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'''Idealism''' in [[philosophy]], also known as '''philosophical idealism''' or '''metaphysical idealism''', is the set of [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] perspectives asserting that, most fundamentally, [[reality]] is equivalent to [[mind]], [[Spirit (vital essence)|spirit]], or [[consciousness]]; that reality or truth is entirely a mental construct; or that ideas are the highest type of reality or have the greatest claim to being considered "real".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/idealism|title=Idealism {{!}} philosophy|website=Encyclopædia Britannica|language=en|access-date=2020-01-22}}</ref><ref name=":1ix">Goldschmidt et al. 2017, p. ix.</ref> Because there are different types of idealism, it is difficult to define the term uniformly.

[[Indian philosophy]] contains some of the first defenses of idealism, such as in [[Vedanta]] and in [[Shaivism|Shaiva]] [[Pratyabhijna|Pratyabhijña]] thought. These systems of thought argue for an all-pervading consciousness as the true nature and ground of reality. Idealism is also found in some streams of [[Mahayana Buddhism]], such as in the [[Yogachara|Yogācāra]] school, which argued for a "mind-only" (''cittamatra'') philosophy on an analysis of subjective experience. In the West, idealism traces its roots back to [[Plato]] in ancient Greece, who proposed that absolute, unchanging, timeless ideas constitute the highest form of reality: [[Platonic idealism]]. This was revived and transformed in the early modern period by [[Immanuel Kant]]'s arguments that our knowledge of reality is completely based on mental structures: [[transcendental idealism]].<ref name=":1ix" />

[[Epistemology|Epistemologically]], idealism is accompanied by a rejection of the possibility of knowing the existence of any ''thing'' independent of mind. [[Ontology|Ontologically]], idealism asserts that the existence of all things depends upon the mind; thus, ontological idealism rejects the perspectives of [[physicalism]] and [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|dualism]]. In contrast to [[materialism]], idealism asserts the ''primacy'' of consciousness as the origin and prerequisite of all phenomena.

Idealism came under attack from proponents of [[Analytic philosophy|analytical philosophy]], such as [[G. E. Moore]] and [[Bertrand Russell]], but its critics also included the [[new realism (philosophy)|new realists]] and [[Marxism|Marxists]]. However, many aspects and paradigms of idealism still have a large influence on subsequent philosophy.

==Definitions==
''Idealism'' is a term with several related meanings. It comes via [[Latin]] ''[[idea]]'' from the [[Ancient Greek]] ''[[idea]]'' (ἰδέα) from ''idein'' (ἰδεῖν), meaning "to see". The term entered the English language by 1743.<ref>{{cite web |title=idealism, n. |url=https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/90960 |publisher=[[Oxford English Dictionary]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=20 June 2023 |title=idealism, n. |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idealism |publisher=[[Merriam-Webster]]}}</ref> The term idealism was first used in the abstract metaphysical sense of the "belief that reality is made up only of ideas" by [[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Christian Wolff]] in 1747.<ref name="SEP3">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Idealism |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |location=Stanford, California |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/idealism/ |date=30 August 2015 |author-link=Martin Kramer |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |last2=Horstmann |first2=Rolf-Peter |last1=Guyer |first1=Paul}}</ref> The term re-entered the English language in this abstract sense by 1796.<ref>{{cite web |title=idealism, n. |url=https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=idealism |publisher=[[Online Etymological Dictionary]]}}</ref> [[A. C. Ewing]] gives this influential definition:

<blockquote>the view that there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience...provided that we regard thinking as part of experience and do not imply by "experience" passivity, and provided we include under experience not only human experience but the so-called "Absolute Experience" or the experience of a God such as [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]] postulates.<ref name=":3">Guyer, 2023, p. 3.</ref></blockquote>

A more recent definition by [[Willem de Vries|Willem deVries]] sees idealism as "roughly, the genus comprises theories that attribute ontological priority to the mental, especially the conceptual or ideational, over the non-mental."<ref name=":3" /> As such, idealism entails a rejection of [[materialism]] (or [[physicalism]]) as well as the rejection of the mind-independent existence of matter (and as such, also entails a rejection of [[Mind–body dualism|dualism]]).<ref>Guyer at al., 2023, p. 4.</ref>

There are two main metaphysical concepts on the position of idealism in contemporary philosophy, depending on whether its thesis is ontological or epistemic:

* [[Ontology|Ontological]] idealism is the view which holds that all of reality is in some way mental (or spirit, reason, or will) or at least ultimately grounded in a fundamental basis which is mental.<ref name=":2">Guyer et al., 2023, pp. 1–2.</ref> This is a form of metaphysical [[monism]] because it holds that there is only one type of thing in existence. The modern paradigm of a Western metaphysical idealism is Berkeley's immaterialism.<ref name=":2" /> Other such idealists are [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]], and [[F. H. Bradley|Bradley]].
* [[Epistemological idealism]] (or "formal" idealism) is a position in [[epistemology]] that holds that all [[knowledge]] is based on mental structures, not on "things in themselves". Whether a mind-independent reality is accepted or not, all that we have knowledge of are mental phenomena.<ref name=":2" /> The main source of Western epistemic idealist arguments is the transcendental idealism of [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]].<ref name=":2" /> Other thinkers who have defended epistemic idealist arguments include [[Ludwig Boltzmann]] and [[Brand Blanshard]].

Thus, ontological idealism holds that reality itself is non-physical, immaterial, or experiential at its core, while [[Epistemological idealism|epistemological idealist]] arguments merely affirm that reality can only be known through ideas and mental structures (without necessarily making metaphysical claims about [[Thing-in-itself|things in themselves]]).<ref name="Brittanica3">Daniel Sommer Robinson, [https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/281802/idealism "Idealism"], ''Encyclopædia Britannica''</ref> Because of this, A.C. Ewing argued that instead of thinking about these two categories as forms of idealism proper, we should instead speak of epistemic and ontological arguments for idealism.<ref name=":0">Guyer, Paul and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/idealism/ "Idealism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''] (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).</ref>

These two ways of arguing for idealism are sometimes combined to defend a specific type of idealism (as done by Berkeley), but they may also be defended as independent theses by different thinkers. For example, while F. H. Bradley and McTaggart focused on metaphysical arguments, [[Josiah Royce]], and [[Brand Blanshard]] developed epistemological arguments.<ref>Guyer et al., 2023, p. 5.</ref>

Furthermore, one might use epistemic arguments, but remain neutral about the metaphysical nature of things in themselves. This metaphysically neutral position, which is not a form of metaphysical idealism proper, may be associated with figures like [[Rudolf Carnap]], [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quine]], [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]], and perhaps even Kant himself (though he is difficult to categorize).<ref>Guyer et al., 2023, p. 4.</ref> The most famous kind of epistemic idealism is associated with [[Kantianism]] and [[transcendental idealism]], as well as with the related [[Neo-Kantianism|Neo-Kantian]] philosophies. Transcendental idealists like Kant affirm epistemic idealistic arguments without committing themselves to whether reality as such, the "[[Thing-in-itself|thing in itself]]", is ''ultimately'' mental.

=== Types of ontological idealism ===
Within ontological idealism, there are numerous further sub-types, including forms of [[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralism]], which hold that there are many independent mental [[Substance theory|substances]] or minds, such as [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]]' [[monadology]], and various forms of [[monism]] or [[absolute idealism]] (e.g. Hegelianism or [[Advaita Vedanta]]), which hold that the fundamental mental reality is a single unity or is grounded in some kind of singular [[Absolute (philosophy)|Absolute]]. Beyond this, idealists disagree on which aspects of the mental are more metaphysically basic. [[Platonic idealism]] affirms that ideal [[Theory of forms|forms]] are more basic to reality than the things we perceive, while [[subjective idealism|subjective idealists]] and [[phenomenalism|phenomenalists]] privilege sensory experiences. [[Personalism]], meanwhile, sees [[person]]s or [[Self|selves]] as fundamental.

A common distinction is between subjective and objective forms of idealism. [[Subjective idealism|Subjective idealists]] like [[George Berkeley]] reject the existence of a mind-independent or "external" world (though not the ''appearance'' of such phenomena in the mind). However, not all idealists restrict the real to subjective experience. [[Objective idealism|Objective idealists]] make claims about a trans-empirical world, but simply deny that this world is essentially divorced from or ontologically prior to mind or consciousness as such. Thus, objective idealism asserts that the reality of experiencing includes and transcends the realities of the object experienced and of the mind of the observer.<ref>Dictionary definition http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/objective+idealism</ref>

Idealism is sometimes categorized as a type of metaphysical [[anti-realism]] or [[skepticism]]. However, idealists need not reject the existence of an objective reality that we can obtain knowledge of, and can merely affirm that this real natural world is mental.<ref>Dunham et al. 2011, p. 4</ref><ref name=":1">Chalmers, David (2019). Idealism and the Mind-Body Problem. In William Seager (ed.), ''The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism''. New York: Routledge. pp. 353–373.</ref> Thus, [[David Chalmers]] writes of anti-realist idealisms (which would include Berkeley's) and realist forms of idealism, such as "[[Panpsychism|panpsychist]] versions of idealism where fundamental microphysical entities are conscious subjects, and on which matter is realized by these conscious subjects and their relations."<ref name=":1" />

Chalmers further outlines the following taxonomy of idealism:<blockquote>Micro-idealism is the thesis that concrete reality is wholly grounded in micro-level mentality: that is, in mentality associated with fundamental microscopic entities (such as [[quarks]] and [[photon]]s). Macro-idealism is the thesis that concrete reality is wholly grounded in macro-level mentality: that is, in mentality associated with macroscopic (middle-sized) entities such as [[human]]s and perhaps non-human animals. Cosmic idealism is the thesis that concrete reality is wholly grounded in cosmic mentality: that is, in mentality associated with the [[cosmos]] as a whole or with a single cosmic entity (such as the universe or a deity).<ref name=":1" /> </blockquote>Guyer et al. also distinguish between forms of idealism which are grounded in [[substance theory]] (often found in the Anglophone idealisms of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries) and forms of idealism which focus on activities or dynamic [[process]]es (favored in post-Kantian German philosophy).<ref>Guyer, 2023, p. 12.</ref>

==Classical Greek idealism==
===Pre-Socratic philosophy===
There are some precursors of idealism in [[Ancient Greek philosophy|Ancient Greek Philosophy]], though scholars disagree on whether any of these thinkers could be properly labeled "idealist" in the modern sense.<ref name=":4">Dunham et al. 2011, p. 11</ref>
One example is [[Anaxagoras]] (480 BC) who taught that all things in the universe ([[apeiron]]) were set in motion by ''[[nous]]'' ("mind"). In the ''[[Phaedo]]'', Plato quotes him as saying, "it is intelligence [nous] that arranges and causes all things".<ref name=":4" /> Similarly, [[Parmenides]] famously stated that "thinking and being are the same".<ref name=":4" /> This has led some scholars, such as Hegel and E. D. Phillips, to label Parmenides an idealist.<ref>Dunham et al. 2011, p. 14.</ref>

===Platonism and neoplatonism===
[[File:Plato_by_Raphael.png|thumb|Detail of [[Plato]] in ''[[The School of Athens]]'', by [[Raphael]]]]
[[Plato]]'s [[Theory of Forms|theory of forms]] or "ideas" (''eidos'') as described in dialogues like [[Phaedo]], [[Parmenides (dialogue)|Parmenides]] and [[Sophist (dialogue)|Sophist]], describes ideal forms (for example the [[platonic solids]] in geometry or abstracts like Goodness and Justice), as perfect beings which "exists-by-itself" (Greek: ''auto kath' auto''), that is, independently of any particular instance (whether physical or in the individual thought of any person).<ref>{{cite web |author=J.D.McNair |title=Plato's Idealism |url=http://faculty.mdc.edu/jmcnair/Joe6pages/Plato%27s%20Idealism.htm |access-date=7 August 2011 |work=Students' notes |publisher=MIAMI-DADE COMMUNITY COLLEGE}}</ref><ref>Dunham et al. 2011, pp. 21–22.</ref> Anything that exists in the world exists by participating in one of these unique ideas, which are nevertheless interrelated causally with the world of becoming, with nature.<ref name=":5">Dunham et al. 2011, p. 23.</ref> Arne Grøn calls this doctrine "the classic example of a metaphysical idealism as a ''[[Transcendental idealism|transcendent]]'' idealism".<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Idealism |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Science and Religion |publisher=eNotes |url=http://www.enotes.com/science-religion-encyclopedia/idealism |access-date=7 August 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110112124313/http://www.enotes.com/science-religion-encyclopedia/idealism |archive-date=12 January 2011 |author=Arne Grøn |url-status=dead}}</ref> Nevertheless, Plato holds that matter as perceived by us is real, though transitory, imperfect, and dependent on the eternal ideas for its existence. Because of this, some scholars have seen Plato as a [[Mind–body dualism|dualist]], though others disagree and favor a [[Monism|monist]] account.<ref>{{cite web |author=Simone Klein |title=What is objective idealism? |url=http://www.philosophos.com/knowledge_base/archives_12/philosophy_questions_12.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110716085840/http://www.philosophos.com/knowledge_base/archives_12/philosophy_questions_12.html |archive-date=16 July 2011 |access-date=7 August 2011 |work=Philosophy Questions |publisher=Philosophos}}</ref><ref name=":5" />

