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{{Short description|United States economic policy}}
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'''Strong dollar policy''' is [[Monetary policy of the United States|United States economic policy]] based on the assumption that a "strong" [[exchange rate]] of the [[United States dollar]] (meaning it takes fewer dollars to purchase the same amount of another currency) is in the interests of the [[United States]]. In 1971, [[United States Secretary of the Treasury|Treasury Secretary]] [[John Connally]] famously remarked how the US dollar was "our currency, but your problem,"<ref>{{Cite web |last=Atkins |first=Rory |date=2023-09-06 |title=The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem |url=https://corporatenetwork.com/the-dollar-is-our-currency-but-its-your-problem/ |access-date=2024-04-02 |website=EIU Corporate Network |language=en-GB}}</ref> referring to how the US dollar was managed primarily for the US' interests despite it being the currency primarily used in global trade and global finance. A strong dollar is recognized to have many benefits but also potential downsides. Domestically in the US, the policy keeps [[inflation]] low, encourages [[foreign portfolio investment|foreign investment]], and maintains the currency's role in the [[global financial system]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Twaronite|first=Lisa|url=http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-strong-dollar-policy-is-a-fairy-tale-that-sends-a-message?pagenumber=1|title=Strong dollar policy is useful fairy tale for U.S.|publisher=Marketwatch|date=29 January 2008|access-date=23 August 2011}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web |title=Strong Dollar: Advantages and Disadvantages |url=https://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/051415/pros-cons-strong-dollar.asp |access-date=2024-04-02 |website=Investopedia |language=en}}</ref> Globally, a strong dollar is thought to be harmful for the rest of the world.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-10-20 |title=Global Repercussions of the Strong Dollar {{!}} Econofact |url=https://econofact.org/global-repercussions-of-the-strong-dollar |access-date=2024-04-02 |website=econofact.org |language=en-US}}</ref> In financial markets, the strength of the dollar is measured in the "DXY Index" (sometimes named the "USDX index"), an index which measures the exchange rate of the dollar relative to other major currencies.<ref>{{Cite web |title=What Is the U.S. Dollar Index (USDX) and How to Trade It |url=https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/usdx.asp |access-date=2024-04-03 |website=Investopedia |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=DXY {{!}} U.S. Dollar Index (DXY) Overview {{!}} MarketWatch |url=https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/index/dxy |access-date=2024-04-03 |website=MarketWatch |language=en}}</ref>

== Background ==
=== What 'strong' vs. 'weak' dollar means ===
A stronger dollar benefits US importers as imports become relatively cheaper. It also benefits foreign exporters as they export products priced in dollars. Notably, a strong dollar harms US exporters as it makes exporting from the US less profitable. A stronger dollar also harms foreign importers as the cost of imports rises. When the dollar weakens, the opposite of what was just mentioned occurs.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago-Strong Dollar/Weak Dollar |url=http://faculty.nps.edu/relooney/3040_258.htm}}</ref><ref name=":4" />
{| class="wikitable"
|+Strong Dollar
!Advantages
!Disadvantages
|-
|Consumer sees lower prices on foreign product/service
|U.S. firms find it harder to compete in foreign markets
|-
|Lower prices on foreign products/services help keep inflation low
|U.S. firms must compete with lower priced foreign goods
|-
|U.S. consumers benefit when they travel to foreign countries
|Foreign tourists find it more expensive to visit the U.S.
|-
|U.S. investors can purchase foreign stocks/bonds at lower prices
|More difficult for foreign investors to provide capital to U.S. in times of heavy borrowing
|}
{| class="wikitable"
|+Weak Dollar
!Advantages
!Disadvantages
|-
|U.S. firms find it easier to sell goods in foreign markets
|Consumers face higher prices on foreign products/services
|-
|U.S. firms find less competitive pressure to keep prices low
|Higher prices on foreign products contribute to a higher cost-of-living
|-
|More foreign tourists can afford to visit the U.S.
|U.S. consumers find traveling abroad more costly
|-
|U.S. capital markets become more attractive to foreign investors
|It is harder for U.S. firms and investors to expand into foreign markets
|}

