View source for Insurgency

{{Short description|Revolt or uprising by irregular forces}}
{{Redirect2|Insurgent|Insurgence}}
[[File:Warsaw Uprising poster 345.jpg|thumb|A [[Home Army]] insurgent next to a propaganda poster during the 1944 [[Warsaw Uprising]]]]
{{History of war}}
{{Terrorism}}
{{Revolution sidebar}}
An '''insurgency''' is a violent, armed [[rebellion]] by small, lightly armed bands who practice [[guerrilla warfare]] against a larger [[authority]].<ref name="FearonLaitin2003">{{Cite journal|last1=Fearon|first1=James D.|last2=Laitin|first2=David D.|date=2003|title=Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/ethnicity-insurgency-and-civil-war/B1D5D0E7C782483C5D7E102A61AD6605|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=97|issue=1|pages=75–90|doi=10.1017/S0003055403000534|doi-broken-date=2024-11-22 |s2cid=8303905|issn=1537-5943|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Lewis|first=Janet I.|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-insurgency-begins/8798DEF1B3A5563C402E4F5D4617C8CA|title=How Insurgency Begins: Rebel Group Formation in Uganda and Beyond|date=2020|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-47966-0|pages=17–18|doi=10.1017/9781108855969|s2cid=225014676}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kalyvas|first1=Stathis N.|last2=Balcells|first2=Laia|date=2010|title=International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40863761|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=104|issue=3|pages=415–429|doi=10.1017/S0003055410000286|jstor=40863761|hdl=10261/45454 |s2cid=17605053|issn=0003-0554|hdl-access=free}}</ref> The key descriptive feature of insurgency is its [[asymmetric warfare|asymmetric]] nature: small [[irregular forces]] face a large, well-equipped, [[regular military]] force [[State (polity)|state]] adversary.<ref name="KocherPepinskyKalyvas2011">{{Cite journal|last1=Kocher|first1=Matthew Adam|last2=Pepinsky|first2=Thomas B.|last3=Kalyvas|first3=Stathis N.|date=2011|title=Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War|journal=American Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=55|issue=2|pages=201–218|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00498.x|issn=1540-5907|doi-access=free}}</ref> Due to this asymmetry, insurgents avoid large-scale direct battles, opting instead to blend in with the civilian population (often in [[rural area]]s) where they gradually expand territorial control and military forces.<ref name="KocherPepinskyKalyvas2011" /> Insurgency frequently hinges on control of and collaboration with local populations.<ref name="KocherPepinskyKalyvas2011" /><ref name="Kalyvas2006">{{Cite book|last=Kalyvas|first=Stathis N.|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/logic-of-violence-in-civil-war/3DFE74EA492295FC6940D58CA8EF4D5C|title=The Logic of Violence in Civil War|date=2006|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-85409-2|series=Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics|location=Cambridge|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511818462|s2cid=14897960 }}</ref>

An insurgency can be fought via [[counter-insurgency]] warfare, as well as other political, economic and social actions of various kinds.<ref>These points are emphasized in many works on insurgency, including Peter Paret, ''French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine'', Pall Mall Press, London, 1964.</ref> Due to the blending of insurgents with the civilian population, insurgencies tend to involve considerable violence against civilians (by the state and the insurgents).<ref name="KocherPepinskyKalyvas2011" /> State attempts to quell insurgencies frequently lead to the infliction of indiscriminate violence, whereas rebel control of territory frequently involves violence against the civilian population.<ref name="Kalyvas2006" /> Insurgency sets itself apart from [[terrorism]] by aiming for political control rather than resorting to indiscriminate violence,<ref>{{Cite news |title=The A to Z of military terms |language=en |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/military-terms-a-to-z |access-date=2023-12-18}}</ref> however, it may incorporate terrorist tactics.{{citation needed|date=April 2024}}

Where a revolt takes the form of armed rebellion, it may not be viewed as an insurgency if a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces. For example, during the [[American Civil War]], the [[Confederate States of America]] was [[List of historical unrecognized states and dependencies|not recognized]] as a sovereign state, but it was recognized as a belligerent power, and thus Confederate warships were given the same rights as United States warships in foreign ports.<ref name="hall-246">Hall, Kermit L. ''The Oxford Guide to United States Supreme Court Decisions'', Oxford University Press US, 2001,  {{ISBN|978-0-19-513924-2}} [https://books.google.com/books?id=nO093wNz1PoC&dq=insurrection+civil+war&pg=RA1-PA246 p. 246] "In supporting Lincoln on this issue, the Supreme Court upheld his theory of the Civil War as an insurrection against the United States government that could be suppressed according to the rules of war. In this way the United States was able to fight the war as if it were an international war, without actually having to recognize the ''de jure'' existence of the Confederate government."</ref><ref name="US-S-D">Staff. [https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cw/106954.htm Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of the Historian -> Timeline of U.S. Diplomatic History -> 1861–1865:The Blockade of Confederate Ports, 1861–1865], U.S. State Department. <!--Retrieved 2009-04-28--> "Following the U.S. announcement of its intention to establish an official blockade of Confederate ports, foreign governments began to recognize the Confederacy as a belligerent in the Civil War. Great Britain granted belligerent status on May 13, 1861, Spain on June 17, and Brazil on August 1. Other foreign governments issued statements of neutrality."</ref><ref name="Goldstein-63">Goldstein, Erik; McKercher, B. J. C. ''Power and stability: British foreign policy, 1865–1965'', Routledge, 2003, {{ISBN|978-0-7146-8442-0}}. [https://books.google.com/books?id=48EQZ8vM0-UC&dq=confederacy+belligerants+foreign+ports&pg=PA63 p. 63]</ref>

