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{{Short description|Independence movement in East Asia}}
{{Multiple issues|
{{More citations needed|date=October 2022}}
{{Essay-like|date=February 2023}}
{{Original research|date=September 2024}}
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{{Use dmy dates|date=March 2023}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| headercolor = #018002
| title = <span style="color:white">Taiwan independence movement</span>
| t = 臺灣獨立運動 {{lang|en|or}}<br />台灣獨立運動
| s = 台湾独立运动
| bpmf = ㄊㄞˊ ㄨㄢ ㄉㄨˊ ㄌㄧˋ ㄩㄣˋ ㄉㄨㄥˋ
| w = {{Tone superscript|T'ai2-wan1 tu2-li4 yün4-tung4}}
| p = Táiwān dúlì yùndòng
| tp = Tái-wan dú-lì yùn-dòng
| mps = Táiwān dúlì yùndùng
| gr = Tair'uan durlih yunndonq
| poj = Tâi-oân to̍k-li̍p ūn-tōng
| tl = Tâi-uân to̍k-li̍p ūn-tōng
| h = Thòi-vân thu̍k-li̍p yun-thung
| altname = <span style="color:white">Abbreviation</span>
| t2 = 臺獨 {{lang|en|or}} 台獨
| s2 = 台独
| bpmf2 = ㄊㄞˊ ㄉㄨˊ
| w2 = {{Tone superscript|T'ai2-tu2}}
| p2 = Táidú
| tp2 = Tái-dú
| mps2 = Táidú
| gr2 = Tairdur
| poj2 = Tâi-to̍k
| tl2 = Tâi-To̍k
| h2 = Thòi-thu̍k
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|t|ai|2|.|wan|1|-|d|u|2|.|l|i|4|-|yu|n|4|.|d|ong|4}}
| mi2 = {{IPAc-cmn|t|ai|2|.|d|u|2}}
}}
{{Taiwan independence movement}}
{{Politics of Taiwan footer}}
{{Multiple image
| direction         = vertical
| width             = 259
| image1            = Flag of Taiwan proposed 1996.svg
| caption1          = A proposed flag for an independent Taiwan designed by Donald Liu in 1996
| image2            = Flag of WTC.svg
| caption2          = Flag of the World Taiwanese Congress
| image3            = 908台灣國運動.svg
| caption3          = Flag of the 908 Taiwan Republic Campaign
| align             = 
| total_width       = 
| alt1              = 
}}

The '''Taiwan independence movement''' is a political movement which advocates the formal declaration of [[Taiwan]] as an independent and sovereign state, as opposed to [[Chinese unification]] according to the [[one China principle]] or the status quo of co-existence in [[Cross-Strait relations]].

Into the 21st-century, [[political status of Taiwan|Taiwan's political status]] is ambiguous. The [[China|People's Republic of China]] (PRC), under the control of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP), claims the [[island of Taiwan]] as a [[Taiwan Province, People's Republic of China|province]] of the [[China|People's Republic of China]] (PRC). However, the ''de facto'' administration of Taiwan maintains that it is already an independent country called the [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] (ROC). Since 2016, the current [[government of Taiwan|government]], led by the independence-leaning [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP), has asserted that there is no need for a formal push for independence through legal means.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Nachmann |first1=Lev |title=No, Taiwan's President Isn't 'Pro-Independence' |url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/no-taiwans-president-isnt-pro-independence/ |website=The Diplomat |publisher=James Pach |access-date=27 July 2020 |archive-date=28 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201028135206/https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/no-taiwans-president-isnt-pro-independence/ |url-status=live }}</ref> As such, the ROC consisting of [[Free area of the Republic of China|Taiwan and other islands under its control]] exercise full autonomy in its internal governance and already conducts official [[Foreign relations of Taiwan|diplomatic relations]] with and is recognized by 12 [[member states of the United Nations]] and the [[Holy See]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_5.php|title=FOREIGN AFFAIRS|date=15 November 2019|website=Taiwan (official website)|url-status=live|access-date=16 November 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115154200/https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_5.php|archive-date=15 November 2019}}</ref>

The use of "independence" for Taiwan can be ambiguous. If some supporters articulate that they agree to the independence of Taiwan, they may either be referring to the notion of formally creating an independent Taiwanese state ([[Republic of Taiwan]]) or to the notion that Taiwan has become synonymous with the current Republic of China and is already independent (as reflected in the concept of [[One Country on Each Side]]). Some supporters advocate the exclusion of [[Kinmen]] and [[Matsu Islands|Matsu]], which are controlled by Taiwan but are located off the coast of [[mainland China]].<ref>{{Cite book | author = [[Department of External Affairs (1921–70)|Department of External Affairs]] | title = Current Notes on International Affairs | volume = 26 | publisher = [[Department of External Affairs (1921–70)|Department of External Affairs]] | location = [[Canberra]] | date = 1955 | page = 57 | quote = In this area of tension and danger a distinction, I think, can validly be made between the position of [[Formosa]] and [[Pescadores]], and the islands off the China coast now in [[Kuomintang|Nationalist]] hands; the latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that are not.}}</ref>

The Taiwan independence movement is supported by the DPP and the broader [[Pan-Green Coalition]] given the threat posed to its sovereignty, [[Regionalism (politics)|regionalist identity]], [[liberal democracy|liberal democratic system]] and [[Human rights in Taiwan|human rights]]. Radical activists advocate the ideal goal of [[De-Sinicization|de-sinicization]] and [[Taiwanization]] of the island and society, although that sentiment is not shared by the Pan-Green establishment, which favors a more pragmatic status quo under the ROC. The movement is opposed by the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) and the broader [[Pan-Blue Coalition]], which seeks to retain the somewhat ambiguous status quo of the ROC under the so-called "[[1992 Consensus]]" or gradually "[[Chinese unification|reunify]]" with mainland China at some point under a pan-Chinese identity.

The [[government of the People's Republic of China]] (PRC) opposes Taiwanese independence. The PRC believes that Taiwan and mainland China comprise two portions of a single country's territory and regards any moves toward independence as [[Secession in China|separatism]]. According to its own interpretation of the [[1943 Cairo Declaration|Cairo Declaration]], the [[Potsdam Declaration]] and the [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI)|United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758]], Taiwan is part of the PRC and that any moves towards independence violate the [[constitution of the PRC]] and international law. The government of the PRC has officially maintained its position of peaceful unification of Taiwan but [[Never promise to renounce the use of force|does not rule out using military force]], if necessary, to "reunify" the island should formal independence be declared. Advocating for Taiwan independence is illegal in the PRC.

As for the ROC, such a move could also be considered a violation of [[Constitution of the Republic of China|its current constitution]]. The process for a constitutional amendment in ROC or national territory alternation must be initiated by one-fourth (25%) of the members of the [[Legislative Yuan]] (the unicameral parliament of ROC), then voted in the Legislative Yuan with at least three-fourths (75%) members attended and by a three-fourths (75%) supermajority, then approved by majority popular vote in a referendum.

Historically, both governments have formulated a "[[One China]]" policy, whereby foreign countries may only conduct official diplomatic relations with either the PRC or the ROC, on the condition that they sever official diplomatic relations with and formal recognition of the other. The ROC's One-China policy was softened following democratization in the 1990s, and economic cooperation and people-to-people exchange were officially permitted.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Shih |first1=Hsiu-chuan |title=Constitution does not allow independence, Hung says |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/06/17/2003620903 |access-date=23 October 2022 |work=Taipei Times |date=17 June 2015 |archive-date=22 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221022153252/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/06/17/2003620903 |url-status=live }}</ref>

== History ==

=== Background ===
{{Main|history of Taiwan}}
[[Geography of Taiwan|Taiwan]] is an island in [[East Asia]]. The [[Indigenous peoples|indigenous]] population, who came from nearby [[China]], spoke [[Austronesian languages]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=台湾与中国大陆：两岸关系的跌宕历史 |url=https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-56760009 |website=BBC (Chinese)}}</ref> These [[Taiwanese indigenous peoples|aboriginal people]] have lived on the island for over 6000 years and, before 1620, were its only inhabitants.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Rogerson |first=James |date=2024-01-26 |title=A vibrant celebration of Taiwan's little-known original inhabitants |url=https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20240125-a-vibrant-celebration-of-taiwans-little-known-original-inhabitants}}</ref> Taiwan has been occupied by several nations, including [[Spain]],<ref name="Andrade">{{Cite book |last=Andrade |first=Tonio |url=http://www.gutenberg-e.org/andrade/ |title=How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century |date=2005 |publisher=Columbia University Press |author-link=Tonio Andrade |via=gutenberg-e.org}}</ref> the [[Netherlands]], [[Ming dynasty|Ming]] and [[Qing dynasty|Qing]] Dynasty [[China]], and [[Empire of Japan|Japan]].

