View source for Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

{{Short description|US-Soviet/Russian treaty (1987–2019)}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=August 2019}}
{{Infobox Treaty
| name = Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
| long_name = Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
| image = Reagan and Gorbachev signing.jpg
| image_width = 300 px
| image_alt = Gorbachev and Reagan sign the INF Treaty.
| caption = [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] and [[Ronald Reagan]] sign the INF Treaty.
| type = [[Nuclear disarmament]]
| date_drafted = 
| date_signed = 8 December 1987, 1:45&nbsp;pm.<ref name="astrolog">{{cite book|last1=Garthoff|first1=Raymond L.|title= The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War|url=https://archive.org/details/greattransitiona00gart|url-access=registration|date=1994|isbn= 978-0-8157-3060-6 |page=[https://archive.org/details/greattransitiona00gart/page/326 326]|publisher=Brookings Institution |quote=The reason for this precision of timing… was a mystery to almost everyone in both governments…  Only much later did it become known that the time had been selected as propitious by Nancy Reagan's astrologer}}</ref>
| location_signed = [[White House]], [[Washington, D.C.]], United States
| date_sealed = 
| date_effective = 1 June 1988
| date_expiration = 2 August 2019 (U.S. withdrawal)
| condition_effective = [[Ratification]] by the Soviet Union and United States
| signatories = *{{flagicon|Soviet Union}} [[Mikhail Gorbachev]]
*{{flagicon|United States}} [[Ronald Reagan]]
| parties = {{flag|Soviet Union}}<br />{{flag|United States}}
| depositories = 
| language = 
| languages = English and Russian
| footnotes = [https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm Text] of the INF Treaty
| citations = 
}}
The '''Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty''' ('''INF Treaty'''){{Efn|Formally the ''Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles''; {{Langx|ru|Договор о ликвидации ракет средней и меньшей дальности}} / ДРСМД; {{transliteration|ru|Dogovor o likvidatsiy raket sredney i menshey dalnosti / DRSMD}}}} was an [[arms control]] [[treaty]] between the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] (and its successor state, the [[Russia|Russian Federation]]). [[President of the United States|US President]] [[Ronald Reagan]] and [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet General Secretary]] [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] signed the treaty on 8 December 1987.<ref name="astrolog" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm|title=Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)|website=U.S. Department of State|access-date=2019-02-08}}</ref> The [[United States Senate|US Senate]] approved the treaty on 27 May 1988, and Reagan and Gorbachev [[ratified]] it on 1 June 1988.<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQC7NeVS4UE |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211212/UQC7NeVS4UE| archive-date=2021-12-12 |url-status=live|title=Reagan And Gorbachev Meet, Reagan And Gorbachev Sign Ratification Instruments For INF Treaty|last=AP Archive|date=21 July 2015 |via=YouTube}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

The INF Treaty banned all of the two nations' nuclear and conventional ground-launched [[ballistic missile]]s, [[cruise missiles]], and missile launchers with ranges of {{convert|1000–5,500|km|mi|abbr=on}} ("intermediate-range") and {{convert|500–1,000|km|mi|sp=us}} ("shorter-range"). The treaty did not apply to air- or sea-launched missiles.<ref name="statedept">{{cite web |title= INF Treaty |publisher= United States Department of State |url= https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm |access-date=4 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/world/europe/inf-treaty.html|title=What Is the I.N.F. Treaty and Why Does It Matter?|first1=Andrew E.|last1=Kramer|first2=Megan|last2=Specia|newspaper=The New York Times|date=1 February 2019}}</ref> By May 1991, the nations had eliminated 2,692 missiles, followed by 10 years of on-site verification inspections.<ref name="sipri2007">{{cite book |title=SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security |author=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |year=2007 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ys0bJwNfF_MC&pg=PA683 | page=683|isbn=978-0-19-923021-1}}</ref>

President [[Donald Trump]] announced on 20 October 2018 that he was withdrawing the US from the treaty due to Russian non-compliance,<ref name="nytleave" /><ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia|title=Trump says US will withdraw from nuclear arms treaty with Russia|last= Pengelly|first=Martin|date=20 October 2018|website=The Guardian |access-date=20 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=What the INF Treaty's Collapse Means for Nuclear Proliferation |url=https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-inf-treatys-collapse-means-nuclear-proliferation |access-date=2023-07-22 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |language=en}}</ref> claiming that Russia had breached the treaty by developing and deploying an intermediate-range cruise missile known as the SSC-8 ([[Novator 9M729]]).<ref>{{Cite web |title=9M729 (SSC-8) |url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-novator-9m729/ |access-date=2023-07-22 |website=Missile Threat |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="jbgnm">{{cite news |last1=Borger |first1=Julian |title=US Nato envoy's threat to Russia: stop developing missile or we'll 'take it out' |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/02/us-ambassador-nato-russia-kay-bailey-hutchison |publisher=Guardian News & Media Limited |date=2 October 2018}}</ref>  The Trump administration claimed another reason for the withdrawal was to counter a [[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|Chinese arms buildup in the Pacific]], including within the [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea#United States|South China Sea]], as China was not a signatory to the treaty.<ref name=nytleave /><ref name="trump" /><ref name=reutersleave /> The US formally suspended the treaty on 1 February 2019,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/us-russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-pompeo/index.html|title=Pompeo announces suspension of nuclear arms treaty|access-date=1 February 2019|website=CNN}}</ref> and Russia did so on the following day in response.<ref>[https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance], Arms Control Association, August 2019.</ref> The United States formally withdrew from the treaty on 2 August 2019.<ref name=bbcinftreaty>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49198565|title=INF nuclear treaty: US pulls out of Cold War-era pact with Russia|work=[[BBC News]]|date= 2 August 2019|access-date=2 August 2019}}</ref>

== Background ==
In March 1976, the Soviet Union first deployed the [[RSD-10 Pioneer]] (called ''SS-20 Saber'' in the West) in its European territories; it was [[Transporter erector launcher|a mobile, concealable]] [[intermediate-range ballistic missile]] (IRBM) with a [[multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle]] (MIRV) containing three nuclear 150-kiloton [[warhead]]s.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4814/1/1998CantPhD.pdf |title=The development of the SS-20 |last=Cant|first=James|date=May 1998|website=Glasgow Thesis Service |access-date=9 January 2019}}</ref> The SS-20's range of {{convert|4700–5,000|km|mi|sp=us}} was long enough to reach Western Europe from well within Soviet territory; it was just below the [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks#SALT II Treaty|Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) Treaty]] minimum range for an [[intercontinental ballistic missile]] (ICBM), {{convert|5500|km|mi|abbr=on}}.<ref name=ss20>{{cite web |title=RSD-10 MOD 1/-MOD 2 (SS-20) |publisher=Missile Threat |date=17 October 2012 |url=http://missilethreat.com/missiles/rsd-10-mod-1-mod-2-ss-20/ |access-date=15 August 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160828104632/http://missilethreat.com/missiles/rsd-10-mod-1-mod-2-ss-20/ |archive-date=28 August 2016  }}</ref><ref name=faschron>{{cite web |title=Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Chronology |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |url=http://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm |access-date=15 August 2016}}</ref>{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=7}} The SS-20 replaced the aging [[SS-4 Sandal]] and [[SS-5 Skean]], which were seen to pose a limited threat to Western Europe due to their poor accuracy, limited payload (one warhead), lengthy time to prepare to launch, difficulty of concealment, and a lack of mobility that exposed them to [[First strike (nuclear strategy)|pre-emptive]] [[NATO]] strikes ahead of a planned attack.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|pp=6–7}} While the SS-4 and SS-5 were seen as defensive weapons, the SS-20 was seen as a potentially offensive system.<ref name=adst />

