View source for One China

{{Short description|Policy of only recognizing one state of China}}
{{Italic title}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=August 2021}}
{{Infobox Chinese
 | title = One China
 | t = 一個中國
 | s = 一个中国
 | l = 
 | p = Yīgè Zhōngguó
 | w = I-ko Chungkuo
 | mi = {{IPAc-cmn|yi|2|g|e|5|-|zh|ong|1|g|uo|2|}}
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
 | title = One China principle
 | t = 一個中國原則
 | s = 一个中国原则
 | l = 
 | p = Yīgè Zhōngguó yuánzé
 | w = I-ko Chungkuo yüantse
 | mi = {{IPAc-cmn|yi|2|g|e|5|-|zh|ong|1|g|uo|2|-|yu|an|2|z|e|2}}
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
 | title = One China with respective interpretations
 | pic = 
 | piccap = 
</div>
 | picsize = 400px
 | t = 一個中國各自表述
 | s = 一个中国各自表述
 | l = 
 | p = Yīgè Zhōngguó gèzì biǎoshù
 | w = 
 | mi = 
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
 | title = One China policy
 | pic = 
 | piccap = 
</div>
 | picsize = 400px
 | t = 一個中國政策
 | s = 一个中国政策
 | l = 
 | p = Yīgè Zhōngguó zhèngcè
 | w = I-ko Chungkuo Chengts'e
 | mi = {{IPAc-cmn|yi|2|g|e|5|-|zh|ong|1|g|uo|2|-|zh|eng|4|c|e|4}}
}}

{{Politics of the People's Republic of China |expanded = Taiwan }}
{{Politics of the Republic of China}}
'''''One China''''' is a phrase with variant meanings, adopted by many states and other actors to describe their stance on the relationship between the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC) based on [[mainland China]], and the [[Republic of China]] (ROC) based on the [[Taiwan Area]]. "One China" asserts that there is only one ''[[de jure]]'' Chinese nation, despite the ''[[de facto]]'' division between the [[Two Chinas|two rival governments]] in the aftermath of the [[Chinese Civil War]]. The term may refer, in alphabetical order, to one of the following:
* The '''''One China policy''''' refers to a [[United States]] policy of [[Policy of deliberate ambiguity|strategic ambiguity]] regarding Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite news |title=What is America's policy of "strategic ambiguity" over Taiwan? |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/05/23/what-is-americas-policy-of-strategic-ambiguity-over-taiwan |access-date=2022-07-23 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=12 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230312110450/https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2022/05/23/what-is-americas-policy-of-strategic-ambiguity-over-taiwan |url-status=live }}</ref> In a [[Shanghai Communiqué|1972 joint communiqué]] with the PRC, the United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the [[Taiwan Strait]] maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China" and "does not challenge that position."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-22 |title=Wilson Center Digital Archive |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325 |access-date=2022-07-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220722001126/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325 |archive-date=22 July 2022 }}</ref> It reaffirms the U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of the [[Political status of Taiwan|Taiwan question]].<ref name="Wilson Center Digital Archive">{{Cite web |date=2022-07-22 |title=Wilson Center Digital Archive |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325 |access-date=2022-07-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220722001126/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121325 |archive-date=22 July 2022 }}</ref> The United States has formal relations with the PRC, recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China, and simultaneously maintains [[Taiwan–United States relations|its unofficial relations with Taiwan]] while taking no official position on Taiwanese sovereignty.<ref>{{Cite web |author=[[Steve Chabot]] |title=Text - H.Con.Res.88 - 114th Congress (2015-2016): Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan relations. |url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/88/text/ih |accessdate=2019-04-14 |date=2016-05-17 |work= [[United States Congress]] |quote= Whereas the Six Assurances are guidelines to conduct relations between the United States and Taiwan and stipulate that the United States would not—......(6) formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. |archive-date=2020-12-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201217181811/https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/88/text/ih |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=[[Michael Green (political expert)|Michael J. Green]]|url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter |title=What Is the U.S. "One China" Policy, and Why Does it Matter? |publisher=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies|CSIS]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220423100948/https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter |url-status=live|archive-date=23 April 2022|date=13 January 2017|access-date=29 April 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354 |title=What is the 'One China' policy? |date=10 February 2017 |work=BBC News |access-date=9 January 2019 |language=en-GB |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190109041259/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354 |archive-date=9 January 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref> The US "acknowledges" but does not "endorse" the PRC's position over Taiwan,<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-09-26 |title=US Does Not Take a Position on Taiwan's Sovereignty, State Department Says |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/us-does-not-take-a-position-on-taiwan-s-sovereignty-state-department-says-/6764381.html |first1=Nike |last1=Ching |access-date=2023-08-17 |website=VOA |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf|website=Congressional Research Service|title=China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei|date=2014-10-10|language=en|pages=39|quote=In the Chinese text, the word for "acknowledge" is "''cheng ren''" (recognize), a change from "''ren shi''" (acknowledge), used in the 1972 Shanghai Communique. During debate on the TRA in February 1979, Senator Jacob Javits noted the difference and said that "it is very important that we not subscribe to [the Chinese position on one China] either way." Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded that "we regard the English text as being the binding text. We regard the word ‘acknowledge’ as being the word that is determinative for the U.S." (Wolff and Simon, pp. 310-311). |first1=Shirley A. |last1=Kan |via=FAS Project on Government Secrecy |access-date=2017-03-07|archive-date=2017-04-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170410204327/https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> and has considered [[Taiwan's political status]] as "undetermined".<ref>{{cite web | title=U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues | author1=Shirley A. Kan | author2=Wayne M. Morrison | page=4 | url=http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | date=2013-01-04 | publisher=Congressional Research Service |via=Foreign Press Centers | quote=The position of the United States, as clarified in the China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy report of the Congressional Research Service (date: July 9, 2007) is summed up in five points:<br>1. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three US-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982.<br> 2. The United States "acknowledged" the "One China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.<br> 3. U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan;<br>4. U.S. policy has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and <br>5. U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as undetermined. U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled.<br> These positions remained unchanged in a 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service. | access-date=2017-05-11 | archive-date=2016-12-11 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161211221234/http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | url-status=dead }}</ref>
**Internationally, it may also refer to the stance of numerous other countries, some of which precede and may have influenced the US formulation. For instance, "Australia's 1972 Joint Communiqué with the PRC recognised the Government of the PRC as China's sole legal government, and acknowledged the position of the PRC that Taiwan was a province of the PRC",<ref>{{Cite web |title=Australia-Taiwan relationship |url=https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/taiwan/australia-taiwan-relationship |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210908173840/https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/taiwan/australia-taiwan-relationship |archive-date=Sep 8, 2021 |website=Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade}}</ref> but "neither supports nor opposes the PRC position" on the matter.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Interpretations of 'one China' |url=https://chinamatters.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Interpretations-of-one-China.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230303080502/https://chinamatters.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Interpretations-of-one-China.pdf |archive-date=Mar 3, 2023 |website=China Matters}}</ref> While some countries, such as the UK, Canada, Australia, and Japan, like the U.S. acknowledge but do not recognise the PRC's claim, the communiqués of some others, including Israel, Panama, and the Gambia, concur with the PRC's interpretation.<ref name="ccpwatch"/>
* The '''''[[One China principle]]''''' is the position held by the [[China|People's Republic of China]] (PRC) and the ruling [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) that there is only one sovereign state under the name China, with the PRC replacing the ROC<ref>{{cite web |author1=中华人民共和国国务院台湾事务办公室 |title=一个中国的原则与台湾问题 |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/twwtbps/202206/t20220606_10699030.html |language=zh-CN |quote=一九四九年十月一日，中华人民共和国中央人民政府宣告成立，取代中华民国政府成为全中国的唯一合法政府和在国际上的唯一合法代表，中华民国从此结束了它的历史地位。这是在同一国际法主体没有发生变化的情况下新政权取代旧政权，中国的主权和固有领土疆域并未由此而改变，中华人民共和国政府理所当然地完全享有和行使中国的主权，其中包括对台湾的主权。国民党统治集团退踞台湾以来，虽然其政权继续使用“中华民国”和“中华民国政府”的名称，但它早已完全无权代表中国行使国家主权，实际上始终只是中国领土上的一个地方当局。}}</ref> and serving as the sole legitimate government of that China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/faq-the-united-states-one-china-policy-is-not-the-same-as-the-prc-one-china-principle/|title=The United States "One China Policy" is NOT the same as the PRC "One China Principle" |publisher=US-Taiwan Business Council |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220412030243/https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/faq-the-united-states-one-china-policy-is-not-the-same-as-the-prc-one-china-principle/ |url-status=live|archive-date=12 April 2022 |date=1 January 2022|access-date=29 April 2022}}</ref><ref name="ccpwatch">{{cite web|author=Jessica Drun |url=https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/one-china-multiple-interpretations |title=One China, Multiple Interpretations |publisher=[[Center for Advanced China Research]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200309224301/https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/One-China-Multiple-Interpretations |url-status=live|archive-date=9 March 2020|date=28 December 2017|access-date=29 April 2022}}</ref> It is opposed to the idea that there are [[Two Chinas|two states holding the name "China"]], the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] (ROC); as well as the idea that China and Taiwan [[One Country on Each Side|form two separate countries]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm |title=The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue |website=www.china.org.cn |access-date=9 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190227214111/http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm |archive-date=27 February 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* '''''[[One China with respective interpretations]]''''' refers to the interpretation of the so-called [[1992 Consensus]] asserted by the ROC's then-governing political party [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) that both the PRC and ROC had agreed that there is one "China", but disagreed on whether "China" is represented by the PRC or ROC.<ref>{{cite web|author=Jessica Drun |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/11/taiwan-opposition-kuomintang-kmt-pro-china-1992-consensus/ |title=Taiwan's Opposition Struggles to Shake Pro-China Image |publisher=[[Foreign Policy]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220501015335/https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/11/taiwan-opposition-kuomintang-kmt-pro-china-1992-consensus/|url-status=live|archive-date=1 May 2022|date=11 March 2020|access-date=2 May 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=Cheng-feng Shih, Mumin Chen|url=http://faculty.ndhu.edu.tw/~cfshih/journal-articles/2010V34N4.pdf |title=Taiwanese Identity and the Memories of 2.28: A Case for Political Reconciliation |publisher=[[National Dong Hwa University]] |volume=34 |page=102 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210801220217/http://faculty.ndhu.edu.tw/~cfshih/journal-articles/2010V34N4.pdf|url-status=live|archive-date=1 Aug 2021|date=2010 |access-date=2 May 2022}}</ref> This interpretation of the 1992 Consensus has not been accepted by the PRC.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chen |first1=Dean |title=Constructing Peaceful Development: The Changing Interpretations of "One China" and Beijing's Taiwan Strait Policy |journal=Asian Security |date=11 March 2014 |volume=10 |pages=22–46 |doi=10.1080/14799855.2013.874337 |s2cid=153446645 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2013.874337 |access-date=20 April 2022 |archive-date=20 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220420170006/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2013.874337 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|first=儀潔|last=蔡|title=陸委會指沒有九二共識 陸學者：民進黨將對抗責任「甩鍋大陸」|url=https://www.ettoday.net/news/20220727/2303398.htm|access-date=27 July 2022|work=[[ETtoday]]|date=27 July 2022|quote=唐永紅(廈門大學台研院副主任)進一步闡述道，在「九二共識」指的是雙方同意「兩岸同屬一個中國、共同努力謀求國家統一」，並非所謂的「一中各表」，「各表」實乃兩岸之分歧而非共識，而當年國民黨及其當局故意在台灣把「九二共識」說成「一中各表」，意圖將「各表」也當成兩岸「共識」，大陸從未認可；事實上，依據兩岸各自有關法規，兩岸不能相互承認，也就是不能把「各表」作為兩岸共識 。|language=zh-tw|archive-date=27 July 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220727172750/https://www.ettoday.net/news/20220727/2303398.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> The [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP), the other major party of the ROC politics, has never acknowledged the existence of the 1992 Consensus and also rejected any claim that both sides of the [[Taiwan Strait]] are part of "one China".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&sms=BF821F021B282251&s=DC2AE73162A42D37|title=The DPP Administration's Logic and Policy on China|publisher=[[Mainland Affairs Council]]|access-date=10 December 2022|archive-date=10 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210113902/https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&sms=BF821F021B282251&s=DC2AE73162A42D37|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Lee Teng-hui]], the President of the ROC from the KMT at the time, said no consensus had been reached in 1992 and claims to the contrary were "nonsense", and that the term was "something that former Mainland Affairs Council minister [[Su Chi]] (蘇起) fabricated to placate the KMT in 2000s", which Su conceded in 2006.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/05/03/2003617348 | title=No such thing as the '1992 consensus': Lee Teng-hui - Taipei Times | date=3 May 2015 | access-date=13 April 2023 | archive-date=9 August 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220809232309/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/05/03/2003617348 | url-status=live }}</ref>
**Prior to the 1991 [[Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China|constitutional amendments]] and democratization of Taiwan, the Kuomintang government considered the ROC itself as the sole legitimate government of all of "China", which contested sovereignty over its constitutionally-defined territories, including the former late [[Qing dynasty]] borders after the 1860 [[Treaty of Aigun]] that consisted of [[Mainland China]], [[Tibet Area (administrative division)|Tibet]], [[Outer Mongolia]], [[Tannu Uriankhai]], and [[Badakhshan]] etc.,<ref>{{citation |chapter=Place, Identity and National Imagination in Postwar Taiwan |author=Bi-Yu Chang |chapter-url=https://faculty.washington.edu/stevehar/Castles%20in%20the%20Sand.pdf |url-status=live |title=Building castles in the sand |publisher=[[Routledge]] |date=2015 |access-date=2 July 2022 |archive-date=2 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220702152424/https://faculty.washington.edu/stevehar/Castles%20in%20the%20Sand.pdf }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/221-greater-china-made-in-taiwan/ |author=Frank Jacobs| title=A Map of Greater China, Made in Taiwan |date=23 July 2010 |work=[[Big Think]] |access-date=2 July 2022 |language=en-GB |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220521151734/https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/221-greater-china-made-in-taiwan/ |archive-date=21 May 2022 |url-status=live }}</ref> and also legally designated the [[Chinese Communist Party]] as a "rebellious group".<ref>{{Cite news|url= https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2021/04/25/2003756299| title= Taiwan in Time: The 'communist rebellion' finally ends |author= Han Cheung |publisher= [[Taipei Times]]|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20211022130449/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2021/04/25/2003756299|archive-date= 22 October 2021|date= 25 April 2021| access-date= 2 July 2022}}</ref>

