View source for Propaganda in China

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{{for|propaganda in the Republic of China era (1912-1949) and subsequently on Taiwan|Propaganda in the Republic of China}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2020}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| s = 中华人民共和国宣传活动
| t = 中華人民共和國宣傳活動
| p = Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó xuānchuán huódòng
| order = st
| pic = Spectators in front of a large sign on Nixon's motorcade route in China. - NARA - 194413.tif
| piccap = A large sign featuring a propaganda slogan in 1972: "Long Live the Great, Glorious, and Correct Communist Party of China!"
}}

'''Propaganda in China''' is used by the ruling [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP), and historically by the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), to sway domestic and international opinion in favor of its policies.<ref name="bradygh">{{cite journal |last=Brady |first=Anne-Marie |author-link=Anne-Marie Brady |year=2006 |title=Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era |journal=Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=58–77 |doi=10.16997/wpcc.15 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="Shambaugh" /> In the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC), this includes [[Censorship in China|censorship]] of proscribed views and an active promotion of views that favor the government. [[Propaganda]] is considered central to the operation of the CCP and the [[government of the People's Republic of China]],<ref name="mitter">{{cite book|last=Mitter|first=Rana|title=Entry on "China" in Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present|publisher=ABC-ClIO|year=2003|isbn=9781576078204|editor=Nicholas J. Cull|pages=73–77|oclc=51779499|editor2=David Colbert|editor3=David Welch}}</ref> with propaganda operations in the country being directed by the CCP's [[Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Propaganda Department]].

Aspects of propaganda can be traced back to the earliest periods of Chinese history, but propaganda has been most effective in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries owing to mass media and an authoritarian government.<ref name=mitter /> Propaganda was an important tool in legitimizing the [[Nationalist government]], which [[Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan|retreated to Taiwan]] in 1949. Propaganda during the [[Mao era]] was known for its constant use of mass campaigns to legitimize the party and the policies of leaders. It was the first time the CCP successfully made use of modern mass [[propaganda techniques]], adapting them to the needs of a country which had a largely rural and [[Literacy|illiterate]] population.<ref name="mitter" /> Contemporary propaganda in the PRC is usually depicted through cultivation of the [[Economy of China|economy]] and [[Chinese nationalism]].<ref name="Link-2009">{{Cite news |last1=Link |first1=Perry |author-link=Perry Link |last2=Kurlantzick |first2=Joshua |author-link2=Joshua Kurlantzick |date=2009-05-25 |title=China's Modern Authoritarianism |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124319304482150525 |url-status=live |access-date=2020-06-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170716230948/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124319304482150525 |archive-date=16 July 2017 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> Under the [[general secretaryship of Xi Jinping]], propaganda has become more prevalent and homogeneous.<ref name="Waight-2025">{{Cite journal |last=Waight |first=Hannah |last2=Yuan |first2=Yin |last3=Roberts |first3=Margaret E. |last4=Stewart |first4=Brandon M. |date=2025-03-18 |title=The decade-long growth of government-authored news media in China under Xi Jinping |journal=[[Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences]] |language=en |volume=122 |issue=11 |doi=10.1073/pnas.2408260122 |issn=0027-8424 |pmc=11929391 |pmid=40067894 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

== Terminology ==
{{Infobox Chinese
|title= Xuanchuan
|t= {{linktext|宣傳}}
|s= {{linktext|宣传}}
|l= spread transmit
|p= xuānchuán
|w= hsüan-ch'uan
|j= syun1 cyun4
|h= siên-chhòn
|mc= sjwendrjwen
|oc-bs= *s-qʷarm-tron
|hangul= 선전
|rr= seonjeon
|mr= sŏnjŏn
|kanji= {{linktext|宣伝}} 
|hiragana= せんでん
|revhep= senden
}}
While the English word usually has a pejorative connotation, the Chinese word ''xuānchuán'' (宣传 "propaganda; publicity", composed of ''xuan'' {{linktext|宣}} "declare; proclaim; announce" and ''chuan'' {{linktext|傳}} or {{linktext|传}} "pass; hand down; impart; teach; spread; infect; be contagious"<ref>{{cite book |editor-last=DeFrancis |editor-first=John |date=2003 |title=ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary |publisher=University of Hawaii Press |pages=1087, 124}}</ref>) The term can have either a neutral connotation in official government [[Context (language use)|contexts]] or a pejorative one in informal contexts. The term is not used for censorship, as it might connote in other parts of the world.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Edney |first=Kingsley |url=https://archive.org/details/globalizationofc0000edne/page/22/mode/1up?view=theater |title=The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda |date=2014 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |isbn=978-1-349-47990-0 |location=New York |pages=22–24, 195 |language=en |doi=10.1057/9781137382153}}</ref>

''Xuānchuán'' first appeared in the 3rd-century historical text ''[[Records of the Three Kingdoms]]'' where its usage referred to the dissemination of military skills.<ref name="Li-2023">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Jie |title=Cinematic Guerillas: Propaganda, Projectionists, and Audiences in Socialist China |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |year=2023 |isbn=9780231206273 |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=6}} In pre-modern times, the term was used to refer to dissemination of ideas and information by ruling elites.<ref name=":Qian">{{Cite book |last=Qian |first=Ying |title=Revolutionary Becomings: Documentary Media in Twentieth-Century China |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=9780231204477 |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=103}} The meaning of "to explain something to someone, or to conduct education" might first appeared in [[Ge Hong]]'s (c. 320) ''[[Baopuzi]]'' criticism of effete scholars who [[Emperor Zhang of Han]] (r. 75–88) extravagantly rewarded.
<blockquote>These various gentlemen were heaped with honors, but not because they could breach walls or fight in the fields, break through an enemy's lines and extend frontiers, fall ill and resign office, pray for a plan of confederation and give the credit to others, or possess a zeal transcending all bounds. Merely because they expounded an interpretation [''xuanchuan''] of one solitary classic, such were the honors lavished upon them. And they were only lecturing upon words bequeathed by the dead. Despite their own high positions, emperors and kings deigned to serve these teachers.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ge |first=Hong |url=https://archive.org/details/alchemymediciner00ware |title=Alchemy, Medicine, Religion in the China of A.D. 320. |date=1966 |publisher=Cambridge, Mass., & London |isbn=9780262230223 |language=en |translator-last=Ware |translator-first=James |page=231}}</ref>{{primary source inline|date=May 2024}}</blockquote>

It was chosen to translate the [[Marxist-Leninist]] concept of Russian ''propagánda'' {{linktext|пропаганда}} in the early 20th-century China. Within the broader context of Marxism-Leninism, "propaganda" has neither dismissive nor negative connotations.<ref name=":Wang">{{Cite book |last=Wang |first=Frances Yaping |title=The Art of State Persuasion: China's Strategic Use of Media in Interstate Disputes |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197757512}}</ref>{{Rp|page=29}}

Some ''xuanchuan'' [[collocation]]s usually refer to "propaganda" (e.g., ''xuānchuánzhàn'' 宣传战 "propaganda war"), others to "publicity" (''xuānchuán méijiè'' 宣传媒介 "mass media; means of publicity"), and still others are ambiguous (''xuānchuányuán'' 宣传员 "propagandist; publicist").<ref name="John DeFrancis 2003">Translations from John DeFrancis, ed. (2003), ''ABC Chinese-English Comprehensive Dictionary'', University of Hawaii Press, p. 1087.</ref> The term ''xuanchuan'' also conveys the meaning of education, whereas the English word propaganda does not.<ref name="Lin-2023" />{{Rp|page=34}}

During the 20th century, use of the term propaganda in China approximated its meaning in early modern Europe, "to propagate what one believes to be true."<ref name="Li-2023" />{{Rp|page=19}} Operating according to this terminology, the CCP is open about the importance of its propaganda work, which it views as having a positive impact on informing the Chinese people and promoting social harmony.<ref name="Sebok-2023">{{Cite book |last=Šebok |first=Filip |title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower? |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2023 |isbn=978-1-03-239508-1 |editor-last=Kironska |editor-first=Kristina |chapter=Social Control and Propaganda |editor-last2=Turscanyi |editor-first2=Richard Q.}}</ref>{{Rp|page=106}} [[David Shambaugh]],<ref>{{cite journal |last=Shambaugh |first=David |author-link=David Shambaugh |date=January 2007 |title=Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy China's |journal=[[The China Journal]] |volume=57 |pages=25–58 |doi=10.1086/tcj.57.20066240 |s2cid=222814073 |url=http://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/china/chipropaganda.pdf |access-date=15 May 2024 |archive-date=22 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151222164530/https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/china/chipropaganda.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|29}} a scholar of Chinese politics and foreign policy, describes "proactive propaganda" in which the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department writes and disseminates information that it believes "''should'' be used in educating and shaping society". In this particular context, ''xuanchuan'' "does ''not'' carry negative connotations for the CCP, nor, for that matter, for most Chinese citizens." The sinologist and anthropologist Andrew B. Kipnis says unlike English ''propaganda'', Chinese ''xuanchuan'' is officially represented as language that is good for the nation as a whole.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kipnis |first=Andrew B. |date=January 1995 |title=Within and Against Peasantness: Backwardness and Filiality in Rural China |journal=[[Comparative Studies in Society and History]] |language=en |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=110–135 |doi=10.1017/S0010417500019563 |s2cid=144272199 |issn=0010-4175}}</ref>{{rp|119}} However, the CCP is also sensitive to the negative connotations of the English word ''propaganda'', and the commonly used Chinese term ''xuanchuan'' acquired pejorative connotations.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mackinnon |first=Stephen R. |date=January 1997 |title=Toward a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period |journal=[[Modern China (journal)|Modern China]] |language=en |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=3–32 |doi=10.1177/009770049702300101 |issn=0097-7004 |jstor=189462|s2cid=148316475 }}</ref>{{rp|4}} In 1992, [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of China|Party General Secretary]] [[Jiang Zemin]] asked one of the CCP's most senior translators to come up with a better English alternative to ''propaganda'' as the translation of ''xuanchuan'' for propaganda targeting foreign audiences.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schoenhals |first=Michael |date=2008 |title=Abandoned or Merely Lost in Translation? |journal=Inner Asia |volume=10 |issue=1 |pages=113–130 |doi=10.1163/000000008793066777 |issn=1464-8172 |jstor=23615059}}</ref>{{rp|125}} Replacement English translations include ''publicity'', ''information'', and ''political communication'' domestically,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Brady |first=Anne-Marie |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uj-1sxeO99kC |title=Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China |date=2008 |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |isbn=978-0-7425-4057-6 |language=en |oclc=968245349 |author-link=Anne-Marie Brady |access-date=2020-05-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308184443/https://books.google.com/books?id=uj-1sxeO99kC |archive-date=2023-03-08 |url-status=live |page=73}}</ref> or ''media diplomacy'' and ''cultural exchange'' internationally.<ref>{{cite book |last=Edney |first=Kingsley |date=2014 |url=https://archive.org/details/globalizationofc0000edne |title=The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda: International Power and Domestic Political Cohesion |publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] |doi=10.1057/9781137382153|isbn=978-1-349-47990-0 |page=24 }}</ref>

==History==
===Republican era===
{{Excerpt|Propaganda in the Republic of China|only=paragraph|paragraphs=1-3}}By the 1930s and 1940s, both the KMT and the CCP used documentary films as a form of propaganda.<ref name="Kendall-2024">{{Cite journal |last=Kendall |first=Paul |date=2024-10-09 |title=Third Front as Method: Mao, Market and the Present in CCTV Documentaries |journal=[[The China Quarterly]] |volume=260 |pages=872–886 |doi=10.1017/s0305741024000912 |issn=0305-7410 |doi-access=free}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=874}}

===Mao era===
[[File:ChineseKoreanWarPoster.jpg|thumb|365x365px|Chinese enlistment poster to volunteer in the [[Korean War]] with the grave of an American soldier]]

The origins of the CCP propaganda system can be traced to [[Yan'an Rectification Movement]] and the rectification movements carried out there.<ref name="Frederick">{{cite book|last=Teiwes|first=Frederick C.|title=Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-65|publisher=Armonk: M. E. Sharpe|year=1993|isbn=978-1563242274|edition=2nd|chapter=1,2|oclc=925200696}}</ref> Following which it became a key mechanism in the Party's campaigns.<ref name="Shambaugh" /><ref>{{Cite book|last=Solomon|first=Richard H.|title=Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture|date=1971|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-02250-8|language=en|oclc=916968066}}</ref> Mao explicitly laid out the political role of culture in his 1942 "Talks at the [[Yan'an Forum]] on Art and Literature". The propaganda system, considered a central part of CCP's "control system",<ref name="Shambaugh" /><ref name="Schurmann-1968">{{Cite book|last=Schurmann|first=Franz|title=''[[Ideology and Organization in Communist China (book)|Ideology and Organization in Communist China]]'' |date=1968|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=0-520-01151-1|edition=2d ed., enlarged|location=Berkeley|oclc=174950}}</ref> drew much from Soviet, Nazi, imperial China, Nationalist China, and other totalitarian states' propaganda methods.<ref name="Shambaugh" /> It represented a quintessential [[agitprop|Leninist "transmission belt" for indoctrination and mass mobilization]].<ref name="Shambaugh">{{cite journal|last=Shambaugh|first=David|author-link=David Shambaugh|date=Jan 2007|title=China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy|journal=China Journal|volume=57|issue=57|pages=25–58|doi=10.1086/tcj.57.20066240|jstor=20066240|s2cid=140932475}}</ref> [[David Shambaugh]] observes that propaganda and indoctrination are considered to have been a hallmark of the Maoist China;<ref name="Shambaugh" /> the CCP employed a variety of "thought control" techniques, including incarceration for "thought reform," construction of role models to be emulated, mass mobilization campaigns, the creation of ideological monitors and propaganda teams for indoctrination purposes, enactment of articles to be memorized, control of the educational system and media, a nationwide system of loudspeakers, among other methods.<ref name="Shambaugh"/> While ostensibly aspiring to a "Communist utopia," often had a negative focus on constantly searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often extremely violent, "a literal acting out of class struggle."<ref name="brady08"/>

Beginning in March 1947, a series of campaigns commemorated and promoted the legacy of [[Liu Hulan]], widely remembered as the youngest [[Martyr (China)|martyr]] of the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]], through propaganda posters and art.<ref name="Wang-2025">{{Cite book |last=Wang |first=Xian |title=Gendered Memories: An Imaginary Museum for Ding Ling and Chinese Female Revolutionary Martyrs |date=2025 |publisher=[[University of Michigan Press]] |isbn=978-0-472-05719-1 |series=China Understandings Today series |location=Ann Arbor}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=157–158}}

