View source for Hwasong-5

{{short description|Short-range ballistic missile}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=February 2025}}
{{Infobox weapon
| name               = Hwasong-5
| image              = Hwasong-5.png
| image_size         = 50
| alt                = 
| caption            = Diagram of the missile
| type               = Short range ballistic missile
| origin             = North Korea
<!-- Type selection -->
| is_ranged          = yes
| is_bladed          = 
| is_explosive       = 
| is_artillery       = 
| is_vehicle         = Yes
| is_missile         = yes
| is_UK              = 
<!-- Service history -->
| service            = 1987−present
| used_by            = See ''[[#Operators|operators]]''
| wars               = {{plainlist|
*[[Iran-Iraq war]]
*[[Syrian civil war]]
*[[Yemeni civil war (2014–present)]]
}}
<!-- Production history -->
| designer           = 
| design_date        = 
| manufacturer       = 125th Machine Factory{{sfn|Zaloga|2013|page=96}}
| developed_from     = 
| developed_into     =
| unit_cost          = 
| production_date    = 1986{{sfn|Zaloga|2013|page=96}}−1992<ref name="Threat">{{cite web |title=Hwasong-5 |url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-5/ |website=Missile Threat |publisher=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] |access-date=19 November 2024 |date=2016-08-08}}</ref>
| number             = 300<ref name="Threat" />
| variants           = See ''[[#Variants|variants]]''
<!-- General specifications -->
| spec_label         = 
| mass               = {{convert|5860|kg|abbr=on}}<ref name="Threat" />
| length             = {{convert|10.94|m|abbr=on}}<ref name="Threat" />
| part_length        = 
| width              = 
| height             = 
| diameter           = {{convert|88|cm|abbr=on}}<ref name="Threat" />
| crew               = 
| passengers         = 
<!-- Ranged weapon specifications --> 
| cartridge          = 
| cartridge_weight   = 
| caliber            = 
| barrels            = 
| action             =
| rate               = 
| velocity           = 
| range              = 
| max_range          = {{convert|300|km|mi}}{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=48}}
| feed               = 
| sights             = 
<!-- Artillery specifications -->
| breech             = 
| recoil             = 
| carriage           = 
| elevation          = 
| traverse           = 
<!-- Bladed weapon specifications --> 
| blade_type         = 
| hilt_type          = 
| sheath_type        = 
| head_type          = 
| haft_type          = 
<!-- Explosive specifications --> 
| filling            = [[Explosive#High|HE]] or [[cluster munition]]{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=48}}
| filling_weight     = {{convert|1000|kg|abbr=on}}{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=48}}
| detonation         = 
| yield              = 
<!-- Vehicle/missile specifications -->
| armour             = 
| primary_armament   = 
| secondary_armament = 
| engine             = 
| engine_power       = 
| pw_ratio           = 
| payload_capacity   = 
| drive              = 
| transmission       = 
| suspension         = 
| clearance          = 
| fuel_capacity      = 
| vehicle_range      = 
| speed              = 
| guidance           = 
| steering           = 
<!-- Missiles only -->
| wingspan           = 
| propellant         = TM-185 (20% [[gasoline]] 80% [[kerosene]]) / AK-27I (27% [[Dinitrogen tetroxide|{{chem|N|2|O|4}}]] 73% [[Nitric acid|{{chem|H|N|O|3}}]])<ref name="FAS">{{cite web |title=Hwasong 5 / Scud-B - North Korea |url=https://nuke.fas.org/guide/dprk/missile/hwasong-5.htm |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |access-date=19 November 2024 |date=25 March 2024}}</ref>
| ceiling            = 
| altitude           = 
| boost              = 
| depth              = 
| accuracy           = {{convert|450|m|yd|abbr=on}} [[Circular error probable|CEP]]{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=46}}
| launch_platform    = [[MAZ-543]] or converted civilian truck [[Transporter erector launcher|TEL]]<ref name="Threat" />
| transport          = 
<!-- For all -->
| ref                = 
}}

The '''Hwasong-5''' ({{korean|hangul=《화성-5》형|lit=Mars Type 5}}){{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=45}} is a [[North Korea]]n [[short-range ballistic missile]] (SRBM){{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=46}} derived from the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] [[R-17 Elbrus]] missile.{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=47}} It is one of several missiles with the [[NATO]] [[reporting name]] '''[[Scud]]-B'''.{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=48}}

