View source for History of foreign relations of China

{{Short description|Foreign Relations of China}}
{{About|the foreign relations of mainland China since 1800|the current foreign relations of the People's Republic of China|Foreign relations of China|the foreign relations of the Republic of China after 1949|Foreign relations of Taiwan|the foreign relations of China prior to 1800|Foreign relations of imperial China}}{{Multiple issues|
{{Lead rewrite|date=September 2024}}
{{Lead too long|date=May 2025}}
}}
The '''history of foreign relations of China''' covers diplomatic, military, political and economic relations in the [[History of China]] from 1800 to the modern era. During the period from 1800 to 1925, China's foreign policy was largely shaped by the country's efforts to resist Western [[imperialism]] and maintain its territorial integrity. China was largely isolated from the rest of the world during this period, with limited contact with other countries outside of its immediate neighbors. This was partly due to China's self-imposed isolationist policies, as well as the fact that Western powers had a major presence only in a few treaty ports such as Shanghai, China was engaged in several small wars with Britain, France and Japan.

In the 19th century, China was forced to sign a series of [[Unequal treaties#China|unequal treaties]] with Great Britain, the U.S., France  and other Western powers (and also Japan), which granted extraterritorial rights to foreigners and opened China's ports to foreign trade. China's foreign policy during this period was characterized by a desire to resist these treaties and regain control over its own affairs.

China's foreign policy between 1925 and 1949 was marked by significant political upheaval and a shifting relationship with the outside world. In the aftermath of the [[May Fourth Movement]] in 1919, China's foreign policy became increasingly focused on anti-imperialism and national liberation. The [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) under [[Mao Zedong]] and the [[Nationalist government]] under [[Chiang Kai-shek]] both sought to resist foreign domination and establish a unified, independent China. This led to the strengthening of nationalist sentiment and the rise of anti-foreign sentiment throughout the country. Efforts were also made to reoccupy [[Mongolia]], [[Tibet]] and [[East Turkestan]].

[[Second Sino-Japanese War|Japan's invasion of China in 1937]] marked a turning point in China's foreign policy. The CCP and the KMT resisted the Japanese. 

Following Mao's establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's foreign policy became closely aligned with the [[Soviet Union]] and the Communist movement. The CCP saw the Soviet Union as a key ally in the struggle against imperialism and sought to model China's development after the Soviet Union's socialist system. This led to increased cooperation between the two countries in areas such as trade, military assistance, and ideological exchange.

China was close to the USSR at first, and fought a major war against the United States and South Korea in 1950–1953. However, by the 1960s China and the USSR were enemies and both were trying to build support worldwide while simultaneously supporting anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The People's Republic of China struggled for several decades to gain recognition from the international community. In 1971, the [[United Nations]] recognized the PRC and expelled the Republic of China (Taiwan). Since then, China has established diplomatic relations with almost all countries in the world.

In the late 1970s, China embarked on a [[Reform and opening up|program of economic reforms]]. This led to increased engagement with the [[World economy|global economy]] and the development of China as a major economic power. China sought to increase trade and investment ties with other countries, and became an active member of international economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization.

Since 2000, China has become more assertive in its foreign policy, as it seeks to expand its influence in the world. China has sought to strengthen its military presence in the [[South China Sea]], expand its [[Belt and Road Initiative]], and promote Chinese values and culture globally. This has led to tensions with India and the United States.

== Qing Dynasty ==
{{Main|History of the Qing dynasty}}
{{see also|List of diplomatic missions of the Qing dynasty|Dates of establishment of diplomatic relations with the Qing dynasty}}
By the mid 19th century, Chinese stability had come under increasing threat from both domestic and international sources. Social unrest and serious revolts became more common while the regular army was too weak to deal with foreign military forces. Chinese leaders increasingly feared the impact of Western ideas. [[John King Fairbank]] argued that from 1840 to 1895 China's response to the worsening relations with Western nations came in four phases. China's military weakness was interpreted in the 1840s and 1850s as a need for Western arms. Very little was achieved in this regard until the 1860s. Since the 1860s the [[Self-Strengthening Movement]] started and there was a focus on acquiring Western technology, similar to Japan. The 1870s to 1890s were characterized with efforts to reform and revitalize the Chinese political system more broadly. There was steady moderate progress, but efforts to leap forward such as the [[Hundred Days' Reform]] in 1898 roused the conservatives who stamped out the effort and executed its leaders. There was a rise in [[Chinese nationalism]]<!--, as a sort of echo of Western nationalism,| Needs to be rewritten if it's included at all. --> which led to a quick defeat in [[First Sino-Japanese War|war with Japan in 1895]]. An intense reaction against modernization set in at the grassroots level in the [[Boxer Rebellion]] of 1900.<ref>John King Fairbank, "China's Response to the West: Problems and Suggestions." ''Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale. Journal of World History. Cuadernos de Historia Mundial'' 3.2 (1956): 381.</ref>

== Opium Wars ==
{{See also|First Opium War|Second Opium War}}
European commercial interests sought to end the trading barriers, but China fended off repeated efforts by Britain to reform the trading system. Increasing sales of Indian [[History of opium in China|opium]] to China by British traders led to the [[First Opium War]] (1839–1842). The superiority of Western militaries and [[military technology]] like [[steamboat]]s and [[Congreve rocket]]s forced China to open trade with the West on Western terms.<ref>Brian Catchpole, ''A map history of modern China'' (1976), pp 21-23.</ref>

The [[Second Opium War]], also known as the Arrow War, (1856-60) saw a joint Anglo-French military mission including Great Britain and the [[Second French Empire|French Empire]] win an easy victory. The agreements of the [[Convention of Peking]] led to the ceding of [[Kowloon Peninsula]] as part of [[British Hong Kong|Hong Kong]].<ref>John Yue-wo Wong, ''Deadly dreams: Opium and the Arrow war (1856-1860) in China'' (Cambridge UP, 2002).</ref>

[[File:China imperialism cartoon.jpg|left|thumb|French political cartoon from 1898 depicts helpless [[Qing Dynasty|China]] being carved up and divided among the great powers: [[British colonial empire|Britain]], [[German colonial empire|Germany]], [[Russian Empire|Russia]], [[French colonial empire|France]] and [[Empire of Japan|Japan]].]]

=== Unequal treaties ===
{{main|Unequal treaty}}
A series of "unequal treaties", including the [[Treaty of Nanking]] (1842), the [[Treaty of Tientsin|treaties of Tianjin]] (1858), and the [[Beijing Convention]]s (1860), forced China to open new [[treaty ports]], including Canton ([[Guangzhou]]), Amoy ([[Xiamen]]), and [[Shanghai]]. The treaties also allowed the [[British Empire]] to set up Hong Kong as a [[Crown colony]] and established international settlements in the treaty ports under the control of foreign diplomats. China was required to accept diplomats at the capital in Peking, provided for the free movement for foreign ships in Chinese rivers, kept its tariffs low, and opened the interior to [[Christian mission]]aries.  Manchu leaders of the Qing government found the treaties useful, because they forced the foreigners into a few limited areas, so that the vast majority of Chinese had no contact whatsoever with them or their ideas. The missionaries, however, ventured more widely but were widely distrusted and made very few converts. Their main impact was setting up schools and hospitals.<ref>Ssu-yü Teng and John King Fairbank, ''China's response to the West: a documentary survey, 1839-1923''(1979) pp 35-37, 134-35.</ref> Since the 1920s, the "unequal treaties" have been a centerpiece of Chinese grievances against the West in general.<ref>Dong Wang, "The Discourse of Unequal Treaties in Modern China," ''Pacific Affairs'' (2003) 76#3 pp 399-425.</ref>

=== Suzerainty and tributaries ===
{{See also|List of tributaries of Imperial China}}
For centuries China had claimed [[Suzerainty|suzerain]] authority over numerous adjacent areas. The areas had internal autonomy but were forced to give tribute to China while being theoretically under the protection of China in terms of foreign affairs. By the 19th century the relationships were nominal, and China exerted little or no actual control.<ref>Amanda J. Cheney, "Tibet Lost in Translation: Sovereignty, Suzerainty and International Order Transformation, 1904–1906." ''Journal of Contemporary China'' 26.107 (2017): 769-783.</ref>  The great powers did not recognize this system and gradually seized the supposed suzerain areas. Japan moved to dominate the [[Korean Empire]] (and [[Korea under Japanese rule#Japan–Korea annexation treaty (1910)|annexed it in 1910]])<ref>Andre Schmid, "Colonialism and the ‘Korea Problem’ in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article." ''Journal of Asian Studies'' 59.4 (2000): 951-976. [http://www.academia.edu/download/40520587/colonialism_and_the_korea_problem.pdf online]{{dead link|date=July 2022|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref>  and seized the [[Ryukyu Islands]];<ref>Ying-Kit Chan, "Diplomacy and the Appointment of officials in Late Qing China: He Ruzhang and Japan’s Annexation Of Ryukyu." ''Chinese Historical Review'' 26.1 (2019): 20-36.</ref> France took [[Nguyễn dynasty|Vietnam]];<ref>Robert Lee, ''France and the exploitation of China, 1885-1901'' (1989).</ref> Britain took [[Konbaung dynasty|Burma]]<ref>Anthony Webster, "Business and empire: A reassessment of the British conquest of Burma in 1885." ''Historical Journal'' 43.4 (2000): 1003-1025.</ref> and [[Kingdom of Nepal|Nepal]]; Russia took parts of [[Siberia]]. Tibet was nominally left, but the [[British expedition to Tibet|Younghusband expedition]] and subsequent [[Chinese expedition to Tibet (1910)|Qing attempt to reassert control]] led to the region's ''de facto'' independence in 1912.<ref>{{cite book|author=Wendy Palace|title=British Empire and Tibet 1900-1922|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HCeSFAQK73IC&pg=PT257|year=2012|publisher=Routledge|page=257|isbn=9781134278633}}</ref>

