View source for SWIFT

{{Short description|Financial telecommunication network}}
{{Other uses||Swift (disambiguation){{!}}Swift}}
{{Use Oxford spelling|date=November 2022}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2020}}
{{Infobox company
| name = S.W.I.F.T. SC
| logo = SWIFT 2023 logo.svg
| type = [[Cooperative society]]<ref>{{cite web |title=CBE Public Search |url=https://kbopub.economie.fgov.be/kbopub/toonondernemingps.html?lang=en&ondernemingsnummer=413330856 |website=kbopub.economie.fgov.be |publisher=FPS Economy, SMEs, Self-Employed and Energy |access-date=27 February 2022}}</ref>
| key_people = {{ubl|Javier Perez-Tasso ([[CEO]])|Graeme Munro (Board Chair)}}
| foundation = {{start date and age|1973|5|3|df=yes}}
| location = {{Unbulleted list|[[La Hulpe]], [[Belgium]]|{{Coord|50|44|04|N|4|28|43|E|type:landmark_region:BE-WBR_source:kolossus-frwiki|display=title,inline}}}}
| num_employees = >3000
| industry = [[Telecommunications]]
| products = [[SWIFT message types|Financial telecommunication]]
| homepage = {{URL|https://swift.com}}
}}
{{Banking |transfer}}
The '''Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication''' ('''SWIFT'''), legally '''S.W.I.F.T. SC''', is a [[cooperative]] established in 1973 in [[Belgium]] ({{langx|fr|Société Coopérative}}) and owned by the banks and other member firms that use its service. SWIFT provides the main messaging network through which international payments are initiated.<ref name=ScottZachariadis>{{Cite book |last1=Scott |first1=Susan V. |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-mono/10.4324/9781315849324/society-worldwide-interbank-financial-telecommunication-swift-susan-scott-markos-zachariadis |title=The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (Swift) : cooperative governance for network innovation, standards, and community |last2=Zachariadis |first2=Markos |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-317-90952-1 |location=New York, NY |pages=1, 35 |doi=10.4324/9781315849324 |oclc=862930816}}</ref> It also sells software and services to financial institutions, mostly for use on its proprietary "SWIFTNet", and assigns [[ISO 9362]] Business Identifier Codes (BICs), popularly known as "SWIFT codes".

As of 2018, around half of all high-value cross-border payments worldwide used the SWIFT network,<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Arnold |first=Martin |date=6 June 2018 |title=Ripple and Swift slug it out over cross-border payments |url=https://www.ft.com/content/631af8cc-47cc-11e8-8c77-ff51caedcde6 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190927142951/https://www.ft.com/content/631af8cc-47cc-11e8-8c77-ff51caedcde6 |archive-date=27 September 2019 |access-date=28 October 2019 |website=[[Financial Times]]}}</ref> and in 2015, SWIFT linked more than 11,000 financial institutions in over 200 countries and territories, who were exchanging an average of over 32&nbsp;million messages per day (compared to an average of 2.4&nbsp;million daily messages in 1995).<ref>{{Cite web |date=9 March 2010 |title=Swift Company Information |url=http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information/index.page?lang=en |access-date=7 December 2016 |publisher=SWIFT |archive-date=22 December 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081222103757/http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information/index.page?lang=en |url-status=dead }}</ref>

SWIFT is headquartered in [[La Hulpe]] near [[Brussels]]. It hosts an annual conference, called [[Sibos (conference)|Sibos]], specifically aimed at the [[financial services]] industry.

== History ==

Before SWIFT's establishment, international financial transactions were communicated over [[Telex]], a public system involving manual writing and reading of messages.<ref>{{cite book| url = https://books.openedition.org/iheid/323| title = Annex 1: The History and Detailed Functioning of SWIFT| series = ECahiers de l'Institut| date = 6 September 2011| publisher = Graduate Institute Publications| isbn = 9782940415731}}</ref> SWIFT was set up out of fear of what might happen if a single private and fully American entity controlled global financial flows – which before was [[First National City Bank]] (FNCB) of New York – later Citibank. In response to FNCB's protocol, FNCB's competitors in the US and Europe pushed an alternative "messaging system that could replace the public providers and speed up the payment process".<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Farrell |first1=Henry |last2=Newman |first2=Abraham L. |date=July 2019 |title=Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion |url=https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/44/1/42-79/12237 |journal=International Security |language=en |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=42–79 |doi=10.1162/isec_a_00351 |s2cid=198952367 |issn=0162-2889|doi-access=free }}</ref>

SWIFT was founded in [[Brussels]] on 3 May 1973. Individuals who played a key role in its creation included bankers Jan Kraa (at [[AMRO Bank]]) and François Dentz (at the [[Banque de l'Union Parisienne]]) as well as [[Carl Reuterskiöld]] and [[Bessel Kok]], who became respectively its first two chairmen and chief executives.{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=14-16}} It was initially supported by 239 banks in 15 countries. It soon started to establish common standards for financial transactions and a shared data processing system and worldwide communications network designed by [[Logica]] and developed by the [[Burroughs Corporation]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Logica history |url=http://www.logica.com/we-are-logica/about-logica/history-and-key-milestones/ |access-date=8 February 2012 |archive-date=20 October 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111020113048/http://www.logica.com/we-are-logica/about-logica/history-and-key-milestones/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> Fundamental operating procedures and rules for [[legal liability|liability]] were established in 1975, and the first message was ceremonially sent by [[Albert II of Belgium|Prince Albert of Belgium]] on {{date|1977/05/09}}.{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=19}}

SWIFT's first non-European operations centre was inaugurated by Governor [[John N. Dalton]] of Virginia in 1979.<ref name="swiftobituary">{{Cite web |date=March 2006 |title=Carl Reuterskiöld |url=http://www.swift.com/about_swift/press_room/swift_news_archive/home_page_stories_archive_2006/61159/carl_reuterski_ld.page? |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120124174712/http://www.swift.com/about_swift/press_room/swift_news_archive/home_page_stories_archive_2006/61159/carl_reuterski_ld.page |archive-date=2012-01-24 |access-date=7 September 2012 |publisher=SWIFT}}</ref> In 1989 SWIFT completed a monumental new head office building in [[La Hulpe]], designed by [[Ricardo Bofill Taller de Arquitectura]].<ref>{{Cite book |title=Ricardo Bofill Taller de Arquitectura: Architecture in the era of local culture and international experience |date=2009 |publisher=RBTA |editor-last=Serena Vergano |page=130}}</ref>

