View source for Operation Chengiz Khan

{{Short description|Pakistan Air Force operation during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict          = Operation Chengiz Khan
| image             ={{Location map+ | India
| width = 350
| caption = 
| places =
  {{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Amritsar]]
    | position = right
    | lat_deg = 31.63
    | lon_deg = 74.87 }}
  {{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Ambala]]
    | position = bottom
    | lat_deg = 30.37
    | lon_deg = 76.78 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Agra]]
    | lat_deg = 27.17
    | lon_deg = 78.00 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Awantipur]]
    | lat_deg = 33.92
    | lon_deg = 75.01 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Bikaner]]
    | lat_deg = 28.02
    | lon_deg = 73.31 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Halwara]]
    | lat_deg = 30.73
    | lon_deg = 75.63 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Jodhpur]]
    | lat_deg = 26.23
    | lon_deg = 73.02 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Jaisalmer]]
    | lat_deg = 26.91
    | lon_deg = 71.90 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Pathankot]]
    | lat_deg = 32.27
    | lon_deg = 75.65 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Bhuj]]
    | lat_deg = 23.24
    | lon_deg = 69.66 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Srinagar]]
    | position = left
    | lat_deg = 34.08
    | lon_deg = 74.79 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Uttarlai]]
    | position = bottom
    | lat_deg = 25.81
    | lon_deg = 71.48 }}
{{Location map~ | India
    | label = [[Faridkot, Punjab|Faridkot]]
    | position = left
    | lat_deg = 30.67
    | lon_deg = 74.75 }}
}}

| caption           = Locations of airstrikes carried out by the [[Pakistan Air Force]]
| partof            = the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]]
| date              = 3 December 1971
| place             = 11 Forward airfields<ref name=Hiro>{{cite book |last=Hiro |first=Dilip |author-link=Dilip Hiro |title=Apocalyptic Realm: Jihadists in South Asia |year=2012 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-17378-9 |page=143}}</ref>
| result = Pakistani failure<ref name="Ganguly 2002">{{Cite book |last=Ganguly |first=Sumit |author-link=Sumit Ganguly |title=Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 |date=April 2002 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-50740-0 |page=67}}</ref>
* Formal commencement of the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]]<ref name=Riedel>{{cite book |last=Riedel |first=Bruce O. |author-link=Bruce Riedel |title=Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad |year=2012 |publisher=Brookings Institution |isbn=978-0-8157-2274-8 |page=10}}</ref>
| combatant1        = {{flagicon|India|size=24px}} [[India]]
* {{air force|India}}
| combatant2        = {{flagicon|Pakistan|size=24px}} [[Pakistan]]
* {{air force|Pakistan}}
| commander1        = {{flagicon image|Flag of Indian Air Chief Marshal 1950-1980.svg}} [[Pratap Chandra Lal]]
| commander2        = {{flagicon image|Pakistani Air Force Ensign.svg}} [[Abdur Rahim Khan]]<br> {{flagicon image|Pakistani Air Force Ensign.svg}} [[Patrick Desmond Callaghan|P. D. Callaghan]]<br>{{flagicon image|Pakistani Air Force Ensign.svg}} [[Eric Gordon Hall]]<br> {{flagicon image|Pakistani Air Force Ensign.svg}} [[Sharbat Ali Changezi]]
| strength1         = [[Anti-Aircraft Warfare|Anti-aircraft guns]] <br /> [[Surface-to-air missile|SAM]] missiles
| strength2         = [[#The first strikes|36 aircraft]] in first two waves <br /> [[#Followup counter-air strikes|15 aircraft]] in a third wave
| casualties1       = No material damage to most of the IAF airfields, with only the runways at Amritsar getting cratered and a radar station destroyed.<ref name="Nordeen1985" /> Most airfields repaired within same night.<ref name=lal />
| casualties2       = 4 aircraft shot down<ref name="Nordeen1985" />
}}

{{Campaignbox Indo-Pakistani War of 1971}}
{{Campaignbox Indo-Pakistani Wars}}
'''Operation Chengiz Khan''' was the code name assigned to the preemptive strikes carried out by the [[Pakistani Air Force]] (PAF) on the [[Forward operating base|forward airbases]] and [[radar]] installations of the [[Indian Air Force]] (IAF) on the evening of 3 December 1971, and marked the formal initiation of hostilities of the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]]. The operation targeted 11 of India's airfields and also included artillery strikes on Indian positions in [[Kashmir]]. The targets were the Indian Airbases of Amritsar, Ambala, Agra, Awantipur, Bikaner, Halwara, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Pathankot, Bhuj, Srinagar and Uttarlai and air defence radars at Amritsar and Faridkot.