China lost wars with Japan and gave up nominal control over the Ryukyu Islands in 1870 to Japan. After the [[Sino-French War]] of 1884–1885, France took control of Vietnam, another tributary state. After Britain took over Burma, as a show of good faith they maintained the sending of tribute to China, putting themselves in a lower status than in their previous relations.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/chinahermysterie00stearich|quote=burma was a tributary state of china british forward tribute peking.|title=China and her mysteries|author=Alfred Stead|year=1901|publisher=Hood, Douglas, & Howard|location=LONDON|page=[https://archive.org/details/chinahermysterie00stearich/page/100 100]|access-date=19 February 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170606232517/https://archive.org/details/chinahermysterie00stearich|archive-date=6 June 2017|url-status=live}}(Original from the University of California)</ref> To affirm this, Britain agreed in the Burma convention in 1886 to continue the Burmese payments to China every 10 years, in return for which China would recognise Britain's occupation of [[Upper Myanmar|Upper Burma]]. After the [[First Sino-Japanese War]] of 1894 it lost [[Formosa]] to Japan.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/chinasintercour01rockgoog|quote=tribute china.|title=China's intercourse with Korea from the XVth century to 1895|author=William Woodville Rockhill|year=1905|publisher=Luzac & Co.|location=LONDON|page=[https://archive.org/details/chinasintercour01rockgoog/page/n11 5]|access-date=19 February 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160509062310/https://archive.org/details/chinasintercour01rockgoog|archive-date=9 May 2016|url-status=live}}(Colonial period Korea; WWC-5)(Original from the University of California)</ref>

[[File:SinoFrenchWar1884-1885.jpg|300px|thumb|left|[[Sino-French War]] (1884–1885)]]

Manchuria was a contested zone between Russia and Japan, taking control away from China and in the process [[Russo-Japanese War|going to war themselves in 1904]].<ref>Ian Nish, ''The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War'' (1985).</ref>

===Christian missionaries===
{{Further|Christianity in China|Jesuit China missions|}}

Catholic missions began with the [[Jesuit China missions]] from France and Italy in the 16th century. For a while they were highly successful in placing intellectuals and scientists in the royal court. The Pope, however, [[Chinese Rites controversy|prohibited the priests from making accommodations for Confucianism or paganism]]. The Jesuits left, but returned in 1842. Converts were from the lower social strata, and numbered about 240,000 in 1840 and 720,000 in 1901. The Jesuits opened [[Aurora University (Shanghai)|Aurora University]] in Shanghai in 1903 to reach an elite audience.<ref>Jean-Paul Wiest,  "Bringing Christ to the nations: shifting models of mission among Jesuits in China." The Catholic historical review 83.4 (1997): 654-681.</ref>  German missionaries arrived in the late 19th century, and Americans arrived in the 1920s, largely to replace the French.<ref>John Harney,  "Enshrining the Mission: The Bishop Sheehan Memorial Museum and Vincentian Visions of China." ''American Catholic Studies'' (2015): 45-69. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/44195521 Online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828173932/https://www.jstor.org/stable/44195521 |date=2019-08-28 }}</ref>

<!-- Beginning in|When? -->Protestant missionaries started to come, including thousands of men, their wives and children, and unmarried female missionaries. These were sponsored and financed by organized churches in their home countries. At first they were limited to the Canton area. In the 1842 treaty ending the First Opium War missionaries were granted the right to live and work in five coastal cities.  In 1860, the treaties ending the Second Opium War opened up the entire country to missionary activity. Protestant missionary activity surged during the next few decades. From 50 missionaries in China in 1860, the number grew to 2,500 (counting wives and children) in 1900. 1,400 of the missionaries were British, 1,000 were Americans, and 100 were from [[Continental Europe]], mostly [[Scandinavia]].<ref>Larry Clinton Thompson,  ''William Scott Ament and the Boxer Rebellion: Heroism, Hubris, and the Ideal Missionary'' (2009), p. 14; Jane Hunter, ''The Gospel of Gentility'' (1984), p. 6</ref>  Protestant missionary activity peaked in the 1920s and thereafter declined due to war and unrest in China, as well as a sense of frustration among the missionaries themselves.  By 1953, all Protestant missionaries had been expelled by the communist government of China.<ref>Nicolas Standaert,  "New trends in the historiography of Christianity in China." ''Catholic Historical Review'' 83.4 (1997): 573-613.</ref>

In the long-term, the major impact of the missions was the introducing modern medical standards, and especially building schools for the few families eager to learn about the outside world.<ref>Miwa Hirono, ''Civilizing missions: International religious agencies in China'' (Springer, 2008).</ref> The hospitals both cured sick people and taught hygiene and care of children.<ref>Michelle Renshaw, "'Family-Centred Care' in American Hospitals in Late-Qing China." ''Clio Medica'' 86.1 (2010).</ref> These hospitals lessened the hostility of Chinese officials.<ref>Xu Guangqiu, "The Impact of Medical Missionaries on Chinese Officials: Dr. Peter Parker and the Canton Hospital, 1835-1855" ''Journal of Presbyterian History'' (2019) 97#1 pp 16-28.</ref><ref>Hu Cheng, "The Modernization of Japanese and Chinese Medicine (1914-1931)." ''Chinese Studies in History'' 47.4 (2014): 78-94.</ref> The key leader of the [[1911 Revolution]], [[Sun Yat-sen]], spent four years in exile in [[Territory of Hawaii|Hawaii]], where he studied in [[Christian school]]s and eventually converted.<ref>[[Irma Tam Soong]],  "Christianity and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's schooling in Hawai'i, 1879-83." ''Chinese America: History and Perspectives'' (2010) pp. 75-86.</ref>

When missionaries returned home they typically preached a highly favorable view toward China, and a negative view toward Japan, helping promote public opinion in the West that increasingly supported China. At the local level across China, missionaries were the only foreigners the vast majority of the population ever saw. Outside the protected international centers, they came under frequent verbal attack, and sometimes violent episodes. This led the international community to threaten military action to protect missionaries, as their diplomats demanded the government provide more and more protection. Attacks reached a height during the Boxer Rebellion, which had a major anti-missionary component. The Boxers killed over 200 foreign missionaries and thousands of Chinese Christians, including Dr. [[Eleanor Chesnut]], who was killed by a mob in 1905.<ref>{{cite book|author=Guangqiu Xu|title=American Doctors in Canton: Modernization in China, 1835-1935|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7K00DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA32|year=2017|publisher=Taylor & Francis|page=32|isbn=9781351532778}}</ref>  Likewise nationalist movements in the 1920s and 1930s also had an anti-missionary component.<ref>{{cite book|author=Lin Su|title=China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zAFBDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT49|year=2017|pages=49 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781351952095}}</ref>

== First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) ==
{{Main|First Sino-Japanese War}}
After 1860, Japan modernized its military after Western models and was far stronger than China. The war, fought in 1894 and 1895, was fought to resolve the issue of control over Korea, which was yet another suzerain claimed by China and under the rule of the [[Joseon|Joseon Dynasty]]. A peasant rebellion led to a request by the Korean government for China to send in troops to stabilize the country. The [[Empire of Japan]] responded by sending its own force to Korea and installing a puppet government in [[Seoul]]. China objected and war ensued. Japanese ground troops routed Chinese forces on the [[Liaodong Peninsula]] and nearly destroyed the Chinese navy in the [[Battle of the Yalu River (1894)|Battle of the Yalu River]].<ref name ="JC Perry 1964">{{cite journal |first1=John Curtis |last1=Perry |author-link=John Curtis Perry |date=1964 |title=The Battle off the Tayang, 17 September 1894 |journal=The Mariner's Mirror |volume=50 |issue=4 |pages=243–259  |doi=10.1080/00253359.1964.10657787 }}</ref>
[[File:Great Victory of Pyongyang and Capture of Chinese Qing Generals by Migita Toshihide 1894.jpg|thumb|right|240px|Chinese generals in Pyongyang surrender to the Japanese, October 1894.]]