=== Status quo ===
{{See|International use of the U.S. dollar}}

Global use of the dollar results from the post-WW2 economic order where the United States came out of the war relatively unscathed unlike other developed nations at the time.<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |title=The Dollar: The World’s Reserve Currency |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dollar-worlds-reserve-currency |access-date=2024-04-02 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |language=en}}</ref> The dollar system as it is structured today originates from the [[Nixon shock|Nixon Shock]], when the former [[Bretton Woods system|Bretton Woods]] system ended. Global trust in the dollar results from the United States being the world's largest economy and having the most stable and liquid financial markets globally.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bertaut |first=Carol |last2=Beschwitz |first2=Bastian von |last3=Curcuru |first3=Stephanie |date=2021-10-06 |title=The International Role of the U.S. Dollar |url=https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-international-role-of-the-u-s-dollar-20211006.html |language=en}}</ref> Global demand of dollars results from most if not all trade globally being priced in dollars, meaning that countries must acquire dollars in order to import goods and countries collect dollars when they export goods. Additionally, the dollar plays a large role in global financial markets where there are many borrowers of dollars, contributing to global dollar demand.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Eren |first=Egemen |last2=Malamud |first2=Semyon |date=2022-05-01 |title=Dominant currency debt |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X21002932 |journal=Journal of Financial Economics |volume=144 |issue=2 |pages=571–589 |doi=10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.023 |issn=0304-405X}}</ref> As the global 'producer' of dollars, the United States plays an important global role by providing dollars (dollar liquidity) to the rest of the world in the form of financial assets that foreigners purchase, bringing money into US financial markets. This is beneficial for the US economy as it allows the US to borrow at more favorable rates than the rest of the world.<ref name=":5" /> The aforementioned factors help strengthen the dollar, all else equal. 
=== Exchange rate weapon ===
The term "exchange rate weapon" was introduced by Professor of International Economic Relations at the [[American University School of International Service|School of International Service]] at [[American University]] Randall Henning to describe the threat of manipulating the exchange rate of a strong country's currency with that of a weak country's currency, in order to extract policy adjustments from their governments and central banks.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Henning |first=C. Randall |title=International Monetary Power |date=2006 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-0-8014-4456-2 |editor1=David M. Andrews |pages=117–138 |chapter=The Exchange-Rate Weapon and Macroeconomic Conflict |jstor=10.7591/j.ctt1xx45w.11}}</ref> The strong dollar policy arose in response to the use of the exchange rate weapon.{{by whom|date=May 2020}}

== History ==

=== 1971–1973 ===
In spite of the [[Bretton Woods Conference|Bretton Woods agreement]], United States (U.S.) officials suspended gold convertibility and imposed a ten percent surcharge on imports in August 1971. This prompted the [[Smithsonian Agreement|G-10 Smithsonian Agreement]], a temporary agreement negotiated in 1971 among the ten leading developed nations in the world. The agreement pegged the [[Japanese yen]], the [[Deutsche Mark]], and the [[Pound sterling|British pound sterling]] and [[French franc]] at seventeen percent, fourteen percent, and nine percent, respectively, below the Bretton Woods parity.<ref>{{Cite web| title = Smithsonian Agreement of the Group of Ten.| url = https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/1971dec.html}}</ref> These proved unsustainable.<ref>{{Cite news| issn = 0261-3077| last = Keegan| first = William| title = William Keegan: Shock as continent cut adrift by Snow| work = The Guardian| date = 2004-11-21| url = https://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/nov/21/comment.economicpolicy}}</ref> Later in 1971, U.S. officials permanently floated the dollar; a second devaluation of the dollar against major currencies and a permanent “float” of major European currencies against the dollar followed in February 1973.<ref>{{Cite web| title = International Trade Negotiations| work = CQ Researcher by CQ Press| url = http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1976051400}}</ref> When the dollar fell in value, the U.S. did little to slow or reverse the fall; this dollar slump incentivized European and Japanese officials to deliver expansionary policies.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book| publisher = Peterson Institute for International Economics| isbn = 978-0-88132-712-0| last = Frankel| first = Jeffrey| title = International Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from the Plaza Accord after Thirty Years| chapter = The Plaza Accord 30 Years Later| date = 2016-04-07}}</ref>

