View source for Operation Opera

{{Short description|1981 Israeli airstrike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor}}
{{Pp|small=yes}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=February 2020}}
{{EngvarB|date=January 2021}}
{{Infobox operational plan
|name        = Operation Opera
|partof      = the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]]
|scope       = [[Strategic victory|Strategic]]
|planned_by  = {{plainlist|
* [[Menachem Begin]]<br/>{{small|([[Prime Minister of Israel]])}}
* [[David Ivry]]<br/>{{small|(Commander, Israeli Air Force)}}
}}
|location    = [[Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center]], [[Diyala Governorate]], [[Ba'athist Iraq|Iraq]]
|coordinates = {{Coord|33|12|12|N|44|31|07|E|type:event_region:IQ-DI|display=inline,title}}
|objective   = Destruction of Iraq's ''Osirak'' nuclear reactor
|executed    = 7 June 1981
|executed_by = {{flagicon image|Air Force Ensign of Israel.svg}} [[Israeli Air Force]]
|outcome     = Israeli operational success
* Osirak nuclear reactor destroyed
* [[Iraq and weapons of mass destruction|Iraqi nuclear program]] severely disturbed
|casualties  = 10 Iraqi soldiers, 1 [[France|French]] civilian killed
|map_type=Iraq
|map_label=Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre
|map_caption=Location of the ''Osirak'' nuclear reactor within Iraq}}

'''Operation Opera''' ({{langx|he| מִבְצָע אוֹפֵּרָה}}),<ref>Perlmutter, p. 172.</ref> also known as '''Operation Babylon''',<ref>Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, Uri Bar-Joseph. ''Two Minutes over Baghdad''. Routledge (2nd ed.), 2008. p. 120.</ref> was a surprise airstrike conducted by the [[Israeli Air Force]] on 7 June 1981, which destroyed an unfinished [[Iraq and weapons of mass destruction|Iraqi nuclear reactor]] located {{Convert|17|km|mi|abbr=off}} southeast of [[Baghdad]], [[Ba'athist Iraq|Iraq]].<ref name=bbc1>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/7/newsid_3014000/3014623.stm|title=1981: Israel bombs Baghdad nuclear reactor|date=7 June 1981|work=BBC News|publisher=British Broadcasting Corporation|access-date=30 November 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |author=Neff |first=Donald |year=1995 |title=Israel Bombs Iraq's Osirak Nuclear Research Facility |url=http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0695/9506081.htm |journal=Washington Report on Middle East Affairs |publisher=Andrew I. Kilgore |pages=81–82 |access-date=30 November 2010}}</ref><ref name=fainberg/> The Israeli operation came a year after the [[Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force]] had caused minor damage to the [[Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center|same nuclear facility]] in [[Operation Scorch Sword]], with the damage having been subsequently repaired by [[France|French]] technicians. Operation Opera, and related [[Cabinet of Israel|Israeli government]] statements following it, established the [[Begin Doctrine]], which explicitly stated the strike was not an anomaly, but instead "a precedent for every future government in Israel". Israel's [[counter-proliferation]] [[Preventive war|preventive strike]] added another dimension to its existing [[policy of deliberate ambiguity]], as it related to the [[nuclear weapon]]s capability of other states in the region.<ref>[http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/nuclear/ Country Profiles -Israel] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006135509/http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/nuclear/ |date=6 October 2014 }}, [[Nuclear Threat Initiative]] (NTI) updated May 2014</ref>

In 1976, Iraq purchased an ''Osiris''-class nuclear reactor from France.<ref name=osiris>Ramberg, Bennett. ''Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy: An Unrecognized Military Peril''. University of California Press, 1985. p. xvii.</ref><ref>Cordesman, Anthony H. ''Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction''. Praeger, 1999. p. 605.</ref> While Iraq and France maintained that the reactor, named ''Osirak'' by the French, was intended for peaceful scientific research,<ref name=worldbook/> the Israelis viewed the reactor with suspicion, believing it was designed to produce nuclear weapons that could escalate the ongoing [[Arab–Israeli conflict]].<ref name=bbc1/> On 7 June 1981, a flight of Israeli Air Force [[General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon|F-16A]] fighter aircraft, with an escort of [[McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle|F-15As]], bombed the ''Osirak'' reactor deep inside Iraq.<ref name="scott">Shirley V. Scott, Anthony Billingsley, Christopher Michaelsen. ''International Law and the Use of Force: A Documentary and Reference Guide''. Praeger, 2009. p. 182.</ref> Israel called the operation an act of self-defense, saying that the reactor had "less than a month to go" before "it might have become [[Nuclear reactor physics#Criticality|critical]]."<ref name=scott132>Scott, p. 132.</ref> The airstrike reportedly killed ten [[Iraqi Armed Forces|Iraqi soldiers]] and one French civilian.<ref name=polakow>Polakow-Suransky, Sasha. ''The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa''. Pantheon (1 ed.), 2010. p. 145.</ref> The attack took place about three weeks before the [[1981 Israeli legislative election]]s for the [[Knesset]].<ref name=perryIQP/>

At the time of its occurrence, the attack was met with sharp international criticism, including in the [[United States]], and Israel was rebuked by the [[United Nations Security Council]] and [[United Nations General Assembly|General Assembly]] in two separate resolutions.<ref name=steele/><ref name=scres/> Media reactions were also negative: "Israel's sneak attack ... was an act of inexcusable and short-sighted aggression",<ref>{{Cite news |date=1981-06-09 |title=Israel's Illusion |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09/opinion/israel-s-illusion.html |access-date=2023-02-13 |work=The New York Times |department=Opinion |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> wrote ''[[The New York Times]]'', while the ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'' called it "[[state-sponsored terrorism]]".<ref name="steele">{{cite web |author=Steele |first=Jonathan |date=7 June 2002 |title=The Bush doctrine makes nonsense of the UN charter |url=https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/jun/07/britainand911.usa |access-date=29 November 2010 |work=The Guardian}}</ref>{{Better source needed|date=June 2023}}<!-- Can the original L.A. Times article be cited? --> The destruction of Iraq's ''Osirak'' reactor has been cited as an example of a [[preventive war|preventive strike]] in contemporary scholarship on [[international law]].<ref name=shue>Shue, Henry and Rhodin, David (2007). ''Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification''. Oxford University Press. p. 215.</ref><ref name=council /> The efficacy of the attack is debated by historians,<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5009212.stm|title = Osirak: Threats real and imagined|date = 5 June 2006}}</ref> who acknowledge that it brought Iraq back from the brink of nuclear capability but drove its weapons program underground and cemented [[President of Iraq|Iraqi president]] [[Saddam Hussein]]'s future ambitions for acquiring nuclear weapons.

==Iraq's nuclear program==
{{Main|Iraq and weapons of mass destruction}}
[[File:Osirak.jpg|thumb|250px|right| The ''Osirak'' reactor prior to the Israeli attack]]
Iraq had established a nuclear program sometime in the 1960s, and in the mid-1970s looked to expand it through the acquisition of a nuclear reactor.<ref name=perl40>Perlmutter, p. 40.</ref> After failing to convince the [[Cabinet of France|French Government]] to sell them a [[gas cooled reactor|gas cooled graphite moderated]] plutonium-[[production reactor|producing reactor]] and [[Nuclear reprocessing|reprocessing plant]], and likewise failing to convince the Italian government to sell them a Cirene reactor, the [[Government of Iraq|Iraqi government]] convinced the French government to sell them an Osiris-class [[research reactor]].<ref name=perl4142>Perlmutter, pp. 41–42.</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=Lucien S. Vandenborucke|year=1984|title=The Israeli Strike Against Osiraq: the dynamics of fear and proliferation in the Middle East|journal=Air University Review|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/1984/vanden.htm}}</ref> The purchase also included a smaller accompanying Isis-type reactor, the sale of 72 kilograms of 93% [[enriched uranium]] and the training of personnel.<ref>Stockman-Shomron, Israel. ''Israel, the Middle East, and the great powers''. Transaction Books, 1985. p. 334.</ref> The total cost has been given as $300 million (equivalent to $1.62 billion in {{Inflation/year|US}}).<ref>{{cite web|title=Iraq Profile: Nuclear Overview|url=http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/iraq/nuclear/index.html|work=Research Library|publisher=Nuclear Threat Initiative (NPT)|access-date=8 December 2010|author=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101105143118/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iraq/Nuclear/index.html|archive-date=5 November 2010}}</ref> In November 1975, the countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement and in 1976, the sale of the reactor was finalized.<ref name=perl4142/>