The United States, then under President [[Jimmy Carter]], initially considered its [[strategic nuclear weapon]]s and nuclear-capable aircraft to be adequate counters to the SS-20 and a sufficient deterrent against possible Soviet aggression. In 1977, however, Chancellor [[Helmut Schmidt]] of [[West Germany]] argued in a speech that a Western response to the SS-20 deployment should be explored, a call which was echoed by NATO, given a perceived Western disadvantage in European nuclear forces.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=7}} [[Leslie H. Gelb]], the US [[Assistant Secretary of State]], later recounted that Schmidt's speech pressured the US into developing a response.<ref name=gelb />

[[File:Miss launch veh.jpg|thumb|SS-20 launchers]]
On 12 December 1979, following European pressure for a response to the SS-20, Western foreign and defense ministers meeting in [[Brussels]] made the [[NATO Double-Track Decision]].{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=7}} The ministers argued that the [[Warsaw Pact]] had "developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe": "theater" nuclear systems (i.e., [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s).{{sfn|Legge|1983|p=1}} In describing this aggravated situation, the ministers made direct reference to the SS-20 featuring "significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads". The ministers also attributed the altered situation to the deployment of the Soviet [[Tupolev Tu-22M]] [[strategic bomber]], which they believed had much greater performance than its predecessors. Furthermore, the ministers expressed concern that the Soviet Union had gained an advantage over NATO in "Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces" (LRTNF), and also significantly increased short-range theater nuclear capacity.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001060621.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170120155134/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001060621.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=20 January 2017|title=Soviet Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces|date=6 April 1978|website=CIA.gov|access-date=8 February 2019}}</ref>

The Double-Track Decision involved two policy "tracks". Initially, 1,000 of the 7,400 theater nuclear warheads would be removed from Europe, and the US would pursue bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, intended to limit theater nuclear forces. Should these negotiations fail, NATO would modernize its own LRTNF, or intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), by replacing US [[Pershing 1a]] missiles with 108 [[Pershing II]] launchers in West Germany and deploying 464 [[BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile]]s (GLCMs) to Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom beginning in December 1983.<ref name=faschron /><ref name=doubletrack>{{cite web |title=Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The "Double-Track" Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces) |publisher=NATO |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090227173641/http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b791212a.htm |archive-date=27 February 2009 |url=http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b791212a.htm |date=12 December 1979 |access-date=15 August 2016}}</ref>{{sfn|Legge|1983|pp=1–2, 35–37}}{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|pp=8–9}}

== Negotiations ==
=== Early negotiations: 1981–1983 ===
The Soviet Union and United States agreed to open negotiations and preliminary discussions, named the Preliminary Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks,<ref name=faschron /> which began in [[Geneva]], Switzerland, in October 1980. The relations were strained at the time due to the 1979 [[Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]] which led America to impose sanctions against the USSR. On 20 January 1981, [[Ronald Reagan]] was sworn into office after defeating Jimmy Carter in the [[1980 United States presidential election]]. Formal talks began on 30 November 1981, with the US negotiators led by Reagan and those of the Soviet Union by [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]], [[Leonid Brezhnev]]. The core of the US negotiating position reflected the principles put forth under Carter: any limits placed on US INF capabilities, both in terms of "ceilings" and "rights", must be reciprocated with limits on Soviet systems. Additionally, the US insisted that a sufficient verification regime be put in place.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|pp=6, 9}}

[[File:Paul Nitze (1983).jpg|thumb|150px|Paul Nitze, 1983]]
[[Paul Nitze]], an experienced politician and long-time presidential advisor on defense policy who had participated in the SALT talks, led the US delegation after being recruited by Secretary of State [[Alexander Haig]]. Though Nitze had backed the first SALT treaty, he opposed SALT II and had resigned from the US delegation during its negotiation. Nitze was also then a member of the [[Committee on the Present Danger]], a firmly [[Anti-Sovietism|anti-Soviet]] group composed of conservative [[Republican Party (United States)|Republicans]].<ref name=gelb>{{cite web |url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-19/gelb3.html |title=Interview with Leslie H. Gelb |publisher=National Security Archive |date=28 February 1999 |access-date=19 August 2016}}</ref><ref name=nitzensa>{{cite web |url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/ |title="The Master of the Game": Paul H. Nitze and U.S. Cold War Strategy from Truman to Reagan |last1=Burr |first1=William |last2=Wampler |first2=Robert |date=27 October 2004 |publisher=[[National Security Archive]] |access-date=19 August 2016}}</ref> Yuli Kvitsinsky, the second-ranking official at the Soviet embassy in West Germany, headed the Soviet delegation.<ref name=adst>{{cite web |title=Paul Nitze and A Walk in the Woods – A Failed Attempt at Arms Control |publisher=[[Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training]] |url=http://adst.org/2016/03/paul-nitze-and-a-walk-in-the-woods-a-failed-attempt-at-arms-control/ |access-date=19 August 2016|date=30 March 2016 }}</ref>{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=9}}<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/09/25/Yuli-A-Kvitsinsky-Chief-Soviet-arms-control-negotiator/4040370238400/ |title=Yuli A. Kvitsinsky: Chief Soviet arms control negotiator |work=[[United Press International]] |date=25 September 1981 |access-date=19 August 2016}}</ref><ref name=chiptheice>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/06/weekinreview/the-world-in-summary-arms-negotiators-in-geneva-begin-to-chip-the-ice.html |title=The World in Summary; Arms Negotiators in Geneva Begin To Chip the Ice |work=The New York Times |last1= Freudenheim |first1=Milt |last2=Slavin |first2=Barbara |date=6 December 1981 |access-date=19 August 2016}}</ref>

On 18 November 1981, shortly before the beginning of formal talks, Reagan made the [[Zero Option]] or "zero-zero" proposal.<ref name=bostonreview>{{cite news |title=Reagan and Nuclear Disarmament |last=Wittner |first=Lawrence S. |work=[[Boston Review]] |date=1 April 2000 |url=http://bostonreview.net/us/lawrence-s-wittner-reagan-and-nuclear-disarmament |access-date=17 August 2016}}</ref> It called for a hold on US deployment of GLCM and Pershing II systems, reciprocated by Soviet elimination of its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles. There appeared to be little chance of the Zero Option being adopted due to Soviet opposition, but the gesture was well received by the European public. In February 1982, US negotiators put forth a draft treaty containing the Zero Option and a global prohibition on intermediate- and short-range missiles, with compliance ensured via a stringent, though unspecified, verification program.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=9}}

Opinion within the Reagan administration on the Zero Option was mixed. [[Richard Perle]], then the [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs]], was the architect of the plan. Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]], who supported a continued US nuclear presence in Europe, was skeptical of the plan, though eventually accepted it for its value in putting the Soviet Union "on the defensive in the European propaganda war". Reagan later recounted that the "zero option sprang out of the realities of nuclear politics in Western Europe".<ref name=bostonreview /> The Soviet Union rejected the plan shortly after the US tabled it in February 1982, arguing that both the US and USSR should be able to retain intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Specifically, Soviet negotiators proposed that the number of INF missiles and aircraft deployed in Europe by each side be capped at 600 by 1985 and 300 by 1990. Concerned that this proposal would force the US to withdraw aircraft from Europe and not deploy INF missiles, given US cooperation with existing British and French deployments, the US proposed "equal rights and limits"—the US would be permitted to match Soviet SS-20 deployments.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=9}}

