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{{Short description|Philosophical view that events are determined by prior events}}
{{About|the general notion of determinism in philosophy}}
{{Distinguish|Fatalism|Predeterminism|Predictability|Theological determinism}}
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'''Determinism''' is the [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] view that all events within the [[universe]] (or [[multiverse]]) can occur only in one possible way.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Determinism {{!}} Definition, Philosophers, & Facts {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/determinism |access-date=2024-02-23 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}}</ref> Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have developed from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. Like [[Eternalism (philosophy of time)|eternalism]], determinism focuses on particular events rather than the future as a concept. Determinism is often contrasted with [[free will]], although some philosophers argue that the two are [[compatibilism|compatible]].<ref name="Franklin">{{cite book |author=Franklin |first=Richard Langdon |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=51wIAQAAIAAJ |title=Freewill and Determinism: A Study of Rival Conceptions of Man |publisher=Routledge & K. Paul |year=1968 |isbn=978-0710031570 |location=London, New York |oclc=42756}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=Conceptually |date=20 January 2019 |title=Determinism – Explanation and examples |url=https://conceptually.org/concepts/determinism |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250207103532/https://conceptually.org/concepts/determinism |archive-date=February 7, 2025 |access-date=20 January 2019 |work=conceptually.org}}</ref> The [[antonym]] of determinism is [[indeterminism]], the view that events are not deterministically caused.

Historically, debates about determinism have involved many philosophical positions and given rise to multiple varieties or interpretations of determinism. One topic of debate concerns the scope of determined systems. Some philosophers have maintained that the entire universe is a single determinate system, while others identify more limited determinate systems. Another common debate topic is whether determinism and free will can coexist; [[compatibilism]] and [[incompatibilism]] represent the opposing sides of this debate.

Determinism should not be confused with the [[Self-determination theory|self-determination]] of human actions by reasons, motives, and desires. Determinism is about interactions which affect cognitive processes in people's lives.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ismael|first=Jenann|date=2019-10-01|title=Determinism, Counterpredictive Devices, and the Impossibility of Laplacean Intelligences|url=https://academic.oup.com/monist/article/102/4/478/5567128|journal=The Monist|language=en|volume=102|issue=4|pages=478–498|doi=10.1093/monist/onz021|issn=0026-9662|url-access=subscription}}</ref> It is about the cause and the result of what people have done. Cause and result are always bound together in cognitive processes. It assumes that if an observer has sufficient information about an object or human being, then such an observer might be able to predict every consequent move of that object or human being. Determinism rarely requires that perfect [[prediction]] be practically possible.

Causal determinism posits that every event results from preceding events and natural laws, while nomological determinism emphasizes the predictability of the future from past and present states. [[Necessitarianism]] claims only one possible world exists, and [[predeterminism]] suggests events are fixed in advance, sometimes biologically or genetically. [[Fatalism]] and [[theological determinism]] attribute outcomes to fate or divine omniscience, whereas adequate determinism and interpretations of [[quantum mechanics]] explore probabilistic or emergent constraints on macroscopic phenomena. Philosophical varieties extend to human behavior, including biological, psychological, social, and cultural determinism, as well as structural determinism, which highlights systemic constraints. Historically, determinism appears in both Western traditions, from the [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|Presocratics]] and [[Stoicism|Stoics]] to [[Newton's laws of motion|Newtonian mechanics]], and Eastern thought, including [[karma]], [[Ājīvika]] fatalism, and [[Buddhism|Buddhist]] dependent origination. Modern science recognizes deterministic models in classical physics and complex generative processes, while quantum mechanics introduces probabilistic and debated interpretations.

== Varieties ==
Determinism may commonly refer to any of the following viewpoints:

=== Causal ===
Causal determinism, sometimes synonymous with [[historical determinism]] (a sort of [[path dependence]]), is "the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature."<ref name="SEPcausaldeterminism">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Hoefer|first=Carl|title=Causal Determinism|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|edition=Winter 2009|date=2008|editor=Edward N. Zalta|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/determinism-causal/}}</ref> However, it is a broad enough term to consider that:<ref name="SEPmoralresponsibility">{{cite encyclopedia|last=Eshleman|first=Andrew|editor=Edward N. Zalta|title=Moral Responsibility|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|edition=Winter 2009|date= 2009|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/moral-responsibility/}}</ref><blockquote>...One's deliberations, choices, and actions will often be necessary links in the causal chain that brings something about. In other words, even though our deliberations, choices, and actions are themselves determined like everything else, it is still the case, according to causal determinism, that the occurrence or existence of yet other things depends upon our deliberating, choosing and acting in a certain way.</blockquote>Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. The relation between events and the origin of the universe may not be specified. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing in the universe that has no cause or is [[causa sui|self-caused]].

Causal determinism has also been considered more generally as the idea that everything that happens or exists is caused by antecedent conditions.<ref name="stanfordincompatibilismarguments"/> In the case of nomological determinism, these conditions are considered events also, implying that the future is determined completely by preceding events—a combination of prior states of the universe and the laws of nature.<ref name="SEPcausaldeterminism" /> These conditions can also be considered metaphysical in origin (such as in the case of theological determinism).<ref name="SEPmoralresponsibility" />[[File:Bled (9664110474).jpg|thumb|Many philosophical theories of determinism frame themselves with the idea that reality follows a sort of predetermined path.]]

==== {{Anchor|Nomological determinism}}Nomological ====
Nomological determinism is the most common form of causal determinism and is generally synonymous with physical determinism.{{cn|date=May 2025}} This is the notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws and that every occurrence inevitably results from prior events. Nomological determinism is sometimes illustrated by the [[thought experiment]] of [[Laplace's demon]].  [[Laplace]] posited that an omniscient observer, knowing with infinite precision all the positions and velocities of every particle in the universe, could predict the future entirely.<ref>{{cite book |author1=Robert C. Solomon |title=The Big Questions: A Short Introduction to Philosophy |author2=Kathleen M. Higgins |publisher=Cengage Learning |year=2009 |isbn=978-0495595151 |edition=8th |page=232 |chapter=Free will and determinism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ekh2AKqXdqgC&pg=PA232}}</ref> [[Ernest Nagel]] viewed determinism in terms of a [[configuration space (physics)|physical state]], declaring a theory to be deterministic if it predicts a state at other times uniquely from values at one given time.<ref>{{cite book |author=Ernest Nagel |title=The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation |publisher=Hackett |year=1999 |isbn=978-0915144716 |edition=2nd |pages=285–292 |chapter=§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state |quote=A theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period. |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=u6EycHgRfkQC&pg=PA285}}</ref>

==== Necessitarianism ====
[[Necessitarianism]] is a [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] principle that denies all mere possibility and maintains that there is only one possible way for the world to exist. [[Leucippus]] claimed there are no uncaused events and that everything occurs for a reason and by necessity.<ref>Leucippus, Fragment 569 – from Fr. 2 Actius I, 25, 4.</ref>

=== Predeterminism ===
[[Predeterminism]] is the idea that all events are determined in advance.<ref name="McKewan">{{cite encyclopedia |last=McKewan |first=Jaclyn |editor=H. James Birx"|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Time: Science, Philosophy, Theology, & Culture |title=Predeterminism |year=2009 |publisher=Sage Publications, Inc. |doi=10.4135/9781412963961.n191 |pages=1035–1036|chapter=Evolution, Chemical |isbn=978-1412941648 }}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Oxford Dictionaries |title=Predeterminism |url=http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/predeterminism |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120904051839/http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/predeterminism |url-status=dead |archive-date=4 September 2012 |access-date=20 December 2012 |date= 2010 }}. See also {{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Collins English Dictionary |title=Predeterminism |url=http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/predeterminism |access-date=20 December 2012 |publisher=Collins}}</ref> The concept is often argued by invoking causal determinism, implying that there is an unbroken [[Chain of events|chain of prior occurrences]] stretching back to the origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain.