Construction for the 40-[[megawatt]] light-water nuclear reactor began in 1979 at the Al Tuwaitha Nuclear Center near [[Baghdad]].<ref name=shlomo>Aloni, Shlomo. ''Israeli F-15 Eagle Units in Combat''. Osprey Publishing, 2006. p. 35.</ref> The main reactor was dubbed ''Osirak'' (Osiraq) by the French, blending the name of Iraq with that of the reactor class. Iraq named the main reactor ''Tammuz 1'' ({{Langx|ar|تموز}}) and the smaller ''Tammuz 2''.<ref>Perlmutter, p. 46.</ref> [[Tammuz (Babylonian calendar)|Tammuz]] was the [[Babylonian calendar|Babylonian]] month when the [[Ba'ath Party]] had come to power in 1968.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Snyder |first=Jed C. |year=1983 |title=The Road To Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb |journal=The Middle East Journal |publisher=Middle East Institute |volume=37 |issue=4 |pages=565–593 |jstor=4326666}}</ref> On 6 April 1979, Israeli agents sabotaged the Osirak reactor awaiting shipment to Iraq at [[La Seyne-sur-Mer]] in France.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Minkov |first=Vladimir |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gJHtHlm9r4YC&dq=6+april+1979+osirak&pg=SL599-PA57 |title=Nuclear Shadowboxing: Legacies and Challenges |last2=Simonenko |first2=Vadim |last3=Stanford |first3=George |date=2005 |publisher=DeVolpi, Inc. |isbn=978-0-9777734-1-1}}</ref> On 14 June 1980, Mossad agents assassinated [[Yahya El Mashad]], an Egyptian nuclear scientist who headed the Iraqi nuclear program, in a hotel in Paris.<ref name=berfman>{{cite news|last=Bergman|first=Ronen|title=Killing the Killers|url= http://www.newsweek.com/2010/12/13/killing-the-killers.html|newspaper=Newsweek|date=13 December 2010}}</ref><ref name= hider>{{cite news|last=Hider|first=James|title=The secret life of Tzipi Livni|url= http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4791158.ece|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20101118021048/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article4791158.ece|url-status= dead|archive-date= 18 November 2010|newspaper=The Times|date=20 September 2008|location= London}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,950533-4,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110318165849/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,950533-4,00.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=18 March 2011|magazine=Time|title=Attack – and Fallout: Israel and Iraq|date=22 June 1981}}</ref> In July 1980, Iraq received from France a shipment of approximately 12.5&nbsp;kilograms of highly enriched uranium fuel to be used in the reactor. The shipment was the first of a planned six deliveries totalling 72&nbsp;kilograms.<ref name=holroyd>Holroyd, Fred. ''Thinking about nuclear weapons: analyses and prescriptions''. Routledge, 1985. p. 147.</ref> It was reportedly stipulated in the purchase agreement that no more than two HEU fuel loadings, 24&nbsp;kilograms, could be in Iraq at any time.<ref>Holroyd, p. 151.</ref>

Iraq and France claimed that the Iraqi reactor was intended for peaceful scientific research.<ref name=worldbook>''The 1982 World Book Year Book''. World Book Inc., 1983. p. 350.</ref> Agreements between France and Iraq excluded military use.<ref name=un277>United Nations Staff. ''Yearbook of the United Nations 1981''. United Nations Pubns, 1984. p. 277.</ref> The American private intelligence agency [[STRATFOR]] wrote in 2007 that the uranium-fueled reactor "was believed to be on the verge of producing plutonium for a weapons program".<ref name="stratfor">{{cite web|url=http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/31570/geopolitical_diary_israeli_covert_operations_iran|title=Geopolitical Diary: Israeli Covert Operations in Iran|access-date=9 December 2010|date=2 February 2007|publisher=[[STRATFOR]]|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101207082154/http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/31570/geopolitical_diary_israeli_covert_operations_iran|archive-date=7 December 2010}} (requires e-mail address)</ref> In a 2003 speech, [[Richard Wilson (physicist)|Richard Wilson]], a professor of physics at [[Harvard University]] who visually inspected the partially damaged reactor in December 1982, said that "to collect enough plutonium [for a nuclear weapon] using ''Osirak'' would've taken decades, not years".<ref>Ragaini, Richard C. ''International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies: 29th session''. World Scientific Publishing, 2003. p. 33.</ref> In 2005, Wilson further commented in ''[[The Atlantic]]'': "The Osirak reactor that was bombed by Israel in June 1981 was explicitly designed by the French engineer Yves Girard to be unsuitable for making bombs. That was obvious to me on my 1982 visit".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200503/letters|work=The Atlantic Magazine|title=Letters to the Editor|date=March 2005|access-date=29 November 2010}}</ref> Elsewhere Wilson has stated that contrary to claims that the bombing of the Iraqi Osirak reactor delayed Iraq's nuclear bomb program, the Iraqi nuclear program before 1981 was peaceful, and the Osirak reactor was not only unsuited to making bombs but was under intensive safeguards.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.accuracy.org/newsrelease.php?articleId=1242|title=Myth: Israel's Strike on Iraqi Reactor Hindered Iraqi Nukes|access-date=29 November 2010|date=16 March 2006|publisher=[[Institute for Public Accuracy]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100613055148/http://accuracy.org/newsrelease.php?articleId=1242|archive-date=13 June 2010|url-status=dead}}</ref>

In an interview in 2012, Wilson again emphasised: "The Iraqis couldn't have been developing a nuclear weapon at Osirak. I challenge any scientist in the world to show me how they could have done so."<ref name="Wilson 2012">{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/25/bomb-iran-nuclear-arms-iraq-israel|last=Hasan|first=Mehdi|date=25 March 2012|title=Bomb Iran and it will surely decide to pursue nuclear arms|work=[[The Guardian]]|access-date=16 May 2012}}</ref>

Iraq was a signatory to the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]], placing its reactors under [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) safeguards.<ref name=perl40/> In October 1981, the ''[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]'' published excerpts from the testimony of Roger Richter, a former IAEA inspector who described the weaknesses of the agency's nuclear safeguards to the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]]. Richter testified that only part of Iraq's nuclear installation was under safeguard and that the most sensitive facilities were not even subject to safeguards.<ref name=bulletin1>{{cite journal|year=1991|title=10 years ago in the Bulletin|journal=The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|volume=47|issue=8|page=5|publisher=Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jQwAAAAAMBAJ&q=osirak+safeguards+npt&pg=PA5|access-date=30 November 2010}}</ref> IAEA's Director-General [[Sigvard Eklund]] issued a rebuttal saying that Richter had never inspected ''Osirak'' and had never been assigned to inspect facilities in the Middle East.<ref name=bulletin1/> Eklund claimed that the safeguards procedures were effective and that they were supplemented by precautionary measures taken by the nuclear suppliers.<ref name=bulletin1/> Anthony Fainberg, a physicist at the [[Brookhaven National Laboratory]], disputed Richter's claim that a fuel processing program for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons could have been conducted secretly.<ref name=bulletin1/> Fainberg wrote that there was barely enough fuel on the site to make one bomb, and that the presence of hundreds of foreign technicians would have made it impossible for the Iraqis to take the necessary steps without being discovered.<ref name="fainberg">{{cite journal |author=Fainberg |first=Anthony |year=1981 |title=Osirak and international security |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PQsAAAAAMBAJ&q=nuclear+fuel+osirak&pg=PA33 |journal=The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |publisher=Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. |volume=37 |issue=8 |pages=33–36 |bibcode=1981BuAtS..37h..33F |doi=10.1080/00963402.1981.11458896 |access-date=30 November 2010}}</ref>

==Strategy and diplomacy==
[[File:Menachem Begin and Moshe Dayan exits from an aircraft.JPEG|thumb|[[Menachem Begin]], Prime Minister of Israel and in charge of the operation, disembarks from an aircraft upon his arrival in the United States, accompanied by Israeli Foreign Minister [[Moshe Dayan]].]]
In Israel, discussions on which strategy to adopt in response to the Iraqi reactor development were taking place as early as [[Yitzhak Rabin|Yitzhak Rabin's]] [[Seventeenth government of Israel|first term in office]] (1974–1977).<ref name=perl67>Perlmutter, p. 67</ref> Reportedly, planning and training for the operation began during this time.<ref name=perl67/> After [[Menachem Begin]] became Prime Minister in 1977 the preparations intensified; Begin authorized the building of a full-scale model of the Iraqi reactor which Israeli pilots could practice bombing.<ref name=simons>[[Geoff Simons|Simons, Geoff]] ''Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam''. St. Martin's Press, 1996. p. 320.</ref> Three Israeli pilots died in accidents while training for the mission.<ref name=solis />

Israel's Foreign Minister [[Moshe Dayan]] initiated diplomatic negotiations with France, the United States and Italy (Israel maintained that some Italian firms acted as suppliers and sub-contractors) over the matter but failed to obtain assurances that the reactor program would be halted. In addition Israel was not able to convince the French governments of [[Valéry Giscard d'Estaing]] and [[François Mitterrand]] to cease aiding the Iraqi nuclear program.<ref>Arye Naor, 2003. "Analysis of the Decision-Making Process," ''Israel's Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 7 June 1981''. Jerusalem: [[Menachem Begin Heritage Center]]. p. 26.</ref> [[Saddam Hussein]] consistently maintained that ''Osirak'' was intended for peaceful purposes.<ref>Sciolino, Elaine. ''The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the War in the Gulf''. John Wiley & Sons Inc. (1st ed.), 1991. p. 152.</ref> Begin considered the diplomatic options fruitless, and worried that prolonging the decision to attack would lead to a fatal inability to act in response to the perceived threat.<ref name=council /> According to Karl P. Mueller, in the spring of 1979, Begin had reached the conclusion that an anticipatory attack was necessary.<ref name=mueller>{{cite book|last=Mueller|first=Karl P.|title=Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy|year=2007|publisher=RAND Corporation|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qg3JDl_zdqcC&q=osirak+dayan&pg=PA215|access-date=23 June 2011|page=215|isbn=978-0-8330-4095-4}}</ref>

