View source for Proposition

{{Short description|Bearer of truth or falsity}}
{{About|the concept in philosophy and logic|the mathematical concept|Proposition (mathematics)|other uses}}
{{Distinguish|Preposition}}
{{More citations needed|date=February 2023}}
A '''proposition''' is a central concept in the [[philosophy of language]], [[semantics]], [[logic]], and related fields, often characterized as the primary [[Truth-bearer|bearer]] of [[truth]] or [[False (logic)|falsity]]. Propositions are the [[Abstract object|objects]] [[Denotation|denoted]] by [[Sentence (linguistics)#By purpose|declarative sentences]]; for example, "The sky is blue" expresses the proposition that the sky is blue. Unlike sentences, propositions are not [[Phrase|linguistic expressions]], so the [[English language|English]] sentence "Snow is white" and the [[German language|German]] "Schnee ist weiß" denote the same proposition. Propositions also serve as the objects of [[belief]] and other [[propositional attitude]]s, such as when someone believes that the sky is blue.

Formally, propositions are often modeled as [[Function (mathematics)|functions]] which map a [[possible world]] to a [[truth value]]. For instance, the proposition that the sky is blue can be modeled as a function which would return the truth value <math>T </math> if given the actual world as input, but would return <math>F </math> if given some alternate world where the sky is green. However, a number of alternative formalizations have been proposed, notably the '''structured propositions''' view.

Propositions have played a large role throughout the history of [[logic]], [[linguistics]], [[philosophy of language]], and related disciplines. Some researchers have doubted whether a consistent definition of propositionhood is possible, [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]] even remarking that "the conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something of a jumble of conflicting desiderata". The term is often used broadly and has been used to refer to various related concepts.

== Definition and roles ==
Propositions are typically characterized in terms of three interlocking roles: as the meanings of [[Sentence (linguistics)#By function or speech act|declarative sentences]], as the contents of psychological attitudes like [[beliefs]], and as the [[Truth-bearer|bearers]] of [[truth]] values. Philosophers debate the relations between these characterizations, questioning whether one is more fundamental than the others and whether they all describe the same class of entities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Speaks|2014|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|King|2014|pp=5–8}} | {{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Salmon|Soames|1988|pp=1–2}} }}</ref>

In their role as the meanings of declarative sentences, propositions are the ideas or [[semantic]] contents expressed by assertions such as "The door is open". Declarative sentences express what is the case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2004|pp=567–568, 658}} | {{harvnb|Audi|1999|pp=753–754}} | {{harvnb|Salmon|Soames|1988|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> They contrast with [[interrogative]] sentences, like "Is the door open?", which request information, and [[Imperative mood|imperative sentences]], such as "Open the door!", which issue commands.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurford|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZaBKd8pT6kgC&pg=PA56 56–57]}} | {{harvnb|Akmajian|Demer|Farmer|Harnish|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gPbQyRdnM18C&pg=PA249 249]}} }}</ref> Different declarative sentences can express the same idea, like the [[English language|English]] sentence "Snow is white" and the [[German language|German]] sentence "Schnee ist weiß". Accordingly, propositions are not identical to individual sentences and do not belong to any particular language.{{efn|The difference is sometimes marked by using [[angle brackets]] for propositions instead of quotation marks for sentences, as in <math>\langle</math>Snow is white<math>\rangle</math>.<ref>{{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=§ 7. The Nature and Status of Propositions}}</ref>}} Instead, they reflect the information content of sentences and track cross-linguistic sameness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|King|2014|pp=5–8}} | {{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=Lead section, § 3.2. Meanings of Sentences}} | {{harvnb|King|2013}} }}</ref> The terms "proposition" and "statement" are sometimes used as synonyms.{{efn|[[Logical positivism|Logical positivists]] use the [[verification principle]] to distinguish statements from propositions. According to this view, all declarative sentences express statements but only verifiable statements are propositions.<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2004|pp=658}}</ref>}} However, the word "statement" is ambiguous since it can also refer to declarative sentences themselves rather than their meanings.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2004|pp=567–568, 658}} | {{harvnb|Gupta|2014|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=M5SKBAAAQBAJ&pg=SA4-PA2 § 4.2 Statement (Proposition)]}} | {{harvnb|Williamson|2005a|p=894}} }}</ref> The term ''proposition'' also overlaps with the term ''[[judgment]]'', with one difference being that judgments are more closely associated with mental processes that affirm or deny the truth of a content.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lindeman|loc=§ 5b. Judging}} | {{harvnb|Williamson|2005|p=763}} }}</ref>

Propositions are further characterized as the contents or objects of psychological attitudes like beliefs. For example, if Leila believes that the train will be delayed, then she has a [[mental state]], called a ''[[propositional attitude]]'', directed at the proposition that the train will be delayed. There are many propositional attitudes besides beliefs, such as [[desires]], [[hopes]], and [[fears]], like when Leila fears that the train will be delayed. The contents of propositional attitudes are shareable: different persons can have the same beliefs or fears, like when Diego also fears that the train will be delayed. Accordingly, propositions are not identical to individual beliefs or desires since the same proposition can underlie many individual mental states. Traditionally, propositions have been understood as non-mental or [[Abstract objects|abstract]] entities, though alternative proposals see them as general types of mental entities. Propositional attitudes are typically expressed through that-clauses to link a psychological attitude to a proposition, as in "she believes ''that'' it will rain". For this reason, propositions are also characterized as the referents of that-clauses.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=Lead section, § 7. The Nature and Status of Propositions}} | {{harvnb|Buchanan|Grzankowski|2014|pp=424–425}} | {{harvnb|King|2014|pp=5–8}} }}</ref>