After the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) defeated the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) in the [[Chinese Civil War]] and the subsequent [[Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan|retreat of the ROC to Taiwan]], the CCP [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|established the PRC]] in mainland China while the ROC ruled over Taiwan and several outlying islands. During this time, both governments continued to claim [[legitimacy (political)|legitimacy]] as the government of all of China. The KMT legally designated the [[Chinese Communist Party]] as a "rebellious group".<ref>{{Cite news |author=Han Cheung |date=25 April 2021 |title=Taiwan in Time: The 'communist rebellion' finally ends |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2021/04/25/2003756299 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211022130449/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2021/04/25/2003756299 |archive-date=22 October 2021 |access-date=2 July 2022 |publisher=[[Taipei Times]]}}</ref> Initially, international recognition of the two was split, but most countries [[Foreign relations of Taiwan#Relations switched from the ROC to the PRC|began to recognize the PRC over the ROC in the 70s]], including the United States [[Taiwan–United States relations#Post-democratization|in 1979]]. The language in the United States' One China policy first arose in its joint [[Three Communiqués|1972 Communiqué]] with the PRC.

Under ROC President [[Lee Teng-hui]] in the 1990s, the [[Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China]] were passed which effectively transformed Taiwan from a [[one-party state]] into a democracy, and limited civil and political rights to citizens in the "[[Free area of the Republic of China|free area]]" (the area under its ''de facto'' control, consisting of the island groups of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and some minor islands), but did not alter language regarding territorial claims or national territory.<ref name="lee1999">Lee Teng-hui 1999 interview with Deutsche Welle: https://fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/0709.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150409031337/https://fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/0709.htm |date=9 April 2015 }}</ref>

Although the 1991 constitutional amendments localized governance to the "free area," the 1947 Constitution still claims all of China as ROC territory, aligning with the Kuomintang's (KMT) original "One China" stance.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) - Article Content - Laws & Regulations Database of The Republic of China (Taiwan) |url=https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000001 |access-date=2025-06-14 |website=law.moj.gov.tw}}</ref>  The Constitution defines ROC territory as encompassing all of China, based on its "existing national boundaries" at the time of adoption (Article 4), asserting the ROC as the legitimate government of the entirety of China, not solely Taiwan. This constitutional stance supports the KMT's historical vision, creating a legal-political disconnect under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) governance. Despite the DPP's political dominance, it has not legally amended the Constitution to formally redefine Taiwan as a separate nation or change the national boundaries to exclude the mainland, not least because this could provoke PRC retaliation or even invasion.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-06 |title=Talking Points: What Does ROC Law Say About Taiwan? |url=https://usali.org/publications/talking-points-what-does-roc-law-say-about-taiwan-wk6w8 |access-date=2025-06-14 |website=U.S.-Asia Law Institute |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-02-17 |title=What is 'Taiwan independence' and is Taiwan already independent? |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-is-taiwan-independence-is-taiwan-already-independent-2025-02-17/ |access-date=2025-06-14 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Taiwanese Presidents Will Not and Can Not Unilaterally Change Taiwan's Status |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/taiwanese-presidents-will-not-and-can-not-unilaterally-change-taiwans-status/ |access-date=2025-06-14 |website=thediplomat.com |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Saul |first=Ben |date=2022-08-17 |title=The complex legal question of Taiwanese independence |url=http://asiatimes.com/2022/08/the-complex-legal-question-of-taiwanese-independence/ |access-date=2025-06-14 |website=Asia Times |language=en-US}}</ref> This deadlock reflects a split along party lines: [[Pan-Blue coalition]] parties (including the [[Kuomintang]]) adhere to "One China with respective interpretations", while [[Pan-Green coalition]] parties (including the [[Democratic Progressive Party]]) reject it. Meanwhile, the PRC has maintained its One China principle.<ref name=TDSGL>{{Cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/xi-urges-vigilance-against-taiwan-independence/|title=Xi Urges Vigilance Against Taiwan Independence|access-date=13 April 2023|archive-date=30 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230130113310/https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/xi-urges-vigilance-against-taiwan-independence/|url-status=live}}</ref>

== Background ==
{{More citations needed section|date=April 2022}}
{{See also|Political status of Taiwan}}

[[File:China map.png|thumb|upright=1.2|Territory controlled by the [[China|People's Republic of China]] (purple) and the [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] (orange). The size of minor islands has been exaggerated in this map for ease of identification.]]

