View source for Texas City refinery explosion

{{Short description|2005 deadly refinery accident}}
{{About|an oil refinery accident in 2005|the 1947 industrial accident|Texas City disaster}}
{{Good article}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=April 2012}}
{{Infobox event
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| image = BP_Texas_City_Explosion_Aftermath.png
| image_upright = 1.35
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| caption = The destruction in the trailer area west of the ISOM unit
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| time = 1:20{{nbsp}}pm{{nbsp}}([[Central Time Zone#Central Daylight Time|CDT]])
| duration = <!-- {{duration|h=x|m=x|s=x}} or {{time interval|date1|date2|options}} -->
| date = {{start date|2005|03|23}}
| venue = BP Texas City refinery
| Location = [[Isomerization]] plant
| coordinates = {{Coord|29|22|23|N|94|56|20|W|region:US-TX_type:event_source:CSBp269|display=inline,title}}
| map = {{Maplink
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 |id=Q2127150
 |description=BP Texas City refinery (now part of [[Marathon Oil]]'s [[Galveston Bay Refinery]])
 |zoom=SWITCH:4,8,12|switch=[[Texas]] and [[Gulf of Mexico]] region, [[Galveston County]] and southeastern [[Greater Houston]], detail
 }}
| also_known_as = 
| type = [[Gas explosion|Vapor cloud explosion]]
| theme = 
| cause = Overfilling of a [[blowdown stack]] with liquid [[raffinate]] due to faulty instrumentation and poor execution of unit start-up procedure
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| casualties1 = 
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| reported deaths = 15
| reported injuries = 180
| reported missing = 
| reported property damage = $200{{nbsp}}million (${{Inflation|index=US|value=200|start_year=2005}}{{nbsp}}million in {{Inflation/year|US}})
| burial = 
| displaced = 
| inquiries = BP's internal investigations, Baker Panel independent investigation, [[U.S. Chemical Safety Board|Chemical Safety Board]] investigation
| inquest = 
| coroner = 
| arrests = 
| suspects = 
| accused = 
| convicted = [[BP|BP Products North America Inc.]]
| charges = Violation of section 112(r)(7) of the [[Clean Air Act (United States)|Clean Air Act]]
| trial = 
| verdict = BP pled guilty and settled for $50{{nbsp}}million and a probation period of three years
| convictions = 
| sentence = 
| publication_bans = 
| litigation = Approximately 4,000 claims
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| blank_label = Costs
| blank_data = Approximately $2.5{{nbsp}}billion of liabilities for BP
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}}

On March 23, 2005, a [[hydrocarbon]] vapor cloud ignited and violently exploded at the [[isomerization]] process unit of the [[BP]]-owned [[oil refinery]] in [[Texas City, Texas]]. It resulted in the killing of 15 workers, 180 injuries and severe damage to the refinery. All the fatalities were contractors working out of temporary buildings located close to the unit to support [[Turnaround (refining)|turnaround]] activities. Property loss was $200{{nbsp}}million (${{Inflation|index=US|value=200|start_year=2005}}{{nbsp}}million in {{Inflation/year|US}}). When including settlements ($2.1 billion), costs of repairs, deferred production, and fines, the explosion is the world's costliest refinery accident. 

The explosive vapor cloud came from [[raffinate]] liquids overflowing from the top of a [[blowdown stack]]. The source of ignition was probably a running vehicle engine. The release of liquid followed the automatic opening of a set of [[Relief valve|relief valves]] on a raffinate splitter column caused by overfilling.

Subsequent investigation reports by BP, the [[U.S. Chemical Safety Board]] (CSB), and an independent [[Blue-ribbon committee|blue-ribbon panel]] led by [[James Baker]] identified numerous technical and organizational failings at the refinery and within corporate BP.

The disaster had widespread consequences on both the company and the industry as a whole. The explosion was the first in a series of accidents (which culminated in the [[Deepwater Horizon oil spill]]) that seriously tarnished BP's reputation, especially in the U.S. The refinery was eventually sold as a result, together with other North American assets. In the meantime, the industry took action both through the issuance of new or updated standards and more radical regulatory oversight of refinery activities.

== Background ==

=== The refinery ===
The refinery was established in 1933 by [[Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company|Pan American Refining Corporation]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Texas City Oil & Chemical Companies |url=https://library.texascitytx.gov/394/Texas-City-Oil-Chemical-Companies |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230530134139/https://library.texascitytx.gov/394/Texas-City-Oil-Chemical-Companies |archive-date=May 30, 2023 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |website=Moore Memorial Public Library}}</ref> Pan American merged with Standard Oil of Indiana in 1954 to form [[Amoco]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Pradhan |first=Samir Ranjan |url= |title=India, GCC, and the Global Energy Regime: Exploring Interdependence and Outlook for Collaboration |publisher=[[Academic Foundation]] |year=2008 |isbn=978-81-7188-633-3 |location=New Delhi, India |page=375 |access-date=}}</ref> [[BP]] acquired the refinery as part of its merger with Amoco in 1999.<ref name=":5">{{Cite news |last=Pulsinelli |first=Olivia |date=1 February 2013 |title=BP Completes Texas City Refinery Sale to Marathon Petroleum |url=https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2013/02/01/bp-completes-texas-city-refinery-sale.html |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130319005148/http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2013/02/01/bp-completes-texas-city-refinery-sale.html |archive-date=19 March 2013 |access-date=21 January 2024 |work=Houston Business Journal}}</ref> As of January 2005, it was the second largest oil refinery out of 23 in Texas (behind [[Baytown Refinery]]), and the fourth overall out of 142 in the United States in terms of operating capacity, which was {{convert|475000|oilbbl|m3}} [[Barrel (unit)#Flow rate|per stream day]].<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |title=Refinery Capacity Report Archives – 2005 with Data as of January 1, 2005 |url=https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/archive/2005/refcap05.xls |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220531225924/https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/refinerycapacity/archive/2005/refcap05.xls |archive-date=31 May 2022 |archive-format=XLS |access-date=21 January 2024 |website=[[Energy Information Administration]] |format=XLS}}</ref>{{Efn|The refinery is often quoted to have been the third largest at the time of the accident.{{Sfnp|United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations|2007|p=110}} This is true if the [[Hovensa|Hovensa refinery]] in the [[United States Virgin Islands]] is not included in the count.<ref name=":3" />}} At the time of the accident it was one of three refineries in Texas City, the other two belonging to [[Marathon Petroleum]] and [[Valero Energy]].<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":3" /> The refinery was also one of five BP refineries in the U.S. and BP’s largest worldwide. It could produce around 10&nbsp;million&nbsp;gallons (38&nbsp;million&nbsp;L) of [[gasoline]] per day, or about 2.5% of the entire volume sold in the United States. It also produced [[Jet fuel|jet fuels]], [[Diesel fuel|diesel fuels]], as well as chemical feed stocks. Its {{Convert|1200|acre|ha|adj=on}} site was covered by 29 oil refining units and four chemical units. It employed around 1,800 BP workers. At the time of the accident, about 800 contractors were onsite to support [[turnaround (refining)|turnaround]] works.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=31}}

At the time of the 1999 merger, the plant was losing money,<ref name=":26">{{Cite web |last=Knutson |first=Ryan |date=July 2, 2010 |title=Blast at BP Texas Refinery in '05 Foreshadowed Gulf Disaster |url=https://www.propublica.org/article/blast-at-bp-texas-refinery-in-05-foreshadowed-gulf-disaster |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100705033747/http://www.propublica.org/article/blast-at-bp-texas-refinery-in-05-foreshadowed-gulf-disaster |archive-date=July 5, 2010 |access-date=February 3, 2024 |website=[[ProPublica]] |language=en}}</ref> but BP was extremely successful in turning the tide. In fact, the complex had performed at an all-time record profitability in 2004, with over $1&nbsp;billion in profit, "more than any other refinery in the BP system" in the words of business unit leader and complex manager Don Parus.{{sfnp|CSB|2007|p=175}} By early 2005 the refinery was making profits of around $100&nbsp;million on a monthly basis.<ref name=":6">{{Cite news |last=Hays |first=Kristen |date=December 6, 2007 |title=Fired BP Operator Takes Stand |url=https://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/fired-bp-operator-takes-stand-1836463.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211128173023/https://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Fired-BP-operator-takes-stand-1836463.php |archive-date=November 28, 2021 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |work=[[Houston Chronicle]]}}</ref>

=== Safety and maintenance record ===
Since 1974, there had been 23 fatalities in 20 separate accidents at the refinery. Three of these occurred in 2004, the year prior to the explosion. Almost half of these fatalities were due to fires or explosions ensuing process fluid releases.<ref>{{Cite web |date=November 30, 2004 |title=Texas City Refinery Fatality History: 1974–Present |url=http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/3252.tif |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240123023211/http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/3252.tif |archive-date=January 23, 2024 |archive-format=TIF |access-date=January 23, 2024 |website=Texas City Explosion |publisher= |format=TIF |via=Brent Coon & Associates}}</ref> A very serious explosion affected the complex in July 1979, when hydrocarbons at {{convert|265|psi|kPa|lk=on|abbr=on}} were released from a failed {{Convert|12|in|cm}} elbow in the depropanizer overhead condensing system of the [[sulfuric acid]] [[alkylation unit]]. More than {{Convert|4000|USgal|m3}} of liquids were discharged. A large vapor cloud formed and traveled downwind about {{Convert|640|ft|m}} to the [[Fluid catalytic cracking|fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit]], where ignition occurred. A control building, the alkylation unit, the FCC unit, and the carbon monoxide boiler sustained heavy damage. Windows were broken up to {{Convert|1.5|mi|km}} away. Although no fatalities occurred, property loss was very significant ($24{{nbsp}}million, or ${{Inflation|index=US|value=24|start_year=1979}}{{nbsp}}million in {{Inflation/year|US}}).<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Manuele |first=Fred A. |date=August 1984 |title=One Hundred Largest Losses: A Thirty Year Review of Property Damage Losses in the Hydrocarbon–Chemical Industries – Seventh Edition – April, 1984 |url=https://www.icheme.org/media/5784/lpb_issue058p001.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240421023429/https://www.icheme.org/media/5784/lpb_issue058p001.pdf |archive-date=April 21, 2024 |access-date=April 21, 2024 |magazine=[[Loss Prevention Bulletin]] |publisher=[[Institution of Chemical Engineers|Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE)]] |pages=1–11 |issue=58 |issn=0260-9576}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=July 21, 1979 |title=Refinery Explosion, Fire |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/national/1979/07/22/refinery-explosion-fire/ae9963dd-c45d-4674-bca0-f2e07fa8618b/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240421023910/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/national/1979/07/22/refinery-explosion-fire/ae9963dd-c45d-4674-bca0-f2e07fa8618b/ |archive-date=April 21, 2024 |access-date=April 21, 2024 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> Another large explosion took place in March 2004. Although no one was injured, BP temporarily evacuated the refinery. The police closed the access roads and asked residents not to leave their houses.<ref>{{Cite news |date=March 31, 2004 |title=Schwere Explosionen in Öl-Raffinerie |trans-title=Heavy Explosions in Oil Refinery |url=https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/usa-schwere-explosionen-in-oel-raffinerie-a-293311.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240123021729/https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/usa-schwere-explosionen-in-oel-raffinerie-a-293311.html |archive-date=January 23, 2024 |access-date=January 23, 2024 |work=[[Der Spiegel (website)|Der Spiegel]] |language=German}}</ref>

The plant had been poorly maintained for several years.<ref>{{cite web |date=26 October 2010 |title=Frontline: The Spill – BP's Troubled Past |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-spill/bp-troubled-past/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230930063912/https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-spill/bp-troubled-past/ |archive-date=30 September 2023 |access-date=23 March 2013 |work=[[PBS]] |publisher=}}</ref> Starting in the early 1990s, Amoco and later BP made substantial budget cuts, especially affecting maintenance expenditure. Immediately after the merger, in fact, BP ordered a 25% cut in operating costs, which was achieved in part with lower spending in maintenance and training and cutting back on safety staff.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=82}}<ref name=":25">{{Cite magazine |last=Hopkins |first=Andrew |date=July 2010 |title=Why BP Ignored Close Calls at Texas City |url=https://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/Assets/CARR/documents/R-R/2010-July-Special-Issue-on-Close-Calls.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240202113552/https://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/Assets/CARR/documents/R-R/2010-July-Special-Issue-on-Close-Calls.pdf |archive-date=February 2, 2024 |access-date=February 2, 2024 |magazine=Risk & Regulation |pages=4–5 |issn=1473-6004}}</ref>

In 2002, BP contracted consulting firm [[Kearney (consulting firm)|A.T. Kearney]] to understand "the historical facts which have led to the deterioration of the Texas City refinery performance." The report<ref>{{Cite report |url=http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/10.pdf |title=Texas City Refinery Retrospective Analysis: Summary of Results |last=A.T. Kearney |date=October 28, 2002 |publisher=[[Kearney (consulting firm)|A.T. Kearney]] |author-link=Kearney (consulting firm) |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071005043019/http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/10.pdf |archive-date=October 5, 2007 |via=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |url-status=dead}}</ref> connected the significant reductions in spending with the deterioration in the refinery's integrity and reliability.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=83}} An internal BP audit conducted in 2003 found that a "checkbook mentality", blame, and status culture eroded [[Environment, health and safety|HSE]] as well as general performance; the condition of assets and infrastructure was poor; management had not created meaningful action plans; and that there were insufficient resources.<ref>{{Cite report |url=http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/13.pdf |title='Getting HSE Right' Audit Report – BP South Houston |last1=Porter |first1=Rick |last2=Seith |first2=Dennis |date=September 22, 2003 |publisher=[[BP]] |last3=Carter |first3=Marilyn |last4=Zoloty |first4=Deb |last5=Bentley |first5=Jim |last6=McDaniel |first6=Roger |last7=Niemczak |first7=Dan |last8=King |first8=David |last9=Callard |first9=Lindsay |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071005044157/http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/13.pdf |archive-date=October 5, 2007 |via=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |url-status=dead |series= |last10=Beausoleil |first10=Craig |last11=Bild |first11=Chuck |last12=Krussow |first12=Doug |last13=Bokoski |first13=Brad |last14=Jenkins |first14=Paul |type=Audit No. 2003-41}}</ref> A similar audit in 2004 found fault across all elements of [[process safety management]] (PSM).<ref>{{Cite report |url=http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/7.pdf |title=Texas City Refinery and Texas City Chemicals Site: gHSEr – 2004 Assessment |last1=Villarreal |first1=Rose M. |last2=Boyd |first2=Kbee T. |publisher=[[BP]] |location=Texas City, Texas |last3=Hearn |first3=Jim |last4=Garvin |first4=Mark |last5=Washington |first5=Johnny |last6=Owens |first6=Cliff |last7=Lane |first7=Don |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071005043204/http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/7.pdf |archive-date=October 5, 2007 |via=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |url-status=dead |year=2004}}</ref> Another external audit report was produced by consulting firm Telos in January 2005.{{Sfnp|The Telos Group|2005a}}{{sfnp|The Telos Group|2005b}} It identified numerous safety issues including "broken alarms, thinned pipe, chunks of concrete falling, bolts dropping, cigarettes falling {{convert|60|ft}} and staff being overcome with fumes." The report's co-author stated, "We have never seen a site where the notion 'I could die today' was so real."<ref>{{Cite news |last=McNulty |first=Sheila |date=18 December 2006 |title=Faults at BP Led to One of Worst US Industrial Disasters |url=https://www.ft.com/content/b77c5102-8ec1-11db-a7b2-0000779e2340 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211221221/https://www.ft.com/content/b77c5102-8ec1-11db-a7b2-0000779e2340 |archive-date=December 11, 2022 |access-date=3 May 2022 |work=[[Financial Times]] }}</ref> The report also stated, "Most interviewees say that production and budget compliance gets recognized and rewarded before anything else",{{Sfnp|The Telos Group|2005a|p=6}} "Most interviewees at the production level say that the pressure for production, time pressure, and understaffing are the major causes of accidents at Texas City"{{sfnp|The Telos Group|2005b|p=3}} and that<blockquote>There is an exceptional degree of fear of catastrophic incidents at Texas City. People talked or wrote at length about serious hazards are in the operating units from [[Corrosion under insulation|CUI]], abandoned [[asbestos]], piping integrity issues, inadequate spare pumps and parts, and other equipment and operating hazards. Of these, piping integrity was repeated again and again. Even where there have been recent investments in piping integrity, people reported that they often could not shut the unit down to in fact replace the pipe they had fabricated. The tolerance of these kinds of risk "distracted" people from routine safe practices at the task level, or made them feel skeptical about the commitment to safety at the plant.{{sfnp|The Telos Group|2005b|p=2}}</blockquote>Some key reports on the preoccupying conditions of the refinery made their way to company board level.{{Sfnp|CSB|2008|loc=16:20 minutes in}} In early March 2005, mere weeks before the explosion, an internal e-mail warned, "I truly believe that we are on the verge of something bigger happening and that we must make some critical decisions [...] over getting the workforce's attention around safety."<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last=Clark |first=Andrew |date=December 11, 2006 |title=Texas Deaths Forever Tarnish Browne's Success |url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/dec/11/businesscomment.bp |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130830225102/https://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/dec/11/businesscomment.bp |archive-date=August 30, 2013 |access-date=January 27, 2024 |work=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref> Management turnover had been high in the years leading to the explosion, with the complex having had five managers in the six years since the merger,<ref name="Boldness">{{Cite news |last=Lyall |first=Sarah |author-link=Sarah Lyall |date=July 12, 2010 |title=In BP's Record, a History of Boldness and Costly Blunders |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/energy-environment/13bprisk.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405071410/https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/energy-environment/13bprisk.html |archive-date=April 5, 2023 |access-date=January 21, 2024 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> with the result that employees were under the impression that any new initiative would not last and that efforts were focused on short-term profit rather than long-term sustainability.{{Sfnp|United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations|2007|p=20}} The complex was still largely using Amoco safety management processes pre-dating the merger.<ref name=":7">{{Cite magazine |last=Broadribb |first=Michael P. |date=December 2006 |title=Lessons from Texas City: A Case History |url=https://www.icheme.org/media/4611/lpb192pg3-12.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240122072343/https://www.icheme.org/media/4611/lpb192pg3-12.pdf |archive-date=January 22, 2024 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |magazine=[[Loss Prevention Bulletin]] |publisher=[[Institution of Chemical Engineers|Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE)]] |pages=3–12 |issue=192 |issn=0260-9576}}</ref>