Predeterminism can be categorized as a specific type of determinism when it is used to mean pre-established causal determinism.<ref name="McKewan" /><ref>{{cite web |url=http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/notes-determinism.html |title=Some Varieties of Free Will and Determinism |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |work=Philosophy 302: Ethics |publisher=philosophy.lander.edu |access-date=19 December 2012| quote=Predeterminism: the philosophical and theological view that combines God with determinism. On this doctrine events throughout eternity have been foreordained by some supernatural power in a causal sequence.}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=The current source is insufficiently reliable ([[WP:NOTRS]]).|date=March 2025}} It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism—in the context of its capacity to determine future events.<ref name="McKewan" /><ref>See for example {{cite arXiv |eprint=hep-th/0104219 |author=Hooft, G. |title=How does god play dice? (Pre-)determinism at the Planck scale |quote=Predeterminism is here defined by the assumption that the experimenter's 'free will' in deciding what to measure (such as his choice to measure the x- or the y-component of an electron's spin), is in fact limited by deterministic laws, hence not free at all |year=2001 }}, and {{cite journal |author=Sukumar |first=C.V. |year=1996 |title=A new paradigm for science and architecture |journal=City |volume=1 |issue=1–2 |pages=181–183 |doi=10.1080/13604819608900044 |bibcode=1996City....1..181S |quote=Quantum Theory provided a beautiful description of the behaviour of isolated atoms and nuclei and small aggregates of elementary particles. Modern science recognized that predisposition rather than predeterminism is what is widely prevalent in nature.}}</ref> However, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Borst, C. |year=1992 |title=Leibniz and the Compatibilist Account of Free Will |journal=Studia Leibnitiana |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=49–58 |jstor=40694201 |quote=Leibniz presents a clear case of a philosopher who does not think that predeterminism requires universal causal determinism.}}</ref><ref name="Society1971">{{cite book|author=Far Western Philosophy of Education Society|title=Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=spkpAQAAMAAJ|year=1971|publisher=Far Western Philosophy of Education Society|page=12|quote='Determinism' is, in essence, the position which holds that all behavior is caused by prior behavior. "Predeterminism" is the position which holds that all behavior is caused by conditions which predate behavior altogether (such impersonal boundaries as "the human conditions", instincts, the will of God, inherent knowledge, fate, and such).}}</ref>

==== Biological ====
The term ''predeterminism'' is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of [[biological determinism]], sometimes called ''genetic determinism''.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Predeterminism |encyclopedia=Merriam-Webster Dictionary |publisher=Merriam-Webster, Inc. |url=http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/predeterminism |access-date=20 December 2012}} See for example {{cite journal |author=Ormond |first=A.T. |year=1894 |title=Freedom and psycho-genesis |url=https://zenodo.org/record/1429090 |journal=Psychological Review |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=217–229 |doi=10.1037/h0065249 |quote=The problem of predeterminism is one that involves the factors of heredity and environment, and the point to be debated here is the relation of the present self that chooses to these predetermining agencies.}}, and {{cite journal |author=Garris, M.D. |display-authors=etal |year=1992 |title=A Platform for Evolving Genetic Automata for Text Segmentation (GNATS) |journal=Science of Artificial Neural Networks |volume=1710 |pages=714–724 |bibcode=1992SPIE.1710..714G |doi=10.1117/12.140132 |quote=However, predeterminism is not completely avoided. If the codes within the genotype are not designed properly, then the organisms being evolved will be fundamentally handicapped. |s2cid=62639035}}</ref> Biological determinism is the idea that all human behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by human genetic nature.

[[Friedrich Nietzsche]] explained that human beings are "determined" by their bodies and are subject to its passions, impulses, and instincts.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Nietzsche |first=Friedrich |title=The Gay Science |publisher=Vintage |year=1974 |isbn=978-0394719856 |page=7 |language=English}}</ref>

=== Fatalism ===
[[Fatalism]] is normally distinguished from determinism,<ref name="SEPDeterminism">{{cite book| url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/| title = SEP, Causal Determinism| year = 2016| publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> as a form of [[Teleology|teleological]] determinism. Fatalism is the idea that everything is fated to happen, resulting in humans having no control over their future. [[Destiny|Fate]] has arbitrary power, and does not necessarily follow any causal or deterministic [[law]]s.<ref name="stanfordincompatibilismarguments" /> Types of fatalism include hard [[theological determinism]] and the idea of [[predestination]], where there is a [[God]] who determines all that humans will do. This may be accomplished through either foreknowledge of their actions, achieved through [[omniscience]]<ref name="Fischer">Fischer, John Martin (1989) ''God, Foreknowledge and Freedom''. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. {{ISBN|1-55786-857-3}}.</ref> or by predetermining their actions.<ref name="Watt">{{Cite book |last=Watt |first=W. Montgomery |title=Free will and Predestination in Early Islam |date=1948 |publisher=Luzac & Company Ltd. |location=Londod |oclc=1813192}}</ref>

=== Theological ===
[[Theological determinism]] is a form of determinism that holds that all events that happen are either preordained (i.e., [[predestination|predestined]]) to happen by a [[monotheism|monotheistic]] [[deity]], or are [[destiny|destined]] to occur given its omniscience. Two forms of theological determinism exist, referred to as ''strong'' and ''weak'' theological determinism.<ref name="JordanTate2004">{{cite book|author1=Anne Lockyer Jordan|author2=Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate|author3=Neil Lockyer|author4=Edwin Tate|title=Philosophy of Religion for A Level|edition=OCR|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uBVuNip8qjkC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2004|publisher=Nelson Thornes|isbn=978-0-7487-8078-5|page=211}}</ref>

Strong theological determinism is based on the concept of a [[creator deity]] dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."<ref name="Iannone2001">{{cite book |author=Iannone |first=Abel Pablo |title=Dictionary of World Philosophy |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-415-17995-9 |page=194 |chapter=Determinism |quote=Theological determinism, or the doctrine of predestination: the view that everything which happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity. A weaker version holds that, though not predestined to happen, everything that happens has been eternally known by virtue of the divine foreknowledge of an omniscient divinity. If this divinity is also omnipotent, as in the case of the Judeo-Christian religions, this weaker version is hard to distinguish from the previous one because, though able to prevent what happens and knowing that it is going to happen, God lets it happen. To this, advocates of free will reply that God permits it to happen in order to make room for the free will of humans. |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7wBmBO3vpE4C}}</ref>

Weak theological determinism is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge—"because God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed."<ref name="Huyssteen2003">{{cite book |author=Wentzel Van Huyssteen |title=Encyclopedia of Science and Religion |publisher=Macmillan Reference |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-02-865705-9 |volume=1 |page=217 |chapter=Theological determinism |quote=Theological determinism constitutes a fifth kind of determinism. There are two types of theological determinism, both compatible with scientific and metaphysical determinism. In the first, God determines everything that happens, either in one all-determining single act at the initial creation of the universe or through continuous divine interactions with the world. Either way, the consequence is that everything that happens becomes God's action, and determinism is closely linked to divine action and God's omnipotence. According to the second type of theological determinism, God has perfect knowledge of everything in the universe because God is omniscient. And, as some say, because God is outside of time, God has the capacity of knowing past, present, and future in one instance. This means that God knows what will happen in the future. And because God's omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed. |access-date=22 December 2012 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HIcYAAAAIAAJ}}</ref> There exist slight variations on this categorization, however. Some claim either that theological determinism requires predestination of all events and outcomes by the divinity—i.e., they do not classify the weaker version as ''theological determinism'' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence—or that the weaker version does not constitute ''theological determinism'' at all.<ref name="VanArragon2010">{{cite book|author=Raymond J. VanArragon|title=Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JyTohO1AMzwC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2010|publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group|isbn=978-1-4411-3867-5|page=21|quote=Theological determinism, on the other hand, claims that all events are determined by God. On this view, God decree that everything will go thus-and-so and ensure that everything goes that way, so that ultimately God is the cause of everything that happens and everything that happens is part of God's plan. We might think of God here as the all-powerful movie director who writes script and causes everything to go accord with it. We should note, as an aside, that there is some debate over what would be sufficient for theological determinism to be true. Some people claim that God's merely knowing what will happen determines that it will, while others believe that God must not only know but must also cause those events to occur in order for their occurrence to be determined.}}</ref>

With respect to free will, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions", more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.<ref name="stanfordincompatibilismarguments">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Arguments for Incompatibilism |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/incompatibilism-arguments |last=Vihvelin |first=Kadri |date=Spring 2011 |editor=Edward |editor-first=N. Zalta |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20150105080922/http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/ |archive-date=5 Jan 2015}}</ref>

Theological determinism can also be seen as a form of causal determinism, in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God.<ref name="SEPmoralresponsibility" /> Some have asserted that [[Augustine of Hippo]] introduced theological determinism into Christianity in 412 CE, whereas all prior Christian authors supported free will against Stoic and Gnostic determinism.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wilson |first1=Kenneth |title=Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology ''in the series Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 111'' |date=2018 |publisher=Mohr Siebeck |location=Tübingen, Germany |isbn=978-3161557538 |pages=273–298}}</ref> However, there are many Biblical passages that seem to support the idea of some kind of theological determinism.