The [[Dutch Empire|Dutch]] established a colony on Taiwan in 1624 based in present-day [[Tainan]].  Shortly after, the [[Spanish Empire|Spanish]] established a colony in Northern Taiwan in 1626, but were driven out by the Dutch in 1642.  It was during this time that large-scale Chinese migration from nearby [[Fujian Province]] began.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Andrade |first1=Tonio |title=How Taiwan Became Chinese - Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century |date=2010 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |url=http://www.gutenberg-e.org/andrade/andrade06.html |access-date=April 3, 2022 |chapter=6 - The Birth of Co-colonization |quote=most were from Fujian Province in China. ... More and more Chinese colonists arrived from Fujian to exploit the new colony. |archive-date=9 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220809163527/http://www.gutenberg-e.org/andrade/andrade06.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Davidson|first1=James W.|author-link=James W. Davidson|title=The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : history, people, resources, and commercial prospects : tea, camphor, sugar, gold, coal, sulphur, economical plants, and other productions|year=1903|publisher=Macmillan & co.|url=https://archive.org/details/islandofformosap00davi|location=London and New York|ol=6931635M|access-date=22 November 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150108025015/https://archive.org/details/islandofformosap00davi|archive-date=8 January 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> The Dutch colony was later conquered by [[Zheng Chenggong]] (Koxinga), a [[Ming dynasty|Ming]]-loyalist, in 1662 as the [[Kingdom of Tungning]], before being incorporated by the [[Qing dynasty]] in 1683 as part of Fujian Province.  In 1887, it was officially made a separate [[Fujian-Taiwan Province]].  Taiwan remained a province for eight years until it was ceded to Japan under the [[Treaty of Shimonoseki]] in 1895 following the [[First Sino-Japanese War]].

While Taiwan remained under Japanese control, the Qing dynasty was [[Xinhai Revolution|ousted]] and the [[Beiyang government|First]] and [[Nationalist government|Second]] [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] (ROC) were established from the Beiyang regime to the  [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) from 1928.  After the conclusion of [[World War II]] in 1945, the Republic of China was given control of Taiwan.<ref>Richard Bush: At Cross Purposes, US-Taiwan Relations since 1942. Published by M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2004</ref><ref>[[Alan M. Wachman]]: Why Taiwan?  Geostrategic rationales for China's territorial integrity.  Published by Stanford University Press Stanford, California 2007.</ref><ref>{{Citation|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/hansard/uk/uk1955as.htm|title=UK Parliament|date=4 May 1955|access-date=23 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721183000/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/hansard/uk/uk1955as.htm|archive-date=21 July 2011|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/congress/crs-sinojapan.htm|title=Sino-Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S. Policy|publisher=Congressional Research Service|date=19 December 2008|access-date=23 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120322230426/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/congress/crs-sinojapan.htm|archive-date=22 March 2012|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/lawjrn/res-cs1.htm|title=Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan|publisher=American Journal of International Law|date=July 2000|access-date=23 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721183045/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/lawjrn/res-cs1.htm|archive-date=21 July 2011|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/state/frus/taiwan/frus1951ar.htm|title=Foreign Relations of the United States|publisher=US Dept. of State|date=3 May 1951|access-date=23 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120322230430/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/state/frus/taiwan/frus1951ar.htm|archive-date=22 March 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1949, after losing control of most of mainland China following the [[Chinese Civil War]], and before the post-war peace treaties had come into effect, the ROC government under the KMT [[Chinese Nationalist Party retreat to Taiwan|withdrew to Taiwan]], and [[Chiang Kai-shek]] declared [[martial law]].

An argument has been made that Japan formally renounced all territorial rights to Taiwan in 1952 in the [[San Francisco Peace Treaty]], but neither in that treaty nor in the peace treaty signed between Japan and China was the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan awarded to the Republic of China.<ref name=":0">{{Citation|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/nstatus/starr.htm|title=Starr Memorandum of the Dept. of State|date=13 July 1971|access-date=23 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721182754/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/nstatus/starr.htm|archive-date=21 July 2011|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{cite book|last=Eisenhower|first=Dwight D.|date=1963|title=Mandate for Change 1953–1956|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/historical/seisen.htm|publisher=Doubleday & Co., New York|access-date=3 January 2014|quote=The Japanese peace treaty of 1951 ended Japanese sovereignty over the islands but did not formally cede them to "China," either Communist or Nationalist.|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140103155850/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/historical/seisen.htm|archive-date=3 January 2014|url-status=live}}</ref> The treaties left the status of Taiwan—as ruled by the ROC or PRC—[[Deliberate ambiguity|deliberately vague]], and the question of [[Legitimacy (political)|legitimate sovereignty]] over China is why China was not included in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /> This argument is not accepted by those who view the sovereignty of Taiwan as having been legitimately [[Retrocession Day|returned]] to the Republic of China at the end of the war.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://aao.sinica.edu.tw/download/publication_list/en/109.pdf |title=Disputes over Taiwan Sovereignty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty Since World War II |author=Tzu-Chin Huang |website=Institute of Modern History, Academia sinica |publisher=Central Academic Advisory Committee and Academic Affairs Office |access-date=25 January 2015 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150128114506/http://aao.sinica.edu.tw/download/publication_list/en/109.pdf |archive-date=28 January 2015 }}<br />{{cite book|author=Charles Holcombe|title=A History of East Asia: From the Origins of Civilization to the Twenty-First Century|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rHeb7wQu0xIC&pg=PA337|year=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-51595-5|page=337|access-date=23 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200513180545/https://books.google.com/books?id=rHeb7wQu0xIC&pg=PA337|archive-date=13 May 2020|url-status=live}}<br />{{cite book|author=Barbara A. West|title=Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Asia and Oceania|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pCiNqFj3MQsC&pg=PA15|date=1 January 2009|publisher=Infobase Publishing|isbn=978-1-4381-1913-7|page=15|access-date=23 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617115200/https://books.google.com/books?id=pCiNqFj3MQsC&pg=PA15|archive-date=17 June 2016|url-status=live}}<br />{{cite book|author=Richard J. Samuels|title=Encyclopedia of United States National Security|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=K751AwAAQBAJ&pg=PT705|date=21 December 2005|publisher=SAGE Publications|isbn=978-1-4522-6535-3|page=705|access-date=23 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160507031015/https://books.google.com/books?id=K751AwAAQBAJ&pg=PT705|archive-date=7 May 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Some argue that the ROC is a government in exile,<ref>{{Citation|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/lawjrn/onechina-tai2.htm|title=One-China Policy and Taiwan|publisher=Fordham International Law Journal|date=December 2004|access-date=23 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120322230435/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/lawjrn/onechina-tai2.htm|archive-date=22 March 2012|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| author = Kerry Dumbaugh (Specialist in Asian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)| title = Taiwan's Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications| publisher = Congressional Research Service| url = https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/64794.pdf| date = 23 February 2006| access-date = 23 August 2011| quote = While on October 1, 1949, in Beijing a victorious Mao proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Chiang Kai-shek re-established a temporary capital for his government in Taipei, Taiwan, declaring the ROC still to be the legitimate Chinese government-in-exile and vowing that he would "retake the mainland" and drive out communist forces.| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110707230929/http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/64794.pdf| archive-date = 7 July 2011| url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| title = Introduction to Sovereignty: A Case Study of Taiwan| publisher = Stanford University| url = http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/catalog/introduction_to_sovereignty_a_case_study_of_taiwan| year = 2004| access-date = 23 August 2011| quote = Enmeshed in a civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists for control of China, Chiang's government mostly ignored Taiwan until 1949, when the Communists won control of the mainland. That year, Chiang's Nationalists fled to Taiwan and established a government-in-exile.| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20141107220328/http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/catalog/introduction_to_sovereignty_a_case_study_of_taiwan/| archive-date = 7 November 2014| url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/taiwanus/rocinexile.htm|title=Republic of China government in exile|access-date=23 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721183400/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/taiwanus/rocinexile.htm|archive-date=21 July 2011|url-status=live}}
</ref> while others maintain it is a [[rump state]].<ref>{{Cite book|title=Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities|url=https://archive.org/details/problematicsover00kras|url-access=limited|last=Krasner|first=Stephen D.|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2001|pages=[https://archive.org/details/problematicsover00kras/page/n164 148]|quote=For some time the Truman administration had been hoping to distance itself from the rump state on Taiwan and to establish at least a minimal relationship with the newly founded PRC.}}</ref>

