View source for Separation of powers in Australia

{{Short description|Separation of powers in Australia set by the Constitution of Australia}}
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The '''separation of powers in Australia''' is the division of the institutions of the Australian government [[Separation of powers|into legislative, executive and judicial branches]]. This concept is where legislature makes the laws, the executive put the laws into operation, and the judiciary interprets the laws; all independently of each other. The term, and its occurrence in Australia, is due to the text and structure of the Australian Constitution, which derives its influences from democratic concepts embedded in the [[Westminster system]], the doctrine of "''responsible government''" and the United States version of the separation of powers. However, due to the conventions of the Westminster system, a strict separation of powers is not always evident in the [[Politics of Australia|Australian political system]], with little separation between the executive and the legislature, with the executive required to be drawn from, and maintain the confidence of, the legislature; a fusion.<ref name=Hilton>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Hilton v Wells]]|court=HCA|num=16|year=1985|parallelcite=(1985) 157 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 57 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> 

The first three chapters of the [[Australian Constitution]] are headed respectively "The Parliament", "The Executive Government", and "The Judicature". Each of these chapters begins with a section by which the relevant "power of the Commonwealth" is "vested" in the appropriate persons or bodies. On the other hand, the Constitution incorporates [[responsible government]], in which the legislature and the executive are effectively united. This incorporation is reflected in sections 44, 62 and 64 of the Constitution.

==Legislature and executive==

Currently in Australia, there is no constitutional system where there is a complete separation of powers.<ref>{{cite web |author=Carney, G |title=Separation of Powers in the Westminster System |url=https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/aspg/papers/930913.pdf |publisher=ASPG (Qld Chapter) |year=1993 |access-date=8 March 2017}}</ref> In the Westminster system, ministers (executive) are required to sit in Parliament (legislative). This is to adhere with the concept of Responsible Government, which is a requirement of [[Section 64 of the Constitution of Australia|section 64 of the Constitution]].<ref name="s64">{{Cite Legislation AU|Cth|act|coaca430|Constitution|64}} Ministers of State.</ref>

The specific requirement for ministers to sit in Parliament established the connection between executive and legislative, though any person may be appointed a Minister, their appointment lapses if they do not gain a seat in either house of the Parliament within three months. This provision was necessary in 1901, as the first government was sworn in on 1 January but the first parliament was not elected until late March (see [[1901 Australian federal election]]). However, the provision is still relevant, such as the appointment of [[Bob Carr]] as Foreign Minister in 2012 prior to his appointment to the Senate. It also applies when a minister in the [[Australian House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] loses their seat at a general election; despite no longer being a member of parliament, the Minister will typically retain their portfolio for some days after the election, until the new government is sworn in. It also applied when [[John Gorton]] became Prime Minister in 1968; he was sworn in while a member of the [[Australian Senate|Senate]], then he resigned to contest a by-election for a lower house seat, which he won, but between his resignation from the Senate and being elected to the House of Representatives, he remained Prime Minister without holding any seat in Parliament.

In ''[[Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan]]'', the [[High Court of Australia]] held that it was impossible, consistent with the British tradition, to insist upon a strict separation between legislative and executive powers.<ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan]]|court=HCA|num=34|year=1931|parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1931/34.pdf (1931) 467 CLR 73] |courtname=auto}}, see also {{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Roche v Kronheimer]]|court=HCA|num=25|year=1921|parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1921/25.pdf (1921) 29 CLR 329] |courtname=auto}}</ref> It was found that legislative power may be delegated to the executive, and as a result upheld the validity of [[delegated legislation]]. By contrast, in its insistence on a strict separation of "judicial power", the High Court has been less willing to compromise.<ref name=Kable>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)]]|court=HCA|num=24|year=1996|parallelcite=(1996) 189 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 51 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> Furthermore, the role of the courts was discussed in ''[[Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)]]'', whereby a NSW statute was invalidated since it purported to confer not-judicial functions to court.{{r|Kable}}<ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Kirk v Industrial Court of NSW]]|court=HCA|num=1|year=2010|parallelcite=(2010) 239 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 531 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> The principle that a State Court cannot be assigned powers that are incompatible with its constitutionally protected independence was extended to Territory Courts in ''Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy'' (2000).<ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy]]|court=HCA|num=63|year=2000|parallelcite=(2000) 205 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 337 |courtname=auto}}.</ref>

The legislature can allocate the executive some of its powers, such as of the making of regulations under an Act passed by Parliament. Similarly, the legislature could restrict or over-rule some powers held by the executive by passing new laws to that effect, though these could be subject to [[judicial review]].