According to academic [[Anne-Marie Brady]], CCP propaganda and thought work (''sīxiǎng gōngzuò'' 思想工作) traditionally had a much broader notion of the public sphere than is usually defined by media specialists.<ref name="brady08" /> Chinese propagandists used every possible means of communication available in China after 1949, including electronic media such as film and television, educational curriculum and research, print media such as newspapers and posters, cultural arts such as plays and music, oral media such as memorizing Mao quotes, as well as thought reform and political study classes.<ref name="brady08" /> [[China Central Television]] (CCTV) has traditionally served as a major national conduit for televised propaganda, while the ''[[People's Daily]],'' the official newspaper of the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]], has served as a medium for print propaganda. During the [[Mao era]], a distinctive feature of propaganda and thought work was "rule by editorial," according to Brady. Political campaigns would be launched through editorials and leading articles in ''People's Daily'', which would be followed by other papers.<ref name="brady08" /> Work units and other organizational political study groups utilized these articles as a source for political study, and reading newspapers in China was "a political obligation". Mao used Lenin's model for the media, which had it function as a tool of mass propaganda, agitation, and organization.<ref name="brady08" />

In [[Rural society in China|rural China]], traveling drama troupes did propaganda work and were particularly important during [[Land Reform Movement|land reform]] and other mass campaigns.<ref name="Li-2023" />{{Rp|page=48}} In 1951, a directive to develop a nationwide propaganda network designated individuals in each school, factory, and [[work unit]] as propaganda workers.<ref name="Li-2023" />{{Rp|page=48}} CCP propaganda sought to promote [[model worker]]s and soldiers whose productive examples were promoted to the public via radio, and other media.<ref name="Simpson-2023">{{Cite book |last=Simpson |first=Tim |title=Betting on Macau: Casino Capitalism and China's Consumer Revolution |date=2023 |publisher=[[University of Minnesota Press]] |isbn=978-1-5179-0031-1 |series=Globalization and Community series |location=Minneapolis}}</ref>{{Rp|page=24}} In 1955, the [[Ministry of Culture (China)|Ministry of Culture]] sought to develop rural cultural networks to distribute media like other performances, [[lantern slides]], books, cinema, radio, books, and to establish newspaper reading groups.<ref name="Li-2023" />{{Rp|page=48}} Salaried workers at rural cultural centers toured the countryside distributing propaganda materials, teaching revolutionary songs, and the like.<ref name="Li-2023" />{{Rp|page=48}}

In arts like [[Chinese painting|painting]], the early PRC had promoted Soviet art styles over traditional Chinese forms.<ref name=":Laikwan">{{Cite book |last=Laikwan |first=Pang |title=One and All: The Logic of Chinese Sovereignty |date=2024 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=9781503638815 |location=Stanford, CA |doi=10.1515/9781503638822}}</ref>{{Rp|page=137}} By the mid-1950s, [[Sino-Soviet relations|relations between China and the Soviet Union were deteriorating]], and Mao became increasingly interested in promoting China's own national path.<ref name=":Laikwan" />{{Rp|page=137}} As part of this effort, propaganda campaigns encouraged re-adoption of traditional Chinese art styles.<ref name=":Laikwan" />{{Rp|page=137}}

In the early 1950s, China increased its [[anti-imperialism]] propaganda campaigns.<ref name="Hirata-2024">{{Cite book |last=Hirata |first=Koji |title=Making Mao's Steelworks: Industrial Manchuria and the Transnational Origins of Chinese Socialism |date=2024 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-009-38227-4 |series=Cambridge Studies in the History of the People's Republic of China series |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=126}} This propaganda often emphasized [[Japanese war crimes]].<ref name="Hirata-2024" />{{Rp|page=126}}

In the 1960s, Chinese propaganda sought to portray contrasting images of the United States government and the United States public.<ref name=":Minami">{{Cite book |last=Minami |first=Kazushi |title=People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=9781501774157 |location=Ithaca, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=17}} Propaganda sought to criticize the government for its [[Vietnam War|war in Vietnam]] while praising the public for [[Opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War|anti-war protests]].<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=17}} As part of propaganda efforts during the 1965 Resist America, Aid Vietnam Campaign, the CCP organized street demonstrations and marches and promoted campaign messages using cultural media like film and photography exhibitions, chorus contests, and street performance.<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=29}}

[[File:SZ 深圳博物館 Shenzhen Museum 深圳改革開放前歷史展廳 Before Reform and Opening-up History Exhibition Hall 文革時代紅色思想宣傳海布 political posters IX1 03.jpg|thumb|210px|A series of posters from the Cultural Revolution, one of which depicts [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Chairman]] [[Mao Zedong]] over a mass rally]]
During the [[Cultural Revolution]], CCP propaganda was crucial to intensification of [[Mao Zedong's cult of personality]], as well as mobilizing popular participation in national campaigns.<ref name="landsberger">{{Citation| url = http://www.iisg.nl/landsberger/mods.html| title = Stefan Landsberger's Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages.| last = Landsberger| first = Stefan R.| year = 2010| access-date = 3 April 2010| archive-date = 27 September 2020| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200927230054/http://www.iisg.nl/landsberger/mods.html| url-status = live}}</ref> Past propaganda also encouraged the Chinese people to emulate government approved model workers and soldiers, such as [[Lei Feng]], Chinese Civil War hero [[Dong Cunrui]], Korean War hero [[Yang Gensi]], and Dr. [[Norman Bethune]], a Canadian doctor who assisted the CCP [[Eighth Route Army]] during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It also praised [[Third World]] revolutionaries and close foreign allies such as [[People's Socialist Republic of Albania|Albania]] and [[North Korea]] while vilifying both the American "[[imperialists]]" and the Soviet "[[Revisionism (Marxism)|revisionists]]" (the latter of whom was seen as having betrayed Marxism–Leninism following the [[Sino-Soviet split]]).

===Modern era===
[[File:Mawei China Propaganda facing Matsu.jpg|thumb|Propaganda sign in [[Xiamen]], China facing [[Kinmen]], [[Republic of China]]. Sign says "Peaceful Unification. [[One country two systems]]".]]

Following the [[Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong|death of Chairman Mao]] in 1976, propaganda was used to blacken the character of the [[Gang of Four]], which was blamed for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. During the era of [[Chinese economic reform|economic reform]] and [[Four Modernizations|modernization]] that was initiated by [[Deng Xiaoping]], propaganda promoting [[socialism with Chinese characteristics]] was distributed. The first post-Mao campaign was in 1983 which saw the [[Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign]].

In 1977, Deng initiated a propaganda campaign to promote science as the cornerstone of China's modernization, in advance of the 1978 National Science Conference.<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=82}} The campaign helped advanced Deng's efforts to improve the quality of science in China, particularly basic research, following the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=82}} [[Chinese Academy of Sciences]] vice president [[Fang Yi]] led the campaign in having schools, factories, and communes organize youth-focused events to celebrate science and technology.<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=82}}

The [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]] were an indication to many elders in the CCP that liberalization in the propaganda sector had gone too far, and that the Party must re-establish its control over ideology and the propaganda system.<ref name="brady08"/>

Brady writes that propaganda and thought work have become the "life blood" of the Party-State since the post-1989 period, and one of the key means for guaranteeing the CCP's continued legitimacy and hold on power.<ref name="brady08">{{cite book|last=Brady|first=Anne-Marie|title=Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|year=2008|isbn=978-0742540576|page=1|oclc=968245349|author-link=Anne-Marie Brady}}</ref>

In the 1990s, propaganda theorists described the challenges to China's propaganda and thought work as "blind spots"; mass communication was advocated as the antidote. From the early 1990s, selective concepts from mass communications theory, public relations, advertising, social psychology, [[The Patriotic Education Campaign|patriotic education]] and other areas of modern mass persuasion were introduced into China's propaganda system for the purpose of creating a modern propaganda model.<ref name="brady08"/>

Particularly since the 1990s, China has engaged in propaganda seeking to eliminate the traditional [[Son preference in China|son preference]].<ref name="Santos-2021">{{Cite book |last=Santos |first=Gonçalo |title=Chinese Village Life Today: Building Families in an Age of Transition |date=2021 |publisher=[[University of Washington Press]] |isbn=978-0-295-74738-5 |location=Seattle |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=6–10}}

===Recent developments===
[[File:社会主义核心价值观 (cropped).jpg|thumb|Giant poster listing the twelve [[Core Socialist Values]] of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (2017).]]

The [[2008 Summer Olympics]] were portrayed by the Chinese government as a symbol of China's pride and place in the world,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Olympic-Games-all-about-China-Chinese-3274954.php|title=→Beijing Olympic Games all about China, Chinese Leaders keen to impress, inspire their own people|author1=April Rabkin|date=1 August 2008|work=San Francisco Chronicle|access-date=17 March 2010|archive-date=19 November 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101119225630/http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-08-01/news/17121901_1_international-olympic-committee-s-choice-beijing-torch-protests|url-status=live}}</ref> and seem to have bolstered some domestic support for the Chinese government, and support for the policies of the CCP, giving rise to concerns that the state will possibly have more leverage to disperse [[dissent]].<ref name="legacy2">{{cite web|last=Gardner|first=Dinah|title=China's Olympic legacy|date=25 August 2008|url=http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/beijing08/2008/08/20088255274440438.html|access-date=29 August 2008|archive-date=29 August 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080829090422/http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/beijing08/2008/08/20088255274440438.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In the lead-up to the Olympics, the government allegedly issued guidelines to the local media for their reporting during the Games: most political issues not directly related to the games were to be downplayed; topics such as pro-Tibetan independence and East Turkestan movements were not to be reported on, as were food safety issues such as "cancer-causing mineral water."<ref>{{Cite web|last=Hutcheon|first=Stephen|date=2008-09-15|title=Was China's milk scandal hushed up?|url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/was-chinas-milk-scandal-hushed-up-20080916-gdsv15.html|access-date=2020-06-15|website=The Sydney Morning Herald|language=en|archive-date=25 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200725065428/https://www.smh.com.au/world/was-chinas-milk-scandal-hushed-up-20080916-gdsv15.html|url-status=live}}</ref> As the [[2008 Chinese milk scandal]] broke in September 2008, there was widespread speculation that China's desire for a perfect Games may have been a factor contributing towards the delayed recall of contaminated [[infant formula]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Spencer|first=Richard|date=2008-09-15|title=China accused over contaminated baby milk|language=en-GB|work=The Telegraph|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/2963808/China-accused-over-contaminated-baby-milk.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/2963808/China-accused-over-contaminated-baby-milk.html |archive-date=12 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|access-date=2020-06-15|issn=0307-1235}}{{cbignore}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Barboza|first=David|date=2008-09-23|title=China Says Complaints About Milk Began in 2007|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/world/asia/24milk.html|access-date=2020-06-15|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=29 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170129060401/http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/world/asia/24milk.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

In early 2009, the CCP embarked on a multibillion-dollar global media expansion, including the 24-hour English-language news channel [[China Global Television Network]] (CGTN) in the style of Western news agencies. According to Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher at [[Human Rights Watch]], it was part of CCP general secretary [[Hu Jintao]]'s plan to "go global" and make "the voice of China better heard in international affairs", by strengthening their foreign-language services, and being less political in their broadcasting. Bequelin notes that their function is to channel a specific view of China to an international audience, and their fundamental premise remains the same; that all information broadcast must reflect the government's views. The Chinese government encouraged the adaption of Western style media marketing in their news agencies due to internal competition with national commercial media.<ref name="Bequelin-2009">{{Cite news |last=Bequelin |first=Nicholas |date=2009-01-30 |title=China's New Propaganda Machine |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123326012456829891 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=2020-06-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171116112518/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123326012456829891 |archive-date=16 November 2017 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref>

In 2011, then [[Chongqing]] [[Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary|party secretary]] [[Bo Xilai]] and the city's Propaganda Department initiated a 'Red Songs campaign' that demanded every district, government departments and commercial corporations, universities and schools, state radio and TV stations to begin singing "red songs", praising the achievements of the CCP and PRC. Bo said the aim was "to reinvigorate the city with the Marxist ideals of his father's comrade-in-arms Mao Zedong"; although academic Ding Xueliang of [[Hong Kong University of Science and Technology]] suspected the campaign's aim was to further his political standing within the country's leadership.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2011-04-20|title=Chinese city of 30m ordered to sing 'red songs'|url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/chinese-city-of-30m-ordered-to-sing-red-songs-20110420-1dohw.html|access-date=2020-06-15|website=The Sydney Morning Herald|language=en|archive-date=11 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200411223715/https://www.smh.com.au/world/chinese-city-of-30m-ordered-to-sing-red-songs-20110420-1dohw.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>http://politics.gmw.cn/2011-04/20/content_1864216.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120323074523/http://politics.gmw.cn/2011-04/20/content_1864216.htm |date=23 March 2012 }} 重庆要求组织干部群众集中传唱《走向复兴》等36首红歌 |http://www.gmw.cn 2011-04-20 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070217164128/http://www.gmw.cn/ |date=17 February 2007 }} 20:32:38</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2015-03-27|title='Red Songs' fuels Chinese politician's ambitions|website=[[Fox News]]|url=https://www.foxnews.com/world/red-songs-fuels-chinese-politicians-ambitions|access-date=2020-06-15|agency=Associated Press|language=en-US|archive-date=9 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200609172325/https://www.foxnews.com/world/red-songs-fuels-chinese-politicians-ambitions|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Branigan|first=Tania|date=2011-04-22|title=Red songs ring out in Chinese city's new cultural revolution|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/22/red-songs-chinese-cultural-revolution|access-date=2020-06-15|issn=0261-3077|archive-date=10 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200610212700/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/22/red-songs-chinese-cultural-revolution|url-status=live}}</ref>

Since [[Xi Jinping]] became the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]] in 2012, censorship and propaganda have been significantly stepped up.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Denyer |first=Simon |date=25 October 2017 |title=China's Xi Jinping unveils his top party leaders, with no successor in sight |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-communist-party-unveils-new-leadership-with-no-obvious-successor-to-xi-jinping/2017/10/25/efe67876-b8fc-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html |url-status=live |access-date=25 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190813203127/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-communist-party-unveils-new-leadership-with-no-obvious-successor-to-xi-jinping/2017/10/25/efe67876-b8fc-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html |archive-date=13 August 2019 |quote=Censorship has been significantly stepped up in China since Xi took power.}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Economy |first=Elizabeth |author-link=Elizabeth Economy |date=29 June 2018 |title=The great firewall of China: Xi Jinping's internet shutdown |newspaper=[[The Guardian]] |url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown |url-status=live |access-date=4 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191010172129/https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown |archive-date=10 October 2019 |quote=Before Xi Jinping, the internet was becoming a more vibrant political space for Chinese citizens. But today the country has the largest and most sophisticated online censorship operation in the world. |ref=none}}</ref> Propaganda has become more prevalent and homogeneous.<ref name="Waight-2025" /> During a visit to Chinese state media, Xi stated that "[[Party media takes the party's last name|party-owned media must hold the family name of the party]]" and that the state media "must embody the party's will, safeguard the party's authority".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Zhuang |first=Pinghui |date=19 February 2016 |title=China's top party mouthpieces pledge 'absolute loyalty' as president makes rare visits to newsrooms |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1914136/chinas-top-party-mouthpieces-pledge-absolute-loyalty |access-date=14 August 2022 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=31 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331170900/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1914136/chinas-top-party-mouthpieces-pledge-absolute-loyalty |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2018, as part of an overhaul of CCP and government bodies, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) was renamed into the [[National Radio and Television Administration]] (NRTA) with its film, news media and publications being transferred to the Central Propaganda Department.<ref name="Buckley-2018b">{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2018-03-21 |title=China Gives Communist Party More Control Over Policy and Media |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/china-communist-party-xi-jinping.html |access-date=2022-12-29 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=12 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211112211222/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/china-communist-party-xi-jinping.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Additionally, the control of China Central Television (CCTV, including its international edition, China Global Television), [[China National Radio]] (CNR) and [[China Radio International]] (CRI) were transferred to the newly established [[China Media Group]] (CMG) under the control of the Central Propaganda Department.<ref name="Buckley-2018b" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=22 March 2018 |title=三台合一, 发出更强"中国之声" |trans-title=Merge of Three Stations into One, Sending Out a Stronger "Voice of China" |work=[[People's Daily]] |url=http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/n1/2018/0322/c1001-29883390.html |access-date=29 December 2022 |archive-date=10 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210910022043/http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/n1/2018/0322/c1001-29883390.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