Between 1981 and 1983, American and Soviet negotiators gathered for six rounds of talks, each two months in length—a system based on the earlier SALT talks.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=9}} The US delegation was composed of Nitze, [[Major general (United States)|Major General]] William F. Burns of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], [[Thomas Graham Jr. (diplomat)|Thomas Graham]] of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]] (ACDA), and officials from the [[US Department of State]], [[Office of the Secretary of Defense]], and [[US National Security Council]]. [[Colonel (United States)|Colonel]] Norman Clyne, a SALT talks participant, served as Nitze's [[chief of staff]].<ref name=adst /><ref name=burns>{{cite web |title=Nomination of William F. Burns To Be Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency |date=7 January 1988 |url=https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1988/010788a.htm |publisher=[[Ronald Reagan Presidential Library]] |access-date=19 August 2016 |archive-date=21 September 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160921043637/https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1988/010788a.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>

There was little convergence between the two sides over these two years. A US effort to separate the question of nuclear-capable aircraft from that of intermediate-range missiles successfully focused attention on the latter, but little clear progress on the subject was made. In the summer of 1982, Nitze and Kvitsinsky took a "walk in the woods" in the [[Jura Mountains]], away from formal negotiations in Geneva, in an independent attempt to bypass bureaucratic procedures and break the negotiating deadlock.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|pp=9–10}}<ref name=adst /><ref name=nytimesnitze /> Nitze later said that his and Kvitsinsky's goal was to agree to certain concessions that would allow for a summit meeting between Brezhnev and Reagan later in 1982.<ref name=nitzeint>{{cite interview |last=Nitze |first=Paul |title=Paul Nitze Interview |date=20 October 1990 |location=Washington, D.C. |interviewer=[[Academy of Achievement]] |url=http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/nit0int-1 |access-date=20 August 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161109101413/http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/nit0int-1 |archive-date=9 November 2016}}</ref>
[[File:Overzicht op Museumplein met spandoek The Dutch disease is better for peace o, Bestanddeelnr 253-8627.jpg|thumb|Protest in Amsterdam against the [[nuclear arms race]] between the United States/NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact]]

Nitze's offer to Kvitsinsky was that the US would forego deployment of the Pershing II and limit the deployment of GLCMs to 75. The Soviet Union, in return, would also have to limit itself to 75 intermediate-range missile launchers in Europe and 90 in Asia. Due to each GLCM launcher containing four GLCMs and each SS-20 launcher containing three warheads, such an agreement would have resulted in the US having 75 more intermediate-range warheads in Europe than the USSR, though Soviet SS-20s were seen as more advanced and maneuverable than American GLCMs. While Kvitsinsky was skeptical that the plan would be well-received in Moscow, Nitze was optimistic about its chances in Washington.<ref name=nitzeint/> The deal ultimately found little traction in either capital. In the United States, the Office of the Secretary of Defense opposed Nitze's proposal, as it opposed any proposal that would allow the Soviet Union to deploy missiles to Europe while blocking American deployments. Nitze's proposal was relayed by Kvitsinsky to Moscow, where it was also rejected. The plan accordingly was never introduced into formal negotiations.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|pp=9–10}}<ref name=adst />

[[Thomas Graham Jr. (diplomat)|Thomas Graham]], a US negotiator, later recalled that Nitze's "walk in the woods" proposal was primarily of Nitze's own design and known beforehand only to Burns and [[Eugene V. Rostow]], the director of ACDA. In a [[National Security Council (United States)|National Security Council]] meeting following the Nitze-Kvitsinsky walk, the proposal was received positively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Reagan. Following protests by Perle, working within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reagan informed Nitze that he would not back the plan. The State Department, then led by Haig, also indicated that it would not support Nitze's plan and preferred a return to the Zero Option proposal.<ref name=adst /><ref name=nytimesnitze>{{cite news |title=Paul H. Nitze, Missile Treaty Negotiator and Cold War Strategist, Dies at 97 |date=21 October 2004 |last=Berger |first=Marilyn |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/21/politics/paul-h-nitze-missile-treaty-negotiator-and-cold-war-strategist.html |access-date=20 August 2016}}</ref><ref name=nitzeint/> Nitze argued that one positive consequence of the walk in the woods was that the Western European public, which had doubted American interest in arms control, became convinced that the US was participating in the INF negotiations in good faith.<ref name=nitzeint/>

In early 1983, US negotiators indicated that they would support a plan beyond the Zero Option if the plan established equal rights and limits for the US and USSR, with such limits valid worldwide, and excluded British and French missile systems (as well as those of any other third party). As a temporary measure, the US negotiators also proposed a cap of 450 deployed INF warheads around the world for both the United States and Soviet Union. In response, Soviet negotiators proposed that a plan would have to block all US INF deployments in Europe, cover both missiles and aircraft, include third parties, and focus primarily on Europe for it to gain Soviet backing. In the fall of 1983, just ahead of the scheduled deployment of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the United States lowered its proposed limit on global INF deployments to 420 missiles, while the Soviet Union proposed "equal reductions": if the US cancelled the planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCM systems, the Soviet Union would reduce its own INF deployment by 572 warheads. In November 1983, after the first Pershing IIs arrived in West Germany, the Soviet Union ended negotiations.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012|p=10}}

=== Restarted negotiations: 1985–1987 ===
[[File:President Ronald Reagan shaking hands with Mikhail Gorbachev.jpg|thumb|Reagan and Gorbachev shake hands after signing the INF Treaty ratification during the [[Moscow Summit (1988)|Moscow Summit]] on 1 June 1988.]]
British Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] played a key role in brokering the negotiations between Reagan and new Soviet General Secretary [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] in 1986 to 1987.<ref>Charles Moore, ''Margaret Thatcher: At Her Zenith'' (2016) 2: 23–26, 594–5.</ref>

In March 1986, negotiations between the US and the USSR resumed, covering not only the INF issue, but also the separate [[START I|Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]] (START I) and space issues (Nuclear and Space Talks). In late 1985, both sides were moving towards limiting INF systems in Europe and Asia. On 15 January 1986, Gorbachev announced a Soviet proposal for a ban on all nuclear weapons by 2000, which included INF missiles in Europe. This was dismissed by the United States as a [[public relations stunt]] and countered with a phased reduction of INF launchers in Europe and Asia with the target of none by 1989. There would be no constraints on British and French nuclear forces.<ref>Charles Moore, ''Margaret Thatcher: At Her Zenith'' (2016) 2: 590–96.</ref>

A series of meetings in August and September 1986 culminated in the [[Reykjavík Summit]] between Reagan and Gorbachev on 11 and 12 October 1986. Both agreed in principle to remove INF systems from Europe and to equal global limits of 100 INF missile warheads. Gorbachev also proposed deeper and more fundamental changes in the strategic relationship. More detailed negotiations extended throughout 1987, aided by the decision of West German Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] in August to remove the joint US-West German Pershing 1a systems. Initially, Kohl had opposed the total elimination of the Pershing missiles, claiming that such a move would increase his nation's vulnerability to an attack by Warsaw Pact forces.<ref>{{Cite book|title=A History of Germany: 1815–1990|last=Carr|first=William|publisher=Harold & Stoughton|year=1991|edition=4th|location=London, United Kingdom|page=393}}</ref> The treaty text was finally agreed in September 1987. On 8 December 1987, the treaty was officially signed by Reagan and Gorbachev at a summit in Washington and ratified the following May in a 93–5 vote by the [[United States Senate]].<ref>{{cite book|author=CQ Press|title=Guide to Congress|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iqN2AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA253|year=2012|publisher=SAGE |pages=252–53|isbn=978-1-4522-3532-5}}</ref><ref>"Senate Votes 93-5 to Approve Ratification of the INF Treaty", ''CQ Weekly Report'' 42#22 (1988): 1431–35.</ref>