Sometimes there may be two or more simultaneous insurgencies (multipolar) occurring in a country. The [[Iraqi insurgency (2003–11)|Iraq insurgency]] is one example of a recognized government{{Efn|Alignments during the heaviest fighting years of the Iraq War were very complex, with some militias supporting the new Iraq government-US coalition, and some receiving third-state state sponsorship such as Saudi-supported Sunni group the [[Islamic State in Iraq]].}} versus multiple groups of insurgents. Other historic insurgencies, such as the [[Russian Civil War]], have been multipolar rather than a straightforward model made up of two sides. During the [[Angolan Civil War]] there were two main sides: [[MPLA]] and [[UNITA]]. At the same time, there was another separatist movement for the independence of the [[Cabinda (province)|Cabinda]] region headed up by [[FLEC]]. Multipolarity extends the definition of insurgency to situations where there is no recognized authority, as in the [[Somali Civil War]], especially the [[Somali Civil War#Division of Somalia (1998-2006)|period from 1998 to 2006]], where it broke into quasi-autonomous smaller states, fighting among one another in changing alliances.

==Definition==
[[File:Kuruc labanc csatajelenet1.jpg|thumb|250px|The so-called ''[[kuruc]]'' were armed anti-[[Habsburg]] rebels in [[Royal Hungary]] between 1671 and 1711.]]
James Fearon and David Laitin define insurgency as "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas."<ref name="FearonLaitin2003" /><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kalyvas|first1=Stathis N.|last2=Kocher|first2=Matthew Adam|date=2007|title=How "Free" Is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem|journal=World Politics|volume=59|issue=2|pages=177–216|doi=10.1353/wp.2007.0023|jstor=40060186|s2cid=55598769|issn=0043-8871|doi-access=free}}</ref> Austin Long defines insurgency as "the use of political and military means by irregular forces to change an existing political order. These forces typically mingle with civilians in order to hide from the forces defending the political order."<ref>{{Citation|last=Long|first=Austin|title=Counter Insurgency|date=2018|url=http://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198777854-e-36|work=The Oxford Handbook of International Security|pages=546–561|editor-last=Gheciu|editor-first=Alexandra|publisher=Oxford University Press|language=en|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.36|isbn=978-0-19-877785-4|editor2-last=Wohlforth|editor2-first=William C.|url-access=subscription}}</ref> According to Matthew Adam Kocher, [[Thomas Pepinsky]] and Stathis Kalyvas, a central objective in insurgencies is to achieve control over civilians.<ref name="KocherPepinskyKalyvas2011" /> To exercise control armed groups apply a variety of practices, including different types of violence, dispute resolution, taxation, regulation of movement, access to aid and services, and social strictures.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bahiss |first1=Ibraheem |last2=Jackson |first2=Ashley |last3=Mayhew |first3=Leigh |last4=Weigand |first4=Florian |title=Rethinking armed group control: Towards a new conceptual framework |journal=ODI / Centre on Armed Groups |date=2022 |url=https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/FINAL_Re-thinking_Armed_Group_Control.pdf}}</ref>

== Insurgency and civil wars ==
According to [[James Fearon|James D. Fearon]], wars have a rationalist explanation behind them, which explains why leaders prefer to gamble in wars and avoid peaceful bargains.<ref name="Fearon1995">{{Cite journal|last=Fearon|first=James|date=Summer 1995|title=Rationalist Explanations for War|jstor=2706903|journal=International Organization|volume=49|issue=3|pages=379–414|doi=10.1017/s0020818300033324|s2cid=38573183 }}</ref> Fearon states that intermediate bargains can be a problem because countries cannot easily trade territories with the spread of nationalism.<ref name="Fearon1995" /> Furthermore, wars can take the form of [[civil war]]s. In her article ''Why Bad Governance Leads to Civil Wars,'' [[Barbara F. Walter]] has presented a theory that explains the role of strong institutions in preventing insurgencies that can result in civil wars. Walter believes that institutions can contribute to four goals.<ref name="Walter2014">{{Cite journal|last=Walter|first=Barbara|date=March 31, 2014|title=Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War|journal=Conflict Resolutions|volume=59|issue=7|pages=1242–1272|doi=10.1177/0022002714528006|s2cid=154632359}}</ref>

Institutions are responsible for checking the government, creating multiple peaceful routes to help the government solve problems, making the government committed to political terms that entails preserving peace, and creating an atmosphere where rebels do not need to form militias.<ref name="Walter2014" /> Furthermore, Walter adds that if there is a conflict between the government and the insurgents in the form of a civil war, that can bring about a new government that is accountable to a wider range of people, who have to commit to a compromise in political bargains. According to Walter, the presence of strong influential institutions can be beneficial to prevent the repetition of civil wars, but [[autocracy|autocratic governments]] are less likely to accept the emergence of strong institutions because of their resulting constraint of governmental corruption and privileges.