=== Adequate ===
Adequate determinism is the idea, because of [[quantum decoherence]], that [[quantum indeterminacy]] can be ignored for most macroscopic events. Random quantum events "average out" in the [[Expected value|limit of large numbers]] of particles (where the laws of [[quantum mechanics]] asymptotically approach the laws of classical mechanics). While there are specific examples of these random events magnified to macro levels, such as Geiger counters, they are still insignificant in the context of free will.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Adequate (or Statistical) Determinism |url=http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/adequate_determinism.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250118183011/https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/adequate_determinism.html |archive-date=January 18, 2025 |website=The Information Philosopher}}</ref>

=== Determined probability ===
[[Stephen Hawking]] explained that the microscopic world of quantum mechanics is one of determined probabilities. That is, nature is not governed by laws that determine the future with certainty but by laws that determine the probability of various futures.<ref name="GDesign"/>{{rp|p=32|}}

=== Many-worlds interpretation ===
The [[many-worlds interpretation]] of quantum mechanics accepts the linear causal sets of sequential events with adequate consistency yet also suggests constant forking of causal chains that can in principle be globally deterministic.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Kent |first=Adrian |date=2010 |title=One World Versus Many: The Inadequacy of Everettian Accounts of Evolution, Probability, and Scientific Confirmation |journal=Many Worlds |pages=307–354 |arxiv=0905.0624 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.003.0012 |isbn=978-0-19-956056-1}}</ref> Meaning the causal set of events leading to the present are all valid yet appear as a singular linear time stream within a much broader unseen conic probability field of other outcomes that "split off" from the locally observed timeline. Under this model causal sets are still "consistent" yet not exclusive to singular iterated outcomes.

The interpretation sidesteps the exclusive retrospective causal chain problem of "could not have done otherwise" by suggesting "the other outcome does exist" in a set of parallel states of the universe that (in one version) split off in any interacting event. This interpretation is sometimes described with the example of agent-based choices.<ref>[[Lev Vaidman|Vaidman, Lev]], [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/qm-manyworlds "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics"], in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), accessed on 2 March 2025</ref>

=== Philosophical varieties ===
==== Nature/nurture controversy ====
Although some of the above forms of determinism concern human behaviors and [[cognition]], others frame themselves as an answer to the debate on [[Nature versus nurture|nature and nurture]]. They will suggest that one factor will entirely determine behavior. As scientific understanding has grown, however, the strongest versions of these theories have been widely rejected as a [[Fallacy of the single cause|single-cause fallacy]].<ref name="melo-martin">{{cite journal |author=Inmaculada de Melo-Martín |year=2005 |title=Firing up the nature/nurture controversy: Bioethics and genetic determinism |journal=Journal of Medical Ethics |volume=31 |issue=9 |pages=526–530 |doi=10.1136/jme.2004.008417 |pmc=1734214 |pmid=16131554}}</ref> In other words, the modern deterministic theories attempt to explain how the interaction of both nature ''and'' nurture is entirely predictable. The concept of [[heritability]] has been helpful in making this distinction.

* [[Biological determinism]], sometimes called ''genetic determinism'', is the idea that each of human behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by human genetic nature.
* [[Behaviorism]] involves the idea that all behavior can be traced to specific causes—either environmental or reflexive. [[John B. Watson]] and [[B. F. Skinner]] developed this nurture-focused determinism.
* [[Cultural materialism (anthropology)|Cultural materialism]], contends that the physical world impacts and sets constraints on human behavior.
* [[Cultural determinism]], along with [[social determinism]], is the nurture-focused theory that the culture in which we are raised determines who we are.
* [[Environmental determinism]], also known as ''climatic'' or ''geographical determinism,'' proposes that the physical environment, rather than social conditions, determines culture. Supporters of environmental determinism often{{quantify|date=August 2014}} also support [[Behaviorism|behavioral determinism]]. Key proponents of this notion have included [[Ellen Churchill Semple]], [[Ellsworth Huntington]], [[Thomas Griffith Taylor]] and possibly [[Jared Diamond]], although his status as an environmental determinist is debated.<ref>{{cite journal
 |last = Andrew
 |first = Sluyter
 |title=Neo-Environmental Determinism, Intellectual Damage Control, and Nature/Society Science
 |journal = Antipode
 |volume = 35
 |issue = 4
 |doi = 10.1046/j.1467-8330.2003.00354.x
 |year = 2003
 |pages = 813–817
 |bibcode = 2003Antip..35..813S
 |url = https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=geoanth_pubs
 |url-access = subscription
 }}
</ref>

==== Determinism and prediction ====
Other "deterministic"{{Opinion|date=December 2022}} theories actually seek only to highlight the importance of a particular factor in predicting the future. These theories often use the factor as a sort of guide or constraint on the future. They need not suppose that complete knowledge of that one factor would allow the making of perfect predictions.

* [[Psychological determinism]] can mean that humans must act according to reason, but it can also be synonymous with some sort of [[psychological egoism]]. The latter is the view that humans will always act according to their perceived best interest.
* [[Linguistic determinism]] proposes that language determines (or at least limits) the things that humans can think and say and thus know. The [[Linguistic relativity|Sapir–Whorf hypothesis]] argues that individuals experience the world based on the grammatical structures they habitually use.
* [[Economic determinism]] attributes primacy to economic structure over politics in the development of human history. It is associated with the [[dialectical materialism]] of [[Karl Marx]].
* [[Technological determinism]] is the theory that a society's technology drives the development of its social structure and cultural values.

== Structural ==
Structural determinism is the philosophical view that actions, events, and processes are predicated on and determined by structural factors.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Proulx|first=J|date=2008|title=Structural determinism as hindrance to teachers' learning: Implications for teacher education|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337843839|journal=Proceedings of PME-33 and PME-NA-20|volume=4}}</ref> Given any particular structure or set of estimable components, it is a concept that emphasizes rational and predictable outcomes. Chilean biologists [[Humberto Maturana]] and [[Francisco Varela]] popularized the notion, writing that a living system's general order is maintained via a circular process of ongoing self-referral, and thus its organization and structure defines the changes it undergoes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Leyland|first=M.L|date=1988|title=An introduction to some of the ideas of Humberto Maturana|journal=Journal of Family Therapy|volume=10|issue=4|pages=357–374|doi=10.1046/j..1988.00323.x|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to the authors, a system can undergo changes of state (alteration of structure without loss of identity) or disintegrations (alteration of structure with loss of identity). Such changes or disintegrations are not ascertained by the elements of the disturbing agent, as each disturbance will only trigger responses in the respective system, which in turn, are determined by each system's own structure.

On an [[Individualism|individualistic]] level, what this means is that human beings as free and independent entities are triggered to react by external stimuli or change in circumstance. However, their own internal state and existing physical and mental capacities determine their responses to those triggers. On a much broader societal level, structural determinists believe that larger issues in the society—especially those pertaining to minorities and subjugated communities—are predominantly assessed through existing structural conditions, making change of prevailing conditions difficult, and sometimes outright impossible. For example, the concept has been applied to the politics of race in the [[United States|United States of America]] and other Western countries such as the [[United Kingdom]] and [[Australia]], with structural determinists lamenting structural factors for the prevalence of racism in these countries.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Tate|first=W|date=1997|title=Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and Implications|url=https://thrive.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Critical%20Race%20Theory%20and%20Education%20History%2C%20Theory%2C%20and%20Implications.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200819194101/https://thrive.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Critical%20Race%20Theory%20and%20Education%20History,%20Theory,%20and%20Implications.pdf |archive-date=2020-08-19 |url-status=live|journal=Review of Research in Education|volume=22|pages=195–247|doi=10.3102/0091732X022001195|s2cid=53626156}}</ref> Additionally, [[Marxism|Marxists]] have conceptualized the writings of [[Karl Marx]] within the context of structural determinism as well. For example, [[Louis Althusser]], a [[Structural Marxism|structural Marxist]], argued that the state, in its political, economic, and legal structures, reproduces the discourse of capitalism, in turn, allowing for the burgeoning of capitalistic structures.

Proponents of the notion highlight the usefulness of structural determinism to study complicated issues related to race and gender, as it highlights often gilded structural conditions that block meaningful change.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pleasants|first=N|date=2019|title=Free Will, Determinism and the 'Problem' of Structure and Agency in the Social Sciences|url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0048393118814952|journal=Philosophy of the Social Sciences|volume=49|pages=3–30|doi=10.1177/0048393118814952|s2cid=149735710|hdl=10871/34537|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Critics call it too rigid, reductionist and inflexible. Additionally, they also criticize the notion for overemphasizing deterministic forces such as structure over the role of human agency and the ability of the people to act. These critics argue that politicians, academics, and social activists have the capability to bring about significant change despite stringent structural conditions.

