View source for Regulatory capture

{{Short description|Form of political corruption}}
{{Competition law}}
In [[politics]], '''regulatory capture''' (also called '''agency capture''') is a form of [[Political corruption|corruption]] of authority that occurs when a political entity, [[Legislator|policymaker]], or [[regulatory agency|regulator]] is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor [[Advocacy group|constituency]], such as a particular geographic area, [[Manufacturing|industry]], [[profession]], or [[Ideology|ideological group]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=Dal Bó |first=Ernesto |title=Regulatory capture: A review |journal=Oxford Review of Economic Policy |volume=22 |issue=2 |year=2006 |pages=203–225 |doi=10.1093/oxrep/grj013 |jstor=23606888 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web | title = Regulatory Capture Definition | url = http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp | website = [[Investopedia]] | access-date = October 2, 2015 | archive-date = October 3, 2015 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20151003140220/http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp | url-status = live }}</ref>

When regulatory capture occurs, a special interest is prioritized over the general interests of the public, leading to a net loss for [[society]]. The theory of ''[[client politics]]'' is related to that of [[rent-seeking]] and [[political failure]]; client politics "occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (e.g., [[Industry (economics)|industry]], profession, or [[Human settlement|locality]]) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of [[people]] (for example, all [[tax]]payers)".<ref>{{cite book | last = Wilson | first = James | title = Bureaucracy: what government agencies do and why they do it | publisher = Basic Books | location = New York | year = 2000 | isbn = 0465007856 }}{{page needed|date=September 2023}}</ref>

==Theory==
[[File:Common-Carriers, 1935-1969, Cumulative Applications versus Licensed In-Operation (Figure 5, Stigler 1971).jpg|thumb|right|Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) as Barrier-to-Competition: Applications-to-Operate vs In-Operation]]
For [[public choice theory|public choice theorists]], regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with high-stakes interests in the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions can be expected to focus their resources and energies to gain the policy outcomes they prefer, while members of the public, each with only a tiny individual stake in the outcome, will ignore it altogether.<ref name="nyt-tbl">Timothy B. Lee, [https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/03/opinion/03lee.html "Entangling the Web"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706075044/https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/03/opinion/03lee.html |date=2018-07-06 }} ''The New York Times'' (August 3, 2006). Retrieved April 1, 2011</ref> Regulatory capture refers to the actions of [[interest group]]s when this is successful at influencing the staff or commission members of the regulator.

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  |quote = ... as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit... We propose the general hypothesis: every industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry. In addition, the regulatory policy will often be so fashioned as to retard the rate of growth of new firms.
  | author = [[George Stigler]]
  | source = ''The Theory of Economic Regulation'' (1971)<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stigler |first1=George J. |title=The Theory of Economic Regulation |journal=The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science |date=1971 |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=3–21 |doi=10.2307/3003160 |jstor=3003160 |citeseerx=10.1.1.178.6588 |s2cid=18393956 }}</ref>
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Regulatory capture theory is a core focus of the branch of public choice referred to as the [[Regulatory economics|economics of regulation]]; economists in this specialty are critical of conceptualizations of governmental regulatory intervention as being motivated to protect the [[Public good (economics)|public good]]. Often cited articles include [[Marver Bernstein|Bernstein]] (1955), Huntington (1952), Laffont & [[Jean Tirole|Tirole]] (1991), and Levine & Forrence (1990). The theory of regulatory capture is associated with [[Nobel Prize|Nobel]] laureate economist [[George Stigler]],<ref>{{Cite news |author=Editorial Board |title =Regulatory Capture 101: Impressionable journalists finally meet George Stigler |url =https://online.wsj.com/articles/regulatory-capture-101-1412544509 |newspaper =Wall Street Journal |date =October 6, 2014 |access-date =March 14, 2017 |archive-date =October 18, 2014 |archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20141018231323/http://online.wsj.com/articles/regulatory-capture-101-1412544509 |url-status =live }}</ref> one of its major developers.<ref>{{cite book |editor-first=Edmund |editor-last=Amann |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=akSneB10pJ0C&pg=PA14 |title=Regulating Development: Evidence from Africa and Latin America |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161212225742/https://books.google.com/books?id=akSneB10pJ0C&pg=PA14 |archive-date=2016-12-12 |via=Google Books |publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing |date=2006 |page=14 |isbn=978-1-84542-499-2 |access-date=April 14, 2011}}</ref>

The likelihood of regulatory capture is a risk to which an agency is exposed by its very nature.<ref>Gary Adams, Sharon Hayes, Stuart Weierter and John Boyd, [http://www.iceaustralia.com/apsacc2011/pdf/papers07/day1_24oct07/StreamA2/RegulatoryCaptureManagingTheRisks_JohnBoyd.pdf "Regulatory Capture: Managing the Risk"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720083041/http://www.iceaustralia.com/apsacc2011/pdf/papers07/day1_24oct07/StreamA2/RegulatoryCaptureManagingTheRisks_JohnBoyd.pdf |date=2011-07-20 }} ICE Australia, International Conferences and Events (PDF) (October 24, 2007). Retrieved April 14, 2011</ref> This suggests that a regulator should be protected from outside influence as much as possible. Alternatively, it may be better to not create a given agency at all. A captured regulator is often worse than no regulation, because it wields the authority of government. However, increased transparency of the agency may mitigate the effects of capture. Recent evidence suggests that, even in mature [[Democracy|democracies]] with high levels of transparency and [[Freedom of the press|media freedom]], more extensive and complex regulatory environments are associated with higher levels of corruption (including regulatory capture).<ref>Hamilton, Alexander (2013), Small is beautiful, at least in high-income democracies: the distribution of policy-making responsibility, electoral accountability, and incentives for rent extraction  [http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2013/01/07/000158349_20130107132037/Rendered/PDF/wps6305.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160607132242/http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2013/01/07/000158349_20130107132037/Rendered/PDF/wps6305.pdf|date=2016-06-07}}, World Bank.</ref>

Stigler framed the problem of regulatory capture as "the problem of discovering when and why an industry is able to use the state for its purposes". He focuses on whole industries. But, it is never a whole industry that is 'capturing' its regulators, but only the big companies that, using the tool of the [[Revolving door (politics)|revolving door]], 'highjack' the regulator by offering high salaries. [[Elise Brezis|Brezis]] and Cariolle (2019)<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brezis|first1=Elise|last2=Cariolle|first2=Joel|title=The revolving door, state connections, and inequality of influence in the financial sector |journal=Journal of Institutional Economics|year=2019|volume=15|issue=4|pages=595–614|doi=10.1017/S1744137418000498|s2cid=219262789}}</ref> have shown that the connected firms are always the big firms. Indeed, the top 5 financial companies concentrate around 80% of the stock of revolving door movements and regulatory capture. This leads to inequality of influence among firms in the same sector.

It should also be noted that regulatory capture in developed countries is not anymore related to corruption and illegal behavior, but to abuse of power.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brezis |first1=Elise S. |title=Legal conflicts of interest of the revolving door |journal=Journal of Macroeconomics |date=June 2017 |volume=52 |pages=175–188 |doi=10.1016/j.jmacro.2017.04.006 |hdl=10419/173749 |url=https://econ.biu.ac.il/sites/econ/files/working-papers/2017-05.pdf }}</ref>

=== Types ===
There are two basic types of regulatory capture:<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Kwak%20-%20Cultural%20Capture%20and%20the%20Financial%20Crisis.pdf |title=Preventing Regulatory Capture |first1=Daniel |last1=Carpenter |first2=David A. |last2=Moss |publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=2014 |access-date=May 22, 2015 |archive-date=July 16, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150716101807/http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Kwak%20-%20Cultural%20Capture%20and%20the%20Financial%20Crisis.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |title=Corralling Capture |url=https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/370256/doc/slspublic/corrralling_caputure.pdf |first=David Freeman |last=Engstrom |journal=Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy |access-date=May 22, 2015 |archive-date=October 30, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201030171737/https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/370256/doc/slspublic/corrralling_caputure.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
* ''Materialist capture'', also called ''financial capture'', in which the captured regulator's motive is based on its material self-interest. This can result from [[bribery]], [[Revolving door (politics)|revolving doors]], [[campaign finance|political donations]], [[political corruption]] or the regulator's desire to maintain its funding.
* ''Non-materialist capture'', also called ''cognitive capture'', can be caused by [[bias]] in the representation of [[public interest]]s, which through [[consensus decision-making]] can be adopted by regulatory agencies and law.<ref name="i965">{{cite journal | last=Li | first=Wendy Y | title=Regulatory capture’s third face of power | journal=Socio-Economic Review | volume=21 | issue=2 | date=7 June 2023 | issn=1475-1461 | doi=10.1093/ser/mwad002 | doi-access=free | pages=1217–1245 | url=https://academic.oup.com/ser/article-pdf/21/2/1217/50537396/mwad002.pdf | access-date=28 February 2025}}</ref> This can result from interest groups [[lobbying]] for the industry. Highly specialized technical industries can pose a risk of cultural capture because the regulating agency typically needs to employ experts in the regulated area, and the pool of such experts typically consists largely of existing or former employees from the regulated industry. 