=== Treaty of Shimonoseki ===
China, badly defeated, sued for peace and was forced to accept the harsh [[Treaty of Shimonoseki]] Signed on April 17, 1895.<ref>Frank W. Ikle, "The Triple Intervention. Japan's Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism." ''Monumenta Nipponica'' 22.1/2 (1967): 122-130. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2383226 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190826175120/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2383226 |date=2019-08-26 }}</ref> China became responsible for a financial indemnity of £30 million. It had to surrender to Japan the island of Taiwan and the [[Penghu|Pescatore Islands]]. Japan received most favored nation status, like all the other powers and Korea became nominally independent, although the Empire of Japan and the Russian Empire were vying for control. The most controversial provision ceded the [[Liaodong Peninsula]] to Japan. However this was not acceptable to Russia, which took the self-appointed mantle of protector of China and worked with Germany and France to intervene and [[Triple Intervention|forced Japan to withdraw from the Liaodong Peninsula]].<ref>Catchpole, ''A map history of modern China'' (1976), pp 32-33.</ref> To pay the indemnities, British, French and Russian banks loaned China the money, but they also gained other advantages. Russia in 1896 was given permission to extend its [[Trans-Siberian Railway]] across [[Manchuria]] to reach [[Vladivostok]], a 350-mile shortcut. The new [[Chinese Eastern Railway]] was controlled by the Russians, and became a major military factor for them in controlling key parts of Manchuria. Later in 1896 Russia and China made a secret alliance, whereby Russia would work to prevent further Japanese expansion into China. In 1898 Russia obtained a 25-year lease over the Liadong Peninsula in southern Manchuria, including the ice free harbor of [[Port Arthur, China|Port Arthur]], their only such facility in the East. An extension of the [[Chinese Eastern Railway]] to Port Arthur greatly expanded Russian military capabilities in the Far East.<ref>Rhoads Murphey, ''East Asia'' (1997) p 325.</ref>
[[File:JapanPunch29September1894.jpg|thumb|right|British cartoon shows the victory of "little" Japan over "large" China. in 1894.]]

== Reforms in 1890s ==
One of the government's main sources of income was a five percent tariff on imports. The government hired [[Sir Robert Hart, 1st Baronet|Robert Hart]] (1835–1911), a British diplomat, to run it from 1863. He set up an efficient system based in Canton that was largely free of corruption, and expanded it to other ports. The top echelon of the service was recruited from all the nations trading with China. Hart promoted numerous modernising programs,<ref>Jung Chang, ''Empress Dowager Cixi'' (2013) p. 80</ref> including a modern postal service and supervision of internal taxes on trade. Hart helped establish Chinese embassies in foreign countries. He helped set up the [[Tongwen Guan]] (School of Combined Learning) in Peking, with a branch in Canton, to teach foreign languages, culture and science. In 1902 the Tongwen Guan was absorbed into the Imperial University, now [[Peking University]].<ref>[[Robert Bickers]], "Revisiting the Chinese maritime customs service, 1854–1950." ''Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History'' 36.2 (2008): 221-226.</ref><ref>Henk Vynckier and Chihyun Chang, "'Imperium In Imperio': Robert Hart, the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, and its (Self-)Representations," ''Biography'' 37#1 (2014), pp. 69-92 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/24570371 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828114701/https://www.jstor.org/stable/24570371 |date=2019-08-28 }}</ref>

=== Hundred Days Reform ===
The ''[[Hundred Days Reform]]'' was a failed 103-day national, cultural, political, and educational reform movement from 11 June to 22 September 1898. It was undertaken by the young [[Guangxu Emperor]] and his reform-minded supporters. Following the issuing of over 100 reformative edicts, a coup d'état ("The Coup of 1898", [[Wuxu Coup]]) was perpetrated by powerful conservative opponents led by [[Empress Dowager Cixi]] (1835–1908). The Emperor was locked up until his death and key reformers were exiled or fled.<ref>Luke S.K. Kwong, "Chinese politics at the crossroads: Reflections on the Hundred Days Reform of 1898." Modern Asian Studies 34.3 (2000): 663-695.</ref><ref>Young-Tsu Wong, "Revisionism Reconsidered: Kang Youwei and the Reform Movement of 1898" ''Journal of Asian Studies'' 51#3 (1992), pp. 513-544 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2057948 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828121951/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2057948 |date=2019-08-28 }}</ref>

Empress Dowager Cixi was in control of imperial policy after 1861; she had remarkable political skills but historians consider her to be responsible for major policy failures and the growing weakness of China. Her reversal of reforms in 1898 and especially support for the Boxers caused all the powers to join against her. Late Qing China remains a symbol of national humiliation and weakness in Chinese and international historiography. Scholars attribute Cixi's "rule behind the curtains" responsible for the ultimate decline of the Qing dynasty and its capitulatory peace with foreign powers. Her failures hastened the revolution to overthrow the dynasty.<ref>Ying-kit Chan, "A Precious Mirror for Governing the Peace: A Primer for Empress Dowager Cixi." ''Nan Nü'' 17.2 (2015): 214-244. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/15685268-00172p02</ref>

==== Boxer rebellion ====
{{main|Boxer Rebellion}}
The Boxer Rebellion (1897–1901) was an anti-foreigner movement by the [[Righteous Harmony Society]] in China between 1897 and 1901. They attacked and often killed missionaries, Christian converts, and foreigners. They held the international diplomats in Peking under siege. The ruler of China, the Dowager Empress Cixi, supported the Boxers. The uprising was crushed by the ad hoc [[Eight Nation Alliance]] of major powers.<ref>Catchpole, ''A map history of modern China'' (1976), pp 34-35.</ref><ref>Diana Preston, ''The Boxer Rebellion : The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners That Shook the World in the Summer of 1900'' (2000).  [https://www.questia.com/read/70134073/the-boxer-rebellion-the-dramatic-story-of-china-s Online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181212123707/https://www.questia.com/read/70134073/the-boxer-rebellion-the-dramatic-story-of-china-s |date=2018-12-12 }}</ref> On top of all the damage, China was forced to pay annual installments of an indemnity of $333 million American dollars to all the victors. Actual total payments amounted to about $250 million.<ref>{{cite book|author=Ji Zhaojin|title=A History of Modern Shanghai Banking: The Rise and Decline of China's Financial Capitalism|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kHKlDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA75|year=2016|publisher=Routledge|page=75|isbn=9781317478072}}</ref>  Robert Hart, the inspector general of the [[Imperial Maritime Customs Service]], was the chief negotiator for the peace terms. The indemnity, despite some beneficial programs, was "nothing but bad" for China, as Hart had predicted at the beginning of the negotiations.<ref>Frank H.H. King, "The Boxer Indemnity—‘Nothing but Bad’." ''Modern Asian Studies'' 40.3 (2006): 663-689.</ref>

== Republican China ==
{{Main|Republic of China (1912–1949)}}
The [[1911 Revolution|Republican Revolution of 1911]] overthrew the imperial court and brought an era of confused politics. [[Yuan Shikai]] became president in 1912 and, with support from regional war lords, tried to declare himself Emperor in 1915. He showed little interest in foreign affairs apart from obtaining loans from Europe. When he suddenly died in 1916 the national government was left in chaos.<ref>Jerome Ch'en, ''Yuan Shih-K'Ai'' (1962) pp. 147–160, 173–77.</ref>

When [[World War I]] broke out in 1914, [[China during World War I|China officially entered the war]] and played a small role. Japan seized the German possessions in China. In January 1915 Japan issued the [[Twenty-One Demands]]. The goal was to greatly extend Japanese control of [[Manchuria]] and of the [[Economy of the Republic of China (1912-1949)|Chinese economy]].<ref>Ch'en, ''Yuan Shih-K'Ai'' (1962) pp. 185–195.</ref><ref>Zhitian Luo. "National humiliation and national assertion: The Chinese response to the twenty-one demands." ''Modern Asian Studies'' 27.2 (1993): 297-319.</ref> The Chinese public responded with a spontaneous nationwide boycott of Japanese goods; Japan's exports to China fell by forty percent. Britain was officially a military ally of Japan but was affronted and no longer trusted Japan. With the British focused on the Western Front against Germany, Japan's position was strong. Nevertheless, Britain and the United States forced Japan to drop the fifth set of demands that would have given Japan a large measure of control over the entire Chinese economy and ended the [[Open Door Policy]]. Japan and China reached a series of agreements which ratified the first four sets of goals on 25 May 1915. Japan gained a little at the expense of China, but Britain refused to renew the alliance and American opinion turned hostile. The [[Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)|Paris Peace Conference in 1919]] resulted in the Versailles Treaty that allowed Japan to retain territories in Shandong that had been surrendered by Germany in 1914. Chinese students launched the [[May Fourth Movement]] in 1919, inspiring a nationwide nationalistic hostility against Japan and the other foreign powers.<ref>Joseph T. Chen, "The May Fourth Movement Redefined." ''Modern Asian Studies'' 4.1 (1970): 63-81 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/311753 online].</ref>

After 1916 almost all of China was in the hands of regional warlords. Until 1929 the [[Nationalist government]] was a small rump establishment based in Beijing, with little or no control over most of China. However, it did control foreign affairs, and was recognized by foreign countries. It received the customs revenue; the money was largely used to pay off old debts, such as the indemnities for the Boxer Rebellion. It managed to negotiate an increase in the customs revenue, and represented China in international affairs such as the Paris peace conference. It tried with limited success to renegotiate the unequal treaties. Britain and the other powers continued to control Shanghai and the other port cities until the late 1920s.<ref>Klaus Mühlhahn, Making China Modern (2019) pp 251-252.</ref><ref>Robert T. Pollard,  China's Foreign Relations, 1917-1931 (1933) p. 310.</ref>