==Contents==
The treaty prohibited both parties from possessing, producing, or flight-testing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of {{cvt|500–5,500|km}}. Possessing or producing ground-based launchers of those missiles was also prohibited. The ban extended to weapons with both nuclear and conventional warheads, but did not cover air-delivered or sea-based missiles.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm|title=Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)|website=U.S. Department of State|access-date=8 February 2019}}</ref> Existing weapons had to be destroyed, and a protocol for mutual inspection was agreed upon.<ref name=":3" /> Each party had the right to withdraw from the treaty with six months' notice, "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests".<ref name=":3" />

==Timeline==
=== Implementation ===
[[File:INF inspection.JPEG|thumb|A Russian inspector examines a [[BGM-109G Gryphon]] ground-launched cruise missile in 1988 prior to its dismantling.]]
[[File:Soviet inspectors at RAF Greenham Common 1989.JPEG|thumb|Accompanied by their NATO counterparts, Soviet inspectors enter a nuclear weapons storage area at [[RAF Greenham Common|Greenham Common]], UK, 1989.]]
[[File:Ambassador_Malloy_Witnesses_the_Elimination_of_the_Last_Soviet_Short-Range_Missiles_Under_the_INF_Treaty.jpg|thumb|Ambassador [[Eileen Malloy]], chief of the arms control unit at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, at the destruction site in [[Sary-Ozek, Almaty Region|Saryozek]] in early 1990]]
By the treaty's deadline of 1 June 1991, a total of 2,692 of such weapons had been destroyed, 846 by the US and 1,846 by the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/why-europe-needs-to-support-the-us-russia-inf-treaty/ |title=Why Europe needs to support the US-Russia INF Treaty |last1=Trakimavicius |first1=Lukas |date=15 May 2018 |publisher=EurActiv |access-date=18 May 2018}}</ref> The following specific missiles, their launcher systems, and their transporter vehicles were destroyed:<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm|title=Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)|work=U.S. Department of State|access-date=21 October 2018}}</ref>

* United States
** [[BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile]] (decommissioned)
** [[Pershing 1a]] (decommissioned)
** [[Pershing II]] (decommissioned)
* Soviet Union (listed by [[NATO reporting name]])
** [[SS-4 Sandal]] (decommissioned)
** [[SS-5 Skean]] (decommissioned)
** [[SS-12 Scaleboard]] (decommissioned)
** [[SS-20 Saber]] (decommissioned)
** [[SS-23 Spider]] (decommissioned)
** [[SSC-X-4 Slingshot]]

=== Treaty after December 1991 ===
Five months prior to the [[Dissolution of the Soviet Union|collapse of the Soviet Union]] in December 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union completed the dismantling of their intermediate-range missiles on May 28 as outlined by the INF Treaty.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=July 2010 |title=Adherence to and the Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/145181.pdf |access-date=April 25, 2022 |website=U.S. Department of State}}</ref> After the collapse of the [[Soviet Union]], the United States focused on negotiations with Belarus, Kazakhstan, [[Russia]], and Ukraine to preserve the [[START I|START 1]] treaty that further decreased nuclear armament. The United States considered twelve of the [[post-Soviet states]] to be inheritors of the treaty obligations (the three Baltic states are considered to preexist their [[Soviet occupation of the Baltic states|illegal annexation]] by the Soviet Union in 1940).<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mendelsohn |first=Jack |date=April 1991 |title=Why START? |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23624481 |journal=Arms Control Today |volume=21 |issue=3 |pages=3–9|jstor=23624481 }}</ref> The US did not focus immediate attention on the preservation of the INF Treaty because the disarmament of INF missiles already occurred.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012}}{{page needed|date=May 2022}} Eventually, the US began negotiations to maintain the treaty in the six newly independent states of the former Soviet Union that contained INF sites subject to inspection: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, with Russia being the USSR's [[Russia and the United Nations|official successor state]] and inheriting its nuclear arsenal.{{sfn|Bohlen|Burns|Pifer|Woodworth|2012}}{{page needed|date=May 2022}} From these six countries, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine entered agreements to continue the fulfillment of the INF Treaty.<ref name=":1" />  The remaining two states, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, became passive participants in the negotiations with approval from the other participating states due to the presence of a single inspection site in each country.<ref name=":1" /> Inspection of INF missile sites continued until May 31, 2001, as stipulated by the 13-year inspection agreement within the treaty.<ref name=":4" /> After this period, the United States and Russia continued to share national technical means of verification and notifications to ensure that each state maintained compliance.<ref name=":4" /> The treaty states continued to meet at Special Verification Committees after the end of the inspection period. There were 30 total meetings with the final meeting occurring in November 2016 in Geneva, Switzerland with the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine meeting to discuss compliance obligations.<ref name=":4" />

=== Initial skepticism and allegations of treaty violations===
In February 2007, [[Vladimir Putin]], the [[President of Russia|President of the Russian Federation]], gave a [[Munich speech of Vladimir Putin|speech at the Munich Security Conference]] in which he said the INF Treaty should be revisited to ensure security, as it only restricted Russia and the US but not other countries.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ft.com/content/b4eef8e6-b91d-11db-a5bc-0000779e2340 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/https://www.ft.com/content/b4eef8e6-b91d-11db-a5bc-0000779e2340 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |url-access=subscription|title=Putin rails against US foreign policy|newspaper=Financial Times|date=10 February 2007|access-date=8 February 2019}}</ref> The [[Chief of the General Staff (Russia)|Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation]], [[General of the Army (Russia)|Army General]] [[Yuri Baluyevsky]], contemporaneously said that Russia was planning to unilaterally withdraw from the treaty in response to deployment of the [[NATO missile defence system]] in Europe and because other countries were not bound to the treaty.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6365000/6365413.stm|title=Россия "может выйти" из договора с США о ракетах|work=[[BBC]]|date=15 February 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120324141538/http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_6365000/6365413.stm|url-status=live|archive-date=24 March 2012}}</ref>

According to US officials, Russia violated the treaty in 2008 by testing the [[RK-55|SSC-8 cruise missile]], which has a range of {{cvt|3000|km}}.<ref name="nytimes deploy">{{cite news|last1=Gordon|first1=Michael R.|title=Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/europe/russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty.html?_r=0|access-date=12 February 2018|work=The New York Times|date=14 February 2017}}</ref><ref name="SIPRI89">{{citation | url=http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_89010101a_86.pdf | title=SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament | last=Norris, Cochran | year=1989 | page=21 | display-authors=etal | access-date=2009-02-04 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081209055524/http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_89010101a_86.pdf | archive-date=2008-12-09 | url-status=dead }}</ref> Russia rejected the claim that their SSC-8 missiles violated the treaty, claiming that the SSC-8 has a maximum range of only {{cvt|480|km}}.{{citation needed|date=December 2020}} In 2013, it was reported that Russia had tested and planned to continue testing two missiles in ways that could violate the terms of the treaty: the road-mobile [[RT-2PM Topol|SS-25]] and the newer [[Rubezh|RS-26]] ICBMs.<ref name=rogin>{{cite web |url=http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/us-disclosed-to-some-but-not-all-nato-allies-that-russia-violated-inf-treaty |title=US Reluctant to Disclose to All NATO Allies that Russia is Violating INF Treaty |last1=Rogin |first1=Josh |date=7 December 2013 |publisher=The Atlantic Council |access-date=7 December 2013}}</ref> The US representatives briefed NATO on other Russian breaches of the INF Treaty in 2014<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-25964387 |title=US briefs Nato on Russian 'nuclear treaty breach' |last1=Marcus |first1=Jonathan |date=30 January 2014 |newspaper=BBC News |access-date=31 January 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/29/moscow-russia-violated-cold-war-nuclear-treaty-iskander-r500-missile-test-us |title=Moscow may walk out of nuclear treaty after US accusations of breach |last1=Luhn |first1=Alec |last2=Borger |first2=Julian |date=29 July 2014 |work=The Guardian |access-date=29 July 2014}}</ref> and 2017.<ref name="nytimes deploy" /><ref name="House">{{Cite journal|last=Woolf|first=Amy F.|date=27 January 2017|title=Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress|url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1026962|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170618084029/http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1026962|url-status=live|archive-date=18 June 2017|journal=Congressional Research Service|issue=7–5700}}</ref> In 2018, NATO formally supported the US claims and accused Russia of breaking the treaty.<ref name=bbcinftreaty/><ref>{{cite web |title=Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty |url=https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_161122.htm |publisher=NATO |access-date=4 December 2018}}</ref> Russia denied the accusation and Putin said it was a pretext for the US to withdraw from the treaty.<ref name=bbcinftreaty/> A [[BBC]] analysis of the meeting that culminated in the NATO statement said that "NATO allies here share Washington's concerns and have backed the US position, thankful perhaps that it includes this short grace period during which Russia might change its mind."<ref>{{cite news |title=Nato accuses Russia of breaking nuclear missile treaty |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46443672 |work=BBC |date=4 December 2018}}</ref>