While large firms can capture regulators due to their larger material and non-material resources,<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Yadin|first=Sharon|date=2015|title=Too Small to Fail: State Bailouts and Capture by Industry Underdogs|url=http://law.capital.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=35862|journal=Capital University Law Review |volume=43 |page=889|archive-date=2016-06-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160618124809/http://law.capital.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=35862|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stigler |first1=George J. |title=The Theory of Economic Regulation |journal=The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science |date=1971 |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=3–21 |doi=10.2307/3003160 |jstor=3003160 |s2cid=18393956 |citeseerx=10.1.1.178.6588 }}</ref> small firms are more prone to retain capture via a special underdog rhetoric.<ref name=":0" />

=== Relationship with federalism ===
There is substantial academic literature suggesting that smaller government units are easier for small, concentrated industries to capture than large ones. For example, a group of states or provinces with a large timber industry might have their legislature and/or their delegation to the national legislature captured by lumber companies. These states or provinces then become the voice of the industry, even to the point of blocking national policies that would be preferred by the majority across the whole country. Moore and Giovinazzo (2012) call this the "distortion gap".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Moore |first1=Ryan T. |last2=Giovinazzo |first2=Christopher T. |title=The Distortion Gap: Policymaking under Federalism and Interest Group Capture |journal=Publius: The Journal of Federalism |date=2012 |volume=42 |issue=2 |pages=189–210 |doi=10.1093/publius/pjr037 |jstor=41441079 }}</ref>

The opposite is possible. Very large and powerful industries (e.g., energy, banking, [[Military–industrial complex|weapon system construction]]) can capture national governments, and then use that power to block policies at the national, state or provincial level that the voters may want,<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://www.businessinsider.com/budget-hawks-till-something-gets-cut-in-their-districts-2013-2
|quote=Senate Budget Committee Chairwoman [[Patty Murray]], an "anti-war Democratic senator from Washington State" who "voted against the Iraq war resolution and subsequent troop surges". She's spearheading the Senate's efforts to bring the budget in line. Until it gets to [[Boeing]]... "Champion for the Boeing Co.", is how Boeing spokesman Doug Kennett endorsed her during her reelection campaign in 2010.
|title=The Military Industrial Complex Is Too Strong Is Too Many States
|first1=Wolf
|last1=Richter
|website=[[Business Insider]]
|date=February 21, 2013
|access-date=2017-08-08
|archive-date=2017-08-08
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170808233449/http://www.businessinsider.com/budget-hawks-till-something-gets-cut-in-their-districts-2013-2
|url-status=live
}}</ref> although even local interests can thwart national priorities.<ref>{{cite news
|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/us/politics/a-pennsylvania-highway-town-at-the-junction-of-politics-and-policy.html
|quote=Millions of people who travel between the Mid-Atlantic and the Midwest each year fight through [[Breezewood, Pennsylvania|Breezewood, Pa.]], a strange gap in the Interstate System... no ramps join [I-70 and the Pennsylvania Turnpike] at their crossing. Instead, drivers travel... blocks with traffic lights and dense bazaar of gas stations, fast-food restaurants and motels... [In order] for a bypass to be considered, essentially Breezewood's own Bedford County must propose it... "It's just not an issue that really appears on the radar for us", said Donald Schwartz, the Bedford County planning director.
|title=As Trump Vows Building Splurge, Famed Traffic Choke Point Offers Warning
|first1=Charlie
|last1=Savage
|date=February 6, 2017
|access-date=2017-08-14
|newspaper=The New York Times
|archive-date=2020-10-30
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201030171739/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/us/politics/a-pennsylvania-highway-town-at-the-junction-of-politics-and-policy.html
|url-status=live
}}</ref>

===Economic rationale===
Regulatory capture has an economic basis: vested interests in an industry have the greatest financial stake in regulations affecting them, and so are more likely to try to influence the regulator than relatively dispersed individual consumers,<ref name="nyt-tbl" /> each with little incentive. When regulators form expert bodies to examine policy, these invariably feature current or former industry members, or at the very least, individuals with lives and contacts in the industry. Capture is also facilitated where consumers or taxpayers have a poorer understanding of underlying issues than businesses.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://cmr.berkeley.edu/search/articleDetail.aspx?article=5779|title=Thin Political Markets: The Soft Underbelly of Capitalism|website=cmr.berkeley.edu|access-date=17 May 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227214008/http://cmr.berkeley.edu/search/articleDetail.aspx?article=5779|url-status=live}}</ref>

Jon Hanson and his co-authors argue that the phenomenon extends beyond political agencies and organizations. Businesses have an incentive to control anything that has power over them, including the media, academia and popular culture, and will try to capture them too. This is called "deep capture".<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hanson |first1=Jon |last2=Yosifon |first2=David |title=The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture |journal=University of Pennsylvania Law Review |date=2003 |volume=152 |issue=1 |pages=129–346 |doi=10.2307/3313062 |jstor=3313062 |s2cid=145110508 |url=https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/1/12964431/1/The%20Situation_%20An%20Introduction%20to%20the%20Situational%20Character%20Crit.pdf }}</ref>

Regulatory public interest is based on [[market failure]] and welfare economics. It holds that regulation is the response of the government to public needs. Its purpose is to make up for market failures, improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and maximize social welfare. Posner states that the [[public interest theory]] contains the assumption that the market is fragile, and that if left unchecked, it will tend to be unfair and inefficient, and government regulation is a costless and effective way to meet the needs of social justice and efficiency. Mimik states that government regulation is a public administration policy that focuses on private behavior. It is a rule drawn from the public interest. Irving and Brouhingan state that regulation is a way of obeying public needs and weakening the risk of market operations. They also expressed the view that regulation reflects the public interest.

== History ==
{{Unreferenced section|date=December 2018}}
The review of the United States history of regulation at the end of the 19th century,{{clarify |date=December 2018 |reason=What is "The review"?}} especially the regulation of railway tariffs by the [[Interstate Commerce Commission]] (ICC) in 1887, revealed that regulations and market failures are not co-relevant. At least until the 1960s, regulation was developed in the direction of favoring producers, and regulation increased the profits of manufacturers within the industry. In potentially competitive industries such as trucking and taxis, regulations allow higher prices and prevent entrants. In monopoly industries such as electric power generation, there is evidence that regulation has little effect on prices, so the industry can earn excess profits. Evidence shows that regulation is beneficial to producers.{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}}

These observations led to the emergence and development of regulatory capture theory<!-- Separate article?  -->. Contrary to regulatory public interest theory, this holds that the provision of regulation adapts to the industry's needs, that is, both the legislator and regulator are controlled and captured by the industry. The basic view of the theory is that the regulator gets captured no matter how the regulatory scheme is designed. The implication is that regulation increases the industry's profits rather than the social welfare.{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}}

This was essentially a purely capture theory in the early days, that is, the regulators and legislators were captured and controlled by the industry. Later regulatory models, such as those by Stigler, Pelzmann, or Becker, follow the regulatory capture theory in the eyes of Posner (1974) and others. All these models reflect that regulators and legislators are trying to maximize private, not public, interests. They use the "private interest" theory to explain the origin and purpose of regulation. Aton (1986) argues that Stigler's theoretical logic is clearer and more central than the previous "capture theory" hypothesis, but it is difficult to distinguish between the two.{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}}

Regulatory capture theory has a specific meaning, that is, an experience statement that regulations are beneficial for producers in real life. So it is essentially not a true regulatory theory. Although the analysis results are similar to the Stigler model, the methods are completely different. Stigler used standard economic analysis methods to analyze the regulation behavior, then created a new regulatory theory – regulatory economic theory. Of course, different divisions depend on the criteria for division, and they essentially depend on the researchers' different understanding of specific concepts.{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}}

Justice Douglas' dissent in ''[[Sierra Club v. Morton#Justice Douglas' dissent|Sierra Club v. Morton]]'' (1972) describes concern that regulators become too favorable with their regulated industries.{{Citation needed|date=December 2018}}

==Examples==

===Europe <span class="anchor" id="European examples"></span>===
====Aberfan disaster====
{{main|Aberfan disaster}}

On 21 October 1966, a [[spoil tip|tip]] containing spoil and tailings from [[Merthyr Vale]] Colliery slipped after a period of heavy rain, [[Aberfan disaster|killing 116 children and 28 adults in the Welsh village of Aberfan]]. In contravention of the [[National Coal Board]]'s procedures, the tip was partly based on the ground from which water springs were known to emerge. After three weeks of rain, the tip became saturated and {{convert|140000|yd3}} of spoil and tailings slipped down the side of the hill, engulfing Pantglas Junior School and a row of houses.

Iain McLean and Martin Johnes, in a 2000 study of the Aberfan disaster, observed that [[Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Mines]] went largely unchallenged by the tribunal, although the two consider that the organisation failed in its duty, falling in line with the interests of the [[National Coal Board]] whose activities they were supposed to be overseeing.<ref>{{cite book |last1=McLean |first1=Iain |last2=Johnes |first2=Martin |date=2000 |title=Aberfan: Government and Disasters |location=Cardiff |publisher=Welsh Academic Press |isbn=978-1860-570-339 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TnLaAAAAMAAJ |page=48,150}}</ref><!-- double-check conclusions here for due weight given rest of book: see https://martinjohnes.com/2016/10/20/aberfan/ -->

====Motorcyclists' protective clothing standards====

With the advent of the European standard for [[Motorcycle personal protective equipment|motorcyclists' protective clothing]] (EN 17092), [[Bennetts]] and ''[[Motor Cycle News]]'' asserted that "the testing standards now used to certify motorcycle riding kit have reduced protection levels by as much as 90%" because of regulatory capture as industry representatives accounted for half the standards committee members including its chair, noting "Few will be aware of the intense opposition [to higher safety standards] from within the industry."<ref>Motorcycle News (2019) 'The Man Who Invented Our Kit Standards', 27 November, pp. 28–29.</ref> However, there is a shortage of academic research into regulatory capture regarding motorcyclists' PPE standards.