In 1931, [[Japanese invasion of Manchuria|Japan seized control of Manchuria]] over the objections of the [[League of Nations]]. Japan quit the League, which was unable to respond.<ref>Alison Adcock Kaufman,  "In Pursuit of Equality and Respect: China’s Diplomacy and the League of Nations." ''Modern China'' 40.6 (2014): 605-638 [http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.947.9164&rep=rep1&type=pdf online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181108025650/http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.947.9164&rep=rep1&type=pdf |date=2018-11-08 }}.</ref> The most active Chinese diplomat was [[Wellington Koo]].<ref>Stephen G. Craft, ''V.K. Wellington Koo and the emergence of modern China'' (University Press of Kentucky, 2015).</ref>

In 1938, [[Chiang Kai-shek|Chiang Kai-Shek]]'s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a "Map of National Shame" which listed Mongolia, parts of Siberia, and Indochina as "lost territories."<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url= |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages= |oclc=1331741429 |author-link=Suisheng Zhao}}</ref>{{Rp|page=138}}

===German role===
{{further|China-Nazi Germany relations}}

The German military had a major role in Republican China.<ref>William C. Kirby, ''Germany and Republican China'' (Stanford UP, 1984).</ref> The [[Imperial German Navy]] was in charge of Germany's [[Jiaozhou Bay Leased Territory]], and spent heavily to set up modern facilities that would be a showcase for Asia. Japan seized the German operations in 1914 after sharp battles. After World War I, the [[Weimar Republic]] provided extensive advisory services to the Republic of China, especially training for the Chinese army. Colonel General [[Hans von Seeckt]], the former commander the German army, organized the training of China's elite [[National Revolutionary Army]] units and the fight against communists in 1933–1935.<ref>Hsi‐Huey Liang, "China, the Sino‐Japanese conflict and the Munich crisis." ''Diplomacy & Statecraft'' 10.2-3 (1999): 342-369.</ref> All military academies had German officers, as did most army units. In addition, German engineers provided expertise and bankers provided loans for [[Rail transport in China|China's railroad system]].

Trade with Germany flourished in the 1920s, with Germany as China's largest supplier of government credit. The last major advisor left in 1938, after [[Nazi Germany]] had allied itself with Japan. Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-Shek continued to use Germany as a model for the nation, as his mentor [[Sun Yat-sen]] had recommended.<ref>Odd Arne Westad, ''Restless Empire: China in the world since 1750'' (2012) pp. 133–135.</ref><ref>Robyn L. Rodriguez, "Journey to the East: The German Military Mission in China, 1927-1938" (PhD Diss. The Ohio State University, 2011) [http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1319222757 online]</ref>

== Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) ==
{{main|Second Sino-Japanese War}}

Japan invaded in 1937, launching the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]. By 1938, the [[United States]] was a strong supporter of China. Michael Schaller says that during 1938:
:China emerged as something of a symbol of American-sponsored resistance to Japanese aggression.... A new policy appeared, one predicated on the maintenance of a pro-American China which might be a bulwark against Japan. The United States hoped to use China as the weapon with which to contain Tokyo's larger imperialism. Economic assistance, Washington hoped, could achieve this result.<ref>Michael Schaller, ''The US Crusade in China, 1938-1945'' (1979) p 17.</ref> 
[[File:Cairo conference.jpg|thumb|right|Chiang Kai-shek with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the [[Cairo Conference]] in 1943]]

Even the [[United States non-interventionism|isolationists]] who opposed war in Europe supported a hard-line against Japan. American public sympathy for the Chinese, and hatred of Japan, was aroused by reports from missionaries, novelists such as [[Pearl Buck]], and ''[[Time Magazine]]'' of Japanese brutality in China, including reports surrounding the [[Nanjing Massacre]], called the 'Rape of Nanking'. By early 1941, the U.S. was preparing to send American planes flown by American pilots under American command, but wearing Chinese uniforms, to fight the Japanese invaders and even to bomb Japanese cities. There were delays and the "[[Flying Tigers]]" under [[Claire Lee Chennault]] finally became operational days after the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] (December 7, 1941) brought the U.S. into the war officially. The Flying Tigers were soon incorporated into the [[United States Army Air Forces|United States Army Air Force]], which made operations in China a high priority, and generated enormous favorable publicity for China in the U.S.<ref>Martha Byrd, ''Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger'' (2003)</ref>

After Japan occupied Southeast Asia<!-- French Indochina and Thailand? -->, American aid had to be routed through [[British Raj|British India]] and over the [[Himalayas|Himalayan Mountains]] at enormous expense and delay. Chiang's beleaguered government was now headquartered in [[Chongqing]]. Roosevelt sent [[Joseph Stilwell]] to train Chinese troops and coordinate military strategy. He became the Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, served as U.S. commander in the [[China Burma India Theater]], was responsible for all [[Lend-Lease]] supplies going to China, and was later Deputy Commander of [[South East Asia Command]]. Despite his status and position in China, he became involved in conflicts with other senior Allied officers over the distribution of Lend-Lease materiel, Chinese political sectarianism and proposals to incorporate Chinese and U.S. forces in the [[11th Army Group]] (which was under British command).<ref>Barbara Tuchman, ''Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–45'' (1971), pp. 231–232.</ref> Chiang Kai-shek's wife [[Soong Mei-ling]], who had been educated in the U.S., addressed the [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]] and toured the country to rally support for China.<ref>Laura Tyson Li, ''Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China's Eternal First Lady'' (2006).</ref> Congress amended the [[Chinese Exclusion Act]] and Roosevelt moved to end the unequal treaties. Chiang and Soong met with Roosevelt and Churchill at the [[Cairo Conference]] of late 1943, but promises of major increases in aid did not materialize.<ref>Jonathan Fenby, ''Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost'' (2005) pp 408-14, 428-433.</ref>

The perception grew that Chiang's government, with poorly equipped and ill-fed troops, was unable to effectively fight the Japanese or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the CCP. [[China Hands]] advising Stilwell argued that it was in American interest to establish communication with the Communists to prepare for a land-based counteroffensive invasion of Japan. The [[Dixie Mission]], which began in 1943, was the first official American contact with the Communists. Other Americans, led by Chennault, argued for air power.<ref name="Feis">Herbert Feis, ''China Tangle: American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission'' (1953) pp 376-79.</ref>

In 1944, Generalissimo Chiang acceded to Roosevelt's request that an American general take charge of all forces in the area, but demanded that Stilwell be recalled. General [[Albert Coady Wedemeyer]] replaced Stilwell, [[Patrick J. Hurley]] became ambassador, and Chinese-American relations became much smoother. The U.S. had included China in top-level diplomacy in the hope that large masses of Chinese troops would defeat Japan with minimal American casualties. When that hope was seen as illusory, and it was clear that [[Boeing B-29 Superfortress|B-29 bombers]] could not operate effectively from China, it became less important to Washington, but was promised a seat in the new [[United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]], with veto power.<ref name="Feis"/>

== Civil War ==
{{Main|Chinese Civil War|Cross-Strait relations}}
When civil war threatened, President [[Harry S. Truman]] sent General [[George Marshall]] to China at the end of 1945 to broker a compromise between the Nationalist government and the Communists, who had established control in much of [[Northern and southern China|northern China]]. Marshall hoped for a [[coalition government]], and brought the two distrustful sides together. At home, many Americans saw China as a bulwark against the spread of communism, but [[China Hands|some Americans]] hoped that the Communists would remain on friendly terms with the [[United States]].<ref>{{cite book |author=[[Daniel Kurtz-Phelan]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QDIsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT7 |title=The China Mission: George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947 |publisher=W. W. Norton |year=2018 |isbn=9780393243086 |pages=7, 141}}</ref> [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP chairman]] [[Mao Zedong]] had long admired the U.S.—[[George Washington]] was a hero to him—and saw it as an ally in the Second World War. He was bitterly disappointed when the U.S. would not abandon the Nationalists, writing that "the imperialists who had always been hostile to the Chinese people will not change overnight to treat us on an equal level." His official policy was "wiping out the control of the imperialists in China completely."<ref>He Di, "The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong's Perception of the United States" ''China Quarterly'' No. 137 (March 1994), pp. 144-158, quotations on page 147. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/655690 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828110157/https://www.jstor.org/stable/655690 |date=2019-08-28 }}</ref> Truman and Marshall, while supplying military aid and advice, determined that American intervention could not save the Nationalist cause. One recent scholar argues that the Communists won the Civil War because [[Mao Zedong]] made fewer military mistakes and [[Chiang Kai-shek]] antagonized key interest groups. Furthermore, his armies had been weakened in the war against Japanese. Meanwhile, the Communists promised to improve the ways of life for groups such as farmers.<ref>Odd Arne Westad, ''Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750'' (2012) p 291</ref>

Soviet leader [[Joseph Stalin]]'s policy was opportunistic and utilitarian. He offered official Soviet support only when the [[People's Liberation Army]] had virtually won the Civil War. [[Sergey Radchenko]] argues that "all the talk of [[proletarian internationalism]] in the [[Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance|Sino-Soviet alliance]] was but a cloak for Soviet expansionist ambitions in East Asia".<ref>[[Sergey Radchenko]],  "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Emergence of the Chinese Communist Regime, 1946–1950: New Documents, Old Story." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 9.4 (2007): 115-124.</ref>

== People's Republic of China ==
{{See also|List of wars involving the People's Republic of China}}
[[File:PRC relations commencement.svg|400px|right|thumb|Countries of the world indicating decade diplomatic relations commenced with the People's Republic of China: 1949/1950s (dark red), 1960s (red), 1970s (orange), 1980s (beige), 1990s/2000s (yellow) and 2010s/2020s (green). Countries not recognized by or not recognizing the PRC are in grey.]]

