View source for Rational egoism

{{Distinguish|text = [[Egotism]]. For broader coverage of egoist philosophy, see [[Egoism]]. For other uses, see [[Egoist (disambiguation)]]}}
{{Individualism sidebar|expanded=philosophies}}
{{short description|Principle that an action is rational if it maximizes one's self-interest}}
'''Rational egoism''' (also called '''rational selfishness''') is the principle that an action is [[rational]] if and only if it maximizes one's [[self-interest]].<ref name="auto">Baier (1990), p. 201; Gert (1998), p. 69; Shaver (2002), §3; Moseley (2006), §2.</ref><ref>{{Citation|last=Shaver|first=Robert|title=Egoism|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-05-27}}</ref> As such, it is considered a [[normative]] form of [[egoism]],<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Egoism|first=Robert|last=Shaver|year=2019|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|editor-first=Edward N.|editor-last=Zalta|edition=Spring 2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/egoism/ }}</ref> though historically it has been associated with both [[positive statement|positive]] and normative forms.<ref name="Scanlan1999">{{cite journal|title=The Case against Rational Egoism in Dostoevsky's ''Notes from Underground''|first=James P.|last=Scanlan|year=1999|journal=Journal of the History of Ideas|volume=60|number=3|pages=549–567|publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press|doi=10.2307/3654018|jstor=3654018|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654018 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> In its strong form, rational egoism holds that to not pursue one's own interest is unequivocally [[irrational]]. Its weaker form, however, holds that while it is rational to pursue self-interest, failing to pursue self-interest is ''not always'' irrational.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Egoism|first=Alexander|last=Moseley|year=2006|encyclopedia=The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor1=J. Fieser|editor2=B. Dowden|url=http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/egoism.htm}}</ref>

Originally an element of [[nihilist]] philosophy in Russia, it was later popularised in English-speaking countries by Russian-American author [[Ayn Rand]].

== Origins ==
Rational egoism ({{langx|ru|разумный эгоизм}}) emerged as the dominant social philosophy of the [[Russian nihilist movement]], having developed in the works of nihilist philosophers [[Nikolay Chernyshevsky]] and [[Dmitry Pisarev]]. However, their terminology was largely obfuscated to avoid government censorship and the name ''rational egoism'' explicitly is unmentioned in the writings of both philosophers.<ref name="Scanlan1999" /><ref>{{cite journal|title=The Debate around Nihilism in 1860s Russian Literature|first=Sasha|last=St. John Murphy|year=2016|journal=Slovo|volume=28|number=2|pages=48–68|url=https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1514593/|doi=10.14324/111.0954-6839.045|publisher=School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London|doi-broken-date=24 June 2025}}</ref> Rational egoism was further embodied in Chernyshevsky's 1863 novel ''[[What Is to Be Done? (novel)|What Is to Be Done?]]'',<ref>{{cite book|author1=Andrzej Walicki|author2=Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka|title=A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ev4ad5wKI9oC&pg=PA196|year=1979|publisher=Stanford University Press|isbn=978-0-8047-1132-6|pages=196}}</ref> and was criticised in response by [[Fyodor Dostoyevsky]] in his 1864 work ''[[Notes from Underground]]''. For Chernyshevsky, rational egoism served as the basis for the [[socialist]] development of human society.<ref name="Scanlan1999" /><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.sparknotes.com/lit/underground/context.html |title=SparkNotes: Notes from Underground: Context |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |website=[[SparkNotes]] |access-date=2015-05-30 }}</ref>

English philosopher [[Henry Sidgwick]] discussed rational egoism in his book ''[[The Methods of Ethics]]'', first published in 1872.<ref>Sidgwick (1907)</ref> A method of ethics is "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what it is 'right' for them—to do, or seek to realize by voluntary action".<ref>Sidgwick (1907), p. 1</ref> Sidgwick considers three such procedures, namely, rational egoism, dogmatic intuitionism, and [[utilitarianism]]. Rational egoism is the view that, if rational, "an agent regards quantity of consequent pleasure and pain to himself alone important in choosing between alternatives of action; and seeks always the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain".<ref>Sidgwick (1907), p. 95</ref>

Sidgwick found it difficult to find any persuasive reason for preferring rational egoism over [[utilitarianism]]. Although utilitarianism can be provided with a rational basis and reconciled with the morality of common sense, rational egoism appears to be an equally plausible doctrine regarding what we have most reason to do. Thus we must "admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of Practical Reason, manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory".<ref>Sidgwick (1907), p. 508</ref>

== Ayn Rand ==
The author and philosopher [[Ayn Rand]] also discusses a theory that she called ''rational egoism''. She holds that it is both irrational and immoral to act against one's self-interest.<ref>Smith (2006); Moseley (2006), §2a.</ref> Thus, her view is a conjunction of both rational egoism (in the standard sense) and [[ethical egoism]], because according to [[Objectivism (Ayn Rand)|Objectivist philosophy]], egoism cannot be properly justified without an [[epistemology]] based on [[rationality|reason]].