Propositions are additionally treated as bearers of [[Truth value|truth values]]. This means that each proposition is either true or [[False (logic)|false]]. The truth value of a proposition depends on its accuracy: true propositions describe the world as it is while false propositions fail to do so. Propositions are not the only entities that have truth values. Other truth-bearers include declarative sentences and beliefs, raising the question of how these truth-bearers relate to each other. According to one proposal, propositions are the primary truth-bearers, meaning that declarative sentences and beliefs are true or false in a derivative sense by being about true or false propositions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|King|2024|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Salmon|Soames|1988|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Merricks|2015|pp=22–25}} }}</ref> Propositions are also discussed as bearers of [[Modality (semantics)|modal]] properties: a proposition can be possible, impossible, or necessary, depending on whether it is logically compatible with coherent scenarios, or in some sense conceivable or contradictory.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=§ 2. Roles for Propositions: Modality}} | {{harvnb|King|2014|pp=5–6}} }}</ref>

The word ''proposition'' originates from the [[Latin language|Latin]] term {{lang|la|proponere}}, meaning {{gloss|to set forth or propose}}. Through its [[past participle]] {{lang|la|propositus}}, it gave rise to the Latin terms {{lang|la|propositio}} and {{lang|la|proposition}} and the [[Old French]] term {{lang|fro|proposition}}. The word entered the English language as a borrowing from Latin and French during the [[Middle English]] period, with its first known use in [[Wycliffe's Bible]] in 1382.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2022}} | {{harvnb|OED staff|2025}} | {{harvnb|Shanker|2003|pp=416–417}} }}</ref>

== Types ==
Various types of propositions are distinguished based on the kind and domain of information they convey and how they assert it. Many of the distinctions overlap and can be combined to form more specific subtypes. For example, a universal proposition can be either affirmative or [[Negation|negative]]. Affirmative propositions state that something is the case, such as "the tree is green". They contrast with negative propositions, which deny that something is the case, like "the tree is not green". In [[classical logic]], a proposition with a [[double negation]], such as "the tree is not not green", is equivalent to an affirmative proposition. In some cases, roughly the same information can be expressed with and without negations, as in "he is not happy" and "he is sad". This raises the question of whether being affirmative or negative is an essential feature of propositions at the level of content rather than a linguistic artifact at the level of expression.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=16}} | {{harvnb|Doyle|2003|pp=769–771}} | {{harvnb|Sethy|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3xszEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 48]}} }}</ref> A closely related distinction is between true and false propositions: a true proposition accurately represents reality, while a false proposition misrepresents it. If an affirmative proposition is true, then the corresponding negative proposition is false, and vice versa.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Johnson-Laird|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oRdREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA233 233]}} | {{harvnb|Murray|Tillman|2022|pp=2–3, 13–14}} | {{harvnb|King|2014|pp=5–6}} }}</ref>

[[Universal quantification|Universal]] propositions assert that something is the case for all entities in a domain, as in "all humans are mortal". They contrast with [[Existential quantification|existential]] propositions, which state that something is the case for at least one entity in a domain, such as "some humans are left-handed". Both universal and existential propositions make general statements.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Williamson|2005b|p=933}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|p=280}} | {{harvnb|Doyle|2003|pp=769–771}} }}</ref> Unlike them, [[singular propositions]] are about one specific entity, as in "Socrates is wise". Philosophers discuss various problems associated with the nature and existence of singular propositions, like how to understand propositions about [[Nonexistent objects|non-existing entities]], as in "Santa Claus has a beard".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Merricks|2015|pp=157–160}} | {{harvnb|Fitch|Nelson|2024|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>

Another distinction is between [[Categorical proposition|categorical]] and [[Material conditional|conditional]] propositions. Categorical propositions assert how things are, independently of other statements or assumptions. Conditional or hypothetical propositions link two simpler propositions, typically expressed as an "if-then" sentence. They hold that the then-statement, called ''consequent'', is true in case the if-statement, called ''antecedent'', is true, as in "if it rains, then the ground gets wet".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chow|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0DWeqYsehDsC&pg=PA30 30]}} | {{harvnb|Doyle|2003|pp=769–771}} }}</ref> Conditional propositions are compound propositions since they have components that are themselves propositions. Other compound propositions include [[Logical conjunction|conjunctive]] and [[Disjunction|disjunctive]] propositions. Conjunctive propositions claim that all their component statements are true, typically expressed as an "and" sentence, such as "the tree is green and the sky is blue". Disjunctive propositions assert that one of their component statements is true, typically expressed as an "or" sentence, as in "it is windy or it is rainy". For inclusive disjunctive propositions, at least one but possibly both component statements are true, while for [[Exclusive or|exclusive disjunctive]] propositions, exactly one component statement is true and the other is false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Doyle|2003|pp=769–771}} | {{harvnb|Turetzky|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sXSMDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA145 145–147]}} }}</ref>