In her book, ''Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in Salvador'', [[Elisabeth Jean Wood]] explains that participants in high-risk activism are very aware of the costs and benefits of engaging in civil wars.<ref name="Wood2003">{{Cite book|title=Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador|last=Wood|first=Elisabeth|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2003|isbn=9780511808685|location=New York|pages=1–30}}</ref> Wood suggests that "participants in the 1964 [[Freedom Summer]] campaign in the [[United States|US]] [[Southern United States|South]] ran high risks of bodily harm in challenging the long-standing practices of racial exclusion in [[Mississippi]]." There are many selective incentives that encourage insurgency and violent movements against autocratic political regimes. For example, the supply of safety as a material good can be provided by the insurgents, which abolishes the exploitation of the government and thus forms one of the main incentives. The revolutionary power can help manifest a social-political network that in return provides access to political opportunities to diverse candidates, who share a collective identity and cultural homogeneity. Also, civil wars and insurgencies can provide employment and access to services and resources that were once taken over by the autocratic regimes.<ref name="Wood2003" />

==Tactics==

Insurgencies differ in their use of tactics and methods. In a 2004 article, Robert R. Tomes spoke of four elements that "typically encompass an insurgency":<ref name=Tomes2004>{{citation
| url = https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/04spring/tomes.pdf
| first = Robert R. | last = Tomes 
| journal = Parameters
| title = Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare
| year = 2004
}}</ref>
#cell-networks that maintain secrecy
#[[terrorism]] used to foster insecurity among the population and drive them to the insurgents for protection
#multifaceted attempts to cultivate support in the general population, often by undermining the new regime
#attacks against the government

Tomes' is an example of a definition that does not cover all insurgencies. For example, the [[French Revolution]] had no cell system, and in the [[American Revolution]], little to no attempt was made to terrorize civilians.{{Citation needed|date = February 2016}} In consecutive [[#coup|coups]] in 1977 and 1999 in Pakistan, the initial actions focused internally on the government rather than on seeking broad support. While Tomes' definition fits well with Mao's Phase I,<ref name=MaoProtracted /> it does not deal well with larger civil wars. Mao does assume terrorism is usually part of the early phases, but it is not always present in revolutionary insurgency.

Tomes offers an indirect definition of insurgency, drawn from [[Trinquier]]'s definition of counterinsurgency: "an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the [insurgents' intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime."<ref name=Trinquier>{{citation
 |url=http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp 
 |year=1961 
 |first=Roger 
 |last=Trinquier 
 |author-link=Roger Trinquier 
 |title=Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency 
 |publisher=Editions de la Table Ronde 
 |url-status=dead 
 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080112132017/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp 
 |archive-date=2008-01-12 
}}</ref>

Steven Metz<ref name=Metz2007>{{citation
| title = Rethinking Insurgency
| url = http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=790
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070609155049/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=790
| url-status = dead
| archive-date = June 9, 2007
| first = Steven | last = Metz
| publisher = Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
| date = 5 June 2007
}}</ref> observes that past models of insurgency do not perfectly fit modern insurgency, in that current instances are far more likely to have a multinational or transnational character than those of the past. Several insurgencies may belong to more complex conflicts, involving "third forces (armed groups which affect the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), who may be distinct from the core insurgents and the recognized government. While overt state sponsorship becomes less common, sponsorship by transnational groups is more common. "The nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure..." (See the discussion of failed states below.) Metz suggests that contemporary insurgencies have far more complex and shifting participation than traditional wars, where discrete belligerents seek a clear strategic victory.

===Terrorism===
{{Main|Terrorism}}
Many insurgencies include terrorism. While there is no accepted definition of terrorism in international law, [[United Nations]]-sponsored working definitions include one drafted by [[Alex P. Schmid]] for the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism. Reporting to the Secretary-General in 2002, the Working Group stated the following:
{{Blockquote|Without attempting a comprehensive definition of terrorism, it would be useful to delineate some broad characteristics of the phenomenon. Terrorism is, in most cases, essentially a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for a political or ideological (whether secular or religious) purpose. Terrorism is a criminal act, but it is more than mere criminality. To overcome the problem of terrorism it is necessary to understand its political nature as well as its basic criminality and psychology. The United Nations needs to address both sides of this equation.<ref name=UNterr>{{citation
| author = ((Secretary General's Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism))
| journal = Focus on Crime and Society
| volume = 4
| date = December 2004
| id = (A/57/273-S/2002/875, annex)
| url = http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Forum/V05-81059_EBOOK.pdf
| title = Preface
| issue = 1 & 2}}</ref>}}

Yet another conflict of definitions involves insurgency versus terrorism. The winning essay of the 24th Annual [[United States]] [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] Strategic Essay Contest, by Michael F. Morris, said [A pure terrorist group] "may pursue political, even revolutionary, goals, but their violence replaces rather than complements a political program."<ref name=Morris2005>{{citation
| title = Al Qaeda as Insurgency
| first = Michael F. | last = Morris
| year = 2005
| publisher = [[United States Army War College]]
| url = http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil234.pdf
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20051212060918/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil234.pdf
| url-status = dead
| archive-date = December 12, 2005
}}</ref> Morris made the point that the use, or non-use, of terrorism does not define insurgency, "but that organizational traits have traditionally provided another means to tell the two apart. Insurgencies normally field fighting forces orders of magnitude larger than those of terrorist organizations." Insurgencies have a political purpose, and may provide social services and have an overt, even legal, political wing. Their covert wing carries out attacks on military forces with tactics such as [[Raid (military)|raids]] and [[ambush]]es, as well as acts of terror such as attacks that cause deliberate civilian casualties.