===United States<span class="anchor" id="United States examples"></span>===

====Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement====
In the aftermath of the 2010 [[Deepwater Horizon oil spill]], the Minerals Management Service (MMS), which had regulatory responsibility for offshore oil drilling, was widely cited as an example of regulatory capture.<ref name="wsj-frank">[[Thomas Frank (political commentator)|Thomas Frank]], [https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124580461065744913 "Obama and 'Regulatory Capture'"] ''[[The Wall Street Journal]]'' (June 24, 2010). Retrieved April 5, 2011</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=The Gulf Spill, the Financial Crisis and Government Failure |first=Gerald |last=O'Driscoll |newspaper=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |date=12 June 2010 |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704575304575296873167457684?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopOpinion }}</ref> The MMS then became the [[Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement]] (BOEMRE) and on October 1, 2010, the collection of mineral leases was split off from the agency and placed under the [[United States Department of the Interior|Department of the Interior]] as the [[Office of Natural Resources Revenue]] (ONRR). On October 1, 2011, BOEMRE was then split into two bureaus, the [[Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement]] (BSEE) and the [[Bureau of Ocean Energy Management]] (BOEM).<ref name="lawbrief-hall">Keith B. Hall, [http://www.oilgaslawbrief.com/offshore-drilling-and-production/boemre-splits----becomes-bsee-and-boem/ "BOEMRE splits &ndash; becomes BSEE and BOEM"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111211214110/http://www.oilgaslawbrief.com/offshore-drilling-and-production/boemre-splits----becomes-bsee-and-boem/ |date=2011-12-11 }} ''Oil & Gas Law Brief'' (October 4, 2011). Retrieved February 17, 2012</ref>

The three-stage reorganization, including the name change to BOEMRE, was part of a re-organization by [[Ken Salazar]],<ref name="lawbrief-hall" /> who was sworn into office as the new [[United States Secretary of the Interior|Secretary of the Interior]] on the same day the name change was announced.<ref name="BOEMRE">[http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/2010/press0621.htm "Salazar Swears-In Michael R. Bromwich to Lead Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement"] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100626003005/http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/2010/press0621.htm |date=June 26, 2010 }} Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (June 21, 2010). Retrieved April 8, 2011</ref> Salazar's appointment was controversial because of his ties to the energy industry.<ref name="nyt-broder">John M. Broder, [https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/us/politics/18salazarcnd.html "Environmentalists Wary of Obama's Interior Pick"] ''[[The New York Times]]'' (December 17, 2008). Retrieved April 8, 2011</ref> As a senator, Salazar voted against an amendment to repeal tax breaks for [[ExxonMobil]] and other major [[petroleum]] companies<ref>[http://www.lcv.org/images/client/pdfs/LCV_Scorecard_05_FINAL_lores.pdf "2005 "National Environmental Scorecard"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081219045249/http://www.lcv.org/images/client/pdfs/LCV_Scorecard_05_FINAL_lores.pdf |date=2008-12-19 }} (PDF) League of Conservation Voters</ref> and in 2006, he voted to end protections that limit [[offshore oil drilling]] in [[Florida]]'s [[Gulf of Mexico|Gulf]] Coast.<ref>{{cite report |url=http://lcv.org/images/client/pdfs/LCV_2006_Scorecard_final.pdf |title=National Environmental Scorecard |date=2006 |orig-date=Second session 109th Congress |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081218004000/http://www.lcv.org/images/client/pdfs/LCV_2006_Scorecard_final.pdf |archive-date=2008-12-18 |publisher=League of Conservation Voters}}</ref> One of Salazar's immediate tasks was to "[end] the [[United States Department of the Interior|department's]] coziness with the industries it regulates"<ref name="nyt-broder" /> but Daniel R. Patterson, a member of the [[Arizona House of Representatives]], said "Salazar has a disturbingly weak conservation record, particularly on energy development, global warming, endangered wildlife and protecting scientific integrity. It's no surprise oil and gas, mining, agribusiness and other polluting industries that have dominated Interior are supporting rancher Salazar – he's their friend".<ref name="nyt-broder" /> Indeed, a spokesman for the [[National Mining Association]], which lobbies for the mining industry, praised Salazar, saying that he was not doctrinaire about the use of [[Public land#United States|public lands]].<ref name="nyt-broder" />

MMS had allowed [[BP]] and dozens of other companies to drill in the [[Gulf of Mexico]] without first attaining permits to assess threats to [[endangered species]], as required by law.<ref name="nyt-urbina">Ian Urbina, [https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14agency.html "U.S. Said to Allow Drilling Without Needed Permits"] ''The New York Times'' (May 13, 2010). Retrieved April 8, 2011</ref> BP and other companies were also given a blanket exemption ([[National Environmental Policy Act#Preparation of a Categorical Exclusion|categorical exclusion]])<ref>Lopez, Jaclyn. "[https://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/ecolwcur37&section=21 BP's Well Evaded Environmental Review]: Categorical Exclusion Policy Remains Unchanged". Ecology L. Currents 37 (2010): 1.</ref> from having to provide [[environmental impact statement]]s.<ref name="nyt-urbina" /> The [[National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]] (NOAA) issued strong warnings about the risks posed by such drilling and in a 2009 letter, accused MMS of understating the likelihood and potential consequences of a major spill in the Gulf of Mexico.<ref name="nyt-urbina" /> The letter further accused MMS of highlighting the safety of [[offshore drilling]] while understating the risks and impact of spills and playing down the fact that spills had been increasing.<ref name="nyt-urbina" /> Both current and former MMS staff scientists said their reports were overruled and altered if they found a high risk of accident or environmental impact.<ref name="nyt-urbina" /> Kieran Suckling, director of the [[Center for Biological Diversity]], said, "MMS has given up any pretense of regulating the offshore oil industry. The agency seems to think its mission is to help the oil industry evade environmental laws".<ref name="nyt-urbina" />

After the Deepwater accident occurred, Salazar said he would delay granting any further drilling permits. Three weeks later, at least five more permits had been issued by the minerals agency.<ref name="nyt-urbina" /> In March 2011, BOEMRE began issuing more offshore drilling permits in the Gulf of Mexico.<ref name="wsj-rydez">Ryan Dezember, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704461304576216563662728054 "U.S. to Issue More Gulf Drilling Permits"] ''The Wall Street Journal'' (March 22, 2011). Retrieved April 8, 2011</ref> [[Michael Bromwich]], head of BOEMRE, said he was disturbed by the speed at which some oil and gas companies were shrugging off Deepwater Horizon as "a complete aberration, a perfect storm, one in a million", but would nonetheless soon be granting more permits to drill for oil and gas in the gulf.<ref name="wsj-rydez" />

====Federal Aviation Administration====
Since the [[Federal Aviation Administration]] (FAA) charter was amended in 1996, its sole focus has been the regulation of safety.{{citation needed|date=April 2019}} A report by the [[U.S. Department of Transportation]] found that FAA managers had allowed [[Southwest Airlines]] to fly 46 airplanes in 2006 and 2007 that were overdue for safety inspections, ignoring concerns raised by inspectors. Audits of other airlines resulted in two airlines grounding hundreds of planes, causing thousands of flight cancellations.<ref name="ainonline">Paul Lowe, [http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2008-08-31/bill-proposes-distance-between-airlines-and-faa-regulators "Bill proposes distance between airlines and FAA regulators"] AINonline.com (September 1, 2008). Retrieved April 11, 2011</ref> The [[United States House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee|House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee]] investigated the matter after two FAA [[whistleblower]]s, inspectors Charalambe "Bobby" Boutris and Douglas E. Peters, contacted them. Boutris said he attempted to ground Southwest after finding cracks in the [[fuselage]], but was prevented by supervisors he said were friendly with the airline.<ref name="latimes-faa">Johanna Neuman, [https://www.latimes.com/travel/la-trw-airlines4apr04,0,4935961.story "FAA's 'culture of coziness' targeted in airline safety hearing"] ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'' (April 3, 2008). Retrieved April 11, 2011</ref> The committee subsequently held hearings in April 2008. [[James Oberstar]], former chairman of the committee said its investigation uncovered a pattern of regulatory abuse and widespread regulatory lapses, allowing 117 aircraft to be operated commercially although not in compliance with FAA safety rules.<ref name="latimes-faa" /> Oberstar said there was a "culture of coziness" between senior FAA officials and the airlines and "a systematic breakdown" in the FAA's culture that resulted in "malfeasance, bordering on corruption".<ref name="latimes-faa" />

As of 2023, aviation in the United States, the field in which the FAA is tasked to regulate, has had an unparalleled safety streak. Because of this, U.S. regulatory policy in this sector is regarded as one of the best in the world.<ref name="USA Today 2018">[https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/04/19/airlines-including-southwest-so-safe-its-hard-rank-them-safety/533166002/ "Airlines, including Southwest, are so safe it's hard to rank them by safety"] USAToday.com (April 20, 2018). Retrieved March 3, 2023</ref> With an estimated 29,000 flights daily, the United States hasn't had a major commercial aviation disaster since [[Colgan Air Flight 3407]] in February 2009.

