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{{Short description|Topic in Aristotelian philosophy}}
{{see also|Potentiality and actuality}}{{Hatnote|This article uses the word 'cause' in its traditional scholarly philosophical sense, not to be confused with the word's main usage in current ordinary language.}}
[[File:Aristotle's Four Causes of a Table.svg|thumb|upright=1.7|[[Aristotle]]'s Four Causes illustrated for a table: material (wood), formal (structure), efficient (carpentry), final (dining).]]
The '''four causes''' or four explanations are, in [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian thought]], categories of questions that explain "the why's" of something that exists or changes in nature. The four causes are the: [[#Material|material cause]], the [[#Formal|formal cause]], the [[#Efficient|efficient cause]], and the [[#Final|final cause]]. [[Aristotle]] wrote that "we do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to say, its cause."<ref>Aristotle, ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' 194 b17–20; see also ''[[Posterior Analytics]]'' 71 b9–11; 94 a20.</ref><ref name="SEP Four Causes">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Falcon |first=Andrea |title=Aristotle on Causality: 2. The Four Causes |date=2019|orig-date=First published 2006|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/aristotle-causality/#FourCaus |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor1-last=Zalta |editor1-first=Edward N. |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri |edition=Spring 2019 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2023-06-19 |quote=...&nbsp;for a full range of cases, an explanation which fails to invoke all four causes is no explanation at all.}}</ref> While there are cases in which classifying a "cause" is difficult, or in which "causes" might merge, Aristotle held that his four "causes" provided an analytical scheme of general applicability.<ref>[[David C. Lindberg|Lindberg, David]]. 1992. ''[[The Beginnings of Western Science]]''. p. 53.</ref>

Aristotle's  word ''aitia'' ({{lang|grc-x-attic|{{wikt-lang|grc|αἰτία}}}}) has, in philosophical scholarly tradition, been translated as 'cause'. This peculiar, specialized, technical, usage of the word 'cause' is not that of everyday English language.{{sfn|Leroi|2015|pages=91–92}} Rather, the translation of Aristotle's {{lang|grc|αἰτία}} that is nearest to current ordinary language is "explanation."<ref name="Hankison1998" /><ref name="SEP Four Causes"/>{{sfn|Leroi|2015|pages=91–92}}

In ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' II.3 and ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'' V.2, Aristotle holds that there are four kinds of answers to "why" questions:<ref name="SEP Four Causes"/><ref name="Hankison1998">"Aristotle famously distinguishes four 'causes' (or causal factors in explanation), the matter, the form, the end, and the agent." 
Hankinson, R. J. 1998. ''Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought''. Oxford: [[Oxford University Press]]. p. 159. {{ISBN|978-0198237457}}. {{doi|10.1093/0199246564.001.0001}}.</ref><ref>Aristotle. [https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1013a ''Metaphysics'' V], (''Aristotle in 23 Volumes'', vols. 17–18), translated by H. Tredennick (1933/1989). London, [[William Heinemann Ltd]]. 1989 – via  [[Perseus Project]]. [https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0052%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1013a § 1013a].

Aristotle discusses the four "causes" in his ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'', Book B, ch. 3.</ref>
;Matter: The material cause of a change or movement. This is the aspect of the change or movement that is determined by the material that composes the moving or changing things. For a table, this might be wood; for a statue, it might be bronze or marble.
;Form: The formal cause of a change or movement. This is a change or movement caused by the arrangement, shape, or appearance of the thing changing or moving. Aristotle says, for example, that the ratio 2:1, and number in general, is the formal cause of the [[octave]].
;Efficient, or agent: The efficient or moving cause of a change or movement. This consists of things apart from the thing being changed or moved, which interact so as to be an agency of the change or movement. For example, the efficient cause of a table is a carpenter, or a person working as one, and according to Aristotle the efficient cause of a child is a parent.
;Final, end, or purpose: The final cause of a change or movement. This is a change or movement for the sake of a thing to be what it is. For a seed, it might be an adult plant; for a sailboat, it might be sailing; for a ball at the top of a ramp, it might be coming to rest at the bottom.