==Ownership and governance==

SWIFT's shareholding structure is adjusted every three years in proportion to volumes of activity incurred by the members, ensuring that the most active members get the most voice irrespective of geography; additional rules are aimed at ensuring some geographical diversity within the board of directors. The 25 directors are elected by the shareholders, on three-year terms with the renewal of one-third of the board every year; all directors are member representatives.{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=30-31}}

As of May 2024, the members directly represented on the board of directors were [[JPMorgan Chase]] (chair), [[Lloyds Bank]] (deputy chair), [[Bank of China]], [[BNP Paribas]], [[Groupe BPCE|BPCE]], [[Citigroup|Citi]], [[Clearstream]], [[Commerzbank]], [[Commonwealth Bank]], [[Deutsche Bank]], [[Euroclear]], [[FirstRand]], [[HSBC]], [[ING Group|ING]], [[Intesa Sanpaolo]], [[KBC Group|KBC]], [[MUFG]], [[NatWest]], [[Nordea]], [[Royal Bank of Canada]], [[Banco Santander|Santander]], [[SEB Group|SEB]], [[UBS]] (2 representatives following the acquisition of [[Credit Suisse]]), as well as the Association of Banks in Singapore.<ref>{{cite web |website=SWIFT |url=https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance/swift-board-directors |title=The Swift Board of Directors}}</ref>

==Operations==
{{More citations needed section|date=July 2025}}
[[File:SWIFT 2021 logo.svg|thumb|SWIFT logo before 2023]]
SWIFT acts as a carrier of the "messages containing the payment instructions between financial institutions involved in a transaction".{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=35}}<ref name=":2">{{Cite news |last1=Kowsmann |first1=Patricia |last2=Talley |first2=Ian |date=2022-02-26 |title=What Is Swift and Why Is It Being Used to Sanction Russia? |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/swift-banking-system-sanctions-biden-11645745909 |access-date=2022-02-27 |issn=}}</ref> However, the organisation does not manage accounts on behalf of individuals or financial institutions, and it does not hold funds from third parties.{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=1-2}} It also does not perform [[Clearing (finance)|clearing]] or [[Settlement (finance)|settlement]] functions.{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=1-2, 35}}<ref name=":2" /> After payment has been initiated, it must be settled through a [[payment system]], such as [[T2 (RTGS)|T2]] in Europe.{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=36}} In the context of cross-border transactions, this step often takes place through [[Correspondent account|correspondent banking accounts]] that financial institutions have with each other.{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=35}}

SWIFT means several things in the financial world: 
# a [[Secure transmission|secure network]] for transmitting messages between financial institutions;
# a set of syntax standards for financial messages (for transmission over SWIFTNet or any other network)
# a set of connection software and services allowing financial institutions to transmit messages over SWIFT network.

Under 3 above, SWIFT provides [[turnkey|turn-key]] solutions for members, consisting of [[Client (computing)|linkage clients]] to facilitate connectivity to the SWIFT network and [[Graphical user interface|CBTs or "computer-based terminals"]] which members use to manage the delivery and receipt of their messages. Some of the more well-known interfaces and CBTs provided to their members are:

* SWIFTNet Link (SNL) software which is installed on the SWIFT customer's site and opens a connection to SWIFTNet. Other applications can only communicate with SWIFTNet through the SNL.
* Alliance Gateway (SAG) software with interfaces (e.g., RAHA = Remote Access Host Adapter), allowing other software products to use the SNL to connect to SWIFTNet
* Alliance WebStation (SAB) desktop interface for SWIFT Alliance Gateway with several usage options:
*# administrative access to the SAG
*# direct connection SWIFTNet by the SAG, to administrate SWIFT Certificates
*# so-called Browse connection to SWIFTNet (also by SAG) to use additional services, for example, the Eurosystem's T2
* Alliance Access (SAA) and Alliance Messaging Hub (AMH) are the main messaging software applications by SWIFT, which allow message creation for [[ISO 15022|FIN messages]], routing and monitoring for FIN and [[ISO 20022|MX messages]]. The main interfaces are FTA (files transfer automated, not FTP) and MQSA, a [[WebSphere MQ]] interface.
* The Alliance Workstation (SAW) is the desktop software for administration, monitoring and FIN message creation. Since Alliance Access is not yet capable of creating MX messages, Alliance Messenger (SAM) has to be used for this purpose.
* Alliance Web Platform (SWP) as new thin-client desktop interface provided as an alternative to the existing Alliance WebStation, Alliance Workstation (soon){{when|date=April 2018}} and Alliance Messenger.
* Alliance Integrator is built on [[Oracle Corporation|Oracle]]'s [[Java Caps]] which enables customer's back-office applications to connect to Alliance Access or Alliance Entry.
* Alliance Lite2 is a secure and reliable, cloud-based way to connect to the SWIFT network which is a light version of Alliance Access specifically targeting customers with low volume of traffic.

===Services===
There are four key areas that SWIFT services fall under in the financial marketplace: [[Security (finance)|securities]], [[treasury]] & [[Derivative (finance)|derivatives]], trade services, and payments & cash management.