The thought of Plato was widely influential, and later Late Platonist (or [[Neoplatonism|Neoplatonist]]) thinkers developed Platonism in new directions. [[Plotinus]], the most influential of the later Platonists, wrote "Being and Intellect are therefore one nature" (''[[Enneads]]'' V.9.8).<ref name=":6">Dunham et al. 2011, p. 25.</ref> According to scholars like Nathaniel Alfred Boll and Ludwig Noiré, with Plotinus, a true idealism which holds that only soul or mind exists appears for the first time in [[Western philosophy]].<ref>'For there is for this universe no other place than the soul or mind'

''(neque est alter hujus universi locus quam anima)''

''Enneads'', iii, lib. vii, c.10</ref><ref>''(oportet autem nequaquam extra animam tempus accipere)''

Arthur Schopenhauer, ''[[Parerga and Paralipomena]]'', Volume I, "Fragments for the History of Philosophy", § 7</ref><ref>''Enneads'', iii, 7, 10</ref><ref name="Noiré2">Ludwig Noiré, ''Historical Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason''</ref> Similarly, for Maria Luisa Gatti, Plotinus' philosophy is a "'contemplationist metaphysics', in which contemplation, as creative, constitutes the reason for the being of everything".<ref name=":6" /> For Neoplatonist thinkers, the first cause or principle is the [[Form of the Good|Idea of the Good]], i.e. The One, from which everything is derived a hierarchical procession (''proodos'') (Enn. VI.7.15).<ref>Dunham et al. 2011, p. 27.</ref>

==Idealism in Judaism and Christianity==
Some [[Christian theologian]]s have held idealist views,<ref>Snowden, J. (1915). Philosophical Idealism and Christian Theology. The Biblical World, 46(3), 152–158. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3142477</ref> often based on [[neoplatonism]]. [[Neoplatonism and Christianity|Christian neoplatonism]] included figures like [[Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite]], and influenced numerous Christian thinkers, including the [[Cappadocian Fathers]] and Augustine.<ref>Wildberg, Christian, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/neoplatonism/ Neoplatonism]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref> Despite the influence of [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] [[scholasticism]] from the 12th century onward, there is certainly a sense in which some medieval [[Scholasticism|scholastic philosophers]] retained influences from the Platonic idealism that came via [[Augustine of Hippo|Augustine]].<ref>Idealism, New Advent Catholic Encyclopaedia, https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07634a.htm</ref> For example, the work of [[John Scotus Eriugena]] (c. 800 – c. 877) has been interpreted as an idealistic philosophy by [[Dermot Moran]] who writes that for Scotus "all spatiotemporal reality is understood as immaterial, mind dependent, and lacking in independent existence".<ref>Dunham et al. 2011, p. 12</ref> Scotus thus wrote: "the intellection of all things...is the being of all things".<ref>Dunham et al. 2011, p. 33.</ref>

Idealism was also defended in medieval [[Jewish philosophy]]. According to Samuel Lebens, early [[Hassidic]] rabbis like [[Yitzchak Luria]] (1534–72) defended a form of [[Kabbalah|Kabbalistic]] idealism in which the world was God's dream or a fictional tale told by God.<ref>Goldschmidt et al. 2017, p. xi.</ref>

Later Western theistic idealism such as that of [[Hermann Lotze]] offers a theory of the "world ground" in which all things find their unity: it has been widely accepted by Protestant theologians.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=world ground (philosophy) – Britannica Online Encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/648307/world-ground |access-date=2012-08-17}}</ref>

Several modern religious movements such as, for example, the organizations within the [[New Thought Movement]] and the [[Unity Church]], may be said to have a particularly idealist orientation. The [[theology]] of [[Christian Science]] includes a form of idealism: it teaches that all that truly exists is God and God's ideas; that the world as it appears to the senses is a distortion of the underlying spiritual reality, a distortion that may be corrected (both conceptually and in terms of human experience) through a reorientation (spiritualization) of thought.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Thompson |first=Theodore L. |date=March 1963 |title=Spiritualization of Thought |url=https://journal.christianscience.com/shared/view/zjn0hepauc |journal=The Christian Science Journal |volume=81 |issue=3 |issn=0009-5613 |access-date=2019-07-27}}</ref>

==Idealism in Eastern philosophy==
{{Asian philosophy sidebar}}
There are currents of idealism throughout [[Indian philosophy]], ancient and modern. Some forms of Hindu idealism (like [[Advaita Vedanta|Advaita]]) defend a type of [[monism]] or [[non-dualism]], in which a single [[consciousness]] ([[brahman]]) is all that exists. However, other traditions defend a theistic pluralism (e.g. [[Shaiva Siddhanta]]), in which there are many selves ([[Ātman (Hinduism)|atman]]) and one God.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Flood |first=Gavin D. |title=An introduction to Hinduism |date=1996 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=0-521-43304-5 |location=New York, NY |pages=163 |oclc=50516193}}</ref>

Buddhist idealism on the other hand is [[Nontheism|non-theistic]] and does not accept the existence of eternal selves (due to their adherence to the theory of [[Anattā|not-self]]).

=== Hindu philosophy ===
[[Image:Yajnavalkya_and_Janaka.jpg|thumb|The Upanishadic [[Rishi|sage]] [[Yājñavalkya]] (c. possibly 8th century BCE) is one of the earliest exponents of idealism, and is a major figure in the ''Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad''.]]

A type of idealistic monism can be seen in the ''[[Upanishads]]'', which often describe the ultimate reality of brahman as "being, consciousness, bliss" (''[[Saccidānanda]]'').<ref>Klaus Witz (1998), The Supreme Wisdom of the Upaniṣads: An Introduction, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-81-208-1573-5}}, pages 227–228</ref> The ''[[Chāndogya Upaniṣad]]'' teaches that everything is an emanation of the immortal brahman, which is the essence and source of all things, and is identical with the self ([[Ātman (Hinduism)|atman]]).<ref>Nikhilananda, Swami. The Upanishads&nbsp;— A New Translation. [http://www.bharatadesam.com/spiritual/upanishads/chandogya_upanishad.php Chhandogya Upanishad], Parts 5–8.</ref><ref>Warder, Anthony (2009), ''A Course in Indian Philosophy'', Motilal Banarsidass; {{ISBN|978-81-208-1244-4}}, pp. 25–28;</ref> The [[Brihadaranyaka Upanishad|''Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad'']] also describes brahman as awaress and bliss, and states that "this great being (mahad bhūtam) without an end, boundless (apāra), [is] nothing but [[vijñāna]] [consciousness]."<ref>Bausch, L. M. (2015). Kosalan Philosophy in the Kāṇva Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Suttanipāta, p. 163. [[University of California, Berkeley|UC Berkeley]]. Retrieved from: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2940b93h</ref>

Idealist notions can be found in different schools of [[Hindu philosophy]], including some schools of [[Vedanta]]. Other schools like the [[Samkhya]] and [[Nyaya]]-[[Vaisheshika]], [[Mimamsa]], [[Yoga]], [[Vishishtadvaita]], [[Dvaita]], and others opposed idealism in favor of realism.<ref>Sinha, Jadunath ''Indian Realism'' p. 15. Routledge, 2024.</ref>

Different schools of Vedanta have different interpretations of brahman-atman, their foundational theory. Advaita Vedanta posits an absolute idealistic monism in which reality is one single absolute existence. Thus, brahman (the ultimate ground of all) is absolutely identical with all atmans (individual selves). Other forms of Vedanta like the [[Vishishtadvaita]] of [[Ramanuja]] and the [[Bhedabheda]] of [[Bhāskara (philosopher)|Bhāskara]] are not as radical in their non-dualism, accepting that there is a certain difference between individual souls and Brahman.

==== Advaita ====
[[file:Raja Ravi Varma - Sankaracharya.jpg|thumb|Śaṅkara, by [[Raja Ravi Varma]]]]
The most influential Advaita philosopher was [[Adi Shankara|Ādi Śaṅkara]] (788–820). In his philosophy, brahman is the single [[Nondualism|non-dual]] foundation (''adhiṣṭhana'') for all existence. This reality is independent, self-established, irreducible, immutable, and free of space, time, and causation.<ref name=":30">Dalal, Neil, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/shankara/ Śaṅkara]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref> In comparison to this reality, the world of plurality and appearances is illusory ([[Maya (religion)|maya]]), an unreal cognitive error (mithya). This includes all individual souls or selves, which are actually unreal and numerically identical to the one brahman.<ref name=":30" />

Śaṅkara did not believe it was possible to prove the view that reality is "one only, without a second" (''[[Chandogya Upanishad|Chandogya]]'' 6.2.1) through independent philosophical reasoning. Instead, he accepts non-duality based on the authority of the Upaniṣads. As such, most of his extant works are scriptural commentaries.<ref name=":30" />

Nevertheless, he did provide various new arguments to defend his theories. A major metaphysical distinction for Śaṅkara is between what changes and may thus be negated (the unreal) and what does not (which is what is truly real).<ref name=":30" /> He compares the real to clay (the substantial cause, analogous to brahman) and the unreal to a pot which depends on the clay for its being (analogous to all impermanent things in the universe).<ref name=":30" /> By relying on dependence relations and on the reality of persistence, Śaṅkara concludes that metaphysical foundations are more real than their impermanent effects, and that effects are fully reducible and indeed identical to their metaphysical foundation.<ref name=":30" /> Through this argument from dependence, Śaṅkara concludes that since all things in the universe undergo change, they must depend on some really existent cause for their being, and this is the one primordial undifferentiated existence (''Chandogya Bhāṣya,'' 6.2.1–2).<ref name=":30" /> This one reality is the single cause that is in every object, and every thing is not different from this brahman since all things borrow their existence from it. Śaṅkara also provides a [[cosmogony]] in which the world arises from an unmanifest state which is like deep dreamless sleep into a state in which [[Ishvara|īśvara]] (God) dreams the world into existence. As such, the world is not separate from God's mind.<ref name=":30" />

Śaṅkara's philosophy, along with that of his contemporary [[Maṇḍana Miśra]] (c. 8th century CE), is at the foundation of Advaita school. The opponents of this school however, labeled him a māyāvādin (illusionist) for negating the reality of the world.<ref name=":30" /> They also criticized what they saw as a problematic explanation for how the world arises from māyā as an error. For them, if māyā is in brahman, then brahman has ignorance, but if it is not in brahman, then this collapses into a dualism of brahman and māyā.<ref name=":31">{{Cite web |last=Ranganathan |first=Shyam |title=Ramanuja {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/ramanuja/ |access-date=2024-02-05 |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |language=en-US}}</ref>

==== Other idealist schools ====
Perhaps the most influential critic of Advaita was [[Ramanuja|Rāmānuja]] (c. 1017 – c. 1137), the main philosopher of the competing [[Vishishtadvaita|Viśiṣṭādvaita]] (qualified non-dual) school. His philosophy affirms the reality of the world and individual selves as well as affirming an underlying unity of all things with God.<ref name=":31" /> One of Rāmānuja's critiques of advaita is epistemological. If, as Advaita argues, all cognition other than pure undifferentiated consciousness is based in error, then it follows we would have no knowledge of the very fact that all individual cognition is error (''[[Sri Bhashya|Śrī Bhāṣya]]'', I.i.1).<ref name=":31" />

Furthermore, Rāmānuja also argues against Advaita that individual selves are real and not illusory. This is because the very idea that an individual can be ignorant presupposes the very existence of that individual.<ref name=":31" /> Furthermore, since all Vedāntins agree that Brahman's nature is knowledge, consciousness and being, to say that brahman is ignorant is absurd, and so it must be individual souls which are ignorant.<ref name=":31" /> Thus, there must be individual selves with a metaphysically prior existence who then fall into ignorance (''Śrī Bhāṣya'', I.i.1.).<ref name=":31" /> Selves might be individual, but as the ''Vedas'' state, they still share a sense of unity with brahman. For Rāmānuja, this is because selves are distinct modes or qualities in the [[Macranthropy|cosmic body]] of Brahman (and are thus different and yet united with brahman).<ref name=":31" /><ref name="staffordbetty215">Stafford Betty (2010), Dvaita, Advaita, and Viśiṣṭādvaita: Contrasting Views of Mokṣa, Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East, Volume 20, Issue 2, pages 215–224</ref> Brahman meanwhile is like the soul in the body of the world. Furthermore, brahman is a theistic creator God for Rāmānuja, which really exists as the union of two deities: [[Vishnu]], and [[Lakshmi|Lakṣmī]].<ref name=":31" />