Starting in June 2021 and continuing through at least 2024, [[Judicial system of China|China's judicial system]] has engaged in a propaganda campaign to promote court cases decided in favor of [[platform economy]] workers against the companies for which they did work.<ref name=":Zhang">{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Angela Huyue |title=High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197682258}}</ref>{{Rp|page=|pages=182–183}} The judicial system's newspapers and magazines have promoted coverage of typical cases and relevant studies.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|pages=182–183}} Academic Angela Huyue Zhang writes that because court rulings in China do not create [[precedent]], the campaign is a mechanism for guiding courts to tighten regulation in this area, particularly where platform workers lack contracts or have been characterized as independent contractors but are in fact subject to tight monitoring by the platform companies that dispatch them.<ref name=":Zhang" />{{Rp|page=183}}

==== Xinjiang ====
{{Further|Persecution of Uyghurs in China|Xinjiang internment camps}}

During the [[July 2009 Ürümqi riots]], CCP officials moved swiftly in a public relations campaign. According to ''[[Newsweek]]'', CCP officials felt that the recent riots risked tarnishing China's global image, and underwent a public relations program involving quickly getting out the government's official version of the events, as well as transporting foreign journalists to riot affected areas. The growth in new technologies, such as email and SMS, forced the CCP's hand into taking up spin.

Since 2017, the Chinese government has engaged in a propaganda campaign to defend its actions in Xinjiang.<ref name="NYT Wonderful">{{Cite news |last=Qin |first=Amy |date=5 April 2021 |title=China Tries to Counter Xinjiang Backlash With ... a Musical? |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/world/asia/china-uyghurs-propaganda-musical.html |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517031825/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/05/world/asia/china-uyghurs-propaganda-musical.html |archive-date=17 May 2021}}</ref><ref name="wsjFaceProp">{{Cite news |last=Xiao |first=Eva |date=2 April 2021 |title=Facebook Staff Fret Over China's Ads Portraying Happy Muslims in Xinjiang |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-staff-fret-over-chinas-ads-portraying-happy-muslims-in-xinjiang-11617366096 |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516193405/https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-staff-fret-over-chinas-ads-portraying-happy-muslims-in-xinjiang-11617366096 |archive-date=16 May 2021 |quote=Beijing is beating back international criticism of its treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang with a propaganda push on Facebook, Twitter and the big screen.}}</ref><ref name="China Digital Times Brouwer 2021">{{Cite news |last=Brouwer |first=Joseph |date=6 April 2021 |title=Propaganda Films Attempt to Cloak Xinjiang in Disinformation |work=[[China Digital Times]] |url=https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/04/propaganda-films-attempt-to-cloak-xinjiang-in-disinformation/ |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517025744/https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2021/04/propaganda-films-attempt-to-cloak-xinjiang-in-disinformation/ |archive-date=17 May 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Kim |first=Jo |date=16 December 2019 |title=Why China's Xinjiang Propaganda Fails |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/why-chinas-xinjiang-propaganda-fails/ |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414195509/https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/why-chinas-xinjiang-propaganda-fails/ |archive-date=14 April 2021}}</ref> China initially denied the existence of the Xinjiang internment camps and attempted to [[cover-up]] their existence.<ref name="Griffiths CNN 2021">{{cite web |last1=Griffiths |first1=James |date=17 April 2021 |title=From cover-up to propaganda blitz: China's attempts to control the narrative on Xinjiang |url=https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/16/china/beijing-xinjiang-uyghurs-propaganda-intl-hnk-dst/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210422163904/https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/16/china/beijing-xinjiang-uyghurs-propaganda-intl-hnk-dst/index.html |archive-date=22 April 2021 |access-date=23 April 2021 |website=CNN}}</ref> In 2018, after being forced to admit by widespread reporting that the Xinjiang internment camps exist, the Chinese government initiated a propaganda campaign to portray the camps as humane and to deny human rights abuses occur in Xinjiang.<ref name="ABCChiProp">{{Cite news |last1=Dorman |first1=Mark |last2=Stephen |first2=Hutcheon |last3=Dylan |first3=Welch |last4=Taylor |first4=Kyle |date=31 October 2018 |title=China's frontier of fear |work=[[ABC News (Australia)|Australian Broadcasting Corporation]] |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-01/satellite-images-expose-chinas-network-of-re-education-camps/10432924?nw=0 |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517170456/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-01/satellite-images-expose-chinas-network-of-re-education-camps/10432924?nw=0 |archive-date=17 May 2021}}</ref> In 2020 and 2021 they expanded the propaganda campaign due to international backlash against government policies in Xinjiang<ref>{{Cite news |last=Shepherd |first=Christian |date=2 April 2021 |title=China intensifies Xinjiang propaganda push as global backlash grows |work=[[The Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/80a4500d-84b0-4e4e-b208-7cf3e7d80df4 |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516193359/https://www.ft.com/content/80a4500d-84b0-4e4e-b208-7cf3e7d80df4 |archive-date=16 May 2021}}</ref> and worries that the Chinese government no longer had control of the narrative.<ref name="Griffiths CNN 2021" />

The Chinese government has used social media as a part of its extensive propaganda campaign.<ref name="wsjFaceProp" /><ref name="rcTikTok">{{cite news |title=Xinjiang's TikTok wipes away evidence of Uyghur persecution |work=[[Rappler]] |agency=[[Coda Story]] |url=https://www.rappler.com/technology/features/xinjiang-tiktok-wipes-away-evidence-uyghur-persecution-coda-story |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210508044444/https://www.rappler.com/technology/features/xinjiang-tiktok-wipes-away-evidence-uyghur-persecution-coda-story |archive-date=8 May 2021}}</ref><ref name="RapSanitizedTikTok">{{cite news |last1=Cockerell |first1=Isobel |date=19 September 2020 |title=Welcome to TikTok's sanitized version of Xinjiang |work=[[Rappler]] |url=https://www.rappler.com/technology/features/tiktok-sanitized-version-xinjiang-coda-story |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210414152322/https://www.rappler.com/technology/features/tiktok-sanitized-version-xinjiang-coda-story |archive-date=14 April 2021}}</ref><ref name="supFaceProp">{{cite news |last1=Niewenhuis |first1=Lucas |date=2 April 2021 |title=How will Facebook deal with Beijing's propaganda on Xinjiang? |work=SupChina |url=https://supchina.com/2021/04/02/how-will-facebook-deal-with-beijings-propaganda-on-xinjiang/ |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417085940/https://supchina.com/2021/04/02/how-will-facebook-deal-with-beijings-propaganda-on-xinjiang/ |archive-date=17 April 2021}}</ref> [[Douyin]], the [[Mainland China|mainland Chinese]] sister app to ByteDance-owned social media app [[TikTok]], presents users with significant amounts of Chinese state propaganda pertaining to the human rights abuses in Xinjiang.<ref name="rcTikTok" /><ref name="WaPoTikProp">{{cite news |last1=Fifeld |first1=Anna |date=27 November 2019 |title=TikTok's owner is helping China's campaign of repression in Xinjiang, report finds |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tiktoks-owner-is-helping-chinas-campaign-of-repression-in-xinjiang-report-finds/2019/11/28/98e8d9e4-119f-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191128183415/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tiktoks-owner-is-helping-chinas-campaign-of-repression-in-xinjiang-report-finds/2019/11/28/98e8d9e4-119f-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html |archive-date=28 November 2019}}</ref><ref name="SCMPTikProp">{{cite news |last1=Borak |first1=Marsha |title=ByteDance says TikTok and Douyin are different, but they face similar criticisms |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/abacus/tech/article/3040147/bytedance-says-tiktok-and-douyin-are-different-they-face-similar |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210415152751/https://www.scmp.com/abacus/tech/article/3040147/bytedance-says-tiktok-and-douyin-are-different-they-face-similar |archive-date=15 April 2021}}</ref>

Chinese government propaganda attacks have targeted international journalists covering human rights abuses in Xinjiang.<ref name="NYT Suds">{{Cite news |last=Qin |first=Amy |date=1 April 2021 |title=BBC Correspondent Leaves China, Citing Growing Risks |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/world/asia/bbc-china-john-sudworth.html |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210415194159/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/world/asia/bbc-china-john-sudworth.html |archive-date=15 April 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Tarabay |first=Jamie |date=4 March 2021 |title=China's BBC Attacks Show Growing Sophistication, Group Says |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-04/china-s-bbc-attacks-show-growing-sophistication-group-says |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210519004052/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-04/china-s-bbc-attacks-show-growing-sophistication-group-says |archive-date=19 May 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Yan |first=Sophia |date=4 March 2021 |title=China using Big Tech firms to attack BBC in state propaganda campaign, says report |work=[[The Daily Telegraph|The Telegraph]] |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/03/04/china-using-big-tech-firms-attack-bbc-state-propaganda-campaign/ |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/03/04/china-using-big-tech-firms-attack-bbc-state-propaganda-campaign/ |archive-date=12 January 2022}}{{cbignore}}</ref> After providing coverage critical of Chinese government abuses in Xinjiang, [[BBC News]] reporter [[John Sudworth]] was subjected to a campaign of propaganda and harassment by Chinese state-affiliated and CCP-affiliated media.<ref name="NYT Suds" /><ref name="BBC Suds">{{Cite news |last=Sudworth |first=John |date=2 April 2021 |title='The grim reality of reporting in China that pushed me out' |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56607815 |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517184422/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56607815 |archive-date=17 May 2021}}</ref><ref name="Sudworth-2021">{{Cite news |last=Sudworth |first=John |date=31 March 2021 |title=BBC journalist John Sudworth flees China after state harassment campaign |work=[[The Times of London]] |url=https://www.thetimes.com/article/bbc-journalist-john-sudworth-flees-china-after-state-harassment-campaign-96g2v937j |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210504122940/https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bbc-journalist-john-sudworth-flees-china-after-state-harassment-campaign-96g2v937j |archive-date=4 May 2021}}</ref> The public attacks resulted in Sudworth and his wife [[Yvonne Murray (journalist)|Yvonne Murray]], who reports for [[Raidió Teilifís Éireann]], fleeing China for [[Taiwan]] for fear of their safety.<ref name="BBC Suds" /><ref name="Goff-2021">{{Cite news |date=31 March 2021 |title=RTÉ reporter in Beijing flees China with husband after threats |newspaper=[[The Irish Times]] |url=https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/rt%C3%A9-reporter-in-beijing-flees-china-with-husband-after-threats-1.4525041 |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210401165355/https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/rt%C3%A9-reporter-in-beijing-flees-china-with-husband-after-threats-1.4525041 |archive-date=1 April 2021}}</ref>

Between July 2019 and early August 2019, the CCP-owned tabloid ''Global Times'' paid [[Twitter]] to promote tweets that deny that the Chinese government is committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang; Twitter later banned advertising from state-controlled media outlets on 19 August after removing large numbers of [[Twitter bot|pro-Beijing bots]] from the social network.<ref name="InterceptTwit">{{cite news |last1=Gallagher |first1=Ryan |date=19 August 2019 |title=Twitter Helped Chinese Government Promote Disinformation on Repression of Uyghurs |work=[[The Intercept]] |url=https://theintercept.com/2019/08/19/twitter-ads-china-uighurs/ |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190821021612/https://theintercept.com/2019/08/19/twitter-ads-china-uighurs/ |archive-date=21 August 2019}}</ref><ref name="SCMPTwitBot">{{cite news |last1=Borak |first1=Masha |date=5 December 2019 |title=New swarm of pro-China Twitter bots spreads disinformation about Xinjiang |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/abacus/tech/article/3040686/new-swarm-pro-china-twitter-bots-spreads-disinformation-about-xinjiang |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210517082020/https://www.scmp.com/abacus/tech/article/3040686/new-swarm-pro-china-twitter-bots-spreads-disinformation-about-xinjiang |archive-date=17 May 2021}}</ref> China has spent heavily to purchase [[Facebook]] advertisements in order to spread propaganda designed to incite doubt on the existence and scope of human rights violations occurring within Xinjiang.<ref name="wsjFaceProp" /><ref name="supFaceProp" /><ref>{{cite news |last1=Mac |first1=Ryan |title=These New Facebook Ads From Chinese State Media Want You To Believe Xinjiang's Muslim Internment Camps Are Just Great |work=[[Buzzfeed News]] |url=https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/chinse-media-facebook-ads-xinjiang-uighur-propaganda |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190821055957/https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/chinse-media-facebook-ads-xinjiang-uighur-propaganda |archive-date=21 August 2019}}</ref>