The ROC continued to claim itself as the rightful ruler of the entirety of China under the single-party KMT regime, and the PRC made a symmetric claim. In 1971, the [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758]] replaced the ROC's seat in the [[United Nations]] with the PRC. From 30 April 1991, the ROC officially recognized the PRC, thus abandoning the [[Hallstein Doctrine]], while maintaining the claim of an [[exclusive mandate]] as the legitimate ruler of China.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hernández-Campos |first1=Augusto |editor1-last=Ma |editor1-first=Ying-jeou |title=Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Volume 24 (2006) |date=2008 |publisher=Cameron May Ltd |page=86 |chapter=The Criteria of Statehood in International Law and the Hallstein Doctrine:The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan |isbn=9789004424968 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x98eEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA86 |access-date=13 April 2023 |archive-date=13 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413153317/https://books.google.com/books?id=x98eEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA86 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ROC transformed into a free and democratic state in the 1990s following decades of martial law with the passage of the [[Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China]].<ref>{{Cite web| url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/taiwan| title=Taiwan| date=30 January 2019| access-date=18 June 2019| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200123202402/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/taiwan| archive-date=23 January 2020| url-status=live}}</ref>  Afterwards, the legal and [[political status of Taiwan]] has become more contentious, with increasing public expressions in favor of [[Taiwan independence]], which were formerly outlawed.

== Viewpoints within Taiwan ==
Within Taiwan, there is a distinction between the positions of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP).

The Kuomintang holds the "One-China principle" and maintains its claim that under the ROC Constitution (passed by the Kuomintang government in 1947 in [[Nanjing]]) the ROC has sovereignty over most of China, including, by their interpretation, both mainland China and Taiwan. After the [[Chinese Communist Party]] expelled the ROC in the Chinese Civil War from most of Chinese territory in 1949 and founded the PRC, the ROC's [[Kuomintang|Chinese Nationalist]] government, which still held Taiwan, continued to claim [[legitimacy (political)|legitimacy]] as the government of all of China. Under former President [[Lee Teng-hui]], additional articles were appended to the [[Constitution of the Republic of China|ROC constitution]] in 1991 so that it applied effectively only to the [[Taiwan Area]].<ref name="lee1999" /> The Kuomintang proclaims a modified form of the "One-China" principle known as the "[[1992 Consensus]]". Under this "consensus", both governments "agree" that there is only one single sovereign state encompassing both mainland China and Taiwan, but disagree about which of the two governments is the [[legitimacy (political)|legitimate]] government of this state. Former ROC President [[Ma Ying-jeou]] had re-asserted claims on mainland China as late as 8 October 2008.<ref>{{cite news|title=Ma refers to China as ROC territory in magazine interview|newspaper=Taipei Times|date=8 October 2008|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320|access-date=8 October 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090603213128/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320|archive-date=3 June 2009|url-status=live}}</ref>

The [[Democratic Progressive Party]] rejects the One China principle, and its official position currently is that Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country whose territory consists of Taiwan and its surrounding smaller islands and whose sovereignty derives only from the ROC citizens living in Taiwan (similar to the philosophy of [[self-determination]]), based on the 1999 "[[Resolution on Taiwan's Future]]". It considers Taiwan as an independent nation under the name of Republic of China, making a formal declaration of independence unnecessary.<ref name="resolution">{{cite web |title=DPP Party Convention |url=http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm |access-date=18 December 2020 |archive-date=10 June 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110610173456/http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>  Though calls for drafting a new constitution and a declaration of a Republic of Taiwan was written into the party charter in 1991,<ref name="1991article">{{cite journal |author1-link=Dafydd Fell |last1=Fell |first1=Dafydd |title=Measuring and Explaining Party Change in Taiwan: 1991–2004 |journal=Journal of East Asian Studies |date=2005 |volume=5 |issue=1 |page=112 |doi=10.1017/S1598240800006275 |jstor=23417889 |s2cid=153572606 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23417889 |access-date=18 December 2020 |archive-date=2 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210402125514/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23417889 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> the 1999 resolution has practically superseded the earlier charter.<ref name="92c">{{cite web |title=DPP denies existence of '1992 consensus' |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/12/25/2003491835 |website=[[Taipei Times]] |date=25 December 2010 |access-date=18 December 2020 |archive-date=2 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210802211135/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/12/25/2003491835 |url-status=live }}</ref>
  
At least one observer of the [[Taiwan independence movement]] believes it runs counter to the PRC's sovereignty claims over Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite news |title='Taiwan Independence' Doesn't Mean What You Think |newspaper=Foreign Policy |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/11/taiwan-independence-china-republic-huadu-taidu/ |access-date=2024-05-30 |issn=1945-2276 |archive-date=12 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160412030159/http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/11/taiwan-independence-china-republic-huadu-taidu/ |url-status=live }}</ref> A [[Brookings Institution]] survey indicates that while Taiwan people overwhelmingly reject unification with the PRC, the vast majority do not support immediate formal independence of a Republic of Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news |title=Why is unification so unpopular in Taiwan? It's the PRC political system, not just culture |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/ |access-date=30 May 2024 |work=Brookings Institution |date=7 Feb 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240514174054/https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-is-unification-so-unpopular-in-taiwan-its-the-prc-political-system-not-just-culture/ |archive-date=14 May 2024}}</ref>

== Evolution of the One China principle ==
[[File:Washington Street, San Francisco (6453).JPG|thumb|280px|[[Flag of the Republic of China]] (right) and [[Flag of China|People's Republic of China]] flying together in [[Chinatown, San Francisco]], revealing different political views from [[overseas Chinese]]]]
One interpretation, which was adopted during the [[Cold War]], is that either the PRC or the ROC is the sole rightful government of all [[China]] and that the other government is illegitimate. While much of the [[western bloc]] maintained relations with the ROC until the 1970s under this policy, much of the [[eastern bloc]] maintained relations with the PRC. While the government of the ROC considered itself the remaining holdout of the legitimate government of a country overrun by what it thought of as "[[Communist bandit]]s", the PRC claimed to have succeeded the ROC in the [[Chinese Civil War]]. Though the ROC no longer portrays itself as the sole legitimate government of China, the position of the PRC remained unchanged until the early 2000s, when the PRC began to soften its position on this issue to promote [[Chinese unification]].

One interpretation of one China is that only one geographical region of China exists, which was split between two Chinese governments during the Chinese Civil War. This is largely the position of current supporters of Chinese unification in mainland China, who believe that "one China" should eventually unite under a single government.<ref name=":2" /> Starting in 2005, this position has become close enough to the position of the PRC, allowing high-level dialogue between the CCP and the [[Pan-Blue Coalition]] of the ROC.{{citation needed|date=July 2024}}

The revised position of the PRC was made clear in the [[Anti-Secession Law]] of 2005, which although stating that there is one China whose [[sovereignty]] is indivisible, does not explicitly identify this China with the PRC. Almost all PRC laws have a suffix "of the People's Republic of China" (prefix in Chinese grammar) in their official names, but the Anti-Secession Law is an exception. Beijing has made no major statements after 2004 which identify one China with the PRC and has shifted its definition of one China slightly to encompass a concept called the '[[1992 Consensus]]': both sides of the Taiwan strait recognize there is only one China—both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China but agree to differ on the definition of which China.<ref name=":2">{{Citation |last=Huang |first=Jing |title=Xi Jinping's Taiwan Policy: Boxing Taiwan In with the One-China Framework |date=2017 |work=Taiwan and China |pages=239–248 |editor-last=Dittmer |editor-first=Lowell |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.16 |access-date=2024-04-22 |series=Fitful Embrace |edition=1 |publisher=University of California Press |jstor=10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.16 }}</ref> According to Taiwanese lawyer Chen Chang-wen, the new version changed from a subordinate relationship to an equal relationship, and the legislation only legalized its constitutional obligations.<ref>陳長文. 法律並非重心-從法律分析的角度，看反分裂法的法律分析 侷限性. 律師雜誌 Taipei Bar Journal. 2005, 309: 29. doi:10.7030/TBJ.200506.0020</ref> Placing less emphasis on which government should represent One China is more compatible with KMT's position as well as the current ROC Constitution. This reformulation was also reflected in the 2022 PRC white paper on Taiwan.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Fabry |first1=Mikulas |title=The Effect of 'One China' Policies of Foreign States on the International Status of Taiwan |journal=Diplomacy & Statecraft |date=2 January 2024 |volume=35 |issue=1 |pages=90–115 |doi=10.1080/09592296.2024.2303855}}</ref>

=== Policy position in the PRC ===
{{See also|Taiwan Province, People's Republic of China}}
In practice, official sources and state-owned media never refer to the "ROC government", and seldom to the "government of Taiwan". Instead, the government in Taiwan is referred to as the "Taiwan authorities". The PRC does not accept or stamp [[Republic of China passport]]s. Instead, a Taiwan resident visiting [[Mainland China]] must use a [[Taiwan Compatriot Entry Permit]]. [[Hong Kong]] grants visa-free entry to holders of a Permit, while holders of a ROC passport must apply for a Pre-arrival Registration. [[Macau]] grants visa-free entry to holders of both the permit and the passport.