=== International recognition ===
{{See also|Dates of establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China}}

Since its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China has worked vigorously to win international recognition and support for its position that it is the sole legitimate government of all China, including [[History of Tibet (1950–present)|Tibet]], [[Foreign relations of Hong Kong|Hong Kong]], [[Foreign relations of Macau|Macau]],  ([[Foreign relations of Taiwan|Taiwan]]), the [[Senkaku Islands|Senkaku/Diaoyu islands]] and islands in the [[South China Sea]].

The early PRC operated under the principle of "cleaning the house before inviting guests," meaning that it would seek to "clean up" colonial influences before it sought recognition from states that it deemed as Western imperialists.<ref name=":052">{{Cite book |last=Meng |first=Wenting |title=Developmental Piece: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=9783838219073 |series=Ibidem |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=51}}

Upon its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China was recognized by [[Eastern Bloc]] countries. On 4 January 1950, Pakistan became the first Muslim country to recognize China.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hussain |first=Syed Rifaat |url= |title=The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform |date=2016 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |others=Thomas Fingar |isbn=978-0-8047-9764-1 |location=Stanford, California |pages=118 |chapter=Sino-Pakistan Ties |oclc=939553543 |author-link=}}</ref> Among the first Western countries to recognize China were the [[United Kingdom]] (6 January 1950), [[Switzerland]] (17 January 1950<ref>[http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/reps/asia/vchn/bilchi.html Bilateral relations between Switzerland and China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141002011012/http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/reps/asia/vchn/bilchi.html |date=2014-10-02 }} (page visited on 19 August 2014).</ref>) and [[Sweden]] (14 February 1950<ref>{{cite web|author1=Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Gothenburg|script-title=zh:中国与瑞典的关系|url=http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cggb/chn/zrgx/t216965.htm|website=www.fmprc.gov.cn|publisher=Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Gothenburg|access-date=4 September 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090302092144/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cggb/chn/zrgx/t216965.htm|archive-date=2 March 2009|location=Gothenburg, Sweden|language=zh|quote=瑞典于1950年1月14日承认新中国}}</ref>). The first Western country to establish diplomatic ties with China was [[Sweden]] (on 9 May 1950).<ref>{{Cite web|url = http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/11/content_891453.htm|title = China-Sweden relations continue to strengthen|date = 2007-06-11|access-date = 2014-08-22|website = China Daily|last = Xinhua|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140819130026/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/11/content_891453.htm|archive-date = 2014-08-19|url-status = live}}</ref> Until the early 1970s, the [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] government in [[Taipei]] was recognized diplomatically by most world powers and held China's permanent seat in the UN Security Council, including its associated [[United Nations Security Council veto power|veto power]]. After the Beijing government assumed the China seat in 1971 (and the ROC government was expelled), the great majority of nations have switched diplomatic relations from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. Japan established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, following the [[Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China]], and the U.S. did so in 1979. In 2011, the number of countries that had established diplomatic relations with Beijing had risen to 171, while 23 maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (or Taiwan).<ref>{{cite web|title=Background Note: China|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm|work=Bureau of Public Affairs|publisher=U.S. Department of State|access-date=10 March 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170121015639/https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm|archive-date=21 January 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> (See also: [[Political status of Taiwan]]).

=== People's diplomacy ===
Soon after its founding, the [[China|People's Republic of China]] institutionalized its view of [[people's diplomacy]] (''renmin waijiao'').<ref name=":Minami">{{Cite book |last=Minami |first=Kazushi |title=People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=9781501774157 |location=Ithaca, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=8–9}} People's diplomacy was expressed through the slogan, "influence the policy through the people."<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=9}} Pursuant to its people's diplomacy, China sent doctors, scientists, and athletes to developing countries in Asia to cultivate ties.<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=9}} This form of people's diplomacy was often executed through the communist party's [[International Department of the Chinese Communist Party|International Liaison Department]].<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=9}} People's diplomacy with the capitalist countries sought to cultivate informal, non-state ties in the hope of developing "foreign friends" who would lobby their governments to improve relations with China.<ref name=":Minami" />{{Rp|page=9}}

== Mao-era foreign policies ==
During the Mao era, China's foreign relations were rooted in Chinese leadership's perceptions of the international socialist movement's purpose.<ref name=":04">{{Cite book |last=Meyskens |first=Covell F. |url= |title=Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China |date=2020 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-108-78478-8 |location=Cambridge, United Kingdom |doi=10.1017/9781108784788 |oclc=1145096137 |s2cid=218936313}}</ref>{{Rp|page=21}} In their view, the primary concern of worldwide revolutionary activities should be anti-imperialism, and the economic development brought by socialism would result in a shift in the global balance of power.<ref name=":04" />{{Rp|page=21}}

Articles 54 and 56 of the [[Common Program]] stated that China's foreign relations would be based on respect for mutual sovereignty.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Leung |first1=Beatrice |last2=Wang |first2=Marcus J. J. |date=2016-05-03 |title=Sino–Vatican Negotiations: problems in sovereign right and national security |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2015.1104921 |journal=Journal of Contemporary China |language=en |volume=25 |issue=99 |pages=467–482 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2015.1104921 |issn=1067-0564|url-access=subscription }}</ref>{{Rp|page=469}}

The terminology of "the Cold War" was not prominent in Chinese discourse during the Mao era.<ref name=":04" />{{Rp|page=20}} From the dominant Chinese view, the conflict between capitalism and socialism that existed from the late 1940s into the 1970s had not gone "cold."<ref name=":04" />{{Rp|pages=20–21}}

In the 1947-1962 era, Mao emphasized the desire for international partnerships, on the one hand to more rapidly develop the economy, and on the other to protect against attacks, especially by the U.S. His numerous alliances, however, all fell apart, including the [[Soviet Union]], [[North Vietnam]], [[North Korea]], and [[People's Socialist Republic of Albania|Albania]]. He was unable to organize an anti-American coalition. Furthermore, Mao was insensitive to the fears of alliance partners that China was so big, and so inwardly directed, that their needs would be ignored.<ref>Michael Yahuda, ''Towards the End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao'' (1983) pp 120-22.</ref>

During the Mao era, China's foreign policy bureaucracy was small.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=175}} Strategic decisions and security issues were handled in a top-down style.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=175}} With Mao in overall control and making final decisions, Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] handled foreign-policy and developed a strong reputation for his diplomatic and negotiating skills.<ref>Yahuda, ''Towards the End of Isolationism'' (1983) p 18.</ref>  Zhou stressed discipline in the diplomatic corps, maintaining that "there is no small matter in diplomacy." Despite his diplomatic skills, Zhou's bargaining position was undercut by the domestic turmoil initiated by Mao.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|pages=174–175}}

The [[1954 Geneva Conference]], which sought to resolve issues from the Korean War and the Indochina War, was the PRC's first significant involvement in an international diplomatic event.<ref name=":Qian">{{Cite book |last=Qian |first=Ying |title=Revolutionary Becomings: Documentary Media in Twentieth-Century China |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=9780231204477 |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=185}}

The [[Bandung Conference]] in 1955, at which Zhou led the Chinese delegation, was an important milestone for China's foreign relations.<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last1=Shinn |first1=David H. |title=China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement |last2=Eisenman |first2=Joshua |date=2023 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21001-0 |location=New York |author-link=David H. Shinn}}</ref>{{Rp|page=80}} China developed its foreign relations with many newly independent and soon-to-be independent countries,<ref name=":322" />{{Rp|page=80}} including making the PRC's first [[Sino-Arab relations|contact with the Arab countries]].<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Har-El |first=Shai |title=China and the Palestinian Organizations: 1964–1971 |date=2024 |publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] |isbn=978-3-031-57827-4 |location=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=xxiv}} China termed this cooperative approach the "Bandung Line."<ref name=":05">{{Cite book |last=Lampton |first=David M. |title=Living U.S.-China relations: From Cold War to Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |isbn=978-1-5381-8725-8 |location=Lanham, MD |pages= |author-link=David M. Lampton}}</ref>{{Rp|page=25}} This was the beginning of China's official discourse of [[South–South cooperation|South-South cooperation]].<ref name=":Laikwan">{{Cite book |last=Laikwan |first=Pang |title=One and All: The Logic of Chinese Sovereignty |date=2024 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=9781503638815 |location=Stanford, CA}}</ref>{{Rp|page=74}} China's [[Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence]] were incorporated into the Ten Principles of Bandung.<ref name=":322" />{{Rp|page=80}} 

After the Sino-Soviet split, Moscow and Beijing sometimes sponsored rival Communist parties around the world, which expended energy fighting each other.  China announced its [[Three Worlds Theory]] at the United Nations in 1974.<ref name=":Laikwan" />{{Rp|page=74}} China's focus on the [[Third World]] portrayed as the legitimate leader of the global battle against imperialism and capitalism.<ref>Westad, ''Restless Empire'' ch 9</ref><ref>John W. Garver, ''China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic'' (2nd ed. 2018), pp 85, 196-98, 228-231, 264.</ref> It urged Third World countries not to side with either the United States or the Soviet Union, viewing both of those count as coveting hegemony over the Third World.<ref name=":04" />{{Rp|page=21}} Mao described Africa and Latin America as the "First Intermediate Zone," in which China's status as a non-white power might enable it to compete with and supersede both United States and Soviet Union influence.<ref name=":172">{{Cite book |last=Crean |first=Jeffrey |title=The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-23394-2 |edition= |series=New Approaches to International History series |location=London, UK}}</ref>{{Rp|page=48}}