[[Anthony Cordesman]] writes that the Israeli intelligence agency [[Mossad]] conducted a series of [[clandestine operation]]s to halt construction or destroy the reactor.<ref name=cordes606>Cordesman, p. 606.</ref> In April 1979, Mossad agents in France allegedly planted a bomb that destroyed the reactor's first set of core structures while they were awaiting shipment to Iraq.<ref name=cordes606/> In June 1980, Mossad agents are said to have assassinated [[Yahya El Mashad|Yehia El Mashad]], an Egyptian atomic scientist working on the Iraqi nuclear program.<ref name=styan>Styan, David. ''France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East''. I.B. Tauris, 2006. p. 134.</ref><ref name=hurst/> Shortly afterward, two other Iraqi engineers working on the program, Salman Rashid and [[Abdul Rasul (Iraqi scientist)|Abdul Rasul]], fell ill and died on trips to Switzerland and France respectively, with Mossad suspected of having poisoned them. It has also been claimed that the Mossad bombed several of the French and Italian companies it suspected of working on the project, and sent threatening letters to top officials and technicians, causing several French technicians to resign.<ref name=Bergman>Bergman, Ronen: ''Rise and Kill First'', pp. 350–352</ref><ref name=cordes606/><ref name=hurst>Hurst, Steven. ''United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War''. Edinburgh University Press, 2009. p. 55.</ref><ref>Spector, Leonard. ''Proliferation Today''. Vintage Books, 1984. pp. 175–178.</ref> Following the bombing in April 1979, France inserted a clause in its agreement with Iraq saying that French personnel would have to supervise the ''Osirak'' reactor on-site for a period of ten years.<ref name=styan />

The alleged assassinations caused widespread panic among Iraqi nuclear scientists. Saddam Hussein, worried over the effect on the morale of the project's scientists, awarded cash bonuses and luxury cars to all senior scientists. Meshad's widow was awarded $300,000 and promised that she and her children would receive a lifelong pension. Iraqi scientists were given financial bonuses for international travel, which they had become increasingly fearful of, and received instructions on how to avoid potential Mossad assassinations.<ref name=Bergman/>

===Iranian attack===
{{Main|Operation Scorch Sword}}
In an air attack codenamed [[Operation Scorch Sword]], Iran attacked and damaged the site on 30 September 1980, with two [[F-4 Phantom II|F-4 Phantoms]], shortly after the outbreak of the [[Iran–Iraq War]].<ref name=airenthusiast /> At the onset of the war, [[Yehoshua Sagi]], director of the Israeli [[Military Intelligence Directorate (Israel)|Military Intelligence Directorate]], publicly urged the Iranians to bomb the reactor.<ref name="airenthusiast">{{cite journal |author=Cooper |first=Tom |last2=Bishop |first2=Farzad |year=2004 |title=Target: Saddam's Reactor; Israeli and Iranian Operations against Iraqi Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons |url=https://www.angelfire.com/art2/narod/opera/ |journal=Air Enthusiast |publisher=Key Publishing |issue=110}}</ref><ref name=note39>{{cite web|url=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcnair41/41not.htm#39|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/19991122090221/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcnair41/41not.htm#39|url-status=dead|archive-date=22 November 1999|title=McNair Paper 41, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995, note 39|publisher=Au.af.mil|access-date=19 June 2011}}</ref> The attack was the first on a [[nuclear reactor]] and only the third on a nuclear facility in history. It was also the first instance of a [[preventive attack]] on a nuclear reactor which aimed to forestall the development of a nuclear weapon.<ref name=note39 /><ref name="reiter">{{cite web |author=Reiter |first=Dan |date=July 2005 |title=Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the "Success" at Osiraq |url=http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Osirak.pdf |access-date=29 November 2010 |work=Nonproliferation Review}}</ref><ref name=mcnair41>{{cite web|url=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcnair41/41irq.htm|title=McNair Paper 41, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995|publisher=Au.af.mil|date=30 September 1980|access-date=19 June 2011|archive-date=29 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190629221406/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcnair41/41irq.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Due to last minute Iranian concerns that the reactor had been already fueled and could release [[radioactive fallout]] if hit, they did not attack the actual reactor dome, but the control room, research/centrifuge facilities, and the adjacent buildings. The targets were struck and the buildings were damaged, along with the plant cooling mechanisms.<ref name=Cooper /> Two other F-4s simultaneously hit Baghdad's main power plant, knocking the city's electricity out for nearly two days. The Iraqis denied any major damage. The French and Italian technicians promptly left Iraq, and nearly withdrew from the project, but some later returned in February 1981 and began to repair the damage.<ref name=Cooper />

[[Trita Parsi]], in the book ''Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States'', writes that a senior Israeli official met with a representative of the [[Ayatollah Khomeini]] in France one month prior to the Israeli attack.<ref name=parsi>Parsi, Trita. ''Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States''. Yale University Press (1st ed.), 2007. p. 107.</ref> The source of the assertion is [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], a former Israeli government employee. At the alleged meeting, the Iranians explained details of their 1980 attack on the site, and agreed to let Israeli planes land at an Iranian airfield in [[Tabriz]] in the case of an emergency.<ref name=parsi/> While the new Iranian government was officially hostile to Israel, due to both nations having a common enemy (Iraq), and Iranian fears that the Iraqis would create an atomic bomb to use on them, they clandestinely worked with Israel to forestall such a development.<ref name=Cooper />

===Operational planning===
[[File:OsirakLocation.gif|thumb|Scheme of operation]]
The distance between Israeli military bases and the reactor site was significant—over {{convert|1600|km|mi nmi|abbr=on}}.<ref>Seale, Patrick. ''Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East''. University of California Press, 1990. p. 370.</ref> The Israeli planes would have to violate [[Jordan]]ian and/or [[Saudi Arabia|Saudi]] airspace in a covert flight over foreign territory, making [[aerial refueling|mid-air refueling]] unfeasible.<ref name=solis/><ref name=raas /><ref>Abbey, Alan D. ''Journey of Hope: The Story of Ilan Ramon, Israel's First Astronaut''. Geffen Publishing House, 2003. p. 11.</ref> The Israelis eventually concluded that a squadron of heavily fueled and heavily armed [[General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon|F-16As]], with a group of [[McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle|F-15As]] to provide air cover and fighter support, could perform a [[surgical strike]] to eliminate the reactor site without having to refuel.<ref name=eitan />

The decision to go through with the operation was hotly contested within Begin's government.<ref name=options/> [[Ariel Sharon]], a member of the [[Security Cabinet of Israel|Security Cabinet]], later said that he was among those who advocated bombing the reactor.<ref>Dan, Uri. ''Ariel Sharon: An Intimate Portrait''. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p. 81.</ref> Dayan, Defense Minister (until late 1980) [[Ezer Weizman]] and Deputy Prime Minister [[Yigael Yadin]] were among those opposed.<ref name=mueller /> According to Mueller, "the principal difference between the hawks and doves on this issue lay in their estimation of the likely international political costs of an air strike".<ref name=mueller /> Shai Feldman specifies that "[those opposed] feared that the operation would derail the fragile Israeli-Egyptian peace process, fuel Arab anxieties about Israel's profile in the region, and damage Israel-French relations".<ref>Feldman, Shai. ''Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East''. MIT Press, 1997. p. 110.</ref> Begin and his supporters, including Sharon, were far less pessimistic than their opponents about the political fallout.<ref name=mueller/> [[Yehoshua Saguy]] argued for continued efforts in trying to find a non-military solution as it would take the Iraqis five to ten years to produce the material necessary for a nuclear weapon.<ref name="options">{{cite web |author=Cirincione |first=Joseph |author-link=Joseph Cirincione |date=19 January 2006 |title=No Military Options |url=http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2006/01/19/no-military-options/1p54 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304023140/http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/01/19/no-military-options/1p54 |url-status=dead |archive-date=4 March 2016 |access-date=1 December 2010 |work=Proliferation Analysis |publisher=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]]}}</ref> In the end, Begin chose to order the attack based on a worst-case estimate where a weapon could be created in one to two years time.<ref name=options/> According to [[Ronen Bergman]], Mossad director [[Yitzhak Hofi]] told Begin in October 1980 that the Mossad's campaign of assassinations and sabotage could not stop the Iraqi nuclear program and that the only way to put an end to it was an airstrike.<ref name=Bergman/>

