View source for Economic sanctions

{{Short description|Financial penalties applied by nations}}
{{redirect|Embargo|other uses|Embargo (disambiguation)}}
{{trade bloc}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=July 2025}}

'''Economic sanctions''' or '''embargoes''' are commercial and financial penalties applied by states or institutions against states, groups, or individuals.<ref name=":1">{{Cite news |last=Drezner |first=Daniel W. |date=2021 |title=The United States of Sanctions |language=en-US |work=Foreign Affairs |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/united-states-sanctions |issn=0015-7120}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Citation |last1=Biersteker |first1=Thomas J. |title=The effectiveness of United Nations targeted sanctions |date=2016 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/targeted-sanctions/effectiveness-of-united-nations-targeted-sanctions/553973997BF1A56B75D00FD4893ECD58 |work=Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action |pages=220–247 |editor-last=Tourinho |editor-first=Marcos |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-13421-8 |last2=Tourinho |first2=Marcos |last3=Eckert |first3=Sue E. |editor2-last=Eckert |editor2-first=Sue E. |editor3-last=Biersteker |editor3-first=Thomas J.}}</ref> Economic sanctions are a form of [[Coercion (international relations)|coercion]] that attempts to get an actor to change its behavior through disruption in economic exchange. Sanctions can be intended to compel (an attempt to change an actor's behavior) or deter (an attempt to stop an actor from certain actions).<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Drezner |first=Daniel W. |date=2003 |title=The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3594840 |journal=International Organization |volume=57 |issue=3 |pages=643–659 |doi=10.1017/S0020818303573052 |jstor=3594840 |s2cid=154827129 |issn=0020-8183|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite journal |last=Pape |first=Robert A. |date=1997 |title=Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539368 |journal=International Security |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=90–136 |doi=10.2307/2539368 |jstor=2539368 |issn=0162-2889|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name="scholar.harvard.edu">Haidar, J.I., 2017."[https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/haidar/files/haidar-sanctionsandexportdeflection-finaldraft.pdf Sanctions and Exports Deflection: Evidence from Iran]," Economic Policy (Oxford University Press), April 2017, Vol. 32(90), pp. 319–355.</ref>

Sanctions can target an entire country or they can be more narrowly targeted at individuals or groups; this latter form of sanctions are sometimes called "smart sanctions".<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last=Drezner |first=Daniel W. |date=2011 |title=Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23016144 |journal=International Studies Review |volume=13 |issue=1 |pages=96–108 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x |jstor=23016144 |issn=1521-9488|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Prominent forms of economic sanctions include [[Trade barrier|trade barriers]], [[Asset freezing|asset freezes]], [[Travel ban|travel bans]], [[Arms embargo|arms embargoes]], and restrictions on financial transactions.

The efficacy of sanctions in achieving intended goals is a subject of debate.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |last=Drezner |first=Daniel W. |date=2024 |title=Global Economic Sanctions |url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-032240 |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |language=en |volume=27 |issue=1 |pages=9–24 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-032240 |issn=1094-2939|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Scholars have also considered the policy externalities of sanctions.<ref name=":12" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Farrell |first1=Henry |last2=Newman |first2=Abraham L. |date=2019 |title=Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion |journal=International Security |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=42–79 |doi=10.1162/isec_a_00351 |issn=0162-2889 |s2cid=198952367 |doi-access=free}}</ref> The humanitarian consequences of country-wide sanctions have been a subject of controversy.<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |last=Drezner |first=Daniel W. |date=2022 |title=How not to sanction |url=https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/5/1533/6686647 |journal=International Affairs |language=en |volume=98 |issue=5 |pages=1533–1552 |doi=10.1093/ia/iiac065 |issn=0020-5850 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221209133546/https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/files/documents/How%20not%20to%20sanction%20Daniel%20Drezner.pdf |archive-date=9 December 2022|url-access=subscription }}</ref> As a consequence, since the mid-1990s, [[United Nations Security Council]] (UNSC) sanctions have tended to target individuals and entities, in contrast to the country-wide sanctions of earlier decades.<ref name="Giumelli 2015" />

== History of sanctions ==
One of the most comprehensive attempts at an embargo occurred during the [[Napoleonic Wars]] of 1803–1815. Aiming to cripple the United Kingdom economically, Emperor [[Napoleon I of France]] in 1806 promulgated the [[Continental System]] – which forbade European nations from trading with the UK. In practice the French Empire could not completely enforce the embargo, which proved as harmful (if not more so) to the continental nations involved as to the British.<ref>{{cite web |title=Continental System Napoleon British Embargo Napoleon's 1812 |url=http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Continental:policy.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110710165750/http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Continental%3Apolicy.htm |archive-date=10 July 2011}}</ref> By the time of the [[Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907]], diplomats and legal scholars regularly discussed using coordinated economic pressure to enforce international law. This idea was also included in reform proposals by Latin American and Chinese international lawyers in the years leading up to [[World War I]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Mitchell|first=Ryan Martinez|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=c6KIEAAAQBAJ|title=Recentering the World: China and Transformation of International Law|date=2022|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-49896-8|language=en}}</ref>

=== World War I and the Interwar period ===
Sanctions in the form of blockades were prominent during [[World War I]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Mulder|first=Nicholas|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kMhQEAAAQBAJ|title=The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War|date=2022|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn=978-0-300-26252-0|language=en}}</ref> Debates about implementing sanctions through international organizations, such as the [[League of Nations]], became prominent after the end of World War I.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Potter|first=Pitman B.|date=1922|title=Sanctions and Guaranties in International Organization|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S000305540001950X/type/journal_article|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=16|issue=2|pages=297–303|doi=10.2307/1943965|issn=0003-0554|jstor=1943965|s2cid=143600305 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> Leaders saw sanctions as a viable alternative to war.<ref name=":11">{{Cite journal |last1=Morgan |first1=T. Clifton |last2=Syropoulos |first2=Constantinos |last3=Yotov |first3=Yoto V. |date=2023 |title=Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges |journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives |language=en |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=3–29 |doi=10.1257/jep.37.1.3 |s2cid=256661026 |issn=0895-3309|doi-access=free }}</ref>

The League Covenant permitted the use of sanctions in five cases:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Buell |first=Raymond Leslie |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PcBAAAAAIAAJ |title=International Relations |date=1925 |publisher=H. Holt |pages=564–565 |language=en}}</ref>

# When Article 10 of the League Covenant is violated
# In case of war or threat of war (Article 11)
# When a League member does not pay an [[arbitration award]] (Article 12)
# When a League member goes to war without submitting the dispute to the League Council or League Assembly (Articles 12–15)
# When a non-member goes to war against a League member (Article 17)

The [[Abyssinia Crisis]] in 1935 resulted in League sanctions against Mussolini's Italy under Article 16 of the Covenant. Oil supplies, however, were not stopped, nor the [[Suez Canal]] closed to Italy, and the conquest proceeded. The sanctions were lifted in 1936 and Italy left the League in 1937.<ref>Richard Pankhurst, "The Italo-Ethiopian War and League of Nations Sanctions, 1935–1936." ''Genève-Afrique/Geneva-Africa 13.2'' (1974): 5+.</ref><ref>George W. Baer, ''Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations'' (Hoover Institution Press, 1976).</ref><ref>Gaines Post, Jr, "The Machinery of British Policy in the Ethiopian Crisis." ''International History Review'' 1#4 (1979): 522–541.</ref><ref>G. Bruce Strang,  "'The Worst of all Worlds:' Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–1936." ''Diplomacy and Statecraft'' 19.2 (2008): 210–235.</ref>

In the lead-up to the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] in 1941, the United States imposed severe trade restrictions on Japan to discourage further Japanese conquests in East Asia.<ref name=":11" />

=== From World War II onwards ===
After [[World War II]], the League was replaced by the more expansive [[United Nations]] (UN) in 1945. Throughout the Cold War, the use of sanctions increased gradually.<ref name=":11" /> After the end of the [[Cold War]], there was a major increase in economic sanctions.<ref name=":10" />

According to the Global Sanctions Data Base, there have been 1,325 sanctions in the period 1950–2022.<ref name=":11" />

== Politics of sanctions ==
Economic sanctions are used as a tool of [[foreign policy]] by many governments. Economic sanctions are usually imposed by a larger country upon a smaller country for one of two reasons: either the latter is a perceived threat to the security of the former nation or that country treats its citizens unfairly. They can be used as a coercive measure for achieving particular policy goals related to trade or for humanitarian violations. Economic sanctions are used as an alternative weapon instead of going to war to achieve desired outcomes.

The Global Sanctions Data Base categorizes nine objectives of sanctions: "changing policy, destabilizing regimes, resolving territorial conflicts, fighting terrorism, preventing war, ending war, restoring and promoting human rights, restoring and promoting democracy, and other objectives."<ref name=":11" />

=== Unilateral coercive measures ===
In contrast to [[International sanctions]], unilateral coercive measures are defined by the United Nations as "economic measures taken by one State to compel a change in the policy of another State" including "trade sanctions in the form of embargoes and the interruption of financial and investment flows between sender and target countries" and "so-called 'smart' or 'targeted' sanctions such as asset freezing and travel bans."<ref>{{Cite web |title=OHCHR and unilateral coercive measures |url=https://www.ohchr.org/en/unilateral-coercive-measures |access-date=2025-12-18 |website=OHCHR |language=en}}</ref> Unilateral coercive measures have faced increasing criticism from the United Nations, with 4 December 2025 being marked as the first International Day Against Unilateral Coercive Measures.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Nations |first=United |title=International Day against Unilateral Coercive Measures |url=https://www.un.org/en/observances/day-against-unilateral-coercive-measures |access-date=2025-12-18 |website=United Nations |language=en}}</ref> Unilateral coercive measures often lead to over-compliance, with economic actors preferring not to trade with sanctioned countries even in ways that are not explicitly penalized by the sanctions. Unilateral coercive measures are typically imposed "under the pretext of criminal responsibility" but without due process, and frequently violate various aspects of international law, such as the immunity of state property, the immunity of state officials and diplomats, and the sovereign equality of states.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Douhan |first=Alena |date=2023-06-20 |title=Unilateral Coercive Measures: Effects and Legality Issues {{!}} Yale Journal of International Law |url=https://yjil.yale.edu/posts/2023-06-20-unilateral-coercive-measures-effects-and-legality-issues |access-date=2025-12-19 |website=yjil.yale.edu |language=en}}</ref> 

===Effectiveness of economic sanctions===
Morgan, Syropoulos, and Yotov analyze how economic sanctions have evolved from broad trade embargoes to targeted financial and individual restrictions. They find sanctions increasingly frequent but inconsistently effective. Economic costs fall heavily on civilians, trade patterns shift toward neutral countries, and enforcement complexity rises. The authors conclude sanctions remain politically appealing yet economically blunt instruments whose success depends on coordination, credible goals, and minimizing humanitarian fallout.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Morgan |first1=T. Clifton |last2=Syropoulos |first2=Constantinos |last3=Yotov |first3=Yoto V. |date=2023-02-01 |title=Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges |url=https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/jep.37.1.3 |journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives |language=en |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=3–29 |doi=10.1257/jep.37.1.3 |issn=0895-3309}}</ref>

Attia finds that sanctions serve more as symbolic or political devices than as costly coercive instruments.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Attia |first=Hana |date=2024 |title=Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/roie.12704 |journal=Review of International Economics |language=en |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=109–131 |doi=10.1111/roie.12704 |issn=1467-9396}}</ref>

According to a study by Neuenkirch and Neumeier, UN economic sanctions had a [[Statistical significance|statistically significant]] impact on targeted states by reducing their GDP growth by an average of 2.3–3.5 percent per year – and more than 5 percent per year in the case of comprehensive UN embargoes – with the negative effects typically persisting for a period of ten years. By contrast, unilateral US sanctions had a considerably smaller impact on GDP growth, restricting it by 0.5–0.9 percent per year, with an average duration of seven years.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last1=Neuenkirch |first1=Matthias |last2=Neumeier |first2=Florian |date=1 December 2015 |title=The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth |journal=European Journal of Political Economy |volume=40 |pages=110–125 |doi=10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.09.001 |issn=0176-2680 |url=http://www.fiw.ac.at/fileadmin/Documents/Publikationen/Working_Paper/N_138_NeuenkirchNeumeier.pdf}}</ref>