China's relations in the Middle East from the founding of the PRC until 1978 were shaped significantly by China's ideological stance.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Chuchu |title=China's Changing Role in the Middle East: Filling a Power Vacuum? |date=2025 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-032-76275-3 |series=Changing Dynamics in Asia-Middle East Relations series |location=Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=20}} China emphasized its own [[Semi-colony|semi-colonial]] history in an effort to build solidarity with the liberation movements in the Middle East.<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|page=20}} The Arab Liberation movements regarded China as a reliable and strong ally and China viewed the newly-independent Middle Eastern countries as "friends standing on the same front".<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|pages=20-21}} 

From the 1950s through the 1970s, more than half the Middle Eastern countries established diplomatic relations with the PRC.<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|page=22}} In 1971, China established relations with the Middle Eastern countries it had previously deemed as reactionary, such as Kuwait, Iran, and Lebanon.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=xxvii}} When the United Nations admitted the PRC to the China seat in 1971, more than a third of the PRC's votes came from the Middle East.<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|page=21}} As part of its diplomatic commitments to the Arab countries, during this period China did not establish [[China–Israel relations|relations with Israel]] and favored the Arab positions on issues relating to the [[Arab–Israeli conflict|Arab-Israeli conflict]].<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|page=22}}

== Soviet Union and Korean War ==
{{Main|Korean War|Sino–Soviet relations|China–North Korea relations|Cold War}}
After its founding, the PRC's foreign policy initially focused on its solidarity with the [[Soviet Union]], the [[Eastern Bloc]] nations, and other communist countries, sealed with, among other agreements, the [[Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance]] signed in 1950 to oppose China's chief antagonists, the West and in particular the U.S. The 1950–53 [[Korean War]] waged by China and its [[North Korea]] ally against the U.S., [[South Korea]], and [[United Nations]] (UN) forces has long been a reason for bitter feelings. After the conclusion of the [[Korean War]], China sought to balance its identification as a member of the Soviet bloc by establishing friendly relations with Pakistan and other [[Third World]] countries, particularly in Southeast Asia.<ref>[[Chen Jian (academic)|Chen Jian]], ''China's road to the Korean War'' (1994)</ref>

China's entry into the Korean War was the first of many "preemptive counterattacks". Chinese leaders decided to intervene when they saw their North Korean ally being overwhelmed and no guarantee American forces would stop at the [[Yalu River]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/26/chinas-dangerous-weakness-part-1-beijings-aggressive-idea-of-self-defense/ |title=China's Dangerous Weakness, Part 1: Beijing's Aggressive Idea Of Self-Defense |last1=Freedberg Jr. |first1=Sydney J. |date=26 September 2013 |website=breakingdefense.com |publisher=Breaking Media, Inc. |access-date=27 September 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130929192358/http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/26/chinas-dangerous-weakness-part-1-beijings-aggressive-idea-of-self-defense/ |archive-date=29 September 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Break with Moscow ===
{{Main|Sino-Soviet split}}
By the late 1950s, relations between China and the Soviet Union had become so divisive that in 1960, the Soviets unilaterally withdrew their advisers from China. The two then began to vie for allegiances among the [[Developing country|developing world]], for China saw itself as a natural champion through its role in the [[Non-Aligned Movement]] and its numerous bilateral and bi-party ties.
In the 1960s, Beijing competed with Moscow for political influence among communist parties and in the developing world generally. In 1962, China had a [[Sino-Indian War|brief war]] with [[India]] over a border dispute. By 1969, relations with Moscow were so tense that fighting erupted along their common border. Following the [[Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia]] and clashes in 1969 on the Sino-Soviet border, Chinese competition with the Soviet Union increasingly reflected concern over China's own strategic position. China then lessened its anti-Western rhetoric and began developing formal diplomatic relations with West European nations.<ref>Dong Wang,  "The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962." ''Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series '' (2005) [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/WP49DW_rev.pdf online].</ref>

In a March 22, 1969 meeting on the Sino-Soviet border clashes, Mao stated that in foreign relations, China was "now isolated" and "we need to relax a little".<ref name=":Li">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Hongshan |title=Fighting on the Cultural Front: U.S.-China Relations in the Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=9780231207058 |location=New York, NY |doi=10.7312/li--20704 |jstor=10.7312/li--20704}}</ref>{{Rp|page=287}} Later that year, China began to restore its embassies, which had been disrupted by the [[Cultural Revolution]], to normal functioning.<ref name=":Li" />{{Rp|page=287}}

== 1970s and 1980s ==
In October 1971, the [[China and the United Nations|United Nations]] expelled the Republic of China and admitted the People's Republic of China as the government of China.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hale |first=Erin |title=Taiwan taps on United Nations' door, 50 years after departure |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/25/chinas-un-seat-50-years-on |access-date=2024-12-08 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref> Between 1971 and 1972, twenty-five countries began diplomatic recognition of the PRC.<ref name=":12222">{{Cite book |last1=Liff |first1=Adam P. |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |last2=Lee |first2=Chaewon |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Korea-Taiwan "Unofficial" Relations after 30 Years (1992-2022): Reassessing Seoul's "One China" Policy |doi=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=165}} 

A visit by Japanese Prime Minister [[Kakuei Tanaka]] to Beijing culminated in the signing of a [[Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China|joint statement]] on September 29, 1972, and normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=48}} Japan stated that it was aware of its responsibility for causing enormous damage to the Chinese people during World War II and China renounced its demand for war reparation from Japan.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=48}} Avoiding political disputes over this traumatic history facilitated immediate strategic cooperation.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=48}}  The Japanese agreed with the Chinese view on the [[political status of Taiwan]], namely "that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China."<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=48}}

In the 1970s and 1980s, China sought to create a secure regional and global environment for itself and foster good relations with countries that could aid its economic development. During the time of Mao, China was a closed country. After his death, authorities led by [[Deng Xiaoping]] began initiating reforms. Along with Deng's policy of [[reform and opening up]], Deng involved more parties in foreign policy decision-making, decentralizing the foreign policy bureaucracy.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|pages=175–176}} Deng's approach attempted to build broad consensus and required enormous efforts to achieve compromises acceptable to all relevant stakeholders on an issue.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|pages=175–176}} This decentralized approach led to consideration of a great number of interests and views, but also fragmentation of policy institutions and extensive bargaining between different bureaucratic units during the policy-making process.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=176}}

Deng described anti-[[Hegemony|hegemonism]] as one of [[Foreign policy of China|China's foreign policy]] priorities and emphasized that China should follow the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in managing its foreign relations with countries that were organized according to different political beliefs and social systems.<ref name=":ChineseTheory">{{Cite book |last1=Yue |first1=Cui |title=Chinese International Relations Theory as Emerging From Practice and Policy |date=2025 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-0-429-19769-7 |editor-last=Ping |editor-first=Jonathan H. |edition= |location=New York, NY |chapter=Conceptualizing Peace in China: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Their Strategic Thinking |editor-last2=Hayes |editor-first2=Anna |editor-last3=McCormick |editor-first3=Brett}}</ref>{{Rp|page=49}} During the late 1970s and the 1980s, Deng's use of anti-hegemonism generally referred to the Soviet Union.<ref name=":ChineseTheory" />{{Rp|page=51}} Deng sought to improve relations with the United States, although it also criticized hegemonic actions of the country.<ref name=":ChineseTheory" />{{Rp|page=51}} While improving ties with the West, China continued to closely follow the political and economic positions of the Third World [[Non-Aligned Movement]], although China was not a formal member.

China grew concerned about the strong Soviet influence in Vietnam, fearing that Vietnam could become a pseudo-[[protectorate]] of the Soviet Union.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=55}} Vietnam's claim to be the world's third largest military power following its victory in the [[Vietnam War]] also increased Chinese apprehensions.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=55}} In the Chinese view, Vietnam was pursuing a regional hegemonic policy in an attempt to control Indochina.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=55}} On 25 December 1978, [[Cambodian–Vietnamese War|Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea]], overrunning most of the country, deposing the Khmer Rouge regime favored by China, and installing [[Heng Samrin]] as the head of the new Cambodian government.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|pages=55–56}} The move antagonized China, which now viewed the Soviet Union as capable of encircling its southern border.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=56}} China launched an invasion of Vietnam in the [[Sino-Vietnamese War|Sino-Vietnamese war]]. On Match 6, 1979, China declared that its punitive mission had been achieved and withdrew.