The philosophy of the [[Yoga|Tantric]] tradition of [[Kashmir Shaivism|Trika Shaivism]] is a non-dual theistic idealism.<ref>S. G. Dyczkowski, Mark. ''The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,'' 1989, pp. 17, 51.</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Lawrence |first=David Peter |title=Kashmiri Shaiva Philosophy {{!}} Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/kashmiri/ |access-date=2024-02-05 |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |language=en-US}}</ref> The key thinkers of this philosophical tradition, known as the [[Pratyabhijna|Pratyabhijñā]] (Recognition) school, are the [[Kashmiris|Kashmirian]] philosophers [[Utpaladeva]] (c. 900–950 CE) and [[Abhinavagupta]] (975–1025 CE).<ref>Torella, Raffaele (2021), ''Utpaladeva: Philosopher of Recognition'', pp. 1–3. DK Printworld (P) Ltd.</ref> This tradition affirms a non-dual monism which sees God ([[Shiva]]) as a single cosmic consciousness.<ref name="Parmeshwaranand2004">{{cite book |author=Swami Parmeshwaranand |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=N4xIBNmhpXcC&pg=PA32 |title=Encyclopaedia of the Śaivism |publisher=Sarup & Sons |year=2004 |isbn=978-81-7625-427-4 |page=32}}</ref> All selves (atman) are one with God, but they have forgotten this, and must recognize their true nature in order to reach liberation.<ref>Dyczkowski, Mark S. G. ''The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,'' Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1989, p. 17-18.</ref>

Unlike in Advaita Vedanta however, the one cosmic consciousness is active and dynamic, consisting of spontaneous vibration (''spanda'') since it has the quality of absolute freedom (''svātāntrya'').<ref>Dyczkowski, Mark S. G. ''The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,'' Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1989, p. 24.</ref> Through the power (''[[Shakti|Śakti]]'') of dynamic vibrations, the absolute (Shiva-Śakti, consciousness and its power) creates the world, and so, the world is a real manifestation of absolute consciousness.<ref>Dyczkowski, Mark S. G. ''The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism,'' Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1989, p. 25.</ref> Thus, in this system, the world and individual selves (which are dynamic, not an unchanging witness) are not an unreal illusion, but are seen as real and active expressions of God's creative freedom.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Singh |first=Jaideva |title=Vedanta and Advaita Shaivagama of Kashmir: A Comparative Study |date=1985 |publisher=[[Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture]] |isbn=978-81-87332-93-0 |pages=44–51}}</ref>

Idealism has remained influential in [[Modern Hinduism|modern Hindu]] philosophy, especially in [[Neo-Vedanta]] modernism. Prominent modern defenders include [[Raja Ram Mohan Roy|Ram Mohan Roy]] (1772–1833), [[Swami Vivekananda|Vivekananda]] (1863–1902),<ref>Madaio, James (2017), "Rethinking Neo-Vedānta: Swami Vivekananda and the Selective Historiography of Advaita Vedānta", Religions, 8 (6): 101, {{doi|10.3390/rel8060101|doi-access=free}}</ref> [[Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan]] (''An Idealist View of Life,'' 1932) and [[Sri Aurobindo|Aurobindo]] (1872–1950).

===Buddhist philosophy===
Buddhist views reminiscent of idealism appear in [[Mahayana]] scriptures like the [[Samdhinirmocana sutra|''Explanation of the Profound Secrets'']], [[Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra|''Descent into Laṅka'']], and ''[[Ten Stages Sutra]]''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Tola |first1=Fernando |last2=Dragonetti |first2=Carmen |date=December 2005 |title=Philosophy of mind in the Yogacara Buddhist idealistic school |url=https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00570832/file/PEER_stage2_10.1177%252F0957154X05059213.pdf |journal=History of Psychiatry |volume=16 |issue=4 |pages=453–465 |doi=10.1177/0957154X05059213 |pmid=16482684 |s2cid=21609414}}</ref> These theories, known as "mind-only" (''cittamatra'') or "the consciousness doctrine" (''vijñanavada'') were mostly associated with the Indian Buddhist philosophers of the [[Yogacara|Yogācāra]] school and the related [[Buddhist logico-epistemology|epistemological school]] (Pramāṇavāda).<ref name=":02">Finnigan, Bronwyn (2017). "Buddhist Idealism." In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), ''Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics''. Oxford University Press. pp. 178–199.</ref> These figures include: [[Vasubandhu]], [[Asaṅga]], [[Dignāga]], [[Dharmakīrti]], [[Sthiramati]], [[Dharmapala of Nalanda|Dharmapāla]], [[Jñanasrimitra|Jñānaśrīmitra]], [[Śaṅkaranandana]], and [[Ratnākaraśānti]]. Their arguments were a lively subject of debate for Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers in India for centuries.<ref name=":02" /> These discussions had a lasting influence on the later [[Buddhist philosophy]] of [[East Asian Buddhism]] and [[Tibetan Buddhism]].<ref name=":02" />

There is some modern scholarly disagreement about whether Indian Yogācāra Buddhism can be said to be a form of idealism.<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231">{{cite journal |last1=Trivedi |first1=Saam |date=November 2005 |title=Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism |journal=Asian Philosophy |volume=15 |issue=3 |pages=231–246 |doi=10.1080/09552360500285219 |s2cid=144090250}}</ref><ref name=":02" /> Some writers like philosopher [[Jay L. Garfield|Jay Garfield]] and German philologist [[Lambert Schmithausen]] argue that Indian Yogacarins are metaphysical idealists that reject the existence of a mind independent external world.<ref name=":212">Schmithausen, Lambert (2005). ''On the Problem of the External World in the Ch'eng wei shih lun''. Tōkyō: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.</ref> Others see them as closer to an epistemic idealist like Kant who holds that our knowledge of the world is simply knowledge of our own concepts and perceptions.<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /> However, a major difference here is that while Kant holds that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, Indian Yogacarins held that ultimate reality is knowable, but only through the non-conceptual yogic perception of a highly trained meditative mind.<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /> Other scholars like [[Dan Lusthaus]] and Thomas Kochumuttom see Yogācāra as a kind of phenomenology of experience which seeks to understand how suffering ([[Duḥkha|dukkha]]) arises in the mind, not provide a metaphysics.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kochumuttom |first1=Thomas A. |title=A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu, the Yogācārin |date=1989 |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass |isbn=978-81-208-0662-7}}{{page needed|date=May 2021}}</ref><ref name="acmuller.net">[[Dan Lusthaus]], "What is and isn't Yogācāra". {{cite web |title=What is and isn't Yogacara |url=http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro-uni.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131216190312/http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro-uni.htm |archive-date=16 December 2013 |access-date=2016-01-12}}</ref>

==== Vasubandhu ====
[[File:Kofukuji Monastery Hosso Patriarchs of Hokuendo (Seshin) (413).jpg|thumb|Statue of Vasubandhu (jp. Seshin), [[Kōfuku-ji]], [[Nara, Nara|Nara]], Japan]]
Whatever the case, the works of [[Vasubandhu]] (fl. c.360) certainly include a refutation of mind-independent "external" objects (Sanskrit: bāhyārtha) and argue that the true nature of reality is beyond subject-object distinctions.<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /><ref name=":02" /> He views ordinary conscious experience as deluded in its perceptions of an external world separate from itself (which does not exist), and instead argues that all there is ''vijñapti'' (ideas, mental images, conscious appearances, representations).<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /><ref>Siderits, Mark, ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, p. 149.</ref><ref name=":02" /> Vasubandhu begins his ''[[Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi|Twenty verses]]'' (''Viṃśikā'') by affirming that "all this [everything we take to exist] is mere appearance of consciousness [''vijñapti''], because of the appearance of non-existent objects, just as a man with an eye disease sees non-existent hairs" (Viṃś.1).<ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /><ref name=":02" /> His main argument against external objects is a critique of the atomist theories of his realist opponents ([[Nyaya|Nyāya]] and [[Abhidharma]] theorists).<ref name=":02" />

Vasubandhu also responds against three objections to idealism which indicate his view that all appearances are caused by mind: (1) the issue of spatio-temporal continuity, (2) accounting for [[intersubjectivity]], and (3) the causal efficacy of matter on subjects.<ref name=":02" /><ref>Siderits, Mark. ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, pp. 150–151.</ref> For the first and third objections, Vasubandhu responds by arguing that dreams can also include spatio-temporal continuity, regularity and causal efficacy.<ref name=":02" /> Regarding intersubjectivity, Vasubandhu appeals to shared karma as well as mind to mind causation.<ref name=":21">Siderits, Mark. ''Buddhism as philosophy'', 2017, pp. 157–170.</ref> After answering these objections, Vasubandhu argues that idealism is a better explanation than [[Philosophical realism|realism]] for everyday experiences. To do this, he relies on the Indian "Principle of Lightness" (an appeal to parsimony like [[Occam's razor|Occam's Razor]]) and argues that idealism is the "lighter" theory since it posits a smaller number of entities.<ref name=":21" /> This is thus an argument from simplicity and an inference to the best explanation (i.e. an [[Abductive reasoning|abductive argument]]).<ref name=":21" />

As such, he affirms that our usual experience of being a self (ātman) that knows objects is an illusory construct, and this constitutes what he calls the "imagined nature" aspect of reality.<ref name=":02" />

Thus, for Vasubandhu, there is a more fundamental "root consciousness" that is empty of subject-object distinctions and yet originates all experiences "just as waves originate on water" ([[Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā|''Thirty Verses'', ''Triṃś'']].17).<ref name=":02" /> However, Vasubandhu sees this philosophy as a mere [[Two truths doctrine|conventional]] description, since [[ultimate reality]] is "inconceivable" (''Triṃś.''29), an ineffable and non-conceptual "[[Tathātā|thusness]]" which cannot be fully captured in words and can only be known through meditative realization by [[yogis]] ("yogacaras", hence the name of his school). This is why certain modern interpreters, like Jonathan Gold, see Vasubandhu's thought as a "conventionalist idealism" or even a type of epistemic idealism like Kant's (and not a full blown objective idealism).<ref name=":172">Gold, Jonathan C., "Vasubandhu", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vasubandhu/</ref><ref name="Trivedi, Saam 2005, pp. 231" /><ref name=":02" />

==== The Buddhist epistemologists ====
Buddhist arguments against external objects were further expanded and sharpened by later figures like [[Dignāga]] (<abbr>fl. 6th century</abbr>) and [[Dharmakirti|Dharmakīrti]] (fl. 7th century) who led an epistemological turn in medieval Indian philosophy.<ref>Dreyfus, Georges B. J. ''Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations'', Suny, 1997, pp. 15–16.</ref><ref name=":02" />

Dignāga's main arguments against external objects (specifically, [[Atomism|atomic]] [[particle]]s) are found in his ''[[Ālambanaparīkṣā]]'' (''Examination of the Object of Consciousness'').<ref name=":02" /> Dignāga argues that for something to be an object (ālambana) of a conscious state, that object must be causally related to the consciousness and it must resemble that consciousness (in appearance or content). Dignāga then attempts to show that realism about external particulars cannot satisfy these two conditions.<ref name=":02" /> Since individual atoms lack a resemblance to the conscious state they supposedly cause, they cannot be the object of cognition. Furthermore, aggregates of atoms also cannot be the object, since they are merely a conceptual grouping of individual atoms (and thus, unreal), and only atoms have causal efficacy.<ref name=":02" />

Dharmakīrti's view is summed up in the [[Pramanavarttika|''Pramānaṿārttika'']] (''Commentary on Epistemology'') as follows: "cognition experiences itself, and nothing else whatsoever. Even the particular objects of perception, are by nature just consciousness itself."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kapstein |first1=Matthew T. |date=July 2014 |title=Buddhist Idealists and Their Jain Critics on Our Knowledge of External Objects |journal=Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement |volume=74 |pages=123–147 |doi=10.1017/S1358246114000083 |s2cid=170689422}}</ref> One of his main arguments for idealism is the inference from "the necessity of things only ever being experienced together with experience" (Sanskrit: ''sahopalambhaniyama'')''.<ref name=":02" />'' Dharmakīrti consicely states this argument in the ''Ascertainment of Epistemology'' (''[[Pramāṇaviniścaya]]''): "blue and the consciousness of blue are not different, because they must always be apprehended together."''<ref name=":02" />'' Since an object is never found independently of consciousness, objects cannot be mind-independent. This can be read as an epistemological argument for idealism which attempts to show there is no good reason (empirically or inferentially) to accept the existence of external objects.''<ref name=":02" />''