The [[United Front (China)|United Front]], which consists of the eight other political parties in the PRC subordinate to the CCP, has adhered to the One-China policy and opposes Taiwan independence. Among the parties that accepted it are the [[Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang]] (a splinter left-wing party that broke away from the main Kuomintang) and the [[Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League]].<ref name=TDSGL/>

In 1950, Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] stated that the principle that Taiwan is part of China is "not only a historical fact but affirmed by the [[1943 Cairo Declaration|Cairo Declaration]], the [[Potsdam Declaration]], and the conditions after Japan's surrender."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781503634152 |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2022 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |pages=34 |doi=10.1515/9781503634152 |access-date=13 April 2023 |archive-date=13 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413153307/https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781503634152/html |url-status=live }}</ref>

In its foreign relations, the PRC does not object to other countries having Taiwan trade offices, so long as those countries are not formally engaged in diplomatic activity.<ref name=":32">{{Cite book |last1=Shinn |first1=David H. |title=China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement |last2=Eisenman |first2=Joshua |date=2023 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21001-0 |location=New York |author-link=David H. Shinn}}</ref>{{Rp|page=34}}

=== Policy position in the ROC ===
{{See also|Taiwan (Republic of China province)|Free area of the Republic of China}}
Chiang Kai-shek held the view that there was One China that should be united under the government of the Republic of China; his adversary Mao praised him for rejecting the idea of 'two Chinas,' stating that Chiang "dared to defy the U.S. policy for 'two Chinas' in front of [John Foster] [[John Foster Dulles|Dulles]], proving that he is still a great nationalist."<ref name=":92">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=2022 |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |doi=10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k |oclc=1348572572 |author-link=Christopher Marquis |s2cid=253067190}}</ref>{{Rp|page=43}}

On 1 August 1992, the ROC's [[National Unification Council]] passed the "Definition of One China Resolution", stating: "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different ... Our side believes that one China should mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China."<ref name=":Chen">{{Cite book |last=Chen |first=Dean P. |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |chapter=Xi Jinping and the Derailment of the KMT-CCP "1992 Consensus" |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|page=229}} This resolution provided the basis for quasi-governmental talks between the ROC's [[Straits Exchange Foundation|Strait Exchange Foundation]] (SEF) and the PRC's [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits]] (ARATS).<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=229}}

During these discussions, SEF stated that "each side expresses its own interpretation verbally in order to solve this sticky problem of [one China] and thereby reaffirmed the August 1st NUC resolution as SEF's interpretation of one China."<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=229}} ARATS agreed to expressing these interpretations verbally and stated that "both sides of the strait uphold the principle of one China, and actively seek national unification, but the political interpretation of the one China will not be referred to in the cross-strait negotiations on functional issues."<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|pages=229–230}} This position later became known as the [[1992 Consensus]], a phrase coined in early 2000 by [[Su Chi]].<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=230}}

There is significant difference on Taiwan regarding recognition and understanding of the One-China principle. The Pan-Blue Coalition parties, led by the Kuomintang, generally accept the One-China principle. In particular, former [[President of the Republic of China|president]] [[Ma Ying-jeou]] has stated that "One China is the Republic of China".<ref>{{cite web |title=President Ma holds press conference to discuss '1992 Consensus' |url=https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3729 |website=Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) |access-date=30 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240530120919/https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/3729 |archive-date=30 May 2024 |date=28 Aug 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref>  The [[Pan-Green Coalition]] parties, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), do not accept the policy and view Taiwan as a country separate from China.  Former DPP president [[Chen Shui-bian]] believes the 1992 Consensus forsakes Taiwan's national sovereignty, effectively ceding it to the PRC.<ref>{{cite news |title=Beijing's 'one China' |url=https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/jul/3/beijings-one-china/ |access-date=30 May 2024 |work=[[The Washington Times]] |date=3 July 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231109133245/https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/jul/3/beijings-one-china/ |archive-date=9 Nov 2023 |url-status=live}}</ref>  President [[Tsai Ing-wen]] rejected the 1992 Consensus categorically in 2019.<ref name="Horton">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/taiwan-xi-jinping-tsai-ing-wen.html|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=January 5, 2019|last=Horton|first=Chris|title=Taiwan's President, Defying Xi Jinping, Calls Unification Offer 'Impossible'|access-date=January 18, 2019|archive-date=4 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210704104654/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/taiwan-xi-jinping-tsai-ing-wen.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

When the ROC established diplomatic relations with [[Kiribati]] in 2003, it did not require that Kiribati sever relations with the PRC.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Chen |first1=Melody |title=Taiwan forges diplomatic ties with Kiribati |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2003/11/08/2003075024 |access-date=15 February 2024 |date=8 Nov 2003}}</ref>  However, the PRC did not accept dual recognition and severed ties with Kiribati as a result.<ref>{{cite news |title=China severs diplomatic ties with Kiribati |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2003-11-29/china-severs-diplomatic-ties-with-kiribati/97836 |access-date=15 February 2024 |publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation |date=29 Nov 2003}}</ref>  In 2024, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it had no preconditions for maintaining diplomatic relations with other countries, in particular that it was not opposed to simultaneous recognition of the ROC and PRC.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Yeh |first1=Joseph |title=Taiwan has no preconditions for foreign exchanges: MOFA |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202402150005 |website=Focus Taiwan |date=15 February 2024 |access-date=15 February 2024}}</ref>

The ROC does not recognize or stamp PRC passports. Instead, mainland Chinese residents visiting Taiwan and other territories under ROC jurisdiction must use an [[Exit & Entry Permit (Republic of China)|Exit and Entry Permit]] issued by the ROC authorities.

== Other countries' One China policies ==
{{More citations needed section|date=April 2022}}
[[File:Embassy of China2 in Kyiv.jpg|thumb|PRC embassy in [[Kyiv]], [[Ukraine]]. Ukraine does not recognize the ROC.]]
[[File:Embassy of China, Canberra.jpg|thumb|PRC embassy in [[Canberra]], [[Australia]]. Australia does not officially recognize the ROC, although it has unofficial relations with it.]]
[[File:Taiwanese Embassy in Mbabane.JPG|thumb|ROC embassy in [[Mbabane]], [[Eswatini]]. Eswatini does not recognize the PRC.]]
[[File:Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan 20080811.jpg|right|thumb|ROC economic and cultural office in [[Tokyo]], Japan. Japan recognizes the PRC, though it also has informal relations with the ROC.]]

Not formally recognizing the ROC is a requirement for any political entity to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, in effect forcing other governments to choose between Beijing and Taipei.<ref>{{Cite journal | journal = [[The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs]] | volume = 31 | title = China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America | first1 = Daniel P. | last1 = Erikson | first2 = Janice | last2 =  Chen | year = 2007 | issue = 2 | page = 71}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web | url = http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm | title = The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue | publisher = [[China Internet Information Center]] | access-date = 9 April 2014 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190227214111/http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7956.htm | archive-date = 27 February 2019 | url-status = live }}</ref>  At times, the PRC has used financial incentives to entice smaller countries to recognize it over the ROC, and both the ROC and PRC have accused each other of dollar diplomacy.<ref>
{{Cite web | title = China and Taiwan in Africa | publisher = HiiDunia | url = http://www.hiidunia.com/2010/04/china-and-taiwan-in-africa/ | access-date = 9 April 2014 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140413124423/http://www.hiidunia.com/2010/04/china-and-taiwan-in-africa/ | archive-date = 13 April 2014 | url-status = live }}</ref> Most countries that recognize Beijing circumvent the diplomatic language by establishing [[List of diplomatic missions in Taiwan|trade and cultural missions]] that represent their interests on Taiwanese soil, while the ROC government represents its interests abroad with [[List of diplomatic missions of Taiwan|reciprocal missions]].

The PRC has, in the past, attempted to get nations to recognize that "the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China ... and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."  However, many nations are unwilling to make this particular statement and there was often a protracted effort to find language acceptable to both sides, for example that they "respect", "acknowledge", "understand", or "take note of" the PRC's One China principle (but do not say they "recognize" it). This [[strategic ambiguity]] in the language used provides the basis for countries to have formal ties with People's Republic of China and maintain unofficial ties to the Republic of China.

Names such as "[[Chinese Taipei]]" (e.g. in the Olympics) or "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu" (e.g. in the [[World Trade Organization]]) are sometimes used in some international arenas since "Taiwan" suggests that Taiwan is a separate country and "Republic of China" suggests that there are [[two Chinas]], and thus both violate the One-China principle.

=== United States policy ===
[[File:Mao Zedong, Zhang Yufeng et Richard Nixon.jpg|thumb|[[Mao Zedong]] greets U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] during his [[1972 Nixon visit to China|visit to China in 1972]].]]