After its defeat in the [[Chinese Civil War]] in 1949, the KMT party, which had ruled Nationalist China since 1928, moved to Taiwan where they reigned until [[Chen Shui-bian]] of the DPP became [[President of the Republic of China|president]] in 2000.<ref>{{Cite web |title=台湾的政治与社会 |trans-title=the politics and society of Taiwan |url=https://ls.china-embassy.gov.cn/zt/twwt/200410/t20041027_7009792.htm |language=zh |quote=80年代末以后，国民党政权迅速“本土化”，台湾当局标榜实行西方民主制度，推行制造“两个中国”的分裂政策。}}</ref>  

=== Early ===
From a pro-independence supporter's point of view, the movement for Taiwan independence began under Qing rule in the 1680s which led to a well known the saying, "Every three years an uprising, every five years a rebellion". Taiwan Independence supporters compared Taiwan under KMT rule to [[History of South Africa#Apartheid era (1948–1994)|South Africa]] under [[apartheid]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.taiwanus.net/news/shownews.php?id=72037|title=台灣海外網|website=www.taiwanus.net|access-date=28 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722011148/http://www.taiwanus.net/news/shownews.php?id=72037|archive-date=22 July 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> 

The Taiwan independence movement under Japan was supported by [[Mao Zedong]] in the 1930s as a means of freeing [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Taiwan from Japanese rule]].<ref name=":222">{{Cite journal |last1=Hsiao |first1=Frank S. T. |last2=Sullivan |first2=Lawrence R. |date=1979 |title=The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928–1943 |journal=[[Pacific Affairs]] |volume=52 |issue=3 |pages=446 |doi=10.2307/2757657 |jstor=2757657}}</ref>

With the end of [[World War II]] in 1945, by issuing "[[General Order No. 1]]" to the [[Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers]], the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] agreed that the [[Republic of China Army]] under the KMT would "temporarily occupy Taiwan, on behalf of the Allied forces."<ref>{{cite web|url = http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sovereignty.htm|title = Methods of Acquiring Sovereignty: PRESCRIPTION|work = Related Topics: Sovereignty|publisher = Taiwan Documents Project|access-date = 10 September 2006|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20061015124645/http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sovereignty.htm|archive-date = 15 October 2006|url-status = live}}</ref>

From 1928 to 1942, the CCP maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation in order to get rid of Japanese occupation of the island.<ref name=":222" /> Mao Zedong was an early supporter of Taiwanese independence, telling [[Edgar Snow]] in the 1930s that the CCP would lend "our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence." He changed this position only after the Nationalists started claiming Taiwan with the [[Cairo Conference|Cairo Declaration]], challenging the status of China.<ref>{{cite web |last1=van der Wees |first1=Gerrit |title=When the CCP Thought Taiwan Should Be Independent |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/when-the-ccp-thought-taiwan-should-be-independent/ |access-date=26 June 2023 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |publisher= |archive-date=8 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231108053621/https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/when-the-ccp-thought-taiwan-should-be-independent/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Martial law period ===
[[File:228 by Li Jun.jpg|thumb|300px|Woodcut print by [[Huang Rong-can]], "The Terrible Inspection" describing the [[February 28 Incident]] massacre in 1947]]
[[File:Terror In Formosa (The Daily News, Perth, 1947).jpg|120px|left|thumb|"Terror In Formosa", a news article from ''[[Daily News (Perth, Western Australia)|The Daily News]]'' of [[Perth]], reported the status in March 1947.]]
The modern-day political movement for Taiwan independence dates back to the Japanese colonial period, but it only became a viable political force within Taiwan in the 1990s.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} Taiwanese independence was advocated periodically during the Japanese colonial period, but was suppressed by the [[Japanese government]]. These efforts were the goal of the [[Taiwanese Communist Party]] of the late 1920s. Unlike current formulations, and in line with the thinking of the [[Comintern]], such a state would have been a [[proletarian]] one. With the end of [[World War II]] in 1945, Japanese rule ended, but the subsequent autocratic rule of the KMT later revived calls for local rule. However, it was a movement supported by the Chinese students who were born on the Island and not associated with KMT. It found its roots in the US and Japan. In the 1950s, a Republic of Taiwan Provisional Government was set up in Japan. [[Thomas Liao]] was nominally the President. At one time it held quasi-official relations with the newly independent [[Indonesia]]. This was possible mainly through the connections between [[Sukarno]] and the Provisional Government's Southeast Asian liaison, [[Chen Chih-hsiung]], who had assisted in Indonesia's local resistance movements against Japanese rule.

After the [[Retrocession of Taiwan|transfer of power from Japan to the ROC]], the focus of the movement was as a vehicle for discontent from the native Taiwanese against the rule of "[[waishengren|mainlander]]s" (i.e. mainland Chinese-born people who fled to Taiwan with KMT in the late 1940s).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kerr |first=George H. |title=Formosa Betrayed |publisher=Houghton Mifflin Company |year=1965 |location=United States |pages=254-266, 291-307 |language=en}}</ref> The [[February 28 Incident]] in 1947 and the ensuing [[Martial law in Taiwan|martial law]] that lasted until 1987 contributed to the period of [[White Terror (Taiwan)|White Terror]] on the island, persecuting not only indigenous leftists, but liberals and democracy advocates as well.

Between 1949 and 1991, the official position<ref>{{cite journal|author=Li, Thian-hok|journal=Foreign Affairs|year=1958|title=The China Impasse, a Formosan view|volume=36|issue=3|pages=437–448|url=http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-jloo-fa58.pdf|doi=10.2307/20029298|jstor=20029298|access-date=28 May 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060615133131/http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-jloo-fa58.pdf|archive-date=15 June 2006|url-status=live}}</ref> of the ROC government on Taiwan was that it was the legitimate government of all of China and it used this position as justification for authoritarian measures such as the refusal to vacate the seats held by delegates elected on the mainland in 1947 for the Legislative Yuan. The Taiwan independence movement intensified in response to this and presented an alternative vision of a sovereign and independent Taiwanese state. This vision was represented through a number of symbols such as the use of [[Taiwanese Minnan|Taiwanese]] in opposition to the school-taught [[Standard Mandarin|Mandarin Chinese]].

Several scholars drafted various versions of a constitution, as both political statement or vision and as intellectual exercise. Most of these drafts favor a [[Bicameralism|bicameral parliament]] rather than [[presidential system]]. In at least one such draft, seats in the upper house would be divided equally among Taiwan's established ethnicities. In the 1980s the Chinese Nationalist government considered publication of these ideas criminal. In the most dramatic case, it decided to arrest the pro-independence publisher [[Cheng Nan-jung]] for publishing a version in his [[Tang-wai]] magazine, ''Liberty Era Weekly'' ({{lang|zh-Hant-TW|自由時代週刊}}). Rather than giving himself up, Cheng [[self-immolation|self-immolated]] in protest. Other campaigns and tactics toward such a State have included soliciting designs from the public for a new national flag and anthem (for example, ''[[Taiwan the Formosa]]''). More recently the [[Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign]] ({{lang|zh-Hant-TW|台灣正名運動}}) has played an active role. More traditional independence supporters, however, have criticized name rectification as merely a superficial tactic devoid of the larger vision inherent in the independence agenda.

Various overseas Taiwan independence movements, such as the Formosan Association, [[World United Formosans for Independence]], United Young Formosans for Independence, Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe, United Formosans in America for Independence, and Committee for Human Rights in Formosa, published "The Independent Formosa" in several volumes with the publisher "Formosan Association." In "The Independent Formosa, Volumes 2–3", they tried to justify Taiwanese collaboration with Japan during World War II by saying that the "atmosphere covered the whole Japanese territories, including Korea and Formosa, and the Japanese mainlands as well", when Taiwanese publications supported Japan's "holy war", and that the people who did it were not at fault.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HtlwAAAAMAAJ&q=formosa+china+partial+same+race |title=The Independent Formosa, Volumes 2–3 |year=1963 |author=Formosan Association, World United Formosans for Independence, United Young Formosans for Independence, Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe, United Formosans in America for Independence, Committee for Human Rights in Formosa |publisher=Formosan Association. |page=14 |access-date=20 December 2011 |quote=newspapers with the help of Roman letters within one month's learning." To be sure, Roman letters are a very effective means to transcribe Formsan. On this point Mr. Ozaki seems to mean that it is against the "Racial style", which is misleading...atmosphere covered the whole Japanese territories, including Korea and Formosa, and the Japanese mainlands as well. So quite naturally works to applaud the "holy war" were not infrequently produced. But who could blame them and who had a right to throw a stone at |archive-date=10 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230410213125/https://books.google.com/books?id=HtlwAAAAMAAJ&q=formosa+china+partial+same+race |url-status=live }}Original from the University of Michigan</ref>{{Promotional source|date=March 2023}}

The anti-communist KMT leader [[Chiang Kai-shek]], President of the ROC on Taiwan, believed that the Americans were going to plot a coup against him in collusion with Taiwan independence activists. In 1950, Chiang Ching-kuo became director of the [[secret police]], which he remained until 1965. Chiang also considered some people who were friends to Americans to be his enemies. An enemy of the Chiang family, [[Wu Kuo-chen]], was kicked out of his position of governor of Taiwan by [[Chiang Ching-kuo]] and fled to America in 1953.<ref name="bare_url">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AW9yrtekFRkC&q=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang&pg=PA302|title=Opposition and dissent in contemporary China|author=Peter R. Moody|year=1977|publisher=Hoover Press|page=302|isbn=0-8179-6771-0|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130606072130/http://books.google.com/books?id=AW9yrtekFRkC&pg=PA302&dq=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang#v=onepage&q=sun%20li%20jen%20americans%20chiang&f=false|archive-date=6 June 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> Chiang Ching-kuo, educated in the Soviet Union, initiated Soviet style military organization in the ROC Military. He reorganized and [[Sovietization|Sovietized]] the political officer corps, surveillance, and KMT party activities. Opposed to this was [[Sun Li-jen]], who was educated at the American [[Virginia Military Institute]].<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_5R2fnVZXiwC&q=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang&pg=PA195|title=The Generalissimo's son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the revolutions in China and Taiwan|author=Jay Taylor|year=2000|publisher=Harvard University Press|page=195|isbn=0-674-00287-3|access-date=28 June 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130606040723/http://books.google.com/books?id=_5R2fnVZXiwC&pg=PA195&dq=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang#v=onepage&q=sun%20li%20jen%20americans%20chiang&f=false|archive-date=6 June 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> Chiang orchestrated the controversial court-martial and arrest of General Sun Li-jen in August 1955, for plotting a coup d'état with the American [[CIA]] against his father Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. The CIA allegedly wanted to help Sun take control of Taiwan and declare its independence.<ref name="bare_url" /><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YoB35f6HD9gC&q=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang&pg=PA181 |title=Patterns in the dust: Chinese-American relations and the recognition controversy, 1949–1950 |author=[[Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]] |year=1983 |publisher=Columbia University Press |page=181 |isbn=0-231-05362-2 |access-date=28 June 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130606141033/http://books.google.com/books?id=YoB35f6HD9gC&pg=PA181&dq=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang#v=onepage&q=sun%20li%20jen%20americans%20chiang&f=false |archive-date=6 June 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref>

During the [[History of Taiwan#Taiwan under martial law|martial law era]] lasting until 1987, discussion of Taiwan independence was forbidden in Taiwan, at a time when [[Project National Glory|recovery of the mainland]] and [[Chinese unification|national unification]] were the stated goals of the ROC. During that time, many advocates of independence and other dissidents fled overseas, and carried out their advocacy work there, notably in Japan and the United States. Part of their work involved setting up think tanks, political organizations, and lobbying networks in order to influence the politics of their host countries, notably the United States, the ROC's main ally at the time, though they would not be very successful until much later. Within Taiwan, the independence movement was one of many dissident causes among the intensifying democracy movement of the 1970s, which culminated in the 1979 [[Kaohsiung Incident]]. The DPP was eventually formed to represent dissident causes.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2019-12-10 |title=The Formosa Incident: a look back |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2019/12/10/2003727276 |access-date=2023-05-19 |work=Taipei Times |archive-date=19 May 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230519082111/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2019/12/10/2003727276 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Multiparty period ===
After the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the acceptance of multi-party politics, the DPP became increasingly identified with Taiwan independence, which was added to its party platform in 1991. At the same time, many overseas independence advocates and organizations returned to Taiwan. For the first time, they openly promoted their cause and gradually built up political support. Many had previously fled to the US or Europe and had been on a blacklist held by the KMT, which had prevented them from returning to Taiwan. In their places of exile, they established organisations like the [[European Federation of Taiwanese Associations]] and the [[Formosan Association for Public Affairs]]. 