=== With free will ===
{{Main|Free will}}

Philosophers have debated both the truth of determinism, and the truth of free will. This creates the four possible positions in the figure. [[Compatibilism]] refers to the view that [[free will]] is, in some sense, compatible with determinism. The three [[Incompatibilism|incompatibilist]] positions deny this possibility. The [[Incompatibilism#Hard incompatibilism|hard incompatibilists]] hold that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, the [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarians]] that determinism does not hold, and free will might exist, and the [[hard determinism|hard determinists]] that determinism does hold and free will does not exist. The Dutch philosopher [[Baruch Spinoza]] was a determinist thinker, and argued that human freedom can be achieved through knowledge of the causes that determine desire and affections. He defined human servitude as the state of bondage of anyone who is aware of their own desires, but ignorant of the causes that determined them. However, the free or virtuous person becomes capable, through reason and knowledge, to be genuinely free, even as they are being "determined". For the Dutch philosopher, acting out of one's own internal necessity is genuine [[freedom]] while being driven by exterior determinations is akin to bondage. Spinoza's thoughts on human servitude and liberty are respectively detailed in the fourth<ref>"Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse." – Ethics, Book IV, Preface</ref>{{Full citation needed|date=March 2025}} and fifth<ref>"At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant." Ethics, book V, Preface</ref>{{Full citation needed|date=March 2025}} volumes of his work ''[[Ethics (Spinoza book)|Ethics]]''.

The standard argument against free will, according to philosopher [[J. J. C. Smart]], focuses on the implications of determinism for free will.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Smart |first=J. J. C. |date=July 1967 |title=Free-Will, Praise and Blame |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251619 |journal=Mind |volume=70 |issue=279 |pages=291–306 |issn=0026-4423 |jstor=2251619 |oclc=9964495257}}</ref> He suggests free will is denied whether determinism is true or not. He says that if determinism is true, all actions are predicted and no one is assumed to be free; however, if determinism is false, all actions are presumed to be random and as such no one seems free because they have no part in controlling what happens.

=== With the soul ===
Some determinists argue that [[materialism]] does not present a complete understanding of the universe, because while it can describe determinate interactions among material things, it ignores the [[mind]]s or [[soul]]s of conscious beings.

A number of positions can be delineated:

* Immaterial souls are all that exist ([[idealism]]).
* Immaterial souls exist and exert a non-deterministic causal influence on bodies (traditional free-will, [[Interactionism (philosophy of mind)|interactionist dualism]]).<ref>By "soul" is meant an autonomous immaterial agent that has the power to control the body but not to be controlled by the body (this theory of determinism thus conceives of conscious agents in [[mind–body dualism|dualistic]] terms). Therefore the soul stands to the activities of the individual agent's body as does the creator of the universe to the universe. The creator of the universe put in motion a deterministic system of material entities that would, if left to themselves, carry out the chain of events determined by ordinary causation. But the creator also provided for souls that could exert a causal force analogous to the primordial causal force and alter outcomes in the physical universe via the acts of their bodies. Thus, it emerges that no events in the physical universe are uncaused. Some are caused entirely by the original creative act and the way it plays itself out through time, and some are caused by the acts of created souls. But those created souls were not created by means of physical processes involving ordinary causation. They are another order of being entirely, gifted with the power to modify the original creation. However, determinism is not necessarily limited to matter; it can encompass energy as well. The question of how these immaterial entities can act upon material entities is deeply involved in what is generally known as the "[[mind–body problem]]". It is a significant problem which philosophers have not reached agreement about.</ref>{{Full citation needed|date=March 2025}}<ref>{{cite book| chapter-url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/| title = Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)| chapter = Free Will| year = 2022| publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref>
* Immaterial souls exist but are part of a deterministic framework.
* Immaterial souls exist, but exert no causal influence, free or determined ([[epiphenomenalism]], [[occasionalism]])
* Immaterial souls do not exist – there is no mind–body [[dichotomy]], and there is a [[Materialism|materialistic]] explanation for intuitions to the contrary.

=== With ethics and morality ===
Another topic of debate is the implication that determinism has on [[morality]].

Philosopher and incompatibilist [[Peter van Inwagen]] introduced this thesis, when arguments that free will is required for moral judgments, as such:<ref>{{cite book|last=van Inwagen|first=Peter|title=The Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will|publisher=Oxford|year=2009}}{{page needed|date=August 2021}}</ref>
# The moral judgment that ''X'' should not have been done implies that something else should have been done instead.
# That something else should have been done instead implies that there was something else to do.
# That there was something else to do, implies that something else could have been done.
# That something else could have been done implies that there is free will.
# If there is no free will to have done other than ''X'' we cannot make the moral judgment that ''X'' should not have been done.

== History ==
Determinism was developed by the Greek philosophers during the [[7th century BC|7th]] and [[6th century BC|6th]] centuries [[Common Era|BCE]] by the [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|Pre-socratic philosophers]] [[Heraclitus]] and [[Leucippus]], later [[Aristotle]], and mainly by the [[Stoicism|Stoics]]. Some of the main philosophers who have dealt with this issue are [[Marcus Aurelius]], [[Omar Khayyam]], [[Thomas Hobbes]], [[Baruch Spinoza]], [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Gottfried Leibniz]], [[David Hume]], [[Baron d'Holbach]] (Paul Heinrich Dietrich), [[Pierre-Simon Laplace]], [[Arthur Schopenhauer]], [[William James]], [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], [[Albert Einstein]], [[Niels Bohr]], [[Ralph Waldo Emerson]] and, more recently, [[John Searle]], [[Ted Honderich]], and [[Daniel Dennett]].

Mecca Chiesa notes that the [[Probability|probabilistic]] or selectionistic determinism of [[B. F. Skinner]] comprised a wholly separate conception of determinism that was not [[Mechanism (philosophy)|mechanistic]] at all. Mechanistic determinism assumes that every event has an unbroken chain of prior occurrences, but a selectionistic or probabilistic model does not.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chiesa |first=Mecca |title=Radical Behaviorism: The Philosophy and The Science. |date=1994 |publisher=Authors Cooperative |isbn=9780962331145 |location=Boston |oclc=30655079}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Ringen |first1=J. D. |year=1993 |title=Adaptation, Teleology, and Selection by Consequences |url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1901/jeab.1993.60-3 |journal=Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages=3–15 |doi=10.1901/jeab.1993.60-3 |issn=0022-5002 |oclc=5156682422 |pmc=1322142 |pmid=16812698 |via=Wiley Online Library}}</ref>

=== Western tradition ===
In the West, some elements of determinism have been expressed in Greece from the 6th century BCE by the [[Pre-Socratic philosophy|Presocratics]] [[Heraclitus]]<ref>Stobaeus ''Eclogae'' I 5 ([[Heraclitus]])</ref>{{Full citation needed|date=March 2025}} and [[Leucippus]].<ref>Stobaeus ''Eclogae'' I 4 ([[Leucippus]])</ref>{{Full citation needed|date=March 2025}} The first notions of determinism appears to originate with the [[Stoicism|Stoics]], as part of their theory of universal causal determinism.<ref>[[Susanne Bobzien]] ''Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy'' (Oxford 1998) chapter 1.</ref> The resulting philosophical debates, which involved the confluence of elements of Aristotelian Ethics with Stoic psychology, led in the 1st–3rd centuries CE in the works of [[Alexander of Aphrodisias]] to the first recorded Western debate over determinism and freedom,<ref>Susanne Bobzien ''The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem'' (Phronesis 43, 1998).</ref> an issue that is known in theology as the [[Argument from free will|paradox of free will]]. The writings of [[Epictetus]] as well as [[Middle Platonism|middle Platonist]] and early Christian thought were instrumental in this development.<ref>[[Michael Frede]] ''A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought'' (Berkeley 2011).</ref> Jewish philosopher [[Maimonides|Moses Maimonides]] said of the deterministic implications of an omniscient god:<ref>Though Moses Maimonides was not arguing against the existence of God, but rather for the incompatibility between the full ''exercise'' by God of his [[omniscience]] and genuine human [[free will]], his argument is considered by some as affected by modal fallacy.</ref> "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that [that] man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect."<ref name="maimonides">''The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics (Semonah Perakhim)'', edited, annotated, and translated with an Introduction by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, pp. 99–100. (New York: AMS Press), 1966.</ref>

==== Newtonian mechanics ====
{{Tone|section|date=April 2022}}
Determinism in the West is often associated with [[Classical mechanics|Newtonian mechanics/physics]], which depicts the physical matter of the universe as operating according to a set of fixed laws. The "billiard ball" hypothesis, a product of Newtonian physics, argues that once the initial conditions of the universe have been established, the rest of the history of the universe follows inevitably. If it were actually possible to have complete knowledge of physical matter and all of the laws governing that matter at any one time, then it would be theoretically possible to compute the time and place of every event that will ever occur (''[[Laplace's demon]]''). In this sense, the basic particles of the universe operate in the same fashion as the rolling balls on a billiard table, moving and striking each other in predictable ways to produce predictable results.