{{See also|China–United States relations|Taiwan–United States relations}}

The United States' One-China policy was first stated in the [[Shanghai Communiqué]] of 1972: "the United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.<ref name="Wilson Center Digital Archive"/> The United States does not challenge that position." The United States has not expressed an explicitly immutable statement regarding whether it believes Taiwan is independent or not. Instead, Washington simply states that they understand the PRC's claims on Taiwan as its own. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker asserts that U.S. One-China policy was not intended to please the PRC government, but as a way for Washington to conduct international relations in the region, which Beijing fails to state.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cabestan |first=Jean-Pierre |date=2010-06-01 |title=Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and The Crisis with China |url=https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/5293 |journal=China Perspectives |language=fr |volume=2010 |issue=2 |doi=10.4000/chinaperspectives.5293 |issn=2070-3449}}</ref>  A more recent study suggests that this wording reflected the Nixon administration's desire to shift responsibility for resolving the dispute to the "people most directly involved" – that is, China and Taiwan.  At the same time, the United States would avoid "prejudic[ing] the ultimate outcome" by refusing to explicitly support the claims of one side or the other.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hilton|first=Brian|date=September 2018|title='Taiwan Expendable?' Reconsidered|url=https://brill.com/view/journals/jaer/25/3/article-p296_296.xml|journal=Journal of American-East Asian Relations|volume=25|issue=3|pages=296–322|doi=10.1163/18765610-02503004|s2cid=240280593|access-date=1 December 2019|archive-date=8 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308090232/https://brill.com/view/journals/jaer/25/3/article-p296_296.xml|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

At the height of the [[Sino-Soviet split]] and [[Sino-Vietnamese War|Sino-Vietnamese conflict]], and at the start of the [[reform and opening]] of the PRC, the United States strategically switched diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 January 1979 under the administration of [[Jimmy Carter]].  Congress quickly responded by passing the [[Taiwan Relations Act]] that defined relations with the ROC, but stopped short of full recognition.  It also required the United States to provide Taiwan with arms sufficient to maintain its self-defense, but did not commit to defending Taiwan in the event of an invasion.

In 1982, President [[Ronald Reagan]] also saw that the [[Six Assurances]] were adopted, the fifth being that the United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Still, United States policy has remained ambiguous. In the [[U.S. House Committee on International Relations|House International Relations Committee]] on 21 April 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, [[James A. Kelly]], was asked by Rep. [[Grace Napolitano]] (D-CA) whether the United States government's commitment to Taiwan's democracy conflicted with the so-called One-China policy.<ref>
{{cite web|url=http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm597.cfm|title=Secretary Powell Must Not Change U.S. Policy on Taiwan|work=heritage.org|access-date=16 January 2005|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041215152550/http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm597.cfm|archive-date=15 December 2004|url-status=unfit}}</ref> He stated "In my testimony, I made the point "our One China," and I didn't really define it, and I'm not sure I very easily could define it. I can tell you what it is not. It is not the One-China policy or the One-China principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan. But it does convey a meaning of solidarity of a kind among the people on both sides of the straits that has been our policy for a very long time."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Gregson |first1=Chip |last2=Hsiao |first2=Russell |last3=Young |first3=Stephen M. |title=David and Goliath: Strengthening Taiwan's Deterrence and Resiliency |url=https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-David-and-Goliath-Strengthening-Taiwan-Deterrence-and-Resiliency-Nov-2020-final.pdf |website=globaltaiwan.org |publisher=Global Taiwan Institute |access-date=27 April 2021 |archive-date=27 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210427203734/https://globaltaiwan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-David-and-Goliath-Strengthening-Taiwan-Deterrence-and-Resiliency-Nov-2020-final.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

When President [[Bill Clinton]] visited Shanghai during his June 1998 visit to China, Clinton articulated the "three nos" for United States foreign policy towards China: (1) not recognizing [[two Chinas]], (2) not supporting Taiwanese independence, and (3) not supporting Taiwanese efforts to join international organizations for which sovereignty is a membership requirement.<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=63 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref>

[[File:President Barack Obama offers a toast to President Xi Jinping of China during a State Banquet at the Great Hall of People in Beijing, China, November 12, 2014 (cropped).jpg|thumb|U.S. President [[Barack Obama]] and Chinese leader [[Xi Jinping]]. Obama supported the "One-China" policy during his administration.<ref>
"[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-taiwan-obama-idUSKBN13S013?il=0 White House: no change to 'one China' policy after Trump call with Taiwan] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170602193633/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-taiwan-obama-idUSKBN13S013?il=0 |date=2017-06-02 }}". Reuters. 2 December 2016.</ref>]]

The position of the United States, as clarified in the ''China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy'' report of the Congressional Research Service (date: 9 July 2007) is summed up in five points:
# The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three US-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982.
# The United States "acknowledged" the "One China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
# U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan;
# U.S. policy has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and
# U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled.
These positions remained unchanged in a 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service.<ref>
{{cite web | title=U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues | author1=Shirley A. Kan | author2=Wayne M. Morrison | page=4 | url=https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | date=4 January 2013 | publisher=Congressional Research Service | access-date=25 June 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171231211949/https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | archive-date=31 December 2017 | url-status=live }}
</ref>

On 2 December 2016, US President-elect Donald Trump and ROC President Tsai Ing-wen conducted a short phone call regarding "the close economic, political and security ties between Taiwan and the US".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://asiatimes.com/trumps-taiwan-call-tempest-teapot/|title=Trump's Taiwan call: Tempest in a teapot?|last=Metzler|first=John J.|date=7 December 2016|website=www.atimes.com|access-date=14 December 2016|archive-date=14 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210314013524/https://asiatimes.com/2016/12/trumps-taiwan-call-tempest-teapot/|url-status=live}}</ref> On 6 December, a few days after the call, Trump said that the US is not necessarily bound by its "one China" policy.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN1400TY|title=Trump says U.S. not necessarily bound by 'one China' policy|date=12 December 2016|newspaper=Reuters|access-date=2 July 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170619151118/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN1400TY|archive-date=19 June 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/donald-trump-china-policy-161212035714312.html|title=Donald Trump questions 'one China' policy|work=aljazeera.com|access-date=12 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161212065809/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/donald-trump-china-policy-161212035714312.html|archive-date=12 December 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.foxnews.com/politics/china-official-says-trumps-taiwan-comments-cause-serious-concern/|title=China official says Trump's Taiwan comments cause 'serious concern'|date=12 December 2016|work=[[Fox News]]|access-date=12 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161212143405/http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/12/12/chinese-media-calls-trump-ignorant-after-taiwan-comments.html|archive-date=12 December 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> On 9 February 2017, in a lengthy phone call, US President [[Donald Trump]] and PRC [[Paramount leader]] Xi Jinping discussed numerous topics and President Trump agreed, at the request of Xi Jinping, to honor the "one China" policy.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/09/readout-presidents-call-president-xi-jinping-china|title=Readout of the President's Call with President Xi Jinping of China|date=9 February 2017|via=[[NARA|National Archives]]|work=[[whitehouse.gov]]|access-date=17 February 2017|archive-date=13 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413153246/https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/readout-presidents-call-president-xi-jinping-china/|url-status=live}}</ref>

On 23 May 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden announced the United States would intervene militarily if China were to unilaterally invade Taiwan. Speaking in Japan, President Biden stated, "That’s the commitment we made," an apparent reference to the Taiwan Relations Act, which ensures military support for Taiwan, although the Act does not specifically guarantee direct military action by the United States in Taiwan. President Biden emphasized that Russia's military invasion of Ukraine created an "even stronger" burden to protect Taiwan.<ref name="Boak 2022">{{cite web |last1=Boak |first1=Josh |last2=Madhani |first2=Aamer |last3=Miller |first3=Zeke |title=Biden: US would intervene with military to defend Taiwan |website=AP NEWS |date=23 May 2022 |url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-taiwan-china-4fb0ad0567ed5bbe46c01dd758e6c62b |access-date=23 May 2022 |archive-date=23 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220523072140/https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-taiwan-china-4fb0ad0567ed5bbe46c01dd758e6c62b |url-status=live }}</ref> China criticized Biden's statement as part of a "hypocritical and futile" pattern of encouragement to {{"'}}Taiwan independence' forces."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-05-25 |title=China Follows Biden Remarks by Announcing Taiwan Military Drills |language=en |work=Bloomberg.com |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-25/china-follows-biden-remarks-by-announcing-taiwan-military-drills |access-date=2022-07-05 |archive-date=13 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413153306/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-25/china-follows-biden-remarks-by-announcing-taiwan-military-drills |url-status=live }}</ref>  Biden later stated that his remarks did not represent a change from the status quo and the U.S. position of [[Policy of deliberate ambiguity|strategic ambiguity]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=2022-07-05 |title=Biden's Words on Taiwan Leave Allies in an Awkward Spot |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/asia/biden-taiwan-china-australia.html |access-date=2022-07-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705203130/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/24/world/asia/biden-taiwan-china-australia.html |archive-date=5 July 2022 |last1=Kanno-Youngs |first1=Zolan }}</ref> Secretary of State [[Antony Blinken]] also delivered a speech in which he stated that U.S. policy regarding the island had not changed, and the State Department updated its fact sheet to reinstate a line stating "we do not support Taiwan independence."<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-06-04 |title=U.S. updates Taiwan fact sheet again to say it does not support independence |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/04/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/us-state-department-taiwan-independence/ |access-date=2022-07-05 |website=The Japan Times |language=en-US |archive-date=6 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220706000953/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/04/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/us-state-department-taiwan-independence/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-05 |title=U.S. Relations With Taiwan - United States Department of State |url=https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ |access-date=2022-07-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705202907/https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/ |archive-date=5 July 2022 }}</ref>