[[File:UN-for-Taiwan banner 20080127.jpg|thumb|200px|Banner displaying the slogan "UN for Taiwan"]]
As the electoral success of the DPP, and later, the DPP-led Pan-Green Coalition grew in recent years, the Taiwan independence movement shifted its focus to [[identity politics]] by proposing many plans involving symbolism and [[social engineering (political science)|social engineering]]. The reinterpretation of historical events such as the February 28 Incident, the use of broadcast language and mother tongue education in schools, the official name and flag of the ROC, slogans in the army, and the orientation of maps all have been issues of concern to the present-day Taiwan independence movement activists.

The movement, which peaked in the 70s through the 90s with the [[Taiwan literature movement]] and other cultural upheavals, has moderated in recent years with the assimilation of these changes. Friction between "mainlander" and "native" communities on Taiwan has decreased due to shared interests, such as increasing economic ties with mainland China, continuing threats by the PRC to invade, and doubts as to whether or not the United States would support a unilateral declaration of independence. Since the late 1990s many supporters of Taiwan independence have argued that Taiwan, as the ROC, is already independent from the mainland, making a formal declaration unnecessary. In May 1999, the DPP formalized this position in its "[[Resolution on Taiwan's Future]]".{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}

==== Lee Teng-hui administration (1988–2000) ====
In 1995, Taiwanese president [[Lee Teng-hui]] was given permission to speak at Cornell University about his dream of Taiwanese independence, the first time a Taiwanese leader had been allowed to visit the United States. This led to a [[1996 Taiwan crisis|military response from China]] that included buying Russian submarines and conducting missile tests near Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite journal |url = http://peggy.hsieh.free.fr/THESE/new%20reference/FA-Ross.pdf |title = Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement |last = Ross |first = Robert S. |date = March–April 2006 |journal = Foreign Affairs |volume = 85 |issue = 2 |pages = 141–148 |doi =  10.2307/20031917|jstor = 20031917 |access-date = 25 March 2015 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150402131417/http://peggy.hsieh.free.fr/THESE/new%20reference/FA-Ross.pdf |archive-date = 2 April 2015 |url-status = live }}</ref>

==== Chen Shui-bian administration (2000–2008) ====
[[File:Republic of China (Taiwan) Passport 2020.svg|thumb|284x284px|[[Taiwan passport|Republic of China passport]] mentioning Taiwan since 2003 in order to distinguish it from the [[Chinese passport|People's Republic of China passport]]. In 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a redesigned passport that highlights "Taiwan"<ref>{{Cite news|department=Reuters Staff|date=11 January 2021|title=Taiwan's new passport hopes to banish confusion with China|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-passport-idUSKBN29G0I4|access-date=13 May 2021|archive-date=13 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210513204757/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-passport-idUSKBN29G0I4|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=MOFA to release new passport to highlight TAIWAN in January 2021 |url=https://www.boca.gov.tw/cp-220-5862-75d57-2.html |access-date=4 Aug 2023 |agency=Bureau Of Consular Affairs |date=2020-09-04 |archive-date=30 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231130102144/https://www.boca.gov.tw/cp-220-5862-75d57-2.html |url-status=live }}</ref>]]
[[File:台灣護照.jpg|thumbnail|200px|An example of a "Taiwan passport", which is typically not accepted in place of the R.O.C. passport]]
In February 2007, President [[Chen Shui-bian]] initiated changes to names of state-owned enterprises, and the nation's embassies and overseas representative offices. As a result, [[Chunghwa Post]] Co. ({{lang|zh-Hant-TW|中華郵政}}) was renamed Taiwan Post Co. ({{lang|zh-Hant-TW|臺灣郵政}}) and Chinese Petroleum Corporation ({{lang|zh-Hant-TW|中國石油}}) is now called ''[[CPC Corporation, Taiwan]]'' ({{lang|zh-Hant-TW|臺灣中油}}) and the signs in Taiwan's embassies now display the word "Taiwan" in brackets after "Republic of China".<ref name="remark7">{{cite news|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/02/12/2003348683|author=Jewel Huang|newspaper=Taipei Times|title=Analysis: Name changes reflect increasing 'Taiwan identity'|page=3|date=12 February 2007|access-date=10 March 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071111075130/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/02/12/2003348683|archive-date=11 November 2007|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2007, the Taiwan Post Co. issued stamps bearing the name "Taiwan" in remembrance of the February 28 Incident. However, the name of the post office was reverted to "Chunghwa Post Co." following the inauguration of KMT president [[Ma Ying-jeou]] in 2008.

The Pan-Blue camp voiced its opposition to the changes and the former KMT Chairman [[Ma Ying-jeou]] said that it would generate diplomatic troubles and cause cross-strait tensions. It also argued that without a change in the relevant legislation pertaining to state-owned enterprises, the name changes of these enterprises could not be valid. As the Pan-Blue camp held only a slim parliamentary majority throughout the administration of President Chen, the Government's motion to change the law to this effect was blocked by the opposition. Later, U.S. Department of State spokesman [[Sean McCormack]] said that the U.S. does not support administrative steps that would appear to change the status-quo by either Taipei or Beijing as threats to regional security.<ref>{{Cite web|title=US Says Taiwanese President's Independence Remarks 'Unhelpful'|url=https://www.voanews.com/archive/us-says-taiwanese-presidents-independence-remarks-unhelpful|access-date=13 May 2021|website=Voice of America|language=en|archive-date=13 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210513203040/https://www.voanews.com/archive/us-says-taiwanese-presidents-independence-remarks-unhelpful|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Former president Lee Teng-hui has stated that he never pursued Taiwanese independence. Lee views Taiwan as already an independent state, and that the call for "Taiwanese independence" could even confuse the international community by implying that Taiwan once viewed itself as part of China. From this perspective, Taiwan is independent even if it remains unable to enter the UN. Lee said the most important goals are to improve the people's livelihoods, build national consciousness, make a formal name change and draft a new constitution that reflects the present reality so that Taiwan can officially identify itself as a country.<ref name="remark8">{{cite news|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/03/10/2003351724|newspaper=Taipei Times|title=Pan-green bickering takes focus off issues|page=8|date=10 March 2007|access-date=10 March 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070502034704/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/03/10/2003351724|archive-date=2 May 2007|url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008–2016) ====
[[2008 Republic of China legislative election|Legislative elections]] were held on 12 January 2008, resulting in a [[supermajority]] (86 of the 113 seats) in the legislature for the KMT and the Pan-Blue Coalition. President Chen Shui-bian's DPP was handed a heavy defeat, winning only the remaining 27 seats. The junior partner in the Pan-Green Coalition, the [[Taiwan Solidarity Union]], won no seats.

Two months later, the [[2008 Republic of China presidential election|election for the 12th-term President and vice-president of the Republic of China]] was held on Saturday, 22 March 2008.<ref>[http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/3918552.shtml]{{dead link|date=March 2019}}</ref> KMT nominee Ma Ying-jeou won, with 58% of the vote, ending eight years of DPP rule.<ref>{{cite news |title=Ma Ying-jeou sworn in as Taiwan's president |url=http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=659323&lang=eng_news&cate_img=&cate_rss=news_Politics_TAIWAN |agency=[[Central News Agency (Republic of China)|Central News Agency]] |date=20 May 2008 |access-date=17 February 2010 |archive-date=25 July 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110725202429/http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=659323&lang=eng_news&cate_img=&cate_rss=news_Politics_TAIWAN |url-status=live }}</ref> Along with the 2008 legislative election, Ma's landslide victory brought the KMT back to power in Taiwan.

On 1 August 2008, the Board of Directors of Taiwan Post Co. resolved to reverse the name change and restored the name "Chunghwa Post".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.post.gov.tw|title=中華郵政全球資訊網|last=中華郵政股份有限公司|date=25 December 2007|website=www.post.gov.tw|access-date=12 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080821232557/http://www.post.gov.tw/post/internet/u_english/index.jsp?ID=21|archive-date=21 August 2008|url-status=live}}</ref> The Board of Directors, as well as resolving to restore the name of the corporation, also resolved to re-hire the chief executive dismissed in 2007, and to withdraw defamation proceedings against him.<ref>[http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-Focus/2007Cti-Focus-Content/0,4518,9708010261+97080116+0+151053+0,00.html 台灣郵政改回中華郵政] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100514181524/http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-Focus/2007Cti-Focus-Content/0,4518,9708010261+97080116+0+151053+0,00.html |date=14 May 2010 }} (Taiwan Post changes back to Chunghwa Post)</ref>