==History==
North Korea received [[rocket artillery]], [[surface-to-air missile]]s (SAMs), and [[anti-ship missile]]s from the Soviet Union in the 1960s and then from [[China]] in the 1970s.{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|p=14}} The range and accuracy of the [[2K6 Luna]] were unsatisfactory, but the Soviets refused to supply ballistic missiles to limit tensions in Korea.{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=47}} North Korea sought a domestic missile-production capability by 1965, and began making military and industrial preparations shortly afterward.{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|p=14}}

A joint development program with China of the DF-61 missile began in 1977, but was cancelled in 1978 due to Chinese domestic politics.{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|pp=14-15}} North Korea received R-17s from [[Egypt]] in the late 1970s or early 1980s. North Korea supported Egypt during the [[Yom Kippur War]] and the countries had friendly relations.{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=47}}{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|pp=15-16}} With relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union deteriorating during the mid-1970s, the Egyptians no longer could purchase ballistic missiles from the Soviets, and to deal with the loss of its sole supplier, the Egyptians helped North Korea to reverse-engineer the R-17 in hope of eventually setting up a production line with North Korean assistance.<ref name="Hinz">{{cite web |last1=Hinz |first1=Fabian |title=After half a century Egypt’s Scuds soldier on |url=https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/06/after-half-a-century-egypts-scuds-soldier-on/ |website=Military Balance Blog |publisher=[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] (IISS) |access-date=20 November 2024 |language=en |date=16 June 2023}}</ref> The Soviet Union may have eventually aided North Korea in these efforts after relations improved in the 1980s.<ref name=Mitzer198>{{cite book |last=Mitzer |first=Stijn |last2=Oliemans |first2=Joost |title=The Armed Forces of North Korea: On the Path of Songun |publisher=Helion & Company |date=2020 |isbn=978-1-910777-14-5 |page=198}}</ref> 
 
The R-17s were [[reverse engineered]] to develop multiple derivatives starting with the Hwasong-5.{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=47}} The Hwasong-5 may have slightly better range than the R-17 due to improved engines.{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|p=16}} There were up to six test launches from April to September 1984 with three successes.{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=48}}{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|p=16}} The missile entered production in 1985. Serial production began in 1986. It entered North Korean service in 1987.{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=48}}  

Hwasong-series missiles are reportedly manufactured by the No. 125 Factory in [[Pyongyang]].{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|p=45}} It is estimated that about 300 missiles were produced between 1986 until 1991 or 1992.<ref name="Threat" /> According to Lennox, it was estimated that 180 Hwasong-5 missiles were kept in North Korea while the rest were exported to [[Iran]].{{sfn|Lennox|2003|page=115}}

The Hwasong-5 is mounted on a North Korean copy of the [[MAZ-543]] [[transporter erector launcher]] (TEL) vehicle or a converted civilian truck.<ref name="Threat" /> The missile can carry high explosive (HE) or cluster munition warheads.{{sfn|Center for Energy and Security Studies|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2021|p=48}} Reportedly, the North Koreans are working on the development of [[Chemical warfare|chemical]] and [[Biological warfare|biological]] warheads for their Hwasong missile program.<ref name="FAS" />

==Export==
According to a 1988 CIA report, the Egyptians conducted a Hwasong-5 test launch in 1986, and that in 1988 the country was probably assembling Hwasong-5 missiles using knock-down kits. While its unknown if Egypt successfully managed to manufacture them locally, it is known that North Korea helped the Egyptians repair and refurbish their aging inventory of Soviet-built Scud-B systems.<ref name="Hinz" />

[[Iran]] first requested missiles from North Korea in 1985, and a 1985 cooperation agreement between the countries may have included Iranian funds for ballistic missile development.{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|p=16}} According to Lennox, 120 missiles and about 18−20 TELs were exported in total. The North Koreans also helped set up a production line, which started to produce '''[[Shahab-1]]''' missiles around 1989.{{sfn|Lennox|2003|page=115}}

Following the end of production of Scud missiles in the Soviet Union, [[Syria]] turned to North Korea and China to support and strengthen its existing Scud battalions. Syria purchased an unknown number of Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 missiles and TELs from North Korea.{{sfn|Zaloga|2013|page=78}} The Syrians also produced Hwasong missiles under the designation '''Golan-1''' and '''Golan-2''' at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre's (SSRC) Jabal Taqsis facility near [[Hama]] with North Korean assistance.<ref name="Hinz2">{{cite web |last1=Hinz |first1=Fabian |title=Ballistics after Bashar |url=https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/06/ballistics-after-bashar/ |website=Missile Dialogue Initiative |publisher=[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] |access-date=23 May 2025 |language=en |date=6 May 2025}}</ref>