The exceptionally strong [[party discipline]] in Australia, especially in the lower house, has had the effect of weakening scrutiny of the executive by the legislature since within the lower house, every member of the numerically larger party will almost always support the executive and its propositions on all issues.

On the other hand, the [[Australian Senate|Senate]] has had the effect of restraining the power of the executive through its ability to query, amend and block government legislation. The result of the adoption of a proportional system of voting in 1949 has been that the Senate in recent decades has rarely been controlled by governments. Minor parties have gained greater representation and Senate majorities on votes come from a coalition of groups on a particular issue, usually after debate by the Opposition and Independents.

The Constitution does, moreover, provide for one form of physical separation of executive and legislature. Section 44, concerning the disqualifications applying to membership of Parliament, excludes from Parliament government employees (who hold "an office of profit under the crown" (iv)) along with people in certain contractual arrangements with the Commonwealth. This was demonstrated in 1992 after Independent MP, Phil Cleary, had won the Victorian seat of Wills. Cleary, on leave without pay from the Victorian Education Department at the time of his election, was held in ''[[Sykes v Cleary]]'' to be holding an office of profit under the Crown and disqualified. The Court noted that that Section 44's intention was to separate executive influence from the legislature.<ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Sykes v Cleary]]|court=HCA|num=60|year=1992|parallelcite=(1992) 176 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 77 |courtname=auto}}.</ref>

==Judiciary==
{{Main| Chapter III Court}}

As early as [[New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915)|New South Wales v Commonwealth]] (''The Wheat Case''), the High Court decided that the strict insulation of judicial power was a fundamental principle of the Constitution.<ref name="Wheat Case">{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915)|New South Wales v Commonwealth]]|court=HCA|num=17|year=1915|parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1915/17.pdf (1915) 20 CLR 54] |courtname=auto}}.</ref><ref name="Boilermakers">{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia]]|year=1956|court=HCA|num=10|parallelcite=(1956) 94 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 254 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> This also applies to tribunals and commissions set up by Federal Parliament which, unlike some of their equivalents in the states, can only recommend consequences. The Federal Parliament itself has the rarely used privilege of being able to act as a court in some circumstances, primarily where it may regard a non-member as acting "in contempt" of parliament.

The reasoning in the ''Wheat Case'' was taken further in ''[[Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd]]'' where a decisive distinction between judicial and arbitral functions was drawn.<ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd]]|court=HCA|num=56|year=1918|parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1918/56.pdf (1918) 25 CLR 434] |courtname=auto}}</ref> The High Court made reference to the separation of powers again in [[R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia]] (''Boilermakers' Case''), highlighting that only a Chapter III Court can exercise judicial powers and, that a Chapter III Court is only permitted to exercise judicial power.<ref name="Boilermakers"/>

A consequence of the Australian version of the separation of powers is its role in encouraging judicial deference to the "political" arms of government. The normal propensity of the High Court is to recognise that separation of powers requires not only that the "political branches" should not interfere with judicial activity, but also that the judiciary should leave politicians and administrators alone. The importance of deference has been acknowledged in extrajudicial writings, and in decisions such as [[Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs|''Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 2)'']].<ref>{{cite AustLII|AATA|179|1979|litigants=Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) |link=Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs |parallelcite=(1979) 11 {{abbr|FLR|Federal Law Reports}} 203 |courtname=auto}}.</ref>

As a manifestation of the separation of powers, a '[[Chapter III Court]]' cannot make administrative decisions. In administrative law this means that the courts cannot substitute an original decision of the executive, but can only decide on its correctness.<ref>{{cite bailii|litigants=[[Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp]] |court=EWCA|num=1|year=1947|parallelcite=[1948] 1 KB 223 |courtname=auto}}.</ref>