Oryoie, A. R. demonstrates that economic sanctions result in welfare losses across all income groups in Iran, with wealthier groups suffering greater losses compared to poorer groups.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Oryoie |first=Ali Reza |date=6 June 2024 |title=The impact of international sanctions on income mobility: Evidence from Iran |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rode.13123 |journal=Review of Development Economics |language=en |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=1695–1717 |doi=10.1111/rode.13123 |issn=1363-6669|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Imposing sanctions on an opponent also affects the economy of the imposing country to a degree. If import restrictions are promulgated, consumers in the imposing country may have restricted choices of goods. If export restrictions are imposed or if sanctions prohibit companies in the imposing country from trading with the target country, the imposing country may lose markets and investment opportunities to competing countries.<ref>{{cite web |last= Griswold |first= Daniel |url= http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |title= Going Alone on Economic Sanctions Hurts U.S. More than Foes |publisher= Cato.org |date= 27 November 2000 |access-date= 30 March 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20110923164257/http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10888 |archive-date= 23 September 2011 |url-status= dead }}</ref>

Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (2008) argue that [[regime change]] is the most frequent foreign-policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for just over 39 percent of cases of their imposition.<ref>
{{cite book |last1 = Hufbauer |first1 = Gary Clyde |last2 = Schott |first2 = Jeffrey J. |last3 = Elliott |first3 = Kimberly Ann |last4 = Oegg |first4 = Barbara |title = Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=crSxDQAAQBAJ |edition = 3 |location = Washington, DC |publisher = Columbia University Press |date = 2008 |page = 67 |isbn = 9780881324822 |access-date = 10 May 2018 |quote = By far, regime change is the most frequent foreign policy objective of economic sanctions, accounting for 80 out of the 204 observations.}}</ref> Hufbauer et al. found that 34 percent of the cases studied were successful.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hufbauer |first1=Gary Clyde |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g-uzlJDD7DwC |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |last2=Schott |first2=Jeffrey J. |last3=Elliott |first3=Kimberly Ann |last4=Oegg |first4=Barbara |publisher=Peterson Institute |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-88132-536-2 |pages=158 |language=en}}</ref> However, when [[Robert A.&nbsp;Pape]] examined their study, he found that only 5 of their reported 40 successes were actually effective,<ref>
{{cite journal |last1 = Pape |first1 = Robert A. |title = Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work |jstor = 2539263 |journal = International Security |date =Summer 1998 |volume = 23 |issue = 1 |pages = 66–77 |doi = 10.1162/isec.23.1.66 |s2cid = 57565095 |quote = I examined the 40 claimed successes and found that only 5 stand up. Eighteen were actually settled by either direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target state made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions, and 3 are indeterminate. If I am right, then sanctions have succeeded in only 5 of 115 attempts, and thus there is no sound basis for even qualified optimism about the effects of sanctions.}}</ref> reducing the success rate to 4 percent. In either case, the difficulty and unexpected nuances of measuring the actual success of sanctions in relation to their goals are both increasingly apparent and still under debate. In other words, it is difficult to determine ''why'' a regime or country changes (i.e., whether it was the sanction or inherent instability) and doubly so to measure the full political effect of a given action.<ref>''A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions: International Relations, Law, and Development'', Golnoosh Hakimdavar, p.&nbsp;105.</ref>

Offering an explanation as to why sanctions are still imposed even when they may be marginally effective, British diplomat [[Jeremy Greenstock]] suggests sanctions are popular not because they are known to be effective, but because "there is nothing else [to do] between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government".<ref name="greenstock">{{cite news |last=Marcus |first=Jonathan |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10742109 |title=Analysis: Do economic sanctions work? |work=BBC News |date=26 July 2010 |access-date=30 March 2015}}</ref> Critics of sanctions like Belgian jurist [[Marc Bossuyt]] argue that in nondemocratic regimes, the extent to which this affects political outcomes is contested, because by definition such regimes do not respond as strongly to the popular will.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Capdevila |first1=Gustavo |title=United Nations: US Riled by Economic Sanctions Report |url=https://www.iatp.org/news/united-nations-us-riled-by-economic-sanctions-report |publisher=Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy |access-date=20 June 2020 |date=18 August 2000}}</ref>

A strong connection has been found between the effectiveness of sanctions and the size of veto players in a government. Veto players represent individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo, for example, parties in a coalition, or the legislature's check on presidential powers. When sanctions are imposed on a country, it can try to mitigate them by adjusting its economic policy. The size of the veto players determines how many constraints the government will face when trying to change status quo policies, and the larger the size of the veto players, the more difficult it is to find support for new policies, thus making the sanctions more effective.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Peksen |first1=Dursun |last2=Jeong |first2=Jin Mun |date=30 August 2017 |title=Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=63 |pages=194–217 |doi=10.1177/0022002717728105 |s2cid=158050636 |via=Sage Journals}}</ref>

Francesco Giumelli writes that the "set of sanctions&nbsp;... that many observers would be likely to consider the most persuasive (and effective)", namely, UN sanctions against "[[central bank]] assets and [[sovereign wealth fund]]s", are "of all the types of measures applied&nbsp;... the one least frequently used".<ref name="Giumelli 2015"/> Giumelli also distinguishes between sanctions against international terrorists, in which "the nature of the request is not as important as the constraining aspect", and sanctions imposed in connection with "post-conflict scenarios", which should "include flexible demands and the potential for adaptation if the situation changes".<ref name="Giumelli 2015"/>

Economic sanctions can be used for achieving domestic and international purposes.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Whang |first1=Taehee |date=1 September 2011 |title=Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States |url=https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/55/3/787/1834344  |journal=International Studies Quarterly |publisher=Ingentaconnect.com |volume=55 |issue=3 |pages=787–801 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00668.x |access-date=30 March 2015|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Foreign [[aid]] suspensions are typically considered as a type of economic sanctions. Previously mentioned work by Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot, and Oegg is a prominent example.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hufbauer |last2=Schott |last3=Elliott |last4=Oegg |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered  |date=2007 |publisher=Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) |isbn=978-0-88132-408-2 |edition=3rd |location=Washington, DC}}</ref> [[Claas Mertens]] finds that "suspending aid is more effective than adopting economic sanctions because (1) aid suspensions are economically beneficial for the adopting state, while sanctions are costly, (2) aid suspensions directly affect the targeted government's budget, (3) market forces undermine sanctions but not aid suspensions, and (4) aid suspensions are less likely to spark adverse behavioral reactions. [...] The findings suggest that economic sanctions are less effective than previously thought and that large donor states have a higher chance of achieving political goals through economic coercion."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mertens |first=Claas |date=28 March 2024 |title=Carrots as Sticks: How Effective Are Foreign Aid Suspensions and Economic Sanctions? |journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=68 |issue=2|article-number=sqae016 |doi=10.1093/isq/sqae016 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

===Criticism===
Sanctions have been criticized on humanitarian grounds, as they negatively impact a nation's economy and can also cause collateral damage on ordinary citizens. Peksen implies that sanctions can degenerate human rights in the target country.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Peksen |first=Dursen |date=2009 |title="Better or Worse?": The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights |journal=Journal of Peace Research |volume=46 |pages=59–77 |doi=10.1177/0022343308098404 |s2cid=110505923}}</ref> Some [[Policy analysis|policy analysts]] believe that imposing trade restrictions only serves to hurt ordinary people as opposed to government elites,<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Habibzadeh |first1=Farrokh |title=Economic sanction: a weapon of mass destruction |journal=The Lancet |date=September 2018 |volume=392 |issue=10150 |pages=816–817 |doi=10.1016/S0140-6736(18)31944-5 |pmid=30139528 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal | url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MUESOM | title=Sanctions of Mass Destruction| journal=Foreign Affairs| year=1999| volume=78| issue=3| pages=43–53| last1=Mueller| first1=John| last2=Mueller| first2=Karl| doi=10.2307/20049279| jstor=20049279| url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://the-libertarian.co.uk/video-economic-sanctions-dont-work/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227102536/http://the-libertarian.co.uk/video-economic-sanctions-dont-work/ |archive-date=27 February 2014 |title=Video: Why Economic Sanctions Don't Work |author=Emile Yusupoff |website=The Libertarian |year=2013}}</ref><ref>[[Hans Köchler]] (ed.), [https://books.google.com/books?id=7lJbn-Lh1vIC Economic Sanctions and Development]. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1997. {{ISBN|3-900704-17-1}}.</ref> and others have likened the practice to [[siege]] warfare.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gordon |first1=Joy |title=Sanctions as siege warfare |journal=The Nation |date=4 April 1999 |volume=268 |issue=11 |pages=18–22 |issn=0027-8378 |url=https://www.thenation.com/article/sanctions-siege-warfare/ |access-date=16 October 2019 |archive-date=25 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191225145737/https://www.thenation.com/article/sanctions-siege-warfare/ |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Vengeyi |first1=Obvious |title=Sanctions against Zimbabwe: A Comparison with Ancient Near Eastern Sieges |journal=Journal of Gleanings from Academic Outliers |date=2015 |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=69–87 |url=https://www.academia.edu/28310267}}</ref> The [[United Nations Security Council]] (UNSC) has generally refrained from imposing comprehensive sanctions since the mid-1990s, in part due to the controversy over the efficacy and civilian harms attributed to the [[sanctions against Iraq]].<ref name="Giumelli 2015"/>; sanctions can have unintended consequences.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Yong Suk |year=2018 |title=International isolation and regional inequality: Evidence from sanctions on North Korea |url=https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v103y2018icp34-51.html |journal=Journal of Urban Economics |volume=103 |issue=C |pages=34–51 |doi=10.1016/j.jue.2017.11.002 |s2cid=158561662|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

=== Smart Sanctions ===
One of the most popular suggestions to combat the humanitarian issues that arise from sanctions is the concept of "smart sanctions", and a lot of research has been done on this concept also known as targeted sanctions.<ref name=":13">Gordon, Joy. "Smart Sanctions Revisited." ''Ethics & International Affairs'', vol. 25, no. 3, 2011, pp. 315–335., {{doi|10.1017/S0892679411000323}}</ref> The term "smart sanctions" refers to measures like asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes that aim to target responsible parties like political leaders and elites with the goal of avoiding causing widespread collateral damage to innocent civilians and neighboring nations.<ref name=":13"/>

Though there has been enthusiasm about the concept, as of 2016, the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) found that targeted sanctions only result in policy goals being met 22 percent of the time.<ref>Kanji, Laura. "Moving Targets: The Evolution and Future of Smart Sanctions." ''Harvard International Review'' 37.4 (2016): 39–42. ProQuest. Web. 30 November 2023</ref>

Smart Sanctions have also not been totally successful in avoiding civilian harm or unintended consequences.<ref name=":13" /> For example, arms embargoes can impact the self-defense efforts of those under attack, aviation bans can affect a nation's transportation sector and the jobs of civilians associated with them, and financial sanctions targeting individuals raise due process issues.<ref name=":13" /> One example of smart sanctions in practice can be seen with sanctions imposed by the United States on the Russian Federation following the latter's 2014 [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]], which were intended to exert pressure on Russia's financial sector.<ref name=":14">Ashford, Emma. “Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia.” ''Foreign Affairs'', vol. 95, no. 1, 2016, pp. 114–123.  {{JSTOR|43946631}}. Accessed 6 December 2023.</ref> The sanctions resulted in American credit card companies [[Visa Inc.|Visa]] and [[Mastercard]] suspending all transactions of sanctioned Russian banks, effectively canceling the credit cards of ordinary Russian consumers.<ref name=":14" /> In addition, the suspension of the [[SWIFT]] payment system in Russia, following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, led to the widespread adoption of its own domestic payment system and decreased reliance on Western banking. <ref>Keskin, G. (2025, October 13). ''Weaponised finance: sanctions, SWIFT and the future of global political risk''. Atlas Institute for International Affairs. <nowiki>https://atlasinstitute.org/weaponized-finance-sanctions-swift-and-the-future-of-global-political-risk/</nowiki></ref>

