearms, an offence for which two members of the assembly had recently been charged. Members of the opposition denounced the bill and asked the King to veto it, and he did so in December 2011.<ref>{{Cite news
  | url = https://matangitonga.to/2012/01/09/king-withholds-assent-lower-firearms-penalties
  | title = King withholds assent on lower firearms penalties
  | newspaper = Matangi Tonga
  | date = 2012-01-09
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
}}</ref>{{further|Politics of Tonga|Royal assent#Tonga}}

== Veto theories ==
In political science, the broader [[power (social and political)|power]] of people and groups to prevent change is sometimes analyzed through the frameworks of '''veto points''' and '''veto players'''. Veto players are actors who can potentially exercise some sort of veto over a change in government [[policy]].{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}} Veto points are the institutional opportunities that give these actors the ability to veto.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}} The theory of veto points was first developed by [[Ellen M. Immergut]] in 1990, in a comparative case study of healthcare reform in different political systems.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=4}} Breaking with earlier scholarship, Immergut argued that "we have veto ''points'' within political systems and not veto ''groups'' within societies."<ref>{{Cite journal
  | author-last = Immergut
  | author-first = Ellen M.
  | year = 1990
  | title = Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of Health Care
  | journal = Journal of Public Policy
  | volume = 10
  | issue = 4 
  | doi = 10.1017/s0143814x00006061
  | page = 391
| s2cid = 55825849
 }}</ref>

Veto player analysis draws on [[game theory]]. [[George Tsebelis]] first developed it in 1995 and set it forth in detail in 2002 ''[[Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work]]''.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=85}} A veto player is a political actor who has the ability to stop a change from the status quo.{{sfn|Croissant|2003|p=74}} There are institutional veto players, whose consent is required by constitution or statute; for example, in US federal legislation, the veto players are the House, Senate and presidency.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=107}} There are also partisan veto players, which are groups that can block policy change from inside an institutional veto player.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=19}} In a [[coalition government]] the partisan veto players are typically the members of the governing coalition.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=19}}<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773913000106 | doi=10.1017/S1755773913000106 | title=Coalition theory: A veto players' approach | date=2014 | last1=Tsebelis | first1=George | last2=Ha | first2=Eunyoung | journal=European Political Science Review | volume=6 | issue=3 | pages=331–357 | url-access=subscription }}</ref>

According to Tsebelis' veto player theorem, policy change becomes harder the more veto players there are, the greater the ideological distance between them, and the greater their internal coherence.{{sfn|Croissant|2003|p=74}} For example, Italy and the United States have stable policies because they have many veto players, while Greece and the United Kingdom have unstable policies because they have few veto players.{{sfn|Tsebelis|2002|p=4}}

While the veto player and veto point approaches complement one another, the veto players framework has become dominant in the study of policy change.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=2}} Scholarship on [[rational choice theory]] has favored the veto player approach because the veto point framework does not address ''why'' political actors decide to use a veto point.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}} In addition, because veto player analysis can apply to any political system, it provides a way of comparing very different political systems, such as presidential and parliamentary systems.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=3}} Veto player analyses can also incorporate people and groups that have ''de facto'' power to prevent policy change, even if they do not have the legal power to do so.{{sfn|Oppermann|Brummer|2017|p=6}}

Some literature distinguishes cooperative veto points (within institutions) and competitive veto points (between institutions), theorizing competitive veto points contribute to [[obstructionism]].<ref name="McGann"/> Some literature disagrees with the claim of veto player theory that multiparty governments are likely to be [[Gridlock (politics)|gridlocked]].<ref name="McGann">{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012463883 | doi=10.1177/0010414012463883 | title=The Calculus of Consensus Democracy | date=2013 | last1=McGann | first1=Anthony J. | last2=Latner | first2=Michael | journal=Comparative Political Studies | volume=46 | issue=7 | pages=823–850 | url-access=subscription }}</ref>

== See also ==
{{wiktionary}}
* [[Royal assent]]
* [[Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]], allowing a temporary legislative override of court decisions
* [[Vetocracy]]