In April 2021, the Chinese government released propaganda videos titled, "Xinjiang is a Wonderful Land", and produced a musical titled "The Wings of Songs" in order to portray Xinjiang as harmonious and peaceful.<ref name="NYT Wonderful" /><ref name="AustraliaBC Wonderful">{{cite news |last1=Xiao |first1=Bang |date=7 April 2021 |title=Uyghur community leaders in Australia appalled and outraged the government allowed a Chinese Communist Party propaganda parade |work=[[ABC News (Australia)]] |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-07/uyghur-leaders-call-china-atrocities-genocide-xinjiang/100053014 |url-status=live |access-date=18 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210520105916/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-07/uyghur-leaders-call-china-atrocities-genocide-xinjiang/100053014 |archive-date=20 May 2021}}</ref><ref name="China Digital Times Brouwer 2021" /> The Wings of Songs portrays an idyllic rural landscape with a cohesive ethnic population notably devoid of repression, surveillance, and Islam.<ref>{{cite web |agency=Agence France-Presse |date=3 April 2021 |title=China launches musical in bid to counter Uyghur abuse allegations |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/03/china-launches-musical-in-bid-to-counter-uyghur-abuse-allegations |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210413202604/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/03/china-launches-musical-in-bid-to-counter-uyghur-abuse-allegations |archive-date=13 April 2021 |access-date=13 April 2021 |website=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref> It is near impossible to get accurate information about the situation in Xinjiang domestically in China,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Jordan |first1=Zoe |title=Xinjiang Cotton and the Shift in China's Censorship Approach |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/xinjiang-cotton-and-the-shift-in-chinas-censorship-approach/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210504171643/https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/xinjiang-cotton-and-the-shift-in-chinas-censorship-approach/ |archive-date=4 May 2021 |access-date=5 May 2021 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] }}</ref> concerns within the domestic audience are also downplayed because many aspects of the abuse such as forced labor are seen as commonplace by many Chinese citizens.<ref name="What Do Chinese People Think Is Happening in Xinjiang?">{{cite web |last1=Tiezzi |first1=Shannon |title=What Do Chinese People Think Is Happening in Xinjiang? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/what-do-chinese-people-think-is-happening-in-xinjiang/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210530151753/https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/what-do-chinese-people-think-is-happening-in-xinjiang/ |archive-date=30 May 2021 |access-date=31 May 2021 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] }}</ref> In 2021, Chinese officials ordered videos of Uyghur men and women saying that they deny the U.S. charges that China that is committing human rights violations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Kang |first=Dake |date=May 20, 2021 |title=Chinese authorities order video denials by Uyghurs of abuses |work=[[Associated Press]] |url=https://apnews.com/article/asia-pacific-technology-f6ffda9288b1671da741c07d8f4f8afc |url-status=live |access-date=May 20, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210520220308/https://apnews.com/article/asia-pacific-technology-f6ffda9288b1671da741c07d8f4f8afc |archive-date=20 May 2021}}</ref>

Critics have said that government propaganda plays into existing colonial and racist tropes about the Uyghurs by depicting them as dangerous or backwards. Domestic propaganda has increased since the international community began considering designating the abuses against the Uyghurs as a genocide. Domestic pushback against the genocide label is also emotional and follows a similar pattern of denial to the genocide committed against the Native Americans.<ref name="What Do Chinese People Think Is Happening in Xinjiang?" />

====COVID-19 pandemic====
{{Further|COVID-19 misinformation by China}}
In 2020, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping and the rest of the CCP began propagating the idea of "winning a battle against America" in containing the [[COVID-19 pandemic|coronavirus pandemic]]. The numbers are [[COVID-19 misinformation|notably misrepresented]] by Chinese authorities, but the CCP has continued to take to the media, pointing out "the failures of America", even though the numbers are manipulated. The now former Secretary of State [[Mike Pompeo]] accused the CCP of spreading disinformation on 17 March. Chinese officials in Japan have referred to the disease as the "Japanese coronavirus", even though there is no such evidence it originated there. The CCP has also used transmitting "positive energy" to promote itself.<ref>{{Cite news|title=China Wants to Use the Coronavirus to Take Over the World|url=https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/04/coronavirus-pandemic-china-seeks-increase-geopolitical-power/|last=Maçães|first=Bruno|date=3 April 2020|access-date=6 April 2020|work=[[National Review]]|archive-date=6 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200406033239/https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/04/coronavirus-pandemic-china-seeks-increase-geopolitical-power/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|title=China's coronavirus propaganda campaign is putting lives at risk|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/18/chinas-coronavirus-propaganda-campaign-is-putting-lives-risk/|last=Rogin|first=Josh|date=18 March 2020|access-date=6 April 2020|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|archive-date=19 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200319145226/https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/18/chinas-coronavirus-propaganda-campaign-is-putting-lives-risk/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|title=The Chinese People Step up to Enforce China's Nationalist Propaganda|url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/the-chinese-people-step-up-to-enforce-chinas-nationalist-propaganda/|last=Kim|first=Jo|date=5 May 2020|access-date=6 May 2020|work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|archive-date=6 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200506053359/https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/the-chinese-people-step-up-to-enforce-chinas-nationalist-propaganda/|url-status=live}}</ref> After Mike Pompeo's accusation that the virus originated in a lab in Wuhan, which [[Anthony Fauci]] denied on 5 May, Chinese officials launched a [[smear campaign]] on the same day against him with multiple propaganda outlets calling him a liar.<ref>{{Cite news |date=May 5, 2020 |title=As Trump Blames China, Beijing Directs Fury at His Top Diplomat |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-05/as-trump-blames-china-beijing-directs-fury-at-his-top-diplomat |access-date=April 8, 2024 |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |archive-date=6 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220506093739/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-05/as-trump-blames-china-beijing-directs-fury-at-his-top-diplomat |url-status=live }}</ref> During the [[George Floyd protests]], the CCP criticized the US for failing to address racial equality. On 30 May 2020, [[Morgan Ortagus]] urged on Twitter for "freedom loving people" to hold the CCP to impose plans on Hong Kong for national security legislation. Her counterpart, [[Hua Chunying]], responded back with "I can't breathe", obviously a reference to Floyd's last words. Some people responded with "I can't tweet" and some have accused the government of using the same police brutality tactics that killed Floyd, with Chinese censors simply deleting the complaints.<ref>{{Cite news|title=In George Floyd Protests, China Sees A Powerful Propaganda Opportunity|url=https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/868566978/in-george-floyd-protests-china-sees-a-powerful-propaganda-opportunity|last=Ruwitch|first=John|date=3 June 2020|access-date=7 June 2020|work=[[NPR]]|archive-date=4 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200604012258/https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/868566978/in-george-floyd-protests-china-sees-a-powerful-propaganda-opportunity|url-status=live}}</ref> In Wuhan, where the outbreak first emerged, television shows and documentaries portrayed the response positively, as a heroic success taken care of by "warriors in white coats".<ref>{{Cite news|title=As China's Propaganda Push Continues, Wuhan Emerges as a Star|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/06/world/asia/covid-coronavirus-china-wuhan.html|last=Wang|first=Vivian|date=November 6, 2020|access-date=December 11, 2020|work=[[The New York Times]]|archive-date=11 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201211233050/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/06/world/asia/covid-coronavirus-china-wuhan.html|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Alexander Kekulé]]'s theory of coronavirus-disease 2019 coming from Italy instead of Wuhan which was taken out of context has sparked Chinese propaganda newspapers following the narrative, with even one headline saying, "China is Innocent!" Kekulé himself says it is pure propaganda.<ref>{{Cite news|title=China Peddles Falsehoods to Obscure Origin of Covid Pandemic|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/06/world/asia/china-covid-origin-falsehoods.html|last=Hernandez|first=Javier|date=December 6, 2020|access-date=December 11, 2020|work=[[The New York Times]]|archive-date=23 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210123185015/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/06/world/asia/china-covid-origin-falsehoods.html|url-status=live}}</ref> State-owned outlets such as [[Xinhua]] and the ''People's Daily'' have blamed elderly deaths in Norway and Germany on COVID-19 vaccines, even though there is no scientific evidence, and have accused English media of downplaying it.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hui |first=Mary |date=January 21, 2021 |title=China's vaccine diplomacy has an aggressive anti-vax element |work=[[Quartz (publication)|Quartz]] |url=https://qz.com/1959855/chinas-coronavirus-vaccine-diplomacy-is-anti-vax/ |url-status=live |access-date=January 25, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210123184106/https://qz.com/1959855/chinas-coronavirus-vaccine-diplomacy-is-anti-vax/ |archive-date=23 January 2021}}</ref>

In 2020, propaganda from China has been controlled by [[state media]] and CCP-run outlets such as the nationalistic [[Chinese tabloid|tabloid]] ''Global Times'', which portray the handling of [[COVID-19]] as a success.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Roberts |first=Jeff |date=30 March 2020 |title=China's coronavirus propaganda has shifted dramatically, report finds |work=[[Fortune (magazine)|Fortune]] |url=https://fortune.com/2020/03/30/china-coronavirus-propaganda-has-shifted-dramatically/ |url-status=live |access-date=6 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200406191924/https://fortune.com/2020/03/30/china-coronavirus-propaganda-has-shifted-dramatically/ |archive-date=6 April 2020}}</ref> On 11 June 2020, Twitter announced that they deleted over 170,000 accounts tied to a Chinese-state linked operation because they were spreading false information about the COVID-19 pandemic.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Miller |first=Maggie |date=11 June 2020 |title=Twitter deletes over 170,000 accounts tied to Chinese propaganda efforts |work=[[The Hill (newspaper)|The Hill]] |url=https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/502371-twitter-deletes-over-170000-accounts-tied-to-chinese-propaganda-efforts |url-status=live |access-date=26 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200626022327/https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/502371-twitter-deletes-over-170000-accounts-tied-to-chinese-propaganda-efforts |archive-date=26 June 2020}}</ref> On 22 June 2020, the [[United States Department of State]] designated several Chinese state media outlets as [[Diplomatic mission|foreign missions]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Fox |first=Ben |date=22 June 2020 |title=U.S. moves to restrict Chinese media outlets as 'propaganda' |work=[[PBS Newshour]] |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-moves-to-restrict-chinese-media-outlets-as-propaganda |url-status=live |access-date=21 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200722022833/https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-moves-to-restrict-chinese-media-outlets-as-propaganda |archive-date=22 July 2020}}</ref> In December 2020, an investigation by ''[[The New York Times]]'' and [[ProPublica]] revealed leaked internal documents showing the state's instructions to local media regarding the death of [[Li Wenliang]]. The documents address news organizations and social media platforms, ordering them to stop using [[Push Notification|push notifications]], make no comment on the situation and control any discussion of the event happening in online spaces. The documents also address "local propaganda workers", demanding they steer online discussions away from anything that "seriously damages party and government credibility and attacks the political system".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Zhong |first1=Raymond |last2=Mozur |first2=Paul |last3=Krolik |first3=Aaron |last4=Kao |first4=Jeff |date=19 December 2020 |title=Leaked Documents Show How China's Army of Paid Internet Trolls Helped Censor the Coronavirus |work=[[ProPublica]] |url=https://www.propublica.org/article/leaked-documents-show-how-chinas-army-of-paid-internet-trolls-helped-censor-the-coronavirus |url-status=live |access-date=20 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201219101738/https://www.propublica.org/article/leaked-documents-show-how-chinas-army-of-paid-internet-trolls-helped-censor-the-coronavirus |archive-date=19 December 2020}}</ref> Pro-Chinese government spam networks also attempted to discredit U.S. vaccines.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Glaun |first=Dan |date=February 4, 2021 |title=Chinese Spam Network Aims to Discredit U.S. COVID Vaccine |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/chinese-spam-network-aims-to-discredit-u-s-covid-vaccine-and-response-report-finds/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210204175607/https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/chinese-spam-network-aims-to-discredit-u-s-covid-vaccine-and-response-report-finds/ |archive-date=February 4, 2021 |access-date=2024-06-19 |website=[[Frontline (American TV program)|Frontline]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

On the 29th of April 2020, an animated video was posted on Twitter and YouTube, called ''Once Upon a Virus'', used Lego figures to represent China through hospital workers and [[Liberty (personification)|Lady Liberty]] representing America, was posted by Xinhua News Agency. [[The Lego Group]], for their part, said they had nothing to do with the video in question. In the video, the hospital worker repeatedly warns the US about the outbreak, but they dismiss them, talking about lockdowns being a violation of human rights, or paywalls. By that point, Lady Liberty is hooked up to an IV and looks severely ill, and at the end, the US says "We are always correct, even when we contradict ourselves", and China responds with "That's what I love best about you Americans, your consistency". The Chinese government delayed warning the public about the outbreak, even as doctors tried to warn people via social media. The [[Associated Press]] reports "China's rigid controls on information, bureaucratic hurdles and a reluctance to send bad news up the chain of command muffled early warnings".<ref>{{Cite news |last=Timsit |first=Annabelle |date=2 May 2020 |title=A Chinese propaganda video mocks America's response to the coronavirus crisis |work=[[Quartz (publication)|Quartz]] |url=https://qz.com/1850097/chinese-propaganda-video-mocks-us-response-to-coronavirus-crisis/ |url-status=live |access-date=3 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200503083427/https://qz.com/1850097/chinese-propaganda-video-mocks-us-response-to-coronavirus-crisis/ |archive-date=3 May 2020}}</ref>

====100th Anniversary of CCP====
In 2021 the state orchestrated a propaganda and information control campaign to bolster the [[100th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Cook |first1=Sarah |title=Reading Between the Lines of the CCP's Centennial Propaganda Blitz |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/reading-between-the-lines-of-the-ccps-centennial-propaganda-blitz/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210630212612/https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/reading-between-the-lines-of-the-ccps-centennial-propaganda-blitz/ |archive-date=30 June 2021 |access-date=1 July 2021 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] }}</ref> Chinese state owned media claimed without evidence that the CIA was recruiting Chinese-speaking spies, an assertion which went viral in the Chinese internet.<ref>{{Cite web |date=18 October 2021 |title=Analysis: China's propaganda machine is intensifying its 'people's war' to catch American spies |url=https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/18/china/cia-spies-mic-intl-hnk/index.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220116011012/https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/18/china/cia-spies-mic-intl-hnk/index.html |archive-date=16 January 2022 |access-date=2022-01-16 |website=[[CNN]] |language=en}}</ref> In 2021, the [[Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of Education of China]] announced that CCP general secretary Xi Jinping's socio-political policies and ideas would be included in the curriculum from primary school up to university level.<ref name="france24.com">{{Cite web |date=2021-09-01 |title=China's kids get schooled in 'Xi Jinping thought' |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210901-china-s-kids-get-schooled-in-xi-jinping-thought |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220318112608/https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210901-china-s-kids-get-schooled-in-xi-jinping-thought |archive-date=18 March 2022 |access-date=2022-03-18 |website=[[France 24]] |language=en}}</ref> The 4-volume ''[[Xi Jinping Thought|Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era]]'' textbooks for primary, secondary and tertiary school students were subsequently introduced in the new school year in 2021,<ref name="ABC News-2021">{{Cite news |date=2021-11-24 |title=China's students are getting new school textbooks — and they reveal a lot about where China is headed |language=en-AU |work=[[ABC News (Australia)|ABC News]] |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-25/chinese-school-textbooks-reflect-rise-of-xi-personality-cult/100640642 |url-status=live |access-date=2022-03-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220310093508/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-25/chinese-school-textbooks-reflect-rise-of-xi-personality-cult/100640642 |archive-date=10 March 2022}}</ref> educators were instructed to "plant the seeds of loving the party, the country and socialism in young hearts".<ref name="france24.com"/> This has led to comparisons of the cults of personality cultivated by Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2021-08-25 |title=China schools: 'Xi Jinping Thought' introduced into curriculum |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58301575 |url-status=live |access-date=2022-03-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317032945/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58301575 |archive-date=17 March 2022}}</ref><ref name="ABC News-2021" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=2021-09-02 |title=Xi Jinping Thought, for children |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2021/09/02/xi-jinping-thought-for-children |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=2022-03-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220318113339/https://www.economist.com/china/2021/09/02/xi-jinping-thought-for-children |archive-date=18 March 2022 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>