Not withstanding the multiplicity of targets, the Pakistani air strikes were ineffectual and failed to inflict any material damage to the IAF air fields, only cratering the runways at Amritsar and destroying a radar station.<ref name="Nordeen1985" /><ref name="Taylor & Francis">{{Cite book |last=Batabyal |first=Guru Saday. |title=Politico-Military Strategy of the Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971 |date=20 December 2020 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-000-31766-4 |edition=illustrated |page=17}}</ref> The PAF reportedly lost four aircraft during the raid.<ref name="Nordeen1985">{{Cite book |last=Nordeen |first=Lon O. |title=Air warfare in the missile age |url=http://archive.org/details/airwarfareinmiss00nord |url-access=registration |year=1985 |publisher=Smithsonian Institution Press |isbn=978-0-87474-680-8 |page=96}}</ref>

In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, then Indian Prime Minister [[Indira Gandhi]] held the air strikes to be a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded with initial air strikes the same night, which were expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning. Statements released by both nations the next day confirmed the "existence of a state of war between the two countries", although neither government formally issued a [[declaration of war]].

==Background==
{{main|Bangladesh Liberation War}}

In March 1971, [[East Pakistan]] (now [[Bangladesh]]) [[Bangladesh declaration of independence|declared independence]] from [[Pakistan]], starting the [[Bangladesh Liberation War]] following rising political discontent and [[cultural nationalism]] among the people of East Pakistan and the brutal suppressive force from West Pakistan in response (see [[Operation Searchlight]] and [[1971 Bangladesh atrocities]]).<ref name= genwatch>{{cite web
| publisher = Gendercide watch
|url=http://www.gendercide.org/case_bangladesh.html
| title=Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971.
| access-date=2008-07-04
}}</ref><ref name= rule>{{cite web
| publisher = Country Studies Bangladesh
|url=http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/21.htm
| title=Emerging Discontent, 1966–70.
| access-date=2008-07-04
}}</ref>

Pakistan came under increasing criticism<ref name= Donaldson>{{Harvnb|Donaldson|1972|p=}}</ref> from India, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Europe as the plight of the refugees and their impact on the Indian economy were highlighted by Indira Gandhi in the UN and on a number of global tours.<ref name=Times13>{{cite magazine
|magazine=Time
|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,910155-2,00.html
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071011034833/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,910155-2,00.html
|url-status=dead
|archive-date=11 October 2007
| title=India and Pakistan: Over the Edge
| access-date=2008-07-04
| date=1971-12-13
}}</ref> However, the United States and China showed little interest in the situation and actively opposed aid, intervention or support to the [[Mukti Bahini]]<ref name= Banglapedia>{{cite book |last=Sheren |first=Syeda Momtaz |year=2012 |chapter=War of Liberation, The |chapter-url=http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=War_of_Liberation,_The |editor1-last=Islam |editor1-first=Sirajul |editor1-link=Sirajul Islam |editor2-last=Jamal |editor2-first=Ahmed A. |title=Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh |edition=Second |publisher=[[Asiatic Society of Bangladesh]]}}</ref><ref name= Nixon>Remarks of President Richard M Nixon on 10 April 1971 at State Department signing of Biological Weapons Convention.

<blockquote> Every Great Power must follow the principle that it should not directly or indirectly allow any other nation to use force or armed aggression against one of its neighbors.</blockquote>.