On July 22, 2008, a bill was unanimously approved in the Democrat-controlled [[United States House|House]] to tighten regulations concerning airplane maintenance procedures, including the establishment of a whistleblower office and a two-year "cooling off" period that FAA inspectors or supervisors of inspectors must wait before they can work for those they regulated.<ref name="ainonline" /><ref>Library of Congress, Thomas Official Website [http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.110hr6493 Bill Summary & Status 110th Congress (2007 - 2008) H.R.6493]</ref> The bill also required the rotation of principal maintenance inspectors and stipulated that the word "customer" properly applies to the flying public, not those entities regulated by the FAA.<ref name="ainonline" /> The bill died in the [[United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation]] that year.<ref>Library of Congress, Thomas Official Website [http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.110s3440 Bill Summary & Status 110th Congress (2007 - 2008) S.3440]</ref> In 2008 the FAA proposed to fine Southwest $10.2 million for failing to inspect older planes for cracks,<ref name="ap-mailtrib/msnbc">David Koenig, [http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080307/BIZ/803070316/-1/rss05 "Southwest Airlines faces $10.2 million fine"] ''[[Mail Tribune]]'', [[Associated Press]] (March 6, 2008). Retrieved April 11, 2011</ref> and in 2009 Southwest and the FAA agreed that Southwest would pay a $7.5 million penalty and would adopt new safety procedures, with the fine doubling if Southwest failed to follow through.<ref>John Hughes for Bloomberg News. March 2, 2009. [https://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avFzkpTRRnHc&refer=us Southwest Air Agrees to $7.5 Million Fine, FAA Says (Update2)]</ref> In September 2009, FAA Administrator [[Randy Babbitt]] issued a directive mandating that the agency use the term "customers" only to refer to the flying public.<ref>[https://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2009-09-17-faa-airline-customers_N.htm "FAA will stop calling airlines 'customers'"] Reuters, ''USA Today'' (September 18, 2009). Retrieved October 17, 2009</ref>

Prior to the [[airline deregulation#Airline deregulation in the United States|deregulation of the US air industry]], the [[Civil Aeronautics Board]] served to maintain an [[oligopoly]] of US airlines.<ref>Roger A. Arnold, [https://books.google.com/books?id=9-wGxBXFKNIC&pg=PA497 ''Economics''] Google Books. Thomson South-Western, 8th edition (2008) p.&nbsp;497. {{ISBN|978-0-324-53801-4}}. Retrieved April 12, 2011</ref><ref>Lori Alden, [http://www.econoclass.com/imperfectcompetition.html "Why are some firms more profitable than others?"] econoclass.com (2007). Retrieved April 12, 2011</ref>

In a June 2010 article on regulatory capture, the FAA was cited as an example of "old-style" regulatory capture, "in which the airline industry openly dictates to its regulators its governing rules, arranging for not only beneficial regulation but placing key people to head these regulators".<ref name="davidoff-regcap">Steven M. Davidoff, [https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture/ "The Government's Elite and Regulatory Capture"] ''The New York Times'' (June 11, 2010). Retrieved April 11, 2011</ref>

That the FAA was a victim of regulatory capture was one focus of a [[United States Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Aviation and Space]] meeting held in the wake of the [[Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302]] crash that followed a previous crash of a [[Lion Air]] flight and claimed 157 lives. The [[Boeing 737 MAX]] platform that crashed had been subjected to only an "amended" [[airworthiness]] [[type certificate]]. The [[NTSB]] was tasked with investigating the FAA's certification process.<ref name=dots>{{cite news |last1=Olive |first1=David |title=Boeing 737 Max raises questions about plane safety process |url=https://www.thestar.com/business/opinion/2019/03/31/boeing-737-max-raises-questions-about-plane-safety-process.html |newspaper=Toronto Star |date=March 31, 2019}}</ref>

====Federal Communications Commission====
Legal scholars have pointed to the possibility that federal agencies such as the [[Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) have been captured by [[media conglomerates]]. Peter Schuck of [[Yale Law School]] has argued that the FCC is subject to capture by the media industries' leaders and therefore reinforce the operation of corporate cartels in a form of "corporate socialism" that serves to "regressively tax consumers, impoverish small firms, inhibit new entry, stifle innovation, and diminish [[consumer choice]]".<ref>{{cite news
  |first=Hannibal |last=Travis
  |title=Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a First Amendment Right
  |ssrn=1025474 |work=Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, p. 148 |publisher=President and Trustees of Hofstra University in Long Island, New York, quoting Peter H. Shuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90 YALE L.J. 702, 707-10 (1981) (book review)  | year=2007 }}</ref> The FCC selectively granted communications licenses to some radio and television stations in a process that excluded other citizens and little stations from having access to the public.<ref>{{cite news
  |first=Hannibal |last=Travis
  |title=Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a First Amendment Right
  |ssrn=1025474 |work=Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, p. 152 |publisher=President and Trustees of Hofstra University in Long Island, New York, citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389, 396 (1969)  | year=2007 }}</ref>

[[Michael K. Powell]], who served on the FCC for eight years and was chairman for four, was appointed president and [[chief executive officer]] of the [[National Cable & Telecommunications Association]], a lobby group, effective April 25, 2011. His role has been the cable industry's leading advocate, spokesman, and representative in its relationship with the U.S. Congress, the Administration, the FCC, and other federal agencies.<ref>[http://smartpei.typepad.com/robert_patersons_weblog/2011/03/regulatory-capture-in-action.html "Regulatory Capture in Action"] Robert Paterson, blog (March 15, 2011). Retrieved April 12, 2011</ref>

[[Meredith Attwell Baker]] was one of the FCC commissioners who approved a controversial merger between [[NBC Universal]] and [[Comcast]]. Four months later, she announced her resignation from the FCC to join Comcast's Washington, D.C. lobbying office.<ref name="nyt-ew">Edward Wyatt, [http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/f-c-c-commissioner-to-join-comcast/ "F.C.C. Commissioner Leaving to Join Comcast"] ''The New York Times'' (May 11, 2011). Retrieved May 12, 2011</ref> Legally, she is prevented from lobbying anyone at the FCC for two years and an agreement made by Comcast with the FCC as a condition of approving the merger will ban her from lobbying any [[executive branch]] agency for life.<ref name="nyt-ew" /> Nonetheless, Craig Aaron, of [[Free Press (advocacy group)|Free Press]], who opposed the merger, complained that "the complete capture of government by industry barely raises any eyebrows" and said public policy would continue to suffer from the "continuously revolving door at the FCC".<ref name="nyt-ew" />

In July 2019, congresswomen [[Elizabeth Warren]] and [[Pramila Jayapal]] issued a letter (citing a report by the [[Project On Government Oversight]]) showing concerns for the composition of the FCC's Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC), questioning whether it could effectively serve the public interest if the majority of its members were representatives of the private sector. They wrote that "having the FCC's policy-making process rely on input from individuals employed by, or affiliated with, the corporations that it is tasked with overseeing is the very definition of regulatory capture".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thehill.com/policy/technology/451159-warren-jayapal-question-fcc-over-industrys-influence|title=Warren, Jayapal question FCC over industry's influence|last=Neidig|first=Harper|date=2019-07-01|website=TheHill|language=en|access-date=2019-07-22}}</ref>

====Food and Drug Administration====
{{Expand section|date=November 2024}}
The [[Food and Drug Administration]] is considered to suffer from regulatory capture.{{how|date=January 2025}}<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Heims |first1=Eva |last2=Moxon |first2=Sophie |date=January 2024 |title=Mechanisms of regulatory capture: Testing claims of industry influence in the case of Vioxx |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12531 |journal=Regulation & Governance |language=en |volume=18 |issue=1 |pages=139–157 |doi=10.1111/rego.12531 |issn=1748-5983|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Moynihan |first=Ray |date=2002-09-14 |title=Alosetron: a case study in regulatory capture, or a victory for patients' rights? |journal=British Medical Journal |volume=325 |issue=7364 |pages=592–595 |doi=10.1136/bmj.325.7364.592 |issn=0959-8138 |pmc=1124108 |pmid=12228140}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Jacobs |first=Maxim |date=2021-06-12 |title=The Regulatory Capture of the FDA |url=https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-regulatory-capture-of-the-fda/ |access-date=2024-09-02 |website=The American Conservative |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bien |first1=Jeffrey |last2=Prasad |first2=Vinay |date=2016-09-27 |title=Future jobs of FDA's haematology-oncology reviewers |url=https://www.bmj.com/content/354/bmj.i5055 |journal=BMJ |language=en |volume=354 |pages=i5055 |doi=10.1136/bmj.i5055 |issn=1756-1833 |pmid=27677772|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

====Federal Reserve Bank of New York====
The [[Federal Reserve Bank of New York]] (New York Fed) is the most influential of the Federal Reserve Banking System. Part of the New York Fed's responsibilities is the regulation of [[Wall Street]], but its president is selected by and reports to a board dominated by the chief executives of some of the banks it oversees.<ref name="nyt-geithner">{{cite news |last1=Becker |first1=Jo |last2=Morgenson |first2=Gretchen |title=Geithner, Member and Overseer of Finance Club |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/business/27geithner.html |work=The New York Times |date=27 April 2009 }}</ref> While the New York Fed has always had a closer relationship with Wall Street, during the years that [[Timothy Geithner]] was president, he became unusually close with the scions of Wall Street banks,<ref name="nyt-geithner" /> a time when banks and [[hedge fund]]s were pursuing investment strategies that caused the [[2008 financial crisis]], which the Fed failed to stop.