The doctrine of ''[[persona designata]]'' permits non-judicial functions to be conferred on judges in their personal capacity, as opposed to their judicial capacity.{{r|Hilton}}<ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Grollo v Palmer]]|court=HCA|num=26|year=1995|parallelcite=(1995) 184 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 348 |courtname=auto}}.</ref><ref>
{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Wainohu v New South Wales]]|court=HCA|num=24|year=2011|parallelcite=(2011) 243 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 181 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> However, in ''[[Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs|Hindmarsh Island Bridge case]]'', it was held that this is subject to the compatibility of the conferred non-judicial function with judicial office.<ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Affairs]] |court=HCA |num=18 |year=1996 |parallelcite=(1996) 189 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 1 |courtname=auto}}.</ref>

==Prevalence in States==

While there are strong textual and structural bases for the independence of the judiciary in the Commonwealth Constitution, the same is not true of the State constitutions. State courts, unlike their federal counterparts, are therefore capable of exercising non-judicial functions.{{r|Kable}} For example, the [[District Court of South Australia]], through its Administrative and Disciplinary Division, conducts merits review of administrative decisions, a function which at Commonwealth level can only be exercised by Executive tribunals. Nevertheless, a degree of judicial independence is maintained at State level by convention.

The federal separation of powers also has implications for State courts, due to the fact that State courts may be invested with federal judicial power under section 71 of the ''Commonwealth Constitution''. On this basis it was held in ''Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)'' that a State court could not be given a function inconsistent with its status as a potential repository of federal judicial power.{{r|Kable}} The doctrine was rarely applied in the early years following Kable, leading Justice Kirby to describe it as "a constitutional guard-dog that would bark but once."<ref>{{cite AustLII |litigants=Baker v R |year=2004 |court=HCA |num=45 |parallelcite=(2004) 223 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 513 at [54] per Kirby J  |courtname=auto}}.</ref> However, there has been a revival in the High Court's application of the doctrine since 2009.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Appleby, G |title=The High Court and Kable: A Study in Federalism and Rights Protection |journal=Monash University Law Review |year=2014 |url=http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MonashULawRw/2014/27.html}} (2015) 40 [[Monash University Law Review]] 673.</ref> One recent case was ''[[South Australia v Totani]],''<ref name="totani">{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[South Australia v Totani]]|court=HCA|num=39|year=2010|parallelcite=(2010) 242 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 1 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> which involved a challenge to the validity of the ''Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008'' (SA).<ref>{{cite Legislation AU|SA|num_act|saoca200813o2008398|Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008|14}}.</ref> Section 14(1) of the Act required members of the [[Magistrates' Court of South Australia]] to make control orders on application by the Commissioner of Police, provided only that the Magistrate was satisfied that the person subject to the control order was a member of a declared organisation. Even though the functions of the Magistrates' Court under the Act are purely a matter of South Australian law, the fact that the Court is also capable of exercising federal jurisdiction was held to require that it maintain certain standards of independence and impartiality so that it retain the character of a court.

Parliamentary scrutiny of the executive and, in particular, by the [[New South Wales Legislative Council]], was tested in the 1990s when Treasurer [[Michael Egan (Australian politician)|Michael Egan]], on behalf of [[Executive Council of New South Wales|Cabinet]], refused to table documents in the Legislative Council of which he was a member. The Council, determined to exercise its scrutiny of the executive, pressed the issues and eventually adjudged the Treasurer in contempt, suspending him from the house twice. The matters were disputed in three cases in the [[High Court of Australia|High Court]] and the [[Supreme Court of New South Wales]]. The results upheld that principle that the Legislative Council does have the power to order the production of documents by a member of the House, including a minister, and can counter obstruction.<ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=Egan v Willis and Cahill|court=NSWCA|num=583|year=1996|parallelcite=(1996) 40 [[NSW Law Reports|NSWLR]] 650 |courtname=auto}}.</ref><ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Egan v Willis]]|court=HCA|num=71|year=1998|parallelcite=(1998) 95 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 424 |courtname=auto}}.</ref><ref>{{cite AustLII|litigants=Egan v Chadwick|court=NSWCA|num=176|year=1999|parallelcite=(1999) 46 [[NSW Law Reports|NSWLR]] 563 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> However, the extent of the Legislative Council's power in relation to [[Cabinet of Australia|Cabinet]] documents remains unclear.