The four "causes" are not mutually exclusive. For Aristotle, several, preferably four, answers to the question "why" have to be given to explain a phenomenon and especially the actual configuration of an object.<ref>According to Reece (2018): "Aristotle thinks that human action is a species of animal self-movement, and animal self-movement is a species of natural change. Natural changes, although they are not substances and do not have causes in precisely the same way that substances do, are to be explained in terms of the four causes, or as many of them as a given natural change has: The material cause is that out of which something comes to be, or what undergoes change from one state to another; the formal cause, what differentiates something from other things, and serves as a paradigm for its coming to be that thing; the efficient cause, the starting-point of change; the final cause, that for the sake of which something comes about."</ref> For example, if asking why a table is such and such, an explanation in terms of the four causes would sound like this: This table is solid and brown because it is made of wood (matter); it does not collapse because it has four legs of equal length (form); it is as it is because a carpenter made it, starting from a tree (agent); it has these dimensions because it is to be used by humans (end).

Aristotle distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic causes. Matter and form are intrinsic causes because they deal directly with the object, whereas efficient and finality causes are said to be extrinsic because they are external.<ref>[[Aristotle]], ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysica]]'' I. 983 a26 ss. As quoted in [[Battista Mondin]] (2022), ''Ontologia e Metafisica'', 3rd ed., ESD, p. 157, {{ISBN|978-8855450539}}.</ref>

[[Thomas Aquinas]] demonstrated that only those four types of causes can exist and no others. He also introduced a priority order according to which "matter is made perfect by the form, form is made perfect by the agent, and agent is made perfect by the finality."<ref>Thomas Aquinas, ''In IV Sententiarum'', d. 3, q. 1, a. 1. sol. 1. As quoted in [[Battista Mondin]] (2022), ''Ontologia e metafisica'', ESD, 2022, p. 158</ref> Hence, the finality is the cause of causes or, equivalently, the queen of causes.<ref>Thomas Aquinas, ''[[Summa Theologiae]]'' I, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 1</ref>

==Definition of "cause"==
{{main|Aristotelianism}}
In his philosophical writings, Aristotle used the [[Greek (language)|Greek]] word [[wikt:αἴτιος|αἴτιον]] (''[[aition]]''), a [[Neuter (grammar)|neuter]] [[Singular (grammatical number)|singular form]] of an [[adjective]]. The Greek word had meant, perhaps originally in a "[[Ancient Greek law|legal]]" context, what or who is "[[Personal responsibility|responsible]]," mostly but not always in a bad sense of "guilt" or "blame." Alternatively, it could mean "to the credit of" someone or something. The appropriation of this word by Aristotle and other philosophers reflects how the Greek experience of legal practice influenced the concern in Greek thought to determine ''what'' is responsible.<ref name=":0">[[G. E. R. Lloyd|Lloyd, G. E. R.]] 1996. "Causes and correlations." In ''Adversaries and authorities: Investigations into ancient Greek and Chinese science'', Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. {{ISBN|0521556953}}.</ref>{{Rp|100, 106–107}} The word developed other meanings, including its use in philosophy in a more abstract sense.<ref>{{Cite book |author=Aristotle |title=Ἀναλυτικὰ ὕστερα |trans-title=Posterior Analytics |language=Greek |url=http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/graeca/Chronologia/S_ante04/Aristoteles/ari_a221.html <!--website Biblioteca Augustana--> |publisher=Hochschule Augsburg |access-date=2023-03-07}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |author=Aristotle |editor-first=W. D. |editor-last=Ross |title=Aristotle's Metaphysics |language=Greek |publisher=Clarendon Press |location=Oxford |date=1924 |url=https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0051%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D1013a |via=perseus.tufts.edu}}</ref><ref>{{Cite dictionary |first1=Henry George |last1=Liddell |first2=Robert |last2=Scott |others=revised and augmented throughout by Sir Henry Stuart Jones with the assistance of Roderick McKenzie |dictionary=A Greek–English Lexicon |title=αἰτιο-λογία |publisher=Clarendon Press |location=Oxford |date=1940 |url=https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dai)tiologi%2Fa |access-date=19 June 2023 |via=perseus.tufts.edu}}</ref>

About a century before Aristotle, the anonymous author of the [[Hippocratic Corpus|Hippocratic]] text ''[[On Ancient Medicine]]'' had described the essential characteristics of a cause as it is considered in medicine:<ref>[[G. E. R. Lloyd|Lloyd, G. E. R.]] 1979. ''[[iarchive:magicreasonexper0000lloy|Magic, Reason and Experience]]''. Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. {{ISBN|0521296412}}. [[iarchive:magicreasonexper0000lloy/page/54|p. 54]].</ref><blockquote>We must, therefore, consider the causes of each [medical] condition to be those things which are such that, when they are present, the condition necessarily occurs, but when they change to another combination, it ceases.</blockquote>