During the crisis, several major banks that were on the verge of collapse were rescued via the [[Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008]].<ref name="nyt-geithner" /> Geithner engineered the New York Fed's purchase of $30 billion of [[credit default swap]]s from [[American International Group]] (AIG), which it had sold to [[Goldman Sachs]], [[Merrill Lynch]], [[Deutsche Bank]] and [[Société Générale]]. By purchasing these contracts, the banks received a "back-door bailout" of 100 cents on the dollar for the contracts.<ref name="bberg-reilly">David Reilly, [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-01-28/secret-banking-cabal-emerges-from-aig-shadows-david-reilly.html "Secret Banking Cabal Emerges From AIG Shadows"] Bloomberg (January 29, 2010). Retrieved April 11, 2011</ref> Had the New York Fed allowed AIG to fail, the contracts would have been worth much less, resulting in much lower costs for any taxpayer-funded bailout.<ref name="bberg-reilly" /> Geithner defended his use<ref name="bberg-reilly" /> of unprecedented amounts of taxpayer funds to save the banks from their own mistakes,<ref name="nyt-geithner" /> saying the financial system would have been threatened. At the January 2010 congressional hearing into the AIG bailout, the New York Fed initially refused to identify the [[counterparty|counterparties]] that benefited from AIG's bailout, claiming the information would harm AIG.<ref name="bberg-reilly" /> When it became apparent this information would become public, a legal staffer at the New York Fed e-mailed colleagues to warn them, lamenting the difficulty of continuing to keep Congress in the dark.<ref name="bberg-reilly" /> [[Jim Rickards]] calls the bailout a crime and says "the regulatory system has become captive to the banks and the non-banks".<ref>Eric King, [http://kingworldnews.com/kingworldnews/Broadcast/Entries/2010/12/7_Jim_Rickards__Part_II.html Part II, Interview with Jim Rickards] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110303222812/http://www.kingworldnews.com/kingworldnews/Broadcast/Entries/2010/12/7_Jim_Rickards__Part_II.html |date=2011-03-03 }} King World News (December 7, 2010). Retrieved May 14, 2011</ref>

====Interstate Commerce Commission====
Historians, political scientists, and economists have often used the [[Interstate Commerce Commission]] (ICC), a now-defunct federal regulatory body in the United States, as a classic example of regulatory capture. The creation of the ICC was the result of widespread and longstanding anti-railroad agitation. [[Richard Olney]], a prominent railroad lawyer, was asked by a railroad president if he could do something to get rid of the ICC.<ref name=Bernstein>{{cite book |last=Bernstein |first=Marver H. |title=Regulating Business by Independent Commission |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jETWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA265 |date=1955 |publisher=Princeton University Press |page=265|isbn=9781400878789 }} Letter by Richard Olney to Charles Perkins, President, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad, December 28, 1892.</ref> Olney, who later was appointed [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] in the [[Grover Cleveland]] administration, replied in an 1892 letter:
{{blockquote|The Commission… is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for government supervision of the railroads, at the same time that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things.… The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.<ref name=Bernstein/>}}

While the [[Interstate Commerce Act]] forbade "undue and unreasonable prejudice" against interstate passengers, in the sixty-six years before [[Sarah Keys v. Carolina Coach Company]] (1955) the ICC had ruled against every black petitioner bringing a [[racial segregation]] complaint, earning the nickname "The Supreme Court of the [[Confederate States of America|Confederacy]]".<ref>{{cite journal|title=Making History in a Segregated Washington: Dovey Johnson Roundtree and her 45-year Fight for Justice|first=Katie |last=McCabe|url=http://www.badc.org/files/journal/JBADC2011.pdf|page=84|journal=Journal of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia|date=15 May 2011
|volume=XLII|issue=I|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120105225311/http://badc.org/files/journal/JBADC2011.pdf|archive-date=January 5, 2012}}</ref> The ICC then failed to enforce ''Keys vs. Carolina Coach'', attempting to justify segregation on a [[separate but equal]] basis for six years before being forced by the [[United States Department of Justice|Department of Justice]] under then-[[Attorney General of the United States|Attorney General]] [[Robert F. Kennedy]] to act in response to the [[Freedom Riders]] protests of 1961.<ref>{{cite book |last=Barnes |first=Catherine A. |location=New York |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=1983 |title=Journey from Jim Crow: The Desegregation of Southern Transit |chapter=Freedom Ride |pages=168–169 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=McCabe |first=Katie |date=2013-03-07 |title=Building "The Beloved Community" The Roundtree Residences and the Vision of Dovey Roundtree |website=The Capital News |url=http://www.thecapitalnews.com/building-the-beloved-community-the-roundtree-residences-and-the-vision-of-dovey-roundtree/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160306173222/http://www.thecapitalnews.com/building-the-beloved-community-the-roundtree-residences-and-the-vision-of-dovey-roundtree/ |archive-date=2016-03-06}}</ref>

====Nuclear Regulatory Commission====
According to [[Frank N. von Hippel]], despite the 1979 [[Three Mile Island accident]] in Pennsylvania, the [[Nuclear Regulatory Commission]] (NRC) has often been too timid in ensuring that America's 104 commercial reactors are operated safely:

<blockquote>Nuclear power is a textbook example of the problem of "regulatory capture" – in which an industry gains control of an agency meant to regulate it. Regulatory capture can be countered only by vigorous public scrutiny and Congressional oversight, but in the 32 years since Three Mile Island, interest in nuclear regulation has declined precipitously.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/opinion/24Von-Hippel.html |title=It Could Happen Here |author=Frank Von Hippel |date=March 23, 2011|work=New York Times}}</ref></blockquote>

Then-candidate [[Barack Obama]] said in 2007 that the five-member NRC had become "captive of the industries that it regulates" and Joe Biden indicated he had absolutely no confidence in the agency.<ref name="salon-je">Justin Elliott, [https://archive.today/20130104144649/http://www.salon.com/news/japan_earthquake/index.html?story=/politics/war_room/2011/03/17/jeff_merrifield_nuclear_energy_institute "Ex-regulator flacking for pro-nuke lobby"] Salon.com (March 17, 2011). Retrieved March 18, 2011</ref>

The NRC has given a license to "every single reactor requesting one", according to [[Greenpeace USA]] nuclear policy analyst Jim Riccio to refer to the agency approval process as a "rubber stamp".<ref name="mothrjns">Kate Sheppard, [http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/japan-nuclear-regulatory-commission "Is the Government's Nuclear Regulator Up to the Job?"] ''[[Mother Jones (magazine)|Mother Jones]]'' (March 17, 2011). Retrieved March 18, 2011</ref> In Vermont, ten days after the [[2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami]] that damaged Japan's [[2011 Fukushima I nuclear accidents|Daiichi plant]] in [[Fukushima Prefecture|Fukushima]], the NRC approved a 20-year extension for the license of [[Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant]], although the [[Vermont state legislature]] had voted overwhelmingly to deny such an extension.<ref name="mothrjns" /><ref>[https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/vermont-yankee.html "Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station-License Renewal"] NRC, official website. Retrieved April 04, 2011</ref> The Vermont plant uses the same [[Nuclear safety in the United States#GE Mark 1 reactor design|GE Mark 1 reactor design]] as the Fukushima Daiichi plant.<ref name="mothrjns" /> The plant had been found to be leaking [[radioactive]] materials through a network of underground pipes, which [[Entergy]], the company running the plant, had denied [[Oath#Modern law|under oath]] even existed. Representative Tony Klein, who chaired the [[Vermont House of Representatives|Vermont House]] Natural Resources and Energy Committee, said that when he asked the NRC about the pipes at a hearing in 2009, the NRC didn't know about their existence, much less that they were leaking.<ref name="mothrjns" /> On March 17, 2011, the [[Union of Concerned Scientists]] (UCS) released a study critical of the NRC's 2010 performance as a regulator. The UCS said that through the years, it had found the NRC's enforcement of safety rules has not been "timely, consistent, or effective" and it cited 14 "near-misses" at U.S. plants in 2010 alone.<ref name="wapo-jly">Jia Lynn Yang, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/democrats-step-up-pressure-on-nuclear-regulators-over-disaster-preparedness/2011/03/17/ABLd66n_story.html "Democrats step up pressure on nuclear regulators over disaster preparedness"] ''The Washington Post'' (March 18, 2011). Retrieved March 19, 2011</ref> Tyson Slocum, an energy expert at [[Public Citizen]] said the nuclear industry has "embedded itself in the political establishment" through "reliable friends from George Bush to Barack Obama", and that the government "has really just become cheerleaders for the industry".<ref name="lichtblau">{{cite news |first=Eric |last=Lichtblau |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25lobby.html |title=Lobbyists' Long Effort to Revive Nuclear Industry Faces New Test |newspaper=The New York Times |date=March 24, 2011 |access-date=March 25, 2011}}</ref>

Although the exception, there have been instances of a [[revolving door (politics)|revolving door]]. Jeffrey Merrifield, who was on the NRC from 1997 to 2008 and was appointed by presidents [[Bill Clinton|Clinton]] and [[George W. Bush|Bush]], left the NRC to take an executive position at [[The Shaw Group]],<ref name="mothrjns" /> which has a nuclear division regulated by the NRC.<ref group=note>[[Pete Domenici]], a former [[U.S. senator]] now promotes nuclear energy. Over the course of his 20 years in government, he received $1.25 million in political contributions connected with the energy sector. From 2000 to 2010, the nuclear industry and people who work in it, contributed $4.6 million to members of Congress, in addition to the $54 million spent by electric utilities, trade groups and other supporters to hire lobbyists, including some former members of Congress. (See {{harvnb|Lichtblau|2011}})</ref>

The NRC Inspector General's report detailed that Merrifield had voted twice on matters involving companies he had contacted about job prospects. In addition, the report noted that Merrifield called a senior executive at another utility to request that he encourage other companies to return calls about his job search. The report also noted that Merrifield failed to report certain reimbursed travel expenses for himself and his family.<ref>{{Cite news|date=October 29, 2009|title=Nuclear regulator broke rules, says inspector general|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/28/AR2009102804764.html|access-date=August 30, 2021|newspaper=The Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=September 17, 2009|title=Alleged conflict of interest by former NRC commissioner (Case No. 07-63)|url=http://pogoarchives.org/m/nss/mf/ig-merrifield-memo-20090917.pdf|access-date=August 30, 2021|website=Project on Government Oversight}}</ref>