Whether or not it is all-encompassing in so doing, Newtonian mechanics deals only with caused events; for example, if an object begins in a known position and is hit dead on by an object with some known velocity, then it will be pushed straight toward another predictable point. If it goes somewhere else, the Newtonians argue, one must question one's measurements of the original position of the object, the exact direction of the striking object, gravitational or other fields that were inadvertently ignored, etc. Then, they maintain, repeated experiments and improvements in accuracy will always bring one's observations closer to the theoretically predicted results. When dealing with situations on an ordinary human scale, Newtonian physics has been successful. But it fails as velocities become some substantial fraction of the [[speed of light]] and when interactions at the atomic scale are studied. Before the discovery of [[Introduction to quantum mechanics|quantum]] effects and other challenges to Newtonian physics, "uncertainty" was always a term that applied to the accuracy of human knowledge about causes and effects, and not to the causes and effects themselves.

Newtonian mechanics, as well as any following physical theories, are results of observations and experiments, and so they describe "how it all works" within a tolerance. However, old western scientists believed if there are any logical connections found between an observed cause and effect, there must be also some absolute natural laws behind. Belief in perfect natural laws driving everything, instead of just describing what we should expect, led to searching for a set of universal simple laws that rule the world. This movement significantly encouraged deterministic views in Western philosophy,<ref>Swartz, Norman (2003) ''The Concept of Physical Law''. Chapter 10: "Free Will and Determinism" https://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/</ref> as well as the related theological views of [[classical pantheism]].

=== Eastern tradition ===
Throughout history, the [[belief]] that the entire [[universe]] is a [[Deterministic system (philosophy)|deterministic system]] subject to the will of [[fate]] or [[destiny]] has been articulated in both [[Eastern religions|Eastern]] and [[Western religions|Western]] religions, philosophy, music, and literature.<ref name="Iran. J. Public Health">{{cite journal |last1=Durmaz |first1=H. |last2=Çapik |first2=C. |date=March 2023 |title=Are Health Fatalism and Styles of Coping with Stress Affected by Poverty? A Field Study |journal=[[Iranian Journal of Public Health]] |publisher=[[Tehran University of Medical Sciences]] |volume=52 |issue=3 |pages=575–583 |doi=10.18502/ijph.v52i3.12140 |issn=2251-6093 |pmc=10135518 |pmid=37124894 |s2cid=257501917 |quote=Fatalism is the belief that everything an individual may encounter in his life is determined against his will and that this destiny cannot be changed by effort. In a fatalistic attitude, individuals believe that they cannot control their lives and that there is no point in making choices. Fatalism is a response to overwhelming threats that seem uncontrollable.}}</ref><ref name="SEP">{{cite encyclopedia |author-last=Rice |author-first=Hugh |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/fatalism/ |title=Fatalism |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-link=Edward N. Zalta |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |date=Winter 2018 |publisher=[[Center for the Study of Language and Information]] |location=[[Stanford University]] |access-date=5 April 2020}}</ref><ref name="Solomon 2003">{{cite journal |title=On Fate and Fatalism |author-last=Solomon |author-first=Robert C. |author-link=Robert C. Solomon |date=October 2003 |journal=[[Philosophy East and West]] |publisher=[[University of Hawaii Press]] |volume=53 |issue=4 |pages=435–454 |doi=10.1353/pew.2003.0047 |jstor=1399977 |s2cid=170753493}}</ref><ref name="Stambaugh 1994">{{cite book |author-last=Stambaugh |author-first=Joan |author-link=Joan Stambaugh |title=The Other Nietzsche |publisher=[[SUNY Press]] |year=1994 |isbn=9781438420929 |pages=79–81 |chapter=''Amor dei'' and ''Amor fati'': Spinoza and Nietzsche |quote= |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qytXzUMTEfQC&pg=PA79}}</ref><ref name="Taylor 1962">{{cite journal |title=Fatalism |author-last=Taylor |author-first=Richard |author-link=Richard Clyde Taylor |date=January 1962 |journal=[[The Philosophical Review]] |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] on behalf of the Sage School of Philosophy at [[Cornell University]] |volume=71 |issue=1 |pages=56–66 |doi=10.2307/2183681 |issn=1558-1470 |jstor=2183681}}</ref>

The ancient Arabs that inhabited the [[Arabian Peninsula]] [[Pre-Islamic Arabia|before the advent of Islam]] used to profess a widespread belief in [[fatalism]] (''ḳadar'') alongside a fearful consideration for [[Worship of heavenly bodies|the sky and the stars as divine beings]], which they held to be ultimately responsible for every phenomena that occurs on Earth and for the destiny of humankind.<ref name="Al-Abbasi 2020">{{cite journal |last=al-Abbasi |first=Abeer Abdullah |date=August 2020 |title=The Arabsʾ Visions of the Upper Realm |url=https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/ep/0004/article/view/8301/8105 |journal=[[Marburg Journal of Religion]] |publisher=[[University of Marburg]] |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=1–28 |doi=10.17192/mjr.2020.22.8301 |issn=1612-2941 |access-date=23 May 2022}}</ref> Accordingly, they shaped their entire lives in accordance with their [[Astrology|interpretations of astral configurations and phenomena]].<ref name="Al-Abbasi 2020"/>

In the ''[[I Ching]]'' and [[Taoism|philosophical Taoism]], the ebb and flow of favorable and unfavorable conditions suggests the path of least resistance is effortless (''see'': [[Wu wei]]). In the [[Indian philosophy|philosophical schools of the Indian Subcontinent]], the concept of ''[[karma]]'' deals with similar philosophical issues to the Western concept of determinism. Karma is understood as a spiritual mechanism which causes the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra'').<ref name="Bodewitz 2019">{{cite book |author-last=Bodewitz |author-first=Henk |year=2019 |chapter=Chapter 1 – The Hindu Doctrine of Transmigration: Its Origin and Background |editor1-last=Heilijgers |editor1-first=Dory H. |editor2-last=Houben |editor2-first=Jan E. M. |editor3-last=van Kooij |editor3-first=Karel |title=Vedic Cosmology and Ethics: Selected Studies |location=[[Leiden]] and [[Boston]] |publisher=[[Brill Publishers]] |series=Gonda Indological Studies |volume=19 |doi=10.1163/9789004400139_002 |doi-access=free |pages=3–19 |isbn=978-90-04-40013-9 |issn=1382-3442}}</ref> Karma, either positive or negative, accumulates according to an individual's actions throughout their life, and at their death determines the nature of their next life in the cycle of Saṃsāra.<ref name="Bodewitz 2019"/> Most [[Indian religions|major religions originating in India]] hold this belief to some degree, most notably [[Hinduism]],<ref name="Bodewitz 2019"/> [[Jainism]], [[Sikhism]], and [[Buddhism]].

The views on the interaction of karma and free will are numerous, and diverge from each other. For example, in [[Sikhism#Liberation|Sikhism]], god's grace, gained through worship, can erase one's karmic debts, a belief which reconciles the principle of karma with a monotheistic god one must freely choose to worship.<ref>House, H. Wayne. 1991. "Resurrection, Reincarnation, and Humanness." ''[[Bibliotheca Sacra]]'' 148 (590). Retrieved 29 November 2013.</ref> [[Karma in Jainism#Material theory|Jainists]] believe in [[compatibilism]], in which the cycle of Saṃsara is a completely mechanistic process, occurring without any divine intervention. The Jains hold an atomic view of reality, in which particles of karma form the fundamental microscopic building material of the universe.