{{col-begin}}
{{col-4}}
'''Securities'''
* SWIFTNet FIX (obsolete)
* SWIFTNet Data Distribution
* SWIFTNet Funds
* SWIFTNet Accord for Securities (''end of life October 2017'')<ref name="swift.com">{{Cite web |date=26 November 2015 |title=Accord |url=https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/a-to-z/accord |access-date=15 August 2016 |archive-date=26 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160826055927/https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/a-to-z/accord |url-status=dead }}</ref>
{{col-4}}
'''Treasury and derivatives'''
* SWIFTNet Accord for Treasury (''end of life October 2017'')<ref name="swift.com" />
* SWIFTNet Affirmations
* SWIFTNet CLS Third Party Service
{{col-4}}
'''Cash management'''
* SWIFTNet Bulk Payments
* SWIFTNet Cash Reporting
* SWIFTNet Exceptions and Investigations
{{col-4}}
'''Trade services'''
* SWIFTNet [[Trade Services Utility]]
{{col-end}}

SWIFT Ref, the global payment reference data utility, is SWIFT's unique reference data service. SWIFT Ref sources data directly from data originators, including central banks, code issuers and banks making it easy for issuers and originators to maintain data regularly and thoroughly. SWIFTRef constantly validates and cross-checks data across the different data sets.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.surecomp.com/value-added.html|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20180328002738/http://www.surecomp.com:80/value-added.html|archivedate=28 March 2018|title=Value-Added Alliances|website=Surecomp}}</ref>

===Operations centres===
The SWIFT secure messaging network is run from three [[data centre]]s, located in the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. These centres share information in [[Real-time computing|near real-time]]. In case of a failure in one of the data centres, another is able to handle the traffic of the complete network. SWIFT uses [[submarine communications cable]]s to transmit its data.<ref name="harvard">{{Cite web |last=Sechrist |first=Michael |date=23 March 2010 |title=Cyberspace in Deep Water: Protecting Undersea Communication Cables By Creating an International Public-Private Partnership |url=https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/PAE_final_draft_-_043010.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180312083233/https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/PAE_final_draft_-_043010.pdf |archive-date=2018-03-12 |url-status=live |publisher=[[Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs]] |quote=For example, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), which describes itself as "the global provider of secure financial messaging services", uses undersea fiber-optic communications cables to transmit financial data between 208 countries}}</ref>

Shortly after opening its third data centre in Switzerland in 2009,<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 September 2008 |title=SWIFT: SIBOS issues |publisher=SWIFT |url=http://www.swift.com/sibos2008/sibos_2008_learn_discuss_debate/sibos_issues/Sibos_Issues_20080916.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151107043453/http://www.swift.com/sibos2008/sibos_2008_learn_discuss_debate/sibos_issues/Sibos_Issues_20080916.pdf |archive-date=7 November 2015}} p. 12.</ref> SWIFT introduced a new distributed architecture with two messaging zones, European and Trans-Atlantic, so data from European SWIFT members no longer mirrored the US data centre.<ref>{{Cite news |date=6 June 2008 |title=Distributed architecture |publisher=SWIFT |url=http://www.swift.com/products_services/industry_initiatives/distributed_architecture |access-date=31 August 2013 |archive-date=17 August 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130817100653/http://www.swift.com/products_services/industry_initiatives/distributed_architecture/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> European zone messages are stored in the Netherlands and in part of the Swiss operating centre; Trans-Atlantic zone messages are stored in the United States and in another part of the Swiss operating centre that is segregated from the European zone messages. Countries outside of Europe were by default allocated to the Trans-Atlantic zone but could choose to have their messages stored in the European zone.
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Data centres
! SN
! SWIFT data centres
! Type
|-
| 1
| [[Zoeterwoude]], [[Netherlands]]
| OPC (Operating Centre)
|-
| 2
| [[Culpeper, Virginia]], [[United States]]
| OPC (Operating Centre)
|-
|3
| [[Diessenhofen]], [[Switzerland]]<ref>Multiple sources:

* {{Cite web |last=Ritter |first=Dieter |title=Startschuss für Rechenzentrum |url=https://www.tagblatt.ch/ostschweiz/frauenfeld-munchwilen/startschuss-fuer-rechenzentrum-ld.961906 |access-date=2022-02-16 |website=[[St.Galler Tagblatt]] |date=15 March 2013 |language=de}}
* {{Cite news |title=Das Daten-Fort-Knox am Rhein |language=de |work=[[Tages-Anzeiger]] |url=https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/wirtschaft/das-datenfortknox-am-rhein/story/13175743 |access-date=2022-02-16 |issn=1422-9994}}
* {{Cite web |last=Hettich |first=Barbara |title=Swift: Der Rohbau steht |url=https://www.tagblatt.ch/ostschweiz/frauenfeld-munchwilen/swift-der-rohbau-steht-ld.964476 |access-date=2022-02-16 |website=St.Galler Tagblatt |date=13 December 2011 |language=de}}
* {{Cite web |last=Ritter |first=Dieter |title=Swift: Mit dem Bau begonnen |url=https://www.tagblatt.ch/ostschweiz/frauenfeld-munchwilen/swift-mit-dem-bau-begonnen-ld.965892 |access-date=2022-02-16 |website=St.Galler Tagblatt |date=18 March 2011 |language=de}}</ref>
| OPC (Operating Centre)
|-
|4
| [[Hong Kong]]
| Command and control
|}

===SWIFTNet network===
SWIFT moved to its current IP network infrastructure, known as SWIFTNet, from 2001 to 2005,<ref>{{Cite news |title=SWIFT History |publisher=SWIFT |url=http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information/swift_history.page?lang=en |access-date=11 January 2009 |archive-date=26 December 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121226183922/http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information/swift_history.page?lang=en |url-status=dead }}</ref> providing a total replacement of the previous [[X.25]] infrastructure. The process involved the development of new protocols that facilitate efficient messaging, using existing and new message standards. The adopted technology chosen to develop the protocols was [[XML]], which now provides a wrapper around all messages legacy or contemporary. The communication protocols can be broken down into:

{{col-begin}}
{{col-3}}
'''InterAct'''
*SWIFTNet InterAct Realtime
*SWIFTNet InterAct Store and Forward
{{col-3}}
'''FileAct'''
* SWIFTNet FileAct Realtime
* SWIFTNet FileAct Store and Forward
{{col-3}}
'''Browse'''
* SWIFTNet Browse
{{col-end}}

SWIFT provides a centralized store-and-forward mechanism, with some transaction management. For bank A to send a message to bank B with a copy or authorization involving institution C, it formats the message according to standards and securely sends it to SWIFT. SWIFT guarantees its secure and reliable delivery to B after the appropriate action by C. SWIFT guarantees are based primarily on high redundancy of hardware, software, and people.