=== The ISOM plant ===
[[File:Pentane isomerization.svg|thumb|upright=1.8|Typical isomerization reaction]]
The [[isomerization]] plant (ISOM) at the site was designed for the conversion of low-octane hydrocarbons, through various chemical processes, into hydrocarbons with higher [[octane rating]]s that could then be blended into unleaded [[gasoline]]. This is achieved by converting straight-chain hydrocarbon molecules into branched ones.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Fahim |first1=Mohamed A. |title=Fundamentals of Petroleum Refining |last2=Alsahhaf |first2=Taher A. |last3=Elkilani |first3=Amal |publisher=[[Elsevier]] |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-444-52785-1 |location=Kidlington, England and Amsterdam, The Netherlands |page=4}}</ref> The main feed to the unit was a mix of [[pentane|''n''-pentane]] and [[hexane|''n''-hexane]], with [[isopentane]] and [[2-Methylpentane|isohexane]] being the main product.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=17}} The plant consisted of a [[desulfurization]] system, a [[Penex]] isomerization reactor, a vapor recovery and liquid recycle unit, and a [[raffinate]] splitter.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=31–32}}

The 170-foot (50 m) tall tower-shaped splitter, a [[Fractionating column|distillation column]], was used to separate lighter hydrocarbon components from the top of the tower (mainly pentane and hexane), which condensed and were then pumped to a light raffinate storage tank, while the heavier components (mainly [[Heptane|C7]] and [[Octane|C8]]) were recovered lower down in the splitter, then pumped to a heavy raffinate storage tank. The unit had an operational capacity of {{convert|45000|oilbbl|m3|}} per day.<ref name=":7" />

Excess hydrocarbon vapors and liquids from vent and [[Relief valve|relief]] were sent to vessel F-20, a [[blowdown stack]]. This was designed to disperse vapors from the top and convey any liquids through a [[Gooseneck (piping)|gooseneck]] into the plant closed sewer network.{{efn|Although it did not prove of relevance on the occasion of the accident, discharging flammable liquids into a sewer system was an unsafe practice.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=38}}}} It was a {{Convert|10|ft|m|adj=on}} diameter vertical drum with a {{Convert|113|ft|m|adj=on}} vertical flue pipe. F-20 was put in commission in the 1950s and had gone through several modifications over the years.<ref name=":7" />

=== Unit turnarounds and use of portable buildings ===
[[File:Trailer area and adjacent ISOM Unit.png|thumb|upright=1.35|Layout of the ISOM unit and the adjacent trailers]]
Remedial work had been started on the raffinate splitter from February 21, 2005. Two [[Turnaround (refining)|turnaround]] activities were also taking place at the adjacent [[Cracking (chemistry)|ultracracker]] unit (UCU) and at the aromatics recovery unit (ARU) at the same time. [[Portable building|Portable buildings]] and [[Construction trailer|trailers]] were often installed for use as offices during construction and maintenance.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=40–41}} In 2004, 122 trailers were in the refinery with an estimated occupancy of 800. BP allowed trailers to be placed near process units based on the results of a screening process.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=122}}

In 1995 a site-wide temporary siting analysis report<ref>{{Cite report |url=http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/facility_siting_screening_project_guidelines_and_results.pdf |title=Facility Siting Screening Project Guidelines and Results |last=Chang |first=Peter |date=Summer 1995 |publisher=[[Amoco]] |location=Texas City, Texas |access-date=January 27, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240127073526/http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/facility_siting_screening_project_guidelines_and_results.pdf |archive-date=January 27, 2024 |via=Brent Coon & Associates |url-status=live}}</ref> had been created at the facility that established an acceptable layout of trailers and other temporary structures with respect to nearby hazardous process facilities. The report was revalidated in 2002, still based on Amoco's standards although more than three years had passed since the BP–Amoco merger. In turn, Amoco's ''Facility Siting Screening Workbook'' was based on the [[American Petroleum Institute]]'s Recommended Practice 752.<ref>{{Cite book |last=API |title=Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings |date=May 1995 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |edition=1st |series=API Recommended Practice 752 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute}}</ref>{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=124–125}}{{efn|The CSB later found that API 752 was not adequate for the assessment of temporary building and trailers.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=122}}<ref name="Holmstrom_PSP">{{Cite journal |last1=Holmstrom |first1=Don |last2=Altamirano |first2=Francisco |last3=Banks |first3=Johnnie |last4=Joseph |first4=Giby |last5=Kaszniak |first5=Mark |last6=Mackenzie |first6=Cheryl |last7=Shroff |first7=Reepa |last8=Cohen |first8=Hillary |last9=Wallace |first9=Stephen |date=September 8, 2006 |title=CSB Investigation of the Explosions and Fire at the BP Texas City Refinery on March 23, 2005 |journal=[[Process Safety Progress]] |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=345–349 |doi=10.1002/prs.10158 |issn=1066-8527 |eissn=1547-5913}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kaszniak |first1=Mark |last2=Holmstrom |first2=Donald |date=January 19, 2008 |title=Trailer Siting Issues: BP Texas City |journal=[[Journal of Hazardous Materials]] |volume=159 |issue=1 |pages=105–111 |doi=10.1016/j.jhazmat.2008.01.039 |pmid=18294765 |bibcode=2008JHzM..159..105K |issn=0304-3894 |eissn=1873-3336}}</ref>}} The next siting analysis was due to take place in 2007 and, therefore, any siting changes before then would have to be under the [[Change management|management of change]] (MOC) process. Plans were made late in 2004 to accommodate contractors due to work on the UCU in 2005 in nine single trailers and one double-wide trailer immediately west of the ISOM process unit. The team carrying out the MOC assessment for the placement of the double-wide trailer identified that the structure would be less than {{convert|350|ft|m}} from the ISOM plant, a distance below which a dedicated risk analysis had to be carried out under Amoco's ''Workbook'' provisions. This team, however, lacked the expertise to complete the risk assessment. The introduction of the nine single trailers in the picture was not assessed in an MOC. Further, contrary to procedure, recommendations issued in the analysis of the change involving the placement of the double-wide trailer were still open when the trailers were occupied in November 2004.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=123–129}}

== Circumstances of the accident ==
[[File:BP Texas City ISOM diagram.png|thumb|upright=1.35|Process schematic of the ISOM splitter and the blowdown stack]]
=== Early morning ===
The start-up process commenced with the [[Shift work|night-shift]] lead operator on March 23 carrying out the initial filling of the splitter tower. Because plant start-ups are especially prone to unexpected situations, operational practice requires the application of a controlled and approved [[Pre-start-up audit|pre-start-up safety review]] (PSSR) procedure. BP had one, but it was not adopted in this case.{{sfnp|CSB|2007|p=47}} The process control level transmitter was designed to indicate the raffinate level within a {{convert|5|ft|m|adj=on}} span from the bottom of the splitter tower to a {{convert|9|ft|m|adj=on}} level. A high-level alarm dependent on this transmitter sounded as intended at 3:09&nbsp;am, when a level of {{convert|7.6|ft|m}} from the bottom was reached. However, during start-up it was common to ignore this alarm and fill up to a level of 99% (as indicated by the transmitter) to prevent damage to the [[Industrial furnace|furnace]] heating the splitter bottom. Unbeknown to the operators, the process control level transmitter, which was used to monitor the level in the splitter during the whole start-up operation, was not calibrated and its readings were not reliable. An independent level alarm triggered by a high-level switch should also have sounded at {{convert|7.9|ft|m}} but failed to. At 5:00&nbsp;am, the lead operator in the ISOM satellite [[control room]] briefed the central control room and went home early. At 6:00&nbsp;am, the [[Shift work|day-shift]] board operator (central control room operator) arrived and started his thirtieth consecutive day on a 12-hour shift duty. By this time, the level was still believed to be below the 9-foot mark, but it was already at {{convert|13|ft|m}}.{{Sfnp|Thomson|2015|p=220}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2008|loc=from 4:40 to 6:15 minutes in}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=35, 43, 81}}

At 7:15&nbsp;am, more than one hour late on the commencement of his shift (6:00&nbsp;am), one of the two day-shift supervisors ("A") arrived at the central control room. Because of his lateness, he could not go through the required handover with the night shift. During the morning meeting on March 23, it was discussed that the heavy raffinate storage tanks were nearly full and, therefore, a second day-shift supervisor ("B") was told that the start-up procedure should not continue, but this information was not passed on. Therefore, the start-up procedure resumed just before 9:30&nbsp;am under instructions from the day-shift supervisor A. The splitter level control valve into the heavy storage tank was placed in manual mode (rather than having its opening regulated by the level transmitter) and set at 4,300&nbsp;[[Barrel (unit)#Flow rate|bpd]]. However, the [[Flow measurement|flow transmitter]] on this line was in error and the valve had actually been closed shut. This, coupled with the malfunctioning of all the splitter tower instruments, allowed the level of liquid in the tower to increase without anyone noticing and caused the operators to lose all [[Situation awareness|situational awareness]].<ref name=":25" /> The circulation process was restarted just before 10&nbsp;am and raffinate was once again fed into the tower, even though the level was already too high. Since the level-control valve was shut and, therefore, there was no circulation out of the tower (i.e. no heavy raffinate being transferred to the storage tank), the splitter tower inevitably began to fill up. The defective level transmitter continued to show the level at less than 100%, and since the external [[sight glass]] was opaque, a visual check to verify the level in the splitter tower was not possible. Day-shift supervisor A, the more experienced of the two, left at 10:50&nbsp;am due to a family emergency. Contrary to the operating rules, no supervisor was left in the central control room. A single, unsupervised, and very tired board operator was now left to supervise the ISOM and two other units during a critical start-up procedure.{{Sfnp|Thomson|2015|p=220}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=43, 46, 52–53}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2008|loc=from 6:15 to 8:25 minutes in}}{{Efn|The need for two operators, especially for dealing with potential plant upsets, had been highlighted in several reports since before the Amoco–BP merger.<ref name=":19" />}}

=== Late morning ===
Two burners in the furnace had been turned on at 9:55&nbsp;am to pre-heat raffinate going into the tower and to heat the raffinate in the tower bottom. Two more were lit at 11:16&nbsp;am. The required temperature for the tower reboiler return flow was 135 °C (275 °F) with a rate increase of 10 °C (18 °F) per hour, but this procedure was not followed: during start-up, the return flow temperature reached 153 °C (307 °F) at a rate of 23 °C (41 °F) per hour. The defective level transmitter still erroneously indicated an ongoing safe level condition in the tower. However, there was still no flow of heavy raffinate from the splitter tower to the storage tank as the level control valve remained closed; instead of the hydrocarbon liquid level being at {{convert|8.65|ft|m}}, i.e. 93% of the instrument range, as indicated, it had actually reached {{convert|67|ft|m}}. Just before midday, with heat increasing in the tower, the actual fluid level had risen to {{convert|98|ft|m}}. Pressure started to build up in the system as the hydrocarbon vapors and the [[nitrogen]] remaining in the tower and associated pipework from when it had been put back in service became compressed with the increasing volume of raffinate. The operations crew thought that the pressure rise was a result of overheating in the tower bottoms as this was a known start-up issue, so the pressure was released.{{Sfnp|CSB|2008|loc=from 8:25 to 9:38 minutes in}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=43, 55}}

=== Explosion ===
By 12:42&nbsp;pm, the furnaces had been turned down and the level control valve was finally opened, draining heavy raffinate from the splitter tower. The gas fueling the furnace was shut off, but the raffinate feed into the splitter tower was not. The operators believed the level transmitter reading which was now down to 78% ({{convert|7.9|ft|m|disp=sqbr}}) but the fluid level in the {{convert|170|ft|m|adj=on}} tall splitter tower had now reached {{convert|158|ft|m}}.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=43}}
[[File:BP Texas City incident diagram.png|thumb|upright=1.35|The release of liquid from the blowdown stack via the open pressure relief valves]]

While the opening of the heavy raffinate flow should have diminished the level in the column, the fact that this hot flow was used to pre-heat the feed meant that the temperature inside the splitter increased dramatically, which led to significant increase in vaporization and the lifting of a slug of liquid over the top of the column into the overheads line.{{Sfnp|Atherton|Gil|2008|p=256}} At 1:13&nbsp;pm, the [[Pressure head|hydrostatic head]] of this liquid had built to over {{convert|42|psi|kPa|lk=on|abbr=on}}.{{Sfnp|Atherton|Gil|2008|p=252}} This was sufficient to open the [[Relief valve|relief valves]].{{Sfnp|Atherton|Gil|2008|p=256}} With the relief valves fully open, over {{convert|51900|USgal|m3}} of heated raffinate passed directly into the collection header over a 6-minute period before the valves closed, as pressure within the splitter overheads pipe dropped below their minimum closing set point ({{convert|37.2|psi|kPa|abbr=on}} above atmospheric pressure).{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=60–61}} Hot raffinate flowed into the blowdown drum and stack, and as it filled, some of the fluid started to flow into the ISOM unit sewer system via a {{convert|6|in|cm|adj=on}} pipeline at the base of the blowdown drum. As the blowdown drum and stack filled up, hot raffinate shot out of the top of the stack and into the air, forming a {{convert|20|ft|m|adj=on|0}} "geyser".{{sfnp|CSB|2007|p=62}} The equivalent of a nearly full tanker truck of raffinate rained down on the ground, ran down the side of the blowdown drum and stack, and pooled at the base of the unit.{{sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|p=6}} A radio call was received in the control room that hot hydrocarbons were overflowing from the stack.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=62}} The plant evacuation alarm was not sounded, a fact that prevented people in the vicinities to evacuate before ignition took place.{{Sfnp|Atherton|Gil|2008|p=262}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2008|loc=from 9:39 to 11:39 minutes in}}
[[File:Texas City Pick Up.png|thumb|Charred remains of the diesel pick-up truck that ignited the flammable vapors|upright=1.35]]
A diesel pick-up truck, with its engine left idling, had been parked about {{convert|25|ft|m|0}} from the [[blowdown stack]]. The vapor cloud reached the vehicle, and hydrocarbon fumes were drawn into the engine's air intake, causing the [[Diesel engine runaway|engine to race]]. Nearby workers frantically tried to shut down the engine, without success. The expanding vapor cloud forced the workers who were trying to shut down the overspeeding truck engine to retreat. The cloud continued to spread across the ISOM plant, across the pipe-rack to the west and into the trailer area unimpeded. No emergency alarm sounded, and at approximately 1:20&nbsp;pm, the vapor cloud was ignited by a backfire, as observed (by nearby witnesses) to be originating from the overheating truck engine.{{Sfnp|CSB|2008|loc=from 11:40 to 12:08 minutes in}}
[[File:Destroyed Trailers and Blowdown Stack.png|thumb|Destroyed trailers with the blowdown stack in the background|upright=1.35]]
Equipment and piping congestion contributed to accelerate the flame front. This triggered a massive [[Gas explosion|vapor cloud explosion]] that was heard for miles.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=66–67}} The blast pressure wave struck the cluster of contractor trailers located as close as {{Convert|121|ft|m}} from the blowdown stack, completely destroying them. The explosion sent debris flying, instantly killing 15 people in the closest trailers and injuring 180 others.{{efn|Ironically, the contractors working in the trailers closest to the explosion had just returned from a lunch organized to celebrate one month without lost-time injury{{Sfnp|Thomson|2015|pp=221}}}} Workers in trailers received injuries as far as {{Convert|480|ft|m}} from the blowdown drum, with heavy damage reaching some trailers as far as {{Convert|600|ft|m}} away. Over 40 trailers were damaged.<ref name="Holmstrom_PSP" />{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=17, 70, 241}} All the fatalities and many of those injured in the accident were contractors.{{Sfnp|CSB|2014|p=32}} Fifty storage tanks sustained structural damage, although the largest portion of the tank farm was more than {{Convert|250|ft|m}} from the explosion.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=69}} Over {{Convert|2750|lb|kg}} of [[benzene]] escaped from one of the damaged tanks.{{sfnp|CSB|2007|p=70}}<ref name=":22">{{Cite court|litigants=State of Texas v. BP Products North America Inc.|court=District Court of Travis County, Texas – 201st Judicial District|date=June 23, 2009|url=https://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/060409bp_pop_1_1.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221110141352/https://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/060409bp_pop_1_1.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