Her book ''[[The Virtue of Selfishness]]'' (1964) explains the concept of rational egoism in depth. According to Rand, a rational man holds his own life as his highest value, rationality as his highest [[virtue]], and his happiness as the final purpose of his life.

Conversely, Rand was sharply critical of the [[ethical altruism|ethical doctrine of altruism]]:

{{quote|Do not confuse altruism with kindness, good will or respect for the rights of others. These are not primaries, but consequences, which, in fact, altruism makes impossible. The irreducible primary of altruism, the basic absolute is ''self-sacrifice''—which means self-immolation, self-abnegation, self-denial self-destruction—which means the ''self'' as a standard of evil, the ''selfless'' as a standard of the good.
Do not hide behind such superficialities as whether you should or should not give a dime to a beggar. This is not the issue. The issue is whether you ''do'' or do ''not'' have the right to exist ''without'' giving him that dime. The issue is whether you must keep buying your life, dime by dime, from any beggar who might choose to approach you. The issue is whether the need of others is the first mortgage on your life and the moral purpose of your existence. The issue is whether man is to be regarded as a sacrificial animal. Any man of self-esteem will answer: ''No.'' Altruism says: ''Yes.''<ref>Ayn Rand, "Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World," ''Philosophy: Who Needs it'', 1982, New American Library, p. 74.</ref>}}

== Criticism ==
Two objections to rational egoism are given by the English philosopher [[Derek Parfit]], who discusses the theory at length in ''[[Reasons and Persons]]'' (1984). First, from the rational egoist point of view, it is rational to contribute to a [[pension scheme]] now, even though this is detrimental to one's present interests (which are to spend the money now). But it seems equally reasonable to maximize one's interests now, given that one's reasons are not only relative to him, but to him as he is now (and not his future self, who is argued to be a "different" person). Parfit also argues that since the connections between the present mental state and the mental state of one's future self may decrease, it is not plausible to claim that one should be indifferent between one's present and future self.<ref>D. Parfit (1984), parts II and III</ref>

==See also==
{{colbegin}}
* {{anl|Cārvāka}}
* {{anl|Egoist anarchism}}
* {{anl|Enlightened self-interest}}
* {{anl|Hedonism}}
* {{anl|Homo economicus}}
* {{anl|Instrumental rationality}}
* {{anl|Invisible hand}}
* {{anl|Practical reason}}
* {{anl|Praxeology}}
* {{anl|Preference (economics)}}
* {{anl|Prisoner's dilemma}}
* {{anl|Rational choice theory}}

{{colend}}

==Notes==
<!--This article uses the Cite.php citation mechanism. If you would like more information on how to add footnotes to this article, please see http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Cite/Cite.php -->
<references />

==References and further reading==
* Baier, Kurt (1990). "Egoism" in ''A Companion to Ethics''. Peter Singer (ed.), Blackwell: Oxford.
* Brink, D. 1992, "Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism," in Essays on Henry Sidgwick, ed. B. Schultz, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
* [[David Gauthier|Gauthier, David]] (1986). ''[[Morals by Agreement]]''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Gert, Bernard (1998). ''Morality: Its Nature and Justification''. Oxford University Press.
* Kagan, S., 1986, "The Present-Aim Theory of Rationality," Ethics 96: 746–59. {{JSTOR|2381097}}
* McKenzie, Alexander J. (2003). "Evolutionary Game Theory". ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/game-evolutionary/ link]
* Moseley, Alexander (2006). "Egoism". ''The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.). [http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/egoism.htm link]
* Mueller, D. (1989). ''Public Choice II''. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
* Parfit, D., 1984, [[Reasons and Persons]], Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Parfit, D., 1986, Reply to Kagan, Ethics, 96: 843–46, 868–69.
* Paul, E. & F. Miller & J. Paul (1997). ''Self-Interest''. Cambridge University Press
* Shaver, Robert (1998). [http://www.cambridge.org/9780521119962 ''Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History'']. Cambridge University Press.
* Shaver, Robert (2002). "Egoism". ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Winter Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/egoism/ link]
* Sigwick, H., [http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/ ''The Methods of Ethics'']. London, 1874, 7th ed. 1907.
* Smith, Tara (2006). [http://www.cambridge.org/9780521705462 ''Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics'']. Cambridge University Press.
* Sober, E. & D.S. Wilson (1998). ''Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior''. Harvard University Press.

==External links==
* [http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/egoism.htm Egoism] in the [[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egoism/ Egoism] in the [[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070929090734/http://www.cs.csbsju.edu/~lziegler/redblack.html The Red/Black Game]

[[Category:Egoism]]
[[Category:Capitalism]]
[[Category:Rationalism]]
[[Category:Rational choice theory]]
[[Category:Philosophy of life]]
[[Category:Ethical theories]]