The difference between [[analytic and synthetic]] propositions depends on the source of their truth. The truth of analytic propositions is determined only by the meanings of concepts, independent of the actual state of the world. For example, the proposition "all bachelors are unmarried" is analytically true because the concept "bachelor" already includes the meaning of "unmarried". The truth of synthetic propositions, such as "snow is white", depends on the state of the world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Juhl|Loomis|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix–x, 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2023}} | {{harvnb|Pradhan|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DR-VDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref>{{efn|The distinction between analytic and synthetic proposition has been criticized in 20th century philosophy, with [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] arguing that there are no analytic truths.<ref>{{harvnb|Hylton|Kemp|2025|loc=Lead section, § 3. The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and the Argument Against Logical Empiricism}}</ref>}} A similar distinction, based on the source of [[knowledge]] rather than truth, is between [[a priori and a posteriori|''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'']] propositions. ''A priori'' propositions can be known through pure [[reasoning]] alone, such as "<math>2 + 2 = 4</math>", while ''a posteriori'' propositions describe [[empirical]] facts knowable through [[sensory experience]], like "the sun is shining".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ A Priori and a Posteriori Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Baehr|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>

[[Modality (semantics)|Modal]] propositions express what is possible, necessary, or impossible. Rather than asserting how the world is, they describe how it could or could not have been, as in "it is possible that I will win the lottery" and "it is impossible to travel faster than light". Logicians examine the relation between different modal propositions. For example, classical [[modal logic]] states that a proposition is necessarily true if it is impossible that it is false. There are different types of modality. [[Alethic modality]] is about what is possible or necessary relative to the [[Scientific law|laws of nature]], [[metaphysics]], or [[logic]]. It contrasts with [[epistemic modality]], which concerns what may or must be the case relative to someone's knowledge or [[evidence]], as in "the butler cannot be the killer".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Doyle|2003|pp=769–771}} | {{harvnb|Kment|2021|loc=Lead section, § 1. Epistemic and Metaphysical Modality, § 2. Metaphysical and Nomic Modality}} | {{harvnb|Garson|2024|loc=Lead section, § 1. What is Modal Logic?, § 2. Modal Logics}} }}</ref>

[[Normativity|Normative]] propositions express what ought to be the case, like "you should not drink and drive". They include permissions, requirements, and prohibitions. [[Morality|Moral]] propositions are normative propositions that assert moral principles or judgments, such as "you should keep promises". [[Fact–value distinction|Normative propositions contrast with descriptive propositions]], which express what is rather than what ought to be.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Copp|Morton|2022|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Dancy|2000|pp=vii–viii}} | {{harvnb|McHugh|Way|Whiting|2018|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=§ 10.1 Expressivism and Moral Propositions}}}}</ref> The schools of [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivism]] and [[non-cognitivism]] debate the existence of normative propositions. Non-cognitivism argues that normative sentences are neither true nor false and do not express propositions, for example, because they convey emotions rather than propositions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McGrath|Frank|2024|loc=§ 10.1 Expressivism and Moral Propositions}} | {{harvnb|Copp|Morton|2022|loc=§ 1.1 Concept vs. World, § 3.2 Normative Realism, 3.4.1 Anti-realist Conceptualism: Non-cognitivist Expressivism}} | {{harvnb|Jackson|2000|pp=102–103}} }}</ref>

A gappy proposition, also called an ''incomplete'' or ''unfilled'' proposition, is a statement whose subject matter is not properly specified, which results in an incomplete meaning. This can happen when the proposition involves an [[empty name]], which does not refer to any real entity, such as the name ''[[Pegasus]]''. Given the difficulties in assigning truth values to gappy propositions, philosophers debate whether they qualify as propositions in the strict sense. Alternative proposals suggest that they are another type of meaning content.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mousavian|2022|pp=437–443}} | {{harvnb|Mousavian|2011|pp=125–129}} | {{harvnb|Yablo|2024|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BGB8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA87 87]}} }}</ref> Temporal propositions, another type, are statements that refer to specific times, such as "the [[Berlin Wall]] fell in 1989".<ref>{{harvnb|Brogaard|2022|pp=347–348}}</ref> Propositions are also classified by the domain or field of inquiry to which they belong, such as mathematical, scientific, metaphysical, and theological propositions.<ref>{{harvnb|Pathak|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=r2RXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA230 230]}}</ref>

==Relation to the mind==
In relation to the mind, propositions are discussed primarily as they fit into [[propositional attitudes]]. Propositional attitudes are simply attitudes characteristic of [[folk psychology]] (belief, desire, etc.) that one can take toward a proposition (e.g. 'it is raining,' 'snow is white,' etc.). In English, propositions usually follow folk psychological attitudes by a "that clause" (e.g. "Jane believes ''that'' it is raining"). In [[philosophy of mind]] and [[psychology]], mental states are often taken to primarily consist in propositional attitudes. The propositions are usually said to be the "mental content" of the attitude. For example, if Jane has a mental state of believing that it is raining, her mental content is the proposition 'it is raining.' Furthermore, since such mental states are ''about'' something (namely, propositions), they are said to be [[intentionality|intentional]] mental states.