Prime Minister Begin defended the timing of the bombing stating that a later attack, after the reactor had become operational, could cause lethal [[radioactive contamination]] doses to reach all the way to Baghdad.<ref name=shlomo/><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Hckys7gpwl4C&q=other+interesting+question+&pg=PA197 |title=Physics and Nuclear Arms Today |date=1991 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-0-88318-626-8 |editor1=Hafemeister |editor-first=David W. |page=205 |contribution=Section 5 Nuclear Proliferation |editor2=Levi |editor-first2=Barbara G. |editor2-link=Barbara Goss Levi}}</ref> An analysis by Warren Donnelly of the United States [[Congressional Research Service]] concluded that "it would be most unlikely for an attack with conventional bombs upon the reactor when operating to have caused lethal exposures to radioactivity in Baghdad, although some people at the reactor site might receive some exposure".<ref>{{cite journal |author=Fainberg |first=Anthony |year=1981 |title=Osirak and international security |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TAoAAAAAMBAJ&q=osirak+radioactivity&pg=PA11 |journal=The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |publisher=Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. |volume=37 |issue=7 |page=12 |bibcode=1981BuAtS..37h..33F |doi=10.1080/00963402.1981.11458896 |access-date=30 November 2010}}</ref> This was similarly the conclusion of Herbert Goldstein of Columbia University using [[IAEA]] release factors, the lethal contamination would be confined to a close proximity to the reactor and small amounts of radiation would be detectable in Baghdad under the assumption that winds were blowing in that direction.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Hckys7gpwl4C&q=iaea+release+factor&pg=PA197 |title=Physics and Nuclear Arms Today: Section 5 Nuclear Proliferation|page =205 |isbn= 978-0-88318-626-8|last1=Hafemeister |first1=David |last2=Levi |first2=Barbara Goss |date= 1991 |publisher=Springer }}</ref>

In October 1980, [[Mossad]] reported to Begin that the ''Osirak'' reactor would be fueled and operational by June 1981.<ref name="raas">{{cite journal |last1=Raas |first1=Whitney |last2=Long |first2=Austin |name-list-style=amp |year=2007 |title=Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities |url=http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v031/31.4raas.html |journal=[[International Security]] |publisher=[[Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs]] |volume=31 |issue=4 |pages=7–32 |doi=10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.7 |s2cid=57560777 |access-date=1 December 2010}}</ref> This assessment was significantly aided by reconnaissance photos supplied by the United States, specifically using the [[KH-11 KENNEN]] satellite.<ref name=solis>Solis, Gary D. ''The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War''. Cambridge University Press, 2010. p. 182.</ref> French technicians installing the reactor later said it was scheduled to become operational only by the end of 1981.<ref name=solis/> Nonetheless, in October 1980, the Israeli cabinet (with Dayan absent) finally voted 10–6 in favor of launching the attack.<ref name=mueller />

===Preliminary Israeli/Iranian actions===
{{Main|H-3 airstrike}}
After the approval for Operation Opera, the Israelis began to plan their mission against Osirak. The basic procedure for the airstrike had been formulated as early as 1979.<ref name=Cooper /> However, the Israelis needed photographic intelligence about the layout of the plant. That task allegedly fell to the Iranians.<ref name=Cooper /> Rather than carrying out a follow-up air raid after their September attack, on 30 November 1980, an Iranian [[F-4 Phantom]] reconnaissance jet took pictures of the Osirak reactor. The photographs were allegedly placed in a top-secret metal container, and certain elements of the Iranian military delivered them to the Israelis. With these photographs, the Israelis began to plan out Operation Opera.<ref name=Cooper />

A team of Israeli pilots using [[A-4 Skyhawk]] aircraft began practicing over the [[Mediterranean Sea]] for the raid. The Israelis shortly afterwards received their first agreed delivery of [[F-16 Fighting Falcon]] aircraft (the first batch was originally earmarked for Iran, but because of the [[Iranian Revolution|Iranian Revolution of 1979]], the Israeli Air Force received theirs ahead of schedule). The new F-16s would be used for the raid.<ref name=Cooper /> Israeli F-4 Phantoms also ran reconnaissance missions over areas of southern and western Iraq. While the Iraqi Air Force was busy fighting the Iranians, on one occasion, an Iraqi [[MiG-21]] chased an Israeli F-4; the Iraqi jet ran out of fuel and the pilot was forced to [[ejection seat|eject]].<ref name=Cooper /> However, in their missions, the Israelis discovered a blind area on Iraqi radar, on the border with Saudi Arabia. While the Iraqis were aware of the blind area, they did not remedy the problem because they did not expect a war with Saudi Arabia.<ref name=Cooper />

The Iraqi Air Force was a potential threat to the Israelis (as the MiG-21 interception showed) and it somewhat deterred Israel from attacking yet.<ref name=Cooper /> However, Israel had an advantage in that Iraq was preoccupied fighting Iran. On 4 April 1981, the Iranian Air Force launched a major attack on Iraq's [[H-3 Air Base|H-3 airbase]] in the western part of the country (near Jordan and Israel). Eight Iranian F-4 Phantoms carried out the long range bombing mission and struck the airbase.<ref name=Cooper /><ref name="Farrokh 03">{{cite book|last=Farrokh|first=Kaveh|title=Iran at war: 1500–1988|year= 2011|publisher=Osprey Publishing Ltd. |isbn=978-1-78096-221-4|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dUHhTPdJ6yIC}}{{Dead link|date=February 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> Iran claimed that 48 Iraqi aircraft were destroyed, although US intelligence concluded that 27 aircraft were destroyed and 11 others damaged.{{clarify|reason=how is "beyond repair" different from "destroyed"?|date=October 2018}} Among the aircraft hit were two [[Tu-22 Blinder]] and three [[Tu-16|Tu-16 Badger]] [[strategic bombers]] (which could have been used to retaliate against Israel in the event of an attack).<ref name=Cooper>{{cite web|last=Cooper|first=Tom|title=Target: Saddam's Reactor|url=https://www.angelfire.com/art2/narod/opera/}}</ref> The attack was a severe blow to Iraqi airpower, and largely gave Iran air superiority over Iraq.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Israeli reconnaissance planes had been monitoring Iraq during the attack, and observed that the Iraqi Air Force had been severely degraded and their retaliatory capacity had been weakened.<ref name=Cooper />

==Attack==
[[File:IAF F-16A Netz 243 CIAF 2004.jpg|thumb|300px|[[General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon#F-16A/B|F-16A]] ''Netz #243'', flown by Colonel [[Ilan Ramon]] in Operation Opera. Here of [[140 Squadron (Israel)|140 Squadron]] "Golden Eagle" (see tail), but at that time of [[110 Squadron (Israel)|110 Squadron]] "Knights Of The North" at [[Ramat David Airbase]].]]
[[File:Hatzerim 240613 F-16.jpg|thumb|300px|Nose of F-16A ''#243'' showing the triangular mission marking for the attack, a nuclear reactor silhouette against the [[Iraqi Air Force]] emblem.]]
[[Yehuda Zvi Blum]], in a speech to the [[United Nations Security Council]] following the attack, claimed that the operation was launched on a Sunday afternoon under the assumption that workers present on the site, including foreign experts employed at the reactor, would have left.<ref name=scott132/> Notwithstanding this precaution, there were hundreds of French workers and other nationals at the plant at the time of the raid.<ref name=simons />

The attack squadron consisted of eight [[F-16 Fighting Falcon|F-16As]], each with two unguided [[Mark 84 bomb|Mark-84]] {{convert|2,000|lb|kg|adj=on}} [[delay-action bomb]]s.<ref name=raas /> A flight of six [[F-15 Eagle|F-15As]] was assigned to the operation to provide fighter support.<ref name=solis /> The F-16 pilots were Ze'ev Raz, [[Amos Yadlin]], Dobbi Yaffe, Hagai Katz, [[Amir Nachumi]], [[Iftach Spector]], [[Relik Shafir]], and [[Ilan Ramon]]. Raz led the attack and was later decorated by the Chief of Staff for his leadership. Ramon, who was the youngest pilot to participate in the operation, later became the first Israeli astronaut and died in the [[Space Shuttle Columbia disaster|Space Shuttle ''Columbia'' disaster]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iafe.net/ma/pdf/opera.pdf |title=Operation Opera |first=Tzahi |last=Ben-Ami |language=he |access-date=28 August 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110723151144/http://www.iafe.net/ma/pdf/opera.pdf |archive-date=23 July 2011 }}</ref>