== Works cited ==
*{{Cite book
  | author-last = Bulmer
  | author-first = Elliot 
  | title = Presidential Veto Powers
  | year = 2017
  | publisher = International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
  | edition = 2nd
  | url = https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/presidential-veto-powers-primer.pdf
  | access-date = 2022-06-11
}}
*{{Cite journal
  | author-last = Croissant
  | author-first = Aurel
  | year = 2003
  | title = Legislative powers, veto players, and the emergence of delegative democracy: A comparison of presidentialism in the Philippines and South Korea
  | journal = Democratization
  | volume = 10
  | issue = 3
  | pages =  68–98
  | doi = 10.1080/13510340312331293937 
  | s2cid = 144739609
 }}
*{{Cite thesis
  | author-last = Köker
  | author-first = Philipp
  | year = 2015
  | title = Veto et Peto: Patterns of Presidential Activism in Central and Eastern Europe
  | url = https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1461326/1/Philipp%20Koeker_thesis%20w%20corrections_final_FINAL%20%28discovery%29.pdf
  | access-date = 2022-06-14
  | degree = PhD
  | institution = University College London
}}
*{{Cite web
  | author1-last = Oppermann
  | author1-first = Kai 
  | author2-last = Brummer
  | author2-first = Klaus 
  | title = Veto Player Approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis 
  | doi = 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.386
  | year = 2017
  | work = Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
  | isbn = 978-0-19-022863-7 
  | url = https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-386
  | access-date = 2022-06-17
}}
*{{Cite book
  | author1-last = Palanza 
  | author1-first = Valeria 
  | author2-last = Sin
  | author2-first = Gisela 
  | year = 2020
  | chapter = Chapter 21: Legislatures and executive vetoes
  | pages = 367–387
  | doi = 10.4337/9781789906516.00030
  | title = Handbook of Parliamentary Studies
  | editor1-last = Benoît
  | editor1-first = Cyril 
  | editor2-last = Rozenberg
  | editor2-first = Olivier
  | publisher = Edward Elgar Publishing
  | isbn = 9781789906516
| s2cid = 229672005 
 }}
*{{Cite book
  | title = Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
  | author-first = George
  | author-last = Tsebelis
  | year = 2002
  | publisher = Princeton University Press
 | isbn = 9781400831456
}}
*{{Cite journal
  | title = Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America
  | author1-first = George 
  | author1-last = Tsebelis
  | author2-first = Eduardo 
  | author2-last = Alemán
  | journal = World Politics
  | volume = 57
  | issue = 3
  | date = April 2005
  | pages = 396–420
  | publisher = Cambridge University Press
  | doi = 10.1353/wp.2006.0005 
  | jstor = 40060107 
  | s2cid = 154191670 
  | url = https://www.jstor.org/stable/40060107
  | url-access = registration
}}
*{{Cite journal
  | author1-last = Tsebelis
  | author1-first = George 
  | author2-last = Rizova
  | author2-first = Tatiana P. 
  | date = October 2007
  | title = Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries
  | journal = Comparative Political Studies
  | volume = 40
  | issue = 10
  | pages = 1155–1182
  | doi = 10.1177/0010414006288979
  | s2cid = 154842077 
 }}
*{{Cite journal
  | author-last = Watson
  | author-first = Richard A.
  | year = 1987
  | title = Origins and Early Development of the Veto Power
  | journal = Presidential Studies Quarterly 
  | issue = 2
  | volume = 17
  | pages = 401–412 
  | jstor = 40574459
  | url = https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574459
}}