== Aristotle's "four causes" ==
Aristotle used the four causes to provide different answers to the question, "because of what?" The four answers to this question illuminate different aspects of how a thing comes into being or of how an event takes place.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|96–98}}

=== {{anchor|Material cause}} Material ===

Aristotle considers the material "cause" ({{Langx|grc|{{wikt-lang|en|ὕλη|ὕλη}}|translit=hū́lē|label=none}})<ref name=preus>{{cite encyclopedia |author=Preus, Anthony |year=2015 |title=Material cause |encyclopedia=Historical Dictionary of Ancient Greek Philosophy |edition=2nd |publisher=Rowman and Littlefield |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wjW_BgAAQBAJ |isbn=978-0810854871}}</ref> of an object as equivalent to the nature of the raw material out of which the object is composed. (The word "nature" for Aristotle applies to both its potential in the raw material and its ultimate finished form. In a sense this form already existed in the material: see [[potentiality and actuality]].)

Whereas modern physics looks to simple bodies, Aristotle's physics took a more general viewpoint, and treated living things as exemplary. Nevertheless, he argued that simple natural bodies such as earth, fire, air, and water also showed signs of having their own innate sources of motion, change, and rest. Fire, for example, carries things upwards, unless stopped from doing so. Things formed by human artifice, such as beds and cloaks, have no innate tendency to become beds or cloaks.<ref>''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' 192b</ref>

In traditional Aristotelian philosophical terminology, material is not the same as [[Substance theory|substance]]. Matter has parallels with substance in so far as primary matter serves as the substratum for simple bodies which are not substance: sand and rock (mostly earth), rivers and seas (mostly water), atmosphere and wind (mostly air and then mostly fire below the moon). In this traditional terminology, 'substance' is a term of [[ontology]], referring to really existing things; only individuals are said to be substances (subjects) in the primary sense. Secondary substance, in a different sense, also applies to man-made artifacts.

=== {{anchor|Formal cause}} Formal ===
{{see|Platonic realism}}

Aristotle considers the formal "cause" ({{Langx|grc|{{wikt-lang|en|εἶδος|εἶδος}}|translit=eîdos|label=none}})<ref name=preus/> as describing the pattern or form which when present makes matter into a particular type of thing, which we recognize as being of that particular type.

By Aristotle's own account, this is a difficult and controversial [[concept]].{{citation needed|date= September 2016}} It links with [[theory of forms|theories of forms]] such as those of Aristotle's teacher, [[Plato]], but in Aristotle's own account (see his ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]''), he takes into account many previous writers who had expressed opinions about forms and ideas, but he shows how his own views differ from them.<ref>[[G. E. R. Lloyd|Lloyd, G. E. R.]] 1968. "The critic of Plato." pp. 43–47 in ''Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought''. Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. {{ISBN|0521094569}}.</ref>

=== {{anchor|Efficient cause}} Efficient ===

Aristotle defines the agent or efficient "cause" ({{Langx|grc|{{wikt-lang|en|κινέω|κινοῦν}}|translit=kinoûn|label=none}})<ref name=preus/> of an object as that which causes change and drives transient motion (such as a painter painting a house) (see Aristotle, Physics II 3, 194b29). In many cases, this is simply the thing that brings something about. For example, in the case of a statue, it is the person chiseling away which transforms a block of marble into a statue. According to Lloyd, of the four causes, only this one is what is meant by the modern English word "cause" in ordinary speech.<ref>{{ Citation | last=Lloyd | first=G. E. R. | author-link=G. E. R. Lloyd | date=1996 | title=Adversaries and authorities: Investigations into ancient Greek and Chinese science | chapter=Causes and correlations | publisher=Cambridge University Press | place=Cambridge | page=96 | isbn=0521556953 | quote=It is clear that of these four, only the efficient cause looks like a ''cause'' in any ordinary English sense.}}</ref>

=== {{anchor|Final cause}} Final ===
{{Main|Teleology|Teleology in biology}}

Aristotle defines the end, purpose, or final "cause" ({{Langx|grc|{{wikt-lang|en|τέλος}}|translit=télos|label=none}})<ref name=preus/> as that for the sake of which a thing is done.<ref>{{Citation | author=Aristotle | author-link=Aristotle | title=Physics | at=II.3. 194 <sup>b 32</sup>}}</ref> Like the form, this is a controversial type of explanation in science; some have argued for its survival in [[evolutionary biology]],<ref name="Lennox 1993">{{ Citation | last=Lennox | first=James G. | author-link=James G. Lennox | date=1993 | title=Darwin ''was'' a teleologist | journal=Biology and Philosophy | volume=8 | issue=4 | pages=409–421 | doi=10.1007/BF00857687 | s2cid=170767015 }}</ref> while [[Ernst Mayr]] denied that it continued to play a role.<ref>"The development or behavior of an individual is purposive, natural selection is definitely not…. Darwin 'has swept out such finalistic teleology by the front door.'"