== Sanctions evasion and shadow fleets ==
''Main article: [[Shadow fleet]]''

Economic sanctions, largely on oil exporters, have led to the growth of so-called [[Dark fleet|''dark'']] and ''shadow fleets'' of tankers that move sanctioned crude and refined products outside regular monitoring and service networks. The terms are used for tankers that operate at the limits of, or outside, conventional monitoring and regulatory frameworks, typically in order to move sanctioned or high-risk oil cargoes. These fleets are most closely associated with Russian crude exports after 2022, but similar patterns have been documented in trades involving Iran, Venezuela and North Korea.<ref name=":15">{{Cite journal |last1=Rodriguez-Diaz |first1=Emilio |last2=Alcaide |first2=Juan Ignacio |last3=Endrina |first3=Nieves |date=2025-06-07 |title=Shadow Fleets: A Growing Challenge in Global Maritime Commerce |journal=Applied Sciences |language=en |volume=15 |issue=12 |pages=6424 |doi=10.3390/app15126424 |doi-access=free |issn=2076-3417}}</ref> Since 2025, Venezuelan shadow vessels have also drawn increased attention, due to the Trump administration's efforts to enforce economic sanctions.<ref>Mower, J. (2025, December 22). US in active pursuit of third vessel associated with Venezuela's shadow fleet. ''S&P Global Energy''. <nowiki>https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/122125-us-in-active-pursuit-of-third-vessel-associated-with-venezuelas-shadow-fleet</nowiki></ref>

In the sanctions literature, “dark fleet” is used for vessels that hide their identity or activities to evade regulations and monitoring. These tankers may change flag and name frequently, use complex ownership chains and front companies, falsify documentation, and sail with [[Automatic identification system|Automatic Identification System]] (AIS) transponders switched off for long periods. This type of opaque structure was first mapped in detail in a 2019 case where United States authorities seized a [[International sanctions against North Korea|North Korean vessel]] operating through layered ownership in several jurisdictions.<ref name=":15" />

Alongside these are “grey fleets”, which keep AIS switched on but often manipulate the data, for example by misreporting destinations or cargoes. Grey fleet operators exploit gaps and inconsistencies in national and international rules so they appear formally compliant while bypassing sanctions in practice. They have become central to moving Russian oil to non-sanctioning buyers such as China, India and Türkiye.<ref name=":15" />

Many recent studies use “Russian shadow fleet” as an umbrella term for both dark- and grey-fleet tankers that carry Russian oil while concealing their links to Russia, operating without insurance from [[International Group of P&I Clubs|International Group]] protection and indemnity clubs, and being owned through companies registered outside the European Union, the G7 and allied states.<ref>Bonsoom, J. (2025). Dark Waters Ahead. ''Department of Political Science, University of Lund'' <nowiki>https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9189765</nowiki></ref> This fleet is largely composed of older [[Aframax]] and [[Suezmax]] tankers purchased out of mainstream fleets and re-flagged to open registries or small coastal and island states, as Western firms have withdrawn from Russian trades.<ref name=":16">Hilgenstock, B., Ribakova E., Shapoval N. (2023). Bold measures are needed as Russia’s oil is slipping beyond G7 reach (Oil Price Cap monitoring brief, November 2023). ''KSE Institute.'' <nowiki>https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/OPC_November2023-1.pdf</nowiki> </ref><ref name=":17">Poussenkova, N. (2024). ''Survival of the Fleetest: Russian Oil Companies under Western Sanctions''. <nowiki>https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-99406-0</nowiki> </ref>

=== '''Economic logic and incentives''' ===
The emergence of a shadow fleet fits standard economic theories of sanctions and [[Black market|black markets]]. Classical work by [[Kenneth E. Boulding|Boulding]] and [[Gary Becker|Becker]] argued that price caps, quotas and embargoes on profitable goods tend to generate illicit markets when the expected net return from evasion exceeds the return available under the sanctioned regime.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Boulding |first=K. E. |date=February 1947 |title=A Note on the Theory of the Black Market |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-economics-and-political-science-revue-canadienne-de-economiques-et-science-politique/article/abs/note-on-the-theory-of-the-black-market/F64409A85166F8900EB650DD50E77459 |journal=Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Economiques et Science Politique |language=en |volume=13 |issue=1 |pages=115–118 |doi=10.2307/137604 |jstor=137604 |issn=0315-4890}}</ref><ref>Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: an economic approach. ''Journal of Political Economy'', ''76''(2), 169–217. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1086/259394</nowiki> </ref> In this framework, sanctions create a wedge between the world price and the effective price received by the exporter. If exporters can recover part of that wedge by paying higher logistics and risk costs, they have a clear incentive to do so.

Recent economic analyses apply this logic to the Russian oil sanctions. Hilgenstock et al.<ref name=":16" /> and Stockbruegger<ref name=":18">Stockbruegger, J. (2023). Reducing Russia’s oil revenues. ''The RUSI Journal'', ''168''(5), 34–42. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2276303</nowiki> </ref> describe how the post-2022 [[2022 Russian crude oil price cap sanctions|price-cap]] regime ties access to key maritime services such as shipping finance, insurance and brokerage to certified compliance with the cap. The intention was to keep Russian barrels on the market, while forcing Russia to sell at a discount and absorb higher transaction costs. In practice, this architecture created strong substitution incentives. As coalition firms tightened due diligence or withdrew from Russian cargoes, Russia and associated traders shifted to non-coalition channels: older hulls held via opaque ownership, wider use of flags of convenience, non-International Group insurance or unclear financial guarantees, more ship-to-ship transfers and intermittent AIS darkness or identity manipulation.<ref name=":16" /><ref name=":17" />

Two margins matter. First, the price margin. Monitoring by think-tanks and central banks reports that by late 2023 many Russian crude cargoes were selling above the nominal cap, with the incidence of sanctions showing up, instead, in higher bundled freight and insurance charges, and in buyer discounts relative to benchmark grades.<ref name=":16" /><ref name=":18" /> [[FOB (shipping)|Free-on-board]] prices stayed within formal limits, but total delivered prices and margins shifted through opaque service pricing.

Second, the capacity margin. Cardoso et al. model evasion capacity – the size of the shadow fleet and its supporting services – as a choice variable. In their calibrated model, Russia can increase the share of exports sold outside coalition services by “investing” in a larger shadow fleet and its enablers. Where evasion capacity can expand at reasonable cost, tightening the cap or moving towards bans does not necessarily reduce Russian revenue; instead, trade re-routes through the shadow fleet and world prices adjust.<ref name=":19">Cardoso, S. D., W. Salant, S., & Daubanes, J. (2025). The Dynamics of Evasion: The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports and the Amassing of the Shadow Fleet. In ''CESifo Working Papers'' (ISSN 2364-1428). Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH. <nowiki>https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp11618.pdf</nowiki></ref> In this setting, caps remain only partially effective unless policy also constrains the growth or utilisation of evasion capacity.

On the producer side, Grebennikov describes how Russia has adjusted its fiscal rules by applying a fixed Urals discount in tax calculations. This cushions budget revenue against volatility in reported export prices and implicitly recognises the higher supply-chain and intermediation costs that accompany sanctions evasion.<ref name=":20">Grebennikov, V. I. (2024). The Impact of Sanctions on Russian Oil Trade. ''Russian Foreign Trade Academy''. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.24412/2072-8042-2024-2-121-130</nowiki></ref> Poussenkova et al. link these fiscal adjustments to a broader re-routing of exports towards India and China, which gain bargaining power as European buyers exit, and competition among service providers thins.<ref name=":21">{{Cite journal |last1=Poussenkova |first1=Nina |last2=Mironova |first2=Irina |last3=Jirušek |first3=Martin |date=2024-01-29 |title=Western Sanctions and Russia's Role for Global Energy |url=http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/658789 |journal=Russian Analytical Digest (RAD) |language=en |volume=308 |doi=10.3929/ethz-b-000658789 |hdl=20.500.11850/658789 |issn=1863-0421}}</ref>

The economic literature is clear on the direction of these incentives but weaker on their exact magnitude. Much early empirical work relies on administrative export prices and customs data with patchy coverage and varying definitions, and there is almost no micro-level data on the pricing and performance of non-International Group insurance contracts. Assertions that many vessels are “uninsured” often mean only that they lack IG cover; they may still be backed by alternative guarantees whose quality is hard to verify.<ref name=":18" /><ref name=":21" />

=== '''Evolution of sanctions and policy response''' ===
Work on the Russian shadow fleet illustrates how sanctions design tends to evolve over time. Rather than a single, static measure, sanctioning coalitions usually adjust instruments in response to evasion and to wider economic effects.<ref name=":20" />

In the Russian case, early measures focused on a price cap that was tied to access to maritime services such as finance, insurance and brokering. The intention was to keep oil supplies on the market while compressing Russian revenue. As evidence accumulated that a growing share of exports was moving through shadow-fleet tankers and non-coalition service providers, the policy mix became progressively tighter. Governments introduced more demanding attestation requirements, began listing specific vessels and facilitators, stepped up insurance document checks at key maritime chokepoints, and restricted suspicious sales of older hulls into opaque ownership structures. By 2024–2025, the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union had also adopted measures directly targeting logistics companies, energy traders and tankers believed to be involved in systematic evasion, while formally maintaining the cap framework.<ref name=":18" /><ref>Antonenko, N., & Savina, A. (2025). Sanctions Against Russia: Dynamics, Enhanced Restrictions and Economic Effects. ''SSRN Electronic Journal''. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5368025</nowiki> </ref>

Economic modelling of these developments uses the shadow fleet as an example of how sanctions and evasion capacity interact. Cardoso et al. show that making a cap stricter, or replacing it with broader prohibitions, does not automatically reduce the target’s income if evasion can expand at relatively low cost.<ref name=":19" /> In such settings, exporters and buyers re-route trade through alternative fleets and service networks, and some of the intended revenue loss is offset by higher world prices. The models therefore stress that the effectiveness of sanctions depends not only on the level of the cap or the breadth of legal restrictions, but also on policies that raise the cost of evasion, for example by limiting access to recognised insurance and bunkering services for high-risk vessels or by tightening controls on ship sales into opaque structures.

From the perspective of the wider sanctions literature, this case underlines three general points. First, sanctions are often implemented as a sequence of measures that respond to observed loopholes rather than as a fully designed regime from the outset. Second, the line between price-based tools and de facto bans can blur over time as senders add restrictions on services and specific actors. Third, policy changes that look tougher on paper may have limited impact if they do not address the parallel networks that sanctions themselves have helped to create.

=== '''Externalities and the blue-economy debate''' ===
Policy essays on the shadow fleet stress externalities rather than just revenue effects. Both Stockbruegger and the Poussenkova et al. argue that the growth of an ageing, lightly regulated tanker pool with opaque ownership and non-standard insurance increases environmental and safety risks borne by coastal states and seafarers. In their view, the re-routing and de-risking of sanctioned trade by coalition firms pushes expected social costs onto jurisdictions and actors who did not choose the sanctions.<ref name=":18" /><ref name=":21" />

Parlov and Sverdrup take a similar line from a legal perspective, claiming that the combination of flags of convenience, reduced inspections and unclear liability undermines more than five decades of work to build a coherent international regime for tanker safety, pollution control and victim compensation.<ref name=":22">Parlov, I. & Sverdrup, U. (2024) Chapter 8: The Emerging ‘Shadow Fleet’ as a Maritime Security and Ocean Governance Challenge In; Lott, A (ed.) 2024, ''Maritime Security Law in Hybrid Warfare'', BRILL, Boston. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [30 November 2025].</ref> Braw and others estimate that a major spill involving a shadow-fleet tanker in European waters could generate clean-up and compensation costs in the order of billions of US dollars, although these figures are scenario-based rather than grounded in observed accident data.<ref>Braw, E. (2024). The threats posed by the global shadow fleet—and how to stop it. ''The Atlantic Council. <nowiki>https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-threats-posed-by-the-global-shadow-fleet-and-how-to-stop-it/#sanctions</nowiki>'' </ref>

So far, these arguments are plausible but not yet backed by detailed micro-evidence. No study provides systematic information on premium levels, deductibles, exclusions or claims outcomes under non-IG cover. Without such data, it is impossible to say how much of the so-called “evasion wedge” is due to weak insurance and liability versus pure logistics, buyer power or regulatory arbitrage.