=== 1977–1978 ===
In 1977 the Carter administration advocated and initiated the “locomotive theory”, which posits that big economies pull along their smaller brethren. Carter’s theory asked for concessions from the smaller countries to benefit the U.S. for the high price the U.S. has incurred for their benevolence after the 1973-75 recession.<ref>{{Cite journal| issn = 0043-2636| volume = 115| issue = 1| pages = 38–50| last = Bronfenbrenner| first = Martin| title = On the Locomotive Theory in International Macroeconomics| journal = Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv| date = 1979| jstor = 40438717| doi = 10.1007/BF02696340| s2cid = 154245012}}</ref> The American initiative met with staunch German and Japanese resistance at first. In response, U.S. authorities let it be known that they would allow the dollar to depreciate against the dissenting countries' currencies in the absence of [[Macroeconomics|macroeconomic]] stimuli.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.2307/2131223| issn = 0022-3816| volume = 47| issue = 3| pages = 1001–1004| last = Scheuerman| first = William| title = United States International Economic Policy in Action: Diversity of Decision Making. Stephen D. Cohen, Ronald I. Meltzer| journal = The Journal of Politics| date = 1985-08-01| jstor = 2131223}}</ref> Eventually, Japanese prime minister [[Takeo Fukuda]] agreed to the U.S. stimulus request in late 1977.<ref>{{Cite news| issn = 0190-8286| last = Rowen| first = Hobart| title = Japan Acts To Approve Stimulus| newspaper = Washington Post| date = 1978-09-02| url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1978/09/02/japan-acts-to-approve-stimulus/216d79f5-642d-42a8-9a64-2af46b54c569/}}</ref> A year later at the [[4th G7 summit|Bonn Economic Summit]] in July 1978, German Chancellor [[Helmut Schmidt]] acceded to [[Fiscal policy|expansionary fiscal policy]] as a part of a package of mutual concessions.<ref>{{Cite book| publisher = Springer Science & Business Media| isbn = 978-1-4615-5143-0| last = Iida| first = Keisuke| title = International Monetary Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, and Germany| date = 2012-12-06}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book| edition = 2nd| publisher = Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books| isbn = 978-0-669-05144-5| pages = [https://archive.org/details/copingwithusjapa00dest/page/243 243–70]| last1 = Destler| first1 = I. M.| last2 = Sato| first2 = Hideo| title = Coping with U.S.-Japanese economic conflicts| chapter = Locomotives on different tracks, macroeconomic diplomacy, 1977-1979| date = 1982| chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/copingwithusjapa00dest| url = https://archive.org/details/copingwithusjapa00dest/page/243}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book| edition = 1st| publisher = Brookings Institution Press| isbn = 978-0-8157-1178-0| pages = [https://archive.org/details/cannationsagreei0000unse/page/12 12–140]| last1 = Putnam| first1 = Robert D.| last2 = Henning| first2 = C. Randall| title = Can Nations Agree?| chapter = The Bonn Summit of 1978: A Case Study in Coordination| series = Issues in International Economic Cooperation| date = 1989| jstor = 10.7864/j.ctv80cd2w.5| chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/cannationsagreei0000unse/page/12}}</ref>

=== 1980–1985 ===
There was a twenty-six percent appreciation of the dollar between 1980 and 1984<ref>{{Cite web| last = Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)| title = Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Major Currencies| work = FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis| access-date = 2019-01-04| date = 1973-01-02| url = https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTWEXM}}</ref> as the result of a combination of tight monetary policy during the 1980-82 period under [[Chair of the Federal Reserve|Federal Reserve Chairman]] [[Paul Volcker]] and expansionary fiscal policy associated with [[Ronald Reagan|Ronald Reagan's]] administration during the 1982-84 period. The combination of these events pushed up Long-term interest rates, which in turn attracted a capital inflow and appreciated the U.S. dollar.<ref name=":1" /> The 1981-84 Reagan administration had an explicit policy of "benign neglect" toward the foreign exchange market.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book| publisher = Institute for International Economics| isbn = 978-0-88132-079-4| last1 = Destler| first1 = I. M.| last2 = Henning| first2 = C. Randall| title = Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States| date = 1989| url = https://archive.org/details/dollarpoliticsex0000dest}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book| edition = 2nd| publisher = Peterson Institute for Intl. Economics| isbn = 978-0-88132-097-8| last = Yoichi| first = Funabashi| title = Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre| location = Washington, D.C| date = 1989-03-01}}</ref> Some U.S. trade partners expressed concerns over the magnitude of the dollar's appreciation, advocating for intervention in the foreign exchange market in order to dampen such moves.<ref name=":1" /> However, Secretary of the Treasury [[Donald Regan]] and other administration officials rejected these notions, arguing that a strong dollar was a vote of confidence in the U.S. economy.<ref>{{Cite book| publisher = Springer| isbn = 978-3-319-41105-7| last = Sargen| first = Nicholas P.| title = Global Shocks: An Investment Guide for Turbulent Markets| date = 2016-10-05}}</ref> At the [[8th G7 summit|Versailles Summit]] of G-7 leaders in 1982, the U.S. agreed to the requests of other member nations to allow an expert study of the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions. The eponymous "Jurgenson Report", named after its lead researcher Phillipe Jurgenson, was submitted to the 1983 [[9th G7 summit|Williamsburg Summit]] where the requesting nations were disappointed that the findings did not support their advice.<ref>{{Citation| publisher = Federal Reserve| last1 = Henderson| first1 = Dale| last2 = Sampson| first2 = Stephanie| title = Intervention in Foreign Exchange Markets: A Summary of Ten Staff Studies.| date = 1983| url = https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/FRB/pages/1980-1984/32029_1980-1984.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite conference| publisher = National Bureau of Economic Research| last = Obstfeld| first = Maurice| title = The Effectiveness of Foreign-Exchange Intervention: Recent Experience| date = December 1988| url = http://www.nber.org/papers/w2796}}</ref><ref>{{Cite conference| publisher = s.n.| last = Jurgensen| first = Philippe| title = Report of the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention| location = s.l.| date = January 1983| url = https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/010584839}}</ref> Only slightly deterred, the [[Plaza Accord]]s in 1985 occurred. (The Plaza Accords were an impetus for the [[Group of Seven|G-7 Finance Ministers]] as the group of officials that had met in New York were the first officials for it.)<ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite book| edition = 1st| publisher = Northwestern University Press| isbn = 978-0-8101-2489-9| last1 = III| first1 = James A. Baker| last2 = Fiffer| first2 = Steve| title = Work Hard, Study . . . and Keep Out of Politics!| location = Evanston, Ill| date = 2008-06-02}}</ref> However, the U.S. began “talking down” the dollar further in order to encourage stimuli to domestic demand in Japan and Germany.<ref name=":0" />