[[Ernst Mayr|Mayr, Ernst]]. 1961. "Cause and Effect in Biology." ''[[Science (journal)|Science]]'' 134(3489):1501–1506. {{doi|10.1126/science.134.3489.1501}}. {{PMID|14471768}}.</ref> It is commonly recognised<ref>{{citation |last=Rand |first=Ayn |date= 2000 |title=The Art of Fiction |publisher=The Penguin Group |page=20 |isbn=0452281547 }}</ref> that Aristotle's conception of nature is teleological in the sense that [[Nature (philosophy)|Nature]] exhibits functionality in a more general sense than is exemplified in the purposes that humans have. Aristotle observed that a ''telos'' does not necessarily involve deliberation, intention, consciousness, or intelligence:<ref>[[Jonathan Barnes|Barnes, Jonathan]], ed. ''The Complete Works of Aristotle'', vol. I. The Revised Oxford Translation.</ref>

{{quote|This is most obvious in the animals other than man: they make things neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation. That is why people wonder whether it is by intelligence or by some other faculty that these creatures work, – spiders, ants, and the like... It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. Art does not deliberate. If the ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature. If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is present also in nature.|author=Aristotle|title=Physics|source=II.8}}

According to Aristotle, a seed has the eventual adult plant as its end (i.e., as its ''[[telos]]'') if and only if the seed would become the adult plant under normal circumstances.<ref>Aristotle gives this example in ''Parts of Animals'' I.1.</ref> In ''Physics'' II.9, Aristotle hazards a few arguments that a determination of the end (i.e., final cause) of a phenomenon is more important than the others. He argues that the end is that which brings it about, so for example "if one defines the operation of sawing as being a certain kind of dividing, then this cannot come about unless the saw has teeth of a certain kind; and these cannot be unless it is of iron."<ref>Aristotle, ''Physics'' II.9. 200b4–7.</ref> According to Aristotle, once a final "cause" is in place, the material, efficient and formal "causes" follow by necessity. However, he recommends that the student of nature determine the other "causes" as well,<ref>Aristotle, ''Physics'' II.9.</ref> and notes that not all phenomena have an end, e.g., chance events.<ref>''Physics'' II.5 where chance is opposed to nature, which he has already said acts for ends.</ref>

Aristotle saw that [[Aristotle's biology|his biological investigations]] provided insights into the causes of things, especially into the final cause:
{{quote|We should approach the investigation of every kind of animal without being ashamed, since in each one of them there is something natural and something beautiful.  The absence of chance and the serving of ends are found in the works of nature especially. And the end, for the sake of which a thing has been constructed or has come to be, belongs to what is beautiful. |source=Aristotle, ''On the Parts of Animals'' 645<sup>a 21–26</sup>, Book I, Part 5.<ref>Lloyd, G. E. R. (1970). ''Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle'', New York: W. W. Norton, p. 105. {{ISBN|978-0393005837}}</ref>}}

[[George Holmes Howison]] highlights "final causation" in presenting his theory of metaphysics, which he terms "personal idealism", and to which he invites not only man, but all (ideal) life:<ref>[[George Holmes Howison|Howison, George Holmes]]. 1901. ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=vAIQAAAAYAAJ&dq=The+limits+of+Evolution+howison&pg=PA39 The Limits of Evolution]''. p. 39; and [https://books.google.com/books?id=dg3wkAkfKQ4C&pg=PA39 second edition], 1905, p.39</ref>

{{quote|Here, in seeing that Final Cause &ndash; causation at the call of self-posited aim or end – is the only full and genuine cause, we further see that Nature, the cosmic aggregate of phenomena and the cosmic bond of their law which in the mood of vague and inaccurate abstraction we call Force, is after all only an effect... Thus teleology, or the Reign of Final Cause, the reign of ideality, is not only an element in the notion of Evolution, but is the very vital cord in the notion. The conception of evolution is founded at last and essentially in the conception of Progress: but this conception has no meaning at all except in the light of a goal; there can be no goal unless there is a Beyond for everything actual; and there is no such Beyond except through a spontaneous ideal. The presupposition of Nature, as a system undergoing evolution, is therefore the causal activity of our Pure Ideals. These are our three organic and organizing conceptions called the True, the Beautiful, and the Good.|author=George Holmes Howison|title=The Limits of Evolution (1901)}}