=== Ājīvika ===
In [[ancient India]], the [[Ājīvika]] school of philosophy founded by [[Makkhali Gosala|Makkhali Gosāla]] (around 500 BCE), otherwise referred to as "Ājīvikism" in [[Indology|Western scholarship]],<ref name="Balcerowicz">{{cite book |last=Balcerowicz |first=Piotr |year=2016 |chapter=Determinism, Ājīvikas, and Jainism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nfOPCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA136 |title=Early Asceticism in India: Ājīvikism and Jainism |location=[[London]] and [[New York City|New York]] |publisher=[[Routledge]] |edition=1st |series=Routledge Advances in Jaina Studies |pages=136–174 |isbn=9781317538530 |quote=The Ājīvikas' doctrinal signature was indubitably the idea of determinism and [[fate]], which traditionally incorporated four elements: the doctrine of destiny (''niyati-vāda''), the doctrine of predetermined concurrence of factors (''saṅgati-vāda''), the doctrine of intrinsic nature (''svabhāva-vāda''), occasionally also linked to [[Charvaka|materialists]], and the doctrine of fate (''daiva-vāda''), or simply fatalism. The Ājīvikas' emphasis on fate and determinism was so profound that later sources would consistently refer to them as ''niyati-vādins'', or ‘the propounders of the doctrine of destiny’.}}</ref> upheld the ''Niyati'' ("[[Fate]]") doctrine of absolute [[fatalism]] or determinism,<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999">{{cite book |editor-last=Leaman |editor-first=Oliver |editor-link=Oliver Leaman |year=1999 |chapter=Fatalism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_4crBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 |title=Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy |location=[[London]] and [[New York City|New York]] |publisher=[[Routledge]] |edition=1st |series=Routledge Key Guides |pages=80–81 |isbn=9780415173636 |quote='''Fatalism.''' Some of the teachings of [[Indian philosophy]] are fatalistic. For example, the Ajivika school argued that fate (''nyati'') governs both the [[Saṃsāra|cycle of birth and rebirth]], and also individual lives. Suffering is not attributed to past actions, but just takes place without any cause or rationale, as does relief from suffering. There is nothing we can do to achieve '''''[[moksha]]''''', we just have to hope that all will go well with us. [...] But the Ajivikas were committed to '''[[asceticism]]''', and they justified this in terms of its practice being just as determined by fate as anything else.}}</ref><ref name="Basham 1981">{{cite book |author-last=Basham |author-first=Arthur L. |author-link=Arthur Llewellyn Basham |year=1981 |orig-date=1951 |chapter=Chapter XII: Niyati |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BiGQzc5lRGYC&pg=PA224 |title=History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, a Vanished Indian Religion |location=[[Delhi]] |publisher=[[Motilal Banarsidass]] |edition=1st |series=Lala L. S. Jain Series |pages=224–238 |isbn=9788120812048 |oclc=633493794 |quote=The fundamental principle of Ājīvika philosophy was Fate, usually called ''Niyati''. [[Buddhist texts|Buddhist]] and [[Jain literature|Jaina]] sources agree that [[Makkhali Gosala|Gosāla]] was a rigid determinist, who exalted ''Niyati'' to the status of the motive factor of the universe and the sole agent of all phenomenal change. This is quite clear in our ''locus classicus'', the ''[[Samaññaphala Sutta]]''. Sin and suffering, attributed by [[Āstika and nāstika|other sects]] to the laws of ''[[karma]]'', the result of evil committed in the previous lives or in the present one, were declared by Gosāla to be without cause or basis, other, presumably, than the force of destiny. Similarly, the escape from evil, the working off of accumulated evil ''karma'', was likewise without cause or basis.}}</ref> which negates the existence of [[free will]] and ''[[karma]]'', and is therefore considered one of the [[Āstika and nāstika|''nāstika'']] or "heterodox" schools of [[Indian philosophy]].<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> The oldest descriptions of the Ājīvika fatalists and their founder Gosāla can be found both in the [[Buddhist texts|Buddhist]] and [[Jain literature|Jaina]] scriptures of ancient India.<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> The predetermined fate of all sentient beings and the impossibility to achieve [[Moksha|liberation]] (''mokṣa'') from the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra'') was the major distinctive philosophical and [[Metaphysics|metaphysical doctrine]] of this heterodox school of Indian philosophy,<ref name="Balcerowicz"/><ref name="Leaman 1999"/><ref name="Basham 1981"/> annoverated among the other ''[[Śramaṇa]]'' movements that emerged in India during the [[History of India#Second urbanisation (c. 600 – 200 BCE)|Second urbanization]] (600–200 BCE).<ref name="Balcerowicz"/>

=== Buddhism ===
{{Buddhist Philosophy sidebar}}
{{Main|Enlightenment in Buddhism|Two truths doctrine}}
{{Further|Four stages of enlightenment|Sotāpanna|Three marks of existence}}

[[Buddhist philosophy]] contains several concepts which some scholars describe as deterministic to various levels. However, the direct analysis of Buddhist metaphysics through the lens of determinism is difficult, due to the differences between European and Buddhist traditions of thought.<ref name="Garfield 2014">{{cite book |author-last=Garfield |author-first=Jay L. |year=2014 |editor2-first=Edwin F. |chapter=Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency, and Ethics for Mādhyamikas |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ru0VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA172 |editor1-last=Dasti |editor1-first=Matthew R. |editor2-last=Bryant |title=Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy |location=Oxford and New York |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |pages=172–185 |doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199922734.003.0008 |isbn=9780199395675 |lccn=2013017925}}</ref>

One concept which is argued to support a hard determinism is the doctrine of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent origination]] (''pratītyasamutpāda'') in the [[early Buddhist texts]], which states that all [[Dharma|phenomena]] (''dharma'') are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to be ''dependent'' on, like links in a massive, never-ending chain; the basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things, which means that they are [[Śūnyatā|fundamentally "empty" or devoid of any intrinsic, eternal essence]] and therefore [[Impermanence (Buddhism)|are impermanent]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Thakchoe |first=Sonam |date=Summer 2022 |title=The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |url-status=live |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor-link=Edward N. Zalta |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab, [[Center for the Study of Language and Information]], [[Stanford University]] |issn=1095-5054 |oclc=643092515 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220528014845/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |archive-date=28 May 2022 |access-date=5 July 2022}}</ref> In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra''); all thoughts and actions exert a [[Karma|karmic force]] that attaches to the individual's [[consciousness]], which will manifest through [[Rebirth (Buddhism)|reincarnation]] and results in future lives.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In other words, righteous or unrighteous actions in one life will necessarily cause good or bad responses in another future life or more lives.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tricycle.org/magazine/dependent-origination/|title=Dependent Origination: The Twelve Links Explained|last=Goldstein|first=Joseph|website=Tricycle: The Buddhist Review|date=4 June 2008 |language=en|access-date=2020-01-26}}</ref> The early Buddhist texts and later [[Tibetan Buddhist canon|Tibetan Buddhist scriptures]] associate dependent arising with the fundamental Buddhist doctrines of [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] (''śūnyatā'') and [[Anatta|non-self]] (''anattā'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/>

Another Buddhist concept which many scholars perceive to be deterministic is the doctrine of [[Anatta|non-self]] (''anattā'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In Buddhism, [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|attaining enlightenment]] involves one realizing that neither in [[humans]] nor any other [[Sentient beings (Buddhism)|sentient beings]] there is a fundamental core of permanent being, identity, or personality which can be called the "soul", and that all sentient beings (including humans) are instead made of [[Skandha|several, constantly changing factors]] which bind them to the [[Saṃsāra|eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth]] (''saṃsāra'').<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/> Sentient beings are composed of the [[Skandha|five aggregates of existence]] (''skandha''): matter, sensation, perception, [[Mental factors (Buddhism)|mental formations]], and consciousness.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> In the ''[[Saṃyutta Nikāya]]'' of the [[Pali Canon|Pāli Canon]], the [[Gautama Buddha|historical Buddha]] is recorded as saying that "just as the word 'chariot' exists on the basis of the aggregation of parts, even so the concept of 'being' exists when the five aggregates are available."<ref>David Kalupahana, ''Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.'' The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 78.</ref> The early Buddhist texts outline different ways in which dependent origination is a middle way between different sets of "extreme" views (such as "[[Monism|monist]]" and "[[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralist]]" ontologies or [[Materialism|materialist]] and [[Mind–body dualism|dualist]] views of mind-body relation).<ref>Choong, Mun-keat (2000). ''The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama'', pp. 192-197. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.</ref> In the ''[[Kaccānagotta Sutta]]'' of the [[Pali Canon|Pāli Canon]] ([[Saṃyutta Nikāya|SN]] 12.15, parallel at [[Āgama (Buddhism)#Saṃyukta Āgama|SA]] 301), the [[Gautama Buddha|historical Buddha]] stated that "this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence" and then explains the right view as follows:<ref name=":34">Choong, Mun-keat (2000). ''The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study Based on the Sutranga Portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama,'' p. 192. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.</ref>
{{Blockquote|But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of existence regarding the world.<ref name=":35">Kaccānagottasutta SN 12.15 SN ii 16, translated by Bhikkhu Sujato https://suttacentral.net/sn12.15/en/sujato</ref>}}

Some Western scholars argue that the concept of non-self necessarily disproves the ideas of [[free will]] and [[moral responsibility]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Repetti 2012"/> If there is no autonomous self, in this view, and all events are necessarily and unchangeably caused by others, then no type of autonomy can be said to exist, moral or otherwise.<ref name="Repetti 2012"/> However, other scholars disagree, claiming that the [[Buddhist cosmology|Buddhist conception of the universe]] allows for a form of [[compatibilism]].<ref name="Garfield 2014"/> Buddhism perceives reality occurring on [[Two truths doctrine|two different levels]]: the [[Nirvana|ultimate reality]], which can only be truly understood by the [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|enlightened ones]], and the [[Maya (religion)#Buddhism|illusory or false reality of the material world]], which is considered to be "real" or "true" by those who are [[Avidyā (Buddhism)|ignorant about the nature of metaphysical reality]]; i.e., those who still haven't achieved enlightenment.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/> Therefore, Buddhism perceives free will as a notion belonging to the [[Three marks of existence|illusory belief in the unchanging self or personhood]] that pertains to the false reality of the material world, while concepts like non-self and dependent origination belong to the ultimate reality; the transition between the two can be truly understood, Buddhists claim, by one who has attained enlightenment.<ref name="Garfield 2014"/><ref name="Stanford 2022"/><ref name="Repetti 2012">{{cite journal |last=Repetti |first=Ricardo |date=2012 |title=Buddhist Hard Determinism: No Self, No Free Will, No Responsibility |url=http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-MAG/mag388415.pdf |journal=Journal of Buddhist Ethics |volume=19 |pages=136–137, 143–145}}</ref>