Chinese anxiety about Soviet strategic advances was heightened following the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion]] of [[Afghanistan]]. Sharp differences between China and the Soviet Union persisted over Soviet support for [[Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia|Vietnam's continued occupation of Cambodia]], the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Soviet troops along the [[China–Russia border|Sino-Soviet border]] and in [[Mongolia]]—the so-called "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations.<ref>Michael B. Yahuda, ''End of Isolationism: China's Foreign Policy After Mao'' (1983).</ref><ref>Michael Yahuda,  "Deng Xiaoping: the statesman." ''The China Quarterly'' 135 (1993): 551-572 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/654102 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190210152538/https://www.jstor.org/stable/654102 |date=2019-02-10 }}.</ref>

In 1983, 74-year-old [[Li Xiannian]] became [[President of the People's Republic of China|President of China]], nominal [[List of state representatives of the People's Republic of China|state representative of China]] under military leader [[Deng Xiaoping]] and one of the longest serving politicians in the leadership of China. He visited many countries and thus began opening China to the world. In 1985, [[Li Xiannian]] was the first president of China to visit the U.S. President Li also visited [[North Korea]]. 1986 saw the arrival of Queen [[Elizabeth II]] in an official visit.<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Anderson |first=Kurt |date=7 May 1984 |title=History Beckons Again |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954285,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130822155758/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954285,00.html |archive-date=22 August 2013 |access-date=19 August 2011 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref> To this end, China looked to the West for assistance with its modernization drive and for help in countering Soviet expansionism, which it characterized as the greatest threat to its national security and to world peace.

Since the 1980s, China's foreign policy has been peace-seeking with a focus on optimizing mutual economic interests between states.<ref name=":33">{{Cite book |last=Atatüre |first=Süha |url= |title=China and Eurasian Powers in a Multipolar World Order 2.0: Security, Diplomacy, Economy and Cyberspace |date=2023 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |others=Mher Sahakyan |isbn=978-1-003-35258-7 |edition= |location=New York |pages= |chapter=The US and China as Main Powers in Multipolar World Order 2.0 |oclc=1353290533}}</ref>{{Rp|page=45}} It has generally sought to maintain good relationships with countries that may be opposed to each other, for example in its cultivation of relationships with both Israel and the Arab states.<ref name=":92">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=2022 |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |pages=251 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k |oclc=1348572572 |author-link=Christopher Marquis |s2cid=253067190}}</ref> During the 1980s, Deng began formulating a good neighboring policy to capitalize on regional activism.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=66}} Under this policy, China no longer considered a neighboring country's ideological tendencies as a critical factor in foreign policy, and instead focused on developing international relationships with its neighbors regardless of their respective ties to the United States or the Soviet Union.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|pages=66–67}} Thus, in 1988, China signed an agreement with Mongolia regarding borders, despite the fact that China's government had long viewed neighboring Mongolia as a Soviet satellite.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=67}}

===1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre===
{{Main|1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre|Reactions to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre}}

In the immediate aftermath of the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]], various countries imposed sanctions, cancelled aid, banned sales of military equipment, or cut back diplomatic ties.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=62}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Klien |first=Susanne |title=Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective |date=2018-10-24 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-315-81105-5 |edition=1 |pages=89 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315811055|s2cid=239920118 }}</ref> In response to these efforts to isolate China, Deng articulated the "twenty-four character guidelines" for China to adopt in its international affairs: observe carefully (冷静观察), secure China's positions (稳住阵脚), calmly cope with the challenges (沉着应付), hide China's capacities and bide its time (韬光养晦), be good at maintaining a low profile (善于守拙), and never claim leadership (绝不当头).<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=62}} China's approach focused on learning to live with the fact of United States hegemony.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=62}}

Although the crackdown hurt relations with Western countries, it had relatively little impact on China's relations with its Asian neighbors.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=67}} Most of these neighboring countries did not have better human rights records than China and were generally sympathetic to China in light of the pressure it received from Western countries.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=67}} Even in the wake of the crackdown, China's foreign relations with its neighbors generally improved.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=67}}

== 1990s ==
In the 1990s, China adopted conservative negotiating tactics in its territorial disputes, deemphasizing the use of confrontation and instead relying on legal agreements and diplomatic measures.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=67}}

Following the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in late 1991, China also opened diplomatic relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union.<ref>Samuel S. Kim, "Chinese Foreign Policy After Tiananmen," ''Current History'' 89#548 (September. 1990), 245-52.</ref> In the post-Cold War environment, CCP general secretary [[Jiang Zemin]] continued Deng's good neighboring policy, under the principles of stabilizing the periphery, expanding diplomacy, and altering the situation.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=66}} China had considered the Soviet Union its principal security threat, and its dissolution reduced the importance of security considerations in China's perceptions of South and Central Asian geo-politics.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Fingar |first=Thomas |url= |title=The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform |date=2016 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |others=Thomas Fingar |isbn=978-0-8047-9764-1 |location=Stanford, California |pages=16 |chapter=China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform |oclc=939553543 |author-link=Thomas Fingar}}</ref> China  began rebuilding relations with its Central Asian countries, with their economic ties growing during the 1990s and subsequently.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=172–175}}

Beginning in 1992, China began to balance its relationships with North and South Korea.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=69}} It normalized its diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992 while continuing its strategic relationship with North Korea.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=69}}

To combat the threat of [[Jihadism|militant Islam]]-fueled separatism in [[Xinjiang]] and to cement relations with the Central Asian states following the Soviet Union's dissolution, China signed the 1996 Treaty of Enhancing Military Mutual Trust in the Border Areas with nearby Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan at a meeting in Shanghai.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=70}} The group of nations began meeting in 1997 as the "Shanghai Five" (and continuing into the 2000s as the [[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation]]).

China increased its reputation among its neighbors during the [[1997 Asian financial crisis]].<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=68}} Other Asian countries harshly affected by the crisis sought the United States or Japan to bail them out of the difficult economic conditions.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=68}} As the United States and Japan moved slowly, China made a highly regarded symbolic gesture by refusing to devalue its own currency (which presumably would have touched off a series of competitive devaluations with serious consequences for the region).<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=68}} Instead, China contributed $4 billion to neighboring countries via a combination of bilateral bailouts and contributing to IMF bailout packages.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=68}} In 1999, as a result of these actions, the World Bank described China as a "source of stability for the region" in one of its reports.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=68}}

Beginning in the late 1990s, China began to articulate its [[new security concept]]: that no single state, even the most powerful, is capable of coping with all security challenges alone.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=71}}

=== Relations with the United States in the 1990s ===
The 1990s presented several challenges in China-United States relations, although there were positive developments for China including the United States' de-linking of China's most favored nation status from its human rights record. In July 1993, the [[Yinhe incident|''Yinhe'' incident]] prompted Jiang's adoption of the "sixteen-characters formula" for working with the United States: "enhancing confidence, reducing troubles, expanding cooperation, and avoiding confrontation."<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=63}} During the ''Yinhe'' incident, the United States Navy stopped a Chinese container ship, the ''Yinhe'', based on incorrect suspicions that the ship contained chemical weapon precursors bound for Iran.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=63}} Although China denied the allegation, the United States unilaterally cut off the ''Yinhe''<nowiki/>'s GPS, causing it to lose direction and forcing it to anchor on the high seas for twenty-four days.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=63}} The ''Yinhe'' ultimately agreed to an inspection which found no chemical weapon precursors.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=63}} Despite China's request for a formal apology, the United States refused to apologize and refused to pay compensation.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=63}} Despite the humiliation of the ''Yinhe'' incident, Jiang adopted a posture of diplomatic good will to the United States, including the sixteen-characters formula.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=63}}

Tensions also followed the [[United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade]] on May 7, 1999,<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|pages=63–64}} which the United States claimed occurred by mistake. The bombing created outrage among Chinese people, who did not accept the United States claim that the bombing was accidental.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=63–64}} For several days, Beijing was rocked by massive anti-US demonstrations. Deeming the importance of the bilateral relationship too great to be harmed by the embassy bombing, CCP general secretary [[Jiang Zemin]] sought to calm the Chinese public outrage.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|pages=63–64}}

==21st century==
Since its founding in 2000, the [[Forum on China–Africa Cooperation|Forum on China-Africa Cooperation]] (FOCAC) is the primary multi-lateral coordination mechanism between China and the African states.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=56}} [[Chinese foreign aid]] is a significant area of interaction within FOCAC.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=84}} Through FOCAC, China provides aid in the forms of debt forgiveness, aid grants, concessional loans, and interest-free loans.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|page=84}}

In 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan began regular meetings under the auspices of the [[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation]].<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=70}} China takes a leadership role in the organization, which focuses on defeating the "three evils" of separatism, terrorism, and extremism.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=70}}

China was active in the [[Six-party talks|Six-Party talks]] in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=71}} China hoped to play a lead role in developing the Six-Party Talks into a lasting multilateral security mechanism for northeast Asia, but ultimately the talks failed.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=75}} China's efforts in the unsuccessful tasks nonetheless raised its international standing.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|pages=73–74}}

Founded in 2004, the [[China–Arab States Cooperation Forum|China-Arab States Cooperation Forum]] (CASCF) serves as the major multi-lateral cooperation mechanism between China and the Arab League states.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Murphy |first=Dawn C. |title=China's Rise in the Global South: The Middle East, Africa, and Beijing's Alternative World Order |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |year=2022 |isbn=978-1-5036-3060-4 |location=Stanford, California |pages=}}</ref>

In 2008, China revised its policies towards [[pariah state]]s, articulating a new view that it was willing to condition its diplomatic protection of pariah countries, forcing them to become more acceptable to the international community.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=76}}