Explaining the relation of propositions to the mind is especially difficult for non-mentalist views of propositions, such as those of the logical positivists and Russell described above, and [[Gottlob Frege]]'s view that propositions are [[Platonist]] entities, that is, existing in an abstract, non-physical realm.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.2 |title=Platonism in metaphysics: Propositions |last=Balaguer |first=Mark |date=2016 |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher= |access-date=30 June 2021}}</ref> So some recent views of propositions have taken them to be mental. Although propositions cannot be particular thoughts since those are not shareable, they could be types of cognitive events<ref>{{cite book |last=Soames |first=Scott |author-link= |date=2014 |title=New Thinking about Propositions |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/new-thinking-about-propositions-9780199693764 |location=New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |editor-last1=King |editor-first1=Jeffrey C. |editor-last2=Soames |editor-first2=Scott |editor-last3=Speaks |editor-first3=Jeff |chapter=Propositions as cognitive event types |chapter-url=https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/678/docs/BookChapters/New_Thinking_About_Propositions/NTP_Chapter_6.pdf  |isbn=9780199693764}}</ref> or properties of thoughts (which could be the same across different thinkers).<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Joaquin |first1=Jeremiah Joven B. |last2=Franklin |first2=James |date=2021 |title=A causal-mentalist view of propositions |url=https://www.organonf.com/journal/jeremiahjovenjoaquinjamesfranklin/ |journal=Organon F |volume=28 |issue= |pages= |doi= |access-date=30 June 2021}}</ref>

Philosophical debates surrounding propositions as they relate to propositional attitudes have also recently centered on whether they are internal or external to the agent, or whether they are mind-dependent or mind-independent entities. For more, see the entry on [[Internalism#Philosophy of mind|internalism and externalism]] in philosophy of mind.

==In modern logic<!--'Proposition (logic)', 'Structured proposition', 'Structured propositions', 'Singular proposition', 'Singular propositions', 'Russellian proposition', 'Russellian propositions', 'General proposition', 'General propositions', 'Particularized proposition', 'Particularized propositions', 'Particularised proposition' and 'Particularised propositions' redirect here-->==

In modern logic, propositions are standardly defined as [[function (mathematics)|function]]s which take a [[possible]] world and return a truth value. For example, the proposition that the sky is blue could be represented as a function notated as <math> f </math>. Then if there is a possible world <math> w </math> where the sky is blue and another world <math> v </math> where it is not, we would have that <math>f(w)=T</math> and <math>f(v)=F</math>. Via the notion of a [[characteristic set]], propositions can be modeled equivalently as a set of possible worlds, namely those where the proposition is true. For instance, if <math> w </math> and <math> w' </math> are the only worlds in which the sky is blue, the proposition that the sky is blue could be modeled as the set <math> \{w, w'\} </math>.<ref>{{cite book |last=Gamut |first=L.T.F. |author-link=L.T.F. Gamut |date=1991 |title= Logic, Language and Meaning: Intensional Logic and Logical Grammar |publisher= University of Chicago Press |page=122 |isbn=0-226-28088-8}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Citation|last=King|first=Jeffrey|title=Structured Propositions|date=2019|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions-structured/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2016|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2022-12-30|at=Section 2}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Irene Heim|author2=Angelika Kratzer|title=Semantics in generative grammar|year=1998|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|isbn=978-0-631-19713-3|page=304}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Pragmatics |encyclopedia=Semantics |year=1972 |last=Stalnaker |first=Robert |editor-last1= Davidson|editor-first1=Donald | editor-last2=Harman | editor-first2=Gilbert|page=381}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title= Contemporary Foundational Accounts of Propositions |encyclopedia=The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Language |year=2025 |last=Manolakaki |first=Eleni |editor-last1=Stojnić |editor-first1=Una|editor-last2=Lepore|editor-first2=Ernie|publisher=Oxford University Press}}</ref>

<!-- maybe some discussion here of versions of the above view that use situations/world-time pairs/etc instead of worlds? -->

Numerous refinements and alternative notions of proposition-hood have been proposed including [[inquisitive semantics|inquisitive propositions]] and '''structured propositions'''.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Ciardelli |first1=Ivano |last2=Groenendijk |first2=Jeroen |last3=Roelofsen | first3=Floris |year=2019 |title=Inquisitive Semantics |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=13, 20–22 |isbn=9780198814795}}</ref><ref name =":2" /> Propositions are called '''structured propositions'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> if they have constituents, in some broad sense.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Citation|last1=Fitch|first1=Greg|title=Singular Propositions|date=2018|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions-singular/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2018|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2019-12-11|last2=Nelson|first2=Michael}}</ref> Assuming a structured view of propositions, one can distinguish between '''singular propositions'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (also '''Russellian propositions'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, named after [[Bertrand Russell]]) which are about a particular individual, '''general propositions'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, which are not about any particular individual, and '''particularized propositions'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->, which are about a particular individual but do not contain that individual as a constituent.<ref name=":2" />

==Objections to propositions==
Attempts to provide a workable definition of proposition include the following:
<blockquote>
Two meaningful declarative sentences express the same proposition, if and only if they mean the same thing.{{citation needed|date=June 2016}}
</blockquote>
which defines ''proposition'' in terms of synonymity. For example, "Snow is white" (in English) and "Schnee ist weiß" (in German) are different sentences, but they say the same thing, so they express the same proposition. Another definition of proposition is:

<blockquote>
Two meaningful declarative sentence-tokens express the same proposition, if and only if they mean the same thing.{{citation needed|date=June 2016}}
</blockquote>
The above definitions can result in two identical sentences/sentence-tokens appearing to have the same meaning, and thus expressing the same proposition and yet having different truth-values, as in "I am Spartacus" said by Spartacus and said by John Smith, and "It is Wednesday" said on a Wednesday and on a Thursday. These examples reflect the problem of [[ambiguity]] in common language, resulting in a mistaken equivalence of the statements. "I am Spartacus" spoken by Spartacus is the declaration that the individual speaking is called Spartacus and it is true. When spoken by John Smith, it is a declaration about a different speaker and it is false. The term "I" means different things, so "I am Spartacus" means different things.