=== '''International law and maritime sanctions enforcement''' ===
Most legal discussion of sanctions evasion at sea centres on how shadow-fleet practices interact with the law of the sea. The basic framework is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and International Maritime Organization (IMO) instruments such as [[MARPOL 73/78|MARPOL]]. These place primary responsibility for safety and pollution control on flag states, while port states enforce rules when vessels call at their ports. <ref name=":23">Nguyen, T. (2023). The Challenges of Dark Ships to the Safety and Security of Commercial Shipping and the Way Forward. ''Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy'', 8(2), 310–328. Brill.</ref><ref name=":24">Beckman, R., Nguyen, T., & Ong, J. (2025). Possible Actions by Coastal States to Protect Their Marine Environment from Oil Tankers in the Dark Fleet. ''The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law'' 40: 3–30. Brill</ref>

Shadow-fleet operators are described as exploiting this division by using flags of convenience with weak enforcement and by avoiding ports in jurisdictions that apply strict port-state control. Instead, they rely on ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas or in EEZs, where traditional port-state tools are harder to use.<ref name=":24" />

A key question is how far coastal states can act inside their EEZs to support sanctions. Suggested measures include applying existing IMO rules on ship-to-ship transfers through documentation and insurance checks, designating monitored transfer zones, and using UNCLOS obligations on flag states to press registries that accept large numbers of high-risk tankers.<ref name=":24" /><ref name=":22" /> A minority of authors argue for a stricter reading of the Convention’s requirement of a “genuine link” between a flag state and its vessels, but attempts to turn this into a practical tool have not succeeded.<ref name=":23" /><ref name=":25">Childs, N. (2025). Russia’s ‘Shadow Fleet’ and Sanctions Evasion: What Is To Be Done? ''International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).''</ref>

The literature generally concludes that these options remain largely theoretical. There is little evidence that coastal states have yet applied them systematically to shadow-fleet operations, so most work maps what states could do in principle rather than documenting state practice in enforcing sanctions at sea.<ref name=":24" /><ref name=":25" />

=== '''Gaps and ongoing debates''' ===
Across legal, economic, environmental and geopolitical work, the literature on sanctions evasion via shadow fleets is still at an early stage. Authors agree that the fleets pose a structural challenge to sanctions enforcement and maritime governance, but empirical knowledge is fragmented.

First, there is a basic data deficit. The fleets operate deliberately in opaque ways, which hampers measurement. Legal analyses of potential coastal-state responses under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – for example, using article 211 paragraph 5 to impose documentation and insurance requirements for ship-to-ship transfers in the exclusive economic zone – remain almost entirely doctrinal. There is no solid evidence that states have tried these measures in a sustained way, so their feasibility is unknown.<ref name=":24" /><ref name=":22" /> Economic studies repeatedly note the absence of reliable micro-data on insurance, ownership chains and claims, and rely instead on partial customs data and indicative shipping information.

Second, there is a geographical bias. Most detailed work focuses on Europe, the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic routes, where political interest and media scrutiny are strongest. Yet key operational hubs for the shadow fleet lie elsewhere: ship-to-ship transfer zones in the eastern Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea and Southeast Asia, permissive port-state regimes in parts of West Africa and the South Atlantic, and final discharge ports in Asia and the Middle East. Bai et al. and Poussenkova et al. argue that these permissive corridors effectively set the floor for global evasion costs and thus for the true effectiveness of sanctions, but they remain under-analysed.<ref name=":21" /><ref>Bai, X., Fernández-Villaverde, J., Li, Y., Xu, L., & Zanetti, F. (2025). ''Charting the uncharted: the (Un)Intended consequences of oil sanctions and dark shipping''. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.3386/w33486</nowiki></ref>

Third, there is almost no systematic work on seafarers’ rights and labour conditions in the shadow fleet, despite indications that many vessels are old, heavily worked and registered under flags with weak labour oversight. Existing studies treat the fleet mainly as an instrument of state strategy or corporate evasion rather than as a workplace embedded in global labour markets. International labour law and human-rights obligations are mentioned as potential levers but not explored in detail.<ref name=":22" />

Finally, the broader geopolitical implications are only partially mapped. Current analyses show how the shadow fleet mitigates Western sanctions and increases Russia’s ability to re-orient exports towards non-coalition buyers, but there is little systematic work on how this reshapes bargaining power, long-term energy relationships or the authority of institutions such as the International Maritime Organization. The risk that aggressive secondary sanctions on shadow-fleet actors could generate collateral damage for developing countries, or accelerate broader shifts in trade and alliance patterns, is noted but not well quantified.

Taken together, existing work on sanctions and the shadow fleet shows that targets respond to economic pressure by building alternative logistics and financial networks, and that these networks create new regulatory and welfare problems of their own. The basic mechanisms are well understood in theory. The scale, distribution and long-term implications are not.

==Implications for businesses==
There is an importance, especially with relation to financial loss, for companies to be aware of embargoes that apply to their intended export or import destinations.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Do I need an export licence?|url=https://www.gov.uk/guidance/beginners-guide-to-export-controls|access-date=5 March 2021|website=GOV.UK|date=11 December 2020 |language=en}}</ref> Properly preparing products for trade, sometimes referred to as an embargo check, is a difficult and timely process for both importers and exporters.<ref>{{Cite web|title=SAP Help Portal|url=https://help.sap.com/viewer/bdb1d2fb216941a69f6300006343e977/11.0.16/en-US/4addab208f6f23aee10000000a42189c.html|access-date=5 March 2021|website=help.sap.com}}</ref>

There are many steps that must be taken to ensure that a [[List of legal entity types by country|business entity]] does not accrue unwanted fines, taxes, or other punitive measures.<ref>{{Cite web|title=US Trade Sanctions Are a Trap for the Unwary {{!}} Norton Rose Fulbright|url=https://www.projectfinance.law/publications/us-trade-sanctions-are-a-trap-for-the-unwary|access-date=5 March 2021|website=www.projectfinance.law|language=en}}</ref> Common examples of embargo checks include referencing embargo lists,<ref>{{Cite web|title=Office of Foreign Assets Control – Sanctions Programs and Information {{!}} U.S. Department of the Treasury|url=https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-sanctions-programs-and-information|access-date=5 March 2021|website=home.treasury.gov}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Perform Sanction, PEPs and Watchlist Verification w/ Lexis Diligence|url=https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexis-diligence/sanction-peps-and-watch-list-verification.page|access-date=5 March 2021|website=www.lexisnexis.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=SAP Help Portal|url=https://help.sap.com/viewer/5424e112323f4f8fa760fe742cde1a1c/6.17.17/en-US/f6eed353ca9f4408e10000000a174cb4.html|access-date=5 March 2021|website=help.sap.com}}</ref> cancelling transactions, and ensuring the validity of a trade entity.<ref>{{Cite web|title=World-Check KYC Screening & Due Diligence|url=https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/world-check-kyc-screening|access-date=5 March 2021|website=www.refinitiv.com|language=en}}</ref>

This process can become very complicated, especially for countries with changing embargoes. Before better tools became available, many companies relied on spreadsheets and manual processes to keep track of compliance issues. Today, there are software based solutions that automatically handle sanctions and other complications with trade.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Export Control and Sanctions Compliance {{!}} About SAP|url=https://www.sap.com/about/agreements/export-statements.html|access-date=5 March 2021|website=SAP|language=English}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Embargo Check|url=https://www.anasys.com/en/embargo-check/|access-date=5 March 2021|website=AnaSys a Bottomline Company|language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=22 January 2021|title=Embargo Check|url=https://www.uniserv.com/en/solutions/data-quality-tools/embargo-check/|access-date=5 March 2021|website=Uniserv GmbH – Customer Data Experts.|language=en|archive-date=7 April 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220407170314/https://www.uniserv.com/en/solutions/data-quality-tools/embargo-check/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

==Examples==
[[File:GASOLINE SHORTAGE HIT THE STATE OF OREGON IN THE FALL OF 1973 BY MIDDAY GASOLINE WAS BECOMING UNAVAILABLE ALONG... - NARA - 555405.jpg|thumb|An undersupplied US gasoline station, closed during the oil embargo in 1973]]

===United States sanctions===
{{Main|United States sanctions}}

====US Embargo Act of 1807====
{{Main|Embargo Act of 1807}}

The United States [[Embargo of 1807]] involved a series of laws passed by the [[United States Congress|US Congress]] (1806–1808) during the second term of President [[Thomas Jefferson]].<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=2&psid=2986 | title = The Embargo of 1807 | author = University of Houston | publisher = digitalhistory.uh.edu | year = 2013 | author-link = University of Houston }}</ref> [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Britain]] and [[First French Empire|France]] were engaged in the [[War of the Fourth Coalition]]; the US wanted to remain [[Neutral country|neutral]] and to trade with both sides, but both countries objected to American trade with the other.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www2.gcc.edu/dept/econ/ASSC/Papers2005/Embargo1807_Snyder.pdf | title= The Embargo of 1807 |location=Pennsylvania | publisher= [[Grove City College]] | author1= Aaron Snyder | author2= Jeffrey Herbener | website= gcc.edu | date= 15 December 2004 | url-status= dead | archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130517115213/http://www2.gcc.edu/dept/econ/ASSC/Papers2005/Embargo1807_Snyder.pdf | archive-date= 17 May 2013 }}</ref> American policy aimed to use the new laws to avoid war and to force both France and Britain to respect American rights.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/embargo-1807 | title = Embargo of 1807 | publisher = monticello.org | date = 8 April 2013}}</ref> The embargo failed to achieve its aims, and Jefferson repealed the legislation in March 1809.

====US embargo of Cuba====
{{Main|United States embargo against Cuba}}

The United States embargo against Cuba began on 14 March 1958, during the overthrow of dictator [[Fulgencio Batista]] by [[Fidel Castro]] during the [[Cuban Revolution]]. At first, the embargo applied only to arms sales; however, it later expanded to include other imports, eventually extending to almost all trade on 7 February 1962.<ref>{{cite web | url= https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/proclamations/03447.html | title = Proclamation 3447 – Embargo on all trade with Cuba | author = National Archives and Records Administration | date = 15 August 2016 | publisher = archives.gov | author-link = National Archives and Records Administration }}</ref> Referred to by Cuba as ''"el bloqueo"'' (the blockade),<ref>{{cite news | url= https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/cuba-trade-embargo-turns-50-still-no-rum-or-cigars-though-some-freedom-in-travel/2012/02/07/gIQAKaYfwQ_blog.html | title = Cuba trade embargo turns 50: Still no rum or cigars, though some freedom in travel | author = Elizabeth Flock | newspaper = washingtonpost.com | date = 7 February 2012}}</ref> the US embargo on Cuba remains {{as of|2022|lc=on}} one of the longest-standing embargoes in modern history.<ref>{{cite web | url= https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15634914 | title = Officially Sanctioned: A Guide to the U.S. Blacklist | author = Eric Weiner | publisher = npr.org | date = 15 October 2007}}</ref> Few of the United States' allies embraced the embargo, and many have argued it has been ineffective in changing Cuban government behavior.<ref>{{cite magazine | url = https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/ | title = It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba | author1= Daniel Hanson | author2= Dayne Batten | author3= Harrison Ealey | magazine = forbes.com | date = 16 January 2013}}</ref> While taking some steps to allow limited economic exchanges with Cuba, American President [[Barack Obama]] nevertheless reaffirmed the policy in 2011, stating that without the granting of improved human rights and freedoms by Cuba's current government, the embargo remains "in the national interest of the United States".<ref>{{cite magazine | url = http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/09/obama-quietly-renews-us-embargo-cuba/42430/ | title = Obama Quietly Renews U.S. Embargo on Cuba | author = Uri Friedman | magazine = [[The Atlantic]] | date = 13 September 2011 | access-date = 23 August 2017 | archive-date = 13 November 2013 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131113220230/http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/09/obama-quietly-renews-us-embargo-cuba/42430/ | url-status = dead }}</ref>