Most of the Yogācāra thinkers and epistemologists (including Dharmakīrti) defended the existence of multiple [[mindstream]]s, and even tackled the [[problem of other minds]]. As such, thinkers like Dharmakīrti were pluralists who held there were multiple minds in the world (in this they differ with Hindu Advaita thinkers who held there was a single cosmic consciousness).''<ref name=":02" />'' However, there was a certain sub-school of Indian Buddhists, exemplified by [[Prajñakaragupta]], [[Jñanasrimitra|Jñānaśrīmitra]] (fl. 975–1025 C.E.) and [[Ratnakīrti]] (11th century CE) who were not pluralists. In his ''Refutation of Other mindstreams'' (''Santānāntaradūṣaṇa''), Ratnakīrti argues that the existence of other minds cannot be established ultimately, and as such ultimate reality must be an undifferentiated [[Nonduality (spirituality)|non-dual]] consciousness (''vijñānādvaita'').<ref name=":210">Chakrabarti, Arindam; Weber, Ralph; [https://books.google.com/books?id=lfiiCgAAQBAJ&q=Ratnak%C4%ABrti Comparative Philosophy without Borders]. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. pp 103–104.</ref> This [[Monism|monistic]] interpretation of [[Yogācāra]] is known as the ''Citrādvaitavāda'' school (the view of variegated non-duality) since it sees reality as a single multifaceted non-dual luminosity (''citrādvaitaprakāśa'').<ref>Wood, Thomas E. ''Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda'', p. 205. University of Hawaii Press, 1991</ref><ref>Patil, Parimal G. (2009). ''Against a Hindu God: Buddhist Philosophy of Religion in India,'' p. 254''.'' New York: Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-231-14222-9}}.</ref>

=== Chinese philosophy ===
[[File:Great_philosopher_Wang_Shouren.jpg|thumb|272x272px|[[Wang Yangming]], a leading Neo-Confucian scholar during the Ming and a founder of the "[[Yangmingism|school of mind]]"]]
In [[Chinese philosophy]], Yogācāra idealism was defended by Chinese Buddhists like [[Xuanzang]] (602–664) and his students [[Kuiji]] (632–682) and [[Woncheuk|Wŏnch'ŭk]] (613–696). Xuanzang had studied Yogācāra Buddhism at the great Indian [[Nalanda University|university of Nalanda]] under the Indian philosopher [[Śīlabhadra]]. His work, especially ''[[Cheng Weishi Lun|The Demonstration of Consciousness-only]]'', was pivotal in the establishment of [[East Asian Yogācāra]] Buddhism (also known as "consciousness only", Ch: ''Weishi'' 唯識), which in turn influenced [[East Asian Buddhism|East Asian Buddhist]] thought in general.<ref name=":04">Cook, Francis (1999). ''[https://bdkamerica.org/download/1861 Three Texts on Consciousness Only]'', pp. 1–3. Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research</ref><ref name=":35">Hammerstrom, Erik J.. [https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Expression-%22The-Myriad-Dharmas-are-Only-in-20-Hammerstrom/ff3f2e8c08a79c4b8c618347dacb4b4baa5bfb91 "The Expression "The Myriad Dharmas are Only Consciousness"] in Early 20th Century Chinese Buddhism". (2010).</ref>

Yogācāra Buddhism also influenced the thought of other Chinese Buddhist philosophical traditions, such as [[Huayan]], [[Tiantai]], [[Pure Land Buddhism|Pure Land]], and [[Zen]].<ref name=":38" /> Many Chinese Buddhist traditions like Huayan, [[Zen]], and [[Tiantai]] were also strongly influenced by an important text called the ''[[Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana|Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna]],'' which synthesized consciousness-only idealism with [[buddha-nature]] thought''.''<ref>Makeham, John. ''The Buddhist Roots of Zhu Xi's Philosophical Thought'', p. 277. Oxford University Press, 2018.</ref><ref name=":32">Aviv, E. (2020). "Chapter 3 The Debate over the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna".  In ''Differentiating the Pearl from the Fish-Eye''. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. {{doi|10.1163/9789004437913_005}}</ref><ref>Hsieh, Ding-Hwa (2004). "Awakening of Faith (Dasheng Qixin Lun)". MacMillan Encyclopedia of Buddhism. Vol. 1. New York: MacMillan Reference USA. pp. 38–9. {{ISBN|0-02-865719-5}}.</ref> This text promoted an influential theory of mind which holds that all phenomena are manifestations of the "One Mind". Some scholars have seen this as an ontological monism''.''<ref name=":32" /> One passage from the text states: "the [[Trailokya|three worlds]] are illusory constructs, created by the mind alone" and "all dharmas are produced from the mind's giving rise to false thoughts".<ref name=":33">Jorgensen, John; Lusthaus, Dan; Makeham, John; Strange, Mark, trans. (2019), ''Treatise on Awakening Mahāyāna Faith'', p. 85. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, {{ISBN|978-0-19-029771-8}}</ref> Jorgensen et al. note that this indicates metaphysical idealism.<ref name=":33" /> The new philosophical trend ushered in by the ''Awakening of Faith'' was resisted by some Chinese Yogācāra thinkers, and the debates between the Yogācāra school of Xuanzang and those who instead followed the doctrines of the ''Awakening of Faith'' continued until the modern era. These debates happened in China as well as in Japan and Korea.<ref name=":38">Makeham, John. ''Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China'', p. 9. Oxford University Press, 2014</ref>

The doctrine that all phenomena arise from an ultimate principle, the One Mind, was adapted by the influential [[Huayan]] school, whose thought is exemplified by thinkers such as [[Fazang]] (643–712) and [[Guifeng Zongmi|Zongmi]] (780–841).<ref name="norden23">Van Norden, Bryan and Nicholaos Jones, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/buddhism-huayan/ Huayan Buddhism]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref><ref name=":111">{{cite book |last1=Tiwald |first1=Justin |title=Readings in Later Chinese Philosophy: Han to the 20th century |last2=Van Norden |first2=Bryan |publisher=Hackett Publishing |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-62466-190-7 |location=Indianapolis, Indiana |pages=80–87}}</ref> This tradition also promoted a kind of [[holism]] which sees every phenomenon in the cosmos as interfused and interconnected with every other phenomenon.<ref>Fox, Alan. (2013). "The Huayan Metaphysics of Totality." In ''A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy'', S.M. Emmanuel (Ed.). {{doi|10.1002/9781118324004.ch11}}</ref> Chinese scholars like [[Feng Youlan|Yu-lan Fung]] and [[Wing-tsit Chan]] see Huayan philosophy as a form of idealism, though other scholars have defended alternative interpretations.<ref name=":37">Chan, Wing-tsit (1963), ''A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy,'' p. 408. Princeton: Princeton University Press.</ref><ref>Liu, Jeeloo. (2022). ''[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363872025_Huayan_Buddhism%27s_Conceptions_of_the_Realness_of_Reality_A_Transformation_from_Subjective_Idealism_into_Holistic_Realism Huayan Buddhism’s Conceptions of the Realness of Reality: A Transformation from Subjective Idealism into Holistic Realism.]'' 10.5040/9781350238534.ch-7.</ref><ref>Fung, Yu-lan (1983). ''A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II'', trans. D. Bodde, p. 359. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</ref> According to Wing-tsit Chan, since Huayan patriarch Fazang sees the One Mind as the basis for all things, including the external world, his system is one of objective idealism.<ref name=":37" /> A key distinction between Huayan's view of the world and that of the Yogācāra school is that in Huayan, there is a single intersubjective world (which nevertheless arises from mind), while Yogācāra holds that each mindstream projects its own world out of their underlying root consciousness.<ref name=":37" /><ref>Ernest Billings Brewster. [http://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-BJ001/bj001577597.pdf What is Our Shared Sensory World?: Ming Dynasty Debates on Yogacara versus Huayan Doctrines.] Journal of Chinese Buddhist Studies  (2018, 31: 117–170)  New Taipei: Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies, pp. 117–170. ISSN: 2313-2000 e-ISSN: 2313-2019</ref>

Chinese Buddhist idealism also influenced [[Confucianism|Confucian philosophy]] through the work of thinkers like the [[Ming dynasty|Ming era]] (1368–1644) [[Neo-Confucianism|neo-confucian]] [[Wang Yangming]] (1472–1529). Wang's thought has been interpreted as a kind of idealism.<ref>"35. Dynamic Idealism in Wang Yang-ming". ''A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy'', edited by, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 654–691. {{doi|10.1515/9781400820030-041}}</ref> According to Wang, the ultimate principle or pattern (''lǐ'') of the whole universe is identical with the mind, which forms one body or substance (''yì tǐ'') with "Heaven, Earth, and the myriad creatures" of the world.<ref name=":34">Van Norden, Bryan, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/wang-yangming/ Wang Yangming]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).</ref> Wang argues that only this view can explain the fact that human beings experience innate care and [[Ren (philosophy)|benevolence]] for others as well as a sense of care for inanimate objects.<ref name=":34" /> Wang's thought, along with that of [[Lu Xiangshan]], led to the creation of the [[Yangmingism|School of Mind]], an important Neo-Confucian tradition which emphasized these idealist views.<ref name=":34" />

Yogācāra idealism saw a revival in the 20th century, associated figures like [[Yang Wenhui]] (1837–1911), [[Taixu]], [[Liang Shuming]], [[Ouyang Jingwu]] (1870–1943), Wang Xiaoxu (1875–1948), and Lu Cheng.<ref name=":36" /><ref name=":35" /> Modern Chinese thinkers associated with consciousness-only linked the philosophy with Western philosophy (especially Hegelian and Kantian thought) and modern science.<ref name=":35" /><ref>Makeham, John. ''Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China'', p. 1. Oxford University Press, 2014</ref> A similar trend occurred among some Japanese philosophers like [[Inoue Enryō]], who linked East Asian philosophies like Huayan with the philosophy of Hegel.<ref name=":35" />

Both modern Chinese Buddhists and [[New Confucianism|New Confucian]] thinkers participated in this revival of consciousness-only studies.<ref name=":36">Makeham, John. ''Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China'', Oxford University Press, 2014</ref><ref name=":32" /><ref name=":35" /> The thought of New Confucians like [[Xiong Shili]], Ma Yifu, [[Tang Chun-i|Tang Junyi]] and [[Mou Zongsan]], was influenced by Yogācāra consciousness-only philosophy, as well as by the metaphysics of the ''[[Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana|Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna]],'' though their thought also contained many critiques of Buddhist philosophy''.''<ref>Makeham, John. ''The Awakening of Faith and New Confucian Philosophy,'' Brill, 2021, introduction.</ref><ref>Makeham, John. ''Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China'', p. 30. Oxford University Press, 2014.</ref>

== Modern philosophy ==
It is only in the [[modern era]] that idealism became a central topic of argumentation among Western philosophers.<ref name=":7">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 15</ref> This was also when the term "idealism" coined by [[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Christian Wolff]] (1679–1754), though previous thinkers like Berkeley had argued for it under different names.

Idealistic tendencies can be found in the work of some [[Rationalism|rationalist]] philosophers, like [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]] and [[Nicolas Malebranche]] (though they did not use the term). Malebranche argued that Platonic ideas (which exist only in the mind of God) are the ultimate ground of our experiences and of the physical world, a view that prefigures later idealist positions.<ref>Dunham et al. 2011, pp. 46–49.</ref> Some scholars also see Leibniz' philosophy as approaching idealism. Guyer et al. write that "his view that the states of [[Monadology|monads]] can be only perceptions and appetitions (desires) suggests a metaphysical argument for idealism, while his famous thesis that each monad represents the entire universe from its own point of view might be taken to be an epistemological ground for idealism, even if he does not say as much."<ref name=":7" /> However, there is still much debate in the contemporary scholarly literature on whether Leibniz can be considered an idealist.<ref>Dunham et al. 2011, p. 69.</ref>

=== Subjective idealism ===
{{main|Subjective idealism}}
[[file:John Smibert - Bishop George Berkeley - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|A painting of Bishop George Berkeley by John Smibert]]
One famous proponent of modern idealism was [[George Berkeley|Bishop George Berkeley]] (1685–1753), an Anglo-Irish philosopher who defended a theory he called immaterialism.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 25.</ref> This kind of idealism is sometimes also called [[subjective idealism]] (also known as [[Phenomenalism|phenomenalistic idealism]]).