During 2007 and 2008, the entire SWIFT network migrated its infrastructure to a new protocol called SWIFTNet Phase 2. The main difference between Phase 2 and the former arrangement is that Phase 2 requires banks connecting to the network to use a Relationship Management Application (RMA) instead of the former [[bilateral key exchange]] (BKE) system. According to SWIFT's public information database on the subject, RMA software should eventually prove more secure and easier to keep up-to-date; however, converting to the RMA system meant that thousands of banks around the world had to update their international payment systems to comply with the new standards.{{Citation needed|date=August 2025}} RMA completely replaced BKE on 1 January 2009.

==Standards==

SWIFT has become the industry standard for [[syntax]] in financial messages. Messages formatted to SWIFT standards can be read and processed by many well-known financial processing systems, whether or not the message travelled over the SWIFT network. SWIFT cooperates with international organizations to define standards for message format and content. SWIFT is also a ''[[registration authority]]'' (RA) for the following [[International Organization for Standardization|ISO]] standards:<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.iso.org/maintenance_agencies.html|title=ISO – Maintenance agencies and registration authorities|website=ISO}}</ref>
* [[ISO 9362]]: 1994 Banking{{snd}}Banking telecommunication messages{{snd}}Bank identifier codes
* [[ISO 10383]]: 2003 Securities and related financial instruments{{snd}}Codes for exchanges and market identification (MIC)
* [[ISO 13616]]: 2003 [[IBAN]] Registry
* [[ISO 15022]]: 1999 Securities{{snd}}Scheme for messages (Data Field Dictionary) (replaces ISO 7775)
* [[ISO 20022]]-1: 2004 and ISO 20022-2:2007 Financial services{{snd}}Universal Financial Industry message scheme
In [[Request for Comments|RFC]] 3615 ''<nowiki>urn:swift:</nowiki>'' was defined as [[Uniform Resource Name]]s (URNs) for SWIFT FIN.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3615.html|title=RFC 3615 – A Uniform Resource Name (URN) Namespace for SWIFT Fin (RFC3615)|website=faqs.org}}</ref>

==Supervision==

SWIFT is not a [[payment system]] and thus neither regulated nor supervised as such, but is nevertheless deemed to be systemically important and thus under the "oversight" of public authorities. In 1998, the so-called [[Group of Ten (IMF)|Group of Ten]] central banks (those of [[National Bank of Belgium|Belgium]], [[Bank of Canada|Canada]], [[Bank of France|France]], [[Deutsche Bundesbank|Germany]], [[Bank of Italy|Italy]], [[Bank of Japan|Japan]], the [[De Nederlandsche Bank|Netherlands]], [[Sveriges Riksbank|Sweden]], [[Swiss National Bank|Switzerland]], the [[Bank of England|United Kingdom]], the [[Federal Reserve Board]] and the [[Federal Reserve Bank of New York]] for the US and the [[European Central Bank]]) started acting as joint overseers, with the [[National Bank of Belgium]] (NBB) in a lead role. The oversight focuses primarily on systemic risk, confidentiality, infrastructure security, and business continuity.{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=43}} It is formalized in bilateral documents between the NBB and SWIFT on the one hand, and between the NBB and each of the other G10 central banks on the other hand.<ref>{{citation |title=The oversight of SWIFT: Objectives, scope and structure |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/fsr/focus/2005/pdf/ecb~d573ca68c6.fsrbox200512_18.pdf |date=December 2005 |publisher=European Central Bank}}</ref> In 2018, the [[International Monetary Fund]] has recommended that "the National Bank of Belgium should consider enhancing oversight with additional regulatory and supervisory powers."<ref>{{citation |publisher=International Monetary Fund |title=Belgium Encouraged to Continue Strengthening Oversight of Critical Payments Node |author=Javier Hamann & Eija Holttinen |date={{date|2018/08/08}} |url=https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/08/08/na080818-belgium-encouraged-to-continue-strengthening-oversight-of-critical-payments-node }}</ref>

In 2012, this framework was complemented by a "SWIFT Oversight Forum" including additional central banks. As of 2024, in addition to the G10 central banks, the SWIFT Oversight Forum included the national central banks of [[Central Bank of Argentina|Argentina]], [[Reserve Bank of Australia|Australia]], [[Central Bank of Brazil|Brazil]], [[People's Bank of China|China]], [[Hong Kong Monetary Authority|Hong Kong]], [[Reserve Bank of India|India]], [[Bank Indonesia|Indonesia]], [[Bank of Korea|Korea]], [[Bank of Mexico|Mexico]], [[Central Bank of Russia|Russia]], [[Saudi Central Bank|Saudi Arabia]], [[Monetary Authority of Singapore|Singapore]], [[South African Reserve Bank|South Africa]], [[Bank of Spain|Spain]], and [[Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey|Turkey]]. According to SWIFT, the Oversight Forum "provides a forum for the G-10 central banks to share information on SWIFT oversight activities with a wider group of central banks."<ref>{{cite web |website=SWIFT |url=https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance/swift-oversight |title=Swift oversight}}</ref>

==Alternatives==
{{see also | BRICS | Dedollarisation | Economic sanctions | Trade war }}


* Current: Purported alternatives to the SWIFT system include:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Prasad |first=Eswar S. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aho-EAAAQBAJ&dq=SWIFT+alternative+INSTEX+CIPS&pg=PA435 |title=The Future of Money: How the Digital Revolution Is Transforming Currencies and Finance |date=2021-09-21 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-27008-4 |language=en}}</ref>