==== Other countries ====
{{Main|United States sanctions against Iran|Humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions against Iran}}

=== Russian sanctions ===
Russia has been known to use economic sanctions to achieve its political goals. Russia's focus has been primarily on implementing sanctions against the pro-Western governments of [[Post-Soviet states|former Soviet Union states]]. The Kremlin's aim is particularly on states that aspire to join the European Union and [[NATO]], such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.<ref name=":7">{{Cite book|title=The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe : a report of the CSIS Europe Program and the CSD Economics Program|last=Conley|first=Heather A.|others=Mina, James, Stefanov, Ruslan, Vladimirov, Martin, [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] (Washington, D.C.), Center for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria)|isbn=9781442279582|location=Washington, DC|oclc=969727837|year = 2016}}</ref> Russia has enacted a law, the [[Dima Yakovlev Law]], that defines sanctions against US citizens involved in "violations of the human rights and freedoms of Russian citizens". It lists US citizens who are banned from entering Russia.<ref name="kremlin_law_descr">[http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/4810 A law on sanctions for individuals violating fundamental human rights and freedoms of Russian citizens has been signed] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130102005952/http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/4810|date=2 January 2013}} // Kremlin.ru, 28 December 2012.</ref>

==== Russia sanctions on Ukraine ====
{{Main|Russian sanctions against Ukraine}}

[[Viktor Yushchenko]], the third president of Ukraine who was elected in 2003, lobbied during his term to gain admission to NATO and the [[Ukraine–European Union relations|EU]].<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Newnham|first=Randall|date=July 2013|title=Pipeline Politics: Russian Energy Sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian Elections|journal=[[Journal of Eurasian Studies]]|volume=4|issue=2|pages=115–122|doi=10.1016/j.euras.2013.03.001|doi-access=free}}</ref> Soon after Yushchenko entered office, Russia demanded [[Kyiv]] pay the same rate that it charged Western European states. This quadrupled Ukraine's energy bill overnight.<ref name=":2" /> Russia subsequently cut off the supply of [[Natural gas in Russia|natural gas]] in 2006, causing significant harm to the [[Economy of Ukraine|Ukrainian]] and [[Economy of Russia|Russian economies]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/3307.cfm|title=Russia-Ukraine 'Gas War' Damages Both Economies|website=www.worldpress.org|language=en|access-date=27 October 2017}}</ref> As the Ukrainian economy began to struggle, Yushchenko's approval ratings dropped significantly; reaching the single digits by the [[2010 Ukrainian presidential election|2010 election]]; [[Viktor Yanukovych]], who was more supportive of Moscow won the election in 2010 to become the fourth president of Ukraine. After his election, gas prices were reduced substantially.<ref name=":2" />

==== Russian sanctions on Georgia ====
The [[Rose Revolution]] in Georgia brought [[Mikheil Saakashvili]] to power as the third president of the country. Saakashvili wanted to bring Georgia into NATO and the EU and was a strong supporter of the US-led war in Iraq and Afghanistan.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Newnham|first=Randall E.|title=Georgia on my mind? Russian sanctions and the end of the 'Rose Revolution'|journal=Journal of Eurasian Studies|volume=6|issue=2|pages=161–170|doi=10.1016/j.euras.2015.03.008|year=2015|doi-access=free}}</ref> Russia would soon implement a number of different sanctions on Georgia, including natural gas price raises through [[Gazprom]] and wider trade sanctions that impacted the Georgian economy, particularly Georgian exports of wine, citrus fruits, and mineral water. In 2006, Russia banned all imports from Georgia which was able to deal a significant blow to the [[Economy of Georgia (country)|Georgian economy]].<ref name=":3" /> Russia also expelled nearly 2,300 Georgians who worked within its borders.<ref name=":3"/>

===United Nations sanctions===
The United Nations issues sanctions by consent of the [[United Nations Security Council]] (UNSC) and/or [[United Nations General Assembly|General Assembly]] in response to major international events, receiving authority to do so under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the [[United Nations Charter]].<ref name="UN Sanctions">{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53850#.WfNxURNSyRt|title=UN sanctions: what they are, how they work, and who uses them|last=Section|first=United Nations News Service|date=4 May 2016|website=UN News Service Section|language=en|access-date=27 October 2017}}</ref> The nature of these sanctions may vary, and include financial, trade, or weaponry restrictions. Motivations can also vary, ranging from humanitarian and environmental concerns<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37755#.WfNxyxNSyRt|title= New UN project uses financial incentives to try to save the dugong|last=Section|first=United Nations News Service|date=14 March 2011|website=UN News Service Section|language=en|access-date=27 October 2017}}</ref> to efforts to halt [[nuclear proliferation]]. Over two dozen sanctions measures have been implemented by the United Nations since its founding in 1945.<ref name ="UN Sanctions"/>

Most UNSC sanctions since the mid-1990s have targeted individuals and entities rather than entire governments, a change from the comprehensive trade sanctions of earlier decades. For example, the UNSC maintains lists of individuals indicted for crimes or linked to international terrorism, which raises novel legal questions regarding [[due process]]. According to a dataset covering the years 1991 to 2013, 95% of UNSC sanction regimes included "sectoral bans" on aviation and/or the import (or export) of arms or raw materials, 75% included "individual/group" sanctions such as asset freezes or restrictions on travel, and just 10% targeted national finances or included measures against [[central bank]]s, [[sovereign wealth fund]]s, or foreign investment. The most frequently used UNSC sanction documented in the dataset is an embargo against imported weapons, which applied in 87% of all cases and was directed against non-state actors more often than against governments. Targeted sanctions regimes may contain hundreds of names, a handful, or none at all.<ref name="Giumelli 2015">{{cite journal|last=Giumelli|first=Francesco|title=Understanding United Nations targeted sanctions: an empirical analysis|journal=[[International Affairs (journal)|International Affairs]]|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|volume=91|issue=6|date=November 2015|pages=1351–1368|doi=10.1111/1468-2346.12448|url=https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/f97592f6-c863-44ac-b416-822e339f296e}}</ref>

==== Sanctions on Somalia, 1992 ====
{{Main|United Nations arms embargo on Somalia}}

The UN implemented sanctions against Somalia beginning in April 1992, after the overthrow of the [[Siad Barre]] regime in 1991 during the [[Somali Civil War]]. UNSC [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 751|Resolution 751]] forbade members to sell, finance, or transfer any military equipment to Somalia.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/751|title=Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea|website=www.un.org|language=en|access-date=27 October 2017}}</ref>

==== Sanctions on North Korea, 2006 ====
{{Main|Sanctions against North Korea}}

The UNSC passed Resolution 1718 in 2006 in response to a nuclear test that the [[North Korea|Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)]] conducted in violation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The resolution banned the sale of military and luxury goods and froze government assets.<ref>{{Cite web |url= http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/ |title= North Korea {{!}} Countries |website= www.nti.org |access-date= 27 October 2017}}</ref> Since then, the UN has passed multiple resolutions subsequently expanding sanctions on North Korea. Resolution 2270 from 2016 placed restrictions on transport personnel and vehicles employed by North Korea while also restricting the sale of natural resources and fuel for aircraft.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm|title=Security Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2270 (2016) {{!}} Meetings Coverage and Press Releases|website=www.un.org|language=en|access-date=27 October 2017}}</ref>

The efficacy of such sanctions has been questioned in light of continued nuclear tests by North Korea in the decade following the 2006 resolution. Professor William Brown of [[Georgetown University]] argued that "sanctions don't have much of an impact on an economy that has been essentially bankrupt for a generation".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/09/why-did-sanctions-fail-against-north-korea/|title=Why Did Sanctions Fail Against North Korea?|website=Foreign Policy|access-date=27 October 2017}}</ref>

==== Sanctions on Libya ====
On 26 February 2011, the UNSC issued an arms embargo against the Libya through [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973|Security Council Resolution 1970]] in response to humanitarian abuses occurring in the [[Libyan Civil War (2011)|First Libyan Civil War]].<ref name=":6">{{Cite web|url=https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/un_arms_embargoes/libya/libya_2011|title=UN Arms embargo on Libya |website=www.sipri.org|language=en|access-date=6 December 2017}}</ref> The embargo was later extended to mid-2018. Under the embargo, Libya has suffered severe inflation because of increased dependence on the private sector to import goods.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/PSIG_images/Sanctions/Templates/Libya%2520I%2520Template.doc|title=Evaluating the Impacts and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions|website=graduateinstitute.ch|access-date=7 December 2017}}{{dead link|date=February 2024|bot=medic}}</ref> The sanctions caused large cuts to health and education, which caused social conditions to decrease. Even though the sanctions were in response to human rights, their effects were limited.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.unicefinemergencies.com/downloads/eresource/docs/Sanctions/2011-06-21%20Literature%20Review%20on%20the%20Effects%20of%20Targeted%20Sanctions.docx|title=Literature Review on the Effects of Targeted Sanctions|website=www.unicefinemergencies.com|access-date=7 December 2017|archive-date=4 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190504113351/http://www.unicefinemergencies.com/downloads/eresource/docs/Sanctions/2011-06-21%20Literature%20Review%20on%20the%20Effects%20of%20Targeted%20Sanctions.docx|url-status=dead}}</ref>

=== Sanction on the Central African Republic ===

In 2013 the UN decreed an arms embargo against the CAR. The arms embargo was established in the context of an intercommunity conflict between the Séléka rebels, with a Muslim majority, and the predominantly Christian militias. to fight back. Raised UN Security Council lifts arms embargo on CAR on 1 August 2024.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/07/1152656|title=Security Council lifts arms embargo on Central African Republic forces |website=www.news.un.org|date=30 July 2024 |language=en|access-date=1 August 2024}}</ref>

====Sanctions on apartheid South Africa====
{{Main|International sanctions during apartheid}}

In effort to punish South Africa for its policies of [[apartheid]], the [[United Nations General Assembly]] adopted a voluntary international oil-embargo against South Africa on 20 November 1987; that embargo had the support of 130 countries.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://richardknight.homestead.com/files/oilembargo.htm|title=Oil Embargo against Apartheid South Africa on richardknight.com|website=richardknight.homestead.com}}</ref> South Africa, in response, expanded its [[Sasol]] production of [[synthetic crude]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Murphy|first=Caryle|date=27 April 1979|title=To Cope With Embargoes, S. Africa Converts Coal Into Oil|language=en-US|newspaper=Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/04/27/to-cope-with-embargoes-s-africa-converts-coal-into-oil/cd39adab-5084-4e46-a28f-79de2896f75e/|access-date=12 December 2020|issn=0190-8286}}</ref>

All United Nations sanctions on South Africa ended over the [[Negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa|Negotiations to end Apartheid]], [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 919|Resolution 919]] and the [[1994 South African election]]s, in which [[Nelson Mandela]] was elected as the first post-Apartheid president.  When asked in 1993 if economic sanctions had helped end apartheid, Mandela replied "Oh, there is no doubt."<ref><!--Jonathan Zimmerman (2013) Nelson Mandela, A True Believer in Sanctions-->{{cite Q|Q121303715}}</ref>

===Other multilateral sanctions===
The United States, Britain, the [[Republic of China (1912-49)|Republic of China]] and the Netherlands imposed [[sanctions against Japan]] in 1940–1941 in response to its expansionism. Deprived of access to vital oil, iron-ore and steel supplies, Japan started planning for military action to [[Dutch East Indies campaign|seize the resource-rich Dutch East Indies]], which required a preemptive [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], triggering the American entry into the [[Pacific War]].<ref>
{{cite web|url= http://history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/pearlhbr.htm|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20001206155000/http://history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/pearlhbr/pearlhbr.htm|url-status= dead|archive-date= 6 December 2000|title= Pearl Harbor Raid, 7 December 1941|date= 3 December 2000|publisher= Department of the Navy – Naval Historical Center|access-date= 20 July 2019|location= Washington|quote= The 7 December 1941 Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor was one of the great defining moments in history. A single carefully-planned and well-executed stroke removed the United States Navy's battleship force as a possible threat to the Japanese Empire's southward expansion. [...] The Japanese military, deeply engaged in the seemingly endless war it had started against China in mid-1937, badly needed oil and other raw materials. Commercial access to these was gradually curtailed as the conquests continued. In July 1941 the Western powers effectively halted trade with Japan. From then on, as the desperate Japanese schemed to seize the oil and mineral-rich East Indies and Southeast Asia, a Pacific war was virtually inevitable.}}</ref>

In 1973–1974, [[OAPEC]] instigated the [[1973 oil crisis]] through its [[oil embargo]] against the United States and other industrialized nations that supported Israel in the [[Yom Kippur War]]. The results included a sharp rise in [[Price of oil|oil prices]] and in [[OPEC]] revenues, an emergency period of [[energy rationing]], a [[1973–75 recession|global economic recession]], large-scale [[Energy conservation|conservation]] efforts, and long-lasting shifts toward natural gas, [[ethanol fuel|ethanol]], [[nuclear power|nuclear]] and other [[alternative energy]] sources.<ref>{{cite book | first= Leonardo | last= Maugeri | title= The Age of Oil | url= https://books.google.com/books?id=JWmx5uKA6gIC | date= 2006 | publisher= Greenwood Publishing Group | pages= 112–116 |isbn= 9780275990084 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url= http://www.history.com/topics/energy-crisis | title= Energy Crisis (1970s) | publisher= [[The History Channel]] | date= 2010}}</ref> Israel continued to receive Western support, however.