Mao considered terrorism a basic part of his first part of the three phases of revolutionary warfare.<ref name=MaoProtracted /> Several insurgency models recognize that completed acts of terrorism widen the [[#Eizenstat and closing gaps|security gap]]; the Marxist guerrilla theoretician [[Carlos Marighella]] specifically recommended acts of terror, as a means of accomplishing something that fits the concept of opening the security gap.<ref name=Marighella>{{citation
| url = http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/index.htm
| first = Carlos | last = Marighella 
| year = 1969
| title = Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla
}}</ref> Mao considered terrorism to be part of forming a guerrilla movement.

===Subversion===
{{Main|Subversion}}
While not every insurgency involves terror, most involve an equally hard to define tactic, subversion. "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front."<ref name="Fall1965">{{citation|last=Fall|first=Bernard B.|title=The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency|url=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art5-w98.htm|archive-url=https://archive.today/20121212202058/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art5-w98.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=December 12, 2012|journal=Naval War College Review|issue=April 1965}}</ref> The exceptional cases of insurgency without subversion are those where there is no accepted government that is providing administrative services.

While the term "subversion" is less commonly used by current U.S. spokesmen, that may be due to the hyperbolic way it was used in the past, in a specifically anticommunist context. [[United States Secretary of State|U.S. Secretary of State]] [[Dean Rusk]] did in April 1962, when he declared that urgent action was required before the "enemy's subversive politico-military teams find fertile spawning grounds for their fish eggs."<ref name=Rosenau2007>{{citation
| title = Subversion and Insurgency
| first = William | last = Rosenau
| publisher = RAND National Defense Research Institute
| year = 2007}}</ref>

In a Western context, Rosenau cites a British [[Secret Intelligence Service]] definition as "a generalized intention to (''emphasis added'') "''overthrow'' or ''undermine'' parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means." While insurgents do not necessarily use terror, it is hard to imagine any insurgency meeting its goals without undermining aspects of the legitimacy or power of the government or faction it opposes. Rosenau mentions a more recent definition that suggests subversion includes measures short of violence, which still serve the purposes of insurgents.<ref name=Rosenau2007 /> Rarely, subversion alone can change a government; this arguably happened in the liberalization of Eastern Europe.{{Citation needed|date=August 2008}} To the Communist government of [[Poland]], [[Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity]] appeared subversive but not violent.{{Citation needed|date=August 2008}}

==Political rhetoric, myths and models==
In arguing against the term [[War on Terror|Global War on Terror]], [[Francis Fukuyama]] said the United States was not fighting terrorism generically, as in [[Chechnya]] or [[Palestine]]. Rather, he said the slogan "war on terror" is directed at "radical Islamism, a movement that makes use of culture for political objectives." He suggested it might be deeper than the ideological conflict of the Cold War, but it should not be confused with [[Samuel P. Huntington|Samuel Huntington]]'s "clash of civilizations." Addressing Huntington's thesis,<ref name=Huntington-1996 /> Fukuyama stressed that the US and its allies need to focus on specific radical groups rather than clash with global Islam.

Fukuyama argued that political means, rather than direct military measures, are the most effective ways to defeat that insurgency.<ref name=Fukuyama2003>{{citation
 |url          = http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/summary20030514.pdf
 |publisher    = Brookings Institution
 |first        = Francis
 |last         = Fukuyama
 |author-link   = Francis Fukuyama
 |date         = May 2003
 |title        = Phase III in the War on Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities
 |contribution = Panel III: Integrating the War on Terrorism with Broader U.S. Foreign Policy
 |url-status      = dead
 |archive-url   = https://web.archive.org/web/20070615035914/http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/summary20030514.pdf
 |archive-date  = 2007-06-15
}}</ref> [[David Kilcullen]] wrote "We must distinguish Al Qa'eda and the broader militant movements it symbolises – entities that use terrorism – from the tactic of terrorism itself."<ref name=Kilcullen2004>{{citation
 |title      = Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism
 |first      = David
 |last       = Kilcullen
 |author-link = David Kilcullen
 |url        = http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/articles/counteringglobalinsurgency.pdf
 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060526054548/http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Articles/CounteringGlobalInsurgency.pdf
 |url-status   = dead
 |archive-date = 2006-05-26
 |year       = 2004
}}</ref>

There may be utility in examining a war not specifically on the tactic of terror but in co-ordination among multiple national or regional insurgencies. It may be politically infeasible to refer to a conflict as an "insurgency" rather than by some more charged term, but military analysts, when concepts associated with insurgency fit, should not ignore those ideas in their planning. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to the strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to use precise terminology.<ref name=Canonico>{{Citation
 |title=An Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism 
 |author=Canonico, Peter J. 
 |url=http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/canonico04.pdf 
 |date=December 2004 
 |publisher=U.S. Naval Postgraduate School 
 |url-status=dead 
 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080414001721/http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/canonico04.pdf 
 |archive-date=2008-04-14 
}}</ref> Insurgent groups often struggle to maintain coherency and authority due to their decentralized nature, and thus rely heavily upon ethnic, religious, or ideological bounds to avoid splintering.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Fjelde |first1=Hanne |last2=Nilsson |first2=Desirée |title=The rise of rebel contenders: Barriers to entry and fragmentation in civil wars |journal=Journal of Peace Research |date=September 2018 |volume=55 |issue=5 |pages=551–565 |doi=10.1177/0022343318767497|doi-access=free }}</ref>

While it may be reasonable to consider transnational insurgency, Anthony Cordesman points out some of the myths in trying to have a worldwide view of terror:<ref name=Cordesman2007-10-29 />
*Cooperation can be based on trust and common values: one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.
*A definition of terrorism exists that can be accepted by all.
*Intelligence can be freely shared.
*Other states can be counted on to keep information secure and use it to mutual advantage.
*International institutions are secure and trustworthy.
*Internal instability and security issues do not require compartmentation and secrecy at national level.
*The "war on terrorism" creates common priorities and needs for action.
*Global and regional cooperation is the natural basis for international action.
*Legal systems are compatible enough for cooperation.
*Human rights and rule of law differences do not limit cooperation.
*Most needs are identical.
*Co-operation can be separated from financial needs and resources.