However, [[Edward Feser]] argues, in line with the Aristotelian and [[Thomism|Thomistic]] tradition, that finality has been greatly misunderstood. Indeed, without finality, efficient causality becomes inexplicable. Finality thus understood is not purpose but that end towards which a thing is ordered.<ref>[[cf.]] {{cite book|last1=Feser|first1=Edward|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J2qhHE-6Mn4C|title=Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide|publisher=Oneworld Publications|year=2009|isbn=978-1780740065|edition=Reprint|series=Beginner's Guides|location=Oxford|publication-date=2011|quote=[...] three principles are central to Aquinas's general metaphysics [...] the principle of finality is in a sense the most fundamental of them, given that the final cause is 'the cause of causes': for, again in Aquinas's' view an efficient cause can bring an effect in to being only if it is 'directed towards' that effect; and it is ultimately in that sense that the effect is 'contained in' the efficient cause.|access-date=2018-03-12}}</ref>
When a match is rubbed against the side of a matchbox, the effect is not the appearance of an elephant or the sounding of a drum, but fire.<ref>
[[cf.]] {{cite book|last1=Feser|first1=Edward|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=J2qhHE-6Mn4C|title=Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide|publisher=Oneworld Publications|year=2009|isbn=978-1780740065|edition=Reprint|series=Beginner's Guides|location=Oxford|publication-date=2011|quote=A match, for example, reliably generates flame and heat when struck, and never (say) frost and cold, or the smell of lilacs, or thunder.|access-date=2018-03-12}}</ref>
The effect is not arbitrary because the match is ordered towards the end of fire<ref>Compare:The match is 'directed towards' the production of fire and heat [...]</ref> which is realized through efficient causes.

In their [[biosemiotic]] study, [[Stuart Kauffman]], [[Robert K. Logan]] ''et al.'' (2007) remark:<ref name="Kauffman Logan 2007"/><!--<ref>Aristotle, ''Physics'' 194 b17–20; see also: {{nowrap|''Posterior Analytics'' 71 b9–11; 94 a20.}}</ref>-->
{{quote|Our language is teleological. We believe that autonomous agents constitute the minimal physical system to which teleological language rightly applies.|author=|title=|source=[[Biology and Philosophy]]<ref name="Kauffman Logan 2007">{{Cite journal |last1=Kauffman |first1=Stuart |last2=Logan |first2=Robert K. |last3=Este |first3=Robert |last4=Goebel |first4=Randy |last5=Hobill |first5=David |last6=Shmulevich |first6=Ilya |date=2007-11-19 |title=Propagating organization: an enquiry |url=http://mechanism.ucsd.edu/teaching/philbio/readings/kauffman.propagatingorganization.pdf |journal=Biology & Philosophy |language=en |volume=23 |issue=1 |pages=27–45 |doi=10.1007/s10539-007-9066-x |s2cid=10929570 |issn=0169-3867}}</ref>}}

==Scholasticism==
In the [[Scholasticism]], the 
efficient causality<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V2PeDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA228|page=228|title=General Metaphysics|author=[[John Patrick Noonan]]|publisher=[[Wipf and Stock Publishers]]|year=2020|isbn=978-1725272644}}</ref> was governed by two principles:
* ''omne agens agit simile sibi''<ref>{{cite journal | jstor=45077278 | title=Il Principio « Omne Agens Agit Simile Sibi » e l'Analogia dei Nomi Divini Nel Pensiero di S. Tommaso d'Aquino | last1=Mondin | first1=P. Battista | journal=Divus Thomas | year=1960 | volume=63 | pages=336–348 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dXpbnTQjkz8C|title=Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile : A "repetition" of Scholastic Metaphysics|author=[[Philipp W. Rosemann]]|publisher=Leuven University Press|year=1996|isbn=978-9061867777|series=Philosophical Studies of Louvain|number=12}} ([https://muse.jhu.edu/article/228897 review]</ref><ref> B. Mondin, ''Ontologia e metafisica'', ESD, 2022, p. 128</ref> (every agent produces something similar to itself): stated frequently in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, the principle establishes a relationship of similarity and [[analogy]] between cause and effect;
* ''nemo dat quod non habet'' (no one gives what he does not possess):<ref name="Mondin, p.160"> B. Mondin, ''Ontologia e metafisica'', ESD, 2022, p. 160</ref><ref>[[s:en:Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/169]]</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/scholastic-terms-and-axioms|title=Scholastic terms and axioms}}</ref> partially similar to the [[Nemo dat quod non habet|legal principle of the same name]], in Metaphysics it establishes that the cause cannot bestow on the effect the quantity of being (and thus of unity, truth, goodness, reality and perfection) that it does not already possess within itself. Otherwise, there would be creation out of nothingness of self and other-from-self<ref>Note that this pattern also holds true in the creation described in the [[Book of Genesis]]. In fact, God the Creator possesses all Being, is the Being Himself and therefore his degree of reality (unity, truth, goodness and perfection) is greater than that of any other creature</ref> In other words, the cause must possess a degree of reality greater than or equal to that of the effect. If it is greater, we speak of equivocal causation, in analogy to the three types of [[predication (logics)|logical predication]] (univocal, equivocal, analogical); if it is equal, we speak of univocal predication.