In 2010, the European Union made the decision to [[Sanctions against Iran|sanction]] Iran due to their involvement in their [[Nuclear program of Iran|nuclear program]].<ref name="loc.gov">{{Cite web |title=European Union: Renewed Sanctions Against Iran |url=https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2010-08-09/european-union-renewed-sanctions-against-iran/ |access-date=18 December 2023 |website=Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. }}</ref> Theresa Papademetriou states the exact restrictions the EU posed on Iran, "prohibition on the provision of insurance, increased restrictions on and notifications needed for transfers of [[Funding|funds]] to and from Iran, restrictions on the supply of or traffic in technology and equipment to be used in certain oil and gas fields and prohibition of investment in such fields, expansion of the list of goods and technology whose supply to Iran is either subject to prior authorization or is completely banned and new [[Visa policy|visa]] restrictions."<ref name="loc.gov"/> Also in 2010, the UN Council imposed sanctions on Iran due to their involvement in their nuclear program.<ref name="auto">{{Cite web |last=Sen |first=Ashish |date=8 May 2018 |title=A Brief History of Sanctions on Iran |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-history-of-sanctions-on-iran/ |access-date=18 December 2023 |website=Atlantic Council |language=en-US}}</ref> These sanctions banned Iran from carrying out tests on their nuclear weapons and imposed an embargo on the transfer of weapons into the country.<ref name="auto"/> These sanctions resulted in drastic macroeconomic downturns for the Iranian economy including volatility in GDP, increase in unemployment, and increase in inflation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sashi |first1=Sivramkrishna |last2=Bhavish |first2=Sharma |date=1 December 2019 |title=Macroeconomic Implications of US Sanctions on Iran: A Sectoral Financial Balances Analysis |journal=Studies in Business and Economics |volume=14 |issue=3 |pages=182–204 |doi=10.2478/sbe-2019-0053 |issn=2344-5416|doi-access=free }}</ref>

==Current sanctions==
{{incomplete list|date=January 2015}}

===By targeted country===
List of sanctioned countries (the below is not an exhaustive list):<ref>{{cite web | url=https://sanctio.com/en | title=Sanctions risk by countries }}</ref>
*[[Sanctions against Afghanistan|Afghanistan sanctions]] by the US<ref>{{cite news |date=17 August 2021 |title=Biden administration freezes billions of dollars in Afghan reserves, depriving Taliban of cash |newspaper=The Washington Post |url=http://washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/08/17/treasury-taliban-money-afghanistan/}}</ref>
*China by the EU and the US. Sanctions made on [[arms embargo]], enacted in response to the [[Tiananmen Square protests of 1989]]<ref>{{cite magazine | url=http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1961947,00.html | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100213160426/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1961947,00.html | url-status=dead | archive-date=13 February 2010 | title =Should Europe Lift Its Arms Embargo on China? | author =Leo Cendrowicz | magazine =[[Time (magazine)|Time]] | date =10 February 2010}}</ref> 
**[[European Union arms embargo on the People's Republic of China]]
** [[Executive Order 13936|Hong Kong]], enacted in response to the [[National Security Law of the People's Republic of China|National Security Law]]
*[[United States embargo against Cuba|Cuban embargoes by the US]]. It covers arms, consumer goods and financial assets, enacted in 1958<ref>{{Cite web |title=United States embargo against Cuba – History |url=https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/history/united-states-embargo-against-cuba-history-h184385.html |access-date=16 June 2022 |website= |language=}}</ref>
*EU, US, Australia, Canada and Norway by Russia since August 2014 on beef, pork, fruit and vegetable produce, poultry, fish, cheese, milk and dairy items.<ref>{{cite news| url=http://www.dw.de/russia-announces-full-embargo-on-most-food-from-us-eu/a-17838717 | work=Deutsche Welle | title=Russia announces 'full embargo' on most food from US, EU | date=7 August 2014}}</ref> On 13 August 2015, the embargo was expanded to include Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, and Liechtenstein<ref name="Russian embargo expansion">{{cite news|title=Russia expands food imports embargo to non-EU states|url=http://english.irib.ir/news/world/europe/item/214154-russia-expands-food-imports-embargo-to-non-eu-states|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210228155419/http://english.irib.ir/news/world/europe/item/214154-russia-expands-food-imports-embargo-to-non-eu-states|url-status=dead|archive-date=28 February 2021|access-date=10 November 2015|work=English Radio|date=13 August 2015}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-33905340|title=Russia expands food import ban|date=13 August 2015|work=BBC News|access-date=17 June 2018}}</ref>
*Gaza Strip by Israel since 2001, under blockade since 2007 supposedly due to the large number of illicit arms traffic used to wage war{{clarify|date=April 2025}}
*Indonesia by Australia on live cattle due to the alleged cruel slaughter methods in Indonesia<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13692211|title=Australia bans all live cattle exports to Indonesia|date=8 June 2011|work=BBC News|access-date=2 January 2016}}</ref>{{Clarify|reason=is this still in force? cant find any source on it yet|date=June 2022}}
* [[Sanctions against Iran|Iran sanctions]] by the US and its allies, notably by barring nuclear, missile and many military exports to Iran and target investments in: oil, gas and petrochemicals, exports of refined petroleum products, banks, insurance, financial institutions, and shipping.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf | title =What You Need To Know About U.S. Economic Sanctions | author =United States Department of the Treasury | publisher =treasury.gov| author-link =United States Department of the Treasury }}</ref> Enacted 1979, increased through the following years and reached its tightest point in 2010.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/meast/iran-sanctions-facts | title =A summary of sanctions against Iran | author =Josh Levs | publisher =cnn.com | date =23 January 2012}}</ref> In April 2019 the US threatened to sanction countries that continued to [[List of countries by proven oil reserves|buy oil from Iran]] after an initial six-month waiver announced in November 2018 had expired.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-oil/u-s-to-end-all-waivers-on-imports-of-iranian-oil-crude-price-jumps-idUSKCN1RX0R1|title=U.S. to end all waivers on imports of Iranian oil, crude price jumps|last1=Wroughton|first1=Lesley|date=22 April 2019|work=Reuters}}</ref> According to the BBC, [[United States sanctions against Iran|US sanctions against Iran]] "have led to a sharp downturn in Iran's economy, pushing the value of its currency to record lows, quadrupling its annual inflation rate, driving away foreign investors, and triggering protests".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48011496|title=Iran oil: US to end sanctions exemptions for major importers|date=22 April 2019|work=BBC News}}</ref> These sanctions have taken a toll on [[Humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions against Iran|humanitarian concerns]].
* Mali by the [[United Nations Security Council|UNSC]] in relation to the spiraling security situation and hostilities in breach of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in 2017<ref>{{Cite web |title=Mali sanctions regime |url=https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/Pages/mali-sanctions-regime |access-date=16 June 2022 |website=Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade |language=en}}</ref>
* [[Sanctions against Burma|Myanmar sanctions]] by the EU. Sanctions were imposed against Myanmar due to the worsening state of democracy and [[Human rights in Burma|human rights infringements]]<ref>Howse, Robert L. and Genser, Jared M. (2008) [http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v29n2-howse-genser.pdf "Are EU Trade Oh hell no on Burma Compatible with WTO Law?"] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100607153959/http://students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v29n2-howse-genser.pdf |date=7 June 2010 }} ''Michigan Journal of International Law'' 29(2): pp. 165–96</ref>
* Nicaragua by the UK. Sanctions imposed in 2020 to push the government to respect democratic principles and legal institutions<ref>{{Cite web |title=Financial sanctions, Nicaragua |url=https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-nicaragua |access-date=16 June 2022 |website=GOV.UK |date=15 November 2021 |language=en}}</ref>
* [[Sanctions against North Korea|North Korean sanctions]]: 
**international sanctions imposed on North Korea since the [[Korean War]] of 1950–1953 eased under the [[Sunshine Policy]] of South Korean President [[Kim Dae Jung]] and of US President [[Bill Clinton]].<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/202/42450.html |title= Clinton Ends Most N. Korea Sanctions |publisher= Globalpolicy.org |date= 18 September 1999 |access-date= 30 March 2015}}</ref> but tightened again in 2010<ref>[http://www.nguoi-viet.com/absolutenm/anmviewer.asp?a=116316&z=5]  {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100723132200/http://www.nguoi-viet.com/absolutenm/anmviewer.asp?a=116316&z=5|date=23 July 2010}}</ref>
**by the UN, US and EU on luxury goods (and arms) enacted 2006<ref>{{cite web |title=Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) |url=http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/sanctions-embargoes/by-country/democratic%20people%20republic%20of%20korea/index.html |archive-url=http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090609003228/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/sanctions-embargoes/by-country/democratic%20people%20republic%20of%20korea/index.html |archive-date=9 June 2009 |access-date=8 March 2016 |publisher=Department for Business Innovation and Skills}}</ref>
**[[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718]] (2006) – a reaction to the DPRK's claim of a nuclear test
*[[Sanctions against Russia|Russian sanctions]]:
** by the US. On 2 August 2017, President [[Donald Trump]] signed into law the [[Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act]] that grouped together sanctions against Russia, Iran and North Korea<ref>"[https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-overwhelmingly-passes-new-russia-and-iran-sanctions/2017/06/15/df9afc2a-51d8-11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html Senate overwhelmingly passes new Russia and Iran sanctions]". ''The Washington Post''. 15 June 2017.</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-sanctions-idUSKBN1AI2N0|title=Iran says new U.S. sanctions violate nuclear deal, vows 'proportional reaction' |newspaper=Reuters |date=2 August 2017}}</ref> 
** by the EU. In March 2021, [[Reuters]] reported that the EU has placed immediate sanctions on both [[Chechnya]] and Russia—due to ongoing government sponsored and backed violence against [[LGBT community|LGBTIQ+]] individuals<ref>{{Cite news |date=22 March 2021 |title=EU sanctions Russians over rights abuses in Chechnya |newspaper=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-russia-rights-idUSKBN2BE20O}}</ref>
** [[International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War|international sanctions]] were also implemented in response to the [[Russo-Ukrainian War]] that started in 2014
** [[International sanctions during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|international sanctions]] during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
*Somalia by the West. Sanctions imposed since 2010, were due to the [[human rights in Somalia|human rights abuses]] and [[Anti-piracy measures in Somalia|anti-piracy measures and concerns]].
*Sudan by the US in 1997<ref>{{Cite web |title=U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Sudan – Sudan {{!}} ReliefWeb |url=https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/us-imposes-new-sanctions-sudan |access-date=7 June 2022 |website=reliefweb.int |date=4 November 1997 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) |url=https://www.wm.edu/offices/techtransfer/ExportControls/Regulations/OFAC/index.php#:~:text=Currently,%20sanctioned%20countries%20include%20the,Sudan,%20Syria,%20and%20Zimbabwe. |access-date=27 June 2022 |website=William & Mary |language=en}}</ref>
*[[Sanctions against Syria|Syrian sanctions]] by the EU and the US on arms and imports of oil<ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15753975 | work=BBC News | title=Syria sanctions | date=27 November 2011}}</ref>
*[[Embargo against Northern Cyprus|Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus embargo]] by the UN on consumer goods, enacted since 1994<ref name="talmon">{{cite journal |last1=Talmon |first1=Stefan |date=2001 |title=The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice |url=http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/12/4/727.short |journal=European Journal of International Law |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=727&ndash;750 |doi=10.1093/ejil/12.4.727 |doi-access=free}}</ref>
*[[International sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis|Venezuelan sanctions]] by the US and its allies since 2015.<ref name="TIME">{{cite magazine|author=Rhodan, Maya|title= White House sanctions seven officials in Venezuela|url= https://time.com/3737536/barack-obama-venezuela-sanctions/|access-date= 2 April 2019|magazine= [[Time (magazine)|Time]]|date= 9 March 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-idUSKBN0M51NS20150310 |title= U.S. declares Venezuela a national security threat, sanctions top officials |date= 10 March 2015 |work=Reuters |access-date=2 April 2019}}</ref> An arms embargo and the selling of assets were banned due to human rights violations, high government corruption, links with drug cartels and electoral rigging in the [[2018 Venezuelan presidential election]]s.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/22/613250814/president-trump-approves-new-sanctions-on-venezuela|title=President Trump Approves New Sanctions On Venezuela|website=[[NPR]]| date=22 May 2018 | last1=Neuman | first1=Scott }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-eu/eu-readies-sanctions-on-venezuela-approves-arms-embargo-idUSKBN1DD0UN?il=0|title=EU readies sanctions on Venezuela, approves arms embargo|first=Robin|last=Emmott|newspaper=Reuters|date=13 November 2017}}</ref> Sanctions imposed by Canada since 2017,<ref name="CBCCanadaSanc">{{cite news |url= https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/canada-venezuela-sanctions-1.4303663 |work= CBC Canada |date= 22 September 2017 |publisher= Thomson Reuters |access-date= 3 April 2019 |title= Canada imposes sanctions on key Venezuelan officials}}</ref><ref name="CanadaSanc">{{cite news |url= https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canada-sanctions-40-venezuelans-with-links-to-political-economic-crisis/article36367074/ |work= The Globe and Mail |title= Canada sanctions 40 Venezuelans with links to political, economic crisis |author= Zilio, Michelle |date= 22 September 2017 |access-date= 3 April 2019}} Also at {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20170924234118/http://puntodecorte.com/esta-la-lista-los-funcionarios-venezolanos-sancionados-canada/ Punto de Corte]}} and [http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/mundo/canada-sanciona-nicolas-maduro-funcionarios-venezolanos_204786 El Nacional]</ref><ref name="VOACanadaSanc">{{cite news |url= https://www.voanews.com/a/canada-to-impose-sanctions-on-more-venezuelan-officials/4416647.html |work= VOA News |title= Canada to impose sanctions on more Venezuelan officials |date = 30 May 2018 |publisher= Reuters |access-date= 4 April 2019}}</ref> and since 2018 by Mexico,<ref name="MexicoSanc">{{cite news|work= Sumarium group|title= México rechaza elecciones en Venezuela y sanciona a siete funcionarios|url= http://sumarium.com/mexico-rechaza-elecciones-en-venezuela-y-sanciona-a-siete-funcionarios/|access-date= 21 April 2018|language= es}}{{Dead link|date=August 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} Also at [https://www.vpitv.com/venezuela/senado-mexicano-aprueba-acuerdo-en-rechazo-a-las-elecciones-en-venezuela/ VPITV]</ref> Panama<ref name="PanamaSanctions">{{cite news |url= http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=2453678&CategoryId=10717 |work= Latin American Herald Tribune |date= 27 March 2018 |access-date= 3 April 2019 |title= Panama sanctions Venezuela, including Maduro & 1st Lady family companies |author= Camacho, Carlos |archive-date= 24 February 2021 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210224235201/http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=2453678&CategoryId=10717 |url-status= dead }}</ref> and Switzerland<ref name="SwitzerlandReuters">{{cite news |url= https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-venezuela/swiss-impose-sanctions-on-seven-senior-venezuelan-officials-idUSKBN1H42KP |work= Reuters |date= 28 March 2018 |access-date= 3 April 2019 |title= Swiss impose sanctions on seven senior Venezuelan officials}} Also at [https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/suiza-impone-sanciones-venezuela-y-congela-bienes-siete-altos-cargos-n4146916 Diario Las Americas]</ref>