An area estimated at {{convert|200000|sqft|m2}} of the refinery was badly burned by the fire that followed the violent explosion, damaging refinery equipment worth millions of dollars.{{sfnp|CSB|2007|p=64}} The pressure wave was so powerful it blew out windows offsite up to {{convert|3/4|mi|km|spell=in|adj=pre|of a}} away.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=70}}

=== Emergency response ===
[[File:BP PLANT EXPLOSION-1 lowres2.jpg|thumb|Firefighting operations|upright=1.35]]
The site emergency response team intervened immediately, mounting a [[search and rescue]] operation.{{Sfnp|Mogford|2005b|pp=13–14}} An order was issued for the [[shelter-in-place]] of 43,000 people.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=17}} [[Mutual aid (emergency services)|Mutual aid]] provided by IMAS (Texas City Industrial Mutual Aid System) and [[Memorial Hermann Life Flight]] resources were mobilized by 1:45&nbsp;pm.{{sfnp|CSB|2007|p=70}}{{Sfnp|Mogford|2005b|pp=13–14}}<ref>{{Cite news |last=Bryant |first=Salatheia |date=March 20, 2007 |title=Campaign for Hospital Helicopters Takes Flight |url=https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/health/article/campaign-for-hospital-helicopters-takes-flight-1797919.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240126090256/https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/health/article/campaign-for-hospital-helicopters-takes-flight-1797919.php |archive-date=January 26, 2024 |access-date=January 26, 2024 |work=[[Houston Chronicle]]}}</ref> The feed to the raffinate splitter was not shut down, but it stopped at 2:45&nbsp;pm when electrical power went down. Fires were brought under control by 150–200 [[Firefighter|firefighters]] after two hours. Ambulances and Life Flight stood down by 4:44&nbsp;pm. The final body was found under a heap of debris at about 11:00&nbsp;pm.{{Sfnp|Mogford|2005b|pp=13–14}}{{Sfnp|Mogford|2005a|p=41}}

== Investigation reports ==
BP's in-house experts as well as various authorities and committees investigated the explosion in relation to technical, organizational, and [[safety culture]] aspects. BP internal investigations included a panel (the Mogford investigation, from the name of the lead investigator) tasked with reconstructing the accident causation chain and conducting a detailed [[Root cause analysis|root-cause analysis]],{{sfnp|Mogford|2005b}} and two other teams (the Bonse and Stanley investigations) who remained focused on underlying procedural and cultural factors as well as managerial accountabilities.{{sfnp|Bonse-Geuking et al.|2007}}{{sfnp|Stanley|2005}} An independent, high-profile panel (the [[James Baker|Baker]] panel) was commissioned by BP on an urgent recommendation by the [[U.S. Chemical Safety Board]] (CSB), to look into management and safety culture issues. The CSB conducted their own detailed and extensive investigation, focused both on technical and procedural aspects.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2007}}

The different panels and investigations found organizational failings including corporate cost-cutting, a failure to invest in the plant infrastructure, a lack of corporate oversight on both safety culture and major accident prevention programs, a focus on [[Occupational safety and health|occupational safety]] as opposed to [[process safety]], a defective [[Change management|management of change]] process (which allowed the siting of contractor trailers too close to the ISOM process unit), the inadequate training of operators, a lack of competent supervision for start-up operations, poor communication between individuals and departments and the use of outdated and ineffective work procedures which were often not followed. Technical failings included the use of a blowdown drum that was both insufficiently sized and outdated, a lack of preventive maintenance on [[Safety-critical system|safety-critical systems]], and inoperative alarms and level sensors in the ISOM process unit.<ref name=":27">{{Cite web |last1=Price |first1=Tom |last2=Aulds |first2=T.J. |date=2005-09-14 |title=What Went Wrong: Oil Refinery Disaster |url=https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/a295/1758242/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230131180921/https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/gadgets/a295/1758242/ |archive-date=January 31, 2023 |access-date=2024-01-21 |website=[[Popular Mechanics]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

=== BP internal investigations ===

==== Mogford report ====
A team of experts led by John Mogford, the senior BP Group vice president for safety and operations, examined the technical aspects of the explosion and suggested corrective actions. An interim report was issued on May 12, 2005.{{Sfnp|Mogford|2005a}} Reacting to the report, Scott Berger, director of the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the [[American Institute of Chemical Engineers]] (AIChE), expressed surprise at the emphasis the report put on individual responsibility by plant operators and supervisors.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Belli |first=Anne |date=May 20, 2005 |title=BP's Finding That Staff at Fault in Blast Is Disputed |url=https://www.chron.com/news/article/BP-s-finding-that-staff-at-fault-in-blast-is-1930706.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210507020605/https://www.chron.com/news/article/BP-s-finding-that-staff-at-fault-in-blast-is-1930706.php |archive-date=May 7, 2021 |access-date=January 26, 2024 |work=[[Houston Chronicle]]}}</ref>

On December 9, 2005, BP published the final revision of the Mogford report.{{Sfnp|Mogford|2005b}} It identified four critical factors without which the explosion would not have happened or would have had a lesser impact: "loss of containment; raffinate splitter start-up procedures and application of knowledge and skills; control of work and trailer siting; and design and engineering of the blowdown stack."{{Sfnp|Mogford|2005b|p=i}} Furthermore, five critical underlying cultural issues were identified:{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=19}}

* "Business context", including a working environment that resisted change and was dominated by lack of motivation, trust and sense of purpose. This was coupled with unclear expectations about management and supervision.
* "Safety as a priority", in that management did not give process safety the necessary importance within the business.
* "Organizational complexity and capability", in the sense of a lack of clarity in accountabilities and poor communication.
* "Inability to see risk", or a tendency to accept high levels of risk due to poor hazard awareness.
* "Lack of early warning", or the inability to recognize and action signals revealing plant and procedures deterioration.

The Mogford final report did not, however, find evidence that anyone intentionally made decisions or took actions that put others at risk.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=19}}

==== Stanley report ====
The company also put together a team of BP and external experts for conducting a process and operational [[audit]] review of the refinery. James W. Stanley, former deputy director of the [[Occupational Safety and Health Administration]]&nbsp;(OSHA), was the team leader. The audit focused on processes and operations; incident management, control of work, risk assessment, and compliance assessment; employee and [[contractor management]]; and maintenance, reliability, and integrity. The Stanley report was issued internally on June 15, 2005. It concluded that significant performance and behavior change on the part of senior and extended management would be needed, in spite of well-designed and documented procedures and processes being available and the workforce being generally capable of good performance.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|pp=19–20}} Among the issues "preventing the successful execution of some key work processes", the team singled out: leadership factors, including failure to hold people accountable for safety and [[Information silo#In organizations|silo mentality]], among other issues; risk awareness, indicated by complacency and repeated failure to heed recommendations arising from previous accidents; measures for control of work, which was found to be both insufficient and unadhered to; negative workplace conditions, as shown by poor [[Housekeeping#Workplace and industrial housekeeping|housekeeping]] and insufficient plant maintenance; and a contractor management philosophy lacking diversity and inclusion values.{{Sfnp|Stanley|2005|loc=Executive Summary}}

==== Bonse report ====
Another internal team was led by {{ill|Wilhelm Bonse-Geuking|de}}, who was BP Group vice president of Europe. The Bonse team investigated the level of compliance by plant managers with BP's management framework and corporate code of conduct. The final report{{snd}}which was only released to the public after a court ordered it on May 3, 2007{{snd}}identified numerous management failures.{{sfnp|Bonse-Geuking et al.|2007}}<ref>{{Cite report |url=http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/bonse_supplemental_report.pdf |title=Management Accountability Report: Texas City Isomerization Explosion – Supplemental Report |last1=Bonse-Geuking |first1=Wilhelm |last2=Blyweert |first2=Rudy |date=February 2007 |publisher=[[BP]] |access-date=January 21, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200923201224/http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/bonse_supplemental_report.pdf |archive-date=September 23, 2020 |via=Brent Coon & Associates |url-status=live |display-authors=1}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite news |date=2007-05-03 |title=BP Study Blames Managers for 2005 Blast at Texas Refinery |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/business/worldbusiness/03iht-bp.4.5553455.html |url-access=registration |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121225800/https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/03/business/worldbusiness/03iht-bp.4.5553455.html |archive-date=January 21, 2021 |access-date=2024-01-21 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=}}</ref> It further noted that management responsibilities within BP Group were unclear, and that the poor state of the plant equipment and the insufficiency of spending on maintenance were contributing factors to the accident.<blockquote>In sum, the Texas City Refinery had a culture of risk taking coupled with a failure to understand the process safety implications of prior incidents [...], a long tradition of failure to comply with simple procedures, the desire to avoid conflict within its organization, and a penchant for placing persons in key roles who lacked adequate professional training.{{sfnp|Bonse-Geuking et al.|2007|p=7}}</blockquote>The report identified four executives for dismissal: Pat Gower, regional vice president for U.S. refining; Mike Hoffman, group vice president for North American refining and marketing; Texas City complex manager Don Parus; and Willie Willis, Texas City West plant supervisor.<ref name=":8" /> As of the date of publication of the report none had actually been sacked.<ref name=":6" />{{efn|Parus was put on "indefinite" leave by BP in May 2005 and remained on their payroll as of September 2007.<ref name=":24" /> It transpired that, prior to the March 2005 explosion, he had tried to highlight the poor safety conditions of the plant to his higher management and asked to stop budget cuts. He even showed [[John Manzoni]], BP head of refining and marketing, a presentation titled "Texas City Is Not a Safe Place to Work"<ref>{{Cite report |last=Parus|first=Don|url=https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/11343/don-parus-powerpoint-presentation.pdf |title=Texas City Is Not a Safe Place to Work |date=2004 |access-date=February 2, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240202071250/https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/11343/don-parus-powerpoint-presentation.pdf |archive-date=February 2, 2024 |url-status=live|publisher=[[BP]]|type=Presentation|via=[[DocumentCloud]]}}</ref> with photographs of workers that lost their life on the job at the refinery. Parus was the manager that commissioned the Telos Report.{{sfnp|The Telos Group|2005a}}<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Steinzor |first=Rena |date=Summer 2011 |title=The Truth About Regulation in America |url=https://journals.law.harvard.edu/lpr/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2013/05/5.2_5_Steinzor.pdf |url-status=live |journal=[[Harvard Law & Policy Review]] |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=323–346 |issn=1935-2077 |eissn=1935-2107 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240202065820/https://journals.law.harvard.edu/lpr/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2013/05/5.2_5_Steinzor.pdf |archive-date=February 2, 2024 |access-date=February 2, 2024}}</ref>}}

=== Baker Panel report ===
[[File:JamesBaker.jpeg|thumb|upright|James A. Baker III]]
After the March explosion, two more serious [[process safety]] incidents occurred at the plant:
* On July 28, 2005, a [[hydrogen]] gas heat exchanger pipe on the [[Hydrodesulfurization|resid hydrotreater unit]] ruptured, causing a release of hydrogen that erupted into a large [[jet fire]]. Fires lasted for about two hours. One person received minor injuries and property damaged amounted to $30&nbsp;million. The Chemical Safety Board found that a contractor had accidentally swapped a [[low-alloy steel]] elbow for a [[carbon steel]] pipe elbow during maintenance, causing a failure mode known as [[high temperature hydrogen attack|high-temperature hydrogen attack]] (HTHA). The CSB found that BP should have required positive materials verification using an [[X-ray fluorescence]] test device and maintained or required the contractor to maintain materials identification using [[Tagging system|tagging]] to prevent misplacement of components when reassembling the equipment.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 15, 2006 |title=CSB Issues Safety Bulletin on BP Texas City Major Fire: Better Material Identification Needed, Errors During Systems Maintenance Cited; Fire Caused $30 Million in Property Damage |url=https://www.csb.gov/csb-issues-safety-bulletin-on-bp-texas-city-major-fire-better-material-identification-needed-errors-during-systems-maintenance-cited-fire-caused-30-million-in-property-damage/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240121134624/https://www.csb.gov/csb-issues-safety-bulletin-on-bp-texas-city-major-fire-better-material-identification-needed-errors-during-systems-maintenance-cited-fire-caused-30-million-in-property-damage/ |archive-date=January 21, 2024 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=October 12, 2006 |title=BP Texas City, TX Refinery Fire – Positive Material Verification: Prevent Errors During Alloy Steel Systems Maintenance |url=https://www.csb.gov/userfiles/file/rhubulletin.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100403184606/https://www.csb.gov/userfiles/file/rhubulletin.pdf |archive-date=April 3, 2010 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |series=Safety Bulletin No. 2005-04-B}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 30, 2005 |title=CSB Investigators Continue Assessment of July 28 Explosion and Fire at BP Texas City Refinery |url=https://www.csb.gov/csb-investigators-continue-assessment-of-july-28-explosion-and-fire-at-bp-texas-city-refinery/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131227201514/https://www.csb.gov/csb-investigators-continue-assessment-of-july-28-explosion-and-fire-at-bp-texas-city-refinery/ |archive-date=December 27, 2013 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]]}}</ref>

* On August 10, 2005, a [[Fuel oil|gasoil]] hydrotreater developed a leak caused by [[corrosion]] and high-temperature [[sulfidation]] which resulted in the release of toxic gases including [[carbon monoxide]] (CO), [[hydrogen sulfide]] (H<sub>2</sub>S), and [[sulfur dioxide]] (SO<sub>2</sub>), as well as flammable hydrocarbon vapors.<ref name=":13">{{Cite court|litigants=United States of America v. BP Products North America Inc.|court=S.D. Tex.|date=2010|url=https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bpproducts-cd.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240124155429/https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bpproducts-cd.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=238}} Property damage was around $2&nbsp;million.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=306}}
Both accidents required community [[shelter-in-place]] alerts.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 30, 2006 |title=CSB Investigation of BP Texas City Refinery Disaster Continues as Organizational Issues Are Probed |url=https://www.csb.gov/csb-investigation-of-bp-texas-city-refinery-disaster-continues-as-organizational-issues-are-probed/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230612200232/https://www.csb.gov/csb-investigation-of-bp-texas-city-refinery-disaster-continues-as-organizational-issues-are-probed/ |archive-date=June 12, 2023 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]]}}</ref> Following these events, on August 17, 2005, the [[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] (CSB) issued an urgent recommendation that BP commission an independent panel to investigate the safety culture and management systems at BP North America.<ref>{{cite web |author= |date=17 August 2005 |title=CSB Issues Urgent Safety Recommendation to BP Global Board, Calls for Creation of Independent Panel to Examine Corporate Safety Management, Oversight, and Safety Culture |url=http://www.csb.gov/newsroom/detail.aspx?nid=210 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230613135732/https://www.csb.gov/csb-issues-urgent-safety-recommendation-to-bp-global-board-calls-for-creation-of-independent-panel-to-examine-corporate-safety-management-oversight-and-safety-culture/ |archive-date=June 13, 2023 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety Board]] |publisher=}}</ref> A [[Blue-ribbon committee|blue-ribbon panel]] was assembled, led by former U.S. Secretary of State [[James Baker|James A. Baker III]].{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=}}<ref name=":18">{{Cite book |last=Sanders |first=Roy E. |title=Chemical Process Safety: Learning from Case Histories |publisher=[[Butterworth-Heinemann]] |year=2015 |isbn=978-0-12-801425-7 |edition=4th |location=Kidlington, England and Waltham, Mass. |pages=99–112}}</ref> A figure of this stature and curriculum was specifically selected by BP to publicly show to U.S. opinion-makers that the company was eager to learn the lesson and make strides to change.{{Sfnp|Thomson|2015|p=216}}