In May 2026, US President [[Donald Trump]] announced he would have a discussion with Chinese leader [[Xi Jinping]] on the matter of arms sales to Taiwan during his [[2026 state visit by Donald Trump to China|visit to China]], potentially breaking with the Six Assurances.<ref>{{Cite news |last=McBride|first=Courtney|last2=Sullivan|first2=Kate|last3=Lee|first3=Yian|date=11 May 2026|title=Trump Says He Will Discuss Taiwan Arms Sales at Xi Summit|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-11/senators-push-trump-on-taiwan-arms-package-ahead-of-xi-summit?srnd=phx-politics|access-date=12 May 2026|work=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref> After the visit concluded, Trump confirmed that the matter of arms sales have been brought up, and said "He talked about that to me, obviously. So what am I going to do, say ‘I don't want to talk to you about it because I have an agreement that was signed in 1982?’"<ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-05-15|title=Trump noncommittal to continued Taiwan arms sales after meeting with Xi|url=https://www.politico.com/news/2026/05/15/trump-taiwan-arm-sales-00923280|access-date=2026-05-16|website=[[Politico]]|language=en}}</ref> In another interview, Trump said he was holding the arm sales to Taiwan "in abeyance and it depends on China" and said the arm sales are a "very good negotiating chip" with China.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley|first=Chris|date=2026-05-16|title=Trump Turns Taiwan Arms Sales Into Bargaining Chip With China|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/16/world/asia/trump-taiwan-arms-bargaining-chip-china.html|access-date=2026-05-16|work=[[The New York Times]]|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

=== Japanese position===
{{See also|China–Japan relations|Japan–Taiwan relations}}
{{Further|2025–2026 China–Japan diplomatic crisis}}

The 1972 [[Japan–China Joint Communiqué|Japan-China Joint Communiqué]] entered into as the basis of diplomatic normalization in [[Sino-Japanese Relations|Sino-Japanese relations]] states that the Government of Japan fully understands and respects the stance of the Government of the People's Republic of China that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." and that it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the [[Potsdam Declaration]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2022 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=48 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref>

Japan has recognized the People's Republic of China "as the sole legal Government of China" since 1975 but has maintained an ambiguous stance regarding the PRC's sovereignty claim over the island of Taiwan.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Liff |first1=Adam P. |title=Has Japan's policy toward the Taiwan Strait changed? |url=https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/23/has-japans-policy-toward-the-taiwan-strait-changed/ |website=Brookings |publisher=The Brookings Institution |access-date=16 April 2022 |date=23 August 2021 |archive-date=16 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220416041449/https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/23/has-japans-policy-toward-the-taiwan-strait-changed/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Russian position ===
{{See also|China–Russia relations|Russia–Taiwan relations}}

In 1949, the [[Soviet Union]] recognized the People's Republic of China as the only lawful government of China. The ROC on Taiwan had cancelled the [[Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance]] treaty in response. The Soviet Union voted to admit the PRC into the UN in 1971.

As with the past leaderships, the Russian government has accepted its support for the One-China policy that Taiwan is "an inalienable part of China, and [the Russian side] opposes any forms of independence", as stated in Article 5 of the [[2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship]]. This was reaffirmed in January 2022, when Russian and PRC leaders [[Vladimir Putin]] and [[Xi Jinping]] discussed the situation in the [[prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine]], and again in July 2022, by Russian foreign minister [[Sergei Lavrov]], as [[Speaker of the United States House of Representatives|United States Speaker of the House]] [[Nancy Pelosi]] visited Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite magazine|url = https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/russia-and-china-unveil-a-pact-against-america-and-the-west/|title = Russia and China Unveil a Pact Against America and the West|magazine = [[The New Yorker]]|date = 7 February 2022|access-date = 13 April 2023|archive-date = 12 April 2023|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230412055450/https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/russia-and-china-unveil-a-pact-against-america-and-the-west|url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60257080|title=China joins Russia in opposing Nato expansion|work=BBC News|date=4 February 2022|access-date=13 April 2023|archive-date=17 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220217171200/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60257080|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news | url=https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/russia-supports-one-china-policy-on-taiwan-lavrov-says/wcm/69ffe5ab-7683-43b9-9e6d-2c5a68c52a5c/amp/ | title=Russia supports 'one China' policy on Taiwan, Lavrov says | newspaper=National Post | date=29 July 2022 }}{{dead link|date=October 2025|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref>

=== Philippine policy===
{{See also|China–Philippines relations|Philippines–Taiwan relations}}

Similar to other countries, the Philippines maintain a One-China policy.<ref name=PH-bane>{{cite news |last1=Burgonio |first1=T. J. |title='One China' policy a bane to Taiwan's trade |url=https://globalnation.inquirer.net/160659/one-china-policy-bane-taiwans-trade |access-date=16 April 2022 |newspaper=Philippine Daily Inquirer |date=5 October 2017 |language=en |archive-date=16 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220416035614/https://globalnation.inquirer.net/160659/one-china-policy-bane-taiwans-trade |url-status=live }}</ref> However, despite officially recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China since 1975, the country also maintains economic and cultural relations with the Republic of China (or Taiwan).<ref name=PH-bane/><ref>{{cite news |title=China unhappy as Philippines signs investment deal with Taiwan |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-philippines-idUSKBN1E217F |access-date=16 April 2022 |work=Reuters |date=8 December 2017 |language=en |archive-date=16 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220416035614/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-philippines-idUSKBN1E217F |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Lito Banayo]], chair of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office in Taiwan remarked that the country's One-China policy only proscribes the Philippines to enter into political and military agreements with the ROC.<ref name=PH-bane/> High-ranking Filipino officials have suggested the reviewal of the country's position on the One China policy after repeated interference by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against the foreign affairs and territorial integrity of the Philippines.<ref>{{Cite web |date=January 17, 2024 |title=Hontiveros wants a review of PH’s political links with China |url=https://globalnation.inquirer.net/225441/hontiveros-wants-a-review-of-phs-political-links-with-one-china-policy |access-date=June 21, 2026 |website=Inquirer |language=en}}</ref>

=== African countries ===
The One China principle is an important factor in [[Sino-African relations|China-Africa relations]].<ref name=":32" />{{Rp|page=34}} In 1971, 26 African countries supported the United Nations General Assembly vote through which the PRC became the sole representative of China.<ref name=":32" />{{Rp|page=34}} The sole African country which does not recognize the PRC (and consequently which the PRC maintains no relations with) is [[Eswatini]].<ref name=":32" />{{Rp|page=22}} All African countries except Eswatini recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China and Taiwan as an integral part of Chinese territory, and support all efforts by the PRC to "achieve national reunification".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Five One-Chinas: The contest to define Taiwan |url=https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/one-china-contest-to-define-taiwan/ |access-date=2025-11-15 |website=[[Lowy Institute]] |language=en}}</ref>

== Cross-strait relations ==
{{Update section|date=September 2023}}{{multiple image
 | align     = right
 | direction = horizontal
 | image1    = Dscf0207.jpg
 | width1    = 200
 | alt1      =
 | caption1  = A propaganda sign on [[Dadan Island|Dadan]] (ROC) facing [[Xiamen]] (PRC) proclaiming "[[Three Principles of the People]] unites China"

 | image2    = Mawei China Propaganda facing Matsu.jpg
 | width2    = 200
 | alt2      =
 | caption2  = A propaganda sign on [[Mawei]] (PRC) facing [[Matsu Islands|Matsu]] (ROC) proclaiming "Peaceful reunification, [[One country, two systems]]."
}}
{{Main|Cross-strait relations}}

The People's Republic of China demands Taiwan acknowledge the One-China principle as a prerequisite to resume any cross-strait dialogue.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-says-china-will-oppose-any-behaviours-that-try-to-separate-the-country|title=19th Party Congress: Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China will be thwarted|last=Koh Ping|first=Chong|date=18 October 2017|work=The Straits Times|access-date=19 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018112744/http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-says-china-will-oppose-any-behaviours-that-try-to-separate-the-country|archive-date=18 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> The PRC offers the chance for open talks and "unobstructed exchanges" with Taiwan as long as it moves to accept the 1992 Consensus.<ref name=":0" /> The PRC's One-China policy rejects formulas which call for "[[two Chinas]]" or "[[one China, one Taiwan]]"<ref>{{Cite web | url = http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/White%20Papers/t36705.htm | title = White Paper—The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue | publisher = Embassy of the PRC in the USA | date = 6 August 1993 | access-date = 20 July 2008 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080808143607/http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/White%20Papers/t36705.htm | archive-date = 8 August 2008 | url-status = dead }}</ref> and has stated that efforts to divide the sovereignty of China could be met with military force.<ref>{{Cite web |date=10 August 2022 |title=Beijing's Taiwan white paper: the messages for home and abroad |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3188367/mainland-china-releases-white-paper-declaring-beijings-greatest |access-date=10 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220811033022/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3188367/mainland-china-releases-white-paper-declaring-beijings-greatest |url-status=live }}</ref>

The PRC has explicitly stated that it is flexible about the meaning "one China", and that "one China" may not necessarily be synonymous with the PRC, and has offered to talk with parties on Taiwan and the government on Taiwan on the basis of the [[Consensus of 1992]] which states that there is one China, but that there are different interpretations of that one China. For example, in Premier [[Zhu Rongji]]'s statements prior to the [[2000 Taiwan presidential election|2000 Presidential Election in Taiwan]], he stated that as long as any ruling power in Taiwan accepts the One-China principle, they can negotiate and discuss anything freely.