A related problem is when identical sentences have the same truth-value, yet express different propositions. The sentence "I am a philosopher" could have been spoken by both Socrates and Plato. In both instances, the statement is true, but means something different.

These problems are addressed in [[predicate logic]] by using a variable for the problematic term, so that "X is a philosopher" can have Socrates or Plato substituted for X, illustrating that "Socrates is a philosopher" and "Plato is a philosopher" are different propositions. Similarly, "I am Spartacus" becomes "X is Spartacus", where X is replaced with terms representing the individuals Spartacus and John Smith.

In other words, the example problems can be averted if sentences are formulated with precision such that their terms have unambiguous meanings.

A number of philosophers and linguists claim that all definitions of a proposition are too vague to be useful. For them, it is just a misleading concept that should be removed from philosophy and [[semantics]]. [[W. V. Quine]], who granted the existence of [[Set (mathematics)|sets]] in mathematics,<ref>{{Citation|last1=McGrath|first1=Matthew|title=Propositions|date=2018|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2018|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-08-20|last2=Frank|first2=Devin}}</ref> maintained that the indeterminacy of translation prevented any meaningful discussion of propositions, and that they should be discarded in favor of sentences.<ref>{{cite book |last=Quine |first=W. V. |title=Philosophy of Logic |publisher=Prentice-Hall |location=NJ USA |year=1970 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/philosophyoflogi0000quin/page/1 1–14] |isbn=0-13-663625-X |url=https://archive.org/details/philosophyoflogi0000quin/page/1 }}</ref>

==Statements==
In [[logic]] and [[semantics]], the term '''statement''' is variously understood to mean either: 
#A meaningful [[sentence (linguistics)#By function or speech act|declarative sentence]] that is [[Truth|true]] or [[false (logic)|false]],{{Citation needed|date=December 2024}} or
#a proposition. Which is the ''[[Denotation|assertion]]'' that is made by (i.e., the [[Meaning (linguistics)|meaning]] of) a true or false declarative sentence.<ref>{{harvtxt|Millican|1994}} "Central to the [Strawsonian tradition] is the distinction between a ''sentence'' and ''what is said'' by a sentence - Strawson initially called the latter a ''use'' of a sentence, and sometimes a ''proposition'', but his most frequent term for ''what is said'', which Wolfram consistently adopts, is the ''statement'' expressed."</ref><ref>{{harvtxt|Rouse|2005}} "A statement is defined as that which is ''expressible'' by a ''sentence'', and is either true or false... A statement is a more abstract entity than even a sentence type. It is not identical
with the sentence used to express it... [That is,] different sentences can be used to express the same statement."</ref>
In the latter case, a (declarative) sentence is just one way of expressing an underlying statement. A statement is what a sentence means, it is the notion or idea that a sentence expresses, i.e., what it represents. For example, it could be said that "2 + 2 = 4" and "two plus two equals four" are two different sentences expressing the same statement. As another example, consider that the [[Arabic numeral]] '7', the [[Roman numeral]] 'VII', and the English word 'seven' are all distinct from the underlying ''number''.{{sfn|Rouse|2005}}

[[Philosophy of language|Philosopher of language]] [[Peter Strawson]] (1919–2006) advocated the use of the term "statement" in sense (2) in preference to proposition.  Strawson used the term "statement" to make the point that two declarative sentences can make the same statement if they say the same thing in different ways.  Thus, in the usage advocated by Strawson, "All men are mortal." and "Every man is mortal." are two different sentences that make the same statement.

In either case, a statement is viewed as a [[truthbearer|truth bearer]].

Examples of sentences that are (or make) true statements:

*"Socrates is a man."
*"A triangle has three sides."
*"Madrid is the capital of Spain."

Examples of sentences that are also statements, even though they aren't true:

*"All toasters are made of solid gold."
*"Two plus two equals five."

Examples of sentences that are not (or do not make) statements:
 
#"Who are you?"
#"Run!"
#"Greenness perambulates."
#"I had one grunch but the eggplant over there."
#"[[Charles III|King Charles III]] is wise."
#"Broccoli tastes good."
#"Pegasus exists."