USIS Text, pp 1–2.</ref> (possibly fearing advancement of Soviet influence deep into South Asia<ref name=Donaldson/>). India's aid to the Mukti Bahini continued unabated, and fighting between the Mukti Bahini and the Pakistani forces grew increasingly vicious. On 9 August 1971, India signed a [[Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation|twenty-year cooperation treaty]] with the Soviet Union<ref name= Kapur>{{Harvnb|Kapur|1972|p=}}</ref> in which each promised military support to the other in the event it was attacked. This provided India cover against any possible Chinese or American intervention in aid of Pakistan if it went to war with India. To the Pakistani leadership, it became clear that armed Indian intervention and secession of East Pakistan was becoming inevitable.<ref name=TIME20/>

==The strategy of pre-emption==
{{more citations needed section|date=January 2015}}
By October 1971, the Mukti Bahini had started launching massive raids deep into East Pakistan, with active support from the Indian Army beginning in November.<ref name= BanglapediaMuktiBahini>{{cite book 
|last=Ahmed |first=Helal Uddin |year=2012 
|chapter=Mukti Bahini 
|chapter-url=http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Mukti_Bahini 
|editor1-last=Islam |editor1-first=Sirajul |editor1-link=Sirajul Islam |editor2-last=Jamal |editor2-first=Ahmed A. |title=Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh |edition=Second |publisher=[[Asiatic Society of Bangladesh]]}}</ref> The situation had deteriorated to a state of active [[undeclared war]] in the East by the end of November, when [[Indian Army|Indian]] and Mukti Bahini forces launched offensives on both the eastern and western borders of East Pakistan. Regular Indian Army troops engaged and mauled Pakistani armour [[Battle of Garibpur|at Garibpur]],<ref name=SainikSamachar>{{cite web
| author = Col. Anil Shorey
| publisher = Sainik Samachar, Indian Ministry of Defence
|url=http://mod.nic.in/samachar/april15-02/html/ch3.htm
| title= The Unique Battle of Garibpur. Sainik Samachar Vol.49, No.8, 16–30 April 2002
| access-date=2008-07-04
}}</ref> during which the two intruding Pakistan Air Force jets were shot down and another badly damaged in the [[Battle of Boyra]] while offensive manoeuvres were launched in [[Battle of Atgram|Atgram]] against Pakistani border posts and communications centres along the eastern border. The Mukti Bahini also launched an offensive on Jessore at this time.<ref name= LOC>{{cite web
| publisher = Library of Congress Country Studies.
|url=http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pk0032)
| title= Pakistan: Yahya Khan and Bangladesh
| access-date=2008-07-04
}}</ref> It was clear to [[Islamabad]] by this time that open conflict was inevitable, and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run.{{citation needed|date=December 2024}} [[Yahya Khan]] chose at this point to try to protect Pakistan's integrity and to hold India by [[Ayub Khan (Field Marshal)|Ayub Khan]]'s strategy – ''"The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West"''.<ref name=Faruqui>{{Harvnb|Faruqui|2001|p=}}</ref>

This policy made the assumptions that an open conflict with India would not last long due to international pressure, and since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. To this end, General. [[Tikka Khan]] had proposed an offensive into India, and the PAF's overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive.{{Citation needed|date=May 2012}} The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of [[air dominance]] by the PAF under which Khan's troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into [[Western India]] before digging in and consolidating their positions. In order to achieve air dominance, Pakistan decided to launch an [[offensive counter air]] strike codenamed ''Operation Chengiz Khan'' on Indian airbases.

A second objective for the PAF was to conduct [[air interdiction]] against the supply routes for the Indian troops opposing Khan's proposed offensive, but these were accorded as secondary targets to be engaged after the operation started.{{Citation needed|date=May 2012}}

The PAF's strikes were based on the same strategy of pre-emptive neutralization of enemy air capability used by the [[Israeli Air Force]] against Egyptian and Arab air forces in [[Operation Focus]] during the [[Six-Day War]] of 1967.<ref name= acig>{{cite web
| author =Tom Cooper, with Syed Shaiz Ali
| publisher =Air Combat Information Group
|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_330.shtml
|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120717035936/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_330.shtml
|url-status=usurped
|archive-date=July 17, 2012
| title=India – Pakistan War, 1971; Western Front, part I
| access-date=2008-07-04
}}</ref><ref name= iaf>{{cite web
| publisher=Indian Air Force
| url=http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=71
| title=The War of December 1971
| access-date=2008-07-04
| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090410000055/http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=71
| archive-date=2009-04-10
| url-status=dead
}}</ref>

The decision to hit India with a pre-emptive air strike was taken on 30 November 1971 during a meeting among the Pakistani President, General [[Yahya Khan]], [[Chief of Army Staff (Pakistan)|Chief of Army Staff]] General [[Abdul Hamid Khan (general)|Abdul Hamid Khan]], and the Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. [[Gul Hassan Khan]].