Social scientists, soldiers, and sources of change have been modeling insurgency for nearly a century if one starts with Mao.<ref name=MaoProtracted>{{citation
| url = http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/PW38.html
| author = Mao Tse-tung
| title = On Protracted War
| work = Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung
| publisher = Foreign Languages Press
| year = 1967 
}}</ref> Counterinsurgency models, not mutually exclusive from one another, come from Kilcullen, McCormick, Barnett and Eizenstat. Kilcullen describes the "pillars" of a stable society, while Eizenstat addresses the "gaps" that form cracks in societal stability. McCormick's model shows the interplay among the actors: insurgents, government, population and external organizations. Barnett discusses the relationship of the country with the outside world, and Cordesman focuses on the specifics of providing security.

Recent studies have tried to model the conceptual architecture of insurgent warfare using computational and mathematical modelling. A recent study by Juan Camilo Bohorquez, Sean Gourley, Alexander R. Dixon, Michael Spagat, and Neil F. Johnson entitled "Common Ecology Quantifies Human Insurgency", suggests a common structure for 9 contemporary insurgent wars, supported on statistical data of more than 50,000 insurgent attacks.<ref name=ECOWAR>
{{citation
| author = Bohorquez 
| title = Common Ecology Quantifies Human Insurgency
| journal = Nature
| date = December 2009 
|display-authors=etal
| volume=462
| issue = 7275 
| doi=10.1038/nature08631
| pmid = 20016600
| pages=911–914| bibcode = 2009Natur.462..911B
| s2cid = 4380248
}}</ref> The model explains the recurrent statistical pattern found in the distribution of deaths in insurgent and terrorist events.<ref name=CLAUSET>
{{citation
| author = Clauset A, Gleditsch KS
| title = The Developmental Dynamics of Terrorist Organizations
|journal = PLOS ONE| volume = 7
| issue = 11
| pages = e48633
| year = 2012
| doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0048633
| pmid = 23185267
| pmc = 3504060
| bibcode = 2012PLoSO...748633C
| doi-access = free
}}</ref>

===Kilcullen's pillars===
[[File:KilcullenEcosystem.png|thumb|Kilcullen Figure 1: Ecosystem of Insurgency<ref name=Kilcullen3P />]]
[[File:Kilcullen3Pillars.svg|thumb|Kilcullen's Three Pillars]]

Kilcullen describes a framework for counterinsurgency. He gives a visual overview<ref name=Kilcullen3P>{{Cite conference
| url = http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080414001722/http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf
| url-status = dead
| archive-date = April 14, 2008
| title = Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency
| first = David | last = Kilcullen | author-link = David Kilcullen
| conference = U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C.
| date = 28 September 2006
}}</ref> of the actors in his model of conflicts, which he represents as a box containing an "ecosystem" defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, and religious characteristics. Inside the box are, among others, governments, counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces, and the general population, which is made up of three groups: 
#those committed to the insurgents;
#those committed to the counterinsurgents;
#those who simply wish to get on with their lives.

Often, but not always, states or groups that aid one side or the other are outside the box. Outside-the-box intervention has dynamics of its own.<ref name=Lynn>{{citation
| url = http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/lynn.pdf
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070625015002/http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/lynn.pdf
| url-status = dead
| archive-date = June 25, 2007
| journal = Military Review
| date = July–August 2005
| title = Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
| author = Lynn, John A.
}}</ref>

The counterinsurgency strategy can be described as efforts to end the insurgency by a campaign developed in balance along three "pillars": security, political, and economical.

"Obviously enough, you cannot command what you do not control. Therefore, ''unity of command'' (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) means little in this environment." Unity of command is one of the axioms of military doctrine<ref name=FM3-0>{{cite book |author=Headquarters, Department of the Army |author-link=United States Department of the Army#Headquarters, Department of the Army |title=FM&nbsp;3–0, Operations (with included Change&nbsp;1) |date=22 February 2011 |orig-year=27&nbsp;February 2008 |place=Washington, DC |publisher=[[United States Government Printing Office|GPO]] |url=https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf |access-date=31 August 2013}}</ref> that change with the use of swarming:.<ref name=Edwards-2004>{{Citation
| url = https://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD189/
| title = Swarming and the Future of War
| author = Edwards, Sean J.A.
|date=September 2004
| series = PhD thesis
| publisher = Pardee RAND Graduate School
}}</ref> In Edwards' [[Swarming (military)|swarming]] model, as in Kilcullen's mode, unity of command becomes "''[[unity of effort]]'' at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least."<ref name=Kilcullen3P />

As in swarming, in Kilcullen's view unity of effort "depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem (i.e., the distributed knowledge of swarms), platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction. Each player must understand the others' strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and objectives, and inter-agency teams must be structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between tasks)."