One of those interviewed by the NRC Inspector General was Dale Klein, Chairman of the NRC at the time. Klein commented that "Merrifield generally was a staunch advocate of his chosen positions and was reluctant to change his mind." The interview notes also indicated that "other Commissioners also commented that Merrifield was excessively touting his accomplishments within [a] task force, but Klein indicated that this self-promoting tendency by Merrifield was not unique to this issue."<ref>{{Cite web|title=NRC OIG- Memorandum of Interview|url=http://pogoarchives.org/m/nss/mf/ig-interview-klein-20071119.pdf}}</ref>

Although the NRC referred the matter to the Justice Department for civil action and to the U.S. Attorney's office for criminal action, neither office pursued the matter.<ref>{{Cite web|date=May 7, 2011|title=Nuclear Agency Is Criticized as Too Close to Its Industry|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/08/business/energy-environment/08nrc.html|website=The New York Times}}</ref> The same U.S. Attorney's Office declined all 20 similar referrals for prosecution during the period from 2004 to 2008.<ref>{{Cite web|title=IG Investigation Spurred by POGO Found Former NRC Commissioner Merrifield Violated Ethics Laws|url=https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2009/10/ig-investigation-spurred-by-pogo-found-former-nrc-commissioner-merrifield-violated-ethics-laws/|website=POGO - The Project on Government Oversight|date=29 October 2009 }}</ref>

A year-long [[Associated Press]] (AP) investigation showed that the NRC, working with the industry, has relaxed regulations so that ageing reactors can remain in operation.<ref name="ap-jdonn">Jeff Donn, [http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2011/06/20/us_aging_nukes_part_1/index.html "U.S. nuclear regulators weaken safety rules"] Salon.com (June 20, 2011). Retrieved June 20, 2011</ref> The AP found that wear and tear of plants, such as clogged lines, cracked parts, leaky seals, rust and other deterioration resulted in 26 alerts about emerging safety problems and may have been a factor in 113 of the 226 alerts issued by the NRC between 2005 and June 2011.<ref name="ap-jdonn" /> The NRC repeatedly granted the industry permission to delay repairs and problems often grew worse before they were fixed.<ref name="ap-jdonn" /><ref group=note>According to the AP, of the United States' 104 operating nuclear power plants, 82 are over 25 years old, the NRC has re-licensed 66 for 20 additional years and another 16 renewal applications are under review.</ref>

However, a paper by Stanford University economics professors John B. Taylor and Frank A. Wolak compared the financial services and nuclear industries. While acknowledging both are susceptible in principle to regulatory capture, they concluded regulatory failure – including through regulatory capture – has been much more of a problem in the financial industry and even suggested the financial industry create an analog to the [[Institute of Nuclear Power Operations]] to reduce regulatory risk.<ref>{{cite conference |first1=John B. |last1=Taylor |first2=Frank A. |last2=Wolak |title=13: A Comparison of Government Regulation of Risk in the Financial Services and Nuclear Power Industries |orig-date=3–4 October 2011 |type=Draft |conference=Nuclear Enterprise Conference |location=Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ. |url=https://web.stanford.edu/~johntayl/Drell-Shultz_NuclearEnterprise_ch13.pdf |access-date=2022-08-21}}</ref>

====Office of the Comptroller of the Currency====
The [[Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]] (OCC) has strongly opposed the efforts of the 50 [[state attorney general|state attorneys general]], who have banded together to penalize banks and reform the mortgage modification process, following the [[subprime mortgage crisis]] and the [[2008 financial crisis]]. This example was cited in ''[[The New York Times]]'' as evidence that the OCC is "a captive of the banks it is supposed to regulate".<ref>Joe Nocera, [https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/business/economy/19nocera.html "An Advocate Who Scares Republicans"]  ''The New York Times'' (March 18, 2011). Retrieved March 19, 2011</ref>

====Securities and Exchange Commission====
The [[United States Securities and Exchange Commission]] (SEC) has also been accused of acting in the interests of [[Wall Street]] banks and [[hedge fund]]s and of dragging its feet or refusing to investigate cases or bring charges for [[fraud]] and [[insider trading]].<ref>[[Matt Taibbi]], [https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216 "Why Isn't Wall Street in Jail?"] ''[[Rolling Stone]]'' (February 16, 2011). Retrieved March 3, 2011</ref> Financial analyst [[Harry Markopolos]], who spent ten years trying to get the SEC to investigate [[Bernie Madoff]], called the agency "nonfunctional, captive to the industry".<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20090611155334/http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/jun2009/pi2009065_888396.htm "Madoff Whistleblower Markopolos Blasts SEC"] ''Bloomberg News'' (June 5, 2009). Retrieved March 29, 2011</ref>

Similarly in the case of the [[Allen Stanford]] [[Ponzi scheme]], there were repeated warnings of fraud from both inside and outside the SEC for more than a decade.<ref>{{cite book |first=Chidem |last=Kurdas |title=Political Sticky Wicket: The Untouchable Ponzi Scheme of Allen Stanford |date=15 September 2012 |publisher=CreateSpace |isbn=978-1479257584}}</ref> But the agency did not stop the fraud until 2009, after the Madoff scandal became public in 2008.

The SEC has been found by the [[U.S. Senate Committee on Finance]], the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] and a [[federal district court]] to have illegally dismissed an employee in September 2005 who was critical of superiors' refusal to pursue [[Wall Street]] titan [[John J. Mack|John Mack]]. Mack was suspected of giving insider information to [[Arthur J. Samberg]], head of [[Pequot Capital Management]],<ref>{{cite court |litigants=Gary J. Aguirre v. Securities and Exchange Commission |vol=551 |reporter=F. Supp. 2d |opinion=33 |pinpoint= |court=[[United States District Court for the District of Columbia]] Civil Action No. 06-1260 (ESH) |date=April 28, 2008 |via=Google Scholar |url=https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=Aguirre&hl=en&as_sdt=4,77,130,140&as_vis=1&case=186383328929363689&scilh=0 |access-date=March 1, 2011}}</ref> once one of the world's largest hedge funds.<ref name="nyt-may272010">[https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/business/28pequot.html "Pequot Capital and Its Chief Agree to Settle S.E.C. Suit for $28 Million"] ''The New York Times'' (May 27, 2010). Retrieved March 4, 2011</ref> After more than four years of legal battles, former SEC investigator [[Gary J. Aguirre]] filed papers in a [[Freedom of Information Act (United States)|Freedom of Information Act]] (FOIA) case he had against the SEC, seeking an order to force the SEC to turn over Pequot investigation records to him on the grounds that they had not charged anyone. Aguirre had already provided incriminating evidence of Pequot's insider trading involving [[Microsoft]] trades to the SEC in a letter on January 2, 2009.<ref name="gap">[http://www.whistleblower.org/press/press-release-archive/633-sec-settles-with-aguirre "SEC Settles with Aguirre"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110417223718/http://www.whistleblower.org/press/press-release-archive/633-sec-settles-with-aguirre |date=2011-04-17 }} [[Government Accountability Project]] (June 29, 2010) Retrieved February 21, 2011</ref> The morning after Aguirre's FOIA papers were filed,<ref name="gap" /> the SEC announced they had filed charges against Pequot and Pequot had agreed to [[Disgorgement (law)|disgorge]] $18 million in illegal gains and pay $10 million in penalties.<ref name="nyt-may272010" /><ref>[https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-88.htm "SEC Charges Pequot Capital Management and CEO Arthur Samberg With Insider Trading"] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission press release (May 27, 2010). Retrieved March 3, 2011</ref> A month later, the SEC settled Aguirre's [[wrongful termination]] lawsuit for $755,000.<ref>Gretchen Morgenson, [https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/business/30sec.html?_r=1 "SEC Settles With a Former Lawyer"] ''The New York Times'' (June 29, 2010). Retrieved February 21, 2011</ref>

The list of officials who have left the SEC for highly lucrative jobs in the private sector and who sometimes have returned to the SEC includes [[Arthur Levitt]], [[Robert Khuzami]],<ref>[https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-31.htm "Robert Khuzami Named SEC Director of Enforcement"] U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Press Release (February 19, 2009) Retrieved January 9, 2011</ref> [[Linda Chatman Thomsen]],<ref>Kara Scannell, [https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123958616552412509 "Davis Polk Recruits Ex-SEC Aide"] ''The Wall Street Journal'' (April 13, 2009) Retrieved February 26, 2011</ref> [[Richard H. Walker]],<ref>[https://archive.today/20120714152939/http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05E4D8123DF931A35753C1A9679C8B63 "Deutsche Bank Hires Former S.E.C. Official"] ''The New York Times'' (October 2, 2001). Retrieved March 4, 2011</ref> [[Gary Lynch]]<ref>Reed Abelson, [https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D07E6DF1038F930A3575AC0A960958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1 "Gary Lynch, Defender of Companies, Has His Critics"] ''The New York Times'' (September 3, 1996). Retrieved March 4, 2011</ref> and Paul R. Berger.<ref>Walt Bogdanich and Gretchen Morgenson, [https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/business/22hedge.html "S.E.C. Inquiry on Hedge Fund Draws Scrutiny"] ''The New York Times'' (October 22, 2006) Retrieved March 4, 2011</ref> The [[Project on Government Oversight]] (POGO) released a report on May 13, 2011, which found that between 2006 and 2010, 219 former SEC employees sought to represent clients before the SEC.<ref name="djn-sb">Suzanne Barlyn, [http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/markets/newsfeeditem.aspx?id=142552112053106 "DJ Compliance Watch: SEC Plan To Catch Big Fish Questioned"] Dow Jones Newswire (May 16, 2011). Retrieved May 23, 2011</ref><ref name="pogo-sec">[http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/financial-oversight/revolving-regulators/fo-fra-20110513.html "Revolving Regulators: SEC Faces Ethic Challenges with Revolving Door"] Project on Government Oversight (May 13, 2011). Retrieved May 23, 2011</ref> Former employees filed 789 statements notifying the SEC of their intent to represent outside clients before the commission, some filing within days of leaving the SEC.<ref name="djn-sb" /><ref name="pogo-sec" />