The objectives of the strike were:<ref>{{Cite news |date=2021-12-13 |title=1971 war: How IAF's air superiority helped in the early fall of Dhaka |url=https://www.firstpost.com/india/1971-war-how-iafs-air-superiority-helped-in-the-early-fall-of-dhaka-10205231.html |access-date=2024-12-18 |work=Firstpost |language=en-us}}</ref>
*To surprise the IAF by attacking its [[forward airfield]]s when it was least expected.
*To neutralize these in order to obtain at least temporary battlefield [[air superiority]] in the West.
*To counter-balance the Indian numerical advantage by hitting the [[forward operating base]]s of the Indian Air Force as a measure reducing the weight of expected counterattacks on PAF's own bases.

To achieve surprise, the decision was made to strike on a Friday, the day of the ''[[jumu'ah]]'' ([[Muslim Sabbath]]), at 17:45 hrs when shifts in IAF control centers were changing. Emulating its operations' experience in battle against the Indian Air Force during the [[Indo-Pakistani Conflict of 1965]], the decision was made to hit the Indian bases in a two-wave dusk strike followed by a number of night-interdiction missions through the night.<ref name= acig/> The plans for the strike also anticipated the Indians securing their aircraft in [[blast pen]]s.{{Citation needed|date=May 2012}} Also, anticipating difficulty in target acquisition for camouflaged targets such as fuel tanks, ammunition dumps and command centers, the primary objectives set for the operation were the runways and air defense radars.{{Citation needed|date=May 2012}}

=== The II Corps offensive into Punjab ===
Under Chengiz Khan, Pakistan's II Corps offensive plan involved driving east from the vicinity of [[Bahawalnagar]] to cross the international border and push towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana in India's "Foxtrot Sector" or "F Sector."<ref name="Gill2003">{{Cite book |last=Gill |first=John H. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=m2q6SgAACAAJ |title=An Atlas of the 1971 India - Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh |date=2003 |publisher=National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies |pages= |language=en |quote=}}</ref>

While describing the situation in the "F sector" of India, John H. Gill writes:
{{Blockquote|text=With poor dispositions and inept leadership, India's 67 Brigade lost a significant parcel of land to Pakistan's 105 Brigade despite repeated and costly counterattacks. Fortunately for India, indecision on the part of Pakistan's high command kept its potentially powerful II Corps from executing a planned offensive against India's "Foxtrot Sector"
(or simply "F Sector").|author=}}
The II Corps offensive plan called for 105 Brigade and 25 Brigade to come under II Corps, while IV Corps advanced from its positions along the Ravi.<ref name="Gill2003" />

The PAF had also positioned mobile radar and pre-stocked forward airfields in the proposed battle area to support the planned attack.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shah |first=Mansoor |url=https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/647248 |title=The gold bird: Pakistan and its Air Force--observations of a pilot |date=2002 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-579772-5 |location=Oxford; New York}}</ref>

Army headquarters ordered II Corps to shift to its forward assembly areas on 14 December and major elements of 1 Armored Division began to move the following day, while the 7 Division was also concentrating south of the Sutlej. However, by now, a major part of II Corps, 33 Division, had been broken up to reinforce Pakistani units against Indian offensives elsewhere.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Khan |first=Jahan Dad |url=https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/1473653 |title=Pakistan leadership challenges |date=1999 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-577990-5 |location=Oxford}}</ref>

Thus, the II Corps offensive was deprived of approximately one third of its striking power before it had even begun.