On 2 September 2008, President Ma defined the relations between Taiwan and mainland China as "[[special non-state-to-state relations|special]]", but "not that between two states" – they are relations based on two areas of one state, with Taiwan considering that state to be the ROC, and mainland China considering that state to be the PRC.<ref>{{cite news |title = Taiwan and China in 'special relations': Ma |newspaper = China Post |date = 4 September 2008 |url = http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm |access-date = 18 November 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080906092524/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm |archive-date = 6 September 2008 |url-status = dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Ma refers to China as ROC territory in magazine interview |newspaper=Taipei Times |date=8 October 2008 |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320 |access-date=18 November 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090603213128/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320 |archive-date=3 June 2009 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Ma's approach with the mainland is conspicuously evasive of political negotiations that may lead to unification which
is the mainland's ultimate goal. The National Unification Guidelines remain "frozen" and Ma precluded any discussion of unification during his term by his "three no's" (no unification, no independence, and no use of force).<ref>{{cite web|title=Heading towards Troubled Waters? The Impact of Taiwan's 2016 Elections on Cross-Strait Relations|author1-link=Wu Yu-shan|author1=Yu-Shan Wu|url=https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2016/03/2016-China-CR.-Bejing.Nanjing.pdf#page=85|page=80|access-date=13 January 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181012014508/https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2016/03/2016-China-CR.-Bejing.Nanjing.pdf#page=85|archive-date=12 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te administration (2016–present) ====
The DPP, led by [[Tsai Ing-wen]], won a landslide victory over the KMT in [[2016 Taiwanese presidential election|2016]] and was reelected in [[2020 Taiwanese presidential election|2020]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Chung|first1=Lawrence Gan|last2=Chan|first2=Minnie|last3=Liu|first3=Zhen|last4=Gan|first4=Nectar|title=Taiwan's first female president Tsai Ing-wen warns China after landslide victory|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1901895/taiwans-first-female-president-tsai-ing-wen-warns-china|access-date=16 December 2016|work=South China Morning Post|date=17 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170404084907/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1901895/taiwans-first-female-president-tsai-ing-wen-warns-china|archive-date=4 April 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Page|first1=Jeremy|last2=Hsu|first2=Jenny W.|last3=Dou|first3=Eva|title=Taiwan Elects Tsai Ing-wen as First Female President|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwans-historic-election-set-to-test-china-ties-1452925430|access-date=16 December 2016|work=Wall Street Journal|date=16 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220182229/http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwans-historic-election-set-to-test-china-ties-1452925430|archive-date=20 December 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Her administration stated that it sought to maintain the current political status of Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news|title=Taiwanese President Tsai: Taiwan Won't Succumb to China's Pressure|url=https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/10/05/taiwanese-president-tsai-taiwan-wont-succumb-to-chinas-pressure/|access-date=16 December 2016|work=Wall Street Journal|date=5 October 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161221092856/http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/10/05/taiwanese-president-tsai-taiwan-wont-succumb-to-chinas-pressure/|archive-date=21 December 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Loa|first1=Iok-sin|title=DPP says new government will maintain 'status quo'|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/02/27/2003640312|access-date=16 December 2016|work=Taipei Times|date=27 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220142500/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/02/27/2003640312|archive-date=20 December 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> The PRC government continued to criticize the ROC government, as the DPP administration has continued to not officially recognize the [[1992 Consensus]] and the [[One-China policy|One China]] policy.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Chen |first1=Dingding |author-link=Dingding Chen |date=25 May 2016 |title=Without Clarity on 1992 Consensus, Tsai and DPP Will Face Challenges Ahead |work=The Diplomat |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/without-clarity-on-1992-consensus-tsai-and-dpp-will-face-challenges-ahead/ |url-status=live |access-date=16 December 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220151314/https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/without-clarity-on-1992-consensus-tsai-and-dpp-will-face-challenges-ahead/ |archive-date=20 December 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Beijing threatens to end communication with Taiwan if it pursues independence|url=http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/hoy-san-diego/sdhoy-beijing-threatens-to-end-communication-with-2016may21-story.html|access-date=16 December 2016|work=San Diego Union Tribune|date=21 May 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171005202605/http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/hoy-san-diego/sdhoy-beijing-threatens-to-end-communication-with-2016may21-story.html|archive-date=5 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

[[Lai Ching-te]], the DPP candidate, won the presidential election in [[2024 Taiwanese presidential election|2024]]. During the campaign period, Lai asserted Taiwanese sovereignty, but said a formal declaration of independence would be unnecessary and favored maintaining the status quo.<ref>{{Cite web |date=25 August 2023 |title=Presidential hopeful Lai says Taiwan's sovereignty is 'a fact' |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/25/taiwan-vice-president-emphasises-islands-autonomy |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240113054053/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/25/taiwan-vice-president-emphasises-islands-autonomy |archive-date=13 January 2024 |access-date=2024-01-13 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref> He also said he would be willing to work with the Chinese government, but only if they renounce any intentions to use force against Taiwan.<ref name=":4">{{Cite news |date=2023-08-15 |title=Can Taiwan's Next Leader Keep the Peace? |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-08-15/taiwan-vice-president-lai-ching-te-on-the-status-quo-with-china |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230906114456/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-08-15/taiwan-vice-president-lai-ching-te-on-the-status-quo-with-china |archive-date=6 September 2023 |access-date=2024-01-13 |work=Bloomberg.com |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite magazine |date=2023-11-21 |title=Taiwan's Presidential Frontrunner Faces a Balancing Act With China |url=https://time.com/6336441/taiwan-presidental-election-william-lai-profile/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240113133524/https://time.com/6336441/taiwan-presidental-election-william-lai-profile/ |archive-date=13 January 2024 |access-date=2024-01-13 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |language=en}}</ref>

== Legal basis for Taiwan independence ==
Taiwan independence is supported by the Pan-Green Coalition in Taiwan, led by the centre-left DPP, but opposed by the Pan-Blue Coalition, led by the conservative KMT. The former coalition aims to eventually achieve full sovereign independence for Taiwan. Whereas, the latter coalition aims to improve relations with the Beijing government (PRC) — which it refers to as "mainland China" — and eventually "reunify" at some point.

Both factions have long been forced to precariously dance around the so-called "status quo" of Taiwan's political status. The DPP is unable to immediately declare independence due to pressure from the PRC and the KMT, whereas the KMT and PRC are unable to immediately achieve Chinese unification due to pressure from the DPP and its ''de facto'' allies (including the United States, Japan, and the European Union); further, the vast majority of Taiwanese as well as the KMT oppose the mainland's proposed [[one country, two systems]] solution.<ref name="heritage.org">{{unfit|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20060316065901/http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/hl808.cfm U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations in the Bush Administration]}}, [[The Heritage Foundation]] (noting the policy of President [[George W. Bush]] toward Taiwan's defense).</ref>{{Failed verification|date=February 2023|reason=The given source only highlights the specific policy of one U.S. administration and does not attest to the assertions made in this paragraph.}}

The 1895 [[Treaty of Shimonoseki]] and 1951 [[Treaty of San Francisco]] are often cited as the main bases for Taiwan independence in international law<ref>{{Cite web| url=http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1950&context=ilj | title=One-China Policy and Taiwan | author=Y. Frank Chiang | year=2004 | access-date=23 May 2016 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160512160757/http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1950&context=ilj | archive-date=12 May 2016 | url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/201107.delisle.taiwan.pdf|title=Microsoft Word - deLisle - Taiwan for Brookings.doc|access-date=23 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180723064358/https://www.fpri.org/docs/media/201107.delisle.taiwan.pdf|archive-date=23 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/748/11PacRimLPolyJ063.pdf|title=Data|website=digital.law.washington.edu|access-date=11 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160208080106/http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/748/11PacRimLPolyJ063.pdf|archive-date=8 February 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> if such things as "[[self-determination]]" and the [[Montevideo Convention|Montevideo Convention (on the Rights and Duties of States)]] are to be disregarded. These two treaties are not recognized by the Beijing government and the Pan-Blue Coalition of Taiwan.

=== Undetermined status theory ===
One hypothesis as to a legal basis for an independent Taiwanese state, the [[Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan|theory of the undetermined status of Taiwan]], posits that:

a) Japan gained sovereignty over Taiwan in 1895

b) Japan lost sovereignty over Taiwan around 1951–1952 according to the Treaty of San Francisco

c) The Treaty of San Francisco does not assign Taiwan to any power

Therefore, some activists and legal scholars hold that, legally speaking, the island of Taiwan is not an integral part of the territory of the ROC (or any other internationally recognized state); its status is more similar to a [[League of Nations mandate]] or [[United Nations trust territories|United Nations trust territory]] administered by the ROC pending a final decision.

==== Mainland position ====
The PRC government regards these agreements as irrelevant to the Taiwan issue, arguing that the Treaty of Shimonoseki (being an [[Unequal treaties|unequal treaty]]) has been nullified and that the Treaty of San Francisco assigns Taiwan to China. It also cites the [[Potsdam Declaration]] and [[Cairo Communique]] as confirming Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; inasmuch as the PRC is the internationally recognized "China", it thus posits that it is the lawful sovereign power on the island. The United Nations currently recognizes Taiwan as an integral part of China (and thus, implicitly, the PRC).

=== ''Huadu'' and ''Taidu'' ===
Within the Pan-Green Coalition of Taiwan, there are two main factions, the [[Huadu (Taiwan)|''Huadu'']] and ''Taidu''. The more moderate ''Huadu'' faction, mainly located in the ruling DPP, posits Taiwan and its outlying islands are ''already'' a sovereign state under the name "Republic of China"'','' making a formal declaration of independence unnecessary. ''Huadu'' politics is the semi-official stance of the ruling DPP under the Lai Ching-te and Tsai Ing-wen administrations.

Conversely, the more radical ''Taidu'' faction advocates a more radical departure from the ''status quo'' by making a formal declaration of independence to create a ''de jure'' "Republic of Taiwan"; advocates for a ''de jure'' Taiwanese state can be found in smaller parties in the Pan-Green coalition, such as the [[Taiwan Statebuilding Party]] and [[Taiwan Solidarity Union]], as well as in minority elements of the ruling DPP.