Berkeley held that objects exist only to the extent that a mind perceives them and thus the physical world does not exist outside of mind. Berkeley's epistemic argument for this view (found in his ''[[A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge]]'') rests on the [[premise]] that we can only know ideas in the mind. Thus, knowledge does not extend to mind-independent things (''Treatise'', 1710: Part I, §2).<ref name=":8">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 34.</ref> From this, Berkeley holds that "the existence of an idea consists in being perceived", thus, regarding ideas "their ''esse'' is ''percipi''", that is, to be is to be perceived (1710: Part I, §3).<ref name=":8" />

Based on this restriction of existence to only what is being perceived, Berkeley holds that it is meaningless to think that there could exist objects that are not being perceived.<ref name=":8" /> This is the basic idea behind what has been called Berkeley's "[[master argument]]" for idealism, which states that "one cannot conceive of anything existing unconceived because in trying to do so one is still conceiving of the object" (1710: Part I, §23).<ref name=":8" /> As to the question of how objects which are currently not being perceived by individual minds persist in the world, Berkeley answers that a single eternal mind keeps all of physical reality stable (and causes ideas in the first place), and this is [[God]].<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 36–37.</ref>

Berkeley also argued for idealism based on a second key premise: "an idea can be like nothing but an idea" and as such there cannot be any things without or outside mind. This is because for something to be like something else, there must be something they have in common. If something is mind independent, then it must be completely different from ideas. Thus, there can be no relation between ideas in the mind and things "without the mind", since they are not alike.<ref name=":9">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 35.</ref> As Berkeley writes, "...I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? if they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense, to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest." (1710: Part I, §8).<ref name=":9" />

A similar idealistic philosophy was developed at around the same time as Berkeley by Anglican priest and philosopher [[Arthur Collier]] (''Clavis Universalis'': ''Or, A New Inquiry after Truth, Being a Demonstration of the Non-Existence, or Impossibility, of an External World,'' 1713). Collier claimed to have developed his view that all matter depends on mind independently of Berkeley.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 39.</ref> [[Paul Brunton]], a British philosopher and mystic, also taught a similar type of idealism called "mentalism".<ref>{{cite web |author=Peter Holleran |title=Paul Brunton – Architect of a 21st Century Philosophy |url=http://www.stillnessspeaks.com/images/uploaded/file/Paul%20Brunton.pdf |access-date=4 May 2023 |website=stillnessspeaks.com}}</ref>

[[A.&nbsp;A. Luce]]<ref>Sense Without Matter Or Direct Perception By A.A. Luce</ref> and [[John Foster (philosopher)|John Foster]] are other subjective idealists.<ref>Review for John Foster's book ''A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism'' http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15785 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110615064147/http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15785 |date=15 June 2011 }}</ref> Luce, in ''Sense without Matter'' (1954), attempts to bring Berkeley up to date by modernizing his vocabulary and putting the issues he faced in modern terms, and treats the Biblical account of matter and the psychology of perception and nature. Foster's ''The Case for Idealism'' argues that the physical world is the logical creation of natural, non-logical constraints on human [[Empirical evidence|sense-experience]]. Foster's latest defense of his views ([[phenomenalistic idealism]]) is in his book ''A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism''.

Critics of subjective idealism include [[Bertrand Russell]]'s popular 1912 book  ''[[The Problems of Philosophy]]'', Australian philosopher [[David Stove]],<ref name=Stove>{{cite web|url=http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.html|title=Stove's discovery of the worst argument in the world}}</ref> [[Alan Musgrave]],<ref name="Alan Musgrave 1998">Alan Musgrave, in an article titled ''Realism and Antirealism'' in R. Klee (ed), ''Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science'', Oxford, 1998, 344–352 – later re-titled to ''Conceptual Idealism and Stove's Gem'' in A. Musgrave, Essays on Realism and Rationalism, Rodopi, 1999 also in [[Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara|M.L. Dalla Chiara]] et al. (eds), ''Language, Quantum, Music'', Kluwer, 1999, 25–35 – [[Alan Musgrave]]</ref> and [[John Searle]].<ref name="Social Reality' p. 174">[[John Searle]], ''The Construction of Social Reality'' p. 174</ref>

=== Epistemic idealism ===

==== Kant's Transcendental idealism ====
{{main|Transcendental idealism}}

Transcendental idealism was developed by [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804), who was the first philosopher to label himself an "idealist".<ref name=":10">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 47.</ref> In his ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]],'' Kant was clear to distinguish his view (which he also called "critical" and "empirical realism") from Berkeley's idealism and from Descartes's views.<ref name=":10" /><ref>''[[Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics]]'', p. 4:374</ref> Kant's philosophy holds that we only have knowledge of our experiences, which consists jointly of intuitions and concepts. As such, our experiences reflect our cognitive structures, not the intrinsic nature of mind-independent things. This means even time and space are not properties of [[Thing-in-itself|things in themselves]] (i.e. mind independent reality underlying appearances).<ref name=":10" />

Since it focuses on the mind dependent nature of knowledge and not on metaphysics per se, transcendental idealism is a type of [[epistemological idealism]]. Unlike metaphysical forms of idealism, Kant's transcendental idealism does not deny the existence of mind independent things or affirm that they must be mental.<ref name=":10" /> He thus accepts that we can conceive of external objects as distinct from our representations of them. However, he argues that we cannot know what external objects are "in themselves".<ref name=":10" /> As such, Kant's system can be called idealist in some respects (e.g. regarding space and time) and also realist in that he accepts there must be ''some'' mind independent reality (even if we cannot know its ultimate nature and thus must remain agnostic about this).<ref name=":11">Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 50–51, 61.</ref> Kant's system also affirms the reality of a free truly existent [[self]] and of a God, which he sees as being possible because the non-temporal nature of the thing-in-itself allows for a radical freedom and genuine spontaneity.<ref name=":11" />

Kant's main argument for his idealism, found throughout the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', is based on the key premise that we always represent objects in space and time through our [[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]] intuitions (knowledge which is independent from any experience).<ref name=":12">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 52.</ref> Thus, according to Kant, space and time can never represent any "property at all of any things in themselves nor any relations of them to each other, i.e., no determination of them that attaches to objects themselves and that would remain even if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of intuition" (CPuR A 26/B 42).<ref name=":12" />

Kant's main point is that since our mental representations have spatio-temporal structure, we have no real grounds for positing that the real objects our mind represents in this way also have spatio-temporal structure in themselves. Kant makes this argument in different parts of the ''Critique'', such as when he asks rhetorically:<blockquote>If there did not lie in you a faculty for intuiting a priori; if this subjective condition were not at the same time the universal a priori condition under which alone the object of ... intuition is possible; if the object ([e.g.,] the triangle) were something in itself without relation to your subject: then how could you say that what necessarily lies in your subjective conditions for constructing a triangle must also necessarily pertain to the triangle in itself. (A 48/B 65)<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 53.</ref></blockquote>Throughout his career, Kant labored to distinguish his philosophy from metaphysical idealism, as some of his critics charged him with being a Berkeleyian idealist.<ref name=":11" /> He argued that even if we cannot know how things are in themselves, we do know they must exist, and that we know this "through the representations which their influence on our sensibility provides for us."<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 57.</ref> In the second edition of his ''Critique'', he even inserted a "refutation of idealism". For Kant, "the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me."<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 58.</ref>

==== Neo-Kantianism ====
Kant's philosophy was extremely influential on European [[Age of Enlightenment|enlightenment]] thinkers (and [[Counter-Enlightenment|counter-enlightenment]] ones as well), and his ideas were widely discussed and debated.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 70.</ref> Transcendental idealism was also defended by later [[Kantianism|Kantian]] philosophers who adopted his method, such as [[Karl Leonhard Reinhold]] and [[Jakob Sigismund Beck]].

The mid-19th century saw a revival of Kantian philosophy, which became known as [[Neo-Kantianism]], with its call of "Back to Kant".<ref name=":26">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 159.</ref> This movement was especially influential on 19th century German academic philosophy (and also continental philosophy as a whole). Some important figures include: [[Hermann Cohen]] (1842–1918), [[Wilhelm Windelband]] (1848–1914), [[Ernst Cassirer]], [[Hermann von Helmholtz]], [[Eduard Zeller]], [[Leonard Nelson]], [[Heinrich Rickert]], and [[Friedrich Albert Lange]].<ref>Heis, Jeremy, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/neo-kantianism/ Neo-Kantianism]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref><ref name=":27">Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 162–169.</ref> A key concern of the Neo-Kantians was to update Kantian epistemology, particularly in order to provide an epistemic basis for the modern sciences (all while avoiding ontology altogether, whether idealist or materialist).<ref name=":27" /> Neo-Kantianism rejected metaphysical idealism while also accepting the basic Kantian premise that "our experience of reality is always structured by the distinctive features of human mentality."<ref name=":26" /> Hence, Cassirer defended an epistemic worldview that held that one cannot reduce reality to any independent or substantial object (physical or mental), instead, there are only different ways of describing and organizing experience.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 172.</ref>

Neo-Kantianism influenced the work of the [[Vienna Circle|Vienna circle]] and its ambassadors to the Anglophone world, [[Rudolf Carnap]] 1891–1970) and [[Hans Reichenbach]].<ref name=":26" /> [[Charles Bernard Renouvier]] was the first philosopher in France to formulate a system based on Kant's critical idealism, which he termed Neo-criticism ''(néo-criticisme''). It is a transformation rather than a continuation of Kantianism.

=== German idealism ===
{{main|German idealism}}
Several important German thinkers who were deeply influenced by Kant are the [[German idealism|German idealists]]: [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]] (1762–1814), [[Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling]] (1775–1854), and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Georg Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 56, 72.</ref> Though heavily drawing on Kant, these thinkers were not transcendental idealists as such, and they sought to move beyond the idea that things in themselves are unknowable {{Ndash}}an idea they considered as opening the door to [[skepticism]] and [[nihilism]].<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 73–74.</ref>

Post-Kantian German idealists thus rejected transcendental idealism by arguing against the opposition of a mind-independent world of being and a subjective world of mental constructs (or the separation between the knowledge and what is known, between subject and object, real and ideal). This new German idealism was distinguished by an "inseparability of being and thinking" and "a dynamic conception of self-consciousness" that sees reality as spontaneous conscious activity and its expressions.<ref name=":13">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 76.</ref> As such, this kind of metaphysical idealism, focused on dynamic processes and forces, was opposed to older forms of idealism, which based itself on substance theory (which these Germans labeled "dogmatism").<ref name=":13" />

The first thinker to elaborate this type of dynamic idealism was [[J. G. Fichte]] (''Doctrine of [[Wissenschaft]],'' 1810–1813).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 77.</ref> For Fichte, the primordial act at the ground of being is called "self-positing".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 77–78</ref> Fichte argues that self-consciousness or the I is a spontaneous unconditioned self-creating act which he also called the deed-act (''tathandlung''). Fichte argues that positing something unconditioned and independent at the ground of all is the only way to avoid an epistemic [[infinite regress]].<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 78</ref> According to Fichte, this "I am" or "absolute subject" which "originally posits its own being absolutely" (''Doctrine'' I, 2: 261), "is at the same time the actor and the product of the act; the actor, and that which the activity brings forth; act and deed are one and the same" (''Doctrine'' I, 2: 259).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 80</ref> Fichte also argues that this "I" has the capacity to "counter-posit" a "not-I", leading to [[Subject and object (philosophy)|a subject-object]] relationship. The I also has a third capacity Fichte calls "divisibility", which allows for the existence of plurality in the world, which however must be understood as manifestations of the "I-activity", and as being "within the I".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 81–82</ref>

Fichte's philosophy was adopted by Schelling who defended this new idealism as a full [[Monism|monistic]] ontology which tried to account for all of nature which he would eventually name "absolute idealism".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 83–85.</ref> For Schelling, reality is an "original unity" (''ursprüngliche Einheit'') or a "primordial totality" (''uranfängliche Ganzheit'') of opposites.<ref name=":14">Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 85–86.</ref> This is an absolute which he described as an "eternal act of cognition" is disclosed in subjective and objective modes, the world of ideas and nature.<ref name=":14" /> 
[[file:Phänomenologie des Geistes.jpg|thumb|Hegel's [[The Phenomenology of Spirit]] was a pivotal work of German absolute idealism.]]
[[G.&nbsp;W.&nbsp;F. Hegel]] also defended a dynamic absolute idealism that sees existence as an all-inclusive whole. However, his system differs from his predecessors' in that it is not grounded on some initial subject, mind, or "I" and tries to move beyond all bifurcation subject and object, of the dualism between thinking and being (which for Hegel just leads to various contradictions).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 86–87.</ref><ref>[[Kenneth Westphal]], ''Hegel's Epistemological Realism'' (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989).</ref> As such, Hegel's system is an ontological monism fundamentally based on a unity between being and thought, subject and object, which he saw as being neither materialistic realism nor subjective idealism (which still stands in an opposition to materialism and thus remains stuck in the subject-object distinction).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 88.</ref>