On 16 December, Army headquarters issued new orders "freezing all movements" until further notice. Trains carrying equipment of 1 Division were unloaded, and II Corps, with its units on both sides of the Sutlej, settled in to await orders. If the operation had proceeded as planned, the corps would likely have launched their attack in the early morning of 17 December. However, due to the "freeze" order, they remained on the Pakistan side of the border and were unable to cross before the cease-fire came into effect at 2000 hours on the same day.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Candeth |first=K. P. |author-link=Kunhiraman Palat Candeth |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/45399558 |title=The Western front : Indo-Pakistan war, 1971 |date=1997 |publisher=English Book Depot |isbn=81-85567-35-2 |location=Dehra Dun, India |oclc=45399558}}</ref>

Pakistan's failure to launch the offensive in a timely manner has generated great controversy among subsequent commentators.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Gill |first=John H. |title=An Atlas of the 1971 India - Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=m2q6SgAACAAJ |year=2003 |publisher=National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies |page=55}}</ref>

==The first strikes==
The final orders for the strike were issued at 17:30 hrs on Friday 3 December 1971. The first formations were in flight and heading for their targets by 17:40 hrs. Officially, it was announced via government channels that the airstrikes were launched in response to attacks along the western border on [[Pakistan Rangers]]' outposts by regular troops of the [[Indian army]], which the Indian Air Force was providing support to.<ref name=Times13/> The Indians would later deny any engagement on the Western Front.<ref name= Times13/> However, the Indian air defence radars failed to detect the approaching formations. The first indications for the Indians of the impending assault was the roar of the strike aircraft over their airfields,<ref name= acig/> while in Delhi, the air-raid sirens were the first indications for newsmen, gathered for the daily brief of the East-Pakistan situation, that something was going on.<ref name= Times13/>

The first of the strikes were mounted against [[Pathankot Air Force Station|Pathankot Airbase]]. Led by a flight of two [[Dassault Mirage III|Mirage III]]s (a reconnaissance craft and a strike escort)<ref name="acig" /> a six-plane wing of [[Canadair F-86 Sabre|F-86F Sabre]]s flying from Murid and led by [[Wing Commander (rank)|Wing Commander]] S N Jilani hit the airbase with unguided rockets and dropped several 125&nbsp;kg bombs. The main target of this strike was the runway, which was damaged and took the Indian ground crew several hours to repair. These missions went unopposed since the IAF had not scrambled any interception, and faced only [[Anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft fire]]. Pathankot was covered by interceptors from Adampur following this first strike during the time it took the ground crew to repair its runway.<ref name="lal">"My years with the IAF" by Air Chief Marshal P C Lal</ref>

At 17:45 hrs, four Mirages flying from [[Sargodha]] and led by Wing Commander Hakimullah attacked [[Amritsar Air Force Station|Amritsar Airbase]].{{Citation needed|date=May 2012}} Hakimullah's flight was armed with two 500&nbsp;kg bombs each, which the strike used efficiently hitting the first 300m of the runway and cratering it enough to leave it nonoperational for several hours.<ref name="Lal">{{Harvnb|Lal|1986|p=}}</ref><ref name="Lon O. Nordeen">{{cite book |title=Air Warfare in the Missile Age |url=https://archive.org/details/airwarfareinmiss00nord |url-access=registration |year=1985 |publisher=Smithsonian Institution Press |isbn=978-0-85368-751-1 |page=[https://archive.org/details/airwarfareinmiss00nord/page/96 96] |author=Lon O. Nordeen}}</ref> However, the Amritsar runway was repaired within the same night to receive detachments of [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|Mig 21s]] and [[Sukhoi Su-7|Su-7]] that flew against [[PAF Base Rafiqui|Rafiqui airbase]] the next morning. A second strike of two [[F-104 Starfighter]]s, led by Wing Commander Amjad H Khan hit the P-35 radar station at Amritsar, rendering it inoperable for nearly an hour. Two Sukhois then took off from the one remaining serviceable lane of the runway, moments before it was bombed by a passing [[Martin B-57 Canberra|B-57 Canberra]].<ref name="lal" />

Within forty-five minutes of these strikes, Pakistani troops had shelled India's western frontier and were reported to have crossed the border at Punch in the state of Jammu.<ref name=Times13/>

==Followup counter-air strikes==
The third wave of the PAF counter air strikes were directed to strike [[Ambala]], [[Agra]] and [[Halwara]] around 18:00 hrs and continued in single or two-plane formations through the evening until at least 22:30 hrs. These strikes involved fifteen [[B-57 Canberra]]s, four [[T-33 Shooting Star|T-33]]s, and one [[C-130]]. The B-57s flew seven single-plane sorties. These caused significant damage, especially in [[Barmer, Rajasthan|Uttarlai]], and [[Halwara]] and impeded IAF's preparation [[#The Indian retaliation|for retaliation]].