The Baker Panel differed from BP's and the CSB's investigations in that it was not charged to conduct a root cause investigation. Its scope was broader, focused on BP's corporate safety oversight, corporate safety culture, and its [[process safety management]] systems and included all five BP refineries in the United States.{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|p=13}}

The Baker Panel report was released on January 16, 2007.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=}}<ref>{{cite news |last1=Mufson |first1=Steven |date=17 January 2007 |title=BP Failed on Safety, Report Says |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011600208.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230726062658/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011600208.html |archive-date=July 26, 2023 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref><ref name="U.S. Chemical Safety Board">{{cite web |date=March 20, 2007 |title=U.S. Chemical Safety Board Concludes 'Organizational and Safety Deficiencies at All Levels of the BP Corporation' Caused March 2005 Texas City Disaster That Killed 15, Injured 180 |url=http://www.csb.gov/newsroom/detail.aspx?nid=205 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131227184909/http://www.csb.gov/u-s-chemical-safety-board-concludes-organizational-and-safety-deficiencies-at-all-levels-of-the-bp-corporation-caused-march-2005-texas-city-disaster-that-killed-15-injured-180/ |archive-date=December 27, 2013 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |publisher=}}</ref> It cited weak safety culture driven by poor process safety leadership and low employee empowerment as underlying causes of the accidents plaguing the refinery. It also highlighted that despite BP's comprehensive [[safety management system]], this was not sufficiently enforced in their refineries. It also showed that BP's focus in measuring its safety performance relied overwhelmingly on occupational safety indicators to the detriment of process safety performance monitoring.<ref>{{cite web |date=April 2007 |title=Safety Culture Weakness Cited in BP Accident |url=https://ehss.energy.gov/sesa/Files/corporatesafety/advisory/SAd_2007-02.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111022161314/http://hss.doe.gov/sesa/corporatesafety/advisory/SAd_2007-02.pdf |archive-date=October 22, 2011 |access-date=March 23, 2013 |website=[[United States Department of Energy]] |series=Office of Health, Safety, and Security Safety Advisory No. 2007-02 |publisher=}}</ref>{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|pp=14–18}} It further stressed that worker fatigue and a system that encouraged [[overtime]] had detrimental effects on safe plant operation,{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|pp=87–89}} and that the company had failed to deal with deficiencies arising from known incidents, risk assessments and audits.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|pp=xiv–xv}} Implementation of [[Good engineering practice|good engineering practices]] was also found lacking.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=148}} 

Additionally, the panel interviewed a number of employees, managers and contractors at all five of BP's U.S. refineries.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|pp=2–3}} They also created and administered to the refineries a process safety culture survey.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|pp=7–11}} They concluded that the [[Toledo, Ohio|Toledo]] and [[Texas City, Texas|Texas City]] plants had the worst process safety culture, while the [[Cherry Point Refinery|Cherry Point refinery]], located in [[Birch Bay, Washington]], had the best process safety culture. The survey results also showed that managers and [[White-collar worker|white-collar]] workers generally had a more positive view of the process safety culture at their plants when compared with the viewpoint of [[blue-collar]] operators and maintenance technicians.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|loc=chapter VI}}

The report made 10 recommendations on various aspects of process safety (leadership; management system; competence; culture; expectations and accountability; leading and lagging [[Performance indicator|performance indicators]]; and auditing), as well as on support for [[line management]] and industry stewardship.<ref>{{Cite news |date=January 16, 2007 |title=Baker's 10 Recommendations |url=http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/4654060/Bakers-10-recommendations.html |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170122195236/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/4654060/Bakers-10-recommendations.html |archive-date=January 22, 2017 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |work=[[The Daily Telegraph]]}}</ref>

=== CSB report ===
[[File:Updated BP Texas City Animation on the 15th Anniversary of the Explosion.ogg|thumb|2020 CSB video animation of the accident|upright=1.35]]
Given the extent of the disaster the Chemical Safety Board examined both the safety management in the Texas City refinery and the role of the BP Group as well as the role of OSHA as a regulatory body. The CSB investigation team was on site 48&nbsp;hours after the accident. Some 13 CSB investigators remained onsite for three months. For its investigation, the CSB used a budget of $2.5&nbsp;million and reviewed more than 30,000 documents, interviewed 370 witnesses, and performed computer modeling and testing. The results of the investigation of the agency were published on March 20, 2007 in a 341-page long report,{{Sfnp|CSB|2007}} the most extensive conducted up to that point by the then nine-year-old agency. The report findings were presented on the same day at a public meeting in Texas City.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Belli |first=Anne |date=March 20, 2007 |title=Cost-cutting, Lax Oversight Blamed for Deadly BP Blast |url=https://www.chron.com/news/article/Cost-cutting-lax-oversight-blamed-for-deadly-BP-1827845.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211020031350/https://www.chron.com/news/article/Cost-cutting-lax-oversight-blamed-for-deadly-BP-1827845.php |archive-date=October 20, 2021 |access-date=January 26, 2024 |work=[[Houston Chronicle]]}}</ref>{{Sfnp|CSB|2008|loc=1:50 minutes in}}<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.icsi-eu.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/Icsi_cahier_EN_investigation_process_major_technological_accidents_2018.pdf |title=The Investigation Process Following Major Technological Accidents: State of Play and Avenues for Improvement |author=((ICSI Working Group 'The Investigation Process Following Major Technological Accidents (2017)')) |date=November 2018 |publisher=Institut pour une culture de sécurité industrielle |location=Toulouse, France |page=23 |access-date=January 29, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818055118/https://www.icsi-eu.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/Icsi_cahier_EN_investigation_process_major_technological_accidents_2018.pdf |archive-date=August 18, 2022 |url-status=live |series= |type=Les Cahiers de la sécurité industrielle 2018-04}}</ref>

==== Design deficiencies ====
[[File:Blowdown Stack.png|thumb|Diagram of the blowdown stack of the ISOM plant at BP's Texas City refinery|upright=1.35]]
[[File:Shell haven flare.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|A flare stack, an [[Inherent safety|inherently safer]] solution to dispose of excess flammable gas]]
One of the key findings of the CSB was that the blowdown system used at the ISOM unit was antiquated and totally inadequate, being located as it was amid the plant and liable to spew unignited heavy vapors down into normally occupied areas.{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|p=34}} The CSB found that BP had failed to heed or implement multiple warnings and safety recommendations made before the blast regarding the ISOM blowdown system. Among them were:{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=109–117}}
*In 1991, the Amoco refining planning department proposed eliminating blowdown systems that vented to the atmosphere, but funding for this plan was not included in the budget.
*In 1992, OSHA issued a citation to Amoco for unsafe design of a similar blowdown system elsewhere in the refinery. However, Amoco successfully persuaded OSHA to drop this citation by relying on the less-stringent requirements in [[American Petroleum Institute|API]] Recommended Practice 521.<ref name=":17">{{Cite book |last=API |title=Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems |date=November 1990 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |edition=3rd |series=API Recommended Practice 521 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute}}</ref>
*In 1993, the "Amoco Regulatory Cluster Project" proposed eliminating atmospheric blowdown systems, but again, funding was not approved.
*Despite Amoco's "Process Safety Standard No.&nbsp;6", which prohibited new atmospheric blowdown systems and called for the phasing out of existing ones, in 1997, Amoco replaced the 1950s-era blowdown drum/vent stack that served the raffinate splitter tower with an identical system, instead of upgrading to recommended alternatives that were safer.
*In 2002, an opportunity to tie the ISOM relief system into the new naphtha desulfurization unit [[Gas flare|flare]] system was not taken, due to a US$150,000 incremental cost.
*Also in 2002, BP's "Clean Streams Project" proposed converting the blowdown drum to a flare knock-out tank, and routing discharges to a flare. When it was found that a needed relief study of the ISOM system had not been completed due to budget constraints, the Clean Streams decided not to pursue the option.
Between 1994 and 2004, at least eight similar cases occurred in which flammable vapors were emitted by the ISOM blowdown drum/vent stack, of which two resulted in a fire. Yet no corrective action was taken.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=103}} Furthermore, the blowdown drum was not designed to deal with a vessel overfill. This was not necessarily attributable to Amoco or BP, but rather to a lack of guidance in the API Recommended Practice 521.<ref name=":17" />{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=119}}{{efn|Flare systems are both more inherently safe and environmentally sound than blowdown stacks: Safer because they significantly reduce the risk of having heavier-than-air flammable gas clouds migrating into the plant{{sfnp|OGP|2000|p=2}} and they eliminate toxic gases like [[hydrogen sulfide]] and other noxious substances like [[Volatile organic compound|volatile organic compounds]];{{sfnp|IPIECA|IOGP|GGFR|2021|p=14}}{{sfnp|OGP|2000|p=3}} more environmentally sound because they convert [[methane]] to [[carbon dioxide]], which is a comparatively milder (albeit still potent) [[greenhouse gas]].{{sfnp|IPIECA|IOGP|GGFR|2021|p=10}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Gas Flaring and Gas Venting |url=http://www.eniscuola.net/en/argomento/natural-gas1/environment-and-territory1/gas-flaring-and-gas-venting/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180408182618/http://www.eniscuola.net/en/argomento/natural-gas1/environment-and-territory1/gas-flaring-and-gas-venting/ |archive-date=April 8, 2018 |website=[[Eni|Eniscuola]]}}</ref> It is true, however, that in the specific scenario occurred at Texas City, unless the flare knock-out drum (a pressure vessel separating and disposing of excess liquid) were to be designed to cope with liquid overfills from upstream equipment, the mere use of a flare would not have prevented an accident from happening, as CSB investigator Don Holmstrom stated.<ref name=":27" /> Nevertheless, the consequences would have most likely been more limited. A liquid slug large enough to overcome an undersized knock-out drum and climb to the flare tip would likely get ignited on exiting the stack, which would result in liquid fires raining down from the flare stack and pooling around it. A flare stack has to be placed away from manned areas due to the high [[thermal radiation]] from the flame the flare generates in case of plant upset scenarios (although not specifically for upsets where liquids are ingested by the flare); this arrangement would have caused any [[pool fire]] to occur in a safe area, empty of people and hazardous equipment.<ref name=":26" />}}

Other design issues included:
* The range of the remote [[Level sensor|level instruments]] at the splitter was too narrow and inadequate for start-up operations.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=312}}
* Additionally, redundant means to assess liquid level for the safe start-up of a distillation column, such as e.g., a bottom [[Pressure measurement#Instruments|pressure transmitter]], were missing altogether.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=107}}
* [[Safety instrumented system|Instrumented systems]] relied decisively on manual operator intervention instead of automatic action. As a consequence, there was no automatic [[Plant process and emergency shutdown systems#Process shutdown (PSD)|process shutdown]] upon the liquid level in the splitter reaching an assigned high level.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=107–109}}
* The [[User interface|human–machine interface]] used in the control rooms was poorly designed, in that it did not show the splitter incoming and outgoing flows on the same screen, nor did it calculate the total liquid in the tower.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=83}}{{Efn|An additional design flaw pointed out elsewhere was that the pressure relief valves should not have been placed so far below the top of the tower. This made them liable to be opened by the static head of liquid in case of column overfilling or liquid carry-over, a scenario that in fact materialized and resulted in overwhelming the blowdown drum, which was not designed to receive such a huge inflow of liquids. This scenario had never been considered in a [[hazard and operability study]] (HAZOP).{{Sfnp|Atherton|Gil|2008|p=256}}}}

==== Plant integrity ====
Several items, most of which safety-critical, were not operational and contributed to the chain of events. In particular, none of the four available level readings and alarms on the splitter worked. The affected instruments were the process control system displacer-type level transmitter, the two independent high- and low-level switches (although the low-level one did not play a role in the accident), and the level [[sight glass]] at the bottom of the splitter tower,{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=327–328}} as well as the [[Flow measurement|flow transmitter]] reading the flowrate of heavy raffinate.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=53}}

The splitter tower mechanical conditions were seen as degraded, so in 2004 the set point of the pressure relief valves was decreased from {{convert|70|psi|kPa|lk=off|abbr=on}} to approximately {{convert|40|psi|kPa|lk=off|abbr=on}}. If this change had not been implemented, the valves would not have opened on the day of the accident and the explosion would not have occurred, because the static head above them would not have reached the valve set point.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=100, 220, 252}}{{Sfnp|Atherton|Gil|2008|pp=252, 259}}

==== Systemic management and safety culture issues ====
The CSB found that organizational and safety deficiencies at all organizational levels of BP contributed to the refinery explosion, such as cost cuts and spending cuts in the safety area, although a large part of the refinery infrastructure and process equipment were in poor condition. In addition, the committee said that BP had cut the budget for training and reduced staff.

Carolyn W. Merritt, chairman and chief executive officer of the CSB, stated that findings about BP's safety culture were similar to those by the Baker Panel,{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|p=6}} and that "[t]he combination of cost-cutting, production pressures, and failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery." She pointed out that, beginning in 2002, BP commissioned several studies through which it became aware of serious safety problems, including insufficient maintenance and training. Merritt highlighted that the studies were shared with key executives in London, but BP's response was inadequate, with the little investment made not addressing the real issues in Texas City. In fact, BP executives challenged their refineries to cut another 25% from their budgets for 2005. In addition, safety improvements between 2002 and 2005 were "largely focused on personal safety—such as slips, trips, falls, and vehicle accidents, rather than on improving safety performance," according to supervisory investigator Don Holmstrom.<ref name="U.S. Chemical Safety Board" />{{efn|The same criticism was made of [[Esso]] regarding the [[1998 Esso Longford fire|Longford gas plant disaster]] occurred in [[Victoria (state)|Victoria, Australia]] in 1998.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hopkins |first=Andrew |title=Lessons from Longford: The Esso Gas Plant Explosion |date=2000 |publisher=[[CCH (company)|CCH Australia]] |at=Chapter 6|isbn=978-1864684223 |location=Macquarie Park, NSW}}</ref>}}

==== Need for updated industry standards ====
The CSB also issued a recommendation for the [[American Petroleum Institute]] (API) and the [[United Steelworkers]] (USW, the trade union representing refinery workers) to work together to develop a guideline for understanding, recognizing and dealing with fatigue during shift work, as well as to create performance indicators specific to process safety in the refining and petrochemical industries,{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=212}} since measuring safety purely based on eminently occupational indicators such as lost-time incidents was seen as insufficient in the context of preventing major process accidents.{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|p=7}} Other recommendations addressed to API were to update Recommended Practice 752 to include guidelines on the safe placement of trailers and temporary buildings in process plants;{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=243}} and to update Recommended Practice 521 ''Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems''<ref>{{Cite book |last=API |title=Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems |date=March 1997 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |edition=4th |series=API Recommended Practice 521 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute}}</ref> to identify overfilling vessels as a potential hazard for evaluation, to mandate sizing disposal drums for credible worst-case liquid relief scenarios, to warn against the use of atmospheric blowdown drums and stacks attached to piping systems receiving flammable discharges from multiple relief valves, and to urge the use of appropriate [[Inherent safety|inherently safer]] alternatives such as a flare system.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=247}}

The CSB judged that the Amoco–BP merger had negatively impacted the ability of the organization to deal with process hazards, because organizational changes occurred without getting assessed in terms of their consequences on safety. Therefore, the Board recommended to OSHA that their [[Process Safety Management (OSHA regulation)|Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals]] regulation,<ref name=":16">{{CodeFedReg|29|1910|119|accessdate=January 23, 2024|subpart=H|year=1992}}</ref> promulgated in 1992 and usually referred to as Process Safety Management (PSM),{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007}} should include a requirement for management of organizational changes, in addition to the existing rules on equipment and procedural changes.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=198–199, 213}} A complementary recommendation was addressed to the Center for Chemical Process Safety, to the effect of developing guidelines on how to perform organizational management of change reviews.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=214}}