In his ''[[The Phenomenology of Spirit|Phenomenology of Spirit]]'' (1807), Hegel provides an epistemological argument for idealism, focusing on proving the "metaphysical priority of identities over and against their opposed elements".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 93–94.</ref> Hegel's argument begins with his conception of knowledge, which he holds is a relation between a claim about a subject and an object that allows for a correspondence between their structural features (and is thus a type of [[correspondence theory]]). Hegel argues that if knowledge is possible, real objects must also have a similar structure as thought (without, however, being reduced to thoughts). If not, there could be no correspondence between what the object is and what a subject believes to be true about the object.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 95</ref> For Hegel, any system in which the subject that knows and the object which is known are structurally independent would make the relations necessary for knowledge impossible.<ref name="Guyer at al. 2023, p. 99">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 99</ref> Hegel also argues that finite qualities and objects depend on other finite things to determine them. An infinite thinking being, on the other hand, would be more self-determining and hence most fully real.<ref>An interpretation of Hegel's critique of the finite, and of the "absolute idealism" which Hegel appears to base that critique, is found in Robert M. Wallace, Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).</ref>

Hegel argued that a careful analysis of the act of knowledge would eventually lead to an understanding of the unity of subjects and the objects in a single all-encompassing whole.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp.96–97</ref> In this system, experiences are not independent of the thing in itself (as in Kant) but are manifestations grounded in a metaphysical absolute, which is also experiential (but since it resists the experiential subject, can be known through this resistance).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 97–101</ref> Thus, our own experiences can lead us to an insight into the thing in itself.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p.98</ref> Furthermore, since reality is a unity, all knowledge is ultimately self-knowledge, or as Hegel puts it, it is the subject being "in the other with itself" (''im Anderen bei sich selbst sein'').<ref name="Guyer at al. 2023, p. 99"/> Since all things have spirit (''[[Geist]]''), a philosopher can attain what he termed "absolute knowing" (''absolutes Wissen''), which is the knowledge that all things are ultimately manifestations of an infinite absolute spirit.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 102.</ref><ref>Leonard F. Wheat, ''Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics: What Only Marx and Tillich Understood'' (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2012), 69, 105–106, 116, 158–59, 160, 291, 338.</ref>

Later, in his ''[[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel#Science of Logic|Science of Logic]]'' (1812–1814), Hegel further develops a metaphysics in which the real and objective activity of thinking unfolds itself in numerous ways (as objects and subjects). This ultimate activity of thought, which is ''not'' the activity of specific subjects, is an immediate fact, a given (''vorhandenes''), which is self-standing and self-organizing.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 102–106, 109</ref> In manifesting the entire world, the absolute enacts a process of self-actualization through a grand structure or master logic, which is what Hegel calls "reason" (''Vernunft''), and which he understands as a [[Teleology|teleological]] reality.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 107</ref>

[[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegelianism]] was deeply influential throughout the 19th century, even as some Hegelians (like [[Karl Marx|Marx]]) rejected idealism. Later idealist Hegelians include [[Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg]] (1802–72) and [[Hermann Lotze|Rudolf Hermann Lotze]] (1817–81).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 160.</ref>

=== Schopenhauer's philosophy ===
The philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer owes much to the thought of Kant and to that of the German idealists, which he nevertheless strongly criticizes.<ref name=":15">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 110</ref> Schopenhauer maintains Kant's idealist epistemology which sees even space, time and causality as mere mental representations (<i>vorstellungen</i>) conditioned by the subjective mind. However, he replaces Kant's unknowable thing-in-itself with an absolute reality underlying all ideas that is a single irrational Will, a view that he saw as directly opposed to Hegel's rational Spirit.<ref name=":15" /> This philosophy is laid out in ''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'' (WWR 1818, 2nd ed. 1844).<ref name=":15" />

Schopenhauer accepts Kant's view that there can be no appearances without there being something which appears. However, unlike Kant, Schopenhauer writes that "we have immediate cognition of the thing in itself when it appears to us as our own body". (WWR §6, pp.&nbsp;40–1).<ref name=":16">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 112</ref> Schopenhauer argues that, even though we do experience our own bodies through the categories of space, time and causality, we also experience it in another more direct and internal way through the experience of willing. This immediate experience reveals that it is will alone which "gives him the key to his own appearance, reveals to him the meaning and shows him the inner workings of his essence, his deeds, his movements" (WWR §18, p.&nbsp;124).<ref name=":16" /> Thus, for Schopenhauer, it is [[desire]], a "dark, dull driving", which is at the root of action, not reason.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 112–113</ref> Furthermore, since this is the only form of insight we have of the inner essence of any reality, we must apply this insight "to [the] appearances in the inorganic [and organic] world as well." Schopenhauer compares willing with many natural forces. As such, Will is "a name signifying the being in itself of every thing in the world and the sole kernel of every appearance" (WWR §23, pp.&nbsp;142–3).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 113</ref>

Because irrational Willing is the most foundational reality, life is filled with frustration, irrationality and disappointment. This is the metaphysical foundation of Schopenhauer's [[Pessimism|pessimistic]] philosophy of life. The best we can hope for is to deny and try to escape (however briefly) the incessant force of the Will, through art, [[Aesthetics|aesthetic experience]], [[asceticism]], and [[compassion]].<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 113</ref>

=== Gentile's actual idealism ===
[[Actual idealism]] is a form of idealism developed by [[Giovanni Gentile]] which argues that reality is the ongoing act of thinking, or in Italian "pensiero pensante" and thus, only thoughts exist.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Peters, R. |year=2006 |title=On Presence: "Actes De Presence": Presence in Fascist Political Culture |journal=History and Theory |volume=45 |pages=362–374 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2303.2006.00371.x |number=3}}</ref><ref name="rightscholarship.wordpress.com2">Right Thinkers #7: Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944). (1 July 2014). Retrieved 12 February 2017, from Right Scholarship https://rightscholarship.wordpress.com/tag/idealism/</ref> He further argued that our combined thoughts defined and produced reality.<ref name="rightscholarship.wordpress.com2" /> Gentile also nationalizes this idea, holding that the state is a composition of many minds coming together to construct reality.<ref name="papermasters.com2">Custom Research Papers on Actual Idealism. (n.d.). Retrieved 11 February 2017, from https://www.papermasters.com/actual-idealism.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161121170055/https://www.papermasters.com/actual-idealism.html |date=21 November 2016 }}</ref> Giovanni Gentile was a key supporter of [[fascism]], regarded by many as the "philosopher of fascism". His idealist theory argued for the unity of all society under one leader, which allows it to act as one body.<ref name="papermasters.com2" />

=== Anglo-American Idealism ===
Idealism was widespread in [[Anglo-American philosophy]] during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was the dominant metaphysics in the English speaking world during the last decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.<ref>Connelly, James; Panagakou, Stamatoula. ''Anglo-American Idealism: Thinkers and Ideas'', p. 3. Peter Lang, 2010</ref><ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 125.</ref> During this time, the defenders of [[British idealism]] made significant contributions to all fields of philosophy. However, other philosophers, like [[J. M. E. McTaggart|McTaggart]], broke from this trend and instead defended a pluralistic idealism in which the ultimate reality is a plurality of minds.

Many Anglo-American idealists were influenced by [[Hegelianism]], but they also drew on Kant, Plato and Aristotle.<ref>Connelly, James; Panagakou, Stamatoula. ''Anglo-American Idealism: Thinkers and Ideas'', p. 4. Peter Lang, 2010</ref> Key figures of this transatlantic movement include many of the British idealists, such as [[Thomas Hill Green|T. H. Green]] (1836–1882), [[F. H. Bradley]] (1846–1924), [[Bernard Bosanquet (philosopher)|Bernard Bosanquet]] (1848–1923), [[John Henry Muirhead|J. H. Muirhead]] (1855–1940), [[Harold Joachim|H. H. Joachim]] (1868–1938), [[A. E. Taylor]] (1869–1945), [[R. G. Collingwood]] (1889–1943), [[Geoffrey Reginald Gilchrist Mure|G. R. G. Mure]] (1893–1979) and [[Michael Oakeshott]].<ref>Connelly, James; Panagakou, Stamatoula. ''Anglo-American Idealism: Thinkers and Ideas'', pp. 3–4. Peter Lang, 2010</ref> American idealist philosophers include [[Josiah Royce]] (1855–1916) and [[Brand Blanshard]] (1892–1987).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 125–127.</ref>

==== British absolute idealism ====
[[file:F.H. Bradley.png|thumb|[[F. H. Bradley|F.H. Bradley]], a leading British absolute idealist]]

One of the early influential British idealists was [[T. H. Green|Thomas Hill Green]], known for his posthumous ''Prolegomena to Ethics''. Green argues for an idealist metaphysics in this text as a foundation for free will and ethics. In a Kantian fashion, Green first argues that knowledge consists in seeing relations in consciousness, and that any sense of something being "real" or "objective" has no meaning outside of consciousness.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 127</ref> He then argues that experience as consciousness of related events "cannot be explained by any natural history, properly so called" and thus "the understanding which presents an order of nature to us is in principle one with an understanding which constitutes that order itself."<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 127–128</ref>

Green then further argues that individual human beings are aware of an order of relations which extends beyond the bounds of their individual mind. For Green, this greater order must be in a larger transpersonal intelligence, while the world is "a system of related facts" which is made possible and revealed to individual beings by the larger intelligence.<ref name=":17">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 128</ref> Furthermore, Green also holds that participation in the transpersonal mind is constituted by the apprehension of a portion of the overall order by animal organisms.<ref name=":17" /> As such, Green accepts the reality of biological bodies when he writes that "in the process of our learning to know the world, an animal organism, which has its history in time, gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness."<ref name=":17" />

Another paradigmatic British absolute idealist is [[F. H. Bradley|Francis Herbert Bradley]], who affirms that "the Absolute is not many; there are no independent reals".<ref name="Francis Herbert Bradley">Candlish, Stewart and Pierfrancesco Basile, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/bradley/ Francis Herbert Bradley]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).</ref> This absolute reality "is one system, and ... its contents are nothing but sentient experience. It will hence be a single and all-inclusive experience, which embraces every partial diversity in concord."<ref name="Francis Herbert Bradley"/> Bradley presents an anti-realist idealism which rejects the ultimate reality of relations, which for him are mere appearance, "a makeshift, a mere practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end most indefensible."<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 129</ref>

Bradley presented his idealism in his ''[[Appearance and Reality]]'' (1893) by arguing that the ideas we use to understand reality are contradictory. He deconstructs numerous ideas including primary and secondary qualities, substances and attributes, quality and relation, space, time and causality and the self.<ref name=":18">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 130</ref> Most famously, Bradley argued that any ultimate distinction between qualities and relations is untenable since "qualities are nothing without relations" since "their plurality depends on relation, and, without that relation, they are not distinct. But, if not distinct, then not different, and therefore not qualities."<ref name=":18" /> Furthermore, for Bradley, the same thing turns out to be true of relations, and of both taken together, since for a relation to relate to a quality, it would then require a further relation. As such, qualities and relations are appearance, not ultimate truth, since "ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 130–131.</ref>

Even though all appearances are "not truth", it is still possible to have true knowledge of ultimate reality, which must be a unity beyond contradictions but which still allows for diversity. Bradley thinks that this character of reality as a diverse unity is revealed to us in sentient experience, since our various experiences must be grounded and caused by some undifferentiated and pre-abstract reality. However he also admits "our complete inability to understand this concrete unity in detail".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 131–132</ref>

==== American idealism ====
[[file:Charles Sanders Peirce.jpg|thumb|Charles Sanders Peirce]]
Idealism also became popular in the United States with thinkers like [[Charles Sanders Peirce]] (1839–1914), who defended an "objective idealism" in which, as he put it, "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws".<ref>Peirce (1891), "The Architecture of Theories",'' [[The Monist]]'' v. 1, pp. [https://archive.org/stream/monistquart01hegeuoft#page/161/mode/1up 161–176], see [https://archive.org/stream/monistquart01hegeuoft#page/170/mode/1up p. 170], via ''Internet Archive''. Reprinted (CP 6.7–34) and (''The Essential Peirce'', 1:285–297, see p. 293).</ref> Peirce initially defended a type of [[Direct and indirect realism|representationalism]] alongside his form of [[Pragmatism]] which was metaphysically neutral since it is "no doctrine of metaphysics".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 143–145</ref> However, in later years (after c.1905), Peirce defended an objective idealism which held that the universe evolved from a state of maximum spontaneous freedom (which he associated with mind) into its present state where matter were merely "congealed" mind.<ref>Burch, Robert, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/peirce/ Charles Sanders Peirce]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Spring 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.).</ref> In arguing for this view, he followed the classic idealist premise that states there must be a metaphysical equality (an [[Isomorphism of categories|isomorphism]]) between thought and being, and as such, "the root of all being is One".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 147</ref> A key feature of Peirce's idealism is "[[Tychism]]", which he defined as "the doctrine that absolute chance is a factor of the universe."<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 148</ref> This allows for an element of chance or [[indeterminism]] in the universe which allows for cosmological evolution.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 148–149</ref>