The term "Taiwan independence movement" is thus somewhat imprecise inasmuch its main representative, the DPP, does not support any change in the constitutional name of the Taiwanese state for the foreseeable future; they generally view the modern ROC as [[Four-Stage Theory of the Republic of China|synonymous with a sovereign Taiwanese state]]; the incumbent President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te of the DPP, believes that "Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China".<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-08-14 |title=Taiwan's Election Is All About War |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2023-08-14/why-taiwan-s-2024-election-is-all-about-threat-of-war-with-china |access-date=2024-09-25 |work=Bloomberg.com |language=en}}</ref>

=== Kinmen and Matsu issue ===

==== Background ====
{{Main|Kinmen|Matsu Islands}}

When the government of the ROC (under the KMT) [[Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan|was forced to retreat]] to [[Geography of Taiwan|Formosa]] and the [[Penghu|Pescadores]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm|title=Treaty of Peace with Japan|website=Taiwan Documents Project|type=This is an archive displaying the original text of the main segments of the [[Treaty of San Francisco]], including the specific phrase "Formosa and the Pescadores".|access-date=7 June 2019|quote=ch. II, art. 2, (b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20010221045459/http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm|archive-date=21 February 2001|url-status=live}}</ref> in 1949, several Chinese (i.e. not Japanese) islands still remained under KMT control. Because the CCP never gained control of the Kinmen, [[Wuqiu, Kinmen|Wuqiu]], and Matsu Islands, they are now governed by the [[Republic of China on Taiwan]] as Kinmen County (Kinmen and Wuqiu) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) within a streamlined [[Fuchien Province, Republic of China|Fujian Province]]. The islands are often referred to collectively as Quemoy and Matsu<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2010/11/quemoy-and-matsu/|title=Quemoy and Matsu: A Historical Footnote Revisited|last=Norris|first=Robert B.|date=November 2010|website=American Diplomacy|type=This is an article discussing the usage of the phrase "Quemoy and Matsu". The phrase was widely used throughout [[Politics of the United States|American political discourse]] during the 1950s–1970s. In modern times, Quemoy is called "Kinmen".|access-date=7 June 2019|quote=Early on in the presidential debates, Kennedy was asked if the United States defense line in the Far East should include Quemoy and Matsu. Kennedy responded that these islands — just a few miles off the coast of China and more than a hundred miles from Taiwan — were strategically indefensible and were not essential to the defense of Taiwan. The Massachusetts Senator also alluded to the unsuccessful efforts by the Eisenhower Administration to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to abandon the offshore islands in order to avoid the possibility of being dragged into a major confrontation with the PRC over these two islands. Perhaps feeling the need to disagree with Kennedy, Vice President Nixon countered. Since Quemoy and Matsu were in the "area of freedom," Nixon contended that they should not be surrendered to the Communists as a matter of "principle." Theodore H. White was of the opinion that Kennedy's initial answer to the question on Quemoy and Matsu was "probably one of the sharpest and clearest responses of any question of the debates."|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190607102301/http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2010/11/quemoy-and-matsu/|archive-date=7 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> or as "Golden Horse".

Historically, Kinmen County ("Quemoy") and Lienchiang County ("Matsu") served as important defensive strongholds for the KMT during the 1950–1970s, symbolizing the frontline of KMT resistance against [[Chinese Communist Revolution|the Communist rebellion]]. They represented the last MKT presence in "mainland China".<ref>{{Cite book|title=Current Notes on International Affairs|author=Department of External Affairs|date=1955|publisher=[[Department of External Affairs (1921–70)|Department of External Affairs]]|volume=26|location=[[Canberra]]|page=57|quote=In this area of tension and danger a distinction, I think, can validly be made between the position of Formosa and Pescadores, and the islands off the China coast now in Nationalist hands; the latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that are not.|author-link=Department of External Affairs (1921–70)}}</ref> The islands received immense coverage from Western (especially United States) media during the [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]] of 1954–1955 and the [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]] of 1958. They were very significant in the context of the [[Cold War]], a period from 1946 until 1991 of geopolitical tension between the [[Eastern Bloc]] and the [[Western Bloc]].

Ever since the transition into multi-party politics (i.e. "Democratization") during the 1990s, Kinmen and Lienchiang counties have now essentially developed into two electorates that can be contested through democratic elections. Currently, the two electorates are "strongholds" for the KMT,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://international.thenewslens.com/article/72871|title=On the Front Lines of Taiwan's History in Kinmen|author=American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan|date=7 July 2017|website=The News Lens International Edition|language=en|type=This article discusses the history of Kuomintang influence in Kinmen and Matsu and the absence of Taiwan independence sentiments.|access-date=2 June 2019|quote=Further, Kinmen differs from Taiwan in its consistently close ties with the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT). Indeed, Kinmen is one of the few locations in ROC territory that the DPP has never controlled. The reason can be traced to the late 1940s, when some Taiwanese began to view the KMT as unwelcome occupiers. That view never took hold in Kinmen, Weng notes. During the Cold War, "the military was here on the front lines protecting people from the enemy – Communist China," he says. Since soldiers were numerous, "they made important contributions to the local economy too. Their presence created many business opportunities." Critically, Kinmen did not experience the 2–28 Incident, an uprising against Nationalist rule in Taiwan that began on February 28, 1947. Government troops brutally suppressed the rebellion; the death toll is generally estimated at 18,000- 28,000. To this day, opponents of the KMT in Taiwan trace their antipathy toward the party to the 2–28 Incident and the subsequent White Terror.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190602171323/https://international.thenewslens.com/article/72871|archive-date=2 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> due mainly to popular opinion within the electorates, rather than brute control (as in the past). The two electorates have recently developed close relations with the mainland, which lies only around 2–9&nbsp;km west from the islands, whereas Taiwan lies around 166–189&nbsp;km east from the islands.

==== Significance of Quemoy and Matsu ====
Quemoy and Matsu are unique and important for several reasons.
* The islands straddle the southeastern coastline of mainland China, only a few kilometers away from mainland China's [[Fujian|Fujian Province]].
* The islands are geographically defined as being part of mainland China rather than Taiwan (aka "Formosa and the Pescadores").
* The islands are defined as comprising the [[Rump state|truncated]], [[Fujian Provincial Government#Government structure|streamlined]] Fujian Province (officially [[Fuchien Province, Republic of China|"Fuchien Province"]]) of the ROC on Taiwan.

==== Quemoy and Matsu in Cross-Strait relations ====
Reportedly, the local government of Kinmen County supports stronger business and cultural ties with mainland China, similarly to the Kuomintang, and views itself as an important [[Wikt: proxy#English|proxy]] (representative) or [[Wikt: nexus#English|nexus]] (focal point) for improving [[Cross-Strait relations]] (that is, in the favour of [[Chinese unification]]). In January 2001, direct travel between Kinmen County (and Lienchiang County) and mainland China re-opened under the "mini [[Three Links]]".<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Headline/201103/t20110316_1787640.htm|title=Backgrounder: Milestones in cross-Straits relations over 30 years|website=Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714173713/http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Headline/201103/t20110316_1787640.htm|archive-date=14 July 2014|url-status=live}}</ref> As of 2015, Kinmen has plans to become a [[Special economic zones of China|special economic zone]] (SEZ), in which free trade and free investment would be allowed between it and the neighbouring mainland SEZ of [[Xiamen]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china/china-turns-firepower-to-soft-power-to-try-to-win-tiny-taiwan-held-island-idUSKCN0S12L320151007|title=China turns firepower to soft power to try to win tiny Taiwan-held island|last1=Lee|first1=Yimou|last2=Hung|first2=Faith|date=8 October 2015|website=Reuters|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606034556/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china/china-turns-firepower-to-soft-power-to-try-to-win-tiny-taiwan-held-island-idUSKCN0S12L320151007|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> This could be accomplished in part by building a huge bridge connecting Kinmen to Xiamen, via the island of [[Lieyu|Lesser Kinmen (Lieyu)]];<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.vagabondjourney.com/bridge-between-kinmen-islands-and-mainland-china-xiamen/|title="Bridging" the Gap between Mainland China and Taiwan|last=Shepard|first=Wade|date=7 November 2014|website=Vagabond Journey|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606034542/https://www.vagabondjourney.com/bridge-between-kinmen-islands-and-mainland-china-xiamen/|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> a bridge [[Kinmen Bridge|has since been constructed]] between Greater Kinmen and Lesser Kinmen.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/07/17/2003696837|title=Pier foundation laid for Kinmen Bridge|last=Shan|first=Shelley|date=17 July 2018|website=Taipei Times|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606034544/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/07/17/2003696837|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Additionally, Kinmen has plans to become a "university island".<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=971|title=Chinese Students Set to Invade Kinmen|last1=Ma|first1=Yueh-lin|last2=Wu|first2=Ting-feng|date=20 August 2010|newspaper=Commonwealth Magazine|last3=Chen|first3=Yi-Shan|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171124225507/http://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=971|archive-date=24 November 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> In 2010, the "National Kinmen Institute of Technology" was upgraded to "[[National Quemoy University]]".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://free-apply.com/university/1015800120|title=National Quemoy University|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606034543/https://free-apply.com/university/1015800120|archive-date=6 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Kinmen County plans to establish several branches of mainland Chinese universities in Kinmen, and has bargained with the central Taiwanese (ROC) government so that universities in Kinmen don't have to be bounded by the same quotas as other Taiwanese universities in terms of admitting mainland Chinese students. In 2018, the local government of Kinmen County unveiled a new undersea pipeline linking Kinmen to mainland China, through which drinking-water can be imported.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-starts-supplying-fresh-water-to-taiwanese-county|title=China starts supplying fresh water to Taiwanese county|last=hermes|date=6 August 2018|website=The Straits Times|language=en|access-date=2 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190602161927/https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-starts-supplying-fresh-water-to-taiwanese-county|archive-date=2 June 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> This business deal caused controversy in Taiwan and resulted in a "stand-off" between Kinmen County and the [[Mainland Affairs Council|Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan (ROC)]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/controversial-chinese-fresh-water-pipeline-starts-supply-to-taiwanese-island/50000262-3711602|title=Controversial Chinese fresh water pipeline starts supply to Taiwanese island|date=5 August 2018|website=EFE (China Taiwan, English)|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190421064137/https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/controversial-chinese-fresh-water-pipeline-starts-supply-to-taiwanese-island/50000262-3711602|archive-date=21 April 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