==== Lack of regulatory oversight ====
In the United States, the PSM regulation<ref name=":16" /> is the key piece of legislation supporting the safe operation of a process facility handling hazardous materials, like the Texas City refinery (and indeed any refinery or sizeable chemical plant). OSHA is the enforcing agency for the regulation. However, the CSB found that OSHA had as supervising authority failed to carry out planned inspections of the refinery and did not enforce safety rules, although there were many warning signs. The CSB also found that only a limited number of OSHA inspectors received the specialized training and experience necessary for complex investigations in refineries.{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|pp=7, 37}} The report further negatively compared OSHA's available resources with those of other agencies, like the British [[Health and Safety Executive]] or the [[Contra Costa County, California]] hazardous materials programs, that were much more prepared in spite of their smaller scope of oversight.{{sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=204–205}}

The refinery also fell under the statutes of the [[United States Environmental Protection Agency|Environmental Protection Agency]] (EPA)'s [[Risk Management Program (EPA rule)|Risk Management Program]] (RMP) rule, a process safety management scheme similar to OSHA's. The CSB found that the EPA had not conducted any audits or inspections on RMP compliance since the rule had been promulgated.{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=209}} However, the CSB did not issue recommendations to the EPA. Merritt stated in a Senate hearing that they were unable to do so because the EPA did not share critical information, without which meaningful recommendations could not be formulated.{{Sfnp|United States Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Transportation Safety, Infrastructure Security, and Water Quality|2007|p=32}}

== Aftermath ==
Property damage from the explosion amounted to $200&nbsp;million (${{Inflation|index=US|value=200|start_year=2005}}&nbsp;million in {{Inflation/year|US}}).<ref name=":2">{{Cite report |last=Marsh Specialty |url=https://www.marsh.com/us/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses/100-largest-losses-report-download.html |title=100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry |publisher=[[Marsh (company)|Marsh]] |year=2022 |edition=27th |pages=54 |author-link=Marsh (company) |access-date=January 22, 2024 |url-access=registration |archive-date=March 3, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240303013507/https://www.marsh.com/us/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses/100-largest-losses-report-download.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The explosion caused the shutdown of several units at the refinery. In anticipation of [[Hurricane Rita]] later in 2005, the entire refinery was shut down. BP then focused on repairing the damage caused by the explosion as well as the hurricane. Process units restart commenced in March 2006.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=43}} Costs of repairs and deferred production amounted to over $1&nbsp;billion.<ref name=":9" /> BP pled guilty to federal [[Environmental crime|environmental crimes]], for which it paid $50&nbsp;million.<ref name=":14">{{Cite news |last=Leopold |first=Jason |author-link=Jason Leopold |date=September 27, 2010 |title=Exclusive: DOJ Refuses to Revoke BP's Probation Over Safety Violations at Texas City Refinery |url=https://truthout.org/articles/exclusive-doj-refuses-to-revoke-bps-probation-over-safety-violations-at-texas-city-refinery/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230926232321/https://truthout.org/articles/exclusive-doj-refuses-to-revoke-bps-probation-over-safety-violations-at-texas-city-refinery/ |archive-date=September 26, 2023 |access-date=January 26, 2010 |work=[[Truthout]]}}</ref> The company also paid at least around $2.1&nbsp;billion in civil settlements.<ref name=":9">{{Cite news |date=March 4, 2008 |title=BP's Texas City Compensation Bill Tops $2 Billion |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL04900882/#:~:text=LONDON%20(Reuters)%20-%20BP%27s%20compensation,another%20%24525%20for%20other%20claims. |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240124084109/https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL04900882/ |archive-date=January 24, 2024 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref> Additionally, BP paid $84.6&nbsp;million and $27&nbsp;million in fines to the federal government on OSHA's and the [[United States Environmental Protection Agency|EPA]]'s request, respectively,<ref name=":11">{{Cite web |date=July 12, 2012 |title=BP Agrees to Pay More Than $13 Million and Abate Violations in Settlement Agreement with US Department of Labor |url=https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/07122012#:~:text=In%20September%202005%2C%20OSHA%20cited,to%20identify%20and%20correct%20deficiencies. |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401011547/https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/07122012#:~:text=In%20September%202005%2C%20OSHA%20cited,to%20identify%20and%20correct%20deficiencies. |archive-date=April 1, 2023 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |website=[[Occupational Safety and Health Administration]]}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite web |date=September 30, 2010 |title=BP North America Settlement |url=https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/bp-north-america-settlement |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240125111848/https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/bp-north-america-settlement |archive-date=January 25, 2024 |access-date=January 25, 2024 |website=[[United States Environmental Protection Agency]]}}</ref><ref name=":15" /> and a $50&nbsp;million fine to the government of Texas for environmental violations.<ref name=":10">{{Cite court|litigants=State of Texas v. BP Products North America Inc.|court=District Court of Travis County, Texas – 201st Judicial District|date=March 11, 2011|url=https://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2011/110311bp_afj.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120807092416/https://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2011/110311bp_afj.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> The disaster is the world's costliest refinery accident.{{Sfnp|Thomson|2015|p=215}}

=== BP's response and fate of the refinery ===
[[File:Browne-Hayward-Dudley.png|thumb|upright=1.5|BP CEOs [[John Browne, Baron Browne of Madingley|John Browne]] (1995–2007), [[Tony Hayward]] (2007–2010) and [[Bob Dudley]] (2010–2020)]]
BP initiated a crisis management plan only six hours after the explosion. The following day, a website<ref>{{Cite web |title=BP Texas City Refinery Incident – March 23, 2005 |url=http://www.bpresponse.org/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050408172006/http://bpresponse.org/external/index.cfm?cid=946 |archive-date=April 8, 2005 |website=bpresponse.org |access-date=June 28, 2005 }}</ref> was set up to publish updates on the accident.{{sfnp|Maresh|Williams|2010|p=293}} [[Chief executive officer|Chief Executive]] Lord [[John Browne, Baron Browne of Madingley|John Browne]] visited the plant on the day after the explosion.<ref name=":23">{{Cite news |last=Cummins |first=Chip |title=BP's Accidents Put Its Celebrated CEO On the Hot Seat |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115041929950681937 |url-access=subscription |access-date=February 1, 2024 |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |archive-date=February 1, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240201081851/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115041929950681937 |url-status=live }}</ref> In the months after the accident BP tended to put the blame on its operators and supervisors. Victims and union leaders considered this amounted to simple [[scapegoating]].{{sfnp|Maresh|Williams|2010|p=290}} At this point, the company consistently chose not to publicly apologize for the accident.{{sfnp|Maresh|Williams|2010|p=292}} This changed on May 17, 2005, when Ross Pillari, president of BP Products North America, made a public apology, saying "We regret that our mistakes have caused so much suffering. We apologize to those who were harmed and to the Texas City community” and promising "financial support and compensation" to the injured and the families of the dead.{{sfnp|Maresh|Williams|2010|p=294}}

On December 9, BP said they would put in place a budget of $1&nbsp;billion to be spent over five years to improve safety at their Texas City refinery.<ref name=":23" />{{Sfnp|United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations|2006|p=484}} BP also said that it would eliminate all blowdown drums/vent stack systems in flammable service, of which there were 11 at Texas City, and install new flares in line with their new policy prohibiting atmospheric venting of-heavier-than-air light hydrocarbons.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":21">{{Cite book |last1=Broadribb |first1=Michael P. |title=Hazards XXI: Process Safety and Environmental Protection in a Changing World |last2=Flynn |first2=Steve A. |publisher=[[Institution of Chemical Engineers]] |isbn=978-08-52955-36-9 |series=IChemE Symposium Series No. 155 |location=Rugby, England |publication-date=2009 |pages=32–38 |chapter=4 Years On from Texas City |type=CD-ROM |oclc=430505407 |access-date=January 31, 2024 |chapter-url=https://www.icheme.org/media/9502/xxi-paper-004.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191220145444/https://www.icheme.org/media/9502/xxi-paper-004.pdf |archive-date=December 20, 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref>{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=120}} They also relocated trailers away from areas where explosions are possible<ref name=":21" />{{Sfnp|CSB|2007|p=129}} and started a trial of an electronic [[integrated safe system of work]] (ISSOW).<ref name=":21" /> Group-wide initiatives were also taken.<ref name=":21" />

Not long after the explosion and the other accidents at Texas City in 2005, however, BP's image in the U.S. was further tarnished by the near-sinking of the [[Semi-submersible platform|semi-submersible]] oil platform ''[[Thunder Horse PDQ]]'' in July of the same year<ref>{{Cite news |last=Kidwell |first=Hugh |date=February 28, 2006 |title=Thunder Horse Back on Course |url=https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/feature582/?cf-view |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240123095024/https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/feature582/ |archive-date=January 23, 2024 |access-date=January 23, 2024 |work=Offshore Technology}}</ref> and, more crucially, in March 2006 when [[Prudhoe Bay oil spill|an oil pipeline spill]] was discovered in [[Prudhoe Bay, Alaska]], while multiple investigations into the Texas City explosion were still ongoing.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Schwartz |first=Nelson |date=October 16, 2006 |title=Can BP Bounce Back? |url=https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/10/16/8388595/index.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231002160855/https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/10/16/8388595/index.htm |archive-date=October 2, 2023 |access-date=January 23, 2024 |magazine=[[Fortune (magazine)|Fortune]] |issn=0015-8259}}</ref> CSB chairman Carolyn Merritt said there were striking similarities between the accidents of Texas City and Prudhoe Bay, including "long delays in implementation, administrative documentation of close-out even though remedial actions were not actually taken, or simple non-compliance" as well as "flawed communication of [[lessons learned]], excessive decentralization of safety functions, and high management turnover."<ref>{{Cite web |date=May 16, 2007 |title=CSB Chairman Carolyn Merritt Tells House Subcommittee of 'Striking Similarities' in Causes of BP Texas City Tragedy and Prudhoe Bay Pipeline Disaster |url=https://www.csb.gov/csb-chairman-carolyn-merritt-tells-house-subcommittee-of-striking-similarities-in-causes-of-bp-texas-city-tragedy-and-prudhoe-bay-pipeline-disaster/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131227184834/https://www.csb.gov/csb-chairman-carolyn-merritt-tells-house-subcommittee-of-striking-similarities-in-causes-of-bp-texas-city-tragedy-and-prudhoe-bay-pipeline-disaster/ |archive-date=December 27, 2013 |access-date=February 1, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]]}}</ref> A further serious accident occurred at BP Texas City in 2007, when 143 workers at the refinery claimed that they were injured when they inhaled toxic vapors released at the plant.<ref name="Times - AP - Texas refinery - 2009">{{cite news |last=AP |author-link=Associated Press |date=December 18, 2009 |title=Jury Awards BP Workers $100 Million in Toxic Substance Case |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/business/energy-environment/19oil.html |url-access=registration |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230530062914/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/business/energy-environment/19oil.html |archive-date=May 30, 2023 |access-date=January 23, 2024 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> CEO John Browne resigned in 2007 over unrelated issues,<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Cobain |first1=Ian |author-link=Ian Cobain |last2=Dyer |first2=Claire |date=May 2, 2007 |title=BP's Browne Quits Over Lie to Court About Private Life |url=https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/may/02/media.pressandpublishing |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230920074448/https://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/may/02/media.pressandpublishing |archive-date=September 20, 2023 |access-date=January 23, 2024 |work=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref> although he did not escape criticism for the lax safety culture and the budget cuts at BP's U.S. refineries.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Paul |first=Katie |date=June 10, 2010 |title=How BP and the Oil Industry Got into Such a Mess |url=https://www.newsweek.com/how-bp-and-oil-industry-got-such-mess-73437 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131122112041/https://www.newsweek.com/how-bp-and-oil-industry-got-such-mess-73437 |archive-date=November 22, 2013 |access-date=January 29, 2024 |website=[[Newsweek]]}}</ref> [[Tony Hayward]] took over at the helm of the company. Hayward shifted emphasis from Lord Browne's focus on [[Renewable energy|alternative energy]], announcing that safety would be the company's "number one priority".<ref name="bbc110509">{{cite news |last=Barley |first=Shanta |date=May 11, 2009 |title=BP Brings 'Green Era' to a Close |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8040468.stm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240112122113/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8040468.stm |archive-date=January 12, 2024 |access-date=January 23, 2024 |work=[[BBC News]]}}</ref> By this time, BP had already taken a markedly apologetic stance over recent accidents, especially Texas City, with their executives and technical experts giving presentations about what went wrong and how they were working to prevent that from happening again.{{Sfnp|Thomson|2015|pp=216, 225}} However, only three years later, the 2010 ''[[Deepwater Horizon]]'' [[Deepwater Horizon explosion|explosion]] and [[Deepwater Horizon oil spill|oil spill]] occurred, causing a very serious impact on the company on a global scale, again stemming from BP's operations in the U.S. As a result, Hayward resigned, and his role was taken over by American-born [[Bob Dudley]].<ref name="DudleyRetires">{{cite news |last1=Reed |first1=Stanley |date=October 4, 2019 |title=BP Chief Executive Bob Dudley Is to Retire |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/business/bp-ceo-bob-dudley-bernard-looney.html |url-access=registration |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405153230/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/business/bp-ceo-bob-dudley-bernard-looney.html |archive-date=April 5, 2023 |access-date=January 23, 2024 |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> Under Dudley, BP announced in 2011 that it was selling its Texas City refinery as part of its divestment plan to pay for ongoing compensation claims and remedial activities following the ''Deepwater Horizon'' disaster. The sale of the refinery was successfully completed at the start of 2013 to [[Marathon Petroleum|Marathon Petroleum Corporation]] for US$2.5&nbsp;billion.<ref name=":5" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=1 February 2013 |title=BP Completes Sale of Texas City Refinery |url=https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-completes-sale-of-texas-city-refinery-and-related-assets-to-marathon-petroleum.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230608152035/https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-completes-sale-of-texas-city-refinery-and-related-assets-to-marathon-petroleum.html |archive-date=8 June 2023 |access-date=21 January 2024 |website=[[BP]]}}</ref> Marathon already owned the adjoining [[Galveston Bay Refinery]] and in 2018 merged the two sites into one refining complex.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 2022 |title=Galveston Bay Refinery |url=https://www.marathonpetroleum.com/content/documents/fact_sheets/Galveston_Bay_Refinery_Fact_Sheet.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211021123912/https://www.marathonpetroleum.com/content/documents/fact_sheets/Galveston_Bay_Refinery_Fact_Sheet.pdf |archive-date=October 21, 2021 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |website=[[Marathon Petroleum]]}}</ref>

Two [[United States congressional hearing|congressional hearings]] were held specifically on the Texas City disaster. Among those heard were API, Baker Panel, CCPS, CSB, EPA, and USW representatives, as well as victim relatives.'''{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007}}{{Sfnp|United States Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Transportation Safety, Infrastructure Security, and Water Quality|2007}}''' In other congressional hearings dedicated to subsequent BP accidents in the U.S., the Texas City case history was consistently presented within the pattern of degraded safety culture at BP.{{Sfnp| United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations|2006}}<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg32146/pdf/CHRG-109shrg32146.pdf |title=BP Pipeline Failure – Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources – United States Senate |last=United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources |date=September 12, 2006 |publisher=[[United States Government Publishing Office|U.S. Government Printing Office]] |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources |access-date=January 25, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230930041821/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg32146/pdf/CHRG-109shrg32146.pdf |archive-date=September 30, 2023 |via=[[GovInfo]] |url-status=live |series= |type=Senate Hearing 109-766}}</ref>{{Sfnp|United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations|2007}}<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg77844/pdf/CHRG-111shrg77844.pdf |title=Workplace Safety and Worker Protections at BP – Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions – United States Senate |last=United States Senate Health Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety |date=July 22, 2010 |publisher=[[United States Government Publishing Office|U.S. Government Printing Office]] |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=United States Senate Health Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety |access-date=January 25, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230929132244/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111shrg77844/pdf/CHRG-111shrg77844.pdf |archive-date=September 29, 2023 |via=[[GovInfo]] |url-status=live |series= |type=Senate Hearing 111-1155}}</ref>