The operation started on 7 June 1981, at 15:55 local time (12:55 [[GMT]]). The Israeli planes left [[Taba International Airport|Etzion Airbase]], flying unchallenged in [[Jordan]]ian and [[Saudi Arabia|Saudi]] airspace.<ref name="eitan">Eitan, Rafael. 2003. "The Raid on the Reactor from the Point of View of the Chief of Staff," ''Israel's Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 7 June 1981''. Jerusalem: [[Menachem Begin Heritage Center]]</ref> To avoid detection, the Israeli pilots conversed in Saudi-accented Arabic while in Jordanian airspace and told Jordanian air controllers that they were a Saudi patrol that had gone off course.<ref name=simons /> While flying over Saudi Arabia, they pretended to be Jordanians, using Jordanian radio signals and formations.<ref name=simons /><ref>Trevor Dupuy, Paul Martell. ''Flawed Victory: Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon''. Hero Books, 1986. p. 69.</ref> The Israeli planes were so heavily loaded that the external fuel tanks that had been mounted on the planes were exhausted in-flight. The tanks were jettisoned over the [[Nafud desert|Saudi desert]].<ref name=eitan />

[[Hussein of Jordan|King Hussein]] of Jordan, vacationing in the [[Gulf of Aqaba]], witnessed the planes overfly his yacht, and noticed their Israeli markings. Taking into account the location, heading, and armament of the jets, Hussein quickly deduced the Iraqi reactor to be the most probable target. Hussein immediately contacted his government and ordered a warning to be sent to the Iraqis. However, due to a communication failure the message was never received and the Israeli planes entered Iraqi airspace undetected.<ref name=eitan /> Upon reaching Iraqi airspace, the squadron split up, with two of the F-15s forming close escort to the F-16 squadron, and the remaining F-15s dispersing into Iraqi airspace as a diversion and ready back-up. The attack squadron descended to {{convert|30|m|ft|abbr=on}} over the Iraqi desert, attempting to fly under the radar of the Iraqi defences.<ref name=eitan />

At 18:35 local time (14:35 [[GMT]]), {{cvt|20|km|}} from the ''Osirak'' reactor complex, the F-16 formation climbed to {{convert|2100|m|ft|abbr=on}} and went into a 35-degree dive at {{convert|1100|km/h|mph|abbr=on}}, aimed at the reactor complex. At {{convert|1100|m|ft|abbr=on}}, the F-16s began releasing the Mark 84 bombs in pairs, at 5-second intervals.<ref name=eitan /> At least eight of the sixteen released bombs struck the containment dome of the reactor.<ref name=raas /> It was later revealed that half an hour before the Israeli planes arrived, a group of Iraqi soldiers manning anti-aircraft defenses had left their posts for an afternoon meal, turning off their radars.<ref name=solis /> The Israeli planes were still intercepted by Iraqi defenses but managed to evade the remaining anti-aircraft fire.<ref name=solis /> The squadron climbed to high altitude and started their return to Israel. The attack lasted less than two minutes.<ref name=reiter />

==International political reactions==
{{See also|United Nations Security Council Resolution 487}}
[[File:F-16netz002.jpg|thumb|IAF F-16A [[Netz 107]] with Osirak bombing mark.]]

International response at the United Nations took two paths. The [[United Nations Security Council]] issued a unanimous and almost immediate response on 19 June 1981, following eight meetings and statements from Iraq and the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]]. Security Council Resolution 487<ref name=scres>{{cite web|url=http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6c57312cc8bd93ca852560df00653995?OpenDocument |title=S-RES-487(1981) Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) |publisher=United Nations |access-date=19 June 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110621231947/http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6c57312cc8bd93ca852560df00653995?OpenDocument |archive-date=21 June 2011 }}</ref> strongly condemned the attack as a "clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct" and called on Israel to refrain from such attacks in the future; the Council recognised the right of Iraq to "establish programmes of technological and nuclear development" and called for Israel to join Iraq within the "IAEA safeguards regime" of the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]].<ref name="UN_SRES4871981">{{UN document|docid=S-RES-487(1981)|type=Resolution|body=Security Council|year=1981|accessdate=10 August 2007|date=19 June 1981}}</ref> The council also stated its consideration that Iraq was "entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered." The United States voted for the resolution and suspended the delivery of four F-16 aircraft to Israel, but blocked punitive action by the UN.<ref name=seliktar>Seliktar, Ofira. ''Divided We Stand: American Jews, Israel, and the Peace Process''. Praeger. p. 66.</ref><ref>Clausen, Peter A. ''Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons''. Longman, 1992. p. 178.</ref> The suspension on the delivery of the aircraft was lifted two months later.<ref>Kreiger, David. ''The challenge of abolishing nuclear weapons''. Transaction Publishers, 2009. p. 161.</ref><ref>Hersh, Seymour. [https://www.scribd.com/doc/29073753/The-Samson-Option-by-Seymour-Hersh ''The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305153035/https://www.scribd.com/doc/29073753/The-Samson-Option-by-Seymour-Hersh |date=5 March 2016 }}. Random House Inc., 1991. p. 6.</ref>

The [[UN General Assembly]] followed the Security Council with Resolution No. 36/27 on 13 November 1981, expressing deep alarm and condemning Israel over the "premeditated and unprecedented act of aggression," and demanding that Israel pay prompt and adequate compensation for the damage and loss of life it had caused.<ref name="United Nations, p. 283">United Nations Staff, p. 283.</ref> The resolution also solemnly warned Israel to refrain from taking such measures in the future.<ref name="United Nations, p. 283"/>

Debate prior to passage of the UN resolution reflected member states' differing positions on issues such as nuclear proliferation in the region and the appropriateness and justifiability of Israel's actions. The Iraqi representative stated that "the motives behind the Israeli attack were to cover up [[Israel's possession of nuclear weapons]] and, more importantly, the determination not to allow the Arab nation to acquire scientific or technical knowledge."<ref name=un277/> Syria requested condemnation not only of Israel for terrorism against Arab peoples, but also of the United States, "which continue[s] to provide Israel with instruments of destruction as part of its strategic alliance."<ref>United Nations Staff, p. 281.</ref>

The representative of France stated that the sole purpose of the reactor was scientific research.<ref name=un277/> Agreements between France and Iraq excluded military use.<ref name=un277/> The United Kingdom said it did not believe Iraq had the capacity to manufacture fissionable materials for nuclear weapons.<ref name=un277/> The IAEA Director-General confirmed that inspections of the nuclear research reactors near Baghdad revealed no non-compliance with the safeguards agreement.<ref name=un277/>

The IAEA's [[Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency|Board of Governors]] convened on 9–12 June and condemned Israel's action.<ref name="louka">{{cite web |author=Louka |first=Eli |year=2009 |title=Precautionary Self-Defense: Preempting Nuclear Proliferation |url=https://www.scribd.com/doc/23531554/Elli-Louka-Nuclear-Weapons-Proliferation |access-date=2 December 2010 |work=Nuclear weapons non-proliferation |page=9}}</ref> The Board further asked that the prospect of suspending Israel's privileges and rights of membership be considered at the next General Conference held by the organization.<ref name=louka/> On 26 September 1981, the IAEA Conference condemned the attack and voted to suspend all technical assistance to Israel.<ref name=louka/> A draft resolution was introduced to expel Israel from the IAEA, but the proposition was defeated.<ref name=louka/> The United States argued that the attack was not a violation of the IAEA Statute and that punitive action against Israel would do great harm to the IAEA and the non-proliferation regime.<ref name=louka/>

The attack was strongly criticized around the world, including in the United States.<ref name=seliktar /><ref>Nyamuya Maogoto, Jackson. ''Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspectives on the Use of Force and the War on Terror''. Ashgate Publishing, 2005. p. 35.</ref> Privately, [[Ronald Reagan|President Reagan]] wrote in his journal on the day of the attack, "I swear I believe Armageddon is near," adding of Begin's decision, "He should have told us & the French, we could have done something to remove the threat."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bennet|first=James|date=September 2010|title=Editor's Note: Nuclear Options|journal=The Atlantic|pages=14}}</ref> [[Jonathan Steele (journalist)|Jonathan Steele]], writing in ''[[The Guardian]]'', described the reaction:

<blockquote>The world was outraged by Israel's raid on 7 June 1981. "Armed attack in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach of international law," [[Margaret Thatcher]] thundered. [[Jeane Kirkpatrick]], the U.S. ambassador to the UN and as stern a lecturer as Britain's then prime minister, described it as "shocking" and compared it to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. American newspapers were as fulsome. "Israel's sneak attack ... was an act of inexcusable and short-sighted aggression," said the ''New York Times''. The ''Los Angeles Times'' called it "[[state-sponsored terrorism]]".<ref name="steele"/></blockquote>

===Aftermath===
[[File:Osirak reactor site damage.jpg|thumb|Osirak reactor site in the aftermath of the attack]]

Ten Iraqi soldiers and one French civilian were killed in the attack.<ref name=polakow/> The civilian killed was engineer Damien Chaussepied, variously described as 24 or 25 years old, who was an employee of [[Air Liquide]] and the French governmental agency [[French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission|CEA]].<ref>Styan, p. 137.</ref><ref>Cooper, H. H. A. ''Terrorism and Espionage in the Middle East: Deception, Displacement and Denial''. [[Lewiston, New York]]: [[Edwin Mellen Press]], 2006. p. 382.</ref><ref name=newsweek>{{cite journal|year=1981|title=Israel Pays a Raid Victim's Family|journal=[[Newsweek]]|volume=152|issue=19|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1mDuAAAAMAAJ&q=damien+chaussepied|access-date=30 November 2010}}</ref> In 1981, Israel agreed to pay restitution to Chaussepied's family.<ref name=newsweek/>