Reporter [[Matt Taibbi]] calls the SEC a classic case of regulatory capture. On August 17, 2011, Taibbi reported that in July 2001, a preliminary fraud investigation against [[Deutsche Bank]] was stymied by [[Richard H. Walker]], then SEC enforcement director, who began working as general counsel for Deutsche Bank in October 2001. [[Darcy Flynn]], an SEC lawyer, the whistleblower who exposed this case also revealed that for 20 years, the SEC had been routinely destroying all documents related to thousands of preliminary inquiries that were closed rather than proceeding to formal investigation. The SEC is legally required to keep files for 25 years and destruction is supposed to be done by the [[National Archives and Records Administration]]. The lack of files deprives investigators of possible background when investigating cases involving those firms. Documents were destroyed for inquiries into [[Bernard Madoff]], [[Goldman Sachs]], [[Lehman Brothers]], [[Citigroup]], [[Bank of America]] and other major Wall Street firms that played key roles in the [[2008 financial crisis]]. The SEC has since changed its policy on destroying those documents and as of August 2011, the SEC investigator general was investigating the matter.<ref>Matt Taibbi, [https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/is-the-sec-covering-up-wall-street-crimes-20110817 "Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes?"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170822123316/http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/is-the-sec-covering-up-wall-street-crimes-20110817 |date=2017-08-22 }} ''Rolling Stone'' (August 17, 2011). Retrieved August 19, 2011</ref><ref>Edward Wyatt, [https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/business/sec-illegally-destroyed-documents-whistle-blower-alleges.html "S.E.C. Files Were Illegally Destroyed, Lawyer Says"] ''The New York Times'' (August 17, 2011). Retrieved August 19, 2011</ref>

====Federal Trade Commission====
The decision known as ''[[In re Amway Corp.]]'', popularly called "Amway '79", made the FTC a captive regulator of the nascent [[multi-level marketing]] industry. The situation came to a head in December 2012, when hedge fund Pershing Square Capital management announced a $1-billion short position against the company, and evidently expected the FTC to act, which, to date, it has not. From a forensic accounting standpoint, there is no difference between a Ponzi scheme like the Madoff scandal, and a [[pyramid scheme]], except that in the latter the money is laundered through product sales, not an investment.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.sequenceinc.com/fraudfiles/category/pyramid-schemes-mlm/|title=Pyramid Schemes & MLM – Fraud Files Forensic Accounting Blog|website=www.sequenceinc.com|access-date=17 May 2018}}</ref> The press has widely reported on why the FTC won't act, e.g. Forbes<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattstroud/2013/07/22/ftc-bill-ackman-prosecute-herbalife/|title=Why The FTC Won't Take Bill Ackman's Advice To Prosecute Herbalife (Even Though It Should)|first=Matt|last=Stroud|website=[[Forbes]]|publisher=|access-date=17 May 2018}}</ref> though legal opinion has been very supportive in some quarters, such as William K. Black, who was instrumental in bringing thousands of criminal prosecutions in the S&L scandal, which was also rife with problems of regulatory capture.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/10/pyramid-scheme-fraudinvestorsrules.html|title=OPINION: Thinking outside the pyramid|publisher=|access-date=17 May 2018}}</ref>

====District of Columbia Taxicab Commission====
The District of Columbia Taxicab Commission has been criticized<ref>Marc Fisher, [https://web.archive.org/web/20120622051829/http://voices.washingtonpost.com/rawfisher/2008/04/dc_taxisno_zones_no_justice.html "D.C. Taxis &ndash; No Zones, No Justice?"] ''The Washington Post'' (April 23, 2008). Retrieved July 9, 2012</ref> for being beholden to taxi companies and drivers rather than ensuring that the district has access to a "safe, comfortable, efficient and affordable taxicab experience in well-equipped vehicles".<ref>[http://dctaxi.dc.gov/dctaxi/cwp/view,a,3,q,487847,dctaxiNav,|30623|.asp "About the DC Taxicab Commission"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120617034542/http://dctaxi.dc.gov/dctaxi/cwp/view%2Ca%2C3%2Cq%2C487847%2CdctaxiNav%2C%7C30623%7C.asp |date=2012-06-17 }}.  Retrieved July 9, 2012</ref>

====Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board and I-502====
Some commentators{{who|date=November 2022}} have acknowledged{{Weasel inline|date=November 2022}} that while [[Washington Initiative 502]] legalized marijuana, it did so in a manner that led to a state-run monopoly on legal marijuana stores with prices far above that of the existing medical dispensaries,<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/editorials/article25896523.html |date=November 14, 2014 |title=Unchecked pot dispensaries are undoing I-502 |access-date=February 17, 2019 |url-access=subscription |work=[[The News Tribune]] }}</ref> which the [[Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board]] is now trying to close down in favor of the recreational stores, where prices are two to five times higher than the product can be obtained elsewhere.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://blog.seattlepi.com/marijuana/2014/11/05/washington-now-has-the-worst-recreational-marijuana-law/#14671101=0&28162103=0|title=Washington now has the worst recreational marijuana law|date=5 November 2014|publisher=|access-date=17 May 2018}}</ref>

===Canada<span class="anchor" id="Canadian examples"></span>===

====Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission====
In August 2009, the [[Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission]] (CRTC) provisionally granted a request by [[Bell Canada]] to impose [[usage-based billing]] on Internet [[wholesale]]rs, igniting protest from both the wholesalers and consumers, who claimed that the CRTC was "kow-towing to Bell".<ref>[https://www.cbc.ca/news/science/crtc-wants-internet-pricing-answers-from-bell-1.778763 "CRTC wants internet pricing answers from Bell"] [[Canadian Broadcasting Company|CBC News]] (August 24, 2009). Retrieved April 5, 2011</ref>

On February 2, 2011, CRTC chair [[Konrad von Finckenstein]] testified before the [[Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology|House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology]] to defend the agency's decision. Critic [[Steve Anderson (open media activist)|Steve Anderson]] said, "The CRTC's stubbornness in the face of a mass public outcry demonstrates the strength of the Big Telecom lobby's influence. While government officials have recognized the need to protect citizens' communications interests, the CRTC has made it clear that their priorities lie elsewhere".<ref>[http://openmedia.ca/news/openmediaca-crtcs-stubbornness-adds-more-fuel-public-discontent "CRTC Chair Defends UBB Decision at Industry Committee Meeting amidst Backlash"] OpenMedia.ca (February 3, 2011). Retrieved April 4, 2011</ref>

===Japan<span class="anchor" id="Japanese examples"></span>===
In Japan, the line may be blurred between the goal of solving a problem and the different goal of making it look as if the problem is being addressed.<ref>Nakamura, Karen. [https://web.archive.org/web/20130625014127/http://ssjj.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/1/17.full.pdf+html  "Resistance and Co-optation: the Japanese Federation of the Deaf and its Relations with State Power"],''Social Science Japan Journal,'' Vol. 5, No. 1 (April 2002), p 19 (PDF 3 of 20).</ref>

====Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency====
Despite warnings about its safety, Japanese regulators from the [[Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency]] (NISA) approved a 10-year extension for the oldest of the six [[Nuclear reactor technology|reactors]] at [[Fukushima Daiichi]] just one month before a 9.0 magnitude [[2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami|earthquake and subsequent tsunami]] damaged reactors<ref name="nyt-januke">{{cite news |first1=Hiroko |last1=Tabuchi |author-link=Hiroko Tabuchi |first2=Norimitsu |last2=Onishi |first3=Ken |last3=Belson |title=Japan Extended Reactor's Life, Despite Warning |newspaper=The New York Times |date=March 21, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/asia/22nuclear.html |access-date=2011-03-22}}</ref> and caused a [[Nuclear meltdown|meltdown]]. The conclusion to the [[Diet of Japan]]'s report on Fukushima attributed this directly to regulatory capture.<ref>{{cite web |title=Reports |date=2012-10-25 |language=en |trans-work=The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) |script-work=ja:国会事故調 (NAIIC) |url=https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/ |access-date=2022-08-21 }}</ref>

Nuclear opponent<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress/index.php?p=37 |title=Comments by Fukushima Prefecture Governor Eisaku Sato Concerning Japan's Pluthermal (MOX fuel utilization) Program and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110724001523/http://www.greenaction-japan.org/modules/wordpress/index.php?p=37 |archive-date=2011-07-24 |work=Green Action |date=20 August 2002 |orig-date=4–5 June 2002 |access-date=2011-03-22}}</ref> [[Eisaku Sato (governor)|Eisaku Sato]], governor of [[Fukushima Prefecture]] from 1988 to 2006, said a conflict of interest is responsible for NISA's lack of effectiveness as a watchdog.<ref name="nyt-januke" /> The agency is under the [[Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry]], which encourages the development of Japan's nuclear industry. Inadequate inspections are reviewed by expert panels drawn primarily from academia and rarely challenge the agency.<ref name="nyt-januke" /> Critics say the main weakness in Japan's nuclear industry is weak oversight.<ref name="nyt-nomf">{{cite news |first1=Norimitsu |last1=Onishi |first2=Martin |last2=Fackler |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/world/asia/17japan.html |title=Japanese Officials Ignored or Concealed Dangers |newspaper=The New York Times |date=16 May 2011 |access-date=2011-05-17}}</ref> [[seismology|Seismologist]] [[Takashi Nakata]] said, "The regulators just rubber-stamp the utilities' reports".<ref name="bloom-japan">{{cite news |first1=Jason |last1=Clenfield |first2=Shigeru |last2=Sato |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awR8KsLlAcSo |title=Japan Nuclear Energy Drive Compromised by Conflicts of Interest |newspaper=[[Bloomberg News]] |date=12 December 2007 |access-date=March 22, 2011}}</ref>