The first two examples are not declarative sentences and therefore are not (or do not make) statements.
The third and fourth are declarative sentences but, lacking meaning, are neither true nor false and therefore are not (or do not make) statements.  The fifth and sixth examples are meaningful declarative sentences, but are not statements but rather matters of opinion or taste.  Whether or not the sentence "Pegasus exists." is a statement is a subject of debate among philosophers.  [[Bertrand Russell]] held that it is a (false) statement.{{Citation needed|date=September 2019}}  Strawson held it is not a statement at all.{{Citation needed|date=September 2019}}

=== As an abstract entity ===
In some treatments, "statement" is introduced in order to distinguish a sentence from its informational content. A statement is regarded as the information content of an information-bearing sentence. Thus, a sentence is related to the statement it bears like a numeral to the number it refers to. Statements are abstract [[logic|logical entities]], while sentences are [[grammar|grammatical entities]].{{sfn|Rouse|2005}}{{sfn|Ruzsa|2000|p=16}}

==Historical usage==

===By Aristotle===

In [[Aristotelian logic]] a proposition was defined as a particular kind of sentence (a [[declarative sentence]]) that affirms or denies a [[Predicate (grammar)|predicate]] of a [[subject (grammar)|subject]], optionally with the help of a [[Copula (linguistics)|copula]].<ref name=":1" /> Aristotelian propositions take forms like "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man."

[[Aristotelian logic]] identifies a [[categorical proposition]] as a sentence which affirms or denies a [[Predicate (grammar)#Traditional grammar|predicate]] of a [[Subject (grammar)|subject]], optionally with the help of a [[Copula (linguistics)|copula]].  An Aristotelian proposition may take the form of "All men are mortal" or "Socrates is a man."  In the first example, the subject is "men", predicate is "mortal" and copula is "are", while in the second example, the subject is "Socrates", the predicate is "a man" and copula is "is".<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-log/#H3|title=Aristotle: Logic — From Words into Propositions|last=Groarke|first=Louis|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref>

===By the logical positivists===
Often, propositions are related to [[Sentence (mathematical logic)|closed formulae (or logical sentence)]] to distinguish them from what is expressed by an [[open formula]]. In this sense, propositions are "statements" that are [[truth-bearer]]s. This conception of a proposition was supported by the philosophical school of [[logical positivism]].

Some philosophers argue that some (or all) kinds of speech or actions besides the declarative ones also have propositional content. For example, [[yes–no question]]s present propositions, being inquiries into the [[truth value]] of them. On the other hand, some [[Semiotics|sign]]s can be declarative assertions of propositions, without forming a sentence nor even being linguistic (e.g. traffic signs convey definite meaning which is either true or false).

Propositions are also spoken of as the content of [[belief]]s and similar [[propositional attitude|intentional attitudes]], such as desires, preferences, and hopes. For example,  "I desire ''that I have a new car''", or "I wonder ''whether it will snow''" (or, whether it is the case that "it will snow"). Desire, belief, doubt, and so on, are thus called propositional attitudes when they take this sort of content.<ref name=":0">{{cite web|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/|title=Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)|last1=McGrath|first1=Matthew|last2=Frank|first2=Devin|website=Plato.stanford.edu|access-date=2014-06-23}}</ref>

===By Russell===
[[Bertrand Russell]] held that propositions were structured entities with objects and properties as constituents. One important difference between [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]]'s view (according to which a proposition is the set of [[possible world]]s/states of affairs in which it is true) is that on the Russellian account, two propositions that are true in all the same states of affairs can still be differentiated. For instance, the proposition "two plus two equals four" is distinct on a Russellian account from the proposition "three plus three equals six". If propositions are sets of possible worlds, however, then all mathematical truths (and all other necessary truths) are the same set (the set of all possible worlds).{{citation needed|date=November 2014}}

==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy}}
* [[Belief]]
**[[Doxastic logic]]
* [[Categorical proposition]]
* [[Concept]]
* [[Probabilistic proposition]]
* [[Sentence (mathematical logic)]]
* [[Truthbearer#Statements|Truthbearer - statements]]