=== Settlements with victims ===
[[File:Ed Bradley.jpg|thumb|Ed Bradley in 2001|upright]]
BP was named in lawsuits from the victims' families and the wounded.<ref>{{cite web |last=Aulds |first=T.J. |date=March 23, 2015 |title=BP Explosions Also a Fixture in County Courts |url=https://www.galvnews.com/news/free/article_a597d7fc-d177-11e4-a27a-57d819822b4b.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170810140233/https://www.galvnews.com/news/free/article_a597d7fc-d177-11e4-a27a-57d819822b4b.html |archive-date=August 10, 2017 |access-date=January 21, 2024 |website=[[The Daily News (Texas)|The Daily News]]}}</ref> The case of Eva Rowe, a young woman who lost her parents in the explosion, attracted nationwide attention. Rowe said that she would not accept a settlement from BP and would drag the group to justice. [[Ed Bradley]], a well-known American journalist, made her story known in the television magazine ''[[60 Minutes]]''.<ref>{{Cite episode |title=A Fighting Chance; Explosion at Texas City; Big Man on Campus |series=60 Minutes |series-link=60 Minutes |network=[[CBS]] |date=October 29, 2006 |season=39 |number=6}}</ref> On November 9, 2006, BP settled the case with Rowe as the last applicant after her lawyers had tried to invite [[John Browne, Baron Browne of Madingley|John Browne]], BP's chief executive officer at the time of the accident, as witness. The amount of compensation for Eva Rowe remained unknown. BP also paid $32&nbsp;million to hospitals and education and research institutions nominated by Rowe, including the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center at [[Texas A&M University]] ($12.5&nbsp;million), the [[University of Texas Medical Branch]] in Galveston and its Truman G. Blocker Adult Burn Unit ($12.5&nbsp;million), the [[College of the Mainland]] in Texas City ($5&nbsp;million), [[St. Jude Children's Research Hospital]] in [[Memphis, Tennessee|Memphis]], Tennessee ($1&nbsp;million), and the [[Hornbeck, Louisiana#Education|Hornbeck, Louisiana school system]] ($1&nbsp;million).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hem |first=Brad |date=November 9, 2006 |title=Settlement Reached in BP Blast Trial |url=https://www.chron.com/news/article/settlement-reached-in-bp-blast-trial-1666647.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240422045200/https://www.chron.com/news/article/settlement-reached-in-bp-blast-trial-1666647.php |archive-date=April 22, 2024 |access-date=April 22, 2024 |work=[[Houston Chronicle]]}}</ref>{{Efn|Rowe's parents were from this town in Louisiana.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lozano |first=Juan A. |date=November 9, 2006 |title=BP Plant Blast Trial Jurors to Be Picked |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/09/AR2006110900052.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305091118/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/09/AR2006110900052.html |archive-date=March 5, 2016 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref>}} Furthermore, BP was forced to publish about seven million pages of internal documents, including the Telos and Bonse reports.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |title=The Terms of Settlement in the Case of Eva Rowe |url=http://www.texascityexplosion.com/eva-terms-of-settlement.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230204054642/http://www.texascityexplosion.com/eva-terms-of-settlement.html |archive-date=February 4, 2023 |access-date=January 23, 2024 |website=Texas City Explosion |publisher=Brent Coon & Associates}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=Johnson |first=Caitlin |date=January 9, 2007 |title=Daughter of BP Victims Fights and Wins |url=http://www.cbsnews.com/news/daughter-of-bp-victims-fights-and-wins/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220627155151/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/daughter-of-bp-victims-fights-and-wins/ |archive-date=June 27, 2022 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |website=[[CBS News]] |publisher=}}</ref>{{Efn|Some of the documents caused a certain embarrassment to BP. For example, some saw an e-mail written on the day of the accident by BP America public relations chief Patricia Wright as very cynical. The e-mail stated that "follow up coverage [...] will essentially go away – due to the holiday weekend. This is a very big story in the U.S. right now – but the [[Terri Schiavo case|Terry Schiavo story]] is huge as well."<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Boudreau |first1=Abbie |author-link=Abbie Boudreau |last2=Yager |first2=Courtney |date=June 17, 2010 |title=BP Documents Highlight PR Strategy After Deadly Texas Blast |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/06/16/bp.refinery.reaction/index.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230922063558/https://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/06/16/bp.refinery.reaction/index.html |archive-date=September 22, 2023 |access-date=January 31, 2024 |work=[[CNN]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Dien |first=Yves |url=https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC118706/proceedings_55esreda_full_report_as_in_pubsy.pdf |title=Accident Investigation and Learning to Improve Safety Management in Complex System: Remaining Challenges. Proceedings of the 55th ESReDA Seminar Hosted by Romanian Railway Investigation Agency AGIFER, 9-10 October, 2018, Bucarest, Romania |publisher=[[Publications Office of the European Union]] |year=2019 |isbn=978-92-76-14172-3 |editor-last=Paul |editor-first=S. |location=Luxembourg, Luxembourg |pages=83–98 |chapter=Method and Mindset: Two Basic Elements for Accident Investigation |doi=10.2760/242130 |access-date=January 31, 2024 |editor-last2=Marsden |editor-first2=E. |editor-last3=Verschueren |editor-first3=F. |editor-last4=Tulonen |editor-first4=T. |editor-last5=Ferjencik |editor-first5=M. |editor-last6=Dien |editor-first6=Y. |editor-last7=Simola |editor-first7=K. |editor-last8=Kopustinkas |editor-first8=V. |archive-date=January 31, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240131084024/https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC118706/proceedings_55esreda_full_report_as_in_pubsy.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>}} Rowe would later participate in one of the congressional hearings held over the accident.{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|p=III}}

As of September 2007, BP had settled at least 1,350 of around 3,000 lawsuits related to the accident.<ref name=":24">{{Cite news |last=Hem |first=Brad |date=September 7, 2007 |title=Witness: Few at BP Knew of 30-year Death Toll |url=https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/witness-few-at-bp-knew-of-30-year-death-toll-1840832.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180629070557/https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/witness-few-at-bp-knew-of-30-year-death-toll-1840832.php |archive-date=June 29, 2018 |access-date=January 24, 2024 |work=[[Houston Chronicle]]}}</ref> By February 2008, about 4,000 claims were filed, of which half had settled, for a total exceeding $1.6 billion.<ref>{{Cite case|case=United States of America v. BP Products North America Inc.|publication-date=February 21, 2008|series=Criminal No. H-07-434|url=https://casetext.com/case/us-v-bp-products-north-america-inc-2|access-date=January 26, 2024}}</ref> BP also said that they had set aside a further $525&nbsp;million for other claims.<ref name=":9" /> By August 2008 only one of the approximately 4,000 claims remained open.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tennissen |first=Marilyn |date=August 26, 2008 |title=Only One BP Civil Case Remains After Four More Settlements |url=https://setexasrecord.com/stories/510609841-only-one-bp-civil-case-remains-after-four-more-settlements |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240126041107/https://setexasrecord.com/stories/510609841-only-one-bp-civil-case-remains-after-four-more-settlements |archive-date=January 26, 2024 |access-date=January 26, 2024 |work=[[Southeast Texas Record]]}}</ref>

=== Criminal prosecution ===
[[File:Lee.Rosenthal424.jpg|thumb|Judge Rosenthal in 2014]]
On February 4, 2008, U.S. district judge [[Lee Rosenthal]] heard arguments regarding BP's offer to plead guilty to a federal [[environmental crime]] for two violations of the [[Clean Air Act (United States)|Clean Air Act]] (CAA)<ref>[[Title 42 of the United States Code|42 U.S.C.]] [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-85 ch. 85] (§§ 7401-7671q). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240125112554/https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-85 |date=January 25, 2024}}</ref> with a $50&nbsp;million fine. At the hearing, blast victims and their relatives objected to the plea, calling the proposed fine "trivial".<ref>{{cite news |last=Baldwin |first=Lisa |date=February 4, 2008 |title=BP Explosion Victims' Relatives Oppose Plea |url=http://www.click2houston.com/news/15210120/detail.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080205102955/http://www.click2houston.com/news/15210120/detail.html |archive-date=2008-02-05 |access-date=February 4, 2008 |work=[[KPRC-TV|Click2Houston]] |publisher=}}</ref> However, the plea was eventually agreed, together with a three-year probation period for BP.<ref name=":14" /> This was the first and, for several years, remained the only federal [[conviction]] for an accidental chemical release under the CAA.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kenyon |first1=Peter |last2=Amon |first2=Tyler |date=March 2020 |title=Criminally Unsafe: Prosecuting Violations of Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act |url=https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1264531/dl?inline |url-status=live |journal=[[Department of Justice Journal of Federal Law and Practice]] |volume=68 |issue=2 |pages=53–68 |issn=1943-9008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240126035733/https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1264531/dl?inline |archive-date=January 26, 2024 |access-date=January 26, 2024}}</ref>

===Fines===
In September 2005, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which in the CSB report would be found lacking in oversight and competency,{{Efn|Admiral [[Frank Bowman]], a member of the Baker Panel, stated in a congressional hearing, "If [OSHA] can find 300 serious violations after the explosion, it would seem to me that preemptively finding those violations may have prevented this tragedy, and I think that that is one of the main root causes of why we are here today."{{Sfnp|United States House Committee on Education and Labor|2007|p=37}}}} gave BP a record $21&nbsp;million fine for committing 301 violations of the Process Safety Management rule.<ref name="Boldness" /><ref>{{cite web |date=22 September 2005 |title=OSHA Fines BP Products North America More Than $21 Million Following Texas City Explosion |url=http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=11589 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051130034438/http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=11589 |archive-date=2005-11-30 |access-date=23 March 2013 |website=[[Occupational Safety and Health Administration]] |publisher=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite report |url=http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/21.pdf |title=Inspection Number 308314640: Citation and Notification of Penalty |last=OSHA |date=September 21, 2005 |author-link=Occupational Safety and Health Administration |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071005044003/http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/21.pdf |archive-date=October 5, 2007 |url-status=dead|via=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]]}}</ref> In October 2009, OSHA imposed a fine of $87&nbsp;million, which shattered its 2005 record, after claiming that BP had failed to implement safety improvements following the disaster and noting that four further fatal accidents occurred in the refinery since the previous fine. In its new report, OSHA cited 709 safety violations.<ref>{{cite web |date=30 October 2009 |title=U.S. Department of Labor's OSHA Issues Record-breaking Fines to BP |url=http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=16674 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221208033834/https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/10302009 |archive-date=2022-12-08 |access-date=22 January 2024 |website=[[Occupational Safety and Health Administration]] |publisher=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2009 |title=Fact Sheet on BP 2009 Monitoring Inspection |url=https://www.osha.gov/dep/bp/Fact_Sheet-BP_2009_Monitoring_Inspection.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210917081902/http://s3.amazonaws.com/fcmd/documents/documents/000/001/720/original/bp-amoco-viols-of-tex-city-settlement_fact-sheet.pdf?1423020705 |archive-date=September 17, 2021 |access-date=November 3, 2009 |website=[[Occupational Safety and Health Administration]]}}</ref> BP announced that it would challenge the fine.<ref>{{cite news |last=Greenhouse |first=Steven |author-link=Steven Greenhouse |date=October 30, 2009 |title=BP to Challenge Fine for Refinery Blast |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/31/business/31labor.html |url-access=registration |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220617115450/https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/31/business/31labor.html |archive-date=June 17, 2022 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> On August 12, 2010, BP announced that it had agreed to pay $50.6&nbsp;million of the 2009 fine, while continuing to contest the remaining $30.7&nbsp;million (the fine had been reduced by $6.1&nbsp;million between when it was levied and when BP paid the first part).<ref>{{cite web |date=August 12, 2010 |title=BP Agrees to Pay Record $50.6m Fine for Texas Explosion |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-10960486 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221207065754/https://www.bbc.com/news/business-10960486 |archive-date=December 7, 2022 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |website=[[BBC News]] |publisher=}}</ref> In July 2012 OSHA and BP agreed that the outstanding $30.7&nbsp;million would be reduced to $13&nbsp;million, which BP paid.<ref name=":11" />

Following the explosion, the [[United States Environmental Protection Agency|U.S. Environmental Protection Agency]] inspected the refinery for compliance with the Clean Air Act (CAA) and found BP in violation of the CAA as well as its [[Risk management program (EPA rule)|Risk Management Program]] (RMP) rule.<ref>{{CodeFedReg|40|68||accessdate=January 25, 2024|subpart=|year=}}</ref> Most of the violations were not directly related to the explosion but rather to other events, like the two later accidents in 2005. A first fine of $12&nbsp;million was imposed on BP by the EPA in February 2009. This settlement also included BP's agreement to spend nearly $170&nbsp;million to improve its environmental performance, with over $150 million dedicated to management of [[benzene]] emissions and the remainder addressing [[Chlorofluorocarbon|chlorofluorocarbons]] and [[asbestos]].<ref name=":15">{{Cite web |date=February 19, 2009 |title=BP Texas City Clean Air Act Settlement |url=https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/bp-texas-city-clean-air-act-settlement |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140711065632/https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/bp-texas-city-clean-air-act-settlement |archive-date=July 11, 2014 |access-date=January 26, 2024 |website=[[United States Environmental Protection Agency]]}}</ref> In September 2010, the EPA and BP agreed on a settlement of $15&nbsp;million on additional counts of violation.<ref name=":13" /> This was both the largest civil penalty recovered for CAA violations at an individual facility and the largest ever for civil violations of the RMP.<ref name=":12" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=September 30, 2010 |title=BP Products to Pay Largest Single-facility Clean Air Act Penalty for Releases of Hazardous Pollutants at Texas City Refinery |url=https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bp-products-pay-largest-single-facility-clean-air-act-penalty-releases-hazardous-pollutants#:-:text=EPA |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221209024039/https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bp-products-pay-largest-single-facility-clean-air-act-penalty-releases-hazardous-pollutants#:-:text=EPA |archive-date=December 9, 2022 |access-date=January 30, 2024 |website=[[United States Department of Justice|U.S. Department of Justice]]}}</ref>

At the request of the [[Texas Commission on Environmental Quality]] (TCEQ), the [[Texas Attorney General]] opened proceedings against BP for violations of the [[Texas Health and Safety Code]]<ref>{{Cite law|type=Code|date=2023|legislature=[[Texas Legislature]]|title=Health and Safety Code|url=https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/SDocs/HEALTHANDSAFETYCODE.pdf}} {{Cite web |url=https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/docs/sdocs/healthandsafetycode.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=March 23, 2024 |archive-date=January 16, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240116135912/https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/docs/sdocs/healthandsafetycode.pdf |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref> and [[Texas Water Code]],<ref>{{Cite law|type=Code|date=2023|legislature=[[Texas Legislature]]|title=Water Code|url=https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/SDocs/WATERCODE.pdf}} {{Cite web |url=https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/SDocs/WATERCODE.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=January 24, 2024 |archive-date=January 24, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240124101450/https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/SDocs/WATERCODE.pdf |url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref> including the release of hydrocarbons through the blowdown stack on March 23, 2005, the prolonged release of benzene from a tank damaged in the explosion, which lasted more than 25 days, and tens of other events.<ref name=":22" /> In a 2011 settlement, BP agreed to pay a $50 million fine covering 72 other emissions in excess of BP's operating permits. This included legal costs of $500,000. In return, the Justice Department agreed not to allow additional criminal charges against BP in connection with the refinery explosion.<ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite news |last=Seba |first=Erwin |date=November 4, 2011 |title=BP Agrees to Pay Texas $50 Million for Pollution |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE7A278X/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240125104019/https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE7A278X/ |archive-date=January 25, 2024 |access-date=January 25, 2024 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref>

== Impact on process safety ==
The disaster had a notable impact in the domain of [[process safety]]. Texas City has become a classic case history used to explain failings in both management and technical barriers in process plants.<ref name=":18" /><ref>{{Cite book |last=CCPS |title=Introduction to Process Safety for Undergraduates and Engineers |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]] |year=2016 |isbn=978-1-118-94950-4 |location=Hoboken, N.J. |pages=53–63 |author-link=American Institute of Chemical Engineers}}</ref>{{Sfnp|Thomson|2015|pp=217–224}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Pike |first=Howard |title=Methods in Chemical Process Safety |date=April 6, 2017 |publisher=[[Academic Press]] |isbn=978-0-12-811547-3 |editor-last=Khan |editor-first=Faisal |volume=1 |location=Cambridge, Mass.; San Diego, Cal.; Kidlington, England; and London, England |pages=57–73 |chapter=Learning from the Experience}}</ref>{{Sfnp|Atherton|Gil|2008|pp=251–264}}