Under the influence of Peirce, it was [[Josiah Royce]] (1855–1916) who became the leading American idealist at the turn of the century.<ref name="Guyer at al. 2023, p. 138">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 138</ref> Royce's idealism incorporated aspects of Peirce's Pragmatism and is defended in his ''The Spirit of Modern Philosophy'' (1892).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 139–140</ref> One of Royce's arguments for idealism is his argument from meaning, which states the possibility of there being [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] at all requires an identity between what is meant (ordinary objects) and what makes meaning (ordinary subjects).<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 140</ref>

In his ''The World and the Individual'' (2 vols, 1899 and 1901), Royce also links meaning with purpose, seeing the meaning of a term as its intended purpose.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 141</ref> Royce was an absolute idealist who held that ultimately reality was a super-self, an absolute mind.<ref name=":24">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 142</ref> Royce argues that for a mind to be able represent itself and its representations (and not lead to a vicious infinite regress), it must be complex and capacious enough, and only an absolute mind has this capacity.<ref name=":24" />

The American philosopher [[Brand Blanshard]] (1892–1987) was also a proponent of idealism who accepted a "necessary isomorphism between knowledge and its object".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 178</ref> His idealism is most obvious in ''The Nature of Thought'' (1939), where he discusses how all [[perception]] is infused with concepts.<ref name=":28">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 179.</ref> He then argues from a coherence theory of truth that the "character of reality" must also include coherence itself, and thus, knowledge must be similar to what it knows.<ref name=":28" /> Not only that, but knowledge must be part of a single system with the world it knows, and causal relations must be also involve logical relations. These considerations lead to an idealism which sees the world as system of relations that cannot be merely physical.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 180</ref>

=== Pluralistic idealism<!--'Plurastic idealism' redirects here--> ===
'''Pluralistic idealism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> takes the view that there are many individual minds, [[Monad (philosophy)|monads]], or processes that together underlie the existence of the observed world and which make possible the existence of the physical universe.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.eskimo.com/~msharlow/idealism.htm|title=Metaphysical Idealism|website=eskimo.com|access-date=2018-11-17|archive-date=8 June 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110608170707/http://www.eskimo.com/~msharlow/idealism.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref> Pluralistic idealism does not assume the existence of a single ultimate mind or absolute as with the total [[monism]] of absolute idealism, instead it affirms an ultimate plurality of ideas or beings.

====Personalism====

[[Personalism]] is the view that the individual minds of persons or selves are the basis for ultimate reality and value and as such emphasizes the fundamentality and inherent worth of persons.<ref name=":22">Williams, Thomas D. and Jan Olof Bengtsson, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/personalism/ Personalism]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).</ref> Modern personalist idealism emerged during the reaction against what was seen as a dehumanizing impersonalism of absolute idealism, a reaction which was led by figures like [[Rudolph Hermann Lotze|Hermann Lotze]] (1817–1881).<ref name=":22" /> Personalists affirmed personal freedom against what they saw as a monism that lead to totalitarianism by subordinating the individual to the collective.<ref name=":22" />

Some idealistic personalists defended a [[Theism|theistic]] personalism (often influenced by [[Thomas Aquinas|Aquinas]]) in which reality is a society of minds ultimately dependent on a supreme person (God).<ref name=":22" /> Defenders of a Theistic and idealistic personalism include [[Borden Parker Bowne]] (1847–1910), [[Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison]] (1856–1931), [[Edgar S. Brightman]] and [[George Holmes Howison]] (1834–1916). These theistic personalists emphasize the dependence of all individual minds on God.<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":22" />

However, other personalists like British idealist [[J. M. E. McTaggart]] and [[Thomas Davidson (philosopher)|Thomas Davidson]] merely argued for a community of individual minds or spirits, without positing a supreme personal deity who creates or grounds them.<ref>Howison, George Holmes. ''The Limits of Evolution; And Other Essays Illustrating The Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism'', 1901.</ref><ref>''Idealistic Argument in Recent British and American Philosophy'' By Gustavus W Cunningham, p. 202, "Ontologically I am an idealist, since i believe that all that exists is spiritual. I am also, in one sense of the term, a Personal Idealist" (McTaggart).</ref><ref name=":20" /> Similarly, [[James Ward (psychologist)|James Ward]] (1843–1925) was inspired by [[Leibniz]] to defend a form of pluralistic idealism in which the universe is composed of "psychic monads" of different levels, interacting for mutual self-betterment.<ref>''The New Cambridge Modern History: The era of violence, 1898–1945, edited by David Thomson'' University Press, 1960, p. 135</ref><ref>Hugh Joseph Tallon The concept of self in British and American idealism 1939, p. 118</ref>

American personalism was particularly associated with idealism and with [[Boston University|Boston university]], where Bowne (who had studied with Lotze) developed his personalist idealism and published his ''Personalism'' (1908).<ref name=":22" /> Bowne's students, like Edgar Sheffield Brightman, [[Albert C. Knudson]] (1873–1953), [[Francis John McConnell|Francis J. McConnell]] (1871–1953), and [[Ralph Tyler Flewelling|Ralph T. Flewelling]] (1871–1960), continued to develop his personal idealism after his death.<ref name=":22" /> The "Boston personalism" tradition also influenced the later work of [[Peter Anthony Bertocci|Peter A. Bertocci]] (1910–1989), as well as the ideas of [[Martin Luther King Jr.]], who studied at Boston University with personalist philosophers and was shaped by their worldview.<ref name=":22" />

[[George Holmes Howison]] meanwhile, developed his own brand of "California personalism". Howison argued that both impersonal monistic idealism and materialism run contrary to the experience of moral [[freedom]], while "personal idealism" affirms it. To deny freedom to pursue truth, beauty, and "benignant love" is to undermine every profound human venture, including science, morality, and philosophy.<ref name=":19">{{cite book|url=http://www.bookrags.com/research/howison-george-holmes-18341916-eoph/ |title=Research & Articles on Howison, George Holmes (1834–1916) by |publisher=BookRags.com |date=2010-11-02 |access-date=2012-08-17}}</ref> Howison, in his book ''The Limits of Evolution and Other Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism'', developed a democratic idealism that extended all the way to God, who instead of a monarch, was seen as the ultimate democrat in eternal relation to other eternal persons.<ref name=":20">{{cite journal |last1=McLachlan |first1=James |title=George Holmes Howison: 'The City of God' and Personal Idealism |journal=The Journal of Speculative Philosophy |date=2006 |volume=20 |issue=3 |pages=224–242 |id={{Project MUSE|209478}} |doi=10.1353/jsp.2007.0005 |s2cid=170825252 }}</ref>

Another pluralistic idealism was [[Thomas Davidson (philosopher)|Thomas Davidson]]'s (1840–1900) "[[apeirotheism]]", which he defined as "a theory of Gods infinite in number".<ref>Charles M. Bakewell, "Thomas Davidson", Dictionary of American Biography, gen. ed. Dumas Malone (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), 96.</ref> The theory was indebted to [[Aristotle]]'s view of the eternal rational soul and the [[nous]].<ref name="Gerson">{{cite journal |last=Gerson |first=Lloyd P. |year=2004 |title=The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's 'De Anima' |url=http://individual.utoronto.ca/lpgerson/The_Unity_Of_Intellect_In_Aristotles_De_Anima.pdf |journal=Phronesis |volume=49 |pages=348–373 |doi=10.1163/1568528043067005 |jstor=4182761 |quote=Desperately difficult texts inevitably elicit desperate hermeneutical measures. Aristotle's ''De Anima,'' book three, chapter five, is evidently one such text. At least since the time of [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]], scholars have felt compelled to draw some remarkable conclusions regarding Aristotle's brief remarks in this passage regarding intellect. One such claim is that in chapter five, Aristotle introduces a second intellect, the so-called 'agent intellect', an intellect distinct from the 'passive intellect', the supposed focus of discussion up until this passage. This view is a direct descendant of the view of Alexander himself, who identified the agent intellect with the divine intellect. Even the staunchest defender of such a view is typically at a loss to give a plausible explanation of why the divine intellect pops into and then out of the picture in the intense and closely argued discussion of the human intellect that goes from chapter four through to the end of chapter seven. |number=4}}</ref> Identifying Aristotle's God with rational thought, Davidson argued, contrary to Aristotle, that just as the soul cannot exist apart from the body, God cannot exist apart from the world.<ref>Davidson, Journal, 1884–1898 (Thomas Davidson Collection, Manuscript Group #169, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University). Quoted in DeArmey, "Thomas Davidson's Apeirotheism", 692</ref>

Another influential British idealist, [[J. M. E. McTaggart]] (1866–1925), defended a theory in which reality is a community of individual spirits connected by the relation of love.<ref name=":23">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 133.</ref> McTaggart defends ontological idealism through a [[Mereology|mereological]] argument which argues only spirits can be substances, as well as through an argument for the unreality of time (a position he also defends in ''[[The Unreality of Time]]'').<ref name=":23" />

In ''The Nature of Existence'' (1927), McTaggart's argument relies on the premise that substances are infinitely divisible and cannot have simple parts. Furthermore, each of their infinite parts determines every other part. He then analyzes various characteristics of reality such as time, matter, sensation, and cogitation and attempts to show they cannot be real elements of real substances, but must be mere appearances.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 134</ref> For example, the existence of matter cannot be inferred based on sensations, since they cannot be divided to infinity (and thus cannot be substances). Spirits on the other hand are true infinitely divisible substances. They have "the quality of having content, all of which is the content of one or more selves", and know themselves through direct perception as substances persisting through time.<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, pp. 136–138</ref> For McTaggart, there is a multiplicity of spirits, which are nevertheless related to each other harmoniously through their love for each other.<ref name="Guyer at al. 2023, p. 138"/>

McTaggart also criticizes Hegel's view of the state in his ''Studies in Hegelian Cosmology'' (1901)'','' arguing that metaphysics can give very little guidance to social and political action, just like it can give us very little guidance in other practical matters, like [[engineering]].<ref>''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', vol. 3, "Idealism", New York, 1967</ref>

=== Contemporary idealism ===
[[File:James Hopwood Jeans.jpg|thumb|upright|The 20th-century British scientist [[James Hopwood Jeans|Sir James Jeans]] wrote that "the Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine."]]
Today, idealism remains a minority view in Western analytic circles.<ref name="SEP3" /> In spite of this, the study of the work of the Anglo-American idealists saw a revival in the 21st century with an increase in publications at the turn of the century, and they are now considered to have made important contributions to philosophy.<ref>Connelly, James; Panagakou, Stamatoula. ''Anglo-American Idealism: Thinkers and Ideas'', pp. 2, 6. Peter Lang, 2010</ref>

Several modern figures continue to defend idealism. Recent idealist philosophers include [[A. A. Luce]] (''Sense without Matter'', 1954), [[Timothy Sprigge]] (''The Vindication of Absolute Idealism'', 1984), [[Leslie Armour]], [[Vittorio Hösle]] (''Objective Idealism'', 1998), [[John Foster (philosopher)|John Andrew Foster]] (''A World for Us'', 2008),<ref>Review for John Foster's book ''A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism'' http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15785 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110615064147/http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15785|date=15 June 2011}}</ref> [[John A. Leslie]] (''Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology'', 2002), and [[Bernardo Kastrup]] (''The Idea of the World'', 2018). In 2022, [[Howard Robinson]] authored ''Perception and Idealism''.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2022|title=Perception and Idealism|url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/perception-and-idealism-9780192845566?cc=pl&lang=en&#|website=Oxford University Press|language=en-GB}}</ref>

Both Foster and Sprigge defend idealism through an epistemic argument for the unity of the act of perception with its object.<ref name=":29">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 181</ref> Sprigge also made an argument from [[Grounding (metaphysics)|grounding]], which held that our phenomenal objects presuppose some [[Noumenon|noumenal]] ground. As such For Sprigge, the physical world "consists in innumerable mutually interacting centres of experience, or, what comes to the same, of pulses and flows of experience."<ref name=":29" /> Thus, the noumenal ground is the totality of all experiences, which are one "concrete universal", that resembles Bradley's absolute.<ref name=":29" />

Helen Yetter-Chappell has defended nontheistic (quasi-)Berkeleyan idealism.<ref>Yetter-Chappell. Helen. (2017). ''Idealism Without God''. In K. Pearce & T. Goldschmidt (eds.), ''Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics''. Oxford University Press.</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|date=2018|title=Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics|url=https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/idealism-new-essays-in-metaphysics/|website=Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews|language=en-GB|archive-date=4 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230204020050/https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/idealism-new-essays-in-metaphysics/|url-status=live |last1=Taylor |first1=Adam P. }}</ref>

==== Analytic idealism ====
A recent strand of idealist metaphysics has been developed within analytic philosophy by Bernardo Kastrup. In his doctoral dissertation Analytic Idealism (2019), he argues that reality is constituted by universal consciousness and introduces the notion of dissociation as a mechanism to explain how individual conscious agents arise within a single underlying mind.<ref>Kastrup, Bernardo (2019). ''Analytic Idealism'' (doctoral dissertation). Radboud University Nijmegen. Available via PhilArchive / PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/archive/KASAIA-3.pdf</ref> His later work Analytic Idealism in a Nutshell has been the subject of reviews and discussion in contemporary philosophy (e.g. Sjöstedt-Hughes 2025).<ref>Sjöstedt-Hughes, P. (2025). ''Flights in the Mindscape – Review of Bernardo Kastrup’s Analytic Idealism in a Nutshell''. PhilArchive / PhilPapers. https://philarchive.org/rec/SJSFIT</ref> Building on this approach, Bruno Tonetto’s Return to Consciousness (2025) synthesizes consciousness-first arguments from science, metaphysics, and cultural analysis, presenting idealism as a unifying worldview.<ref>Tonetto, Bruno (2025). ''Return to Consciousness: A Philosophical Journey from Materialism to Meaning''. PhilArchive / PhilPapers. https://philpapers.org/rec/TONRTC-4</ref> These contributions exemplify a small but ongoing effort to revive idealist metaphysics in analytic philosophy of mind.