== References ==
=== Notes ===
{{notelist|30em}}

=== Citations ===
{{reflist|30em}}

=== Sources ===
{{refbegin|30em}}

* {{cite book |last1=Akmajian |first1=Adrian |last2=Demer |first2=Richard A. |last3=Farmer |first3=Ann K. |last4=Harnish |first4=Robert M. |title=Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-51123-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gPbQyRdnM18C&pg=PA249 |language=en |date=2001 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |edition=2nd |publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=1999 |isbn=0-521-63722-8 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Baehr |first1=Jason S. |title=A Priori and A Posteriori |url=https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=17 September 2022 |archive-date=7 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210807213522/https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Brogaard |first1=Berit |editor1-last=Tillman |editor1-first=Chris |editor2-last=Murray |editor2-first=Adam |title=The Routledge Handbook of Propositions |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9781315270500-25 |edition=1st |chapter=Temporal Propositions and Our Attitudes toward the Past and the Future |date=2022 |pages=347–362 |isbn=978-1-315-27050-0 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Buchanan |first1=Ray |last2=Grzankowski |first2=Alex |chapter=26. Propositions as Objects of the Attitudes |pages=424–436 |editor1-last=King |editor1-first=Jeffrey C. |editor2-last=Soames |editor2-first=Scott |editor3-last=Speaks |editor3-first=Jeff |title=New Thinking about Propositions |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-969376-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UHhCAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2014 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Bunnin |first1=Nicholas |last2=Yu |first2=Jiyuan |title=The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy |date=2004 |publisher=Blackwell |isbn=1-4051-0679-4}}
* {{cite book |last1=Chow |first1=Siu L. |title=Statistical Significance: Rationale, Validity and Utility |publisher=SAGE |isbn=978-0-7619-5205-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0DWeqYsehDsC&pg=PA30 |language=en |date=1996 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Copp |first1=David |last2=Morton |first2=Justin |title=Normativity in Metaethics |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/normativity-metaethics/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 October 2025  |date=2022 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Dancy |first1=Jonathan |editor1-first=Jonathan |editor1-last=Dancy |title=Normativity |publisher=Blackwell Publishers |date=2000 |isbn=0-631-22041-0 |chapter=Editor's Introduction |pages=vii–xv }}
* {{cite book |last1=Doyle |first1=J. J. |date=2003 |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |edition=2nd |publisher=Gale |volume=11 |chapter=Proposition |pages=769–771 |isbn=0-7876-4015-8}}
* {{cite web |last1=Fitch |first1=Greg |last2=Nelson |first2=Michael |title=Singular Propositions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions-singular/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 November 2025  |date=2024 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Garson |first1=James |title=Modal Logic |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 November 2025  |date=2024 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Gupta |first1=Uma Shanker |title=Discrete Mathematical Structures |publisher=Pearson Education India |isbn=978-93-325-3722-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M5SKBAAAQBAJ&pg=SA4-PA2 |language=en |date=2014 }}
* {{cite web |author1=HarperCollins |title=Proposition |url=https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=proposition |website=American Heritage Dictionary |publisher=HarperCollins |access-date=8 November 2025  |date=2022 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Hurford |first1=James R. |title=Grammar: A Student's Guide |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-45627-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZaBKd8pT6kgC&pg=PA56 |language=en |date=1994 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Hylton |first1=Peter |last2=Kemp |first2=Gary |title=Willard Van Orman Quine |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quine/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 November 2025  |date=2025 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |editor1-first=Jonathan |editor1-last=Dancy |title=Normativity |publisher=Blackwell Publishers |date=2000 |isbn=0-631-22041-0 |chapter=5. Non-Cognitivism, Normativity, Belief |pages=100–115 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Johnson-Laird |first1=Philip |title=How We Reason |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-156421-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oRdREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA233 |language=en |date=2008 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Juhl |first1=Cory |last2=Loomis |first2=Eric |title=Analyticity |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-27841-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 |language=en |date=2009 }}
* {{cite web |last1=King |first1=Jeffrey C. |title=Propositions |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0212.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies Online |doi=10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0212  |date=2013 }}
* {{cite book |last1=King |first1=Jeffries C. |chapter=1. What Role do Propositions Play in our Theories? |pages=5–8 |editor1-last=King |editor1-first=Jeffrey C. |editor2-last=Soames |editor2-first=Scott |editor3-last=Speaks |editor3-first=Jeff |title=New Thinking about Propositions |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-969376-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UHhCAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2014 }}
* {{cite web |last1=King |first1=Jeffrey C. |title=Structured Propositions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions-structured/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=7 November 2025  |date=2024 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Kment |first1=Boris |title=Varieties of Modality |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-varieties/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 November 2025  |date=2021 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Lindeman |first1=David |title=Propositional Attitudes |url=https://iep.utm.edu/prop-ati/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lowe |first1=E. J. |chapter=Affirmative and Negative Propositions |page=16 |date=2005 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press }}
* {{cite book |last1=Lowe |first1=E. J. |chapter=Existential Proposition |page=280 |date=2005a |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press }}
* {{cite web |last1=McGrath |first1=Matthew |last2=Frank |first2=Devin |title=Propositions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=7 November 2025  |date=2024 }}
* {{cite book |last1=McHugh |first1=Conor |last2=Way |first2=Jonathan |last3=Whiting |first3=Daniel |editor1-last=McHugh |editor1-first=Conor |editor2-last=Way |editor2-first=Jonathan |editor3-last=Whiting |editor3-first=Daniel |title=Normativity: Epistemic and Practical |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2018 |isbn=978-0-19-875870-9 |chapter=Introduction |pages=1–11}}
* {{cite book |last1=Merricks |first1=Trenton |title=Propositions |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-104652-0 |language=en |date=2015 }}
* {{cite web |url=https://www.millican.org/papers/1994Wolfram.pdf |title=Statements and Modality: Strawson, Quine and Wolfram |author-link=Peter Millican |last=Millican |first=Peter |year=1994}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Mousavian |first1=Seyed N. |title=Gappy Propositions? |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |volume=41 |issue=1 |doi=10.1353/cjp.2011.0003 |date=2011 |pages=125–157}}
* {{cite book |last1=Mousavian |first1=Seyed N. |editor1-last=Tillman |editor1-first=Chris |editor2-last=Murray |editor2-first=Adam |title=The Routledge Handbook of Propositions |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-315-27050-0 |edition=1st |doi=10.4324/9781315270500-31 |language=en |chapter=The Varieties of Gappy Propositions |date=2022 |pages=437–459}}
* {{cite book |last1=Murray |first1=Adam Russell |last2=Tillman |first2=Chris |editor1-last=Tillman |editor1-first=Chris |editor2-last=Murray |editor2-first=Adam |title=The Routledge Handbook of Propositions |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-315-27050-0 |edition=1st |doi=10.4324/9781315270500-1 |language=en |chapter=Introduction |date=2022 |pages=1–54}}
* {{cite dictionary |chapter-url=https://www.oed.com/dictionary/proposition_n?tab=factsheet#27885926 |dictionary=Oxford English Dictionary |date=2025 |publisher=Oxford University Press |edition=3rd |chapter=Proposition, n. |author=OED staff}}
* {{cite book |last1=Pathak |first1=Krishna Mani |editor1-last=Pathak |editor1-first=Krishna Mani |title=Quietism, Agnosticism and Mysticism: Mapping the Philosophical Discourse of the East and the West |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-981-16-3223-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=r2RXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA230 |language=en |chapter=The Cosmic World, the Mystical Mind, and the Vedic Concept of Origination |date=2022 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Pradhan |first1=Ramesh Chandra |title=Mind, Meaning and World: A Transcendental Perspective |publisher=Springer Nature Singapore |isbn=978-981-13-7228-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DR-VDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |language=en |date=2019 }}
* {{cite book |last=Rouse |first=David L. |title=A Practical Introduction to Formal Logic |chapter=Sentences, Statements and Arguments |chapter-url=http://people.uvawise.edu/philosophy/Logic%20Text/Chapter%202%20Sentences,%20Statements%20and%20Arguments.pdf |url=http://people.uvawise.edu/philosophy/Logic%20Text/Contents.htm |date=2005 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Russell |first1=Bruce |title=A Priori Justification and Knowledge |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 September 2022 |date=2020 |archive-date=12 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812143105/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Russell |first1=Gillian |title=Analytic/Synthetic Distinction |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0044.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies |publisher=Oxford University Press |access-date=16 August 2024 |language=en |date=2023 }}
* {{cite books |last=Ruzsa |first=Imre |title=Bevezetés a modern logikába |series=Osiris tankönyvek |publisher=Osiris |publication-place=Budapest |year=2000 |isbn=963-379-978-3}}
* {{cite book |last1=Salmon |first1=Nathan U. |last2=Soames |first2=Scott |title=Propositions and Attitudes |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-875092-5 |language=en |chapter=Introduction |date=1988 |pages=1–15}}
* {{cite book |last1=Sethy |first1=Satya Sundar |title=Introduction to Logic and Logical Discourse |publisher=Springer Nature Singapore |isbn=978-981-16-2689-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3xszEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 |language=en |date=2021 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Shanker |first1=S. G. |title=Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IX: Philosophy of the English-Speaking World in the Twentieth Century 1: Science, Logic and Mathematics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-39336-7 |language=en |date=2003 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Speaks |first1=Jeff |chapter=Introduction |pages=1–4 |editor1-last=King |editor1-first=Jeffrey C. |editor2-last=Soames |editor2-first=Scott |editor3-last=Speaks |editor3-first=Jeff |title=New Thinking about Propositions |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-969376-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UHhCAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2014 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Stroll |first1=Avrum |title=Epistemology |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology |website=Encyclopædia Britannica |access-date=20 May 2022 |language=en |archive-date=10 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190710175341/https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology |url-status=live |date=2023 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Turetzky |first1=Philip |title=The Elements of Arguments: An Introduction to Critical Thinking and Logic |publisher=Broadview Press |isbn=978-1-77048-690-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sXSMDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA145 |language=en |date=2019 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Williamson |first1=Colwyn |chapter=Proposition |page=736 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press }}
* {{cite book |last1=Williamson |first1=Colwyn |chapter=Statements and Sentences |page=894 |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005a |publisher=Oxford University Press }}
* {{cite book |last1=Williamson |first1=Colwyn |chapter=Universal Proposition |page=933 |date=2005b |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press }}
* {{cite book |last1=Yablo |first1=Stephen |title=Aboutness |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-4008-4598-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BGB8AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA87 |language=en |date=2024 }}
{{refend}}