==== Quemoy and Matsu as part of Taiwan ====
{{Unreferenced section|date=December 2022}}
Within Taiwan, the radical camp believes that Kinmen County (Quemoy) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) should be abandoned from a potential independent and sovereign Taiwanese state. This view aligns with the aforementioned treaties and acts that do not define Kinmen and Matsu as being part of Taiwan. This same camp also believes that the PRC has only "allowed" the ROC to continue controlling Kinmen and Matsu in order to "tether" Taiwan to mainland China. The fact that the PRC propagandizes Kinmen and Matsu is evidence that this is true to at least a certain degree. In a hypothetical scenario where Kinmen and Matsu are abandoned by the Taiwanese state, they would likely be "ceded" to the PRC via a [[peace treaty]], officially ending the Chinese Civil War. Many domestic and foreign defense analysts also grimly conclude that the islands could likely be easily taken by the PLA given its short distance from the mainland should the Chinese choose to do so,<ref>{{cite web | title=China could seize Taiwan's outlying islands, US intelligence report warns | website=[[Independent.co.uk]] | date=27 May 2025 | url=https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/china-invasion-taiwan-outlying-island-intelligence-b2758334.html }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | title=US report warns on China targeting outlying islands - Taipei Times | date=29 May 2025 | url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/05/29/2003837690 }}</ref> and many inhabitants identify with China and would likely not resist due to their shared identity and ethnicity.<ref>{{cite web | title=The Kinmen and Matsu challenge - Taipei Times | date=7 July 2024 | url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/07/07/2003820434 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | title=Stuck in the Middle: What the Existence of Regional Identities on Taiwan's Outlying Islands Can Tell Us About the Construction of Nationalism | date=12 March 2025 | url=https://saisobserver.org/2025/03/12/stuck-in-the-middle-what-the-existence-of-regional-identities-on-taiwans-outlying-islands-can-tell-us-about-the-construction-of-nationalism/ }}</ref>

Also within Taiwan, the moderate camp believes that Quemoy and Matsu belong to Taiwan. This camp believes that the ROC and Taiwan have become one and the same. By this logic, Taiwan effectively owns all of the same territories that the ROC is said to own. Among these territories is Quemoy and Matsu. If a potential Taiwanese state were to be created, this camp believes that the new country will actually be the [[successor state]] to the ROC, rather than an entirely new country. Therefore, if Taiwan independence were to be successfully achieved, then the islands of Quemoy and Matsu would hypothetically cease to be administered as "Fujian Province", and would instead simply be classified as "satellite islands of Taiwan" (much in the same way as Penghu).

Despite the differing views of these two camps, there is a general understanding throughout Taiwan that Quemoy and Matsu are not part of the historical region of "Taiwan", due to having never been governed under the following regimes: [[Dutch Formosa]], [[Spanish Formosa]], [[Kingdom of Tungning]], [[Republic of Formosa]], and Japanese Formosa. Additionally, Quemoy and Matsu experienced a unique history for several years as military outposts of the ROC, further separating the islands from Taiwan in terms of culture.

== Positions ==
{{Anti-imperialism}}
The questions of independence and the island's relationship to mainland China are complex and inspire very strong emotions among [[Taiwanese people]]. There are some who continue to maintain the KMT's position, which states that the ROC is the sole legitimate government for ''all'' of China (of which they consider Taiwan to be a part), and that the aim of the government should be eventual unification of the mainland and Taiwan under the rule of the ROC. Some argue that Taiwan has been, and should continue to be, completely independent from China and should become a Taiwanese state with a distinct name. Then, there are numerous positions running the entire spectrum between these two extremes, as well as differing opinions on how best to manage either situation should it ever be realized.

On 25 October 2004, in Beijing, the U.S. Secretary of State [[Colin Powell]] said Taiwan is "not sovereign," provoking strong comments from both the Pan-Green and Pan-Blue coalitions – but for very different reasons. From the DPP's side, President Chen declared that "Taiwan is definitely a sovereign, independent country, a great country that absolutely does not belong to the People's Republic of China". The TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union) criticized Powell, and questioned why the US sold weapons to Taiwan if it were not a sovereign state. From the KMT, then Chairman Ma Ying-jeou announced, "the Republic of China has been a sovereign state ever since it was formed <nowiki>[</nowiki>in 1912<nowiki>]</nowiki>." The pro-unification PFP Party Chairman, [[James Soong]], called it "Taiwan's biggest failure in diplomacy."<ref>{{cite web
|url = http://www.pfp.org.tw/news/news_detail.php?id=732&p=960&j=2
|title = The appropriate interpretation of Powell's statement
|publisher = People First Official Website
|language = zh
|access-date = 10 May 2008
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110609111502/http://www.pfp.org.tw/news/news_detail.php?id=732&p=960&j=2
|archive-date = 9 June 2011
|url-status = live
}}</ref>

=== Support for independence ===
[[File:Parade of Taiwan independence.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|Parade of Taiwan independence supporters]]
The first view considers the move for Taiwan independence as a nationalist movement. Historically, this was the view of such pro-independence groups as the [[Tangwai movement]] (which later grew into the DPP) who argued that the ROC under the KMT had been a "foreign regime" forcibly imposed on Taiwan. Since the 1990s, supporters of Taiwan independence no longer actively make this argument. Instead, the argument has been that, in order to survive the growing power of the PRC, Taiwan must view itself as a separate and distinct entity from "China."  Such a change in view involves: 
* removing the name of "China" from official and unofficial items in Taiwan,
* changes in history books, which now portrays Taiwan as a central entity,
* promoting the use of Hokkien Language in the government and in the education system,
* reducing economic and cultural links with mainland China,
* opposing Chinese unification regardless of China [[Liberalism in China|liberalizing]] or [[Democracy in China|becoming a liberal democracy]]
* promoting the general thinking that Taiwan is a separate entity.

The goal of this movement is the eventual creation of a country where China is a ''foreign'' entity, and Taiwan is an internationally recognized ''country'' separate from any concept of "China." The proposed "Republic of Taiwan" will exclude areas such as Quemoy and Matsu off the coast of Fujian, and some of the islands in the South China Sea ([[Taiping Island]], [[Pratas Island]], [[Zhongzhou Reef]]), which historically were not part of Taiwan. Some supporters of Taiwan independence argue that the Treaty of San Francisco justifies Taiwan independence by not explicitly granting Taiwan to either the ROC or the PRC, even though neither the PRC nor the ROC government accepts such legal justification. It is also thought that if formal independence were declared, Taiwan's foreign policies would lean further towards Japan and the United States, and the desirable option of [[United Nations Trusteeship Council]] is also considered.<ref>{{cite web
| author = United Nations
| title = UN Trusteeship Council
| publisher = United Nations
| url = https://www.un.org/en/about-us/trusteeship-council
| date = 1999-10-25
| accessdate = 2023-07-26
| quote = The UN Charter established the Trusteeship Council as one of the main organs of the United Nations, and assigned to it the task of supervising the administration of Trust Territories placed under the International Trusteeship System. The Trusteeship Council suspended its operations on 1 November 1994, a month after the independence of Palau, the last remaining United Nations trust territory.
| archive-date = 22 March 2022
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220322132852/https://www.un.org/en/about-us/trusteeship-council
| url-status = live
}}</ref>

The [[Taiwan Independence Party]] (TAIP) won a single seat in the Legislative Yuan in the 1998 legislative election. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was formed in 2001, and is also supportive of independence. Though it gained more legislative support than TAIP in elections, the TSU's legislative representation has dropped over time. In 2018, political parties and organizations demanding a referendum on Taiwan's independence formed an alliance to further their objective. The [[Formosa Alliance]] was established on 7 April 2018, prompted by a sense of crisis in the face of growing pressure from China for unification. The alliance wanted to hold a referendum on Taiwan's independence in April 2019, and change the island's name from the "Republic of China" to "Taiwan," and apply for membership in the United Nations.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Pro-independence-forces-in-Taiwan-align-to-push-referendum|title=Pro-independence forces in Taiwan align to push referendum|website=Nikkei Asian Review|access-date=6 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180506173959/https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Pro-independence-forces-in-Taiwan-align-to-push-referendum|archive-date=6 May 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> In August 2019, another party supportive of independence, the [[Taiwan Action Party Alliance]] was founded.

=== Support for status quo ===
{{See also|Huadu (Taiwan)}}
A second view is that Taiwan is already an independent nation with the official name "Republic of China," which has been independent (i.e. de facto separate from mainland China/de jure separate from PRC) since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, when the ROC lost control of mainland China, with only Taiwan (including the Penghu islands), Kinmen (Quemoy), the Matsu Islands off the coast of Fujian Province, and some of the [[South China Sea Islands|islands in the South China Sea]] remaining under its administration.<ref>{{Cite web |title=While Pledging to Defend Taiwan from China, Biden Shifted on Taiwan Independence. Here's Why That Matters. |url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/while-pledging-defend-taiwan-china-biden-shifted-taiwan-independence-heres-why-matters |access-date=2024-02-05 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |language=en |archive-date=5 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240205031449/https://www.cfr.org/blog/while-pledging-defend-taiwan-china-biden-shifted-taiwan-independence-heres-why-matters |url-status=live }}</ref> Although previously no major political faction adopted this pro-status quo viewpoint, because it is a "compromise" in face of PRC threats and American warnings against a unilateral declaration of independence, the DPP combined it with their traditional belief to form their latest official policy. 

This viewpoint has not been adopted by more radical groups such as the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which favor only the view described above and are in favor of an independent Republic or State of Taiwan.  In addition, many members of the Pan-Blue Coalition are rather suspicious of this view, fearing that adopting this definition of Taiwan independence is merely an insincere stealth tactical effort to advance [[desinicization|de-sinicization]] and the radical view of Taiwan independence.  As a result, supporters of Pan-Blue tend to make a clear distinction between Taiwan ''independence'' and Taiwan ''sovereignty'', while supporters of Pan-Green tend to try to blur the distinction between the two.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-07-28 |title=Taiwanese Preference for Status Quo Remains Constant Even as Views Harden |url=https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/07/taiwanese-preference-for-status-quo-remains-constant-even-as-views-harden/ |access-date=2024-02-05 |website=Global Taiwan Institute |language=en-US |archive-date=5 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240205031449/https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/07/taiwanese-preference-for-status-quo-remains-constant-even-as-views-harden/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

Most Taiwanese and political parties of the ROC support the status quo and recognize de facto independence through sovereign self-rule.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-11-21 |title=Majority support 'status quo,' poll shows – Taipei Times |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2021/11/21/2003768230 |access-date=2024-02-05 |website=www.taipeitimes.com |archive-date=5 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240205031450/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2021/11/21/2003768230 |url-status=live }}</ref> Even among those who believe Taiwan is and should remain independent, the threat of war from the PRC softens their approach, and they tend to support maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing an ideological path that could result in war with the PRC. When President Lee Teng-hui put forth the two-states policy, he received 80% support. A similar situation arose when President Chen Shui-bian declared that there was "[[One Country on Each Side|one country on each side]]" of the Taiwan Strait. To this day, the parties disagree, sometimes bitterly, on such things as territory, name (ROC or Taiwan), future policies, and interpretations of history. The Pan-Blue Coalition and the PRC believe that Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian are intent on publicly promoting a moderate form of Taiwan independence in order to advance secretly deeper forms of Taiwan independence, and that they intend to use popular support on Taiwan for political separation to advance notions of cultural and economic separation.