However, the One-China principle would apparently require that Taiwan formally give up any possibility of [[Taiwan independence|Taiwanese independence]], and would preclude any "one nation, two states" formula similar to ones used in German ''[[Ostpolitik]]'' or in [[Korean reunification]]. [[Chen Shui-bian]], president of the Republic of China between 2000 and 2008 repeatedly rejected the demands to accept the One-China principle and instead called for talks to discuss One China itself. With the [[2008 Republic of China legislative election|January]] and [[2008 Republic of China presidential election|March]] 2008 elections in Taiwan, and the election of [[Ma Ying-jeou]] as the President of the ROC, who was inaugurated on 20 May, a new era of better relations between both sides of the Taiwan Strait was established.<ref>{{Cite web |last=SHI |first=Zhe |date=2017 |title=Local elections in Taiwan in 2008 and changes in the island |trans-title=English |url=https://www.iiss.pku.edu.cn/fj/PDF/ciss_cn/upload/docs/2016-11-22/doc_8311479784227.pdf |access-date= |website= |quote=“ 国民党籍的马英九在2008年3月贏得台湾地区领导人选举，为两岸关系的进展，注入了全然不同以往的动力。”}}</ref> KMT officials visited mainland China, and the Chinese [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits|ARATS]] met in [[Beijing]] with its Taiwanese counterpart, the [[Straits Exchange Foundation]]. [[Cross-Strait charter|Direct charter flights]] were therefore established.

One China was the formulation held by the ROC government before the 1990s, but it was asserted that the one China was the Republic of China rather than PRC.  However, in 1991, President [[Lee Teng-hui]] indicated that he would not challenge the Communist authorities to rule mainland China.  This is a significant point in the history of [[Cross-Strait relations]] in that a president of the ROC no longer claims administrative authority over mainland China.  Henceforth, the [[Taiwan independence movement]] gained a political boost, and under Lee's administration the issue is no longer who rules mainland China, but who claims legitimacy over Taiwan and the surrounding islands.  Over the course of the 1990s, President Lee appeared to drift away from the One-China formulation, leading many to believe that he was actually sympathetic to Taiwan independence.  In 1999, Lee proposed a [[special state-to-state relations]] for mainland China–Taiwan relations which was received angrily by [[Beijing]], which ended semi-official dialogue until June 2008, when ARATS and SEF met, and in which President [[Ma Ying-jeou]] reiterated the 1992 Consensus and the different interpretation on "One China".

After the election of [[Chen Shui-bian]] in 2000, the policy of the ROC government was to propose negotiations without preconditions.  While Chen did not explicitly reject Lee's two states theory, he did not explicitly endorse it either.  Throughout 2001, there were unsuccessful attempts to find an acceptable formula for both sides, such as agreeing to "abide by the 1992 consensus".  Chen, after assuming the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship in July 2002, moved to a somewhat less ambiguous policy, and stated in early August 2002 that "it is clear that both sides of the straits are separate countries".  This statement was strongly criticized by opposition [[Pan-Blue Coalition]] parties on Taiwan, which support a One-China principle, but oppose defining this "One China" as the PRC.

The One-China policy became an issue during the [[2004 ROC Presidential election]].  Chen Shui-bian abandoned his earlier ambiguity and publicly rejected the One-China principle claiming it would imply that Taiwan is part of the PRC.  His opponent [[Lien Chan]] publicly supported a policy of "one China, different interpretations", as done in 1992. At the end of the 2004 election, Lien Chan and his running mate, [[James Soong]], later announced that they would not put ultimate unification as the goal for their cross-strait policy and would not exclude the possibility of an independent Taiwan in the future.  In an interview with Time Asia bureau prior to the 2004 presidential elections, Chen used the model of Germany and the European Union as examples of how countries may come together, and the Soviet Union as illustrating how a country may fragment.

In March 2005, the PRC passed an [[Anti-Secession Law]] which authorized the use of force to prevent a "serious incident" that breaks the One-China policy, but which at the same time did not identify one China with the People's Republic and offered to pursue political solutions. At the same session of the PRC Congress, a large increase in military spending was also passed, leading blue team members to interpret those measures as forcing the ROC to adhere to the One-China policy or else the PRC would attack.

In April and May 2005, Lien Chan and [[James Soong]] made separate trips to mainland China,<ref>
{{cite news | url = http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/site/Tj/ct.asp?xItem=21298&CtNode=122 | title = People First Party leader visits China after KMT head's return | newspaper = Taiwan Journal | date = 13 May 2005 | access-date = 20 July 2008 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090301041957/http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/site/Tj/ct.asp?xItem=21298&CtNode=122 | archive-date = 1 March 2009 | url-status = dead }}
</ref> during which both explicitly supported the [[Consensus of 1992]] and the concept of one China and in which both explicitly stated their parties' opposition to [[Taiwan independence]]. Although President Chen at one point supported the trips of Lien and Soong for defusing cross-strait tensions,<ref>
{{Cite news | url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4489739.stm | title = Lien's China trip highlights tensions | publisher = BBC | date = 27 April 2005 | first = Francis | last = Markus | access-date = 20 July 2008 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060314173632/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4489739.stm | archive-date = 14 March 2006 | url-status = live }}
</ref> he also attacked them for working with the "enemy" PRC{{Citation needed|date=June 2010}}. On 28 April 2008, Honorary Chairman [[Lien Chan]] of the then opposition [[Kuomintang]] visited Beijing and met with [[Hu Jintao]] for the fourth time since their historic encounter on 29 April 2005 in their respective capacity as party leaders of both the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT.  Lien also met [[Chen Yunlin]], director of the PRC's [[Taiwan Affairs Office]] of the State Council.<ref>
{{cite news | url = http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/04/27/153774/KMT's-Lien.htm | title = KMT's Lien to meet China's President Hu for fourth time | newspaper = The China Post | date = 27 April 2008 | access-date = 20 July 2008 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080503044750/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/04/27/153774/KMT%27s%2DLien.htm | archive-date = 3 May 2008 | url-status = dead }}
</ref>

On 28 May 2008, Kuomintang Chairman [[Wu Po-hsiung]] made a landmark visit to [[Beijing]],<ref>
{{cite news | url = http://en.bcnq.com/china/2008-05/27/content_6715745.htm | title = Kuomintang Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung arrives in Beijing | newspaper = China Daily | date = 27 May 2008 | access-date = 20 July 2008 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090301235008/http://en.bcnq.com/china/2008-05/27/content_6715745.htm | archive-date = 1 March 2009 | url-status = live }}
</ref> and met and shook hands with the Communist General Secretary [[Hu Jintao]], at the [[Great Hall of the People]]. He also visited the mausoleum of [[Sun Yat-sen]]. Hu Jintao called for resuming exchanges and talks, based on the [[1992 Consensus]].{{citation needed|date=September 2023}}

== See also ==
{{Portal|China|Taiwan|United States}}
* [[Dates of establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China]]
* [[Exclusive mandate]]
* [[Hallstein Doctrine]]
* [[One country, two systems]]
* [[Taiwanese nationalism]]
* [[Timeline of diplomatic relations of the Republic of China]]

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

==External links==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20061211233313/http://www.nwc.navy.mil/apsg/communiques.htm#U.S.-PRC%20JOINT%20COMMUNIQUE,%20August%2017,%20198 US-PRC Joint Communiqué, August 17, 1982]

{{Cross-Strait relations}}
{{China–United States relations}}
{{Taiwan–United States relations}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Cross-strait relations]]
[[Category:Foreign relations of China]]
[[Category:Foreign relations of Taiwan]]
[[Category:China–United States relations]]
[[Category:Opposition to Taiwan independence]]
[[Category:Taiwan–United States relations]]
[[Category:United States diplomacy]]
[[Category:Presidency of Richard Nixon]]
[[Category:Foreign policy doctrines]]