Thomas in this regard distinguished between ''causa fiendi'' (cause of occurring, of only beginning to be) and ''causa essendi'' (cause of being and also of beginning to be)<ref name="Mondin, p.160" /><ref>The builder (''causa fiendi'') and the materials of a house (''causa essendi'') are examples. The house continues to exist even when the builder has ceased his work, which is why the latter is the necessary and sufficient cause of its beginning to be; but without the order and quality of the building materials, the house collapses, which is why these are necessary not only for its beginning to be, but also for its permanence in being (''causa essendi'').</ref> When the being of the agent cause is in the effect in a lesser or equal degree, this is a ''causa fiendi''.<ref>For example, parents who procreate a human or animal being with a degree of being equal to their own, i.e. a creature with the same rights and duties and ontological status (and a soul if it is a human creature). They are ''causa fiendi'' of the creature's mere beginning of life, which, in fact, once it has given birth and after a certain period of training for life, is capable of living even without its parents</ref>
Furthermore, the second principle also establishes a qualitative link: the cause can only transmit its own essence to the effect. For example, a dog cannot transmit the essence of a feline to its young, but only that of a dog.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/tmots022.htm|title=The Metaphysics of the School / by Thomas Harper, S.J. }}</ref> The principle is equivalent to that of ''Causa aequat effectum'' (cause equals effect)<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-0NgRF-y0IIC&pg=PA97|page=97|title=Some Problems of Philosophy|author=[[William James]]|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|date=1979|series=Donald F. Koch American Philosophy Collection|isbn=978-0674820357|others=Curators: [[Frederick Burkhardt]], [[Fredson Bowers]], [[Ignas K. Skrupskelis]]}}</ref> in both a quantitative and qualitative sense.

==Modern science==
{{See also|Teleology#Teleology and science}}

In his ''[[Advancement of Learning]]'' (1605), [[Francis Bacon]] wrote that [[natural science]] "doth make inquiry, and take consideration of the same natures : but how? Only as to the material and efficient causes of them, and not as to the forms." Using the terminology of Aristotle, Bacon demands that, apart from the "[[Physical law|laws of nature]]" themselves, the causes relevant to natural [[science]] are only [[efficient cause]]s and [[material cause]]s, or, to use the formulation which became famous later, natural phenomena require scientific explanation in terms of matter and motion.  

In ''[[The New Organon]]'', Bacon divides knowledge into [[physics]] and [[metaphysics]]:<ref>Bacon, Francis. 1620. ''[[The New Organon]]'' II, Aphorism 9.</ref> <blockquote>From the two kinds of axioms which have been spoken of arises a just division of philosophy and the sciences, taking the received terms (which come nearest to express the thing) in a sense agreeable to my own views. Thus, let the investigation of forms, which are (in the eye of reason at least, and in their essential law) eternal and immutable, constitute [[Metaphysics]]; and let the investigation of the efficient cause, and of matter, and of the latent process, and the latent configuration (all of which have reference to the common and ordinary course of nature, not to her eternal and fundamental laws) constitute [[Physics]]. And to these let there be subordinate two practical divisions: to Physics, Mechanics; to Metaphysics, what (in a purer sense of the word) I call Magic, on account of the broadness of the ways it moves in, and its greater command over nature.</blockquote>