=== 1990s ===
In 1992, following a [[Early 1990s recession|recession]] with a slow recovery and a delayed response in the labor markets, [[Bill Clinton|Bill Clinton's]] administration signaled the desirability of yen appreciation against the dollar: "I would like to see a stronger yen.”<ref>{{Cite news| issn = 0190-8286| title = THOSE MARKETS AREN'T CRAZY| newspaper = Washington Post| date = 1994-05-31| url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1994/05/31/those-markets-arent-crazy/ca27af03-a598-49e5-96da-1ebb35b9a200/}}</ref> Also, in February 1993, then-Treasury Secretary [[Lloyd Bentsen]] reiterated the position when he was asked if he'd like to see a weaker dollar.<ref>{{Cite news| issn = 0099-9660| last = Kilgore| first = Tomi| title = Stocks Shouldn't Blindly Follow Dollar's Guidance| work = Wall Street Journal| date = 2010-10-28| url = https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303362404575580223424648704}}</ref> These comments were to influence the USDJPY so as to protect against Japanese export-growth at the expense of the U.S. [[Current account (balance of payments)|current account position]].<ref name=":0" /> Afterwards, the dollar slumped against the yen, moving the yen to the 100 level against the dollar in the 1993 summer.<ref>{{Cite book| publisher = Springer| isbn = 978-1-4039-0710-3| last1 = Brown| first1 = B.| last2 = Aliber| first2 = Robert Z.| title = The Yo-Yo Yen: and the Future of the Japanese Economy| date = 2002-05-01}}</ref>