===Eizenstat and closing gaps===
Insurgencies, according to Stuart Eizenstat grow out of "gaps".<ref name=Eizenstat-2005>{{citation
| url = http://www.cgdev.org/doc/commentary/15_Eizenstat.pdf
| journal = Foreign Affairs
| title = Rebuilding Weak States
| author = Eizenstat, Stuart E.
| author-link = Stuart E. Eizenstat
| author2 = John Edward Porter|author3=Jeremy M. Weinstein
| date = January–February 2005
| volume = 84 
| issue = 1
| page = 134
| doi = 10.2307/20034213
| jstor = 20034213
}}</ref> To be viable, a state must be able to close three "gaps", of which the first is most important:
*Security: protection "... against internal and external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory. If a government cannot ensure security, rebellious armed groups or criminal nonstate actors may use violence to exploit this security gap—as in Haiti, Nepal, and Somalia."
*Capacity: the survival needs of water, electrical power, food and public health, closely followed by education, communications and a working economic system.<ref name=Sagraves>{{citation
 |url=https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2005/acsc/3569%20-%20Sagraves.pdf 
 |title=The Indirect Approach: the role of Aviation Foreign Internal Defense in Combating Terrorism in Weak and Failing States 
 |author=Sagraves, Robert D 
 |publisher=Air Command and Staff College 
 |date=April 2005 
 |url-status=dead 
 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080414001721/https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2005/acsc/3569%20-%20Sagraves.pdf 
 |archive-date=2008-04-14 
}}</ref> "An inability to do so creates a capacity gap, which can lead to a loss of public confidence and then perhaps political upheaval. ''In most environments, a capacity gap coexists with—or even grows out of—a security gap.'' In Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, segments of the population are cut off from their governments because of endemic insecurity. And in postconflict Iraq, critical capacity gaps exist despite the country's relative wealth and strategic importance."<ref>{{cite journal |first1=Stuart E. |last1=Eizenstat |first2=John Edward |last2=Porter |first3=Jeremy M. |last3=Weinstein |url=http://www.stanford.edu/~jweinst/files/ForeignAffairs_2005.pdf |title=Rebuilding Weak States |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604094548/http://www.stanford.edu/~jweinst/files/ForeignAffairs_2005.pdf |archive-date=2011-06-04 |url-status=dead |journal=Foreign Affairs |publisher=Council on Foreign Relations |date=January–February 2005 |page=136 |volume=84 |number=1 |doi=10.2307/20034213 |jstor=20034213 }}</ref>
*Legitimacy: closing the legitimacy gap is more than an incantation of "democracy" and "elections", but a government that is perceived to exist by the [[consent of the governed]], has minimal corruption, and has a working law enforcement and judicial system that enforce human rights.

Note the similarity between Eizenstat's gaps and Kilcullen's three pillars.<ref name=Kilcullen3P/> In the table below, do not assume that a problematic state is unable to assist less developed states while closing its own gaps.

{| class="wikitable"
<caption>Rough classification of states{{Original research inline|date=July 2012}}{{Citation needed|date=July 2012}}</caption>
|-
! State type
! Needs
! Representative examples
|-
| Militarily strong but weak in other institutions
| Lower tensions before working on gaps
| [[Cuba]], [[North Korea]]
|-
| Good performers
| Continuing development of working institutions. Focused private investment
| [[El Salvador]], [[Ghana]], [[Mongolia]], [[Senegal]], [[Nicaragua]], [[Uganda]]
|-
| Weak states
| Close one or two gaps
| [[Afghanistan]], [[Egypt]], [[Indonesia]], [[Iraq]], [[Ivory Coast]], [[Kazakhstan]], [[Pakistan]], [[Philippines]], [[Kyrgyzstan]], [[Myanmar]], [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Sudan]], [[Syria]], [[Tajikistan]], [[Uzbekistan]], [[Zimbabwe]]
|-
| Failed states
| Close all gaps
| [[Angola]], the [[Democratic Republic of the Congo]], [[Haiti]], [[Liberia]], [[Palestine]], [[Somalia]]
|}

===McCormick Magic Diamond===
McCormick's model<ref name=McCormick>{{Citation
| title = The Shining Path and Peruvian terrorism
| author = McCormick, Gordon
| publisher = RAND Corporation
| id = Document Number: P-7297
| year = 1987
| postscript = .
}} often called Magic Diamond</ref> is designed as a tool for counterinsurgency (COIN), but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both the Insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success. In this way the counterinsurgency model can demonstrate how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail. The model's strategies and principle apply to both forces, therefore the degree the forces follow the model should have a direct correlation to the success or failure of either the Insurgent or COIN force.