===Biology===
Explanations in terms of final causes remain common [[Teleology in biology|in evolutionary biology]].<ref name="Lennox 1993"/><ref name="Ayala 1998">[[Francisco J. Ayala|Ayala, Francisco]]. 1998. "Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology." ''Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology''. [[MIT Press]].</ref> [[Francisco J. Ayala]] has claimed that [[teleology]] is indispensable to [[biology]] since the concept of [[adaptation]] is inherently teleological.<ref name="Ayala 1998" /> In an appreciation of [[Charles Darwin]] published in ''[[Nature (journal)|Nature]]'' in 1874, [[Asa Gray]] noted "Darwin's great service to Natural Science" lies in bringing back teleology "so that, instead of [[Morphology (biology)|Morphology]] ''versus'' Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to Teleology." Darwin quickly responded, "What you say about Teleology pleases me especially and I do not think anyone else has ever noticed the point."<ref name="Lennox 1993"/> [[Francis Darwin]] and [[T. H. Huxley]] reiterate this sentiment. The latter wrote that "the most remarkable service to the philosophy of Biology rendered by Mr. Darwin is the reconciliation of Teleology and Morphology, and the explanation of the facts of both, which his view offers."<ref name="Lennox 1993"/> [[James G. Lennox]] states that Darwin uses the term 'Final Cause' consistently in his ''Species Notebook'', ''[[On the Origin of Species]]'', and after.<ref name="Lennox 1993"/>

Contrary to [[Francisco J. Ayala|Ayala]]'s position, [[Ernst Mayr]] states that "adaptedness... is ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' result rather than an [[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]] goal-seeking."<ref>[[Ernst Mayr|Mayr, Ernst W.]] 1992. "The idea of teleology." ''[[Journal of the History of Ideas]]'' 53:117–135.</ref> Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, S. H. P. Madrell writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection."<ref>Madrell, S. H. P. 1998. "Why are there no insects in the open sea?" ''[[The Journal of Experimental Biology]]'' 201:2461–2464.</ref> However, Lennox states that in evolution as conceived by Darwin, it is true both that evolution is the result of mutations arising by chance and that evolution is teleological in nature.<ref name="Lennox 1993" />

Statements that a species does something "in order to" achieve survival are teleological. The validity or invalidity of such statements depends on the species and the intention of the writer as to the meaning of the phrase "in order to." Sometimes it is possible or useful to rewrite such sentences so as to avoid teleology.<ref name=Reiss>{{cite book |last=Reiss |first=John O. |date=2009 |title=Not by Design: Retiring Darwin's Watchmaker |publisher=University of California Press }}</ref> Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention.

=== Animal behaviour (Tinbergen's four questions) ===
{{main|Tinbergen's four questions}}

[[Tinbergen's four questions]], named after the [[ethologist]] [[Nikolaas Tinbergen]] and based on Aristotle's four causes, are complementary categories of explanations for [[animal behaviour]]. They are also commonly referred to as [[Level of analysis|levels of analysis]].

The four questions are on:<ref>{{Cite journal|last=MacDougall-Shackleton|first=Scott A.|date=2011-07-27|title=The levels of analysis revisited|journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences|volume=366|issue=1574|pages=2076–2085|doi=10.1098/rstb.2010.0363|pmc=3130367|pmid=21690126}}</ref><ref name="h&h">Hladký, Vojtěch, and Jan Havlíček. 2013. "[http://ishe.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/HEB_2013_28_4_3-11.pdf Was Tinbergen an Aristotelian? Comparison of Tinbergen's Four Whys and Aristotle's Four Causes]." ''Human Ethology Bulletin'' 28(4):3–11.</ref>

# [[function (biology)|function]], what an [[adaptation]] does that is [[natural selection|selected for]] in [[evolution]];
# [[phylogeny]], the evolutionary history of an [[organism]], revealing its relationships to other species;
# [[mechanism (biology)|mechanism]], namely the proximate cause of a behaviour, such as the role of [[testosterone]] in [[aggression]]; and
# [[ontogeny]], the [[developmental biology|development]] of an organism from egg to embryo to adult.

== Technology (Heidegger's four causes) ==

In ''[[The Question Concerning Technology]]'', echoing Aristotle, [[Martin Heidegger]] describes the four causes as follows:{{sfn|Heidegger|1977|pp=289-290}}

# ''causa materialis'': the material or matter
# ''causa formalis'': the form or shape the material or matter enters
# ''causa finalis'': the end
# ''causa efficiens'': the effect that brings about the finished result.