====Russian invasion of Ukraine====
{{Further|China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine}}

During the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], Chinese diplomats, government agencies, and state-controlled media in China have adopted a sympathetic view of Russia, while emphasizing that the war was caused by the United States and NATO.<ref>{{cite news |date=9 March 2022 |title=China blames NATO for pushing Russia-Ukraine tension to 'breaking point' |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china-blames-nato-pushing-russia-ukraine-tension-breaking-point-2022-03-09/ |url-status=live |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220318075720/https://www.reuters.com/world/china-blames-nato-pushing-russia-ukraine-tension-breaking-point-2022-03-09/ |archive-date=18 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Zhou |first=Maria Repnikova, Wendy |date=2022-03-11 |title=What China's Social Media Is Saying About Ukraine |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/china-xi-ukraine-war-america/627028/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317144658/https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/china-xi-ukraine-war-america/627028/ |archive-date=17 March 2022 |access-date=2022-03-18 |website=[[The Atlantic]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Kroll |first=Andy |date=2022-03-02 |title=China's Propaganda Machine Gears Up for Putin -- and Blames America for the Invasion |url=https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/russia-china-ukraine-propaganda-invasion-ccp-1315024/ |access-date=2022-03-18 |magazine=Rolling Stone |language=en-US |archive-date=3 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220303134311/https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/russia-china-ukraine-propaganda-invasion-ccp-1315024/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

On the eve of the attack, ''Shimian'', a digital outlet owned by newspaper [[The Beijing News|''Beijing News'']], accidentally posted an internal memo of the [[Cyberspace Administration of China|Chinese Cybersecurity Agency]] to media outlets. The outlets were told to "publish neither information favorable to the United States nor critiques of Russia", the media were also tasked to censor user comments and trend hashtags released by the three state-owned media, [[Xinhua News Agency]], China Central Television (CCTV) and the ''People's Daily''.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Liu |first1=Tracy Wen |title=China's Propaganda Over Ukraine Is Shifting and Uncertain |work=[[Foreign Policy]] |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/china-propaganda-ukraine-russia/ |url-status=live |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220306022347/https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/01/china-propaganda-ukraine-russia/ |archive-date=6 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=White |first1=Edward |last2=Lin |first2=Andy |last3=Mitchell |first3=Tom |date=26 February 2022 |title=Don't mention the invasion: China spins Russia's war in Ukraine |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/8d2e9f59-06b2-4e90-aba9-fd32249f67be |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220307054714/https://www.ft.com/content/8d2e9f59-06b2-4e90-aba9-fd32249f67be |archive-date=7 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Feng |first1=John |date=23 February 2022 |title=China censors appear to ban anti-Russia media content on Ukraine invasion |language=en |work=[[Newsweek]] |url=https://www.newsweek.com/china-censors-appear-ban-anti-russia-media-content-ukraine-invasion-1681638 |url-status=live |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317192358/https://www.newsweek.com/china-censors-appear-ban-anti-russia-media-content-ukraine-invasion-1681638 |archive-date=17 March 2022}}</ref>

Xinhua, CCTV and ''[[Global Times]]'' often posted unverified news from Russian state-controlled network [[RT (TV network)|RT]], that were later proven to be erroneous; examples of which were when ''Global Times'' posted a video saying that a large number of Ukrainian soldiers had surrendered, or when CCTV reported that Ukrainian President [[Volodymyr Zelenskyy]] had fled Kyiv during the initial stages of the war.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Yuan |first1=Li |date=4 March 2022 |title=How China Embraces Russian Propaganda and Its Version of the War |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/business/china-russia-ukraine-disinformation.html |url-status=live |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220318003021/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/business/china-russia-ukraine-disinformation.html |archive-date=18 March 2022}}</ref><ref name="CNA-2022">{{cite news |title=China's media echoes Russia on Ukraine war |language=en |work=CNA |url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/ukraine-invasion-chinas-media-echoes-russia-2562881 |url-status=live |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220314122449/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/ukraine-invasion-chinas-media-echoes-russia-2562881 |archive-date=14 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Young |first=Oliver |date=2022-03-12 |title=Chinese State Media Reinforces Russian Disinformation About War in Ukraine |url=https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/03/chinese-state-media-reinforces-russian-disinformation-about-war-in-ukraine/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220318101106/https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/03/chinese-state-media-reinforces-russian-disinformation-about-war-in-ukraine/ |archive-date=18 March 2022 |access-date=2022-03-18 |website=[[China Digital Times]] |language=en-US}}</ref> In the midst of the invasion, China Global Television Network (CGTN) interviewed [[Denis Pushilin]], a Ukrainian separatist leader, who claimed that the "vast majority of citizens want to be as close to Russia as possible".<ref name="CNA-2022" /> CCTV also censored the live speech of [[Andrew Parsons (sports administrator)|Andrew Parsons]], president of the [[International Paralympic Committee]], during the opening ceremony of the [[2022 Winter Paralympics]] held in Beijing, as he condemned the war and called for diplomacy.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Robinson |first1=Jonathan Cheng and Joshua |date=4 March 2022 |title=China Censors Paralympics Opening Ceremony, Premier League Over Ukraine |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-paralympics-opening-ceremony-premier-league-ukraine-11646410117 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305132300/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-paralympics-opening-ceremony-premier-league-ukraine-11646410117 |archive-date=5 March 2022}}</ref>

Besides official state media channels, private Chinese tech giants such as [[Tencent]], [[Sina Weibo]] and [[ByteDance]]<ref>{{cite news |last1=White |first1=Edward |date=11 March 2022 |title=China's tech platforms become propaganda tools in Putin's war |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/d460c6f6-ffc7-4d61-9350-bef378fcc5c5 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220318015443/https://www.ft.com/content/d460c6f6-ffc7-4d61-9350-bef378fcc5c5 |archive-date=18 March 2022}}</ref> also amplified conspiracy theories created by Russian state media, such as the false claims of nefarious US biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine<ref>{{cite news |last1=Langley |first1=William |last2=White |first2=Edward |date=14 March 2022 |title=China backs Russian allegations about US biological weapons |work=[[Financial Times]] |url=https://www.ft.com/content/3f9b8164-e9d6-4dfd-880a-f4fa96966439 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317161636/https://www.ft.com/content/3f9b8164-e9d6-4dfd-880a-f4fa96966439 |archive-date=17 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=China Pushes Conspiracy Theory About U.S. Labs in Ukraine |work=[[Bloomberg News]] |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-08/china-pushes-russia-conspiracy-theory-about-u-s-labs-in-ukraine |url-status=live |access-date=18 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220316135009/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-08/china-pushes-russia-conspiracy-theory-about-u-s-labs-in-ukraine |archive-date=16 March 2022}}</ref> and propagating the notion that Ukrainian government consists of neo-Nazis<ref>{{Cite web |last=Haime |first=Jordyn |title=China adopts Russia's 'denazification' myth to rationalize invasion of Ukraine |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/china-adopts-russias-denazification-myth-to-rationalize-invasion-of-ukraine/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220310203703/https://www.timesofisrael.com/china-adopts-russias-denazification-myth-to-rationalize-invasion-of-ukraine/ |archive-date=10 March 2022 |access-date=2022-03-18 |website=[[The Times of Israel]] |language=en-US |quote=Official Chinese news sites have published baseless claims in recent articles claiming that the United States trained Ukrainian neo-Nazis to destabilize Hong Kong during protests there in 2019.}}</ref><ref name="Kuo-0190">{{Cite news |title=In China, a battle for public opinion over Ukraine pits facts against propaganda |language=en-US |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/10/china-russia-ukraine-media-eu/ |url-status=live |access-date=2022-03-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220313094916/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/10/china-russia-ukraine-media-eu/ |archive-date=13 March 2022 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> and that the Ukrainian army were sabotaging their own nuclear plant.<ref>{{cite news |title=Ukraine: How China is censoring online discussion of the war |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/60684682 |access-date=18 March 2022 |work=BBC News |date=12 March 2022 |archive-date=17 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317090920/https://www.bbc.com/news/60684682 |url-status=live }}</ref> Chinese streaming platform [[IQIYI|iQiyi]] also cancelled the broadcast of the [[Premier League|English Premiere League]] to avoid showing the football teams' support for Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Frater |first=Patrick |date=2022-03-09 |title=Chinese Streamer iQiyi Seeks Funding as it Blocks Ukraine Coverage, Courts Controversy Over Korean Drama |url=https://variety.com/2022/tv/asia/iqiyi-funding-ukraine-soccer-korea-1235199740/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220316044617/https://variety.com/2022/tv/asia/iqiyi-funding-ukraine-soccer-korea-1235199740/ |archive-date=16 March 2022 |access-date=2022-03-18 |website=Variety |language=en-US}}</ref>

There were also numerous reports of censorship of [[Anti-war movement|anti-war]] comments by Chinese academics, celebrities and micro-influencers on social media.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Liy |first1=Macarena Vidal |title=Russia's propaganda campaign around the war in Ukraine reaches China |url=https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-03-14/russias-propaganda-campaign-around-the-war-in-ukraine-reaches-china.html |access-date=18 March 2022 |work=EL PAÍS English Edition |date=14 March 2022 |language=es |archive-date=17 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317174314/https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-03-14/russias-propaganda-campaign-around-the-war-in-ukraine-reaches-china.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Kuo-0190" />

==Mechanics==
{{Politics of China |expanded = Publicity }}
{{Politics of the Republic of China}}
Propaganda and censorship in China are centrally directed by CCP's [[Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party|Central Propaganda Department]] (CPD).<ref name="Xu&Albert">{{Cite news |last1=Xu |first1=Beina |last2=Albert |first2=Eleanor |date=17 February 2017 |title=Media Censorship in China |newspaper=[[Council on Foreign Relations]] |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china |url-status=live |access-date=20 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200726005300/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china |archive-date=26 July 2020}}</ref> David Shambaugh, American professor and [[Sinology|sinologist]], wrote in 2007 that the CCP's propaganda system extends itself as a sprawling bureaucratic establishment, into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information.<ref name="Shambaugh" /> Shambaugh noted that according to the CCP publication ''Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian.''<ref name="Shambaugh" /><ref>{{cite book |title=Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian 1921–1991 (An Encyclopedia on the Building of the CCP) |publisher=Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1992 |page=676}}</ref> numerous public places, such as media and news organizations, educational institutions, literature and art centers, and cultural exhibitions come under CCP's propaganda oversight. Shambaugh believed that this expansive definition implies that every conceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people of China falls under bureaucratic purview of the CPD.<ref name="Shambaugh" /> Shambaugh stated that the writ of the CPD has remained unchanged since the Maoist era, although the mechanics of oversight and active censorship have undergone considerable evolution.<ref name="Shambaugh" />

According to official government reports in 2003, channels of propaganda dissemination of the CPD included 2,262 television stations (of which 2,248 were "local"), 2,119 newspapers, 9,074 periodicals and 1,123 publishing houses,<ref name="Shambaugh" /><ref>{{cite book |title=National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2004 |publisher=Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2004 |pages=844–46, 853}}</ref> in addition to internal circulation papers and local gazetteers, approximately 68 million internet accounts with more than 100 million users, and more than 300 million mobile phone users who fall under the system's purview.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Xiao |first=Qiang |url=https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.14.05qiang_xiao_wrts.pdf |title=China's State Control Mechanisms and Methods |date=2005 |publisher=U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission |location=Washington |language=en |oclc=60931696 |access-date=15 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210624204913/https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.14.05qiang_xiao_wrts.pdf |archive-date=24 June 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>

According to Brady, propaganda work by the CCP has been historically divided into two categories: directed towards Chinese people (internal or ''duinei'') and directed towards foreigners and the outside world (external or ''duiwai'') as well as four types: political, economic, cultural and social.<ref name="bradygh" /> The Central Propaganda Department oversees internal propaganda, and, the closely linked bureaucracy, The Office of Foreign Propaganda matters relating to external propaganda.<ref name="bradygh" />

Shambaugh stated that the propaganda system, including the Central Propaganda Department, are highly secret and does not appear in officially published diagrams of the Chinese Bureaucratic System, whether in Chinese or in other languages.<ref name="bradygh" /><ref name="Shambaugh" /> The Office of External Propaganda (OEP) itself is more commonly known as '[[State Council Information Office]]' (SCIO), under the [[one institution with two names]] system, according to Brady.<ref name="bradygh" />

The Central Propaganda Department has direct control over the National Radio and Television Administration.<ref name="Buckley-2018a">{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2018-03-21 |title=China Gives Communist Party More Control Over Policy and Media |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/china-communist-party-xi-jinping.html |access-date=2021-11-12 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=12 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211112211222/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/world/asia/china-communist-party-xi-jinping.html |url-status=live }}</ref> It additionally manages the China Media Group, which controls several of China's largest news agencies. In 2014, the OEP was absorbed into the larger Central Propaganda Department, turning the SCIO into an external nameplate of the department.<ref name="Lulu-2021">{{Cite web |last1=Lulu |first1=Jichang |last2=Jirouš |first2=Filip |last3=Lee |first3=Rachel |date=2021-01-25 |title=Xi's centralisation of external propaganda: SCIO and the Central Propaganda Department |url=https://sinopsis.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/scio.pdf |access-date=2021-11-20 |website=Sinopsis |language=en-US |archive-date=20 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211120213638/https://sinopsis.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/scio.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Control of media===
Media operations and content are tightly controlled,<ref name="Xu&Albert" /><ref name="Buckley-2018a" /> and the CCP, primarily through its Central Propaganda Department, determines what appears in news reports. Controlling media content allows the CCP to disseminate propaganda supportive of government policies, censor controversial news stories, and have reports published criticizing political adversaries of the CCP.<ref name="Buckley-2018a" /><ref name="Esarey1">{{cite web|last=Esarey|first=Ashley|date=31 July 2007|title=Access to Information in the People's Republic of China" presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission|url=https://archive.org/details/AccessToInformationInThePeoplesRepublicOfChina}}</ref> In 2005, [[Reporters Without Borders]] published a report about China's official news agency, the Xinhua News Agency, calling it "the world's biggest propaganda agency", and said that it was "at the heart of censorship and disinformation put in place" by the government.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2005-09-30|title=Xinhua: the world's biggest propaganda agency|url=https://rsf.org/en/reports/xinhua-worlds-biggest-propaganda-agency|access-date=2020-06-15|publisher=Reporters Without Borders|language=en|archive-date=23 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210323045446/https://rsf.org/en/reports/xinhua-worlds-biggest-propaganda-agency|url-status=live}}</ref>