===By targeted individuals===
* [[International sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis|List of individuals sanctioned during the Venezuelan crisis]]
* [[List of people and organizations sanctioned during the Russo-Ukrainian War]]
* [[List of people and organizations sanctioned in relation to human rights violations in Belarus]]
* [[Sanctions against Afghanistan|United Nations sanction]] imposed by [[UN Security Council Resolution 1267]] in 1999 against all [[Al-Qaida]]- and [[Taliban]]-associated individuals. The cornerstone of the sanction is a consolidated list of persons maintained by the Security Council. All nations are obliged to freeze bank accounts and other financial instruments controlled by or used for the benefit of anyone on the list.

===By sanctioning country or organization===
* Australia currently sanctions 9 countries<ref>{{Cite web |title=Sanctions Regimes |url=https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes |access-date=28 June 2022 |website=www.dfat.gov.au}}</ref>
* [[Chinese sanctions]]
** [[Rare earths trade dispute|Chinese restrictions on rare metals exports]]
* [[India sanctions]]
* United Kingdom currently has sanctions on 27 countries<ref>{{Cite web |title=UK sanctions regimes |url=https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-regimes-under-the-sanctions-act |access-date=28 June 2022 |website=GOV.UK |date=31 December 2020 |language=en}}</ref>
* United Nations has since 1966 established 30 sanctions regimes to countries (such as [[Southern Rhodesia]], South Africa, [[Yugoslavia]] and more) and to organizations (such as [[Islamic State|ISIL]], [[Al-Qaeda|al-Qaida]] and the [[Taliban]])<ref>{{Cite web |title=Sanctions {{!}} United Nations Security Council |url=https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information |access-date=28 June 2022 |website=www.un.org}}</ref>
* [[United States sanctions]] and [[United States embargoes]]
** [[2002 United States steel tariff]] was placed by the United States on steel to protect its industry from foreign producers such as China and Russia. The [[World Trade Organization]] ruled that the tariffs were illegal. The European Union threatened retaliatory tariffs on a range of US goods that would mainly affect [[swing states]]. The US government then removed the steel tariffs in early 2004.

===By targeted activity===
* In response to cyber-attacks on 1 April 2015, President Obama issued an Executive Order establishing the first-ever economic sanctions. The Executive Order was intended to impact individuals and entities ("designees") responsible for cyber-attacks that threaten the national security, foreign policy, economic health, or financial stability of the US. Specifically, the Executive Order authorized the Treasury Department to freeze designees— assets.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/sanctions-cyber-crime.pdf|title=Sanctions: U.S. action on cyber crime|website=pwc|publisher=PwC Financial Services Regulatory Practice, April 2015}}</ref> The European Union implemented their first targeted financial sanctions regarding cyber activity in 2020.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Thompson|first=Natalie|date=1 October 2020|title=Countering Malicious Cyber Activity: Targeted Financial Sanctions|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3770816|journal=|language=en|volume=|pages=|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3770816 |ssrn=3770816|s2cid=236785768 |via=|url-access=subscription}}</ref>
* In response to intelligence analysis alleging Russian hacking and interference with the 2016 US elections, President Obama expanded presidential authority to sanction in response to cyber activity that threatens democratic elections.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/274594-obama-extends-cyber-sanctions-powers/|title=Obama extends cyber sanctions power|first=Cory|last=Bennett|work=The Hill |date=29 March 2016}}</ref> Given that the original order was intended to protect critical infrastructure, it can be argued that the election process should have been included in the original order.

===Bilateral trade disputes===
* Vietnam as a result of capitalist influences over the 1990s and having imposed sanctions against Cambodia, is accepting of sanctions disposed with accountability.{{clarify|date=January 2015}}
* Brazil introduced sanctions against the US in March 2010. These sanctions were placed because the US government was paying cotton farmers for their products against World Trade Organization rules. The sanctions cover cotton, as well as cars, chewing gum, fruit, and vegetable products.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2010/03/brazil-slaps-trade-sanctions-on-us--to-retaliate-for-subsidies-to-cotton-farmers/1 |title=Brazil slaps trade sanctions on U.S. to retaliate for subsidies to cotton farmers |publisher=Content.usatoday.com |date=9 March 2010 |access-date=30 March 2015}}</ref> The WTO is currently supervising talks between the states to remove the sanctions.{{citation needed|date=November 2018}}

==Former sanctions==
* Comecon nations ([[Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls|CoCom]] export controls) by the [[Western Bloc]]
* [[2006 Russian ban of Moldovan and Georgian wines|Georgian and Moldovan import ban]] by Russia on agricultural products, wine and mineral water (2006–2013)<ref>{{cite news |date=16 December 2013 |title=Georgia Doubles Wine Exports as Russian Market Reopens |work=RIA Novosti |url=http://en.ria.ru/business/20131216/185616873/Georgia-Doubles-Wine-Exports-as-Russian-Market-Reopens.html}}</ref>
* [[Sanctions against Iraq|Iraqi sanctions]] by the US (1990–2003)<ref>{{cite web |title=Resolution 1483 – UN Security Council – Global Policy Forum |url=http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0522resolution.htm |access-date=30 May 2009 |publisher=Globalpolicy.org}}</ref>
* [[Arab League boycott of Israel|Israeli boycott]] by Arab nations
* Italy by the [[League of Nations]] in 1935 after the [[Second Italo-Ethiopian War|Italian invasion of Abyssinia]]
* Japan ([[ABCD line]]) by the US, UK, China and the Netherlands in 1940 to discourage [[Japanese militarism|militarism]]
* Libya by the UN in 2011 due to mass killings of Libyan protesters/rebels. Ended in 2012 after the [[Death of Muammar Gaddafi|overthrow and execution of Gaddafi]]
*India by the UK due to nuclear exports restriction<ref name="UKnuclear">{{Cite web |title=India and Pakistan (Nuclear Exports) |url=http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/sanctions-embargoes/by-country/india-pakistan/index.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100218045356/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/sanctions-embargoes/by-country/india-pakistan/index.html |archive-date=18 February 2010 |website=BIS}}</ref>
*Macedonia total trade embargo by Greece (1994–1995)
*Mali total embargo by [[ECOWAS]] in 2012 to force the junta to return power to the civilian government and re-install the National constitution<ref>{{cite news |author=Lydia Polgreen |date=2 April 2012 |title=Mali Coup Leaders Suffer Sanctions and Loss of Timbuktu |newspaper=The New York Times  |url-access=subscription |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/africa/rebels-take-timbuktu-in-mali.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240201182715/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/africa/rebels-take-timbuktu-in-mali.html |archive-date= 1 February 2024 }}</ref><ref>Callimachi, Rukmini (3 April 2012) [https://web.archive.org/web/20120404171138/http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/post-coup-mali-hit-with-sanctions-by-african-neighbours/article2390504/ "Post-coup Mali hit with sanctions by African neighbours"]. ''The Globe and Mail''. Retrieved 4 May 2012.</ref>
*[[United States embargo against Nicaragua|Nicaraguan embargo]] by the US
*[[North Vietnam]] (and then unified Vietnam) trade embargo by the US (1964–1994)<ref>{{cite news |last=Cockburn |first=Patrick |date=4 February 1994 |title=US finally ends Vietnam embargo |work=The Independent |location=London |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/us-finally-ends-vietnam-embargo-1391770.html |url-status=live |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20240224192311/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/us-finally-ends-vietnam-embargo-1391770.html |archive-date= 24 February 2024 }}</ref>
*Pakistan by the UK in 2002 on nuclear export restrictions<ref name="UKnuclear" />
* [[2006–2007 economic sanctions against the Palestinian National Authority|Palestinian National Authority sanctions]] by Israel, US and other countries (2006–2007)
* [[2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis|Qatar]] by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt due to Qatar's alleged support for terrorist organizations (2017–2021)<ref>{{Cite web |title=International: United Nations Welcomes Loosening of Sanctions in Gulf Region |url=https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-02-17/international-united-nations-welcomes-loosening-of-sanctions-in-gulf-region/ |access-date=16 June 2022 |website=Library of Congress |date=17 February 2021 |last1=    Boomer |first1=Elizabeth }}</ref>
* [[International sanctions during apartheid|South African sanctions]] by the international community during [[Apartheid]] (see also [[disinvestment from South Africa]])
*Serbia by Kosovo's unilaterally declared government in 2011<ref>{{cite news|url=http://sofiaecho.com/2011/07/21/1127258_kosovo-imposes-embargo-on-serbia|title=Kosovo imposes embargo on Serbia|date=21 July 2011|work=The Sofia Echo|access-date=2 January 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304191608/http://sofiaecho.com/2011/07/21/1127258_kosovo-imposes-embargo-on-serbia |archive-date= 4 March 2016 }}</ref>
*[[Sanctions against Yugoslavia|Yugoslavian sanctions]] by the UN in response to the [[Bosnian War]] (1992–2001)<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Mandala de Elegua |date=2005 |first1= Sandra María |last1=Esteves |publisher=University of Michigan Press Ebook Collection  |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/mpub.6710954.cmp.21 |journal=Nuyorican Feminist Performance: From the Café to Hip Hop Theater |access-date=27 June 2022 |doi=10.3998/mpub.6710954.cmp.21 |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Sukovic |first1=Danilo |last2=Jovanovic |first2=Predrag |date=2001 |title=A Decade Under Sanctions |url=https://www.transparentnost.org.rs/stari/dokumenti/d012.html |website=transparentnost.org.rs |access-date=27 June 2022 |archive-date=27 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221227113131/https://www.transparentnost.org.rs/stari/dokumenti/d012.html |url-status=dead }}</ref>
*[[Embargo Act of 1807]]