== Further reading ==
*A. G. Hamilton, ''[[iarchive:logicformathemat0000hami_g5m2|Logic for Mathematicians]]'', Cambridge University Press, 1980, {{ISBN|0-521-29291-3}}.
* {{cite journal
  |title = Sentence and Statement: Prof. Quine on Mr. Strawson
  |last = Xenakis
  |first = Jason
  |journal = [[Analysis (journal)|Analysis]]
  |issn = 1467-8284
  |volume = 16
  |issue = 4
  |year = 1956
  |pages = 91–4
  |doi = 10.2307/3326478
  |jstor = 3326478
  }}
* [[Peter Strawson|P. F. Strawson]], "[https://web.archive.org/web/20110723034837/http://www.sol.lu.se/common/courses/LINC04/VT2010/Strawson1950.pdf/ On Referring]" in ''[[Mind (journal)|Mind]]'', Vol 59 No 235 (Jul 1950)

==External links==
*{{Commons category-inline|Propositions}}

{{philosophy of language}}
{{logic}}
{{Formal semantics}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Propositions| ]]
[[Category:Logical expressions]]
[[Category:Philosophy of language]]
[[Category:Semantic units]]
[[Category:Statements]]
[[Category:Syntax (logic)]]
[[Category:Semantics]]
[[Category:Term logic]]
[[Category:Propositional attitudes]]
[[Category:Mathematical logic]]
[[Category:Propositional calculus]]
[[Category:Ontology]]
[[Category:Formal semantics (natural language)]]