In 2011, Dan Blumenthal of the [[American Enterprise Institute]] wrote that the actual Russian problem with the INF Treaty was that China was not bound by it and continued to build up their own intermediate-range forces.<ref>Mark Stokes and Dan Blumenthal [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123104108.html "Can a treaty contain China's missiles?"] ''[[Washington Post]]'', 2 January 2011.</ref>

According to Russian officials and the American academic [[Theodore Postol]], the US decision to deploy [[United States national missile defense|its missile defense system]] in Europe was a violation of the treaty as they claim they could be quickly retrofitted with offensive capabilities;<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thebulletin.org/2019/02/russia-may-have-violated-the-inf-treaty-heres-how-the-united-states-appears-to-have-done-the-same/|title=Russia may have violated the INF Treaty. Here's how the United States appears to have done the same.|date=2019-02-07|website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|access-date=2019-02-08 |quote= The Western press has often treated the Russian claim that US missile defense installations have an offensive capability as rhetorical obfuscation. But publicly available information makes it clear that the US Aegis-based systems in Eastern Europe, if equipped with cruise missiles, would indeed violate the INF.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Kennedy |first1=Kristian |title=Destabilizing Missile Politics Return to Europe, Part II: For Russia, Pershing II Redux? |url=http://natoassociation.ca/destabilizing-missile-politics-return-to-europe-part-ii-for-russia-pershing-ii-redux/ |website=NAOC|date=12 July 2018 }}</ref><ref name=euractivdestroy>{{cite news |last1=Gotev |first1=Georgi |title=Moscow: US comments on possible destruction of Russian warheads are dangerous |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/moscow-us-comments-on-possible-destruction-of-russian-warheads-are-dangerous/ |agency=euractiv}}</ref> this accusation has in turn been rejected by US and NATO officials and academic [[Jeffrey Lewis (academic)|Jeffrey Lewis]].<ref name=euractivdestroy/><ref>{{cite news |last1=Majumdar |first1=Dave |title=Russia's Dangerous Nuclear Forces are Back |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-dangerous-nuclear-forces-are-back-19442 |agency=National Review |date=14 February 2017 |quote=The Russians will inevitably claim that the United States violated the INF treaty first with Aegis Ashore missile defense sites, which use the Mk-41 vertical launch system. The Mk-41 is capable of launching the Tomahawk cruise missile—which could be argued is a violation of the treaty. "As for the Mk 41, it's kind of a [flimsy] argument," Lewis said. "The Mk-41 is a launcher, right? So... The treaty prohibits 'GLCM launchers' and 'GLBM launchers.' The Tomahawk is permitted because it is a SLCM. Moving the MK41 to land would be a problem if we then fired a Tomahawk off it.  But we've only fired SAMs out of it and the treaty contains an exception for SAMs. Then the Tomahawk would be a GLCM.  But it's not." The United States has offered to allow Moscow to inspect the Mk-41 sites to verify that they do not contain Tomahawks, however, the Russians have refused. "As a practical matter, the U.S. should—and in fact has—offered to let the Russians take a look and reassure themselves," Lewis said. "Russians refused."}}</ref> Russian experts also stated that the US usage of target missiles and [[unmanned aerial vehicle]]s, such as the [[General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper|MQ-9 Reaper]] and [[Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton|MQ-4 Triton]], violated the INF Treaty,<ref>{{cite news |url=https://news.usni.org/2014/07/31/russian-nuclear-treaty-violation-basics |title=Russian Nuclear Treaty Violation: The Basics |last1=Adomanis |first1=Mark |date=31 July 2014 |publisher=U.S. Naval Institute |access-date=31 July 2014}}</ref> which has also in turn been rejected by US officials.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Herteleer |first1=Simon |title=Analysis: The INF Treaty |url=http://www.atahq.org/2019/02/analysis-inf-treaty/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190807214918/http://www.atahq.org/2019/02/analysis-inf-treaty/ |url-status=usurped |archive-date=7 August 2019 |agency=ATA |date=11 February 2019 |quote=Russia furthermore claims that the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the MQ-9 Reaper and the MQ-4 violate the INF treaty, something the United States vehemently denies.}}</ref>

===US withdrawal and termination===
{{See also|Nuclear arms race|Cold War II}}
The US declared its intention to withdraw from the treaty on 20 October 2018, citing the previous violations of the treaty by Russia.<ref name=nytleave>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-trump-administration.html|title=U.S. to Tell Russia It Is Leaving Landmark I.N.F. Treaty|last1=Sanger|first1=David E.|last2=Broad|first2=William J.|date=October 19, 2019|access-date=May 21, 2020|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref><ref name="trump">{{cite web | url =https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45930206 |title=President Trump to pull US from Russia missile treaty|publisher=BBC| date=20 October 2018| access-date =20 October 2018}}</ref><ref name=reutersleave>{{cite news |title=Trump: U.S. to exit nuclear treaty, citing Russian violations |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-trump/trump-u-s-to-exit-nuclear-treaty-citing-russian-violations-idUSKCN1MU0Z8|publisher=[[Reuters]]|date=October 20, 2019}}</ref> This prompted Putin to state that Russia would not launch first in a nuclear conflict but would "annihilate" any adversary, essentially re-stating the policy of "[[Mutually Assured Destruction]]". Putin claimed Russians killed in such a conflict "will go to heaven as martyrs".<ref>{{cite news | author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> | date=19 October 2018 | title='Aggressors Will Be Annihilated, We Will Go to Heaven as Martyrs,' Putin Says | url=https://themoscowtimes.com/news/aggressors-will-be-annihilated-we-will-go-to-heaven-as-martyrs-putin-says-63235 | work=The Moscow Times | location=Russia |access-date=26 October 2018 }}</ref>