Iraq said it would rebuild the facility and France agreed, in principle, to aid in the reconstruction.<ref>Leonard, Barry. ''Technology Transfer to the Middle East''. DIANE Publishing, 1984. p. 387.</ref> Because of a mix of factors, including the [[Iran–Iraq War]], international pressure and Iraqi payment problems, negotiations broke down in 1984 and France withdrew from the project.<ref name=cordes606/><ref>Chauhan, Sharad S. ''War on Iraq''. New Delhi, 2003. p. 183.</ref> The ''Osirak'' facility remained in its damaged state until the 1991 [[Persian Gulf War]], when it was completely destroyed by subsequent coalition air strikes by the [[United States Air Force]], one of them being the [[Package Q Strike]].<ref>{{cite web|first=John|last=Pike|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/osiraq.htm|title=Osiraq – Iraq Special Weapons Facilities|publisher=GlobalSecurity.org|date=24 July 2011|access-date=31 August 2013}}</ref> During the war, 100 out of 120 members of the [[Knesset]] signed a letter of appreciation to Menachem Begin, thanking him for ordering the attack on ''Osirak''.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Cohen|first=Avner|author2=Marvin Miller|title=Iraq and the Rules of the Nuclear Game|journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]|date=July–August 1991|volume=47|issue=6|pages=10–11 and 43|doi=10.1080/00963402.1991.11459992|bibcode=1991BuAtS..47f..10C|url=http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/bas-iraq-rules-nuke-8-91.htm|access-date=8 December 2010|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720065734/http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/bas-iraq-rules-nuke-8-91.htm|archive-date=20 July 2011}}</ref> In July 1991, Begin, in a rare interview granted to [[Israeli Army Radio]], claimed that the Gulf War, and especially the Iraqi [[Scud]] missile attacks on Israel during that war, vindicated his decision to bomb the reactor.<ref>{{cite web |date=1991-07-11 |title=Begin says Gulf war vindicated Israeli attack on reactor |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2519&dat=19910711&id=B7BdAAAAIBAJ&pg=2347,1393814 |work=Observer-Reporter}}</ref>

In response to their failures to prevent the ''Osirak'' attack (and the earlier H-3 attack), [[Saddam Hussein]] ordered the [[capital punishment|execution]] of Colonel Fakhri Hussein Jaber, the head of Iraq's Western Air Defense Zone, and all officers under his command above the rank of [[Major (rank)|major]]. In addition, 23 other Iraqi pilots and officers were imprisoned.<ref name=Cooper />

[[File:Operation_Opera_Dan_Hadani_Archive_II.jpg|thumb|Begin at a press conference following the attack on the reactor, 10 June 1981]]
The attack took place approximately three weeks before the [[1981 Israeli legislative election|Israeli legislative election of 1981]]. Opposition leader [[Shimon Peres]] criticized the operation as a political ploy, which did not go over well with the electorate.<ref name=perryIQP>Perry, Dan. ''Israel and the Quest for Permanence''. McFarland & Co Inc., 1999. p. 46.</ref> Dan Perry writes that "the ''Osirak'' bombing—and Peres's poor political judgement in criticizing it—were crucial in turning the tide of what initially had seemed to be a hopeless election campaign for [[Likud]]".<ref name=perryIQP/> Begin responded to Peres's accusation at a Likud rally: "Jews, you have known me for forty years, since I lived in the Hassidoff neighborhood of Petah Tikva to fight for the Jewish people (a reference to Begin's incognito days in the [[Irgun]]). Would I send Jewish boys to risk death—or captivity worse than death, because those barbarians would have tortured our boys horribly—for elections?" On 30 June, Likud was reelected over Peres's [[Alignment (Israel)|Alignment]] party, winning by just one seat in the Knesset.<ref name=perryIQP/>

The US government had been caught completely off-guard by the attack. A former senior official in US intelligence told Israeli journalist [[Ronen Bergman]] that the failure to detect preparations for the attack was perceived as a grave intelligence failure within the [[United States Intelligence Community|US intelligence community]], and that it led to a special team within US intelligence being set up to investigate the failure to detect preparations for an operation of this magnitude within the Israeli Air Force, military intelligence, the Mossad, and political system.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4747949,00.html|title=NSA spying on Israel: This is how you treat your enemies|first=Ronen|last=Bergman|newspaper=Ynetnews |date=3 January 2016|via=www.ynetnews.com}}</ref>

In 2009, the Prime Minister of Iraq [[Nouri al-Maliki]] demanded that Israel compensate Iraq for the destruction of the reactor.<ref name=alalam>{{cite web|title=Iraq demands compensation from Israel|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zULTV7MD-UI |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130719184846/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zULTV7MD-UI&feature=player_embedded |archive-date=2013-07-19 |url-status=dead|publisher=[[Al-Alam News Network]]|access-date=7 December 2010|date=6 June 2009}}</ref> An Iraqi official asserted that Iraq's right to redress is supported by [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 487|Resolution 487]] adopted by the [[United Nations Security Council]] in response to the attack.<ref name=alalam/> In early 2010, ''[[The Siasat Daily]]'', citing an unnamed Iraqi parliament member, reported that Iraqi officials had received word from the [[UN Secretariat]] that the Iraqi government was entitled to seek compensation from Israel for damage caused by the attack.<ref>{{cite web|title=Iraq pursuing compensation for Israel nuke attack|url=http://www.siasat.com/english/news/iraq-pursuing-compensation-israel-nuke-attack|work=[[The Siasat Daily]]|access-date=7 December 2010|date=6 January 2010}}</ref>

==Assessment==
Israel claims that the attack impeded Iraq's nuclear ambitions by at least ten years.<ref name=council>[[Council of Europe]]. Parliamentary Assembly – Working papers – 2007 Ordinary Session (Third part) 25–29 June 2007 – Volume V (2008). p. 178.</ref> In an interview in 2005, [[Bill Clinton]] expressed support for the attack: "everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osiraq, in 1981, which, I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing. You know, it kept Saddam from developing nuclear power."<ref name="Davos2005">{{cite web|url=http://www.clintonfoundation.org/news/news-media/012705-cf-ee-cgi-usa-che-ts-interview-at-the-world-economic-forum|title=Transcript: Interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos|date=27 January 2005|publisher=The Clinton Foundation|access-date=13 March 2012}}{{dead link|date=March 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} Viewable on {{YouTube|SLqEQyyVNzI}} at 27:38.</ref> [[Louis René Beres]] wrote in 1995 that "[h]ad it not been for the brilliant raid at Osiraq, Saddam's forces might have been equipped with atomic warheads in 1991."<ref>Louis Rene Beres and Tsiddon-Chatto, Col. (res.) Yoash, "Reconsidering Israel's Destruction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor," Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 9(2), 1995. Reprinted in ''Israel's Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 7 June 1981'', Jerusalem: [[Menachem Begin Heritage Center]]: 2003, 60, quoted from [https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/osirak1.html]</ref>

In 2010, squad leader Ze'ev Raz said of the operation: "There was no doubt in the mind of the decision makers that we couldn't take a chance. We knew that the Iraqis could do exactly what we did in [[Negev Nuclear Research Center|Dimona]]."<ref>{{cite web|title=Zeev Raz|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-KRwyPP0hso |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211219/-KRwyPP0hso |archive-date=2021-12-19 |url-status=live|work=Interview with Ze'ev Raz| date=31 January 2010 |publisher=[[Leadel.net]]|access-date=24 January 2011}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

As early as the autumn of 1981, [[Kenneth Waltz]] discussed the fallout from the strike:

{{Blockquote|In striking Iraq, Israel showed that a preventive strike can be made, something that was not in doubt. Israel's act and its consequences however, make clear that the likelihood of useful accomplishment is low. Israel's strike increased the determination of Arabs to produce nuclear weapons. Arab states that may attempt to do so will now be all the more secretive and circumspect. Israel's strike, far from foreclosing Iraq's nuclear future, gained her the support of some other Arab states in pursuing it. And despite Prime Minister Begin's vow to strike as often as need be, the risks in doing so would rise with each occasion.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Waltz|first=Kenneth|title=The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better|journal=[[Adelphi Papers]]|date=Autumn 1981|volume=21|issue=171|url=http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm|access-date=10 December 2010|publisher=[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]]|location=London|doi=10.1080/05679328108457394|archive-date=1 December 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101201053554/http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref>}}

[[Charles R. H. Tripp]], in an interview for the 25th anniversary of the attack, described the bombing of ''Osirak'' as a variation of Israeli military doctrine beginning with the premiership of [[David Ben-Gurion]], "advocating devastating [[preemptive war|pre-emptive]] strikes on Arab enemies."<ref name=bbc2>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5009212.stm|work=BBC News|title=Osirak: Threats real and imagined|date=5 June 2006|access-date=20 May 2010}}</ref> Tripp asserted, "the ''Osirak'' attack is an illegal way to behave—Resolution 487 established that—but it is an understandable way to behave if you are the Israeli military-security establishment."<ref name=bbc2/>