=== Constitutions cited ===
{{div col|small=yes}}
*Benin: {{Cite web
  | title = Constitution de la République du Bénin
  | url = https://courconstitutionnelle.bj/download/constitution-de-la-republique-du-benin/
  | date = 2020-09-28
  | access-date = 2022-06-15
  | language = French
  | archive-date = 2 July 2022
  | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220702101903/https://courconstitutionnelle.bj/download/constitution-de-la-republique-du-benin/
  | url-status = dead
  }} 
**{{Cite web
  | title = Constitution of the Republic of Benin
  | publisher = Oxford University Press
  | url = https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin_1990.pdf?lang=en
  | year = 1990
  | access-date = 2022-06-15
  | translator = Jessie L. Matthews
}}
* Cameroon: {{Cite web
  | url = https://www.assnat.cm/images/La_Constitution.pdf
  | title = LA CONSTITUTION de la République du Cameroun
  | language = French
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
}}
** {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cameroon_2008?lang=en
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = Cameroon 1972 (rev. 2008) Constitution
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project 
  | year = 2008
}}
* Canada: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/ConstRpt/FullText.html
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = THE CONSTITUTION ACTS, 1867 to 1982
  | date = 2022-06-10
  | publisher = Government of Canada
}}
* Dominican Republic: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2015?lang=es
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = República Dominicana 2015 Constitución
  | year = 2015
  | language = Spanish
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project 
}}
** {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2015?lang=en
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = Dominican Republic 2015 Constitution
  | year = 2015
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project 
}}
* Estonia:  {{Cite web
  | title = The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia
  | date = 2011-07-22
  | access-date = 2022-06-14
  | work = Riigi Teataja
  | url = https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide
}}
*France: {{Cite web
  | url = https://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly#Title2
  | access-date = 2022-06-16
  | title = Constitution of October 4, 1958
  | publisher = Assemblée Nationale
  | date = 2008-07-23
}}
* Georgia: {{Cite web
  | url = https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Georgia_2018.pdf?lang=en
  | access-date = 2022-06-12
  | title = Georgia's Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2018
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project
  | year = 2018
}}
* Hungary: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2016?lang=en
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = Hungary 2011 (rev. 2016) Constitution
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project
  | year = 2016
}}
* Indonesia: {{Cite web
  | url = https://www.mkri.id/public/content/infoumum/regulation/pdf/uud45%20eng.pdf
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
  | title = The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia
  | publisher = Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia
  | year = 2015
}}
* Iran: {{Cite web
  | url = https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
  | title = Iran (Islamic Republic of)'s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989
  | year = 1989
}}
* Japan: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_annai.nsf/html/statics/shiryo/dl-constitution.htm
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = 日本国憲法
  | publisher = The House of Representatives
  | year = 1946
  | language = Japanese
}}
** {{Cite web
  | url = https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
  | title = The Constitution of Japan
  | publisher = Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet
  | year = 1946
}}
* Korea, South: {{Cite web
  | url = https://law.go.kr/%EB%B2%95%EB%A0%B9/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%9C%EB%AF%BC%EA%B5%AD%ED%97%8C%EB%B2%95/%EC%A0%9C53%EC%A1%B0
  | access-date = 2022-06-21
  | title = 대한민국헌법
  | language = Korean
  | date = 1988-02-25
}} 
**{{Cite web
  | url =  https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=1&lang=KOR
  | title = Constitution of the Republic of Korea
  | work = Statutes of the Republic of Korea
  | publisher = Korea Law Translation Center
  | access-date = 2022-06-21
}}
* Latvia: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/57980
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
  | publisher = Latvijas Vēstnesis
  | year = 2018
}}
* Micronesia, Federated States of: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Micronesia_1990?lang=en
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = Micronesia (Federated States of) 1978 (rev. 1990) Constitution
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project
  | year = 1990
}}
* Philippines: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
  | title = The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
  | work = Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines
  | date = 1987-02-02
}}
* Poland: {{Cite web
  | title = THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND OF 2nd APRIL, 1997
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
  | url = https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm
  | year = 1997
}}
* Portugal: {{Cite web
  | title = CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC: SEVENTH REVISION [2005] 
  | url = https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/EN/Parliament/Documents/Constitution7th.pdf
  | year = 2005
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
}}
* South Africa: {{Cite web
  | title = Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
  | url = https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996
  | year = 2022
  | publisher = Government of South Africa
}}
* Spain: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://app.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/titulos/articulos.jsp?ini=81&fin=92&tipo=2
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = La Constitución española de 1978
  | publisher = Congreso de los deputados
  | date = 2003
  | language = Spanish
}}
**{{Cite web
  | url = https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011.pdf?lang=en
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
  | year = 2011
  | title = Spain's Constitution of 1978 with Amendments through 2011
}}
* Tonga: {{Cite web 
  | url=http://legislation.to/Tonga/DATA/PRIN/1988-002/ActofConstitutionofTonga.pdf 
  | title=Constitution of the Kingdom of Tonga
  | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120119162624/http://legislation.to/Tonga/DATA/PRIN/1988-002/ActofConstitutionofTonga.pdf
  | archive-date=19 January 2012
  |url-status=dead
}}
* Uganda: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2017?lang=en
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = Uganda 1995 (rev. 2017) Constitution
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project
  | year = 2017
}}
* United States: {{Cite web
  | title = Constitution of the United States
  | url = https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
  | publisher = U.S. Senate
  | access-date = 2022-06-21
}}
* Uzbekistan: {{Cite web
  | title = Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan
  | url = https://constitution.uz/en
  | access-date = 2022-06-22
  | publisher = UZINFOCOM
  | year = 2014
}}
* Zambia: {{Cite web
  | url =  https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016?lang=en
  | access-date = 2022-06-23
  | title = Zambia 1991 (rev. 2016) Constitution
  | publisher = Comparative Constitutions Project
  | year = 2016
}}
{{div col end}}

== References ==
{{reflist}}

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Veto| ]]
[[Category:Latin legal terminology]]
[[Category:Latin words and phrases]]