It was also reported that the US need to counter a [[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|Chinese arms buildup in the Pacific]], including within [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea#United States|South China Sea]], was another reason for their move to withdraw, because China was not a signatory to the treaty.<ref name=nytleave /><ref name="trump" /><ref name=reutersleave /> US officials extending back to the presidency of [[Barack Obama]] have noted this. For example, [[Kelly Magsamen]], who helped craft the [[The Pentagon|Pentagon]]'s Asian policy under the Obama administration, said China's ability to work outside of the INF treaty had vexed policymakers in Washington, long before Trump came into office.<ref name=escalate/> A ''[[Politico]]'' article noted the different responses US officials gave to this issue: "either find ways to bring China into the treaty or develop new American weapons to counter it" or "negotiating a new treaty with that country".<ref name="2018-politico-china">{{cite news |last1=Hellman |first1=Gregory |title=Chinese missile buildup strained US-Russia arms pact |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/chinese-missile-buildup-strained-us-russia-arms-pact/ |access-date=23 October 2018 |publisher=Politico.eu |date=23 October 2018}}</ref> The deployment since 2016 of the Chinese [[DF-26]] IRBM with a range of {{cvt|4,000|km}} meant that US forces as far as [[Guam]] can be threatened.<ref name=escalate/> The [[United States Secretary of Defense]] at the time, [[Jim Mattis]], was quoted stating that "the Chinese are stockpiling missiles because they're not bound by [the treaty] at all".<ref name=nytleave /> Bringing an ascendant China into the treaty, or into a new comprehensive treaty including other nuclear powers, was further complicated by complex relationships between China, [[India]], and [[Pakistan]].<ref name=":0">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/us/politics/trump-inf-nuclear-treaty.html|title=U.S. Suspends Nuclear Arms Control Treaty With Russia|first1=David E.|last1=Sanger|first2=William J.|last2=Broad|work=The New York Times |date=1 February 2019|via=NYTimes.com}}</ref>

[[File:Sergey Shoigu and John Bolton (2018-10-23) 6.jpg|thumb|[[John R. Bolton]] holds a meeting with Russian Defense Minister [[Sergei Shoigu]] in Moscow on 23 October 2018.]]

The [[Chinese Foreign Ministry]] said a unilateral US withdrawal would have a negative impact and urged the US to "think thrice before acting". On 23 October 2018, [[John R. Bolton]], the [[National Security Advisor (United States)|US National Security Advisor]], said on the Russian radio station [[Echo of Moscow]] that recent Chinese statements indicate that it wants Washington to stay in the treaty, while China itself is not bound by it.<ref name=escalate>{{cite news |title=Trump's missile treaty pullout could escalate tension with China |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-china/trumps-missile-treaty-pullout-could-escalate-tension-with-china-idUSKCN1MX0E7 |work=reuters |date=23 October 2018}}</ref> On the same day, a report in ''Politico'' suggested that China was "the real target of the [pull out]".<ref name="2018-politico-china"/> It was estimated that 90% of China's ground missile arsenal would be outlawed if China were a party to the treaty.<ref name="2018-politico-china"/> Bolton said in an interview with Elena Chernenko from the Russian newspaper ''[[Kommersant]]'' on 22 October 2018: "we see China, [[Iran]], [[North Korea]] all developing capabilities which would violate the treaty if they were parties to it."<ref>{{cite web |title=APNSA John Bolton Interview with Elena Chernenko, Kommersant – Moscow, Russia – October 22, 2018 |url=https://ru.usembassy.gov/apnsa-john-bolton-interview-with-kommersant/ |website=www.ru.usembassy.gov |date=22 October 2018 |publisher=U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia}}</ref>

On 26 October 2018, Russia unsuccessfully called for a vote to get the [[United Nations General Assembly]] to consider calling on Washington and Moscow to preserve and strengthen the treaty.<ref name=uninftreaty>{{Cite news | url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-russia-un/russia-u-s-clash-over-inf-arms-treaty-at-united-nations-idUSKCN1N02FI | title=Russia, U.S. Clash over INF arms treaty at United Nations| newspaper=Reuters| date=26 October 2018}}</ref> Russia had proposed a draft resolution in the 193-member General Assembly's [[United Nations General Assembly First Committee|disarmament committee]], but missed 18 October submission deadline<ref name=uninftreaty/> so it instead called for a vote on whether the committee should be allowed to consider the draft.<ref name=uninftreaty/> On the same day, Bolton said in an interview with Reuters that the INF Treaty was a [[Cold War]] relic and he wanted to hold strategic talks with Russia about Chinese missile capabilities.<ref>{{cite news |title=Trump adviser says wants U.S.-Russia strategic talks on Chinese threat |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-bolton-china/trump-adviser-says-wants-u-s-russia-strategic-talks-on-chinese-threat-idUSKCN1N01TI |work=Reuters  |date=26 October 2018}}</ref>

Four days later at a news conference in Norway, NATO Secretary General [[Jens Stoltenberg]] called on Russia to comply with the treaty saying "The problem is the deployment of new Russian missiles".<ref>{{cite news |title=NATO's Stoltenberg calls on Russia to comply with INF nuclear treaty |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-russia-nato/natos-stoltenberg-calls-on-russia-to-comply-with-inf-nuclear-treaty-idUSKCN1N41AN |work=Reuters }}</ref> Putin announced on 20 November 2018 that the [[Government of Russia|Kremlin]] was prepared to discuss the INF Treaty with Washington but would "retaliate" if the United States withdrew.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://themoscowtimes.com/news/putin-says-russia-will-retaliate-if-us-quits-inf-nuclear-missile-treaty-63538|title=Putin Says Russia Will Retaliate if U.S. Quits INF Nuclear Missile Treaty|date=20 November 2018 |access-date=20 November 2018}}</ref>

Starting on 4 December 2018, the US asserted that Russia had 60 days to comply with the treaty.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-nato-give-russia-60-days-comply-nuclear-pact-n943761|title=U.S., NATO give Russia 60 days to comply with nuclear pact|website=NBC News|date=4 December 2018 |access-date=5 December 2018}}</ref> On 5 December 2018, Russia responded by revealing their [[Peresvet (laser weapon)|Peresvet combat laser]], stating the weapon system had been deployed with the [[Russian Armed Forces]] as early as 2017 "as part of the state procurement program".<ref>{{cite news|title=Peresvet combat lasers enter duty with Russia's armed forces|url=http://tass.com/defense/1034344|agency=TASS|access-date=7 December 2018}}</ref>

Russia presented the 9M729 (SSC-8) missile and its technical parameters to foreign military attachés at a military briefing on 23 January 2019, held in what it said was an exercise in transparency it hoped would persuade Washington to stay in the treaty.<ref name=reutersrussia>{{cite news |last1=Balmforth & Osborn |first1=Tom & andrew |title=Russia takes wraps off new missile to try to save U.S. nuclear pact |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-russia/russia-takes-wraps-off-new-missile-to-try-to-save-u-s-nuclear-pact-idUSKCN1PH15A |work=Reuters |publisher=Reuters |date=23 January 2019}}</ref> The [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Russian Defence Ministry]] said diplomats from the US, Britain, France and Germany had been invited to attend the static display of the missile, but they declined.<ref name=reutersrussia/> The US had previously rejected a Russian offer to do so because it said such an exercise would not allow the Americans to verify the true range of the missile.<ref name=reutersrussia/> A summit between the United States and Russia on 30 January 2019 failed to find a way to preserve the treaty.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2019/jan/31/trump-news-live-latest-updates-wall-mexico-national-emergency-us-politics-today?page=with%3Ablock-5c538e60e4b01125b082af72|title=Trump picks climate change skeptic for EPA science board – latest news|first1=Gabrielle Canon Ben Jacobs in|last1=Washington (earlier)|first2=Emily|last2=Holden|date=1 February 2019|via=www.theguardian.com}}</ref>