Following the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003]], American forces captured a number of documents detailing conversations that Saddam Hussein had with his inner sanctum.<ref name="hussein">{{cite news|title=Papers From Iraqi Archive Reveal Conspiratorial Mind-Set of Hussein|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/world/middleeast/archive-offers-rare-glimpse-inside-mind-of-saddam-hussein.html |author=Gordon, Michael R.|date=25 October 2011|work=The New York Times}}</ref> In a 1982 conversation Hussein stated that, "Once Iraq walks out victorious [over Iran], there will not be any Israel." Of Israel's anti-Iraqi endeavors, Saddam noted, "Technically, they [the Israelis] are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq."<ref name=hussein/>

Tom Moriarty, a military intelligence analyst for the [[United States Air Force]], wrote in 2004 that Israel had "gambled that the strike would be within Iraq's threshold of tolerance." Moriarty argues that Iraq, already in the midst of a war with Iran, would not start a war with Israel at the same time and that its "threshold of tolerance was higher than normal."<ref name=moriarty>{{cite journal|last=Moriarty |first=Tom|title=Entering the Valley of Uncertainty: The Future of Preemptive Attack|journal=World Affairs|date=Fall 2004|volume=167|issue=2|pages=71–77|jstor=20672710|publisher=World Affairs Institute}}</ref>

[[Joseph Cirincione]], then director of non-proliferation at the [[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]], wrote in 2006:

{{Blockquote|Israel had pulled off a remarkable military raid, striking targets with great precision over long distances. But the bombing set back Israel more than Iraq. It further harmed Israel's international reputation, later worsened by the ill-fated 1982 invasion of Lebanon, while making Iraq appear a victim of Israeli aggression.<ref name=options/>}}

By contrast, Iraqi researchers have stated that the [[Iraq and weapons of mass destruction|Iraqi nuclear program]] simply went underground, diversified, and expanded.<ref name="salama">{{cite web |author1=Salama |first=Sammy |author2=Ruster |first2=Karen |name-list-style=amp |date=August 2004 |title=A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences |url=http://cns.miis.edu/stories/040812.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101110092942/http://cns.miis.edu//stories/040812.htm |archive-date=10 November 2010 |access-date=29 November 2010 |publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies}}</ref> [[Khidir Hamza]], an Iraqi nuclear scientist, made the following statement in an interview on [[CNN]]'s ''[[Crossfire (U.S. TV program)|Crossfire]]'' in 2003:

{{Blockquote|Israel—actually, what Israel [did] is that it got out the immediate danger out of the way. But it created a much larger danger in the longer range. What happened is that Saddam ordered us—we were 400 ... scientists and technologists running the program. And when they bombed that reactor out, we had also invested $400 million. And the French reactor and the associated plans were from Italy. When they bombed it out we became 7,000 with a $10 billion investment for a secret, much larger underground program to make bomb material by enriching uranium. We dropped the reactor out totally, which was the plutonium for making nuclear weapons, and went directly into enriching uranium. ... They [Israel] estimated we'd make 7&nbsp;kg [15 lb] of plutonium a year, which is enough for one bomb. And they get scared and bombed it out. Actually it was much less than this, and it would have taken a much longer time. But the program we built later in secret would make six bombs a year.<ref name=salama/>}}

Similarly, the Iraqi nuclear scientist Imad Khadduri wrote in 2003 that the bombing of ''Osirak'' convinced the Iraqi leadership to initiate a full-fledged nuclear weapons program.<ref>Khadduri, Imad. ''Iraq's Nuclear Mirage, Memoirs and Delusions''. Springhead Publishers, 2003. p. 82.</ref> United States Secretary of Defense [[William J. Perry|William Perry]] stated in 1997 that Iraq refocused its nuclear weapons effort on producing highly enriched uranium after the raid.<ref name=perryPTR/> Its interest in acquiring plutonium as fissile material for weapons continued, but at a lower priority.<ref name=perryPTR>Perry, William J. ''Proliferation: Threat and Response''. DIANE Publishing, 1996. p. 19.</ref>

In the Duelfer Report, released by the [[Iraq Survey Group]] in 2004, it is stated that the Iraqi nuclear program "expanded considerably" with the purchase of the French reactor in 1976, and that "Israel's bombing of Iraq's ''Osirak'' nuclear reactor spurred Saddam to build up Iraq's military to confront Israel in the early 1980s."<ref>{{cite book|last=Duelfer|first=Charles|title=Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (The Duelfer Report)|pages= 28 and 31|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070613050723/https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap1.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=13 June 2007|access-date=8 December 2010|chapter=Regime Strategic Incident|date=30 September 2004}}</ref>

[[Bob Woodward]], in the book ''State of Denial'', writes:

{{Blockquote|Israeli intelligence were convinced that their strike in 1981 on the ''Osirak'' nuclear reactor about {{convert|10|mi|km}} outside Baghdad had ended Saddam's program. Instead [it initiated] covert funding for a nuclear program code-named 'PC3' involving 5,000 people testing and building ingredients for a nuclear bomb.<ref>{{cite book|last=Woodward|first=Bob|year=2006|title=State of Denial|publisher=Simon & Schuster|page=[https://archive.org/details/stateofdenial00wood/page/215 215]}}</ref>}}

[[Richard K. Betts]] wrote that "there is no evidence that Israel's destruction of Osirak delayed Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The attack may actually have accelerated it."<ref name="Betts2006">{{cite journal|url=http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-osirak-fallacy-1093|last=Betts|first=Richard K.|date=1 March 2006|title=The Osirak Fallacy|journal=The National Interest|issue=83|access-date=13 March 2012}}</ref> [[Dan Reiter]] has repeatedly said<ref name=Reiter2004>{{cite journal|last=Reiter|first=Dan|date=October 2004|title=The Osiraq Myth and the Track Record of Preventive Military Attacks|journal=Policy Brief|publisher=Pittsburgh's Ridgway Center|issue=4–2|pages=1–4|url=http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/RW/ReiterPB.pdf|access-date=13 March 2012}}</ref><ref name="Reiter2005">{{cite journal|last=Reiter|first=Dan|date=July 2005|title=Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the 'Success' at Osiraq|journal=Nonproliferation Review|volume=12|issue=2|publisher=Routledge|pages=355–371|url=http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Osirak.pdf|access-date=13 March 2012|doi=10.1080/10736700500379008|s2cid=144450978}}</ref> that the attack was a dangerous failure: the bombed reactor had nothing to do with weapons research, while "the attack may have actually increased Saddam's commitment to acquiring weapons."<ref name="Reiter2005"/> In 2011, and basing herself on new Iraqi sources, Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer said that the attack: "...triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist ... a decade later Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability. This case suggests that preventive attacks can increase the long-term proliferation risk posed by the targeted state."<ref name="BHegg2011">{{cite journal|url=http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21174/revisiting_osirak.html|last=Braut-Hegghammer|first=Malfrid|date=Summer 2011|title=Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks|journal=International Security|volume=36|issue=1|pages=101–132|access-date=13 March 2012|doi=10.1162/isec_a_00046|s2cid=57564983|archive-date=4 July 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120704192053/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21174/revisiting_osirak.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> Elsewhere, she wrote:

{{blockquote|The destruction of the Osiraq reactor did not delay the development of a nuclear weapons option because it [the reactor] was never intended to be part of such an effort. The French-supplied facility was subject to rigorous safeguards and designed to ensure that Iraq would not be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium. An examination of the reactor by Harvard physicist Richard Wilson after the attack concluded that the facility was not suited for production of weapons-grade plutonium. As a result, the attack did not reduce the risk that Iraq would develop nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it brought about a far more determined and focused effort to acquire nuclear weapons.<ref name="BHegg HuffPo">{{cite web|url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malfrid-brauthegghammer/can-an-attack-deny-iran-t_b_572162.html|title=Can an Attack Deny Iran the Bomb?|author=Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer|date=11 May 2011|work=The Huffington Post|access-date=13 March 2012}}</ref>}}

Following [[Gulf War|Desert Storm]], [[Dick Cheney]], then the United States Secretary of Defense, thanked the Israeli mission commander for the "outstanding job he did on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981".  While many scholars debate the value of the bombing, Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons at the outbreak of the Gulf War, and, according to Cheney, the bombing made Desert Storm easier.<ref>Mitchell Bard, [http://blogs.britannica.com/2010/03/israeli-attack-on-iraqi-reactor-offers-history-lesson-for-obama/ Israeli Attack on Iraqi Reactor Offers History Lesson for Obama] ({{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402133700/http://blogs.britannica.com/2010/03/israeli-attack-on-iraqi-reactor-offers-history-lesson-for-obama/ |date=2 April 2015 }}), 16 March 2010, Encyclopædia Britannica Blog</ref>