Both the ministry and the agency have ties with nuclear plant operators, such as [[Tokyo Electric]]. Some former ministry officials have been offered lucrative jobs in a practice called ''[[amakudari]]'', "descent from heaven".<ref name="nyt-januke" /><ref name="nyt-nomf" /> A panel responsible for re-writing Japan's nuclear safety rules was dominated by experts and advisers from utility companies, said seismology professor [[Katsuhiko Ishibashi]], who quit the panel in protest, saying it was rigged and "unscientific".<ref name="nyt-nomf" /><ref name="bloom-japan" /> The new guidelines, established in 2006, did not set stringent industry-wide [[earthquake]] standards, rather nuclear plant operators were left to do their own inspections to ensure their plants were compliant.<ref name="nyt-nomf" /> In 2008, the NISA found all of Japan's reactors to be in compliance with the new earthquake guidelines.<ref name="nyt-nomf" />

[[Yoshihiro Kinugasa]] helped write Japan's nuclear safety rules, later conducted inspections and still in another position at another date, served on a licensing panel, signing off on inspections.<ref name="bloom-japan" />

====Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW)====
In 1996, the [[Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Japan)|Ministry of Health and Welfare]] (now combined with the Ministry of Labour) came under fire over the [[HIV-tainted blood scandal (Japan)|scandal of HIV-tainted blood]] being used to treat [[hemophiliac]]s.<ref name="jpri">{{cite report |first=Masao |last=Miyamoto |url=http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp23.html |title=Mental Castration, the HIV Scandal, and the Japanese Bureaucracy |publisher=Japan Policy Research Institute |date=August 1996 |access-date=April 1, 2011}}</ref>

Although warned about HIV contamination of blood products imported from the U.S., the ministry abruptly changed its position on heated and unheated blood products from the U.S., protecting the [[Green Cross (Japan)|Green Cross]] and the Japanese [[pharmaceutical industry]], keeping the Japanese market from being inundated with heat-treated blood from the United States.<ref name="jpri" /> Because the unheated blood was not taken off the market, 400 people died and over 3,000 people were infected with HIV.<ref name="jpri" />

No senior officials were indicted and only one lower-level manager was indicted and convicted.<ref name="jatimes">{{cite news |first=Tomoko |last=Otake |url=http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20091101x4.html |title=Ministry insider speaks out |newspaper=Japan Times |date=November 1, 2009 |access-date=April 1, 2011}}</ref> Critics say the major task of the ministry is the protection of industry, rather than of the population.<ref name="jpri" /> In addition, bureaucrats get ''[[amakudari]]'' jobs at related industries in their field upon retirement, a system which serves to inhibit regulators.<ref name="jpri" /> Moriyo Kimura, a critic who works at MHLW, says the ministry does not look after the interests of the public.<ref name="jatimes" />

===Philippines<span class="anchor" id="Philippine examples"></span>===
[[Tobacco control]] in the Philippines is largely vested in the Inter-Agency Committee on Tobacco (IACT) under Republic Act No. 9211 (Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003).<ref name="auto">{{Cite web|url=http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2003/06/23/republic-act-no-9211/|title=Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003|last=|first=|date=23 June 2003|website=|access-date=}}</ref> The IACT's membership includes pro-tobacco groups in the [[Department of Agriculture (Philippines)|Department of Agriculture]] and National Tobacco Administration,<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://nta.da.gov.ph/|title=National Tobacco Administration|last=|first=|date=|website=|access-date=}}</ref> as well as "a representative from the Tobacco Industry to be nominated by the legitimate and recognized associations of the industry", the [[Philippine Tobacco Institute]] (composed of the largest local cigarette producers and distributors).<ref name="auto"/> In a 2015 Philippine Supreme Court case, the Court ruled that the IACT as the "exclusive authority" in regulating various aspects tobacco control including access restrictions and tobacco advertisement, promotion, and sponsorships. In this case, the [[Department of Health (Philippines)|Department of Health]], which is the primary technical agency for disease control and prevention, was held to be without authority to create tobacco control regulations unless the IACT delegates this function.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=255|title=Department of Health v. Philip Morris Manufacturing (2015)|last=Philippine Supreme Court|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170704203643/http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=255|archive-date=2017-07-04|url-status=dead}}</ref> The IACT's organization also limits the Philippines' enforcement of the [[WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control|World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.congress.gov.ph/legisdocs/basic_17/HB00917.pdf|title=House Bill No. 917 (17th Congress)|last=Roque|first=Harry|date=|website=|access-date=}}</ref>

===International<span class="anchor" id="International examples"></span>===

====World Trade Organization====
The academic [[Thomas Alured Faunce]] has argued the [[World Trade Organization]] [[non-violation nullification of benefits]] claims, particularly when inserted in bilateral trade agreements, can facilitate intense lobbying by industry which can result in effective regulatory capture of large areas of governmental policy.<ref>Thomas A. Faunce, Warwick Neville and Anton Wasson, [http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/6705a.pdf "Non Violation Nullification of Benefit Claims: Opportunities and Dilemmas in a Rule-Based WTO Dispute Settlement System"] (PDF) Peace Palace Library. In M. Bray (Ed.), ''Ten Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Australian Perspectives''. Office of Trade Negotiations of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Commonwealth of Australia. Retrieved April 17, 2011</ref>

===Other examples===
McClean and Johnes argued that the [[sinking of the Titanic]] and its investigation illustrate an early example of regulatory failure and regulatory capture of the [[Board of Trade]] and [[Parliament of the United Kingdom|Parliament]] by the shipping industry.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McLean |first1=Iain |last2=Johnes |first2=Martin |title='Regulation run mad': The Board of Trade and the loss of the Titanic |journal=Public Administration |volume=78 |issue=4 |date=2000 |pages=729–730, 746–747|doi=10.1111/1467-9299.t01-1-00228 }}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Politics}}
{{Div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Elon Musk]]
* [[Department of Government Efficiency|DOGE]]
* [[Availability heuristic]]
* [[Campaign finance]]
* [[Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs]]
* [[Corporate welfare]]
* [[Crony capitalism]]
* [[Gaming the system]]
* [[Inverted totalitarianism]]
* [[Iron triangle (US politics)]]
* [[Mere-exposure effect]]
* [[Occupational licensing]]
* [[Regulator shopping]]
* [[Regulatory capitalism]]
* [[Rent seeking]]
* [[State capture]]
{{Div col end}}

;North American groups promoting transparency
* [[MAPLight.org]], tracks money and politics in the U.S.
* [[Sunlight Foundation]], promotes government transparency and accountability

==Notes==
{{reflist|group=note}}

==References==
{{Reflist|2}}

==Further reading==
{{wikiquote}}
* {{cite book |title=Regulating Business by Independent Commission |last1=Bernstein |first1=M. H. |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1955 |isbn=0691650381 }}
* Glover, P. 2007. [https://web.archive.org/web/20110726143814/http://www.healthdemocracy.org/painsure.html "A Crime Not a Crisis: Why Health Insurance Costs So Much"'].
* {{cite journal |last1=Huntington |first1=Samuel P. |title=The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest |journal=The Yale Law Journal |date=1952 |volume=61 |issue=4 |pages=467–509 |doi=10.2307/793586 |jstor=793586 |hdl=20.500.13051/13870 |url=https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol61/iss4/1 |hdl-access=free }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Laffont |first1=Jean-Jacques |last2=Tirole |first2=Jean |title=The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture |journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics |date=1991 |volume=106 |issue=4 |pages=1089–1127 |doi=10.2307/2937958 |jstor=2937958 |hdl=1721.1/64145 |hdl-access=free }}
* {{cite news |last1=Lee |first1=Timothy B. |title=Opinion {{!}} Entangling the Web |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/03/opinion/03lee.html |work=The New York Times |date=3 August 2006 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Levine |first1=Michael E. |last2=Forrence |first2=Jennifer L. |title=Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis |journal=Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization |date=1990 |volume=6 |pages=167–198 |doi=10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.167 |jstor=764987 }}
* Greg McMahon, [https://web.archive.org/web/20050627120912/http://www.iipe.org/conference2002/papers/McMahon.pdf Regulatory Capture: Causes and Effects] (PDF) International Institute for Public Ethics. Paper given October 4, 2002 conference, Brisbane, Australia.
* {{cite journal
|last= Mintz |first=Joel A. |title=Has Industry Captured The EPA?: Appraising Marver Bernstein's Captive Agency Theory After Fifty Years |journal= Fordham Environmental Law Review |volume=17 |issue=1 |year=2005 |pages= 1–36 |jstor=44175806 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Nakamura |first1=K. |title=Resistance and Co-optation: the Japanese Federation of the Deaf and its Relations with State Power |journal=Social Science Japan Journal |date=April 2002 |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=17–35 |doi=10.1093/ssjj/05.1.17 |doi-access=free }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Stigler |first1=George J. |title=The Theory of Economic Regulation |journal=The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science |date=1971 |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=3–21 |doi=10.2307/3003160 |jstor=3003160 |s2cid=18393956 |citeseerx=10.1.1.178.6588 }}
* {{cite book|title=[[100,000,000 Guinea Pigs]]|first1=Arthur|last1=Kallet|author1link=Arthur Kallet|first2=F.J.|last2=Schlink|author2link=F.J. Schlink|year=1933}}

{{corruption}}
{{conflict of interest}}
{{Biases}}
[[Category:Conflict of interest]]
[[Category:Economics of regulation]]
[[Category:Lobbying]]
[[Category:Political corruption]]
[[Category:Public choice theory]]