The US suspended its compliance with the INF Treaty on 2 February 2019 following an announcement by US Secretary of State [[Mike Pompeo]] the day prior. In a statement, Trump said there was a six-month timeline for full withdrawal and INF Treaty termination if the Russian Federation did not come back into compliance within that period.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2019/feb/01/trump-news-live-latest-updates-cory-booker-politics|title=Roger Stone case: judge 'considering gag order' against Trump adviser – live|first1=Vivian|last1=Ho|first2=Adam|last2=Gabbatt|first3=Erin|last3=Durkin|newspaper=The Guardian |date=1 February 2019|via=www.theguardian.com}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> The same day, Putin announced that Russia had also suspended the INF Treaty in a 'mirror response' to Trump's decision, effective that day.{{Citation needed|date=December 2020}} The next day, Russia started work on new intermediate range (ballistic) [[hypersonic]] missiles along with land-based [[3M-54 Kalibr]] systems (both [[Nuclear weapons delivery|nuclear capable]]) in response to the US announcing it would start to conduct research and development of weapons formerly prohibited under the treaty.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-russia-us-cold-war-trump-nuclear-weapons-missiles-treaty-arms-race-military-a8759616.html|title=Putin threatens new arms race after Trump pulls US out of nuclear weapons treaty|date=2 February 2019|website=The Independent}}</ref>

Following the six-month US suspension of the INF Treaty, the Trump administration formally announced it had withdrawn from the treaty on 2 August 2019. On that day, Pompeo stated that "Russia is solely responsible for the treaty's demise".<ref name="cnn withdraw">{{cite news | url = https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/02/politics/nuclear-treaty-inf-us-withdraws-russia/index.html | title = US formally withdraws from nuclear treaty with Russia and prepares to test new missile | first1 = Veronica | last1= Stracqualursi | first2= Nicole | last2= Gaouette | first3=  Barbara | last3 = Starr |first4=  Kylie | last4 =Atwood | date = 2 August 2019 | access-date = 2 August 2019|publisher=[[CNN]]}}</ref> While formally ratifying a treaty requires the support of two-thirds of the members of the US Senate, because [[United States Congress|Congress]] has rarely acted to stop a number of presidential decisions regarding international treaties during the 20th and 21st centuries, there have been established a precedent that the president and executive branch can unilaterally withdraw from a treaty without congressional approval.<ref>{{cite web | url = https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/donald-trump-can-unilaterally-withdraw-treaties-because-congress-abdicated-responsibility-ncna870866 | title = Donald Trump can unilaterally withdraw from treaties because Congress abdicated responsibility | first=  Russell | last = Feingold | date = 7 May 2018 | access-date = 2 August 2019 | work = [[NBC News]] }}</ref> On the day of the withdrawal, the US Department of Defense announced plans to test a new type of missile that would have violated the treaty, from an eastern NATO base. Military leaders stated the need for this new missile to stay ahead of both Russia and China, in response to Russia's continued violations of the treaty.<ref name="cnn withdraw"/>

The US withdrawal was backed by most of its NATO allies, citing years of Russian non-compliance with the treaty.<ref name="cnn withdraw"/> In response to the withdrawal, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister [[Sergei Ryabkov]] invited the US and NATO "to assess the possibility of declaring the same moratorium on deploying intermediate-range and shorter-range equipment as we have, the same moratorium Vladimir Putin declared, saying that Russia will refrain from deploying these systems when we acquire them unless the American equipment is deployed in certain regions."<ref name="cnn withdraw"/> This moratorium request was rejected by NATO's Stoltenberg who said that it was not credible as Moscow had already deployed such warheads.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-inf-moratorium/russian-request-for-missile-freeze-has-zero-credibility-stoltenberg-idUSKCN1US18Y|title=Russian request for missile freeze has 'zero credibility': Stoltenberg|website=[[Reuters]]|date=2 August 2019|access-date=8 August 2019}}</ref> On 5 August 2019, Putin stated, "As of August 2, 2019, the INF Treaty no longer exists. Our US colleagues sent it to the archives, making it a thing of the past."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61271|title=Statement by the President of Russia on the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles|website=en.kremlin.ru|date=5 August 2019|access-date=8 August 2019}}</ref>

[[File:DOD Conducts Ground-launched Cruise Missile Test (190818-O-PZ834-724).webm|thumb|The United States test firing a conventionally configured ground-launched medium-range cruise missile ([[Tomahawk (missile family)|Tomahawk]]) on 18 August 2019]]

On 18 August 2019, the US conducted a test firing of a missile that would not have been allowed under the treaty; a ground-based version of the [[Tomahawk (missile family)|Tomahawk]], similar to the [[BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile|BGM-109G]] banned by the treaty decades prior.<ref name=smhaufirst>{{cite news |newspaper=The Sydney Morning Herald |title=US tests its first intermediate-range missile since quitting treaty with Russia |date=20 August 2019 |first=Missy |last=Ryan |url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/us-tests-its-first-intermediate-range-missile-since-quitting-treaty-with-russia-20190820-p52j1c.html |access-date=21 August 2019}}</ref><ref name=bbcfirsttest>{{cite news |title=INF nuclear treaty: US tests medium-range cruise missile  |publisher= BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49405499 |date=20 August 2019 |access-date=21 August 2019}}</ref><ref name=firsttest>{{cite news |title=The US proves Russia right with its first post-treaty missile launch|publisher= QZ|url=https://qz.com/1691464/us-proves-russia-right-with-its-first-post-treaty-missile-launch/ |date=21 August 2019 |access-date=26 November 2019}}</ref> The Pentagon said that the data collected and lessons learned from this test would inform its future development of intermediate-range capabilities, while the Russian foreign ministry said that it was a cause for regret, and accused the United States of escalating military tensions.<ref name=smhaufirst/><ref name=bbcfirsttest/><ref name=firsttest/>

===Further reactions to the withdrawal===
Numerous prominent nuclear arms control experts, including [[George Shultz]], [[Richard Lugar]] and [[Sam Nunn]], urged Trump to preserve the treaty.<ref>{{cite news|author=Gladstone, Rick|date=November 8, 2018|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/world/europe/trump-russia-arms-treaty.html|title=In Bipartisan Pleas, Experts Urge Trump to Save Nuclear Treaty With Russia|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|access-date=May 21, 2020}}</ref> Gorbachev criticized Trump's nuclear treaty withdrawal as "not the work of a great mind" and stated "a new arms race has been announced".<ref>{{cite news |title=Gorbachev says Trump's nuclear treaty withdrawal 'not the work of a great mind' |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/22/gorbachev-says-trumps-nuclear-treaty-withdrawal-not-the-work-of-a-great-mind.html |last=Ellyatt |first=Holly |work=CNBC |date=22 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://thehill.com/policy/defense/413383-trump-stokes-debate-about-new-cold-war-arms-race|title=Trump stokes debate about new Cold War arms race|first=Ian|last=Swanson|date=27 October 2018|website=The Hill}}</ref> The decision was criticized by the chairmen of the House Committees on [[United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs|Foreign Affairs]] and [[United States House Committee on Armed Services|Armed Services]] [[Eliot Engel]] and [[Adam Smith (Washington politician)|Adam Smith]], who said that instead of crafting a plan to hold Russia accountable and pressure it into compliance, the Trump administration had offered Putin an easy way out of the treaty and played right into his hands.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/opinions/us-pulling-out-of-the-inf-treaty-rewards-putin-hurts-nato-engel-smith/index.html|title=US pulling out of the INF treaty rewards Putin, hurts NATO|author=Eliot Engel and Adam Smith|date=2 February 2019 |publisher=[[CNN]]}}</ref> Similar arguments had been brought previously on 25 October 2018 by European members of NATO who urged the US "to try to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty rather than quit it, seeking to avoid a split in the alliance that Moscow could exploit".<ref name=uninftreaty/>

NATO chief Stoltenberg suggested the INF Treaty could be expanded to include countries such as China and India, an idea that both the US and Russia had indicated being open to, although Russia had expressed skepticism that such an expansion could be achieved.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dw.com/en/nato-chief-stoltenberg-bats-for-expanded-inf-treaty-deal-with-more-members/a-47402106|title=NATO chief Stoltenberg bats for expanded INF treaty deal with more members &#124; DW &#124; 07.02.2019|publisher=Deutsche Welle |website=DW.COM}}</ref>