== Inception of the current policy ==
In 1995 in response to the ailing dollar, on 25 April the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors released a statement from their meeting in [[Washington, D.C.]] calling for the orderly appreciation of the dollar:<blockquote>“The ministers and governors expressed concerns about recent developments in exchange markets. They agreed that recent movements have gone beyond the levels justified by underlying economic conditions in the major countries. They also agreed that orderly reversal of those movements is desirable, would provide a better basis for the continued expansion of international trade and investment, and would contribute to our common objectives of sustained non-inflationary growth. They further agreed to strengthen their efforts in reducing internal and external imbalances and to continue to cooperate closely in exchange markets.”<ref>{{Cite web| title = UofT G8 Information Centre: G8 Finance Ministers' Meetings.| url = http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/g7dcfin.htm}}</ref></blockquote>Replacing Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen early in December 1994, [[Robert Rubin|Robert E. Rubin]] responded to the dollar’s depreciation with: “A strong dollar is in our national interest.”<ref>{{Cite news| title = Rubin: Strong dollar in national interest| work = UPI| date = 1995-03-03| url = https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/03/03/Rubin-Strong-dollar-in-national-interest/2559794206800/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news| issn = 0362-4331| last = Bradsher| first = Keith| title = CURRENCY MARKETS; Intervention No Help As Dollar Sinks Again| work = The New York Times| date = 1995-03-04| url = https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/04/business/currency-markets-intervention-no-help-as-dollar-sinks-again.html}}</ref> Thus, in 1995, Rubin re-set U.S. dollar policy, stating, in paraphrase: The strong-dollar policy is a U.S. government policy based on the assumption that a strong exchange rate of the dollar is both in the U.S. national interest and in the interest of the rest of the world.<ref>{{Cite web| last1 = Buiter| first1 = Willem| last2 = Rahbari| first2 = Ebrahim| title = The 'strong dollar' policy of the US: Alice-in-Wonderland semantics vs. economic reality| work = VoxEU.org| date = 2011-06-28| url = https://voxeu.org/article/strong-dollar-policy-us}}</ref> Rubin further emphasized that it “wouldn’t be used as a tool for trade."<ref>{{Cite news| last = Anstey| first = Chris| title = Mnuchin's Dollar Salvo Pales Against 1980s Currency War| work = Bloomberg| date = 2018-01-24| url = https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/rubin-de-weaponized-currencies-leaving-mnuchin-little-leeway}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book| edition = 1st| publisher = Routledge| isbn = 978-0-415-49896-8| last = Baker| first = Andrew| title = The Group of Seven: Finance Ministries, Central Banks and Global Financial Governance| location = London| date = 2006-01-22}}</ref> In essence, the strong dollar policy was seen as a way to assure investors that Washington would not intervene in exchange markets to debase the currency,<ref>{{Cite news| last1 = Wroughton| first1 = Lesley| last2 = Lange| first2 = Jason| title = U.S. 'strong dollar' policy in question| work = Reuters| date = 2018-01-24| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/global-forex-dollar-idUSL2N1PJ2EO}}</ref> a de-weaponization of the [[foreign exchange market]], as [[Marc Chandler]] says.<ref>{{Cite web| last = Chandler| first = Marc| title = The Dollar and Its Rivals| work = Marc to Market| format = Marctomarket.com| date = 2018-12-04| url = http://www.marctomarket.com/2018/12/the-dollar-and-its-rivals.html}}</ref> Robert Rubin’s motivation for introducing the strong dollar policy revolved around his desire to keep U.S. bond yields low, and to avoid criticism from trade partners that America was deliberately devaluing its currency to boost exports.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web| last = Davies| first = Gavyn| title = President Trump abandons the strong dollar policy| work = Financial Times| date = 2017-04-15| url = https://www.ft.com/content/d24b7283-ece9-3348-b50c-a5339a8e916d}}</ref> Initially, the rhetoric helped the dollar rise by thirty percent between 1995 and 2002, but some assert that this had more to do with U.S. [[Monetary policy|monetary tightening]] and the [[Dot-com bubble]] than any deliberate policy initiatives.<ref name=":3" /> Nevertheless, the dollar underwent an extraordinary revival since hitting lows in April 1995, rising more than 50 percent against the yen and nearly 20 percent against the mark by 1997 — with an appreciation of 7.5 percent against the yen and 8.7 percent against the mark from 1 January 1997 to 7 February 1997.<ref>{{Cite news| last = Blustein| first = Paul| title = Rubin Signals Shift to Curb Dollar's Rise| newspaper = The Washington Post| date = 1997-02-08| url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/govt/admin/stories/rubin020897.htm}}</ref>

== 21st century ==
Since its inception, the strong dollar policy has usually consisted as periodic statements by government officials insisting that the U.S. continues to pursue a strong dollar.<ref>{{Cite web| last = Klein| first = Ezra| title = What Larry Summers taught Christina Romer about the dollar - The Washington Post| work = Washingtonpost.com| format = .com| date = 2011-05-23| url = https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/what-larry-summers-taught-christina-romer-about-the-dollar/2011/05/19/AFSdci9G_blog.html?wprss=ezra-klein}}</ref> However, the status quo is not always adhered to. For example, during the [[World Economic Forum]] in [[Davos|Davos, Switzerland]], Secretary of the Treasury [[Steven Mnuchin]] was quoted saying "a weak dollar is good for U.S. trade",<ref>{{Cite news| last = Domm| first = Patti| title = Treasury secretary could clarify comment that caused dollar to tumble| work = CNBC| location = Online| date = 2018-01-24| url = https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/24/treasury-secretary-gets-a-do-over-to-clarify-u-s-stance-on-dollar.html}}</ref> which was an impetus for a one percent drop in the [[U.S. Dollar Index]] by six days later.

==See also==
*[[Dissolution of the Soviet Union]]
*[[Hard currency]]
*[[International use of the U.S. dollar]]
*[[Superdollar (economics)]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Strong Dollar Policy}}
[[Category:Foreign exchange market]]
[[Category:Commercial policy]]
[[Category:United States economic policy]]