Heidegger explains that "[w]hoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought forth, according to the terms of the four modes of occasioning."{{sfn|Heidegger|1977|p=295}}

The [[Education|educationist]] David Waddington comments that although the efficient cause, which he identifies as "the craftsman," might be thought the most significant of the four, in his view each of Heidegger's four causes is "equally co-responsible" for producing a craft item, in Heidegger's terms "bringing forth" the thing into existence. Waddington cites Lovitt's description of this bringing forth as "a unified process."<ref name="Waddington2005">{{cite journal |author=Waddington, David |title=A Field Guide to Heidegger Understanding {{!}} ''The Question Concerning Technology'' |journal=Educational Philosophy and Theory |date=2005 |volume=37 |issue=4 |page=568 |url=https://www.academia.edu/540032|doi=10.1111/j.1469-5812.2005.00141.x |s2cid=143892202 }}</ref><ref name="Lovitt1972">{{cite journal |journal=Man and World |last=Lovitt |first=W. |date=1973 |title=A Gespräch with Heidegger on Technology, Man and World |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=44–62 |doi=10.1007/BF01252782|s2cid=145770576 }}</ref>

==See also==
{{col div|colwidth=30em}}
* [[First cause]]
* [[Anthropic principle]]
* [[Biosemiotics]]
* [[Tinbergen's four questions]]
* [[Convergent evolution]]
* [[Five whys]]
* [[Four discourses]], by [[Jacques Lacan]] 
* [[Proximate and ultimate causation]]
* [[Socrates]]
* [[Teleology]]
* [[The purpose of a system is what it does]]
{{colend}}

==Notes==
{{reflist|30em}}

==References==
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
* Cohen, Marc S. [http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/4causes.htm "The Four Causes"] (Lecture Notes) Accessed March 14, 2006.
* Falcon, Andrea. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/#FouCau Aristotle on Causality] (link to section labeled "Four Causes"). ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' 2008.
* {{cite book |author-link=Martin Heidegger |last=Heidegger |first=Martin |editor=Krell, D. F. |title=Die Frage nach der Technik |trans-title=The Question Concerning Technology |work=Basic Writings |publisher=Harper & Row |year=1977 |orig-year=1949 }} 
* Hennig, Boris. "The Four Causes." Journal of Philosophy 106(3), 2009, 137–160.
* {{cite book |author-link=Armand Marie Leroi |last=Leroi |first=Armand Marie |title=The Lagoon: How Aristotle Invented Science |title-link=Aristotle's Lagoon |publisher=Bloomsbury |date=2015 |isbn=978-1408836224 }}
* Moravcsik, J.M. "Aitia as generative factor in Aristotle's philosophy." Dialogue, 14 : pp 622–638, 1975.
* {{cite journal |author=Reece, Bryan C. |title=Aristotle's Four Causes of Action |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume= 97|issue= 2|pages= 213–227|doi=10.1080/00048402.2018.1482932|year=2019 |s2cid=172010122 }}
* English translation of [http://www.humanistmovement.org/downloads/Pia_fugera_study_Estudio_sobre_Fidias-PF-eng-final.pdf Study on Phideas] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304185504/http://www.humanistmovement.org/downloads/Pia_fugera_study_Estudio_sobre_Fidias-PF-eng-final.pdf |date=2016-03-04 }}, by Pía Figueroa written with theme of Final Cause as per Aristotle.
{{div col end}}

==External links==
* [https://books.google.com/books?id=60rgkVJXgfkC&pg=PT48 The Consequences of Ideas: Understanding the Concepts that Shaped Our World, By R. C. Sproul]
* [https://books.google.com/books?id=76mfL03rjdUC&pg=PT91 Aristotle on definition. By Marguerite Deslauriers, p. 81]
* [https://books.google.com/books?id=L0w6kvdKJ8QC&dq=%22four+causes%22&pg=PA201 Philosophy in the ancient world: an introduction. By James A. Arieti. p. 201.]
* [https://books.google.com/books?id=IXMsL2XG-3cC&pg=PA157 Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. By Joseph Owens and Etienne Gilson.]
* [http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S001221730002655X Aitia as generative factor in Aristotle's philosophy]
* [https://openlibrary.org/works/OL11825279W/A_compass_for_the_imagination A Compass for the Imagination, by Harold C. Morris. Philosophy thesis elaborates on Aristotle's Theory of the Four Causes. Washington State University, 1981.]

{{Aristotelianism}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Four Causes}}
[[Category:Philosophy of Aristotle]]
[[Category:Causality]]
[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]]