[[File:COIN-McCormick.png|thumb|McCormick insurgency model]]
The model depicts four key elements or players:
#Insurgent force
#Counterinsurgency force (i.e., the government)
#Population
#International community

All of these interact, and the different elements have to assess their best options in a set of actions:
#Gaining support of the population
#Disrupt opponent's control over the population
#Direct action against opponent
#Disrupt opponent's relations with the international community
#Establish relationships with the international community

===Barnett and connecting to the core===
In Thomas Barnett's paradigm,<ref name=Barnett>{{Citation
| author = Barnett, Thomas P.M.
| author-link = Thomas P.M. Barnett
| title = The Pentagon's New Map: The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century
| publisher = Berkley Trade
| year = 2005
| isbn = 978-0425202395
| id = Barnett-2005
| url = https://archive.org/details/pentagonsnewmap00thom
}}</ref> the world is divided into a "connected core" of nations enjoying a high level of communications among their organizations and individuals, and those nations that are disconnected internally and externally. In a reasonably peaceful situation, he describes a "system administrator" force, often multinational, which does what some call "nation-building", but, most importantly, connects the nation to the core and empowers the natives to communicate—that communication can be likened to swarm coordination. If the state is occupied, or in civil war, another paradigm comes into play: the leviathan, a first-world military force that takes down the opposition regular forces. Leviathan is not constituted to fight local insurgencies, but major forces. Leviathan may use extensive [[Swarming (military)|swarming]] at the tactical level, but its dispatch is a strategic decision that may be made unilaterally, or by an established group of the core such as [[NATO]] or [[ASEAN]].

===Cordesman and security===
Other than brief "Leviathan" takedowns, security building appears to need to be regional, with logistical and other technical support from more developed countries and alliances (e.g., ASEAN, NATO). Noncombat military assistance in closing the security gap begins with training, sometimes in specialized areas such as intelligence. More direct, but still noncombat support, includes intelligence, planning, logistics and communications.

Anthony Cordesman notes that security requirements differ by region and state in region. Writing on the Middle East, he identified different security needs for specific areas, as well as the US interest in security in those areas.<ref name=Cordesman2007-10-29>{{citation|title=Security Cooperation in the Middle East |first=Anthony H. |last=Cordesman |date=29 October 2007 |publisher=Center for Strategic and International Studies |url=http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4139/type,1/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080410035422/http://www.csis.org/component/option%2Ccom_csis_pubs/task%2Cview/id%2C4139/type%2C1/ |archive-date=10 April 2008 }}</ref>
* In [[North Africa]], the US focus should be on security cooperation in achieving regional stability and in counterterrorism.
* In the [[Levant]], the US must largely compartment security cooperation with Israel and cooperation with friendly Arab states like [[Egypt]], [[Jordan]], and [[Lebanon]], but can improve security cooperation with all these states.
* In the [[Persian Gulf]], the US must deal with the strategic importance of a region whose petroleum and growing gas exports fuel key elements of the global economy.

It is well to understand that counterterrorism, as used by Cordesman, does not mean using terrorism against the terrorism, but an entire spectrum of activities, nonviolent and violent, to disrupt an opposing terrorist organization. The French general, Joseph Gallieni, observed, while a colonial administrator in 1898,
{{Blockquote|A country is not conquered and pacified when a military operation has decimated its inhabitants and made all heads bow in terror; the ferments of revolt will germinate in the mass and the rancours accumulated by the brutal action of force will make them grow again<ref name=McClintock-2005>{{citation|author=McClintock, Michael|title=Great Power Counterinsurgency|publisher=Human Rights First|date=November 2005|url=http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/programareas/conferences/presentations/McClintock,%20Michael.ppt}}</ref>
}}

Both Kilcullen and Eizenstat define a more abstract goal than does Cordesman. Kilcullen's security pillar is roughly equivalent to Eizenstat's security gap:
* Military security (securing the population from attack or intimidation by guerrillas, bandits, terrorists or other armed groups)
* Police security (community policing, police intelligence or "Special Branch" activities, and paramilitary police field forces).
* Human security, building a framework of human rights, civil institutions and individual protections, public safety (fire, ambulance, sanitation, civil defense) and population security.

{{Blockquote|This pillar most engages military commanders' attention, but of course military means are applied across the model, not just in the security domain, while civilian activity is critically important in the security pillar also ... all three pillars must develop in parallel and stay in balance, while being firmly based in an effective information campaign.<ref name=Kilcullen3P />
}}

Anthony Cordesman, while speaking of the specific situation in Iraq, makes some points that can be generalized to other nations in turmoil.<ref name=Cordesman-2006>{{citation|title=The Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq |author=Cordesman, Anthony H. |author-link=Anthony Cordesman |publisher=Center for Strategic and International Studies |url=http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3411/type,1/ |date=August 1, 2006 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080410035736/http://www.csis.org/component/option%2Ccom_csis_pubs/task%2Cview/id%2C3411/type%2C1/ |archive-date=April 10, 2008 }}</ref> Cordesman recognizes some value in the groupings in [[Samuel P. Huntington]]'s idea of the [[clash of civilizations]],<ref name=Huntington-1996>{{cite book|title=The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order|author-link=Samuel P. Huntington|author=Huntington, Samuel P.|publisher=Simon & Schuster|year=1996|isbn=978-0684811642|url=https://archive.org/details/clashofciviliza00hunt}}</ref> but, rather assuming the civilizations must clash, these civilizations simply can be recognized as actors in a multinational world. In the case of Iraq, Cordesman observes that the burden is on the Islamic civilization, not unilaterally the West, if for no other reason that the civilization to which the problematic nation belongs will have cultural and linguistic context that Western civilization cannot hope to equal.

The heart of strengthening weak nations must come from within, and that heart will fail if they deny that the real issue is the future of their civilization, if they tolerate religious, cultural or separatist violence and terrorism when it strikes at unpopular targets, or if they continue to try to export the blame for their own failures to other nations, religions, and cultures.