The CPD weekly sends censorship guidelines to prominent editors and media providers and Chinese state media generally employ their own monitors for censorship.<ref name="Xu&Albert" /> While in the past the Central Propaganda Department and its local branches sent faxes to all media throughout the country with instructions indicating subjects that the media should stress or avoid entirely, directives are now imparted to ranking media managers or editors during phone conversations—a move designed to reduce the paper trail.<ref name="Esarey1"/> Media in China faces few restrictions on content that is not deemed to be politically damaging.<ref name="Esarey1"/>

Wu Xuecan, a former editor of the ''People's Daily'' overseas edition,<ref name="Xuecan">{{cite web|last=Xuecan|first=Wu|title=Turning Everyone into a Censor: The Chinese Communist Party's All- Directional Control over the Media|url=https://corpora.tika.apache.org/base/docs/govdocs1/153/153945.pdf}}</ref> reports that through control of the "ideological domain, material means and living necessities," editors and reporters are conditioned to keep news and reports aligned with the interests of the CCP.<ref name="Xuecan"/> Wu further reports that, political study sessions ensures that editors first practice self-censorship.<ref name="Xuecan"/> He Qinglian writes that long years of media control have bred in Chinese journalists a habit of "self-discipline," and that most Chinese journalists resign themselves to playing the role of "Party mouthpieces."<ref name="Qinglian">{{cite book|url=https://yangl3.sg-host.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Fog-of-Censorship.pdf |last=Qinglian |first=He |year=2004 |title=The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China |oclc=263802627}}</ref> Control is also directed at sources of information, as ordinary people are restricted from providing news to Chinese media, and more so to foreign media.<ref name="Qinglian"/>

===Thought reform===
{{Main|Thought reform in China}}
Propaganda and thought work in the Maoist era had a number of distinctive features, according to Brady, such as "ideological remolding" or "thought reform", ideological purges, ritual humiliation of ideological opponents, an emphasis on political study to raise levels of awareness of the current line, and targeting high-profile individuals as symbols of negative tendencies which must be eradicated.<ref name="brady08"/>

The experiences of propaganda and thought work in the Cultural Revolution provided the CCP with a "profound lesson," according to Brady. Virtually all post-Mao era CCP leaders had been under attack during that time, and drew two seemingly contradictory lessons: the rejection of mass movements and thought reform as means of transforming China, and the recognition of the "vital role of propaganda and thought work in China's political control." The administration of propaganda and thought work was plagued by these issues through the 1980s, and up to the events of 4 June 1989.<ref name="brady08"/>

Biderman and Meyers wrote in 1968 that while some kind of thought reform is characteristic of all totalitarian regimes, the CCP "set about it more purposefully, more massively, and more intensively than have other ruling groups," including through employing known techniques in new ways. They note the presence of such techniques in Maoist political campaigns, such as daily meetings for criticism and self-criticism; surveillance and sanctions were connected with education to find and correct deficiencies in personal conducts. In the military, political leaders attacked all personal connections between soldiers that were not based on political conviction, thus exploiting social pressures and personal anxieties to build a sense of conformity.<ref name=bidermanmeyers>Meyers, Samuel M. and Albert D Biderman. ''Mass behaviour in battle and captivity: The communist soldier in the Korean war.'' (1968), Chicago University Press. p.99</ref>

In terms of intensity and scope, spiritual control has been reinforced under the CCP's rule, and has become a basic feature of citizens' daily life, according to Victor Shaw.<ref name="Shaw-1996">{{Cite book|last=Shaw|first=Victor N|title=Social Control in China: A Study of Chinese Work Units|date=1996|publisher=Praeger|isbn=978-0-275-95599-1|location=Westport, Conn.|language=en|oclc=34078426}}</ref> To an extent, the "freedom of silence" cherished by some older Chinese scholars was not even possible for an illiterate peasant in a remote area under the CCP mass propaganda.<ref name="Shaw-1996" />

According to Shaw, the CCP utilizes propaganda to spread its policies, build social consensus, and mobilize the population for social programs. Ideological tensions result in mass movements, and the resulting spiritual control legitimizes the political establishment.<ref name="Shaw-1996" /> "Political studies, legal education, heroic models, and thought reform provide the CCP with effective weapons to propagandize rules and legal codes, normalize individual behaviour, and rehabilitate deviants in labor camps."<ref name="Shaw-1996" />

Kurlantzick and Link stated that the CCP uses the technique of "thoughtwork" (sixiang gongzuo) to maintain popular obedience, dating back to the Mao Zedong era.<ref name="Link-2009" /> They noted that while Mao-era campaigns are aimed at transforming the Chinese society and people's natures, the modern approach to thoughtwork are more subtle and only focuses on issues important to the CCP's rule. According to Kurlantzick and Link, it consists largely of cultivating pro-government views in the media and other influential people in Chinese society, and as such complaints against the government becomes distracted with pro-government propaganda. The government also attempts to distance itself from local issues by blaming them on corrupt local officials, says Kurlantzick and Link.

===Public relations===
{{Further|Chinese information operations and information warfare|Public opinion struggle}}

According to Anne-Marie Brady, the Foreign Ministry first set up a system of designated officials to give information in times of crisis in 1983, and greatly expanded the system to lower levels in the mid-1990s. China's spin had been directed only at foreigners, but in the 1990s leaders realized that managing public crises was useful for domestic politics; this included setting up provincial level "News Coordinator Groups," and inviting foreign PR firms to give seminars.<ref name="brady08"/>

Brady writes that Chinese foreign propaganda officials took cues from the [[Tony Blair|Blair government]]'s spin doctoring during the [[Bovine spongiform encephalopathy|mad cow disease crisis of 2000–2001]], and the [[George W. Bush|Bush government]]'s use of the U.S. media after the [[September 11 attacks|terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001]]. According to her, the Blair model allows for a certain amount of negative coverage to be shown during a crisis, which is believed to help release some of the "social tension" surrounding it. She believes information managers in China used this approach during coal mining disasters of 2005.<ref name="brady08"/> According to Brady, trained official spokespeople are now available on call in every central government ministry, as well as in local governments, to deal with emerging crises; these spin doctors are coordinated and trained by the Office of Foreign Propaganda, externally named the SCIO.<ref name="brady08" />

Instead of attempting a media blackout as with the [[2008 Tibetan unrest]], the CCP has adopted a series of more advanced techniques to influence the information leaving China. The day after violence in Ürümqi, the SCIO set up a Xinjiang Information Office in Ürümqi to assist foreign reporters. It invited foreign media to Xinjiang to tour the riot zones, visit hospitals, and look at the aftermath themselves. Journalists were also given CDs with photos and TV clips. "They try to control the foreign journalists as much as possible by using this more sophisticated PR work rather than ban[ning] them," according to academic [[Xiao Qiang]], quoted by ''[[Newsweek]]''.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hennock |first=Mary |date=2009-07-06 |title=Uighur Riots Teach China to Spin |url=https://www.newsweek.com/uighur-riots-teach-china-spin-81849 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210116161610/https://www.newsweek.com/uighur-riots-teach-china-spin-81849 |archive-date=16 January 2021 |access-date=2020-10-01 |website=[[Newsweek]] |language=en}}</ref>

==Propaganda on the internet==
{{internet}}
{{main|Internet in China}}
{{See also|Internet censorship in China}}
Traditionally, the CCP propaganda apparatus had been based around suppressing news and information, but this often meant the Party found itself in a reactive posture, according to Chinese media expert David Bandurski.<ref name="bandurski08">{{Cite web |last=Bandurski |first=David |date=2008-07-07 |title=FEER: "China's Guerrilla War for the Web" |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/2008/07/07/feer-chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web/ |access-date=2023-12-27 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US |archive-date=28 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240728022504/https://chinamediaproject.org/2008/07/07/feer-chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In later years the internet played a key role in the spread of propaganda to Chinese diaspora. PRC-based Internet sites remain a leading source of Chinese-language and China-related news for overseas Chinese. The internet is an extremely effective tool for guiding and organizing overseas Chinese public opinion, according to Anne-Marie Brady.<ref name="bradycongress" />

Brady cites an example of the role of the internet in organizing popular protests by overseas Chinese, its usage by the state against a perceived bias of the Western media in its coverage of 2008 Tibetan unrest and, a month later, in organizing a series of worldwide demonstrations in support of China during the [[2008 Summer Olympics torch relay|Olympic torch relay]].<ref name="bradycongress" /> Brady noted that these protests were genuine and popular, demonstrating the effectiveness of China's efforts to rebuild positive public opinion within the Chinese overseas diaspora, but the demonstrations nevertheless received official support both symbolically and in practice.<ref name="bradycongress">Brady, Anne-Marie [http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_04_30_wrts/09_04_30_brady_statement.php China's Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091202053733/http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_04_30_wrts/09_04_30_brady_statement.php |date=2 December 2009 }}, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 30 April 2009</ref> While there was no compulsion for overseas Chinese to attend the rallies, those who did were given free T-shirts, souvenirs, transport, and accommodation, donated by local embassy officials and China-based donors.<ref name="bradycongress" />

===50 Cent Party===
{{Main|50 Cent Party}}
{{See also|Internet Water Army}}
The Chinese government regularly uses fake social media accounts and posts to attempt to [[Astroturfing|shape online dialogue]] and steer discussions away from sensitive topics.<ref name="Gallagher-2016">{{cite web |last=Gallagher |first=Sean |date=13 June 2016 |title=Red astroturf: Chinese government makes millions of fake social media posts |url=https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/06/red-astroturf-chinese-government-makes-millions-of-fake-social-media-posts/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160613152302/https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/06/red-astroturf-chinese-government-makes-millions-of-fake-social-media-posts/ |archive-date=13 June 2016 |access-date=2016-06-14 |website=[[Ars Technica]]}}</ref> This is done by specially trained internet users who comment on blogs, public forums, or [[wiki]]s, to shift the debate in favor of the CCP and influence public opinion.<ref name=bandurski08/> They are sometime called the "50-cent party" – named so because they are allegedly paid 50 Chinese cents for each comment supporting the CCP they make,<ref name="internetspin">{{cite news |last=Bristow |first=Michael |date=16 December 2008 |title=China's internet 'spin doctors' |work=[[BBC News]] |publisher= |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7783640.stm |url-status=live |access-date=11 February 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180807174949/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7783640.stm |archive-date=7 August 2018}}</ref> though some speculate that they are probably not paid anything for the posts, instead being required to do so as a part of their official party duties.<ref name="Gallagher-2016" />

An internal government document released by the BBC outlines the requirements for those employed as online posters, which include having "relatively good political and professional qualities, and have a pioneering and enterprising spirit", being able to react quickly, etc.<ref name="internetspin"/>

It is believed that such government-sponsored Internet commentators have now become widespread and their numbers could be in the tens of thousands;<ref name="internetspin"/> David Bandurski suggests the number may be up to 280,000<ref name=bandurski08 /> while ''[[The Guardian]]'' puts the estimate as 300,000.<ref>{{cite news |last=Fareed |first=Malik |date=22 September 2008 |title=China joins a turf war |work=[[The Guardian]] |location=London |url=https://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/sep/22/chinathemedia.marketingandpr |url-status=live |access-date=24 February 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170128023951/https://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/sep/22/chinathemedia.marketingandpr |archive-date=28 January 2017}}</ref> According to ''The Guardian'', the growth in popularity of such astroturfing owes to the ease with which web 2.0 technologies such as Twitter, Wikipedia and YouTube can be employed to sway public opinion. The [[BBC News]] reports that special centers have been set up to train China's 'army of internet spin doctors'.<ref name="internetspin"/> Data analysis of social media activity and leaked government emails by a team led by [[Gary King (political scientist)|Gary King]] at [[Harvard University|Harvard]]'s Institute for Quantitative Science showed that, in the mid-2010s, the Chinese government generated over 440 million posts every year through such accounts.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=King |first1=Gary |last2=Pan |first2=Jennifer |last3=Roberts |first3=Margaret E. |date=August 2017 |title=How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument |journal=[[American Political Science Review]] |language=en |volume=111 |issue=3 |pages=484–501 |doi=10.1017/S0003055417000144 |issn=0003-0554 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="Gallagher-2016" />

=== Wikipedia ===
{{Further|2021 Wikimedia Foundation actions on the Chinese Wikipedia}}
On 13 September 2021, the [[Wikimedia Foundation]] banned seven Wikipedia users and removed administrator privileges from twelve users that were part of Wikimedians of Mainland China (WMC).<ref name="Harrison">{{Cite web |last=Harrison |first=Stephen |date=2021-10-26 |title=Why Wikipedia Banned Several Chinese Admins |url=https://slate.com/technology/2021/10/wikipedia-mainland-china-admins-banned.html |access-date=2022-08-11 |website=[[Slate (magazine)|Slate]] |language=en |archive-date=27 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211027002825/https://slate.com/technology/2021/10/wikipedia-mainland-china-admins-banned.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Maggie Dennis, the foundation's vice present of community resilience and sustainability, said that there had been an yearlong investigation into infiltration concerns. Dennis observed that the infiltrators had tried to promote "the aims of China, as interpreted through whatever filters they may bring to bear".<ref>{{Cite news |date=2021-09-16 |title=Wikipedia blames pro-China infiltration for bans |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-58559412 |access-date=2022-08-11 |archive-date=18 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210918133637/https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-58559412 |url-status=live }}</ref>  Dennis said, “we needed to act based on credible information that some members (not all) of that group [WMC] have harassed, intimidated, and threatened other members of our community, including in some cases physically harming others, in order to secure their own power and subvert the collaborative nature of our projects”.<ref name="Harrison"/>

==Domestic propaganda==
Within the doctrine of [[China's peaceful rise]] resorting to [[Peace Journalism]] has been analyzed as a growing trend in China's strategy for domestic propaganda, in particular in covering news from [[Xinjiang]].<ref name="e-ir.info">Aberkane, I. J. "Yin of Yang? China and the Muslim World" E-International Relations, 29 April 2011 | http://www.e-ir.info/?p=8455 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111126210307/http://www.e-ir.info/?p=8455 |date=26 November 2011 }}</ref> After [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]]'s having termed Central Asia the "Global Balkans"<ref>{{Cite book|last=Brzezinski|first=Zbigniew|title=The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership|date=2004|publisher=Basic Books|isbn=0-465-00800-3|location=New York|oclc=53170328}}</ref> [[Idriss Aberkane]] has argued the resorting to unilateral, state-endorsed Peace Journalism could be a way for China to "de-[[balkanization|balkanize]]" Xinjiang. This he has called "coercive Peace Journalism".

{{blockquote| Peace journalism does not sell well because it typically proscribes the coverage of a conflict by news eliciting strong emotional reactions. Man becomes easily addicted to strong emotions and this has played a central role in peace journalism's failure at being adopted by mainstream media. On the other hand, mainstream media badly need (and compete with each other) to provide the strongest emotional value to their audience and this has become a vital part of their [[business model]].