In 1989, the [[United Arab Emirates]] purchased Hwasong-5 missiles.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/why-did-the-uae-purchase-weapons-from-north-korea/|title=Why Did the UAE Purchase Weapons From North Korea?|first=Samuel|last=Ramani|website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|access-date=21 November 2021|date=2017-08-08}}</ref> The missiles were decommissioned, allegedly due to unsatisfactory quality.<ref name="UAE">{{cite book |last=United States |first=Congress. House. Committee on International Relations |title=U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, Part 2 |publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office |date=2000 |pages=91–92 |isbn=9780160607646}}</ref>

In 2002, Yemen purchased at least twenty Hwasong-5 missiles from the North Koreans.<ref name="Mizokami">{{cite news |last1=Mizokami |first1=Kyle |title=The Quiet Missile War You’re Not Hearing About |url=https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a13734124/the-quiet-missile-war-youre-not-hearing-about/ |access-date=24 May 2025 |work=Popular Mechanics |date=15 November 2017}}</ref> In 2015, it was reported that the [[Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation]] attempted to procure spare parts for the MAZ-543 TELs from a Russian company and deliver them through a Ukrainian intermediary.<ref>{{cite news |last1=LaFoy |first1=Scott |title=Houthis may have fired North Korean missiles – South Korean intelligence |url=https://www.nknews.org/2015/07/houthis-may-have-fired-north-korean-missiles-south-korean-intelligence/ |access-date=24 May 2025 |work=NK News |date=31 July 2015}}</ref>

Besides confirmed exports to Iran, Syria, and the UAE,{{sfn|Zaloga|2013|pages=78,96}} the North Koreans reportedly exported (or planned to export) the Hwasong-5 to the [[Republic of Congo]], [[Cuba]], Egypt, [[Ethiopia]], [[Iraq]], [[Libya]], [[Myanmar]], [[Vietnam]], and [[Yemen]]; Lennox notes that North Korea may have only exported missile technology to the Egyptians and Libyans.<ref name="Threat" />{{sfn|Lennox|2003|page=115}}

==Operational history==

===Iran-Iraq war===

During the [[War of the Cities]] against [[Iraq]], Iran initially used R-17 missiles supplied by [[Libya]], but after the Soviet Union pressured the Libyans to stop supplying missiles, the Iranians turned to North Korea for help.{{sfn|Zaloga|2013|pages=80,82}} According to Lennox, 77 Scud-B missiles were launched by Iran in 1988.{{sfn|Lennox|2003|page=115}} While Pinkston mentions eight launch failures. North Korea received operational data from Iran.{{sfn|Pinkston|2008|p=16}}

===Syrian civil war===

The [[Ba'athist Syria|Assad regime]] made wide use of Scud missiles against [[Syrian opposition (2011–2024)|opposition forces]] and civilian areas, with the first reported deployment in late 2012. Israeli sources claimed that 90% of the Syrian ballistic missile arsenal was expended against the rebels. Despite having developed chemical warheads for its missile arsenal, the Assad regime used aerial bombs and artillery rockets to carry [[nerve agent]] attacks instead.<ref name="Hinz2" />

After the [[fall of the Assad regime]] in December 2024, Israel bombarded the SSRC production facilities and former [[Syrian Arab Armed Forces#Syrian Arab Army|Syrian Arab Army]] missile bases, but video evidence following the airstrikes indicate that at least some missile capabilities may have survived.<ref name="Hinz2" />

===Yemen civil war (2014−present)===

During the conflict, the [[Houthi movement]] have seized the country stockpile of Soviet and North Korean ballistic missiles and used them against [[Saudi Arabia]] and the UAE, forcing both countries to deploy [[Patriot missile]] batteries to counter them.<ref name="Mizokami" /> According to the [[OSINT]] website ''[[Oryx (website)|Oryx]]'', most of Yemen's Hwasong-5s were converted into [[Burkan-1]] missiles.<ref name="Oryx">{{cite web |last1=Mitzer |first1=Stijn |last2=Oliemans |first2=Joost |title=Houthi Drone And Missile Handbook |url=https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2019/09/houthi-drone-and-missile-handbook.html |website=Oryx |access-date=20 November 2024 |date=4 September 2022}}</ref>

==Variants==
===Iran===
*'''[[Shahab-1]]''' − Locally produced version.