# [[BRICS Pay]]: by [[BRICS]] member nations
# [[Cross-Border Interbank Payment System|CIPS]]: sponsored by [[China]], for [[Renminbi|RMB]]-related deals. 1467 financial institutions in 111 countries and regions have connected to the system. The actual business covers more than 4,200 banking institutions in 182 countries and regions around the world.<ref>{{cite web |title=Exclusive - China's payments system scaled back; trade deals only: sources |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-yuan-payments-idUKKCN0PN0P020150713?edition-redirect=uk |website=Reuters |language=en |date=13 July 2015}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-02-28 |title=Factbox: What is China's onshore yuan clearing and settlement system CIPS? |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/what-is-chinas-onshore-yuan-clearing-settlement-system-cips-2022-02-28/ |access-date=2022-03-04}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=CIPS Participants Announcement No. 88 |url=https://www.cips.com.cn/en/participants/participants_announcement/60005/index.html |access-date=2023-09-18 |website=www.cips.com.cn}}</ref>
# [[Structured Financial Messaging System|SFMS]]: sponsored by [[India]]
# [[SPFS]]: developed by the [[Russian Federation]]<ref>{{cite web |title=Перечень пользователей СПФС Банка России {{!}} Банк России |url=https://www.cbr.ru/PSystem/mes/perechen-pol-zovateley-spfs-banka-rossii/ |website=www.cbr.ru}}</ref>
# [[Pix (payment system)]]: developed by Brazil.

* Former 
# [[Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges|INSTEX]]: sponsored by the [[European Union]], limited to non-USD transactions for trade with [[Iran]], largely unused and ineffective.<ref>{{cite web |title=Iran blames EU on INSTEX ineffectiveness |url=https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/457059/Iran-blames-EU-on-INSTEX-ineffectiveness |website=Tehran Times |language=en |date=18 January 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=No transaction has been done through INSTEX: Iranian diplomat |url=https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/445829/No-transaction-has-been-done-through-INSTEX-Iranian-diplomat |website=Tehran Times |language=en |date=4 March 2020}}</ref> Liquidated in March 2023.

==Leadership==

===Chair===
* Johannes Kraa ([[AMRO Bank]], Dutch), 1973–1974
* François Dentz ([[Crédit du Nord]], French), 1974–1976
* Helmer Hasselblad (Swedish), 1976–1984
* W. Robert Moore ([[Chemical Bank]], American), 1984–1989
* Richard Fröhlich (Austrian), 1989–1992
* Eric C. Chilton ([[Barclays]], British), 1992–1996
* Jean-Marie Weydert ([[Société Générale]], French), 1996–2000
* Jaap Kamp ([[ABN AMRO]], Dutch), 2000–2006
* Yawar Shah ([[JPMorgan Chase|JPMorgan]] then [[Citigroup|Citi]], American), 2006–2022{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=16}}
* Mark Buitenhek ([[ING Bank|ING]], Dutch), acting 2022–2023
* Graeme Munro ([[JPMorgan Chase|JPMorgan]], British), since 2023<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-board-names-new-chair-and-deputy-chair-completing-leadership-transition |publisher=SWIFT |title=Swift Board names new Chair and Deputy Chair, completing leadership transition |date=30 March 2023}}</ref>

===Chief executive officer===
* [[Carl Reuterskiöld]], 1973–1983
* [[Bessel Kok]], 1983–1991
* Jacques Cerveau (interim CEO), 1991
* Leonard (Lennie) Schrank, 1992–2007
* Lazaro Campos, 2007–2012
* Gottfried Leibbrandt, 2012–2019{{R|ScottZachariadis|p=17}}
* Javier Pérez-Tasso, since 2019<ref>{{Cite web |title=Javier Pérez-Tasso |url=https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance/swift-management/members/javier-perez-tasso |access-date=15 November 2019 |publisher=SWIFT |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115082657/https://www.swift.com/about-us/organisation-governance/swift-management/members/javier-perez-tasso |url-status=dead}}</ref>

==Controversy==

===Inefficiency===

SWIFT has been criticised for inefficiency. In 2018, the London-based ''[[Financial Times]]'' noted that transfers frequently "pass through multiple banks before reaching their final destination, making them time-consuming, costly and lacking transparency on how much money will arrive at the other end".<ref name=":0" /> SWIFT has since introduced an improved service called "Global Payments Innovation" (GPI), claiming it was adopted by 165 banks and was completing half its payments within 30 minutes.<ref name=":0" /> The new standard which included SWIFT Go was supposed to be utilised in receiving and transferring low-value international payments. One of the significant changes was the transaction amount, which would not differ from start to end. However, {{as of| 2023|lc=y}}, uptake was mixed. For instance, Alisherov Eraj, [[Alif Bank]] Treasury Department SWIFT Transfers & Banking Relationship Expert in the [[Tajikistan|Republic of Tajikistan]], describes that the leading cause for the late SWIFT Go adoption in Tajikistan was the [[Core Banking System]] itself. To connect to SWIFT Go, he adds, banking system interfaces needed to be upgraded and integrated with their software to be fully compatible; this hindered many banks from adopting the technology earlier.

===US government surveillance===

A series of articles published on 23 June 2006 in ''[[The New York Times]]'', ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]'', and the ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'' revealed a program, named the [[Terrorist Finance Tracking Program]], which the [[US Treasury Department]], [[CIA|Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)]], and other [[United States government]]al agencies initiated after the [[11 September attacks]] to gain access to the SWIFT transaction database.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Brand |first=Constant |date=28 September 2005 |title=Belgian PM: Data Transfer Broke Rules |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/28/AR2006092800585.html |access-date=23 May 2010}}</ref>

After the publication of these articles, SWIFT quickly came under pressure for compromising the [[data privacy]] of its customers by allowing governments to gain access to sensitive personal information. In September 2006, the Belgian government declared that these SWIFT dealings with American governmental authorities were a breach of Belgian and [[European Union law|European]] [[privacy law]]s.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hart |first=Jeffrey A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yZHTEAAAQBAJ&dq=SWIFT+September+2006+Belgian+privacy&pg=PA117 |title=Essays on the History and Politics of the Internet: Cyberpolitics |date=2023-08-11 |publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing |isbn=978-1-5275-2871-0 |language=en}}</ref>

In response, and to satisfy members' concerns about privacy, SWIFT began a process of improving its architecture by implementing a distributed architecture with a two-zone model for storing messages {{crossreference|(see {{slink||Operations centres}})}}.