== Modern scientific perspective ==
=== Generative processes ===
{{Main|Emergence}}

Although it was once thought by scientists that any indeterminism in quantum mechanics occurred at too small a scale to influence biological or neurological systems, there is indication that [[nervous system]]s are influenced by quantum indeterminism due to [[chaos theory]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lewis |first1=Edwin R. |last2=Macgregor |first2=Ronald J. |date=2006-06-01 |title=On indeterminism, chaos, and small number particle systems in the brain |url=https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219635206001112 |journal=Journal of Integrative Neuroscience |volume=05 |issue=2 |pages=223–247 |doi=10.1142/S0219635206001112 |pmid=16783870 |issn=0219-6352|url-access=subscription }}</ref> It is unclear what implications this has for the problem of [[free will]] given various possible reactions to the problem in the first place.<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1142/S0219635206001112 | last=Lewis | first=E.R. |author2=MacGregor, R.J. | year=2006 | title=On Indeterminism, Chaos, and Small Number Particle Systems in the Brain | journal=[[Journal of Integrative Neuroscience]] | volume=5 | issue=2 | pages=223–247 |url=http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110608034826/http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~lewis/LewisMacGregor.pdf |archive-date=2011-06-08 |url-status=live | citeseerx=10.1.1.361.7065 | pmid=16783870 }}</ref> Many biologists do not grant determinism: [[Christof Koch]], for instance, argues against it, and in favour of [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian free will]], by making arguments based on generative processes ([[emergence]]).<ref name=Koch>{{cite book |last1=Koch |first1=Christof |author-link1=Christof Koch |editor1-first=Nancy|editor1-last=Murphy |editor2-first=George |editor2-last=Ellis |editor3-first=Timothy|editor3-last=O'Connor |title=Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will |year=2009 |publisher=[[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] |location=New York|isbn=978-3-642-03204-2 |chapter=Free Will, Physics, Biology and the Brain|bibcode=2009dcnf.book.....M }}</ref> Other proponents of emergentist or [[Generative science|generative philosophy]], [[cognitive science]]s, and [[evolutionary psychology]], argue that a certain form of determinism (not necessarily causal) is true.<ref name="Kenrick">{{cite journal | last1 = Kenrick | first1 = D. T. | last2 = Li | first2 = N. P. | last3 = Butner | first3 = J. | year = 2003 | title = Dynamical evolutionary psychology: Individual decision rules and emergent social norms | url = http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/normanli/KenrickLiButner2003.pdf| journal = Psychological Review | volume = 110 | issue = 1| pages = 3–28 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.3 | pmid=12529056| citeseerx = 10.1.1.526.5218 | s2cid = 43306158 }}</ref><ref name="Nowak">Nowak A., Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W., (2000) "Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure", Psychological Review 107.</ref><ref name="Axtell">{{Cite book |last1=Epstein |first1=Joshua M. |title=Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up |last2=Axtell |first2=Robert |date=1996 |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |isbn=9780262272360 |location=Washington, D.C. |language=en |oclc=42854515}}</ref><ref name="Epstein">Epstein J.M. (1999) "Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science". ''Complexity'', IV (5)</ref> They suggest instead that an [[Illusionism (free will)|illusion of free will]] is experienced due to the generation of infinite behaviour from the interaction of finite-deterministic set of rules and [[parameter]]s. Thus the unpredictability of the emerging behaviour from deterministic processes leads to a perception of free will, even though free will as an [[Ontology|ontological]] entity does not exist.<ref name= "Kenrick"/><ref name= "Nowak"/><ref name= "Axtell"/><ref name= "Epstein"/>

[[File:Gospers glider gun.gif|thumb|An animation of [[Conway's Game of Life]], where the interaction of just four simple rules creates patterns that seem somehow "alive"]]

As an illustration, the strategy board-games [[chess]] and [[Go (game)|Go]] have rigorous rules in which no information (such as cards' face-values) is hidden from either player and no [[randomness|random]] events (such as dice-rolling) happen within the game. Yet, chess and especially Go with its extremely simple deterministic rules, can still have an extremely large number of unpredictable moves. When chess is simplified to 7 or fewer pieces, however, endgame tables are available that dictate which moves to play to achieve a perfect game. This implies that, given a less complex environment (with the original 32 pieces reduced to 7 or fewer pieces), a perfectly predictable game of chess is possible. In this scenario, the winning player can announce that a checkmate will happen within a given number of moves, assuming a perfect defense by the losing player, or fewer moves if the defending player chooses sub-optimal moves as the game progresses into its inevitable, predicted conclusion. By this analogy, it is suggested, the experience of free will emerges from the interaction of finite rules and deterministic parameters that generate nearly infinite and practically unpredictable behavioural responses. In theory, if all these events could be accounted for, and there were a known way to evaluate these events, the seemingly unpredictable behaviour would become predictable.<ref name= "Kenrick"/><ref name= "Nowak"/><ref name= "Axtell"/><ref name= "Epstein"/> Another hands-on example of generative processes is [[John Horton Conway]]'s playable [[Conway's Game of Life|Game of Life]].<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.bitstorm.org/gameoflife/| title = John Conway's Game of Life}}</ref> [[Nassim Nicholas Taleb|Nassim Taleb]] is wary of such models, and coined the term "[[ludic fallacy]]."

=== Compatibility with the existence of science ===
Certain [[philosophy of science|philosophers of science]] argue that, while causal determinism (in which everything including the brain/mind is subject to the laws of causality) is compatible with minds capable of science, fatalism and predestination is not. These philosophers make the distinction that causal determinism means that each step is determined by the step before and therefore allows sensory input from observational data to determine what conclusions the [[brain]] reaches, while fatalism in which the steps between do not connect an initial cause to the results would make it impossible for observational data to correct false hypotheses. This is often combined with the argument that if the brain had fixed views and the arguments were mere after-constructs with no causal effect on the conclusions, science would have been impossible and the use of arguments would have been a meaningless waste of energy with no persuasive effect on brains with fixed views.<ref>Karl Popper: ''Conjectures and rRefutations''{{page needed|date=August 2021}}</ref>

=== Mathematical models ===
Many [[mathematical model]]s of physical systems are deterministic. This is true of most models involving [[differential equation]]s (notably, those measuring rate of change over time). Mathematical models that are not deterministic because they involve randomness are called [[stochastic]]. Because of [[Butterfly effect|sensitive dependence on initial conditions]], some deterministic models may appear to behave non-deterministically; in such cases, a deterministic interpretation of the model may not be useful due to [[Numerical stability|numerical instability]] and a finite amount of [[accuracy and precision|precision]] in measurement. Such considerations can motivate the consideration of a stochastic model even though the underlying system is governed by deterministic equations.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Werndl | first1 = Charlotte | year = 2009 | title = Are Deterministic Descriptions and Indeterministic Descriptions Observationally Equivalent? | doi = 10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.06.004 | journal = Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics | volume = 40 | issue = 3| pages = 232–242 | bibcode = 2009SHPMP..40..232W | arxiv = 1310.1615 | s2cid = 11515304 }}</ref><ref>Werndl, Charlotte (2009). ''[http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004775/ Deterministic Versus Indeterministic Descriptions: Not That Different After All?]''. In: A. Hieke and H. Leitgeb (eds), "Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis", ''Proceedings of the 31st International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium''. Ontos, 63–78.</ref><ref>J. Glimm, D. Sharp, ''Stochastic Differential Equations: Selected Applications in Continuum Physics'', in: R.A. Carmona, B. Rozovskii (ed.) ''Stochastic Partial Differential Equations: Six Perspectives'', American Mathematical Society (1998) {{ISBN|0-8218-0806-0}}{{page needed|date=August 2021}}</ref>

=== Quantum and classical mechanics ===
==== Classical theories ====
{{Further|Macroscopic quantum phenomena}}

Since the beginning of the 20th century, quantum mechanics—the physics of the extremely small—has revealed previously concealed aspects of [[Phenomenon|event]]s. Before that, [[classical mechanics|Newtonian physics]]—the physics of everyday life—dominated. Taken in isolation (rather than as an [[approximation]] to quantum mechanics), Newtonian physics depicts a universe in which objects move in perfectly determined ways. At the scale where humans exist and interact with the universe, Newtonian mechanics remain useful, and make relatively accurate predictions (e.g. calculating the trajectory of a bullet). But whereas in theory, [[Universality (philosophy)|absolute knowledge]] of the forces accelerating a bullet would produce an absolutely accurate prediction of its path, modern quantum mechanics casts reasonable doubt on this main thesis of determinism.