Yet in China the media industry is not driven by returns on financial investments but by returns on political interests. Thus paradoxically promoting Peace Journalism is much easier for the PRC than say for countries of the European Union as in promoting a political agenda the former can afford to broadcast news with low emotional weight, especially in a non-competitive environment for its media industry.<ref name="e-ir.info"/>}}

The Chinese government has used its public evaluations of historical, public figures as a means of communicating to the Chinese public the traits and political goals that it considers desirable and undesirable. The Chinese government has historically tended towards evaluating public figures either as villains or heroes, leaving little room for interpretation and making it clear whether the traits and goals of individual figures should be emulated or despised. The public image of some figures, including [[Peng Dehuai]], have undergone radical reverses throughout the history of the PRC, as required by CCP propagandists: Peng was portrayed as a subhuman villain during the Cultural Revolution; but, since 1978, has been evaluated as a nearly perfect Marxist, general, and public official.<ref name="Domes1478">{{Cite book |last=Domes |first=Jürgen |title=P'eng Te-huai: The Man and the Image |date=1985 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8047-1303-0 |pages=147–148 |language=en}}</ref>

By examining the qualities associated with public figures whose images have been manipulated to make those figures either exaggeratedly positive or exaggeratedly negative symbols, scholars have developed a number of assumptions about the traits and political goals generally desired by various PRC governments. Figures whose images have been manipulated to make them positive symbols will be portrayed as: coming from proletarian or semi-proletarian backgrounds; being courageous, fair, straightforward, and honest in their treatment of subordinates and superiors; leading a simple and frugal life; demonstrating great concern for the "masses"; achieving outstanding professional success; and, being impeccably loyal to the CCP and to the communist cause. Figures whose images have been manipulated to make them negative symbols will be portrayed as: coming from backgrounds which have exposed them to "bourgeoise" thoughts and attitudes; adhering to all or most historical attempts to oppose political figures in the PRC who later became powerful, which are also vilified; being professionally inept, only succeeding temporarily or appearing to succeed through trickery or deception; participating in "conspiracies" against the correct leadership of the CCP; cooperating with "foreign countries" (historically either the Soviet Union or the United States, depending on which is more threatening at the time); and, having numerous negative traits, such as opportunism or corruption. Usually, public figures will provide considerable examples of either positive or negative qualities, but will be made to fit either a positive or negative stereotype through exaggerating qualities which support the interpretation desired by the CCP, and by omitting from the historical narrative qualities which contradict the CCP's intended interpretation.<ref name="Domes1478" />

As part of the "Propaganda Teaching Team" (''xuan jiang tuan''), tens of thousands of CCP cadre routinely travel from China's urban areas to rural China to engage in ''[[xuanchuan]]'' activities at the grassroots level.<ref name="Lin-2023">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chunfeng |title=Red Tourism in China: Commodification of Propaganda |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2023 |isbn=9781032139609 |doi=10.4324/9781003231783|s2cid=253659539 }}</ref>{{Rp|page=30}}

==External propaganda==
{{Update section|date=April 2024|reason=This section does not address changes after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012}}
{{Further|Chinese information operations and information warfare|Chinese censorship abroad|Three warfares|Wolf warrior diplomacy}}

The Chinese state refers to all media work abroad as ''wai xuan,'' or "external propaganda."<ref name="Bequelin-2009" /> Through its external propaganda operations, frequently directed by the CCP's [[United Front Work Department]], China seeks to shape international perception of the Chinese government and its policies to "allay concerns about China's economic rise, military build-up and increasing political and diplomatic influence."<ref>{{cite web |last=Newmyer |first=Jacqueline |date=30 April 2009 |title=China's Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities That Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security |url=http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_04_30_trans/09_04_30_trans.pdf |url-status=dead |journal= |publisher=[[United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission]] |page=83 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121030000714/http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_04_30_trans/09_04_30_trans.pdf |archive-date=30 October 2012 |access-date=15 November 2012}}</ref> Specifically by:
# '''Reducing fears that China is a threat to neighboring countries.''' China seeks to change its image within the region from that of a growing threat and aggressor to that of a benefactor and potential partner.<ref name="Kurlantzick">{{cite book |last=Kurlantzick |first=Joshua |url=https://archive.org/details/charmoffensiveho00kurl |title=Charm Offensive |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-300-13628-9 |location=New Haven |author-link=Joshua Kurlantzick |url-access=registration}}</ref>{{rp|5}} Beijing is working to "diminish fears of China's future military power, or concerns that China's massive economic growth would divert trade and foreign investment from other nations."<ref name="Kurlantzick"/>{{rp|40}}
#'''Securing access to resources and energy.''' As China's economy continues to grow at a rapid pace, the need for resources and energy has become more pressing. To protect its access to these resources, China is working to gain the trust of foreign states that possess oil, gas, and other materials.<ref name="Kurlantzick"/>{{rp|41}}
#'''Building alliances and weaken Taiwan's relationship with the international community.''' In 1994, China announced that it would "use all economic and diplomatic resources to reward countries that are willing to isolate Taiwan."<ref name="Mitchell-2007" />{{Rp|page=114}} Through propaganda as well as economic incentives, China seeks to convince any nation that still recognizes Taiwan to switch their loyalty to Beijing and formally declare that Taiwan is part of China.<ref name="Kurlantzick" />{{rp|42}}
#'''Promoting a multipolar world and constrain U.S. global power.'''<ref name="Mitchell-2007">{{cite journal |last=Mitchell |first=Derek J |year=2007 |title=China and the Developing World |url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090212_06china_developing.pdf |url-status=live |journal=The China Balance Sheet in 2007 and Beyond |page= |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110207005233/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090212_06china_developing.pdf |archive-date=7 February 2011 |access-date=15 November 2012}}</ref>{{Rp|page=111}} China seeks to slowly diminish the United States' influence in Asia, and create its own [[sphere of influence]] in Southeast Asia.<ref name="Kurlantzick" />{{rp|43}}

In a 2008 report, the U.S. State Department's International Security Advisory Board declared that China was in the midst of a "comprehensive strategic deception campaign," which was said to include "Psychological Warfare (propaganda, deception, and coercion), Media Warfare (manipulation of public opinion domestically and internationally), and Legal Warfare (use of 'legal regimes' to handicap the opponent in fields favorable to him)."<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Anderson|first1=Eric C|url=https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo122061|title=China's Use of Perception Management and Strategic Deception|last2=Engstrom|first2=Jeffrey G|date=2009|publisher=[[United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission]]|language=en|oclc=765544963|access-date=15 June 2020|archive-date=28 July 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240728022505/https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GOVPUB-Y3-PURL-gpo122061|url-status=live}}</ref> On its official Chinese Web site, CCTV describes itself as "the mouthpiece of the Party and the government," and lists its main operations under the heading "propaganda situation," referring to new foreign-language channels as "reaching a new stage in external propaganda."<ref name="Bequelin-2009" />

===CCP propaganda themes===
{{See also|Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party|Socialism with Chinese characteristics}}

Former CCP leader Deng Xiaoping advised Chinese leadership to "hide your capabilities, and bide your time."<ref>{{cite web|last=Brookes|first=Peter|title=Hearing on "China's Foreign Policy: Challenges and Actors"|publisher=U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission|date=13 April 2011|url=http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_04_13_wrt/11_04_13_brookes_testimony.pdf|journal=|access-date=15 November 2012|archive-date=29 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121029235806/http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_04_13_wrt/11_04_13_brookes_testimony.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> Most modern Chinese foreign propaganda seeks to pursue China's strategic goals while adhering to this advice. The following themes were stated by [[Zheng Bijian]] to be characteristic of China's foreign propaganda prior to Xi Jinping:

*''China seeks a peaceful rise.'' In other words, "China is not a threat." As it industrializes, China does not seek to rival other nations for resources. It also seeks to industrialize without high amounts of pollution, energy consumption, and investment.<ref name="Bijian">{{cite journal |last=Bijian |first=Zheng |author-link=Zheng Bijian |date=September–October 2005 |title=China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status |url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status |url-status=live |journal=[[Foreign Affairs]] |volume=84 |issue=5 |pages=18–24 |doi=10.2307/20031702 |jstor=20031702 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121222133935/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-power-status |archive-date=22 December 2012 |access-date=15 November 2012|url-access=subscription }}</ref>
*''China does not seek hegemony.'' "Instead, China will transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation with all countries of the world."<ref name="Bijian"/> China "advocates a new international political and economic order, one that can be achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations."<ref name="Bijian"/>
*''The CCP is evolving and is no longer an authoritarian regime.'' China's government has evolved from the days of Mao Zedong. It is no longer a strict, authoritarian style [[Communism|Communist]]/[[Maoism|Maoist]] system, but is democratizing. The CCP seeks to "transcend outdated modes of social control and to construct a [[harmonious socialist society]]."<ref name="Bijian"/>
*''China does not view the United States as a strategic adversary.'' Instead, "Beijing wants Washington to play a positive role in the region's security as well as economic affairs."<ref name="Bijian"/>
External propaganda efforts have since shifted to denigrating [[liberal democracy]] and stoking [[Anti-Americanism|anti-American sentiment]].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hsu |first1=Tiffany |last2=Myers |first2=Steven Lee |date=1 April 2024 |title=China's Advancing Efforts to Influence the U.S. Election Raise Alarms |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/01/business/media/china-online-disinformation-us-election.html |access-date=1 April 2024 |work=[[The New York Times]] |quote=China’s efforts to advance its ideology in the West struggled to gain traction, first as it pushed its official propaganda about the superiority of its culture and economy and later as it began denigrating democracy and stoking anti-American sentiment. |archive-date=3 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240403091121/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/01/business/media/china-online-disinformation-us-election.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Instruments ===
The PRC uses many tactics and techniques to disseminate its propaganda themes abroad. China uses its news and media outlets, which are directly influenced by various state organizations (and ultimately the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP),<ref>{{cite web|last=Polumbaum|first=Judy|title=China's Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities That Target the United States, and the Resulting Imacts on U.S. National Security|publisher=Hearing Before the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission|date=30 April 2009|page=20|url=http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_04_30_trans/09_04_30_trans.pdf|journal=|access-date=15 November 2012|archive-date=30 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121030000714/http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_04_30_trans/09_04_30_trans.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> to relay news stories consistent with these themes to foreign audiences. In 2009, reports emerged that China intends to invest US$6.6 billion to expand its foreign language news service. This includes plans for a 24-hour English-language news network to discuss world affairs from Beijing's point of view.<ref>{{cite web|last=Brookes|first=Peter|title=China's Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities That Target the United States, and the Resulting Imacts on U.S. National Security|publisher=Hearing Before the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission|date=30 April 2009|page=2|url=http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_04_30_trans/09_04_30_trans.pdf|journal=|access-date=15 November 2012|archive-date=30 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121030000714/http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09_04_30_trans/09_04_30_trans.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> A 2015 investigative report by [[Reuters]] found a network of at least 33 radio stations in 14 countries that obscures China Radio International (CRI) as its majority shareholder. A significant portion of the programming on these stations is either produced or provided by CRI, or by media firms CRI controls in the United States, Australia, and Europe.<ref name="reuters2015">{{cite news |last1=Shiffman |first1=John |last2=Gui Qing |first2=Koh |title=Beijing's covert radio network airs China-friendly news across Washington, and the world |url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/ |access-date=10 February 2024 |work=[[Reuters]] |archive-date=2 November 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151102183225/http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-radio/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Public diplomacy ====
{{Excerpt|Public diplomacy#People's Republic of China|only=paragraph}}

==== International communication centers ====
{{Excerpt|International communication center|only=paragraph|paragraphs=1}}

==== Generative artificial intelligence ====
[[Spamouflage]], an online disinformation and propaganda campaign of the [[Ministry of Public Security (China)|Ministry of Public Security]], has used news anchors created with [[generative artificial intelligence]] to deliver fake news clips.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Milmo |first1=Dan |last2=Hawkins |first2=Amy |date=2024-05-18 |title=How China is using AI news anchors to deliver its propaganda |url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/18/how-china-is-using-ai-news-anchors-to-deliver-its-propaganda |access-date=2024-05-19 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077 |archive-date=25 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240525185211/https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/may/18/how-china-is-using-ai-news-anchors-to-deliver-its-propaganda |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Soft power initiatives===
{{Further|Soft power of China}}
Since 2005, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao has promoted a "[[soft power]] initiative"<ref name="CFR" /> aimed at increasing China's influence overseas through cultural and language programs. These trends have been identified by the American [[Council of Foreign Relations]], which describes that "Beijing is trying to convince the world of its peaceful intentions, secure the resources it needs to continue its soaring economic growth, and isolate Taiwan."<ref name="CFR">{{cite news|title= China's Soft Power Initiative|last= Pan|first= Esther|url= http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-soft-power-initiative/p10715#p2|access-date= 21 July 2011|archive-date= 8 May 2011|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20110508145928/http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-soft-power-initiative/p10715#p2|url-status= dead}}</ref> The article points out that adverse effects of soft power, that "China has the potential to become the 600-pound gorilla in the room," and that "Chinese influence may begin to breed resentment."<ref name="CFR" />

The [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Politburo Standing Committee]] members Li Changchun and [[Liu Yunshan]] have repeatedly stressed that Chinese propaganda should be equally spread both domestically and internationally, and Li Changchun stated that the [[Confucius Institute]]s are "an important channel to glorify Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture spread to the world", which is "part of China's foreign propaganda strategy".<ref>{{Cite news|last=Wachter|first=Will|date=24 May 2007|title=The language of Chinese soft power in the US|work=[[Asia Times]]|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IE24Ad02.html|url-status=dead|access-date=14 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070525105656/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IE24Ad02.html|archive-date=25 May 2007}}</ref>

''[[The Economist]]'' noted that Confucius Institutes are used to project China's soft power and win the support of an external audience, and Confucius was specifically chosen to cast an image of peace and harmony. Such centers are partially sponsored by the Chinese government, with a hands-off approach to management, its directors being directly appointed by their attached universities.<ref>{{Cite news|date=24 October 2009|title=A message from Confucius: New ways of projecting soft power|newspaper=The Economist|url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2009/10/24/a-message-from-confucius|access-date=2020-06-14|issn=0013-0613|archive-date=14 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200614235400/https://www.economist.com/special-report/2009/10/24/a-message-from-confucius|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2009, Chinese state media launched the English-language version of the ''Global Times'', a nationalistic tabloid under the auspices of the ''People's Daily''. It was described as a part of a larger push by the Chinese government to have a greater say in international media, as well as supplanting what it considers to be biased Western media sources.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Tejada|first=Carlos|date=2009-04-20|title=A New English-Language Paper Extends China's Media Reach|url=https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/04/20/a-new-english-language-paper-extends-chinas-media-reach/|access-date=2020-06-14|website=The Wall Street Journal|language=en-US|archive-date=20 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171120184836/https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/04/20/a-new-english-language-paper-extends-chinas-media-reach/|url-status=live}}</ref>