=== Opposition to independence ===
[[File:Anti-Taiwan independence movement protesters in Washington DC 20051020.jpg|thumbnail|250x250px|Anti-Taiwan independence protesters in [[Washington, D.C.]] during Lee Teng-hui's visit in 2005]]
[[File:2023 joint anti-Taiwan independence and anti-intervention operation.png|thumb|250x250px|In 2023, in Taiwan, a joint anti-Taiwan independence and [[Non-interventionism|anti-intervention]] protest against [[Lai Ching-te|William Lai Ching‑te]]]]
The third view, put forward by the government of the PRC and Nationalists of the KMT, defines Taiwan independence as "splitting Taiwan from China, causing division of the nation and the people." What the PRC claims by this statement is somewhat ambiguous according to supporters of Taiwanese independence, as some statements by the PRC seem to identify China solely and uncompromisingly with the PRC. Others propose a broader and more flexible definition suggesting that both mainland China and Taiwan are parts that form one cultural and geographic entity, although divided politically as a vestige of the Chinese Civil War. [[Chinese nationalism|Chinese nationalists]] have called the Taiwan independence movement and its supporters to be ''[[hanjian]]'' (traitors).<ref>{{cite journal |last=沈 |first=己堯 |date=1996 |title=「台獨漢奸」論 |journal=海峽評論 |issue=63 |pages=54–55 |doi=10.29925/SRM.199603.0013}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title="台独"的核心分子，祖上都是汉奸！有一个算一个必须清算|website=[[Sohu]] |url=https://www.sohu.com/a/903095699_122219672|accessdate=1 August 2025|date=10 June 2025}}</ref>

The KMT and the broader Pan-Blue coalition believe that China should be unified under the ROC and opposes any attempts in de-sinicization that erases any links with China. Since 2016, divisions have emerged in the coalition following electoral defeats and widespread sentiments among the Taiwanese electorate that rejects any form of unification, with pro-Beijing elements beginning to infiltrate the ranks of the coalition through the [[United front in Taiwan|united front]] that advocate unification under the PRC.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.taiwangazette.org/news/2018/10/25/they-used-to-be-anti-communist-but-now-they-play-to-beijings-tune | title=They Used to be Anti-Communist, but Now They Play to Beijing's Tune | date=25 October 2018 }}</ref>

The PRC considers itself the sole legitimate government of all China, and the ROC to be a defunct entity replaced in the Communist revolution that succeeded in 1949. Therefore, assertions that the ROC is a sovereign state are construed as support for Taiwan independence, so are proposals to change the name of the ROC. Such a name change is met with even more disapproval since it rejects Taiwan as part of the [[greater China]] entity (as one side of a still-unresolved Chinese civil war). The ROC used to be recognized by the UN as the sole legal government of China until 1971. In that year, the [[UN General Assembly Resolution 2758|UN Resolution 2758]] was passed, and the PRC became recognized as the legal government of China by the UN.

The CCP classifies Taiwan independence activists as one of the [[Five Poisons]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Callick |first=Rowan |date=March 11, 2007 |title=China's great firewall |url=https://www.theaustralian.com.au/subscribe/news/1/?sourceCode=TAWEB_WRE170_a&dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theaustralian.com.au%2Fnation%2Finquirer%2Fchinas-great-firewall%2Fnews-story%2Fbf7df5dafcf4af8968ffd56cd0688460&memtype=anonymous&mode=premium&nk=251a57fdace5b075f2cf7af36f498b32-1737436718 |url-status=live |access-date=May 21, 2024 |website=[[The Australian]] |archive-date=28 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210928071818/https://amp.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/chinas-great-firewall/news-story/bf7df5dafcf4af8968ffd56cd0688460 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Hoffman |first1=Samantha |last2=Mattis |first2=Peter |date=18 July 2016 |title=Managing the Power Within: China's State Security Commission |url=http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/managing-the-power-within-chinas-state-security-commission/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160719130204/http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/managing-the-power-within-chinas-state-security-commission/ |archive-date=19 July 2016 |access-date=22 July 2016 |website=War on the Rocks}}</ref> In 2005, the [[10th National People's Congress]] passed the [[Anti-Secession Law]] authorizing military force for unification.<ref>{{cite web |last=Robinson |first=Dan |date=16 March 2005 |title=US House Criticizes China Bill on Taiwan Secession |url=http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-03-16-voa60.cfm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050402022813/http://voanews.com/english/2005-03-16-voa60.cfm |archive-date=2005-04-02 |access-date=2005-03-17 |website=[[Voice of America]]}}</ref> In 2024, the Chinese government issued the [[Guidelines on Imposing Criminal Punishments on Diehard "Taiwan independence" Separatists for Conducting or Inciting Secession]] to the courts stating that "diehard" independence supporters could be [[Tried in absentia|tried ''in absentia'']] with [[Capital punishment in China|capital punishment]] imposed.<ref>{{Cite news |date=June 21, 2024 |title=China threatens death penalty for 'diehard' Taiwan separatists |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-issues-guidelines-criminal-punishment-diehard-taiwan-separatists-2024-06-21/ |access-date=June 22, 2024 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=June 21, 2024 |title=China threatens death penalty for supporters of Taiwan independence |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/taiwan-independence-06212024151620.html |access-date=June 22, 2024 |work=[[Radio Free Asia]]}}</ref>

== Opinion polls ==
{{See also|Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity}}

Several polls have indicated an increase in support of Taiwanese independence in the three decades after 1990. In a {{ill|Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation|zh|台灣民意教育基金會}} (TPOF) poll conducted in June 2020, 54% of respondents supported ''de jure'' independence for Taiwan, 23.4% preferred maintaining the status quo, 12.5% favored unification with China, and 10% did not hold any particular view on the matter. This represented the highest level of support for Taiwanese independence since the survey was first conducted in 1991.<ref name="poll">[https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3951560 Poll shows highest ever support for Taiwan independence] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201206221136/https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3951560/ |date=6 December 2020 }}  Taiwan News, 22 June 2020</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.tpof.org/%e7%a4%be%e6%9c%83%e8%b6%a8%e5%8b%a2/%e7%9c%81%e7%b1%8d%e6%97%8f%e7%be%a4/%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e4%ba%ba%e7%9a%84%e7%b5%b1%e7%8d%a8%e7%ab%8b%e5%a0%b4%ef%bc%882020%e5%b9%b46%e6%9c%8822%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/|title=台灣人的統獨立場（2020年6月22日） – 財團法人台灣民意教育基金會|accessdate=17 March 2023|archive-date=1 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230201001215/https://www.tpof.org/%e7%a4%be%e6%9c%83%e8%b6%a8%e5%8b%a2/%e7%9c%81%e7%b1%8d%e6%97%8f%e7%be%a4/%e5%8f%b0%e7%81%a3%e4%ba%ba%e7%9a%84%e7%b5%b1%e7%8d%a8%e7%ab%8b%e5%a0%b4%ef%bc%882020%e5%b9%b46%e6%9c%8822%e6%97%a5%ef%bc%89/|url-status=live}}</ref> A later TPOF poll in 2022 showed similar results, as 50% said they support Taiwan independence, 11.8% were for unification, 25.7% were for maintaining status quo.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/20210830-英文版2「台灣人的民族認同與統獨傾向」七月民調補充報告.pdf|title=英文版2「台灣人的民族認同與統獨傾向」七月民調補充報告}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=17 August 2022 |title=50% of Taiwanese support independence after PLA drills |url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4628706 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230201004103/https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4628706 |archive-date=1 February 2023 |access-date=1 February 2023 |website=[[Taiwan News]]}}</ref> In the Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Survey by The Election Study Center of [[National Chengchi University]] there has been a steady increase in respondents choosing "maintain the status quo and move toward independence in the future" since the survey began in 1994. However, the option "maintain the status quo indefinitely" had a similar increase in the same period and the most popular option was "maintain the status quo and decide in the future between independence or unification" every year between 1994 and 2022. The option "independence as soon as possible" never went above 10% in the same time period. "Unification as soon as possible" has been more unpopular – never going above 4.5%.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |title=Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2022/12) |access-date=26 October 2021 |archive-date=26 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026231952/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6965/%E9%87%8D%E8%A6%81%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E6%85%8B%E5%BA%A6%E5%88%86%E4%BD%88%E8%B6%A8%E5%8B%A2%E5%9C%96%E8%B3%87%E6%96%99%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E6%96%B9%E6%B3%95%E8%AA%AA%E6%98%8E%28methodology%29202212.pdf |title=Methodology |access-date=1 February 2023 |archive-date=1 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230201001208/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6965/%E9%87%8D%E8%A6%81%E6%94%BF%E6%B2%BB%E6%85%8B%E5%BA%A6%E5%88%86%E4%BD%88%E8%B6%A8%E5%8B%A2%E5%9C%96%E8%B3%87%E6%96%99%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E6%96%B9%E6%B3%95%E8%AA%AA%E6%98%8E(methodology)202212.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6963/Tondu202212.jpg |title=Tondu |access-date=1 February 2023 |archive-date=22 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230122232728/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/upload/44/doc/6963/Tondu202212.jpg |url-status=live }}</ref>