[[Ambala Air Force Station|Ambala Airbase]] was a hit by a two plane B-57 formation led by Wg. Cdr. Rais Rafi. The flight hit the runway with eight bombs, causing minor damage.

Like Ambala, [[Agra Airport|Agra Airbase]], which lay deepest among the PAF's targets that evening, was struck by a two-plane B-57 formation led by Wg. Cdr. Yunus and followed by Flight Lieutenant Mazhar Bukhari. The bombs dropped by Yunus did not explode. Rais Rafi explained the old age of the bombs as the reason for their ineffectiveness as these were supposed to be used in the Second World War.<ref name="Rais Ahmed Rafi">{{cite book |title=PAF Bomber Operations 1965 and 1971 Wars |publisher=PAF Book Club |pages=105–106 |author=Rais Ahmed Rafi}}</ref> The first Indian counter strikes launched that very night included the [[English Electric Canberra|Canberra]]s of No.5 Sqn based at Agra.{{citation needed|date=December 2024}}

Sirsa was hit by Sqn. Ldr. Alvi with bombs equipped with time-delayed fuses, damaging the runway heavily and forcing the runway to be closed for the rest of the night.<ref name="Lal" />

Four [[T-33 Shooting Star|T-33s]] from A-Flight No.2 Squadron, led by Sqn. Ldr. Qureshi, hit [[Uttarlai Air Force Station|Uttarlai]], causing damage to the runway. These were launched at the same time as the [[#Srinagar|second strike over Srinagar]]. Uttarlai was attacked a second time later that night by Wg. Cdr. Akhtar. The net damage to the runway was significant enough to keep the runway closed for six days and for the [[taxiway]] to be used instead.<ref name="lal" />

In the south, Sqn. Ldr. Ishtak Qureshi's bombs hit the underground power cable at [[Jaisalmer]], cutting off the power supply and telephone connection for six hours. At the same time, [[Jodhpur]] was hit by two B-57s led by Sqn. Ldr. Sohail Mansur while [[Jamnagar]] was hit by Flt. Lt. Ejaz Azam.<ref name="lal" />

==The Indian retaliation==
{{see also|East Pakistan Air Operations}}

As Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addressed the nation on radio shortly after midnight<ref name= BBC>{{cite news
|publisher=BBC
|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/3/newsid_2519000/2519133.stm
| title=Pakistan intensifies air raids on India
| access-date=2008-07-04
 | date=1971-12-03}}</ref> informing about the Pakistani attack, the [[Indian Air Force]] struck back. By 21:00hrs, the [[B-57 Canberra|Canberra]]s of the [[No. 35 sqn|No.35 Squadron]] and [[No. 106 Squadron IAF|No.106 Squadron]], as well as No.5 and No.16 squadron were armed and ready for attacks deep into Pakistan. These flew against eight Western Pakistani airbases: [[PAF Base Murid|Murid]], [[PAF Base M.M. Alam|Mianwali]], [[PAF Base Mushaf|Sargodha]], [[Chandhar Air Force Base|Chandhar]], Risalewala, [[PAF Base Rafiqui|Rafiqui]], and [[PAF Base Masroor|Masroor]]. In total, 23 combat [[sortie]]s were launched that night, inflicting heavy damage to Sargodha and Masroor airbases.<ref name=acig/> The PAF units stationed on these airfields had to operate from taxiways for the following two days.