Concurrently, the [[European Union]] negotiated an agreement with the [[Federal government of the United States|United States government]] to permit the transfer of intra-EU SWIFT transaction information to the United States under certain circumstances. Because of concerns about its potential contents, the [[European Parliament]] adopted a position statement in September 2009, demanding to see the full text of the agreement and asking that it be fully compliant with EU privacy legislation, with oversight mechanisms emplaced to ensure that all data requests were handled appropriately.<ref>{{Cite news |date=17 September 2009 |title=European Parliament resolution of 17 September 2009 on the SWIFT Agreement |publisher=[[European Parliament]] |url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2009-0016&language=EN&ring=B7-2009-0038}}</ref> An interim agreement was signed without European Parliamentary approval by the [[European Council]] on 30 November 2009,<ref>{{Cite news |date=21 January 2010 |title=European Parliament to vote on interim agreement at February session |publisher=[[European Parliament]] |url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/019-67614-018-01-04-902-20100119IPR67613-18-01-2010-2010-false/default_en.htm}}</ref> the day before the [[Treaty of Lisbon|Lisbon Treaty]]—which would have prohibited such an agreement from being signed under the terms of the [[codecision procedure]]—formally came into effect. While the interim agreement was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 2010, the text of the agreement was classified as "EU Restricted" until translations could be provided in all EU languages and published on 25 January 2010.

On 11 February 2010, the European Parliament decided to reject the interim agreement between the EU and the US by 378 to 196 votes.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Brand |first=Constant |date=11 February 2010 |title=Parliament rejects bank transfer data deal |work=European Voice |url=http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/02/parliament-rejects-bank-transfer-data-deal/67144.aspx}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=11 February 2010 |title=Euro MPs block bank data deal with US |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8510471.stm}}</ref> One week earlier, the parliament's civil liberties committee had already rejected the deal, citing legal reservations.<ref>{{Cite news |date=11 February 2010 |title=European parliament rejects SWIFT deal for sharing bank data with US |work=[[Deutsche Welle|DW]] |agency=Reuters |url=http://www.dw.com/en/european-parliament-rejects-swift-deal-for-sharing-bank-data-with-us/a-5239595}}</ref>

In March 2011, it was reported that two mechanisms of data protection had failed: [[EUROPOL]] released a report complaining that requests for information from the US had been too vague (making it impossible to make judgments on validity)<ref name="2011spiegel">{{Cite news |last=Schult |first=Christoph |date=16 March 2011 |title=Brussels Eyes a Halt to SWIFT Data Agreement |work=Der Spiegel |url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,751262,00.html}}</ref> and that the guaranteed right for European citizens to know whether their information had been accessed by US authorities had not been put into practice.<ref name="2011spiegel" />

''[[Der Spiegel]]'' reported in September 2013 that the [[National Security Agency]] (NSA) widely monitors banking transactions via SWIFT, as well as credit card transactions.<ref name="speigel">{{Cite web |date=15 September 2013 |title='Follow the Money': NSA Spies on International Payments |url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html |access-date=18 September 2013 |website=Der Spiegel}}</ref> The NSA intercepted and retained data from the SWIFT network used by thousands of banks to securely send transaction information. SWIFT was named as a "target", according to documents leaked by [[Edward Snowden]]. The documents revealed that the NSA spied on SWIFT using a variety of methods, including reading "SWIFT printer traffic from numerous banks".<ref name=speigel/> In April 2017, a group known as the [[Shadow Brokers]] released files allegedly from the NSA which indicate that the agency monitored financial transactions made through SWIFT.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Baldwin |first=Clare |author-link=Clare Baldwin |date=15 April 2017 |title=Hackers release files indicating NSA monitored global bank transfers |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-swift-idUSKBN17G1HC |access-date=15 April 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Lawler |first=Richard |title=Shadow Brokers release also suggests NSA spied on bank transactions |url=https://www.engadget.com/2017/04/14/shadow-brokers-release-also-suggest-nsa-spied-on-bank-transactio/ |access-date=15 April 2017 |website=Engadget|date=15 April 2017 }}</ref>

===SWIFT and sanctions===

====Iran====
In January 2012, the advocacy group [[United Against Nuclear Iran]] (UANI) implemented a campaign calling on SWIFT to end all relations with Iran's banking system, including the [[Central Bank of Iran]]. UANI asserted that Iran's membership in SWIFT violated US and EU financial sanctions against Iran as well as SWIFT's own corporate rules.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gladstone |first=Rick |date=31 January 2012 |title=Iran Praises Nuclear Talks with Team from U.N. |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/middleeast/iran-calls-un-nuclear-teams-visit-constructive.html |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref>

Consequently, in February 2012, the [[United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs|US Senate Banking Committee]] unanimously approved sanctions against SWIFT aimed at pressuring it to terminate its ties with blacklisted Iranian banks. Expelling Iranian banks from SWIFT would potentially deny Iran access to billions of dollars in revenue using SWIFT but not from using [[Informal value transfer system|IVTS]]. [[Mark Wallace]], president of UANI, praised the Senate Banking Committee.<ref name="nyt">{{Cite news |last=Gladstone |first=Rick |date=3 February 2012 |title=Senate Panel Approves Potentially Toughest Penalty Yet Against Iran's Wallet |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/world/middleeast/tough-iran-penalty-clears-senate-banking-panel.html |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref>

Initially SWIFT denied that it was acting illegally,<ref name="nyt" /> but later{{when|date=May 2021}} said that "it is working with U.S. and European governments to address their concerns that its financial services are being used by Iran to avoid sanctions and conduct illicit business".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Solomon |first1=Jay |last2=& Adam Entous |date=4 February 2012 |title=Banking Hub Adds to Pressure on Iran |work=The Wall Street Journal |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203889904577201330206741436 |access-date=4 February 2012}}</ref> Targeted banks would be—amongst others—[[Saderat Bank of Iran]], [[Bank Mellat]], [[Post Bank of Iran]] and [[Sepah Bank]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=17 February 2012 |title=Banking's SWIFT says ready to block Iran transactions |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-sanctions-swift-idUSL5E8DH31020120217 |access-date=17 February 2012}}</ref> On 17 March 2012, following an agreement two days earlier between all 27 member states of the [[Council of the European Union]] and the council's subsequent ruling, SWIFT disconnected all Iranian banks that had been identified as institutions in breach of current EU sanctions from its international network and warned that even more Iranian financial institutions could be disconnected from the network.