There were contrasting opinions on the withdrawal among American lawmakers. The INF Treaty Compliance Act (H.R. 1249) was introduced to stop the United States from using Government funds to develop missiles prohibited by the treaty,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Blake |first1=Andrew |title=Bill offered to keep U.S. in compliance with collapsing Cold War-era weapons treaty |url=https://www.apnews.com/9560ec6d3ccd6f2fbc0b690bee23718f |access-date=20 February 2019 |work=AP News |publisher=The Washington Times |date=15 February 2019 |archive-date=25 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190225215337/https://www.apnews.com/9560ec6d3ccd6f2fbc0b690bee23718f |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1249/text|title=Text - H.R.1249 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): INF Treaty Compliance Act of 2019 &#124; Congress.gov &#124; Library of Congress}}</ref> while Republican senators [[Jim Inhofe]] and [[Jim Risch]] issued statements of support for the withdrawal.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Brown |first1=David |title=U.S. officially pulls out of missile treaty with Russia today |url=https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-defense/2019/08/02/us-officially-pulls-out-of-missile-treaty-with-russia-today-464535 |work=Politico |date=2 August 2019}}</ref>

On 8 March 2019, the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ukraine)|Foreign Ministry of Ukraine]] announced that since the United States and Russia had both pulled out of the treaty, it now had the right to develop intermediate-range missiles, citing [[Russo-Ukrainian War|Russian aggression against Ukraine]] as a serious threat to the European continent, and the presence of Russian [[9K720 Iskander|Iskander-M]] nuclear-capable missile systems in [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|Russian-annexed Crimea]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-right-develop-missiles-russia-us-nuclear-treaty-cancelled-foreign-1356870|title=Ukraine has the right to develop missiles now that Russia-U.S. nuclear treaty is canceled, Kiev says|last=Maza|first=Cristina|date=2019-03-08|website=Newsweek|access-date=2019-03-13}}</ref> Ukraine was home to about [[Ukrainian space program|forty percent]] of the Soviet space industry, but was never allowed to develop a missile with the range to strike Moscow,{{citation needed|date=February 2024}} only having both longer and shorter-ranged missiles, but it has the capability to develop intermediate-range missiles.<ref name=":02">{{Cite web|last1=Budjeryn|first1=Mariana|last2=Steiner|first2=Steven E.|date=March 4, 2019|title=Forgotten Parties to the INF|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/forgotten-parties-to-the-inf|access-date=2021-04-28|website=Wilson Center|language=en}}</ref>

After the United States withdrew from the treaty, some American commentators wrote that this might allow the country to more effectively counter Russia and China's missile forces.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Williams |first1=Clive |title=Pacific collateral from the INF Treaty collapse |url=https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/pacific-collateral-inf-treaty-collapse |agency=The Interpreter |publisher=Lowy Institute |date=31 Jan 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Mahnken |first1=Thomas G |title=Countering Missiles With Missiles: U.S. Military Posture After the INF Treaty |url=https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/countering-missiles-with-missiles-the-u-s-military-after-the-inf-treaty/ |agency=War on the rocks |date=16 July 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Walton |first1=Timothy A |title=America Could Lose a Real War Against Russia |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/opinion/inf-treaty-putin-trump.html |newspaper=The New York Times |date=5 Aug 2019}}</ref> This was later followed by the development and deployment of the [[Typhon missile launcher|Typhon Medium Range Capability]] weapon system in 2023.

According to Brazilian journalist Augusto Dall'Agnol, the INF Treaty's demise also needs to be understood in the broader context of the gradual erosion of the strategic arms control regime that started with the US withdrawal from the [[ABM Treaty]] in 2002 amidst Russia's objections.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Dall'Agnol | first1 = Augusto C. | last2 = Cepik | first2 = Marco | title = The demise of the INF Treaty: a path dependence analysis | journal = Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional | date = 18 June 2021 | volume = 64 | issue = 2 | pages = 1–19 | issn = 1983-3121 | doi = 10.1590/0034-7329202100202 | pmid = | s2cid = 237962045 | doi-access = free }}</ref>{{opinion|date=September 2022}}

== Notes ==
{{Notelist}}

== References ==
{{reflist}}

== Bibliography ==
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite report |url=https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/30-arms-control-pifer-paper.pdf |access-date=16 August 2016 |title=The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces: History and Lessons Learned |last1=Bohlen |first1=Avis |author1-link=Avis Bohlen |last2=Burns |first2=William |last3=Pifer |first3=Steven |author3-link=Steven Pifer |last4=Woodworth |first4=John |year=2012 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]] |location=Washington, D.C. }}
* {{cite journal|last1=Davis E.|first1=Lynn|title=Lessons of the INF Treaty|journal=Foreign Affairs|volume=66|issue=4|year=1988|pages=720–734|issn=0015-7120|doi=10.2307/20043479|jstor=20043479}}
* {{cite journal |jstor=2149415 |title=The NATO Decision on Theater Nuclear Forces |journal=[[Political Science Quarterly]] |last=Garthoff |first=Raymond L. |volume=98 |issue=2 |date=1983 |pages=197–214|doi=10.2307/2149415 }}
* {{cite book|last1=Gassert|first1=Philip|title=The INF Treaty of 1987: A Reappraisal|date=2020|publisher=Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht}}
* {{cite book |title=European Missile Defense and Russia |last1=Giles |first1=Keir |author1-link=Keir Giles |last2=Monaghan |first2=Andrew |year=2014 |publisher=United States Army War College Press |location=Carlisle Barracks, PA |url=http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1219 |isbn=978-1-58487-635-9 |access-date=30 October 2014 |archive-date=12 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170212205447/https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1219 |url-status=dead }}
* {{cite book |title=Beyond the INF Treaty: Arms, Arms Control, and the Atlantic Alliance |last=Haass |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Haass |year=1988 |publisher=University Press of America |location=Lanham, MD |isbn=978-0-8191-6942-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6wB9-pA--LwC }}
* {{cite report |url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R2964.pdf |title=Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response |last=Legge |first=J. Michael |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |year=1983 |access-date=15 August 2016 }}
*{{cite journal |last1=Moniz & Nunn |first1=Ernest & Sam|title=The Return of Doomsday: The New Nuclear Arms Race – and How Washington and Moscow Can Stop It|journal=Foreign Affairs|volume=98|issue=5|year=2019|pages=150–61}}
* {{cite book |title=Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x0l3R0BMR6YC |last=Rhodes |first=Richard |publisher=Vintage |location=New York, NY |year=2008 |isbn=978-0-375-71394-1 }}
*{{cite book |last1=Ritter |first1=Scott |title=Disarmament in the Time of Perestroika: Arms Control and the End of the Soviet Union |date=2022 |publisher=Clarity Press |location=Atlanta |isbn=978-1-949762-61-7}}
* {{cite book|last1=Woolf|first1=Amy F.|title=Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress|date=25 April 2018|publisher=Congressional Research Service|location=Washington, DC|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf|access-date=9 May 2018}}
{{refend}}

==External links==
{{Commons category|Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty}}
* [https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm Text] of the INF Treaty
* [https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552558 Video] of a 1986 [[PBS]] program on the future of arms control
* [https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552678 Video] of a 1986 year-in-review for the Soviet Union
* Statements by Ronald Reagan on INF Treaty negotiations in [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/252427 March], [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/252645 April], [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/252413 June], and [https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/252182 December] 1987

{{Nuclear weapons limitation treaty}}
{{Soviet Union–United States relations}}
{{Russia–United States relations}}
{{Presidency of Ronald Reagan}}

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