{{mw-datatable}}
{| class="wikitable mw-datatable" style="text-align:center; font-size:85%; line-height:16px; margin-bottom:0"
|- style="height:42px; background:#E9E9E9"
! style="width:130px" | Date(s)<br />conducted
! style="width:90px"  | Polling<br />firm
! style="width:65px"  | Sample size
! style="width:65px"  | Margin of error
! style="width:90px"  | Independence{{efn|Includes respondents who answered that they would like the ROC government to maintain the status quo at present but eventually work towards independence.}}
! style="width:90px"  | Unification{{efn|Includes respondents who answered that they would like the ROC government to maintain the status quo at present but eventually work towards unification with China.}}
! style="width:90px"  | Status quo
! style="width:90px"  | No opinion
! style="width:40px"  | Lead
|-
| 17–21 October 2019
| [[Mainland Affairs Council|MAC]]<ref>{{cite web | url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201910260005 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200429143143/https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201910260005 | archive-date=29 April 2020 | title=Over 27% of Taiwan people support independence: MAC poll - Focus Taiwan | date=26 October 2019 }}</ref>
| 1,073
| ±2.99 pp
| 27.7% || 10.3% || style="background:Yellow" | '''56.8%''' || 5.2% || style="background:Yellow" | '''29.1%'''
|-
| 21–24 November 2019
| [[CommonWealth Magazine (Taiwan)|CWM]]<ref>{{Cite web | title=Taiwan vs. Republic of China, the Brewing Generational Conflict｜Politics & Society｜2020-01-13｜CommonWealth Magazine | work=CommonWealth Magazine | url=https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=2636 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200311041542/https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=2636 | access-date=2025-08-18 | archive-date=2020-03-11}}</ref>
| 1,073
| ±2.99 pp
| 32% || 5.5% || style="background:Yellow" | '''58.1%''' || 4.4% || style="background:Yellow" | '''26.1%'''
|-
| 15–16 June 2020
| TPOF<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3951560 | title=Poll shows highest ever support for Taiwan independence &#124; Taiwan News &#124; Jun. 22, 2020 12:24 | date=22 June 2020 }}</ref>
| 1,074
| ±2.99 pp
| style="background:LightGreen" | '''54%''' || 12.5% || 23.4% || 10% || style="background:LightGreen" | '''30.6%'''
|-
| 8–9 August 2022
| TPOF<ref>{{Cite web| title=Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation | date=August 2022 | url=https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/20220816-TPOF-August-2022-Public-Opinion-Poll-–-English-Excerpt.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220816141546/https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/20220816-TPOF-August-2022-Public-Opinion-Poll-%E2%80%93-English-Excerpt.pdf | archive-date=2022-08-16}}</ref>
| 1,035
| ±3.05 pp
| style="background:LightGreen" | '''50%''' || 11.8% || 25.7% || 12.5% || style="background:LightGreen" | '''24.3%'''
|}

{{mw-datatable}}
{| class="wikitable mw-datatable" style="text-align:center; font-size:85%; line-height:16px; margin-bottom:0"
|- style="height:42px; background:#E9E9E9"
|+ Polls conducted by ESC, [[National Chengchi University|NCCU]] (1994–2024)<ref>{{cite web | url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 | title=Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2024/12) }}</ref>
! style="width:130px" | Year<br />conducted
! style="width:65px"  | Sample size
! style="width:90px"  | Independence as soon as possible
! style="width:90px"  | Maintain status quo, move toward independence
! style="width:90px"  | Maintain status quo, decide at a later date
! style="width:90px"  | Maintain status quo indefinitely
! style="width:90px"  | Maintain status quo, move toward unification
! style="width:90px"  | Unification as soon as possible
! style="width:90px"  | No opinion
|-
|1994
|1,209
|3.1%
|8.0%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''38.5%'''
|9.8%
|15.6%
|4.4%
|20.5%
|-
| 1995
| 21,402
| 3.5%
| 8.1%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''26.3%'''
| 15.6%
| 19.4%
| 2.3%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''26.3%'''
|-
|1996
|10,666
|4.1%
|9.5%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''30.5%'''
|15.3%
|19.5%
|2.5%
|18.6%
|-
|1997
|3,910
|5.7%
|11.5%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''30.5%'''
|16.3%
|17.3%
|3.2%
|15.4%
|-
|1998
|14,063
|5.7%
|11.5%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''30.3%'''
|15.9%
|15.9%
|2.1%
|18.7%
|-
|1999
|9,273
|4.7%
|13.6%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''30.9%'''
|18.8%
|15.2%
|2.2%
|15.2%
|-
| 2000
| 11,062
| 3.1%
| 11.6%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''29.5%'''
| 19.2%
| 17.3%
| 2.0%
| 17.4%
|-
|2001
|10,679
|3.7%
|10.5%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''35.9%'''
|16.4%
|17.5%
|2.8%
|10.5%
|-
|2002
|10,003
|4.3%
|13.8%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''36.2%'''
|15.0%
|15.7%
|2.5%
|12.4%
|-
|2003
|14,247
|6.2%
|14.5%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''35.0%'''
|18.0%
|11.9%
|1.8%
|12.5%
|-
|2004
|34,854
|4.4%
|15.2%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''36.5%'''
|20.9%
|10.6%
|1.5%
|11.0%
|-
| 2005
| 7,939
| 6.1%
| 14.2%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''37.3%'''
| 19.9%
| 12.3%
| 1.8%
| 8.5%
|-
|2006
|13,193
|5.6%
|13.8%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''38.7%'''
|19.9%
|12.1%
|2.0%
|7.9%
|-
|2007
|13,910
|7.8%
|13.7%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''36.8%'''
|18.4%
|10.0%
|1.9%
|11.4%
|-
|2008
|16,280
|7.1%
|16.0%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''35.8%'''
|21.5%
|8.7%
|1.5%
|9.4%
|-
|2009
|20,244
|5.8%
|15.0%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''35.1%'''
|26.2%
|8.5%
|1.3%
|8.1%
|-
| 2010
| 13,163
| 6.2%
| 16.2%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''35.9%'''
| 25.4%
| 9.0%
| 1.2%
| 6.1%
|-
|2011
|23,779
|4.6%
|15.6%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''33.8%'''
|27.4%
|8.8%
|1.5%
|8.2%
|-
|2012
|18,011
|4.8%
|15.1%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''33.9%'''
|27.7%
|8.7%
|1.7%
|8.1%
|-
|2013
|13,359
|5.7%
|17.2%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''32.6%'''
|26.3%
|9.2%
|1.9%
|7.2%
|-
|2014
|20,009
|5.9%
|18.0%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''34.3%'''
|25.2%
|7.9%
|1.3%
|7.3%
|-
| 2015
| 22,509
| 4.3%
| 17.9%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''34.0%'''
| 25.4%
| 8.1%
| 1.5%
| 8.8%
|-
|2016
|15,099
|4.6%
|18.3%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''33.3%'''
|26.1%
|8.5%
|1.7%
|7.4%
|-
|2017
|13,455
|5.1%
|17.2%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''33.1%'''
|25.3%
|10.1%
|2.3%
|6.9%
|-
|2018
|9,490
|5.0%
|15.1%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''33.4%'''
|24.0%
|12.8%
|3.1%
|6.6%
|-
|2019
|16,276
|5.1%
|21.8%
|style="background:LightGreen" |'''29.8%'''
|27.8%
|7.5%
|1.4%
|6.5%
|-
| 2020
| 11,490
| 6.6%
| 25.8%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''28.8%'''
| 25.5%
| 5.6%
| 1.0%
| 6.8%
|-
| 2021
| 12,026
| 6.0%
| 25.1%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''28.4%'''
| 27.3%
| 6.0%
| 1.4%
| 5.8%
|-
| 2022
| 12,173
| 5.2%
| 24.4%
| 27.7%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''29.4%'''
| 5.9%
| 1.3%
| 6.0%
|-
| 2023
| 14,933
| 3.8%
| 21.5%
| 27.9%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''33.2%'''
| 6.2%
| 1.2%
| 6.2%
|-
| 2024/06
| 6,151
| 3.8%
| 22.4%
| 27.3%
|style="background:LightGreen" | '''33.6%'''
| 5.5%
| 1.1%
| 6.3%
|}

== See also ==
{{Portal|Taiwan|China|Politics}}
* [[Four-Stage Theory of the Republic of China]]
* [[Foreign relations of Taiwan]]
* [[Taiwan independence Left]]
* [[History of the Republic of China]]
* [[China and the United Nations]]
* [[Taiwan Independence Revolutionary Armed Force]]
* [[Taiwan Revolutionary Party]]
* [[Three Communiqués]]
* [[Progressivism in Taiwan]]

== Notes ==
{{Notelist}}

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

== Further reading ==
{{Library resources box}}
{{refbegin}}
* Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007). ''A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America''. Wiley. {{ISBN|0-471-98677-1}}
* Bush, R. (2006). ''Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait''. Brookings Institution Press. {{ISBN|0-8157-1290-1}}
* Carpenter, T. (2006). ''America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan''. Palgrave Macmillan. {{ISBN|1-4039-6841-1}}
* Cole, B. (2006). ''Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects''. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-36581-3}}
* Copper, J. (2006). ''Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan''. Praeger Security International General Interest. {{ISBN|0-275-98888-0}}
* Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110428102539/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf |date=28 April 2011 }}
* Gill, B. (2007). ''Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy''. Brookings Institution Press. {{ISBN|0-8157-3146-9}}
* Manthorpe, Jonathan (2008). ''Forbidden Nation: a History of Taiwan''. Palgrave MacMillan. {{ISBN|1-4039-6981-7}}
* {{cite book |last=Shi |first=Ming |title=Taiwan's 400 Year History: The Origins and Continuing Development of the Taiwanese Society and People |title-link=Modern History of Taiwanese in 400 Years |date=1986 |publisher=Taiwanese Cultural Grassroots Association |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=9780939367009}}
* Shirk, S. (2007). ''China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise''. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-530609-0}}
* Tsang, S. (2006). ''If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics''. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-40785-0}}
* Tucker, N.B. (2005). ''Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis''. Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|0-231-13564-5}}
{{refend}}

{{Chinese Civil War}}
{{Cross-Strait relations}}
{{Foreign relations of the Republic of China (Taiwan)}}
{{Stateless nationalism in Asia}}
{{Ethnic nationalism}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Taiwan independence movement}}
[[Category:Taiwan independence movement| ]]
[[Category:Taiwanese nationalism]]
[[Category:Anti-imperialism in Asia]]
[[Category:Taiwan under Republic of China rule]]
[[Category:Independence movements]]
[[Category:Ideology of the Democratic Progressive Party]]
[[Category:Public policy proposals]]