=== Asymmetric and irregular conflicts ===
[[Asymmetric warfare|Asymmetric conflicts]] (or [[irregular warfare|irregular conflicts]]), as the emerging type of insurgencies in recent history, is described by [[Eli Berman|Berman]] and [http://www.ailamatanock.com/ Matanock] in their review as conflicts where "the government forces have a clear advantage over rebels in coercive capacity."<ref name="BermanMatanock2015">{{Cite journal|title=The Empiricists' Insurgency|journal = Annual Review of Political Science|volume = 18|pages = 443–464|last1=Berman|first1=Eli|last2=Matanock|first2=Aila M.|date=2015-05-11|language=en|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-082312-124553|doi-access=free}}</ref> In this kind of conflicts, rebel groups can reintegrate into the civilian population after an attack if the civilians are willing to silently accept them. Some of the most recent examples include the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Berman|first1=Eli|last2=Callen|first2=Michael|last3=Felter|first3=Joseph H.|last4=Shapiro|first4=Jacob N.|date=2011-08-01|title=Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|language=en|volume=55|issue=4|pages=496–528|doi=10.1177/0022002710393920|s2cid=30152995|issn=0022-0027}}</ref> As the European countries intervenes in the conflicts, creating asymmetry between the government forces and rebels, asymmetric conflict is the most common form of subnational conflicts and the most civil conflicts where the western countries are likely to be involved. Such interventions and their impacts can be seen in the [[2011 military intervention in Libya|NATO operation in Libya in 2011]] and the [[Operation Serval|French-led intervention in Mali in 2013]].<ref name="BermanMatanock2015" />

[[Eli Berman|Berman]] and Matanock suggested an ''information-centric'' framework to describe asymmetric conflicts on a local level.<ref name="BermanMatanock2015" /> Three parties are involved in framework: government forces, rebels and civilians. Government forces and rebels attack each other and may inadvertently harm civilians whereas civilians can ''anonymously'' share local information with government forces, which would allow government forces to effectively use their asymmetric advantage to target rebels. Taking the role of civilians in this framework into consideration, the government and rebels will divert resources to provide services to civilians so as to influence their decision about sharing information with the government.

The framework is based on several assumptions:
* The consequential action of civilians is information sharing.
* Information can be shared anonymously without endangering the civilians who do so and civilians are assumed to respond to incentives.
* Neither side of government forces and rebels will actively target civilians with coercion or intimidation.
This framework leads to five major implications for counterinsurgency strategies:
# The government and rebels have an incentive to provide services to civilians, which increases with the value of the information shared.
# Rebel violence may be reduced by service provision from the government.
#* Projects that address the needs of the civilians in the local communities and conditioned on information sharing by the community are more effective in reducing rebel violence. In practice, these may be smaller projects that are developed through consultation with local communities, which are also more easily revoked when information is not shared.
#* Innovations that increase the value of projects to local civilians, such as including development professionals in project design and implementation, will enhance the effect of violence-reducing.
# Security provided by the government and service provision (i.e. development spending) are complementary activities.
# If either side of the government forces or rebels causes casualties among civilians, civilians will reduce their support for that side.
# Innovations that make anonymous tips to the government easier, of which are often technical, can reduce rebel violence.
These implications are tested by empirical evidences from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and several other subnational conflicts.<!-- More details on the empirical findings can be seen in Berman and Matanock's article, "The Empiricists' Insurgency." --> Further research on [[governance]], [[rule of law]], attitudes, dynamics and agency between allies are needed to better understand [[Asymmetric warfare|asymmetric conflicts]] and to have better informed decisions made at the tactical, strategic and public policy levels.

==Counter-insurgency==
{{See also|Counterinsurgency|Foreign internal defense}}
[[File:Nigerian Army Boko Haram demonstration.jpg|thumb|[[Nigerian Army]] counterinsurgency forces demonstrating tactics used against [[Boko Haram]], 2016]]
Before one counters an insurgency, one must understand what one is countering. Typically the most successful counter-insurgencies have been the British in the [[Malay Emergency]]<ref>Thomas Willis, "Lessons from the past: successful British counterinsurgency operations in Malaya 1948–1960", July–August 2005, ''Infantry Magazine''.</ref> and the Filipino government's countering of the [[Huk Rebellion]]. In the [[Philippine–American War]], U.S. forces successfully quelled the Filipino insurgents by 1902, albeit with tactics considered unacceptable by the majority of modern populations.

==See also==
{{div col}}
* [[Asymmetric warfare]]
* [[Fourth generation warfare]]
* [[Insurrectionary anarchism]]
* [[Irregular warfare]]
* [[Political warfare]]
* [[Revolutionary warfare]]
* [[Violent non-state actor]]
* [[COIN (board game)]]

'''National doctrines'''
* [[Foreign internal defense]]
* [[Reagan Doctrine]]
* [[Unconventional warfare (United States Department of Defense doctrine)]]

'''Case studies'''
* [[List of revolutions and rebellions]]
* [[Hearts and Minds (Vietnam)]] 
* [[Insurgency in North East India]]
* [[Insurgency in the North Caucasus]]
* [[Islamic insurgency in the Philippines]]
* [[South Thailand insurgency]]
{{div col end}}

== Notes ==
{{Notelist}}

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==External links==
{{Wiktionary|insurgency}}
*{{Commons category-inline|Insurgency}}
*[https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html How Insurgencies End] by Ben Connable, Martin C. Libicki

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Insurgency| ]]
[[Category:Military doctrines]]