=== Idealistic theories based on 20th-century science ===

Idealist notions took a strong hold among physicists of the early 20th century confronted with the paradoxes of [[quantum physics]] and the [[theory of relativity]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2003-10-01 |title=Physics & reality {{!}} American Academy of Arts and Sciences |url=https://www.amacad.org/publication/daedalus/physics-reality |access-date=2025-07-10 |website=www.amacad.org |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Popov |first=M. A. |date=2004 |title=Einstein's idealism and a new kind of space research |url=https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2004cosp...35.4366P/abstract |journal=35th COSPAR Scientific Assembly |language=en |volume=35 |pages=4366 |bibcode=2004cosp...35.4366P }}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last1=Howard |first1=Don A. |title=Einstein's Philosophy of Science |date=2025 |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2025/entries/einstein-philscience/ |access-date=2025-07-10 |edition=Spring 2025 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |last2=Giovanelli |first2=Marco |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri}}</ref>

[[Arthur Eddington]], a British astrophysicist of the early 20th century, wrote in his book ''The Nature of the Physical World'' that the stuff of the world is mind-stuff, adding that "The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds."<ref>A.S. Eddington, ''The Nature of the Physical World'', page 276-81.</ref> [[Ian Barbour]], in his book ''Issues in Science and Religion'', cites Arthur Eddington's ''The Nature of the Physical World'' (1928) as a text that argues The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principles provides a scientific basis for "the defense of the idea of human freedom" and his ''Science and the Unseen World'' (1929) for support of philosophical idealism "the thesis that reality is basically mental."<ref>(1966), p.&nbsp;133</ref>

The physicist [[Sir James Jeans]] wrote: "The stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the realm of matter... we ought rather hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter."<ref>Sir James Jeans, ''The mysterious universe'', page 137.</ref>

The chemist [[Ernest Lester Smith]], a member of the occult movement [[Theosophy]], wrote a book ''Intelligence Came First'' (1975) in which he claimed that consciousness is a fact of nature and that the cosmos is grounded in and pervaded by mind and intelligence.<ref>Ernest Lester Smith ''Intelligence Came First'' Quest Books, 1990 {{ISBN|0-8356-0657-0}}</ref> 
This theory is a modern one that was presented on the site in recent years. 
==Criticism==

In the [[Western world]], the popularity of idealism as a metaphysical view declined severely in the 20th century, especially in English language [[analytic philosophy]]. This was partly due to the criticisms of British philosophers like [[G. E. Moore]] and [[Bertrand Russell]] and also due to the critiques of the American "new realists" like [[E. B. Holt|E.B. Holt]], [[Ralph Barton Perry]] and [[Roy Wood Sellars]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Sprigge |first1=T. L. S. |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |year=2016 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |chapter=Idealism |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N027-1}}</ref><ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 150.</ref><ref name="SEP3" />

Moore famously critiqued idealism and defended [[Philosophical realism|realism]] in ''The Refutation of Idealism'' (1903), and ''[[A Defence of Common Sense]]'' (1925). In the ''Refutation,'' Moore argues that arguments for idealism most often rely on the premise that to be is to be perceived (''esse est percipi''), but that if this is true "how can we infer that anything whatever, let alone everything is an inseparable aspect of any experience?".<ref name=":25">Guyer at al. 2023, p. 152</ref> [[Bertrand Russell]]'s popular 1912 book ''[[The Problems of Philosophy]]'' also contained a similar critique.<ref name="SEP3"/> Their main objection is that idealists falsely presuppose that the mind's relation to any object is a necessary condition for the existence of the object. Russell thinks this fallacy fails to make "the distinction between act and object in our apprehending of things" (1912 [1974: 42]).<ref name=":25" /> Guyer et al. write that the success of these arguments might be controversial and that "the charge that they simply conflate knowledge and object hardly seems to do justice to the elaborate arguments of the late nineteenth-century idealists."<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 152.</ref> It also relies on a realist epistemology in which knowledge stands "in an immediate relation to an independent individual object".<ref>Guyer at al. 2023, p. 153.</ref>

Regarding positive arguments, Moore's most famous argument ''for'' the existence of external matter (found in ''Proof of an External World'', 1939) was an epistemological argument from [[common sense]] facts, sometimes known as "[[Here is one hand]]". Idealism was also more recently critiqued in the works of Australian philosopher [[David Stove]],<ref name=Stove/> and by [[Alan Musgrave]],<ref name="Alan Musgrave 1998"/> and [[John Searle]].<ref name="Social Reality' p. 174"/>

Physicist [[Milton A. Rothman]] has written that idealism is incompatible with science and is not considered an empirical system of knowledge unlike [[Philosophical realism|realism]] which is pragmatical and makes testable predictions.<ref name="Rothman">{{cite book |last=Rothman |first=Milton A. |author-link=Milton A. Rothman |date=1992 |title=The Science Gap: Dispelling the Myths and Understanding the Reality of Science |publisher= Prometheus Books |pages=27–32 |isbn=0-87975-710-8}}</ref> Rothman commented that "idealism saying nothing about why ten different observers in different parts of the world measure the speed of light to be the same. If the light beam exists only a construct in my mind, then how does an experimenter in Moscow always get the same result that I do in, say Princeton".<ref name="Rothman"/>

Philosopher and physicist [[Mario Bunge]] has written that idealistic thinking is often found in [[pseudoscience]]s as it postulates immaterial entities that disregard scientific laws.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Bunge, Mario|year=2006|title=The Philosophy behind Pseudoscience|journal=Skeptical Inquirer|url=https://cdn.centerforinquiry.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2006/07/22164602/p29.pdf|volume=30|issue=4|pages=29–37}}</ref>

==See also==
* [[Hard problem of consciousness]]
* [[Innatism]]
* [[Qualia]]

==Notes==
{{Reflist}}

==References==

=== Primary ===

* [[George Berkeley|Berkeley, George]]. ''[[A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge|Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge]],'' 1710.
* [[F. H. Bradley|Bradley, Francis Herbert]], ''[[Appearance and Reality]]: A Metaphysical Essay,'' Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893
* [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte|Fichte'','' Johann Gottlieb]]. ''[[Foundations of Natural Right]]'' (''Grundlagen des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre''), 1797.
* Foster, John Andrew. ''A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism''. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. {{ISBN|0-19-929713-4}}
* [[Dignāga]]; Krumroy, Robert E; Sastri, N. Aiyaswami. ''[[Ālambanaparīkṣā]]'', and ''Vṛtti'' by [[Dignāga|Diṅnāga]], with the Commentary of [[Dharmapala of Nalanda|Dharmapāla]], Restored into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese Versions and Edited with English Translations and Notes and with Copious Extracts from Vinītadeva's Commentary. Jain Publishing Company, 2007.
* [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, ''[[The Phenomenology of Spirit|Phenomenology of the Spirit]]'' (''Phänomenologie des Geistes''), 1807.
* [[Kant]], Immanuel. ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]] (Kritik der reinen Vernunft),'' 1781/87.
* [[Leibniz]], Gottfried Wilhelm, [[Monadology|''La Monadologie (The Monadology)'']], c. 1714.
* [[John A. Leslie|Leslie, John A.]] ''Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology,'' Clarendon Press, 2003.
* [[J. M. E. McTaggart|McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis]]. ''The Nature of Existence'', 2 volumes, Cambridge University Press. 1921–7.
* [[Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan|Radhakrishnan]], Sarvepalli. ''An Idealist View of Life'', 1932
* [[Schelling]], Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. ''System des transcendentalen Idealismus'' (''[[System of Transcendental Idealism]]''), 1800.
* [[Arthur Schopenhauer|Schopenhauer]], Arthur. ''[[Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung]]'' (''The World as Will and Presentation''), Leipzig, 1819.
* [[Timothy Sprigge|Sprigge, T.L.S.]], ''The Vindication of Absolute Idealism'', Edinburgh University Press, 1983.
* [[Vasubandhu]] (c. 4th century), ''[[Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi]] (Twenty Verses on Consciousness Only)'' in Gold, Jonathan C. 2015. ''Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu’s Unifying Buddhist Philosophy, New York: Columbia University Press.''
* Vasubandhu, ''Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (Treatise on the Three Natures),'' in William Edelglass & Jay Garfield (eds.)'', Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings,'' New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.&nbsp;35–45.
* [[Xuanzang]] (c. 7th century). ''[[Cheng Weishi Lun|Chéng Wéishì Lùn]]'' (''The Demonstration of Consciousness-only,'' Ch: 成唯識論).

=== Other ===

* Dunham, Jeremy; Grant, Iain Hamilton; Watson, Sean. ''Idealism: The History of a Philosophy'', Acumen, 2011, {{ISBN|978-0-7735-3837-5}}
* Goldschmidt, Tyron; Pearce, Kenneth L. (ed.), ''Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics'', Oxford University Press, 2017, {{ISBN|978-0-19-874697-3}}
* Guyer, Paul; Horstmann, Rolf-Peter. ''Idealism in Modern Philosophy'', Oxford University Press, 2023.
* Neujahr, Philip J., ''Kant's Idealism'', Mercer University Press, 1995 {{ISBN|0-86554-476-X}}
* [[Prabhat Rainjan Sarkar]] (1984), ''Human Society. Vols. I and II.'' (Ananda Marga Publications, Calcutta, India).
* [[Surendranath Dasgupta]] (1969), ''Indian Idealism'' ([[Cambridge University Press]], New York, NY, USA), {{ISBN|0-521-09194-2}}
* [[Sohail Inayatullah]] (2001), ''Understanding P. R. Sarkar: The Indian Episteme, Macrohistory and Transformative Knowledge,'' (Leiden, [[Brill Publishers]]) {{ISBN|90-04-12193-5}}.
* Watts, Michael. ''Kierkegaard'', Oneworld, {{ISBN|978-1-85168-317-8}}

==External links==
{{Wiktionary|idealism}}
{{Commons category}}
* {{PhilPapers|category|idealism}}
* {{InPho|idea|267}}
* {{cite IEP|url-id=germidea/|title=German idealism |first=Colin |last=McQuillan}}
* {{cite EB1911 |wstitle=Idealism |volume=14 |pages=281–287 |first=John |last=Muirhead |short=1}}
* {{cite SEP|url-id=idealism|title=Idealism}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20110707080431/http://www.acgrayling.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=76:wittgenstein-on-scepticism-and-certainty&catid=28:wittgenstein A. C. Grayling-Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20140223132247/http://shvetsandrey.narod.ru/idealizme.pdf Idealism and its practical use in physics and psychology ]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20071010105602/http://www.gresham.ac.uk/event.asp?PageId=45&EventId=678 'The Triumph of Idealism'], lecture by Professor [[Keith Ward]] offering a positive view of Idealism, at [[Gresham College]], 13 March 2008 (available in text, audio and video download)
* [http://sresearch.scienceontheweb.net/philosophy.php A new theory of ideomaterialism being a synthesis of idealism and materialism]

{{Idealism}}
{{Metaphysics}}
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[[Category:Idealism| ]]
[[Category:Metaphysical theories]]