Through the night the Indian Air Force also [[East Pakistan Air Operations#3–4 December|struck the main East Pakistani airfields]] of [[Tejgaon Airport|Tejgaon]], and later [[Shahjalal International Airport|Kurmitola]]. At the same time, the Indian Air Force was deploying additional aircraft to its forward airfields for the strikes that were to follow the next morning. Within days, India was able to achieve air superiority.<ref name= TIME20>{{cite magazine
|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878969,00.html
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070112032245/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878969,00.html
|url-status=dead
|archive-date=12 January 2007
| title=Bangladesh: Out of War, a Nation Is Born |magazine=Time |volume=98 |issue=25
| access-date=2008-07-04
| date=1971-12-20
}}</ref>

==Analysis==
Of its stated objectives, the PAF was unable to neutralize the Indian Air Force in the west,<ref name= Times13/> which on its part had dispersed its aircraft in hardened aircraft shelters, suffering only minor damage to a few aircraft.<ref name="Pradeep P. Barua">{{cite book |title=The State at War in South Asia |url=https://archive.org/details/stateatwarsoutha00baru |url-access=limited |year=2005 |publisher=University of Nebraska Press |isbn=0-8032-1344-1 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/stateatwarsoutha00baru/page/n240 222]–223 |author=Pradeep P. Barua}}</ref>

As ''[[Newsweek]]'' magazine (1971) described the attack: <blockquote>Trying to catch the Indian Air Force napping, Yahya Khan, launched a Pakistani version of Israel's 1967 air blitz in hopes that one rapid attack would cripple India's far superior air power. But India was alert, Pakistani pilots were inept, and Yahya's strategy of scattering his thin air force over a dozen air fields was a bust!<ref>{{Cite book |last=Singh |first=Mandeep |title=Anti-Aircraft Artillery in Combat, 1950–1972: Air Defence in the Jet Age |publisher=Air World |year=2020 |page=208}}</ref></blockquote>

== See also ==
* [[Timeline of the Bangladesh Liberation War]]
* [[Military plans of the Bangladesh Liberation War]]
* [[Mitro Bahini order of battle]]
* [[Pakistan Army order of battle, December 1971]]
* [[Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan]]

==References==
{{reflist}}

==Further reading==
*{{Citation
 | surname1 = Donaldson
 | given1 = Robert H.
 | date = June 1972
 | title = India: The Soviet Stake in Stability
 | doi = 10.2307/2643045
 | journal = Asian Survey
 | publisher = University of California Press
 | volume = 12 | issue = 6 | pages = 475–492
 | issn = 0004-4687
 | jstor = 2643045
}}.
*{{Citation
 | surname1 = Kapur
 | given1 = Ashok
 | date = June 1972
 | title = Indo-Soviet Treaty and the Emerging Asian Balance
 | doi = 10.2307/2643044
 | journal = Asian Survey
 | publisher = University of California Press
 | volume = 12 | issue = 6 | pages = 463–474
 | issn = 0004-4687
 | jstor = 2643044
}}.
*{{Citation
 | surname1 = Lal
 | given1 = Pratap Chandra
 | year = 1986
 | title = My Years with the IAF
 | publisher = Casemate Pub & Book Dist Llc
 | isbn = 978-81-7062-008-2}}.
*{{Citation
 | surname1 = Faruqui
 | given1 = A
 | year = 2001
 | title = Failure in Command: Lessons from Pakistan's Indian Wars, 1947–1999. Defense and Security Analysis, Volume 17, Number 1, 1 April 2001, pp. 31–40(10)
 | journal = Defense & Security Analysis
 | publisher = Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group
 | issn = 1475-1798
}}.

{{1971 Indo-Pak War}}
{{Military of Pakistan}}

{{coord missing|Pakistan}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Chengiz Khan 1971}}
[[Category:Military operations of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971]]
[[Category:Airstrikes conducted by Pakistan]]
[[Category:Airstrikes during the Indo-Pakistani wars]]
[[Category:Military operations of the Kashmir conflict]]
[[Category:1970s in Jammu and Kashmir]]
[[Category:1970s in Punjab, India]]
[[Category:1970s in Rajasthan]]
[[Category:1970s in Gujarat]]
[[Category:1970s in Uttar Pradesh]]
[[Category:Military operations involving airports]]
[[Category:Attacks on airports in Asia]]
[[Category:Attacks on military installations in Jammu and Kashmir]]
[[Category:Attacks on military installations in India]]
[[Category:Attacks on military installations in 1971]]
[[Category:Attacks on air bases]]
[[Category:Airstrikes in India]]