In February 2016, most Iranian banks reconnected to the network following the lift of sanctions due to the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Torchia |first=Andrew |date=17 February 2016 |title=Iranian banks reconnected to SWIFT network after four-year hiatus |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-banks-swift-idUSKCN0VQ1FD |access-date=21 April 2016}}</ref> 

In November 2024, Iran implemented a [[paradigm shift]] approach to shift the focus from the SWIFT payment system by initiating the concept of bringing [[ACUMER]]. ACUMER was coined by Iran as a retaliation to the international sanctions imposed by the United States which has ever since limited Iran's competitive edge in the context of [[international trade]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last= |date=2024-11-25 |title=Iran top banker: Significant measures taken to counter sanctions |url=https://en.irna.ir/news/85670174/Iran-top-banker-Significant-measures-taken-to-counter-sanctions |access-date=2025-02-26 |website=IRNA English |language=en}}</ref> Iran had long conceived an idea of bringing a viable alternative option to SWIFT in order to actively engage in smooth economic activities and international trade.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-25 |title=Iran unveils SWIFT competitor called ACUMER |url=https://www.intellinews.com/iran-unveils-swift-competitor-called-acumer-354944/ |access-date=2025-02-26 |website=www.intellinews.com |language=en}}</ref>

====Israel====
In 2014, SWIFT rejected calls from pro-Palestinian activists to revoke [[Banking in Israel|Israeli banks]]' access to its network owing to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory.<ref>[https://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.619514 International banking giant refuses to cut off Israel, despite boycott calls]. ''[[Haaretz]]''. 7 October 2014.</ref>

====Russia and Belarus====
{{See also|SWIFT ban against Russian banks}}
Similarly, in August 2014 the UK planned to press the EU to block Russian use of SWIFT as a sanction due to [[Russian military intervention in Ukraine (2014–present)|Russian military intervention in Ukraine]].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hutton |first1=Robert |last2=Ian Wishart |date=29 August 2014 |title=U.K. Wants EU to Block Russia From SWIFT Banking Network |agency=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-29/u-k-wants-eu-to-block-russia-from-swift-banking-network.html |access-date=31 August 2014}}</ref> However, SWIFT refused to do so.<ref>{{Cite press release |title=SWIFT Sanctions Statement |url=http://www.swift.com/about_swift/shownews?param_dcr=news.data/en/swift_com/2014/PR_swift_sanctions_statement.xml |work=swift.com}}</ref> [[SPFS]], a Russian alternative to SWIFT, was developed by the [[Central Bank of Russia]] as a backup measure.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Turak |first=Natasha |date=23 May 2018 |title=Russia's central bank governor touts Moscow alternative to SWIFT transfer system as protection from US sanctions |publisher=CNBC |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/23/russias-central-bank-governor-touts-moscow-alternative-to-swift-transfer-system-as-protection-from-us-sanctions.html |access-date=4 October 2018}}</ref>

During the [[prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the United States developed preliminary possible sanctions against Russia, but excluded banning Russia from SWIFT.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Shalal|first=Andrea|date=2022-02-11|title=SWIFT off Russia sanctions list, state banks likely target -U.S., EU officials|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swift-off-russia-sanctions-list-state-banks-likely-target-us-eu-officials-2022-02-11/|access-date=2022-02-14}}</ref> Following the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the foreign ministers of the Baltic states Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia called for Russia to be cut off from SWIFT. However, other EU member states were reluctant, both because European lenders held most of the nearly $30 billion in foreign banks' exposure to Russia and because Russia had developed the SPFS alternative.<ref>{{cite web |title=EU unlikely to cut Russia off SWIFT for now, sources say |url=https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/eu-unlikely-to-cut-russia-off-swift-for-now-sources-say/ar-AAUf89H |website=Reuters |access-date=24 February 2022 |language=en |date=24 February 2022}}</ref> The European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States finally agreed to remove a few Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system in response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Japan individually released statements alongside the EU.<ref>{{cite web |title=Joint Statement on further restrictive economic measures |url=https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_1423 |website=ec.europa.eu |date=26 February 2022 |access-date=26 February 2022}}</ref><ref name=":2" />

On 20 March 2023, Russia was banned from SWIFT.<ref>{{cite web |title=New financial messaging rules for Russia approved {{!}} Bank of Russia |url=https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=14635 |website=[[Central Bank of Russia]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230812012003/http://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=14635 |archive-date=2023-08-12}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author1=Adeela Naureen |author2=Waqar K Kauravi |title=De-dollarisation and emerging global order |url=https://tribune.com.pk/story/2415289/de-dollarisation-and-emerging-global-order |work=[[The Express Tribune]] |date=6 May 2023 |language=en}}</ref>

The [[European Union]] issued the first set of sanctions against Belarus; the first was introduced on 27 February 2022, which banned certain categories of Belarusian items in the EU, including timber, steel, mineral fuels and tobacco.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Martin |first=Jessica |date=27 February 2022 |title=EU extends Russia sanctions to airspace, media, Belarus |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/west-seeks-to-cripple-russian-banks-currency-in-ukraine-sanctions/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220301014247/https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/west-seeks-to-cripple-russian-banks-currency-in-ukraine-sanctions/ |archive-date=1 March 2022 |access-date=1 March 2022 |website=Euractiv |language=en-GB}}</ref> After the Lithuanian prime minister proposed disconnecting Belarus from SWIFT,<ref>{{Cite tweet|number=1497981026093703180|user=nexta_tv|title=Lithuanian Prime Minister proposed to disconnect Belarus from SWIFT}}</ref> the [[European Union]], which does not recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate [[President of Belarus]], started to plan an extension of the sanctions already issued against Russian entities and top officials to its ally.<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 February 2022 |title=EU to impose new sanctions on Belarus this week -EU official |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-impose-new-sanctions-belarus-this-week-eu-official-2022-02-28/ |url-status=live |access-date=1 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220302205535/https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-impose-new-sanctions-belarus-this-week-eu-official-2022-02-28/ |archive-date=2 March 2022}}</ref>