In early 2011, the Chinese government launched a million dollar advertising campaign, which was aimed to improve the "incomplete understandings" the American public has about China. A 60-second ad was shown at New York's [[Times Square]], which featured Chinese personalities such as scientist [[Sun Jiadong]], singer [[Liu Huan]] and news anchor [[Jing Yidan]], ending with the message of "Chinese Friendship". ''Newsweek'' noted the ad's great production values, but criticized it as confusing and explaining little about the featured Chinese identities.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Stone Fish|first=Isaac|date=19 January 2011|title=Official Chinese Media Campaign Falls Short|work=Newsweek|url=https://www.newsweek.com/official-chinese-media-campaign-falls-short-66725|access-date=14 June 2020|archive-date=14 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200614231050/https://www.newsweek.com/official-chinese-media-campaign-falls-short-66725|url-status=live}}</ref> China scholar David Shambaugh, a professor at [[George Washington University]], says that "the scale of Beijing’s [propaganda] push is unprecedented" and estimates that "China spends $10bn a year on external propaganda".<ref name="smyth">{{cite news |last1=Smyth |first1=Jamie |title=China's $10bn propaganda push spreads Down Under |url=https://www.ft.com/content/324d82c4-2d60-11e6-a18d-a96ab29e3c95 |access-date=12 December 2023 |agency=[[Financial Times]] |archive-date=12 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231212135118/https://www.ft.com/content/324d82c4-2d60-11e6-a18d-a96ab29e3c95 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Since 2018, provincial and municipal-level [[international communication center]]s (ICCs) have been established to "innovate" foreign-directed propaganda.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Colville |first=Alex |date=2024-12-04 |title=Telling Zhejiang's Story |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/2024/12/04/telling-zhejiangs-story/ |access-date=2024-12-04 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US}}</ref> Each ICC has tended to take on a specific geographic area of focus for its propaganda initiatives.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bandurski |first=David |date=2023-10-05 |title=Reading China's Media Counter-Attack |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/2023/10/05/reading-chinas-propaganda-counter-attack/ |access-date=2024-12-04 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US |archive-date=9 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231009213527/https://chinamediaproject.org/2023/10/05/reading-chinas-propaganda-counter-attack/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2025, China was noted for its increased use of paid trips for foreign [[Influencer|influencers]] as part of a soft power strategy.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Warrington |first=James |date=2025-06-21 |title=Beijing turns to influencers in fresh Chinese propaganda push |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/06/21/beijing-turns-influencers-peddle-chinese-propaganda/ |access-date=2025-06-23 |work=[[The Daily Telegraph]] |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235}}</ref>

== Propaganda in the arts ==
[[File:The_Friendly_Communist.JPG|An old propaganda painting in Guangzhou promoting [[One-child policy|family planning]]|330px|thumb|right]]
As in the Soviet Union, the CCP under Mao Zedong took [[socialist realism]] as its basis for art, making clear its goal was the 'education' of the people in [[Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP ideology]]. This included, as during the Cultural Revolution, transforming literature and art to serve these ends. Pre-revolutionary songs<ref name="Lu-2007">{{Cite book |last=Lu |first=Shu |title=When Huai Flowers Bloom: Stories of the Cultural Revolution |date=2007 |publisher=[[State University of New York Press]] |isbn=978-0-7914-7941-4 |doi=10.1353/book5242|s2cid=133953005 }}</ref>{{Rp|page=72}} and operas<ref name="Lu-2007" />{{Rp|page=12}} were banned as a poisonous legacy of the past. Middle and high schools were targeted by one campaign because the students circulated romance and love stories among themselves.<ref name="Lu-2007" />{{Rp|page=16}}

Maoist propaganda art has been remade and modernized for almost two decades, and old Cultural Revolution era propaganda productions have appeared in new formats such as DVDs and karaoke versions. They appear in rock and pop versions of revolutionary songs in praise of Mao, as well as T-shirts, watches, porcelain, and other memorabilia.<ref name="Mittler-2008">{{Cite journal |last=Mittler |first=Barbara |date=2008 |title=Popular Propaganda? Art and Culture in Revolutionary China |journal=Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society |volume=152 |issue=4 |pages=466–489 |issn=0003-049X |jstor=40541604}}</ref> The works of propaganda from the Cultural Revolution have been selling extremely well in recent years, largely for nostalgia, social, patriotic or entertainment purposes.<ref name="Mittler-2008" /><ref name="Gunde">Gunde, Richard. [2002] (2002) Culture and Customs of China. Greenwood Press. {{ISBN|0-313-30876-4}}</ref>

Propaganda songs and music, such as [[guoyue]] and [[revolutionary opera]], have a long and storied history in the PRC, featuring prominently in the popular culture of the 1950s to the 1970s. Many of these songs were collected and performed as modern rock adaptations for several albums that were released during the 1990s, including ''[[Red Rock (album)|Red Rock]]'' and ''Red Sun: Mao Zedong Praise Songs New Revolutionary Medley''. The latter sold 6–10 million copies in China.<ref>[http://www.sino.uni-heidelberg.de/conf/propaganda/musik.html Rethinking Cultural Revolution Culture] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050728142055/http://www.sino.uni-heidelberg.de/conf/propaganda/musik.html |date=28 July 2005 }}, Audio-Visual Accompaniment to the Exhibit: "Picturing Power: Art and Propaganda in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) A Multi-Media Exhibition Held at Universitätsmuseum Heidelberg, 31.1.-28.2.2001</ref> Most of the older songs praise Mao, the CCP, the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Red Army and the [[People's Liberation Army]], the unity of the ethnic groups of China, and the various ethnic groups' devotion to Mao and the CCP.

In recent times, films and documentaries such as [[Silent Contest]], [[Amazing China]], The Founding of a [[The Founding of a Party|Party]], [[The Founding of a Republic|Republic]] and [[The Founding of an Army|Army]] has become the new staple of Chinese propaganda, known as "main melody" films.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Pulver|first=Andrew|date=2013-11-01|title=Chinese propaganda film accuses US of trying to overthrow ruling communists|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/film/2013/nov/01/china-propaganda-film-us-infiltration|access-date=2020-06-15|issn=0261-3077|archive-date=4 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304131317/http://www.theguardian.com/film/2013/nov/01/china-propaganda-film-us-infiltration|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Famous propaganda works===

====Novel====
''[[Red Crag]]'', a famous 1961 Chinese novel featuring underground CCP agents fighting an espionage battle against the Kuomintang.

====Sculpture====
''[[Rent Collection Courtyard]]'', a 1965 sculpture depicting former landlord [[Liu Wencai]] as an evil landlord collecting rent from poor, although this depiction has been disputed by modern accounts.

====Films and plays====
[[File:Revolutionary opera.jpg|thumb|right|''[[Red Detachment of Women (ballet)|The Red Detachment of Women]]'']]
*''[[Battle on Shangganling Mountain]]'', a 1956 Chinese war film also known as Shangganling Battle ({{lang-zh|links=no|c=上甘岭战役}}), depicting the [[Battle of Triangle Hill]] during the Korean War.
* ''[[The East Is Red (1965 film)|The East Is Red]]'', a 1965 song and dance film performed in the [[People's Great Hall]] depicting the history of China from the [[Boxer Rebellion]] to the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]].
*''[[The Battle at Lake Changjin]]'', a 2021 film set during the Korean War about Chinese troops defeating American troops. It is the second highest-grossing film of 2021 worldwide, behind [[Spider-Man: No Way Home]] and ahead of ''[[No Time to Die]]'' and ''[[Shang-Chi and the Legend of the Ten Rings]]''.<ref>{{Cite web |title=2021 Worldwide Box Office |url=https://www.boxofficemojo.com/year/world/2021/ |access-date=November 1, 2022 |website=[[Box Office Mojo]] |publisher=[[IMDb]]}}{{cbignore}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url = https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58868854|title = The Chinese film beating Bond and Marvel at the box office - BBC News|work = BBC News|date = 16 October 2021|access-date = 18 October 2021|archive-date = 18 October 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211018032634/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-58868854|url-status = live}}</ref>
* The ''[[Eight model plays]]'' (八个样板戏), revolutionary themed operas and ballets, were the only ones allowed to be performed during the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Lu-2007" />{{Rp|page=12}}
**''[[Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy]]'' (智取威虎山), a play about CCP soldiers infiltrating a bandit camp during the Chinese Civil War.
**''[[The Legend of the Red Lantern]]'' (红灯记), a play based on the activities of the CCP resistance against Japan in [[Hulin]] during the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]].
**''[[Red Detachment of Women (ballet)|Red Detachment of Women]]'' (红色娘子军), a pre-Cultural Revolution-era play, later extolled during the Cultural Revolution, about the women of [[Hainan Island]] who rose up in resistance on behalf of the CCP
**''[[The White Haired Girl]]'' (白毛女), a play exploring the miseries of China peasants in 1930's China.

====Songs====
{{Main|Category:Chinese patriotic songs}}

The titles of some of the more well-known propaganda songs are as follows:{{citation needed|date=October 2016}}

*"[[Nanniwan]]" (《南泥湾》/《南泥灣》), a 1943 [[guoyue|revolutionary song]]
*"[[The East Is Red (song)|The East is Red]]" (《东方红》/《東方紅》), the ''de facto'' [[national anthem]] of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution
*"[[Socialism is Good]]" (《社会主义好》), a modern rock adaptation of which was performed by [[Zhang Qu]] and featured on the 1990s album ''[[Red Rock (album)|Red Rock]]''.
*"Battle Hymn of the Chinese People's Volunteers" (《中国人民志愿军战歌》/《中國人民志願軍戰歌》) – a well-known song from the [[Korean War]] period
*"Red Sun Shining Over the Border" (《红太阳照边疆》/《紅太陽照邊疆》){{spaced ndash}}a song from the [[Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture]] in [[Jilin|Jilin Province]]
*"A Wa People Sing New Songs" (阿佤唱新歌曲){{spaced ndash}}a song attributed to the [[Wa people|Wa]] ethnic minority of [[Yunnan]]
*"Laundry Song" (《洗衣歌》){{spaced ndash}}a song celebrating the [[Battle of Chamdo|liberation]] of [[Tibet]]
*"Liuyang River" (《浏阳河》){{spaced ndash}}a song about a river near Mao Zedong's hometown of [[Shaoshan]] in Hunan
*"Saliha Most Follows the Words of Chairman Mao" (《萨利哈听毛主席的话》/《薩利哈最聽毛主席的話》){{spaced ndash}}a song attributed to the [[kazakhs|Kazakh]] minority of the Xinjiang
*"The Never-Setting Sun Rises Over the Grassland" (《草原上升起不落的太阳》/草原上升起不落的太陽{{spaced ndash}} ) from [[Inner Mongolia]]
*"Xinjiang is Good" (新疆好){{spaced ndash}}attributed to the ethnic [[Uyghur people|Uyghurs]] of Xinjiang
*"[[I Love Beijing Tiananmen]]" (《我爱北京天安门》/《我愛北京天安門》){{spaced ndash}}claimed to have been translated into over 50 languages, this song is frequently taught to schoolchildren in the PRC
*"Zhuang Brocade Dedicated to Chairman Mao" (莊錦獻給毛主席){{spaced ndash}}a song attributed to the [[Zhuang people|Zhuang]] ethnic minority of the [[Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region]]
*"Sweet-Scented Osmanthus Blooms With the Arrival of Happiness" (《桂花开放幸福来》) (attributed to the [[Hmong people|Miao]], or Chinese [[Hmong people|Hmong]], ethnic minority group)
*"Generations Remember Chairman Mao's Kindness" (《世世代代铭记毛主席的恩情》) (a song celebrating the "liberation of the ethnic [[Xibe people]]")
*"Salaam Chairman Mao" (《萨拉姆毛主席》/《薩拉姆毛主席》){{spaced ndash}}a [[Xinjiang]] song praising Mao, composed by [[Wang Luobin]]. A modern version was performed by Chinese rock singer [[Dao Lang (singer)|Dao Lang]].
*"Song of [[Mount Erlangshan]]" (《歌唱二郎山》){{spaced ndash}}a 1950s song celebrating the development of Tibet, which made Mount Erlangshan in western [[Sichuan]] famous
*"Story of the Spring" (春天的故事){{spaced ndash}}a song performed by [[Dong Wenhua]], initially at the 1997 [[CCTV New Year's Gala]], days before his death, dedicated to late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping
*"The Cultural Revolution is Just Great" (《无产阶级文化大革命就是好》/《無產階級文化大革命就是好》){{spaced ndash}}a song praising the Cultural Revolution
*"On the Golden Mountains of Beijing" (北京的金山上){{spaced ndash}}a song attributed to the [[Tibet]]an people praising Mao as the shining sun
*"Ode to the Socialist Motherland" (《歌唱社会主义祖国》/《歌唱社會主義祖國》){{spaced ndash}}the Cultural Revolution-era modification of the well-known patriotic song "[[Ode to the Motherland]]" (《歌唱祖国》/《歌唱祖國》).
*"Where are you going, Uncle Kurban?" (库尔班大叔您上哪儿){{spaced ndash}}a song attributed to a Uyghur elder named [[Kurban Tulum]] (also known as Uncle Kurban) praising People's Liberation Army.

Most of the songs listed above are no longer used as propaganda by the CCP, but are exhibited in China as a means of reviving popular nostalgia for the "old times".{{citation needed|date=October 2016}}

== References ==
=== Citations ===
{{Reflist}}

=== Sources ===
{{Commons category|Propaganda of China}}
{{Library resources box}}
{{refbegin}}
* Min, Anchee, Duo, Duo, Landsberger, Stefan R., ''Chinese Propaganda Posters'', [[Taschen]] (Bibliotheca Universalis series), 608 pages. {{ISBN|9783836557474}}.
* [[Michael Wolf (photographer)|Wolf, Michael]] ''Chinese Propaganda Posters: From the Collection of Michael Wolf'', 2003, {{ISBN|3-8228-2619-7}}.
* Harriet Evans, Stephanie Donald (eds.), ''Picturing Power in the People's Republic of China'', {{ISBN|0-8476-9511-5}}.
* Stefan Landsberger, ''Chinese Propaganda Posters: From Revolution to Reform'', {{ISBN|90-5496-009-4}}.
* Hunter, Edward. ''Brain-washing in Red China: the calculated destruction of men's minds''. New York, NY: Vanguard Press, 1951, 1953.
* Lincoln Cushing and Ann Tompkins, ''Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'', San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books, 2007, {{ISBN|978-0-8118-5946-2}}.
* [[Jacques Ellul|Ellul, Jacques]]. ''[[Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes]]''. Trans. Konrad Kellen & Jean Lerner. New York: Knopf, 1965. New York: Random House/Vintage 1973.
{{refend}}

{{Asia topic|Propaganda in}}
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[[Category:Propaganda in China| ]]
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[[Category:Mass media in Taiwan]]
[[Category:Kuomintang]]