===North Korea===
*'''[[Hwasong-6]]'''
*'''KN-21''' − A variant with terminal maneuverability and tested on August 26, 2017.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/introducing-the-kn21-north-koreas-new-take-on-its-oldest-ballistic-missile/|title=Introducing the KN21, North Korea's New Take on Its Oldest Ballistic Missile|first=Ankit|last=Panda|website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]|access-date=21 November 2021|date=2017-09-14}}</ref> Not seen after August 2017 and likely abandoned. KN-21 is the [[U.S.]] designation.<ref>{{Cite web|author=Michael Elleman|date=9 October 2019|title=North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation|url=https://www.38north.org/2019/10/melleman100919/|website=[[38 North]]|access-date=2025-02-09}}</ref> However, other sources referred to this variant as [[KN-18]].<ref name="thebulletin">{{Cite web|title=North Korean nuclear weapons, 2024|url=https://thebulletin.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/rbul_a_2365013_t0001_full.pdf|access-date=2025-01-18|website=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|author1=Vann H. Van Diepen|author2=Daniel R. Depetris|date=2019-09-05|title=Putting North Korea's New Short-Range Missiles Into Perspective|url=https://www.38north.org/2019/09/vvandiependdepetris090519/|access-date=2021-11-20|website=[[38 North]]|language=en}}</ref>

===Syria===
*'''Golan-1''' − Locally produced version, capable of carrying [[Chemical weapon|chemical]] warheads.<ref name="Hinz2" />

==Operators==

===Current===

*{{EGY}} − Possibly assembled locally in 1988 using knock-down kits<ref name="Hinz" />
*{{IRN}}{{sfn|Zaloga|2013|page=96}} − Produced locally as the [[Shahab-1]].<ref name="Threat" /> According to a 2024 report from the ''[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]]'', their service status is "uncertain"{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2024a|page=354}}
*{{PRK}} − 30+ Hwasong-5/6 launchers in service as of 2024{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2024|page=282}}
*{{SYR}}{{sfn|Zaloga|2013|page=78}} − Produced locally as the Golan-1. Status unknown following the [[fall of the Assad regime]]<ref name="Hinz2" />

===Former===

*{{UAE}}{{sfn|Zaloga|2013|page=96}} − Reportedly decommissioned.<ref name="UAE" /> According to the IISS, the UAE still have 6 launchers and up to 20 missiles in its inventories as of 2024{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2024a|page=391}}
*{{YEM}} − Pre-war stocks depleted during the [[Yemeni civil war (2014–present)]]. Most were converted into [[Burkan-1|Burkan missiles]] by the [[Houthi]]s<ref name="Oryx" />

== References ==
=== Citations ===
{{Reflist|30em}}

=== Sources ===
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book |author=Center for Energy and Security Studies |author2=The International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead |date=14 July 2021 |url=https://www.iiss.org/en/research-paper/2021/07/dprk-strategic-capabilities-security-korean-peninsula/ }}
* {{cite journal |last1=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=Chapter Five: Asia |journal=The Military Balance |date=12 February 2024 |volume=124 |issue=1 |pages=218–327 |doi=10.1080/04597222.2024.2298593 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/04597222.2024.2298593 |access-date=19 November 2024 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |language=en |issn=0459-7222|url-access=subscription }}
* {{cite journal |last1=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=Chapter Six: Middle East and North Africa |journal=The Military Balance |date=12 February 2024a |volume=124 |issue=1 |pages=328–395 |doi=10.1080/04597222.2024.2298594 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/04597222.2024.2298594 |access-date=19 November 2024 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |language=en |issn=0459-7222|url-access=subscription }}
*{{cite book |last1=Lennox |first1=Duncan |title=Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems |date=2003 |publisher=Jane's Information Group |location=Coulsdon, Surrey |isbn=978-0-7106-0880-2 |edition=38th |url=https://archive.org/details/janes-strategic-weapon-systems-issue-38-2003/}}
* {{cite book |last=Pinkston |first=Daniel A. |title=The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA477526.pdf |date=February 2008 |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute, US Army |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140826113522/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477526.pdf |archive-date=2014-08-26 }}
*{{cite book |last1=Zaloga |first1=Steven J. |author1-link=Steven J. Zaloga |title=Scud Ballistic Missile and Launch Systems 1955–2005 |date=2013 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |isbn=978-1-4728-0306-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8X-HCwAAQBAJ |language=en}}
{{refend}}

==External links ==
*[https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/hwasong-5-scud-b-variant/ Hwasong-5 at the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance]

{{Scud}}
{{DPRK missiles}}

[[Category:Chemical weapon delivery systems]]
[[Category:Tactical ballistic missiles]]
[[Category:Ballistic missiles of North Korea]]
[[Category:Korea–Soviet Union relations]]
[[Category:Tactical ballistic missiles of North Korea]]
[[Category:Military equipment introduced in the 1980s]]