The Baker Panel report became well known among process safety engineers, who felt its findings were relevant to other plants and it was important for strengthening process safety awareness in the chemical process industry.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Rodríguez |first1=Jennifer M. |last2=Payne |first2=Stephanie C. |last3=Bergman |first3=Mindy E. |last4=Beus |first4=Jeremy M. |date=May 8, 2011 |title=The Impact of the BP Baker Report |journal=[[Journal of Safety Research]] |volume=42 |issue=3 |pages=215–222 |doi=10.1016/j.jsr.2011.03.005 |issn=0022-4375 |eissn=1879-1247 |pmid=21855693}}</ref> This fulfilled the Panel's wish as stated in the report:<blockquote>Although we necessarily direct our report to BP, we intend it for a broader audience. We are under no illusion that deficiencies in process safety culture, management, or corporate oversight are limited to BP. Other companies and their stakeholders can benefit from our work. We urge these companies to regularly and thoroughly evaluate their safety culture, the performance of their process safety management systems, and their corporate safety oversight for possible improvements. We also urge the same companies to review carefully our findings and recommendations for application to their situations.{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007|p=i}}</blockquote>

=== Analysis of weak implementation of process safety management ===
The accident has been extensively analyzed in the specialized literature, which highlighted how several elements of process safety management (PSM) were implemented weakly and poorly managed. Observations made on PSM elements as defined in OSHA's rule<ref name=":16" /> include:

* Employee participation: The refinery suffered from workers' fear of punishment from reporting incidents or hazards.<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/20/csb_20public_20hearing.pdf?14811 |title=CSB Public Hearing: Safety Performance Indicators. Houston, Texas, July 23–24, 2012 |date=2012 |publisher=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |page=64 |access-date=January 31, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230801214346/https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/20/csb_20public_20hearing.pdf?14811 |archive-date=August 1, 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref>
* [[Process hazard analysis]]: the plant [[Hazard and operability study|hazard and operability analysis]] (HAZOP) failed to identify the column overfilling scenario{{sfnp|Atherton|Gil|2008|p=256}} and the risk assessment for the placement of temporary buildings was not complete and, for the most part, erroneous.{{sfnp|CSB|2007|pp=123–129}}<ref name=":20">{{Cite magazine |last1=Gurung |first1=Kalokson |last2=Jayadeep |first2=Laya |last3=Siwek |first3=Janusz |last4=Vora |first4=Satyam |last5=Zhou |first5=David |date=October 2020 |title=Texas City Refinery Explosion – Safety Out of Focus |url=https://www.icheme.org/media/14611/lpb275_pg04.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220122111657/https://www.icheme.org/media/14611/lpb275_pg04.pdf |archive-date=January 22, 2022 |access-date=January 31, 2024 |magazine=[[Loss Prevention Bulletin]] |publisher=[[Institution of Chemical Engineers|Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE)]] |pages=4–6 |issn=0260-9576}}</ref>
* Operating procedures: Deviations from key procedures like the start-up of the ISOM plant had become routine. Additionally, the same start-up procedure lacked sufficient instructions.<ref name=":19">{{Cite journal |last1=MacKenzie |first1=Cheryl |last2=Holmstrom |first2=Donald |last3=Kaszniak |first3=Mark |date=October 2007 |title=Human Factors Analysis of the BP Texas City Refinery Explosion |journal=[[Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting]] |volume=51 |issue=20 |pages=1444–1448 |doi=10.1177/154193120705102015 |s2cid=109975216 |issn=1071-1813 |eissn=2169-5067}}</ref><ref name=":20" />{{Sfnp|Khan|Amyotte|2007|p=394}}
* Training: Training for key plant operators was largely insufficient, especially regarding abnormal situation management and verification of operator knowledge and qualifications.<ref name=":19" />
* Contractors: [[Contractor management|Management of contractors]] disregarded important safety aspects. As an example, those occupying trailers in proximity to the ISOM plant were not told of the start-up.{{Sfnp|Khan|Amyotte|2007|p=394}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2008|loc=4:20 minutes in}} All the fatalities and many of those injured in the accident were contractors.{{Sfnp|CSB|2014|p=32}}
* [[Pre-start-up audit|Pre-start-up safety review]]: This key review in preparation to a particularly hazardous operation was not conducted.<ref name=":20" />
* Mechanical integrity: Multiple instruments and valves were not operational, because they had not been tested or maintained.<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" />
* [[Change management (engineering)|Management of change]]: This failed in multiple respects, namely the changes to the unit start-up procedure that required the operators to work the splitter above a safe level,<ref name=":19" /> the lacking or incomplete MOCs for the placement of trailers in the vicinity of a highly hazardous unit,<ref name=":20" />{{Sfnp|Khan|Amyotte|2007|p=394}} and the lack of a formal change process assessing the elimination of critical operator positions to manage the ISOM plant.<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.commerce.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/atoms/files/231254_br_petroleumrefineryexplosion.pdf |title=Human Factors: Case Study – Petroleum Refinery Explosion |last=WorkSafe Western Australia |date=June 2023 |publisher=[[Worksafe (Western Australia)|WorkSafe Western Australia]] |location=Perth, WA |page=8 |author-link=Worksafe (Western Australia) |access-date=31 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240131105147/https://www.commerce.wa.gov.au/sites/default/files/atoms/files/231254_br_petroleumrefineryexplosion.pdf |archive-date=31 January 2024 |url-status=live|type=Information Sheet}}</ref>
* [[Accident analysis|Incident investigation]]: Learning from past incidents and near misses was impaired by the near absence of internal investigations and the consequent spreading of useful [[lessons learned]].<ref name=":20" />
* Emergency planning and response: The evacuation alarm was not sounded, and this may have contributed to the number of fatalities, since the contractors in the trailers did not have a chance to leave the area.{{Sfnp|Khan|Amyotte|2007|p=394}}
* Compliance [[Audit|audits]]: Audits were conducted but, by BP's own admission, "[audit] action items did not appear to be tracked and effectively closed."{{sfnp|Mogford|2005b|p=139}}

Additional elements of process safety are defined in the Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS) PSM scheme,<ref>{{Cite book |last=CCPS |title=Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety |publisher=Center for Chemical Process Safety of the [[American Institute of Chemical Engineers]] and [[John Wiley & Sons]] |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-470-16569-0 |location=New York, N.Y. and Hoboken, N.J. |author-link=American Institute of Chemical Engineers}}</ref> and the refinery was also lacking in some of these:

* Process [[safety culture]]: This failed at all levels, as mentioned in all investigation reports.{{sfnp|Bonse-Geuking et al.|2007}}{{Sfnp|Baker|Bowman|Erwin|Gorton|2007}}{{Sfnp|CSB|2007}}{{sfnp|Mogford|2005b|p=165}}
* Measurement and metrics: Metrics for safety performance management were focused only on occupational accidents. This contributed to give a distorted picture of the health of safety management, since no performance indicators were used to assess the impact of past and the possibility of future process accidents in connection with critical losses of containment of hazardous materials.<ref name=":20" />

Other essential safety practices that failed included:

* Shift handover and communication between operators was also very poor,<ref name=":19" /> a problem that contributed to several other disasters such as [[Piper Alpha]], the [[1998 Esso Longford fire|Esso Longford gas plant fire]] and the [[Buncefield fire]].<ref name="Reid">{{Cite journal |last=Reid |first=Marc |date=2020 |title=The Piper Alpha Disaster: A Personal Perspective with Transferrable Lessons on the Long-Term Moral Impact of Safety Failures |journal=[[ACS Chemical Health & Safety]] |volume=27 |issue=2 |pages=88–95 |doi=10.1021/acs.chas.9b00022 |eissn=1878-0504 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Hopkins |first=Andrew |title=Lessons from Longford: The Esso Gas Plant Explosion |publisher=CCH Australia |year=2000 |isbn=978-18-64684-22-3 |location=Macquarie Park, NSW |at=Chapter 5 |chapter=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=CCPS |title=Human Factors Handbook for Process Plant Operations |date=April 2022 |publisher=[[American Institute of Chemical Engineers]] and [[John Wiley & Sons]] |isbn=978-1-119-64049-3 |location=New York, N.Y. and Hoboken, N.J. |pages=124, 241 |author-link=American Institute of Chemical Engineers}}</ref>
* Control of ignition sources also failed, as demonstrated by the laxness in managing vehicle access in close proximity to live hydrocarbon process equipment.<ref name="Holmstrom_PSP" /><ref name=":20" />{{Sfnp|Khan|Amyotte|2007|p=394}}

=== New industry guidelines and initiatives ===
API actioned the recommendations from the CSB's report, thus creating new standards and guidelines for the industry:

* '''Standard 521''': API issued a new revision of its document on ''Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems'' and upgraded its status from Recommended Practice to Standard. The new standard had more stringent requirements on the atmospheric venting of process gas and an instruction to include overfilling from upstream equipment among the design cases of blowdown systems.<ref>{{Cite book |last=API |title=Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems |date=January 2007 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |edition=5th |series=ANSI/API Standard 521 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute}}</ref><ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.csb.gov/file.aspx?DocumentId=6204 |title=Ethylene Release and Fire at Kuraray America, Inc. EVAL Plant: Investigation Report |last=CSB |date=December 16, 2022 |publisher=[[U.S. Chemical Safety Board|U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |location=Washington, D.C. |page=83 |author-link=U.S. Chemical Safety Board |access-date=January 29, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221222012413/https://www.csb.gov/file.aspx?DocumentId=6204 |archive-date=December 22, 2022 |url-status=live |series= |type=Report No. 2018-03-I-TX}}</ref>
* '''Recommended Practice 753''': API issued new guidance on the location of trailers and portable buildings within hazardous process sites. The scope of Recommended Practice 752 was reduced to permanent buildings only starting with the third edition.<ref>{{Cite book |last=API |title=Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings |date=June 2007 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |edition=1st |series=API Recommended Practice 753 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=API |title=Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Permanent Buildings |date=December 2009 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |edition=3rd |series=API Recommended Practice 752 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute}}</ref><ref name="Talbot2">{{Cite magazine |last=Talbot |first=Paul |date=2009 |title=Facility Siting and Portable Buildings |magazine=Loss Control Newsletter |publisher=[[Marsh (company)|Marsh]] |pages=21–24 |issue=2}}</ref>
* '''Recommended Practice 754''': API addressed the need for process safety performance indicators in this new Recommended Practice on ''Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries''.<ref name="API 7542">{{Cite book |last=API |title=Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries |date=April 2010 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |edition=1st |series=ANSI/API Recommended Practice 754 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute}}</ref><ref name="API 754f2">{{Cite report |url=https://www.api.org/~/media/files/oil-and-natural-gas/refining/process%20safety/rp-754-fact-sheet.pdf |title=Recommended Practice 754: Process Safety Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries |last=API |date=September 2021 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute |access-date=January 23, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211208225033/https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Oil-and-Natural-Gas/Refining/Process%20Safety/RP-754-Fact-Sheet.pdf |archive-date=December 8, 2021 |url-status=live|type=Fact Sheet}}</ref> In general, in the wake of Texas City, awareness of the difference between occupational and process safety became more widespread in light of the investigations' findings.'''<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Khan |first1=Faisal |title=Methods in Chemical Process Safety |last2=Hashemi |first2=Seyed J. |date=April 6, 2017 |publisher=[[Academic Press]] |isbn=978-0-12-811547-3 |editor-last=Khan |editor-first=Faisal |volume=1 |location=Cambridge, Mass.; San Diego, Cal.; Kidlington, England; and London, England |pages=1–36 |chapter=Introduction}}</ref>'''{{Efn|As a further example, the Texas City explosion was among the factors that led the British regulator to issue guidance on process safety metrics and setting a goal that by the end of 2015 process plants liable to major accidents will have to gauge their safety performance using key lagging and leading performance indicators.{{Sfnp|CSB|2014|pp=51, 59}}<ref>{{Cite report |url=http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/guidance/process-safety-performance-indicators.pdf |title=COMAH Competent Authority Workstream 2e: Process Safety Performance Indicators (Operational Delivery Guide) |last=COMAH Competent Authority |date=February 2012 |publisher=[[Health and Safety Executive]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101111115734/http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/guidance/process-safety-performance-indicators.pdf |archive-date=November 11, 2010 |url-status=dead}}</ref>}}
* '''Recommended Practice 755''': This new guideline was directed to refineries and petrochemical plants and detailed how to put in place a fatigue risk management system (FRMS). This document includes recommendations for work on rotating shifts, for the maximum acceptable number of overtime hours and the number of days to be worked on without interruption.<ref>{{Cite book |last=API |title=Fatigue Risk Management Systems for Personnel in the Refining and Petrochemical Industries |date=April 2010 |publisher=[[American Petroleum Institute]] |edition=1st |series=ANSI/API Recommended Practice 755 |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=American Petroleum Institute}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Pasman |first=Hans |title=Risk Analysis and Control for Industrial Processes – Gas, Oil and Chemicals |publisher=[[Butterworth-Heinemann]] |year=2015 |isbn=978-0-12-800057-1 |location=Kidlington, England and Waltham, Mass. |page=246}}</ref><ref>{{Cite report |url=https://wombatt.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Fatigue-Prevention-in-the-Oil-and-Gas-Industry.pdf |title=Fatigue Prevention in the Oil and Gas Industry |last=Verhardt |first=Jean |date=July 5, 2023 |publisher=WOMBATT Fatigue Management |access-date=January 22, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230815064226/https://wombatt.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Fatigue-Prevention-in-the-Oil-and-Gas-Industry.pdf |archive-date=August 15, 2023 |url-status=live |type=White paper}}</ref>

The CCPS published an extensive guideline on organizational management of change to address another related recommendation from the CSB report.<ref>{{Cite book |last=CCPS |title=Guidelines for Managing Process Safety Risks During Organizational Change |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]] |year=2013 |isbn=978-1-118-37909-7 |location=Hoboken, N.J. |author-link=American Institute of Chemical Engineers}}</ref><ref name=":28" />

After being singled out for lack of initiative and competency in assessing and inspecting large hazardous process plants, and refineries in particular, OSHA took action, initiating a refinery Process Safety Management National Emphasis Program (NEP) and enforcing a dedicated inspection audit program between 2007 and 2011. This was the most significant PSM enforcement action since the regulation<ref name=":16" /> was issued in 1992.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Laughland |first1=Graeme |title=Hazards 28 |publisher=[[Institution of Chemical Engineers]] |year=2018 |isbn=978-19-11446-63-7 |series=IChemE Symposium Series No. 163 |location=Rugby, England |chapter=Practical Experience with Management of Change Reflecting upon Incidents, Audits and Gap Analyses |type=CD-ROM |oclc=1043423002 |access-date=January 27, 2024 |chapter-url=https://www.icheme.org/media/16936/hazards-28-paper-30.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240127095032/https://www.icheme.org/media/16936/hazards-28-paper-30.pdf |archive-date=January 27, 2024 |url-status=live}}</ref>

OSHA also issued an internal memorandum<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fairfax |first=Richard E. |date=March 31, 2009 |title=Management of Organizational Change |url=https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/standardinterpretations/2009-03-31-0#:~:text=An%20MOC%20procedure%20must%20be,can%20have%20a%20similar%20effect. |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018165554/https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/standardinterpretations/2009-03-31-0 |archive-date=October 18, 2020 |access-date=January 29, 2024 |website=[[Occupational Safety and Health Administration]] |series=Memorandum for regional administrators}}</ref> to address the CSB's recommendation on updating the PSM regulation to include requirements for hazardous process facilities to extend their management-of-change procedures to capture organizational changes. However, the CSB did not deem this initiative sufficient to close the recommendation, which, {{As of|2024|January|lc=y|url=https://www.csb.gov/recommendations/?F_InvestigationId=3515}}, was still open.<ref name=":28">{{Cite web |title=Recommendations: BP America (Texas City) Refinery Explosion |url=https://www.csb.gov/recommendations/?F_InvestigationId=3515 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240129051605/https://www.csb.gov/recommendations/?F_InvestigationId=3515 |archive-date=January 29, 2024 |access-date=January 29, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 25, 2013 |title=Recommendations Status Change Summary |url=https://www.csb.gov/assets/recommendation/status_change_summary__osha__bp_txc_r9___o-ur.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240121152533/https://www.csb.gov/assets/recommendation/status_change_summary__osha__bp_txc_r9___o-ur.pdf |archive-date=January 21, 2024 |access-date=January 29, 2024 |website=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]]}}</ref>

== TV documentaries ==
The accident has been featured in a number of documentaries:

* [[National Geographic Channel|National Geographic]]'s series ''[[Seconds from Disaster]]'', season 3, episode 10 "Texas Oil Explosion", first aired on November 6, 2006.<ref>{{Cite episode |title=Texas Oil Explosion |series=Seconds from Disaster |series-link=Seconds from Disaster |network=[[National Geographic (American TV channel)|National Geographic]] |date=December 6, 2006 |season=3 |number=10 |last=Rhode |first=David}}</ref>
* [[History (U.S. TV channel)|History Channel]]'s series ''[[Modern Marvels]]'', season 12, episode 56 "Engineering Disasters 20", first aired on December 6, 2006.<ref>{{cite web |title=Modern Marvels: Engineering Disasters 20 |url=https://watch.plex.tv/show/modern-marvels/season/13/episode/56 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240122042122/https://watch.plex.tv/show/modern-marvels/season/13/episode/56 |archive-date=January 22, 2024 |access-date=January 22, 2024 |website=[[Plex Inc.|Plex]]|date=December 6, 2006 }} </ref><ref>{{Cite episode |title=Engineering Disasters 20 |series=Modern Marvels |series-link=Modern Marvels |network=[[History Channel]] |date=December 6, 2006 |season=13 |number=56}}</ref>
* [[Science Channel]]'s series ''[[Engineering Catastrophes]]'', season 4, episode 4 "Terror in Texas", first aired on July 7, 2021.<ref>{{Cite episode |title=Terror in Texas |series=Engineering Catastrophes |series-link=Engineering Catastrophes |network=[[Science Channel]] |date=July 7, 2021 |season=4 |number=4}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Texas|Energy}}
* [[1984 Romeoville petroleum refinery disaster]]
* [[Phillips disaster of 1989]]
* [[2019 Philadelphia refinery explosion]]
* [[List of Seconds from Disaster episodes|National Geographic ''Seconds from Disaster'' episodes]]

== Explanatory notes ==
{{Notelist}}

==References==
{{Reflist|colwidth=30em}}

===Sources===
{{Refbegin}}
* {{Cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuJtdQOU_Z4&t=33s |title=Anatomy of a Disaster: Explosion at BP Texas City Refinery |type=DVD |publisher=[[U.S. Chemical Safety Board]] |year=2008 |others=Written by Sandy Gilmour and Daniel Horowitz. Includes interviews to Glenn Erwin, [[Trevor Kletz]], Andrew Hopkins, and Don Holmstrom, among others |access-date=January 28, 2024 |oclc=230738756 |via=[[U.S. Chemical Safety Board|USCSB]] channel on [[YouTube]] |ref={{harvid|CSB|2008}} }}
* {{Cite book |last1=Atherton |first1=John |title=Incidents That Define Process Safety |last2=Gil |first2=Frederic |publisher=Center for Chemical Process Safety of the [[American Institute of Chemical Engineers]] and [[John Wiley & Sons]] |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-470-12204-4 |location=New York, N.Y. and Hoboken, N.J.}}
* {{Cite report |last1=Baker |first1=James A. III |url=https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/20/baker_panel_report1.pdf?13842 |title=The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel |last2=Bowman |first2=Frank L. 'Skip' |last3=Erwin |first3=Glenn |last4=Gorton |first4=Slade |last5=Hendershot |first5=Dennis |last6=Leveson |first6=Nancy |last7=Priest |first7=Sharon |last8=Rosenthal |first8=Isadore 'Irv' |last9=Tebo |first9=Paul V. |last10=Wiegmann |first10=Douglas A. |first11=L. Duane |last11=Wilson |date=January 2007 |publisher=BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel |location=Houston, Texas |author-link=James Baker |author-link2=Frank Bowman |author-link4=Slade Gorton |author-link6=Nancy Leveson |author-link7=Sharon Priest |access-date=January 22, 2024 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230612175103/https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/20/baker_panel_report1.pdf?13842 |archive-date=June 12, 2023 |via=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]]}}
* {{Cite report |last1=Bonse-Geuking |first1=Wilhelm |url=http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/bonse_main_report.pdf |title=Management Accountability Project: Texas City Isomerization Explosion – Final Report |last2=Blyweert |first2=Rudy |date=February 2007 |publisher=[[BP]] |display-authors=1 |access-date=January 21, 2024 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20240121100401/http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/bonse_main_report.pdf |archive-date=January 21, 2024 |via=Brent Coon & Associates |url-status=live |ref={{harvid|Bonse-Geuking et al.|2007}}}}
* {{Cite report |last=CSB |url=https://www.csb.gov/file.aspx?DocumentId=5596 |title=Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire (15 Killed, 180 Injured) |date=March 20, 2007 |publisher=[[U.S. Chemical Safety Board|U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |series= |location=Washington, D.C. |format=PDF |author-link=U.S. Chemical Safety Board |access-date=21 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231209032232/https://www.csb.gov/file.aspx?DocumentId=5596 |archive-format=PDF |archive-date=9 December 2023 |url-status=live |type=Report No. 2005-04-I-TX}}{{source-attribution}}
* {{Cite report |last=CSB |url=https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/20/chevron_regulatory_report_draft_for_public_comment_12162013.pdf?15101 |title=Regulatory Report: Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire |date=May 2014 |publisher=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |series= |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=U.S. Chemical Safety Board |access-date=January 31, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211022130827/https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/20/chevron_regulatory_report_draft_for_public_comment_12162013.pdf?15101 |archive-date=October 22, 2021 |url-status=live |type=Report No. 2012-03-I-CA}}
* {{Cite report |last1=IPIECA |url=https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/35178b35bcfb9bfd144079f84512ab7d-0400072022/original/Flaring-management-guidance-for-the-oil-and-gas-industry.pdf |title=Flaring Management Guidance for the Oil and Gas Industry |last2=IOGP |last3=GGFR |year=2021 |series= |type=IOGP Report 467 |author-link=IPIECA |author-link2=International Association of Oil & Gas Producers |access-date=March 24, 2024 |archive-date=13 October 2022 |via=[[World Bank]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221013180239/https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/35178b35bcfb9bfd144079f84512ab7d-0400072022/original/Flaring-management-guidance-for-the-oil-and-gas-industry.pdf |url-status=live}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Khan |first1=Faisal I. |last2=Amyotte |first2=Paul R. |date=July–November 2007 |title=Modeling of BP Texas City Refinery Incident |journal=[[Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries]] |volume=20 |issue=4–6 |pages=387–395 |doi=10.1016/j.jlp.2007.04.037 |bibcode=2007JLPPI..20..387K |issn=0950-4230}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Maresh |first1=Michelle |title=The Handbook of Crisis Communication |last2=Williams |first2=David E. |publisher=[[Wiley-Blackwell]] |year=2010 |isbn=978-1-4051-9441-9 |editor-last=Coombs |editor-first=W. Timothy |location=Hoboken, N.J. |pages=285–300 |chapter=Oil Industry Crisis Communication |editor-last2=Holladay |editor-first2=Sherry J.}}
* {{Cite report |last=Mogford |first=John (investigation manager) |url=http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/T/texas_city_investigation_report.pdf |title=Fatal Accident Investigation Report – Isomerization Unit Explosion – Interim Report – Texas City, Texas, USA |date=May 12, 2005a |publisher=[[BP]] |access-date=May 25, 2005 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050525151256/http://www.bp.com:80/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/T/texas_city_investigation_report.pdf |archive-date=May 25, 2005 |url-status=dead }}
* {{Cite report |last=Mogford |first=J. (investigation team leader) |url=http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/us/bp_us_english/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/t/final_report.pdf |title=Fatal Accident Investigation Report – Isomerization Unit Explosion – Final Report – Texas City, Texas, USA |date=9 December 2005b |publisher=[[BP]] |oclc=884785009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070621081155/http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/us/bp_us_english/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/t/final_report.pdf |archive-date=June 21, 2007 |url-status=dead }}
* {{Cite report |last=OGP |title=Flaring & Venting in the Oil & Gas Exploration & Production Industry |date=January 2000 |publisher=[[International Association of Oil & Gas Producers]] |location=London, England |series= |format=PDF |author-link=International Association of Oil & Gas Producers |url=https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/flaring-and-venting-in-the-oil-and-gas-exploration-and-production-industry/ |access-date=February 3, 2024 |url-access=registration |archive-date=February 3, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240203114736/https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/flaring-and-venting-in-the-oil-and-gas-exploration-and-production-industry/ |url-status=live |type=OGP Report No. 2.79/288}}
* {{Cite report |url=http://images.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/05/blast/stanleyreport.pdf |title=Process and Operational Audit Report – BP Texas City |last=Stanley |first=James W. (team leader) |date=June 15, 2005 |publisher=[[BP]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081207143706/http://images.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/05/blast/stanleyreport.pdf |archive-date=December 7, 2008 |via=[[Houston Chronicle]] |url-status=dead}}
* {{Cite report |last=The Telos Group |url=http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/telosreport-exhibit_19.pdf |title=BP Texas City Site Report of Findings – Texas City's Protection Performance, Behaviors, Culture, Management, and Leadership |date=January 21, 2005a |publisher=The Telos Group |access-date=January 22, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240122100851/http://www.texascityexplosion.com/uploads/1/1/6/4/116433877/telosreport-exhibit_19.pdf |archive-date=January 22, 2024 |via=Brent Coon & Associates |url-status=live}}
* {{Cite report |last=The Telos Group |url=http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/18.pdf |title=Executive Summary of Report of Findings |date=January 21, 2005b |publisher=The Telos Group |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071005043144/http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/bpfinalreport/18.pdf |archive-date=October 5, 2007 |via=[[U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board]] |url-status=dead}}
* {{Cite book |last=Thomson |first=J.R. |title=High Integrity Systems and Safety Management in Hazardous Industries |publisher=[[Butterworth-Heinemann]] |year=2015 |isbn=978-0-12-801996-2 |location=Kidlington, England and Waltham, Mass.}}
* {{Cite report |author=((United States House Committee on Education and Labor)) |url=https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=UT_u7fYceSgC&rdid=book-UT_u7fYceSgC&rdot=1 |title=The BP Texas City Disaster and Worker Safety – Hearing Before the Committee on Education and Labor – U.S. House Of Representatives |date=March 22, 2007 |publisher=[[United States Government Publishing Office|U.S. Government Printing Office]] |series= |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=978-0-16-079514-5 |author-link=United States House Committee on Education and the Workforce |access-date=January 23, 2024 |url-access=registration |archive-date=January 23, 2024 |via=[[Google Books]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240123042254/https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=UT_u7fYceSgC&rdid=book-UT_u7fYceSgC&rdot=1 |url-status=live |type=Report No. 110-12}}
* {{Cite report |author=((United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations)) |url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg31461/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg31461.pdf |title=BP's Pipeline Spills at Prudhoe Bay: What Went Wrong? – Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce – House of Representatives |date=September 7, 2006 |publisher=[[United States Government Publishing Office|U.S. Government Printing Office]] |series= |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations |access-date=January 25, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220710022855/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg31461/pdf/CHRG-109hhrg31461.pdf |archive-date=July 10, 2022 |via=[[GovInfo]] |url-status=live |type=Report No. 109-135}}
* {{Cite report |author=((United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations)) |url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg41657/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg41657.pdf |title=The 2006 Prudhoe Bay Shutdown: Will Recent Regulatory Changes and BP Management Reforms Prevent Future Failures? – Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce – House of Representatives |date=May 16, 2007 |publisher=[[United States Government Publishing Office|U.S. Government Printing Office]] |series= |location=Washington, D.C. |author-link=United States House Energy Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations |access-date=January 25, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230929075455/https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg41657/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg41657.pdf |archive-date=September 29, 2023 |via=[[GovInfo]] |url-status=live |type=Report No. 110-46}}
* {{Cite report |author=((United States Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Transportation Safety, Infrastructure Security, and Water Quality)) |url=https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=dn6lmMemC3kC&rdid=book-dn6lmMemC3kC&rdot=1 |title=Lessons Learned from Chemical Safety Board Investigations Including Texas City, Texas – Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Transportation Safety, Infrastructure Security, and Water Quality of the Committee on Environment and Public Works – United States Senate |date=July 10, 2007 |publisher=[[United States Government Publishing Office|U.S. Government Printing Office]] |series= |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=978-0-16-090039-6 |author-link=United States Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Transportation Safety, Infrastructure Security, and Water Quality |access-date=January 21, 2024 |via=[[Google Books]] |url-access=registration |type=Senate Hearing 110-1099}}
{{Refend}}

==Further reading==
{{Refbegin}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Abílio Ramos |first1=Marilia |last2=López Droguett |first2=Enrique |last3=Mosleh |first3=Ali |last4=das Chagas Moura |first4=Márcio |last5=Ramos Martins |first5=Marcelo |date=August 18, 2017 |title=Revisiting Past Refinery Accidents from a Human Reliability Analysis Perspective: The BP Texas City and the Chevron Richmond Accidents |journal=[[The Canadian Journal of Chemical Engineering]] |volume=95 |issue=12 |pages=2293–2305 |doi=10.1002/cjce.22996 |issn=0008-4034 |eissn=1939-019X}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Barozzi |first1=Marco |last2=Melchiore |first2=Alessandra |last3=Derudi |first3=Marco |last4=Copelli |first4=Sabrina |year=2023 |title=Integrating Recursive Operability Analysis with Different Risk Assessment Methods: Analysis of the Historical BP American Refinery Explosion |url=https://www.cetjournal.it/cet/23/104/028.pdf |url-status=live |journal=[[Chemical Engineering Transactions]] |volume=104 |pages=163–168 |doi=10.3303/CET23104028 |isbn=979-12-81206-06-9 |issn=2283-9216 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240126085716/https://www.cetjournal.it/cet/23/104/028.pdf |archive-date=January 26, 2024 |access-date=January 26, 2024 |doi-access=free }}
* {{Cite book |last=ESReDA Project Group Foresight in Safety |url=https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/30d2359c-3a96-11eb-b27b-01aa75ed71a1/language-en |title=Enhancing Safety: The Challenge of Foresight |publisher=[[Publications Office of the European Union]] |year=2020 |isbn=978-92-76-25189-7 |series=EUR 30441 EN |location=Luxembourg, Luxembourg |doi=10.2760/814452 |access-date=January 26, 2024 |doi-access=free |archive-date=January 26, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240126100530/https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/30d2359c-3a96-11eb-b27b-01aa75ed71a1/language-en |url-status=live }}
* {{Cite book |last=Hopkins |first=Andrew |title=Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City Refinery Disaster |date=July 1, 2008 |publisher=[[CCH (company)|CCH Australia]] |isbn=978-1921322440 |location=Macquarie Park, NSW}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Manca |first1=Davide |last2=Brambilla |first2=Sara |date=2012 |title=Dynamic Simulation of the BP Texas City Refinery Accident |journal=[[Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries]] |volume=25 |issue=6 |pages=950–957 |doi=10.1016/j.jlp.2012.05.008 |bibcode=2012JLPPI..25..950M |issn=0950-4230 |eissn=1873-3352}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Saleh |first1=Joseph H. |last2=Haga |first2=Rachel A. |last3=Favarò |first3=Francesca M. |last4=Bakolas |first4=Efstathios |date=October 2, 2013 |title=Texas City Refinery Accident: Case Study in Breakdown of Defense-in-depth and Violation of the Safety–Diagnosability Principle in Design |journal=[[Engineering Failure Analysis]] |volume=36 |pages=121–133 |doi=10.1016/j.engfailanal.2013.09.014 |issn=1350-6307 |eissn=1873-1961}}
{{Refend}}

==External links==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20080312235020/http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/05/blast/index.html 2005 ''Houston Chronicle'' Special Report] (archived on March 12, 2008)
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070726220606/http://www.safetyreviewpanel.com/cmtfiles/index.php?file_id=81&link_id=38 Baker Panel homepage] (archived on July 26, 2007)
* [http://www.csb.gov/bp-america-refinery-explosion/ BP America (Texas City) Refinery Explosion] at [[Chemical Safety Board]]
** [https://www.csb.gov/recommendations/?F_InvestigationId=3515 CSB investigation recommendation status tracker]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20050408172006/http://bpresponse.org/external/index.cfm?cid=946 BP response corporate webpage] (archived on April 8, 2005)
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20170613213852/http://www.rememberthe15.com/ Remember the 15] (archived on March 12, 2008) – Memorial site for those lost in the explosion
* [http://www.texascityexplosion.com/ Texas City Explosion] – Webpage managed by Brent Coon & Associates, lead counsel in the litigation following the blast. Hosts a wealth of evidence used in the case.

{{Texas City, Texas}}
{{BP}}

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