Under [[general secretaryship of Xi Jinping]], China has adopted a new foreign policy doctrine called "Major Country Diplomacy" ({{lang-zh|大国外交}}) which has replaced the earlier Deng Xiaoping era slogan of "keep a low profile" ({{lang-zh|韬光养晦}}) and has legitimized a more active role for China on the world stage, particularly with regards to reform of the international order, engaging in open ideological competition with the West, and assuming a greater responsibility for global affairs in accordance with China's rising power and status.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=Stephen |title=China's "Major Country Diplomacy" |url=https://academic.oup.com/fpa/article-abstract/17/2/orab002/6139347?redirectedFrom=fulltext |journal=Foreign Policy Analysis |date=16 February 2021 |doi=10.1093/fpa/orab002 |access-date=21 September 2021|url-access=subscription }}</ref> During the first five years of [[Chinese Communist Party]] [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|general secretary]] [[Xi Jinping]]’s [[General secretaryship of Xi Jinping|leadership]] the budget for diplomacy doubled.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Loh |first1=Dylan M.H |title=Over here, overbearing: The origins of China's 'Wolf Warrior' style diplomacy |url=https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/12/over-here-overbearing-the-origins-of-chinas-wolf-warrior-style-diplomacy/ |website=hongkongfp.com |date=12 June 2020 |access-date=31 July 2020}}</ref>

The aggressive style of Chinese diplomacy which emerged in the 21st century has been termed “[[Wolf Warrior Diplomacy]]."<ref>{{cite web |last1=NAKAZAWA |first1=KATSUJI |title=China's 'wolf warrior' diplomats roar at Hong Kong and the world |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-s-wolf-warrior-diplomats-roar-at-Hong-Kong-and-the-world |website=nikkei.com |publisher=Nikkei Asia Review |access-date=27 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200528002259/https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-s-wolf-warrior-diplomats-roar-at-Hong-Kong-and-the-world |archive-date=28 May 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Wu |first1=Wendy |title=Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi defends 'wolf warrior' diplomats for standing up to 'smears' |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3085856/chinese-foreign-minister-wang-yi-defends-wolf-warrior |website=www.scmp.com |date=24 May 2020 |publisher=SCMP |access-date=27 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200527172149/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3085856/chinese-foreign-minister-wang-yi-defends-wolf-warrior |archive-date=27 May 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> The phrase is derived from the patriotic Chinese movie ''[[Wolf Warrior]]'' and its sequel ''[[Wolf Warrior 2]]'', the film's tagline was "Even though a thousand miles away, anyone who affronts China will pay."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Jiang |first1=Steven |last2=Westcott |first2=Ben |title=China is embracing a new brand of foreign policy. Here's what wolf warrior diplomacy means |url=https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-intl-hnk/index.html |website=www.cnn.com |date=29 May 2020 |publisher=CNN |access-date=30 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200529120219/https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-intl-hnk/index.html |archive-date=29 May 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> Efforts aimed at incorporating Chinese diaspora into China's foreign policy have also intensified with an emphasis placed on ethnic loyalty over national loyalty.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wong |first1=Brian |title=How Chinese Nationalism Is Changing |url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/how-chinese-nationalism-is-changing/ |website=thediplomat.com |publisher=The Diplomat |access-date=30 May 2020}}</ref>

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi kept an extensive schedule of phone and video foreign meetings as part of his "cloud diplomacy" (云外交), which received prominent attention in Chinese media, similar to in-person foreign visits.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=15}}

China has been criticized for its aggressive diplomatic response to the COVID-19 outbreak<ref>{{cite news |last1=Zhai |first1=Keith |last2=Lun Tien |first2=Yew |title=In China, a young diplomat rises as aggressive foreign policy takes root |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-insight/in-china-a-young-diplomat-rises-as-aggressive-foreign-policy-takes-root-idUSKBN21I0F8 |website=www.reuters.com |date=31 March 2020 |agency=Reuters |access-date=2020-05-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200422033042/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-diplomacy-insight/in-china-a-young-diplomat-rises-as-aggressive-foreign-policy-takes-root-idUSKBN21I0F8 |archive-date=2020-04-22 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Bengali |first1=Shashank |title='Put on a mask and shut up': China's new 'Wolf Warriors' spread hoaxes and attack a world of critics |url=https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-05-04/wolf-warrior-diplomats-defend-china-handling-coronavirus |website=[[Los Angeles Times]] |date=4 May 2020 |access-date=4 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200505065423/https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-05-04/wolf-warrior-diplomats-defend-china-handling-coronavirus |archive-date=5 May 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> which included spreading [[COVID-19 misinformation by China|misinformation]] about how other countries were handling the outbreak.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Palmer |first1=James |title=Why Chinese Embassies Have Embraced Aggressive Diplomacy |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/15/chinese-embassies-embrace-aggressive-diplomacy-coronavirus-pandemic-misinformation/ |website=foreignpolicy.com |date=15 April 2020 |publisher=Foreign Policy |access-date=4 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200426115050/https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/15/chinese-embassies-embrace-aggressive-diplomacy-coronavirus-pandemic-misinformation/ |archive-date=26 April 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Social media===
Engagement on [[social media]] sites such as [[Facebook]] and [[Twitter]] has become an integral component of Chinese diplomacy.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Feng |first1=Zhaoyin |title=China and Twitter: The year China got louder on social media |work=BBC News |date=29 December 2019 |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50832915 |access-date=31 July 2020}}</ref> From April 2019 to April 2020 the output of Chinese diplomat's Twitter accounts increased fourfold.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Scott |first1=Mark |title=Chinese diplomacy ramps up social media offensive in COVID-19 info war |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/china-disinformation-covid19-coronavirus/ |website=www.politico.eu |date=29 April 2020 |access-date=30 July 2020}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|China}}
* [[International relations (1814–1919)]]
** [[Diplomatic history of World War I]]
** [[International relations (1919–1939)]]
** [[Diplomatic history of World War II]]
** [[Cold War]]
* [[China–United States relations]]
* [[History of Sino-Russian relations]]
* [[Ten Major Relationships]], Mao's policy speech of 1956
* [[Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China]]
**[[Foreign relations of Imperial China]]
** [[Foreign relations of Hong Kong]]
** [[Foreign relations of Macao]]
** [[Foreign relations of Taiwan]]

==Notes==
<references/>

==Further reading==
* Athwal, Amardeep. ''China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics'' (Routledge, 2007) [https://books.google.com/books?id=DLFgmgBhLZAC&dq=China+India&pg=PP1 online].
* Bickers, Robert. ''The Scramble for China: Foreign devils in the Qing empire, 1832-1914'' (Penguin, 2016). [http://www.royalasiaticsociety.org.cn/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/RAS.Journal2013.pdf#page=342 online review p 342ff] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220508031709/http://www.royalasiaticsociety.org.cn/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/RAS.Journal2013.pdf#page=342 |date=2022-05-08 }}
* Bolt, Paul J., and Sharyl Cross. ''China, Russia, and Twenty-First Century Global Geopolitics'' (Oxford UP, 2018).
* Cole, Bernard d. ''China’s Quest For Great Power'' (Naval Institute Press, 2013), stress on military and naval power
* Dian, Matteo. ''Contested memories in Chinese and Japanese foreign policy'' (Elsevier, 2017). [https://books.google.com/books?id=Bky0DAAAQBAJ&pg=PP1 online]
* Garver, John W. ''China's quest: the history of the foreign relations of the people's Republic of China'' (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2018), a major comprehensive scholarly history since 1945. [https://www.amazon.com/Chinas-Quest-History-Relations-Republic/dp/0190884355/ excerpt]
* Goh, Evelyn. ''The struggle for order: Hegemony, hierarchy, and transition in post-Cold War East Asia'' (Oxford UP, 2013).
* Kirby, William C. "The internationalization of China: Foreign relations at home and abroad in the Republican era." ''The China Quarterly'' 150 (1997): 433–458. [http://www.jstor.org/stable/655344 online]
* Mackerras, Colin. "Fifty Years of Australian Diplomatic Relations with China: Some Reflections." ''Asian Studies Review'' 47.1 (2023): 109–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2022.2135481
* Shambaugh, David. ''China Goes Global: The Partial Power'' (Oxford UP, 2013), its recent economic role in world affairs
* Sutter, Robert G. ''Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War''(3rd ed. Rowman & Littlefield, 2012)

===Relations with United States===
* Cohen, Warren I. ''America’s Response To China: A History Of Sino-American Relations'' (6th ed. Columbia UP, 2019) [https://archive.org/details/americasresponse0005edcohe_f5a5 2010 edition online]
* Garver, John W. ''China's quest: the history of the foreign relations of the people's Republic of China'' (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2018), chapters 3, 9, 11, 21, 23, 24.
* MacMillan, Margaret. ''Nixon and Mao: the week that changed the world'' (Random House, 2008).
* Kirby, William C., et al. ''Normalization of US-China relations: an international history'' (Harvard University Asia Center Publications Program, 2005).
* Wang, Dong. ''The United States and China: A history from the eighteenth century to the present'' (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021).

{{Clear}}
{{Foreign relations of China}}
{{China topics|state=autocollapse}}
{{Foreign relations of Asia}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Foreign Relations Of The People's Republic Of China}}
[[Category:History of the foreign relations of China| ]]