In 2018 the High Court held that all matters falling within [[Section 75 of the Constitution of Australia|section 75]],<ref name="s75">{{cite Legislation AU|Cth|act|coaca430|Constitution|75}} Original jurisdiction of High Court.</ref> and [[Section 76 of the Constitution of Australia|section 76]],<ref name="s76">{{cite Legislation AU|Cth|act|coaca430|Constitution|76}} Additional original jurisdiction.</ref> of the Constitution formed part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, including a dispute between the residents of different States. It followed that the federal separation of powers meant that a State tribunal was unable to determine a dispute between residents of different States.<ref name="Burns v Corbett">{{cite AustLII|HCA|15|2018|litigants=Burns v Corbett |parallelcite=}} {{citation |url=http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/judgment-summaries/2018/hca-15-2018-04-18.pdf |title=Judgment summary |publisher=[[High Court of Australia|High Court]]}}</ref>

==Prevalence in Territories==

One of the bases for the separation of powers in the Constitution is that the powers of the Parliament are found in [[Chapter I of the Constitution of Australia|Chapter I]], executive powers are in [[Chapter II of the Constitution of Australia|Chapter II]] and judicial powers are in [[Chapter III Court|Chapter III]]. In 1915 it had been held that the separation of powers precluded the exercise of judicial power by the [[Inter-State Commission]], provided for at [[Section 101 of the Constitution of Australia|section 101]],<ref name="s101">{{cite Legislation AU|Cth|act|coaca430|Constitution|101}} Inter‑State Commission.</ref> in Chapter IV Finance and Trade.<ref name="Wheat Case"/> The power to make laws for the government of the territories is found in [[Section 122 of the Constitution of Australia|section 122]],<ref name="s122">{{cite Legislation AU|Cth|act|coaca430|Constitution|122}} Government of territories.</ref> located in Chapter VI New States. How section 122 relates to Chapter III is "a problem of interpretation ... which has vexed judges and commentators since the earliest days of Federation"<ref>{{cite AustLII|HCA|44|1999|litigants=Re The Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte Eastman |parallelcite=(1999) 200 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 322 at p. 332 [9] |date=2 September 1999 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> Three of the six judges in the ''[[Kruger v Commonwealth|Stolen Generations case]]'',<ref name="1997 HCA 27">{{cite AustLII|HCA|27|1997|litigants=[[Kruger v Commonwealth]] |parallelcite=(1997) 190 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 1 |courtname=auto}} per Brennan CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ.</ref> held that the separation of powers doctrine did not apply to the power to make laws for a territory under section 122 of the Constitution. The High Court went on to hold in 2004 that federal jurisdiction can be invested by the Australian Parliament in a Territory court as well as in a State court.<ref>{{cite AustLII|HCA|31|2004|litigants=North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley |parallelcite=(2004) 218 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 146 |courtname=auto}}.</ref> In 2015 the question was again considered by the High Court where Gageler J,<ref name="2015 HCA 41">{{cite AustLII|HCA|41|2015|litigants=North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Limited v Northern Territory |parallelcite=(2015) 256 [[Commonwealth Law Reports|CLR]] 569 |courtname=auto}}.</ref>{{rp|at [118]}} and Keane J,<ref name="2015 HCA 41"/>{{rp|at [161]}} held that the power under section 122 was not constrained by the doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in Chapter III of the Constitution. Keane J similarly held . The other members of the Court, French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ,<ref name="2015 HCA 41"/>{{rp|at [46]}} and Nettle and Gordon JJ,<ref name="2015 HCA 41"/>{{rp|at [194]}} found it was unnecessary to answer the question.

== References ==
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{{Separation of powers}}

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[[Category:Australian constitutional law]]
[[Category:Separation of Powers in the Australian Constitution cases]]
[[Category:Separation of powers|Australia]]