The second use of the [[Begin Doctrine]] was [[Operation Outside the Box|Operation Orchard]] in 2007, an Israeli airstrike on a purported [[Syrian]] nuclear target. Like in Operation Opera, the same types of aircraft were involved, although their roles were reversed with the [[F-15E Strike Eagle#F-15I|F-15Is]] carrying bombs while the [[F-16I]]s provided escort.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2018-03-21 |title=Ending a decade of silence, Israel confirms it blew up Assad's nuclear reactor |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/ending-a-decade-of-silence-israel-reveals-it-blew-up-assads-nuclear-reactor/ |access-date=2018-03-21 |work=The Times of Israel}}</ref>

==See also==
* [[France–Iraq relations]]
* [[French support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War]]
* [[Iraq–Israel relations]]
* [[Nuclear weapons and Israel]]
* [[Operation Entebbe]]
* [[Operation Gift]]
* [[Operation Orchard]]&nbsp;– a 2007 Israeli airstrike on a purported [[Syrian]] nuclear target
* [[Operation Wooden Leg]]&nbsp;– the Israeli Air Force's raid on [[Tunisia]]
* [[Stuxnet]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Bibliography==
{{Refbegin|60em}}
* Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, Uri Bar-Joseph, ''Two Minutes Over Baghdad'', {{ISBN|978-0-7146-8347-8}}
* Geoff Simons, ''Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam'', {{ISBN|978-1-4039-1770-6}}
* [[Gary D. Solis]], ''The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War'', {{ISBN|978-0-521-87088-7}}
* United Nations Staff, ''Yearbook of the United Nations 1981'', {{ISBN|978-0-8002-3756-1}}
* ''The 1982 World Book Year Book'', {{ISBN|978-0-7166-0482-2}}
* [[Anthony Cordesman]], ''Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction'', {{ISBN|978-0-275-96528-0}}
* Bennett Ramberg, ''Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy: An Unrecognized Military Peril'', {{ISBN|978-0-520-04969-7}}
* Sasha Polakow-Suransky, ''The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa'', {{ISBN|978-0-375-42546-2}}
* [[Trita Parsi]], ''Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States'', {{ISBN|978-0-300-12057-8}}
* Israel Stockman-Shomron, ''Israel, the Middle East and the Great Powers'', {{ISBN|978-965-287-000-1}}
* Henry Shue, David Rhodin, ''Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification'', {{ISBN|978-0-19-923313-7}}
* [[Elaine Sciolino]], ''The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the War in the Gulf'', {{ISBN|978-0-471-54299-5}}
* Shirley V. Scott, Anthony Billingsley, Christopher Michaelsen, ''International Law and the Use of Force: A Documentary and Reference Guide'', {{ISBN|978-0-313-36259-0}}
* Dan Perry, ''Israel and the Quest for Permanence'', {{ISBN|978-0-7864-0645-6}}
* Shlomo Aloni, ''Israeli F-15 Eagle Units in Combat'', {{ISBN|978-1-84603-047-5}}
* Fred Holroyd, ''Thinking about nuclear weapons: analyses and prescriptions'', {{ISBN|978-0-7099-3775-3}}
* Richard C. Ragaini, ''International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies: 29th session'', {{ISBN|978-981-238-586-4}}
* David Styan, ''France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East'', {{ISBN|978-1-84511-045-1}}
* Leonard Spector, ''Proliferation Today'', {{ISBN|978-0-394-72901-5}}
* Dan McKinnon, ''Bullseye Iraq'', {{ISBN|978-0-425-11259-5}}
* [[Patrick Seale]], ''Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East'', {{ISBN|978-0-520-06976-3}}
* Allan D. Abbey, ''Journey of Hope: The Story of Ilan Ramon, Israel's First Astronaut'', {{ISBN|978-965-229-316-9}}
* Trevor Dupuy, Paul Martell, ''Flawed Victory: Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon'', {{ISBN|978-0-915979-07-3}}
* Ofira Seliktar, ''Divided We Stand: American Jews, Israel, and the Peace Process'', {{ISBN|978-0-275-97408-4}}
* Peter A. Clausen, ''Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons'', {{ISBN|978-0-06-501395-5}}
* David Krieger, ''The challenge of abolishing nuclear weapons'', {{ISBN|978-1-4128-1036-4}}
* [[Seymour Hersh]], ''[[The Samson Option (book)|The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy]]'', {{ISBN|978-0-679-74331-6}}
* Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, ''Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspectives on the Use of Force and the War on Terror'', {{ISBN|978-0-7546-4407-1}}
* H. H. A. Cooper, ''Terrorism and espionage in the Middle East: deception, displacement and denial'', {{ISBN|978-0-7734-5866-6}}
* Barry Leonard, [http://www.dianepublishing.net/Technology_Transfer_to_the_Middle_East_p/1428923837.htm ''Technology Transfer to the Middle East''],
* Sharad S. Chauhan, ''War on Iraq'', {{ISBN|978-81-7648-478-7}}
* [[Bob Woodward]], ''[[State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III]]'', {{ISBN|978-0-7432-7223-0}}
* Imad Khadduri, ''Iraq's Nuclear Mirage, Memoirs and Delusions'', {{ISBN|978-0-9733790-0-6}}
* Karl P. Mueller, ''Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy'', {{ISBN|978-0-8330-3881-4}}
* Shai Feldman, ''Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East'', {{ISBN|978-0-262-56108-2}}
{{Refend}}

== Further reading ==
* {{cite book|last1=Avner|first1=Yehuda|author-link1=Yehuda Avner|title=[[The Prime Ministers|The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership]]|date=2010|publisher=[[Toby Press]]|isbn=978-1-59264-278-6|oclc=758724969}}
* Rodger Claire, ''Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb'', {{ISBN|978-0-7679-1400-0}}
* Steven E. Lobell (2020) "[[doi:10.1080/01402390.2020.1837116|Why Israel launched a preventive military strike on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program (1981): The fungibility of power resources]]". ''Journal of Strategic Studies''
* Timothy L. H. McCormack, ''Self-Defense in International Law: The Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor'', {{ISBN|978-0-312-16279-5}}
* Dan McKinnon (1987), ''Bullseye One Reactor'', {{ISBN|978-0-941437-07-3}}
* Dan McKinnon (1987), ''Bullseye Iraq'' {{ISBN|978-0-425-11259-5}}

==External links==
{{commons category}}
{{Spoken Wikipedia|En-OperationOpera-article.ogg|date=2017-12-19}}
* {{YouTube|LbMeaKTjGjE|HUD video recording from two F-16s, including hit of two bombs at 1:07}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070607210648/http://www.americanheritage.com/places/articles/web/20060607-israel-iraq-nuclear-weapons-baghdad-saddam-hussein-alexander-haig-menachem-begin-osirak-preemptive-strike.shtml Attack on Iraq’s Nuke Plant], ''[[American Heritage (magazine)|American Heritage]]''
* [https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq.htm Osiraq / Tammuz I], [[Federation of American Scientists]]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060214200101/http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/Adobefiles/A961-Isr.pdf Israel's Air Strike Against The Osiraq Reactor: A Retrospective], ''Temple International and Comparative Law Journal''
* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4774733.stm Osirak: Over the reactor], [[BBC News]], 5 June 2006 (interview with pilots involved)
* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5020778.stm Factfile: How Osirak was bombed], BBC News
* [http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/sites/English/Exhibitions/Pages/Operation-Opera.aspx Operation Opera: the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear Reactor] ({{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201027161235/http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/sites/English/Exhibitions/Pages/Operation-Opera.aspx |date=27 October 2020 }}) – Exhibition in the IDF & Defense establishment archives
* [http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss4/8 Operation Opera: An Ambiguous Success], ''Journal of Strategic Studies''
* [https://archive.org/details/TheIsraeliAggressionAgainstThePeacefulNuclearInstallationsInIraq The Israeli aggression against the peaceful nuclear installations in Iraq : statement made by Dr. Sa'adoun Hammadi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, before the Security Council, 12 June 1981]

{{Arab-Israeli Conflict}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Opera 1981}}
[[Category:Military operations of the Iran–Iraq War in 1981]]
[[Category:Military operations of the Arab–Israeli conflict]]
[[Category:Airstrikes in Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War]]
[[Category:1981 in international relations]]
[[Category:1981 in aviation]]
[[Category:1981 in Israel]]
[[Category:1981 building bombings]]
[[Category:Building bombings in Iraq]]
[[Category:Airstrikes conducted by Israel]]
[[Category:Mossad operations]]
[[Category:Military history of Diyala Governorate]]
[[Category:Iraq–Israel relations]]
[[Category:France–Iraq relations]]
[[Category:France–Israel relations]]
[[Category:June 1981 in Asia]]
[[Category:Nuclear technology in Iraq]]
[[Category:Military nuclear accidents and incidents]]
[[Category:Foreign relations during the Iran–Iraq War]]
[[Category:20th century in Diyala Governorate]]