==See also==
{{Portal|Economics}}
*[[Arms embargo]]
*Boycott
*[[Economic freedom]]
*[[Economic warfare]]
* [[Globalization]]
*[[International political economy]]
*[[International sanctions]]
*[[Magnitsky legislation]]
*[[Political economy]]
*[[Shadow fleet|Shadow Fleet]]
* [[Specially Designated National]]
*[[Trade war]]
*[[Transshipment]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}
{{LOC-general|article=European Union: Renewed Sanctions Against Iran
 |url=https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2010-08-09/european-union-renewed-sanctions-against-iran/ |accessdate=14 December 2023}}

==Further reading==
* Ashouri, Mahan "The Role of  transnational Private  Actors in Ukraine International Flight 752 Crash  in Iran Under Economic Sanctions Pressure" (2021) [https://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/The_Role_of_Transnational_Private_Actors_in_Ukraine_International_Flight_752_2.pdf]
* Brzoska, Michael. "International sanctions before and beyond UN sanctions." ''International Affairs'' 91.6 (2015): 1339–1349.
* Caruso, Raul. "The impact of international economic sanctions on trade: An empirical analysis." ''Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy'' 9.2 (2003) [https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/9310993.pdf online].
* Cortright, David, et al. ''The sanctions decade: Assessing UN strategies in the 1990s'' (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
* Doxey, Margaret P. ''International sanctions in contemporary perspective'' (1987) [https://archive.org/details/internationalsan0000doxe online]
** Doxey, Margaret. "International sanctions: a framework for analysis with special reference to the UN and Southern Africa." ''International organization'' 26.3 (1972): 527–550.
** Doxey, Margaret. "International sanctions in theory and practice." ''Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law'' 15 (1983): 273+. [http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1806&context=jil online]
* Drezner, Daniel W. ''The Sanctions Paradox''. (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
* Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. "Dealing with tyranny: International sanctions and the survival of authoritarian rulers." ''International studies quarterly'' 54.2 (2010): 335–359. [https://www.ucdc.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Academic/Courses/V12SB/sanctions%20and%20authoritarian%20rulers.pdf online]
* Felbermayr, Gabriel; Morgan, T. Clifton; Syropoulos, Constantinos; Yotov, Yoto V. (2025). "[[doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-081623-020909|Economic Sanctions: Stylized Facts and Quantitative Evidence]]". ''Annual Review of Economics''.
* Farrall, Jeremy Matam. ''United Nations sanctions and the rule of law'' (Cambridge University Press, 2007). [https://www.michaelkirby.com.au/images/stories/speeches/2000s/vol65+/2008/2285-BOOK_REVIEW_UN_SANCTIONS_MAY_2008.doc online]
* Hufbauer, Gary C. ''Economic sanctions and American diplomacy'' (Council on Foreign Relations, 1998) [https://books.google.com/books?id=urvIo1FQWZwC&dq=International+Sanctions++Hufbauer,+Gary+C.&pg=PP9 online].
* Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberley Ann Elliott. '' Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy'' (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990)
* Kaempfer, William H. ''International economic sanctions: a public choice perspective'' (1992) [https://archive.org/details/internationaleco0000kaem online]
* Köchler, Hans. ''The United Nations sanctions policy & international law'' (1995) [https://archive.org/details/unitednationssan0000koch online]
* [[Paul Krugman|Krugman, Paul]], "The American Way of Economic war: Is Washington Overusing Its Most Powerful Weapons?" (review of [[Henry Farrell (political scientist)|Henry Farrell]] and [[Abraham L. Newman|Abraham Newman]], ''Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy'', Henry Holt, 2023, 288 pp.), ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'', vol. 103, no. 1 (January/February 2024), pp.&nbsp;150–156. "The [U.S.] dollar is one of the few currencies that almost all major banks will accept, and... the most widely used... As a result, the dollar is the currency that many companies must use... to do international business." (p.&nbsp;150.) "[L]ocal banks facilitating that trade... normally... buy U.S. dollars and then use dollars to buy [another local currency]. To do so, however, the banks must have access to the U.S. financial system and... follow rules laid out by Washington." (pp.&nbsp;151–152.) "But there is another, lesser-known reason why the [U.S.] commands overwhelming economic power. Most of the world's [[fiber-optic cables]], which carry data and messages around the planet, travel through the United States." (p.&nbsp;152.) "[T]he U.S. government has installed 'splitters': [[prism (optics)|prism]]s that divide the beams of light carrying information into two streams. One... goes on to the intended recipients, ... the other goes to the [[National Security Administration|National Security Agency]], which then uses high-powered [[computation]] to analyze the data. As a result, the [U.S.] can monitor almost all international communication." (p.&nbsp;154) This has allowed the U.S. "to effectively cut Iran out of the world financial system... Iran's economy stagnated... Eventually, Tehran agreed to cut back its [[nuclear reactor|nuclear]] programs in exchange for relief." (pp.&nbsp;153–154.) "[A] few years ago, American officials... were in a panic about [the Chinese company] [[Huawei]]... which... seemed poised to supply [[5G]] equipment to much of the planet [thereby possibly] giv[ing] China the power to eavesdrop on the rest of the world – just as the [U.S.] has done.... The [U.S.] learned that Huawei had been dealing surreptitiously with Iran – and therefore violating U.S. sanctions. Then, it... used its special access to information on international bank data to [show] that [Huawei]'s chief financial officer, [[Meng Wanzhou]] (... the founder's daughter), had committed [[bank fraud]] by falsely telling the British [[financial services company]] [[HSBC]] that her company was not doing business with Iran. Canadian authorities, acting on a U.S. request, arrested her... in December 2018. After... almost three years under house arrest... Meng... was allowed to return to China... But by [then] the prospects for Chinese dominance of 5G had vanished..." (pp.&nbsp;154–155.) Farrell and Newman, writes Krugman, "are worried about the possibility of [U.S. ''Underground Empire''] overreach. [I]f the [U.S.] weaponizes the dollar against too many countries, they might... band together and adopt alternative methods of international payment. If countries become deeply worried about U.S. spying, they could lay fiber-optic cables that bypass the [U.S.]. And if Washington puts too many restrictions on American exports, foreign firms might turn away from U.S. technology." (p.&nbsp;155.)
* Mulder, Nicholas. ''The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War'' (2022) [https://www.amazon.com/Economic-Weapon-Rise-Sanctions-Modern/dp/0300259360/ excerpt] also see [https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-economic-weapon-book-review-the-limits-of-sanctions-from-abyssinia-to-ukraine-11643302954?mod=djembooks online review]
* Nossal, Kim Richard. "International sanctions as international punishment." ''International Organization'' 43.2 (1989): 301–322.
* Royal Institute of International Affairs. ''International Sanctions'' (1935).
*{{cite book|last=Selden|first=Zachary|title=Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy|publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group]]|year=1999|isbn=978-0-275-96387-3}}
* Stevenson, Tom, "First Recourse for Rebels" (review of Nicholas Mulder, ''The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War'', Yale, 2022, {{ISBN|978 0 300 25936 0}}, 434 pp.), ''[[London Review of Books]]'', vol. 44, no. 6 (24 March 2022), pp.&nbsp;25–29. "US sanctions are based on monopoly power over a global commons: the world's reserve currency and medium of exchange." (p.&nbsp;25.) "At some point the US may no longer be in a position to exploit its financial centrality as it does now. For large parts of the world that moment will be cause for celebration." (p.&nbsp;29.)

==External links==
* [https://bscn.nl/en/sanctions-risk-list-countries Business and Sanctions Consulting Network: List of Countries]
* [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0014292120301914 The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB)]<ref>{{Cite web|title=Global Sanctions Database – GSDB|url=https://www.globalsanctionsdatabase.com/|access-date=18 May 2021|website= globalsanctionsdatabase.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last1=Felbermayr|first1=Gabriel|last2=Kirilakha|first2=Aleksandra|last3=Syropoulos|first3=Constantinos|last4=Yalcin|first4=Erdal|last5=Yotov|first5=Yoto|date=18 May 2021|title=The 'Global Sanctions Data Base': Mapping international sanction policies from 1950–2019|url=https://voxeu.org/article/global-sanctions-data-base-mapping-international-sanction-policies-1950-2019|access-date=18 May 2021|website=VoxEU.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kirikakha|first1=Aleksandra|last2=Felbermayr|first2=Gabriel J.|last3=Syropoulos|first3=Constantinos|last4=Yalcin|first4=Erdal|last5=Yotov|first5=Yoto V.|date=10 December 2021|title=The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB): an update that includes the years of the Trump presidency|url=https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781839102714/9781839102714.00010.xml|journal=Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions|pages=62–106|language=en-US|doi=10.4337/9781839102721.00010|isbn=9781839102721|s2cid=245356746|url-access=subscription}}</ref>
*[https://sanctions.web.unc.edu/ Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) Dataset]<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Morgan|first1=T. Clifton|last2=Bapat|first2=Navin A.|last3=Kobayashi|first3=Yoshiharu|date=10 December 2021|title=The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data project: a retrospective|url=https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781839102714/9781839102714.00009.xml|journal=Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions|pages=44–61|language=en-US|doi=10.4337/9781839102721.00009|isbn=9781839102721|s2cid=245374708|url-access=subscription}}</ref>
*[https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00223433221087080 The International Sanctions Termination (IST) dataset]
* [https://archive.org/search.php?query=title%3A%28%27%27International%20Sanctions%27%27.%20%29 Online Books]

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{{Wiktionary|embargo}}
{{Portal bar|India|United States|Israel|Pakistan|Japan}}
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[[Category:International sanctions]]
[[Category:Non-tariff barriers to trade]]
[[Category:Economic sanctions]]
[[Category:Human rights abuses]]