===Security===
{{See also|Bangladesh Bank robbery}}

In 2016 an $81&nbsp;million theft from the [[Bangladesh]] central bank via its account at the New York [[Federal Reserve Bank of New York|Federal Reserve Bank]] was traced to [[Hacker (computer security)|hacker]] penetration of SWIFT's Alliance Access software, according to a ''New York Times'' report. It was not the first such attempt, the society acknowledged, and the security of the transfer system was undergoing new examination accordingly.<ref>Corkery, Michael, [https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/business/dealbook/hackers-81-million-sneak-attack-on-world-banking.html "Hackers’ $81 Million Sneak Attack on World Banking"], ''The New York Times'', 30 April 2016. Retrieved 1 May 2016.</ref> Soon after the reports of the theft from the Bangladesh central bank, a second, apparently related, attack was reported to have occurred at a commercial bank in Vietnam.<ref name="Second Attack Reported NYT">{{Cite news |last=Corkery, Michael |date=12 May 2016 |title=Once Again, Thieves Enter Swift Financial Network and Steal |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/business/dealbook/swift-global-bank-network-attack.html |access-date=13 May 2016}}</ref><ref name="ReutersSpecialReport">{{Cite news |last1=Bergin |first1=Tom |last2=Layne |first2=Nathan |date=20 May 2016 |title=Special Report: Cyber thieves exploit banks' faith in SWIFT transfer network |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-heist-swift-specialreport-idUSKCN0YB0DD |access-date=24 May 2016}}</ref>

Both attacks involved [[malware]] written both to issue unauthorized SWIFT messages and to conceal that the messages had been sent. After the malware sent the SWIFT messages that stole the funds, it deleted the database record of the transfers and then took further steps to prevent confirmation messages from revealing the theft. In the Bangladeshi case, the confirmation messages would have appeared on a paper report; the malware altered the paper reports when they were sent to the printer. In the second case, the bank used a PDF report; the malware altered the PDF viewer to hide the transfers.<ref name="Second Attack Reported NYT" />

In May 2016, [[Banco del Austro]] (BDA) in Ecuador sued [[Wells Fargo]] after Wells Fargo honoured $12&nbsp;million in fund transfer requests that had been placed by thieves.<ref name="ReutersSpecialReport" /> In this case, the thieves sent SWIFT messages that resembled recently cancelled transfer requests from BDA, with slightly altered amounts; the reports do not detail how the thieves gained access to send the SWIFT messages. BDA asserts that Wells Fargo should have detected the suspicious SWIFT messages, which were placed outside of normal BDA working hours and were of an unusual size. Wells Fargo claims that BDA is responsible for the loss, as the thieves gained access to the legitimate SWIFT credentials of a BDA employee and sent fully authenticated SWIFT messages.<ref name="ReutersSpecialReport" />

In the first half of 2016, an anonymous Ukrainian bank and others—even "dozens" that are not being made public—were variously reported to have been "compromised" through the SWIFT network and to have lost money.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Metzger |first=Max |date=28 June 2016 |title=SWIFT robbers swoop on Ukrainian bank |url=http://www.scmagazineuk.com/swift-robbers-swoop-on-ukrainian-bank/article/506140/ |access-date=29 June 2016 |publisher=[[SC Magazine]] UK}}</ref>

In March 2022, Swiss newspaper ''[[Neue Zürcher Zeitung]]'' reported about the increased security precautions by the State Police of [[Thurgau]] at the SWIFT data centre in [[Diessenhofen]]. After most of the Russian banks had been excluded from the private payment system, the risk of sabotage was considered higher. Inhabitants of the town described the large complex as a "fortress" or "prison" where frequent security checks of the fenced property are conducted.<ref>Gyr, Marcel (1 March 2022). [https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/das-swift-rechenzentrum-in-der-schweiz-wird-polizeilich-geschuetzt-aus-angst-vor-sabotage-ld.1672402?reduced=true "Das Swift-Rechenzentrum in der Schweiz wird polizeilich geschützt – wegen der Gefahr von Sabotage"] (in German) ''NZZ.com''. Retrieved 2 March 2022.</ref>

== See also ==
{{Portal|Banks}}
<!-- Please respect alphabetical order -->
* [[BRICS PAY]]
* [[Electronic money]]
* [[Indian Financial System Code]] (IFSC)
* [[Single Euro Payments Area]] (SEPA)
* [[TIPANET]]
* [[Value transfer system]]

== References ==
{{reflist}}

== Further reading ==
* {{cite book |last1=Farrell |first1=Henry |last2=Newman |first2=Abraham |date=2019 |title=Of Privacy and Power: The Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and Security |location=Princeton, New Jersey |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691189956}}
* {{cite book |last1=Scott |first1=Susan V. |last2=Zachariadis |first2=Markos |date=2013 |title=The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT): cooperative governance for network innovation, standards, and community  |location=New York, NY |publisher=Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group |isbn=978-1-315-84932-4 }}

== External links ==
* {{Official website}}

{{Bank codes and identification}}
{{Major financial technology companies}}
{{Authority control}}

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[[Category:Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication| ]]
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[[Category:1973 establishments in Belgium]]
[[Category:Financial markets software]]
[[Category:Financial metadata]]
[[Category:Financial services companies established in 1973]]
[[Category:La Hulpe]]
[[Category:Market data]]
[[Category:Network architecture]]
[[Category:Ricardo Bofill buildings]]
[[Category:Cooperatives]]
[[Category:Cooperatives in Europe]]
[[Category:Cooperatives in Belgium]]