This doubt takes radically different forms. The observed results of quantum mechanics are random but various [[interpretations of quantum mechanics]] make different assumptions about determinism which cannot be distinguished experimentally. The standard interpretation widely used by physicists is not deterministic, but the other interpretations have been devised which are deterministic.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Hoefer |first=Carl |date=2024 |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri |title=Causal Determinism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ |access-date=2025-03-03 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> 

==== Standard quantum mechanics ====
[[File:Feynman paths.png|thumb|These are five of the infinitely many paths available for a particle to move from point A at time t to point B at time t’(>t).]]

Quantum mechanics is the product of a careful application of the [[scientific method]], [[logic]] and [[empiricism]]. Through a large number of careful experiments physicists developed a rather unintuitive mental model: A particle's path cannot be specified in from its quantum description. "Path" is a classical, practical attribute in everyday life, but one that quantum particles do not possess. Quantum mechanics attributes probability to all possible paths and asserts the only one outcome will be observed. 

The randomness in quantum mechanics derives from the quantum aspect of the model. Different experimental results are obtained for each individual quanta. Only the probability can predicted.<ref name="Peres-2002">{{Cite book |last=Asher |first=Peres |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/0-306-47120-5 |title=Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods |date=2002 |publisher=Springer Netherlands |isbn=978-0-7923-3632-7 |editor-last=Peres |editor-first=Asher |location=Dordrecht |language=en |doi=10.1007/0-306-47120-5|bibcode=2002qtcm.book.....P }}</ref>{{rp|7}}
As [[Stephen Hawking]] explains, the result is not traditional determinism, but rather determined probabilities.<ref name="GDesign">{{Cite book |last1=Hawking |first1=Stephen |title=The Grand Design |last2=Mlodinow |first2=Leonard |publisher=[[Bantam Books]] |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-553-80537-6 |editor-link=Stephen Hawking |location=New York |page=32 |oclc=654183639}}</ref> As far as the thesis of determinism is concerned, these probabilities, at least, are quite determined. 

[[File:Double-slit experiment results Tanamura 2.jpg|thumb|right|Although it is not possible to predict the arrival position or time for any particle, probabilities of arrival predict the final pattern of events.]]

On the topic of predictable probabilities, the [[double-slit experiment]]s are a popular example. [[Photon]]s are fired one-by-one through a double-slit apparatus at a distant screen. They do not arrive at any single point, nor even the two points lined up with the slits (the way it might be expected of bullets fired by a fixed gun at a distant target). Instead, the photons arrive in varying concentrations and times across the screen, and only the final distribution of photons can be predicted. In that sense the behavior of light in this apparatus is predictable, but there is no way to predict where or when in the resulting [[Wave interference|interference]] pattern any single [[photon]] will make its contribution.

Some (including [[Albert Einstein]]) have argued that the inability to predict any more than probabilities is simply due to ignorance.<ref>[[Albert Einstein]] insisted that, "I am convinced God does not play dice" in a private letter to [[Max Born]], 4 December 1926, [http://www.alberteinstein.info/db/ViewDetails.do?DocumentID=38009 Albert Einstein Archives] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100819045822/http://www.alberteinstein.info/db/ViewDetails.do?DocumentID=38009 |date=19 August 2010 }} reel 8, item 180</ref> The idea is that, beyond the conditions and laws can be observed or deduced, there are also hidden factors or "[[Hidden-variable theory|hidden variables]]" that determine ''absolutely'' in which order photons reach the detector screen. They argue that the course of the universe is absolutely determined, but that humans are screened from knowledge of the determinative factors. So, they say, it only ''appears'' that things proceed in a probabilistically way. 

[[John Stewart Bell|John S. Bell]] analyzed Einstein's work in his famous [[Bell's theorem]], which demonstrates that quantum mechanics can makes statistical predictions that would be violated if local hidden variables really existed. Many experiments have verified the quantum predictions.<ref name="Markoff">{{cite news |last=Markoff |first=Jack |title=Sorry, Einstein. Quantum Study Suggests 'Spooky Action' Is Real. |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/science/quantum-theory-experiment-said-to-prove-spooky-interactions.html |date=21 October 2015 |work=[[New York Times]] |accessdate=21 October 2015 }}</ref><ref name="Hensen et al.">{{cite journal|last1=Hensen|title=Loophole-free Bell inequality violation using electron spins separated by 1.3 kilometres|journal=Nature|volume=526|issue=7575|pages=682–686|doi=10.1038/nature15759|display-authors=etal|bibcode = 2015Natur.526..682H|pmid=26503041|year=2015|arxiv=1508.05949|s2cid=205246446 }}</ref>

=== Other interpretations ===
Bell's theorem only applies to [[Principle of locality|local]] hidden variables. Quantum mechanics can be formulated with non-local hidden variables to achieve a deterministic theory that is in agreement with experiment.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jabs |first1=Arthur |year=2016 |title=A conjecture concerning determinism, reduction, and measurement in quantum mechanics |journal=Quantum Studies: Mathematics and Foundations |volume=3 |issue=4 |pages=279–292 |arxiv=1204.0614 |doi=10.1007/s40509-016-0077-7 |bibcode=2016QSMF....3..279J |s2cid=32523066}}</ref> An example is the [[De Broglie–Bohm theory|Bohm interpretation]] of quantum mechanics. Bohm's Interpretation, though, violates special relativity and it is highly controversial whether or not it can be reconciled without giving up on determinism.

The [[Many worlds]] interpretation focuses on the deterministic nature of the [[Schrodinger's equation]]. For any closed system, including the entire universe, the wavefunction solutions to this equation evolve deterministically. The apparent randomness of observations corresponds to branching of the wavefunction, with one world for each possible outcome.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Vaidman |first=Lev |date=2021 |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |title=Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/ |access-date=2025-03-03 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> 

Another foundational assumption to quantum mechanics is that of [[free will]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zeilinger |first=Anton |title=Dance of the Photons: From Einstein to Quantum Teleportation |publisher=Farrar, Straus and Giroux |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-374-23966-4 |edition= |location=New York |page=261 |quote=A new picture of the world must encompass three properties that evidently seem to play a significant role in quantum experiments[...]The second important property of the world that we always implicitly assume is the freedom of the individual experimentalist. This is the assumption of free will. It is a free decision what measurement one wants to perform.}}</ref> which has been argued to be foundational to the scientific method as a whole.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Gisin |first=Nicolas |title=Quantum Chance: Nonlocality, Teleportation and Other Quantum Marvels |publisher=Sringer International Publishing |year=2014 |isbn=978-3-319-05472-8 |location=Switzerland |page=90 |quote=not only does free will exist, but it is a prerequisite for science, philosophy, and our very ability to think rationally in a meaningful way. Without free will, there could be no rational thought. As a consequence, it is quite simply impossible for science and philosophy to deny free will.}}</ref> Bell acknowledged that abandoning this assumption would both allow for the maintenance of determinism as well as locality.<ref>BBC Radio interview with Paul Davies, 1985: "''There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the 'decision' by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears."''

</ref>{{Citation needed|date=March 2025}} This perspective is known as [[superdeterminism]], and is defended by some physicists such as [[Sabine Hossenfelder]] and [[Tim Palmer (physicist)|Tim Palmer]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hossenfelder|first1=Sabine|last2=Palmer|first2=Tim|date=2020|title=Rethinking Superdeterminism|journal=Frontiers in Physics|volume=8|article-number=139|language=English|doi=10.3389/fphy.2020.00139|arxiv=1912.06462|bibcode=2020FrP.....8..139P|issn=2296-424X|doi-access=free}}</ref>

More advanced variations on these arguments include [[quantum contextuality]], by Bell, [[Simon B. Kochen]] and [[Ernst Specker]], which argues that hidden variable theories cannot be "sensible", meaning that the values of the hidden variables inherently depend on the devices used to measure them.

This debate is relevant because there are possibly specific situations in which the arrival of an electron at a screen at a certain point and time would trigger one event, whereas its arrival at another point would trigger an entirely different event (e.g. see [[Schrödinger's cat]]—a thought experiment used as part of a deeper debate).

In his 1939 address "The Relation between Mathematics and Physics",<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dirac |first=P. A. M. |date=1940 |title=XI.—The Relation between Mathematics and Physics |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0370164600012207/type/journal_article |journal=Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh |language=en |volume=59 |pages=122–129 |doi=10.1017/S0370164600012207 |issn=0370-1646|url-access=subscription }}</ref> [[Paul Dirac]] pointed out that purely deterministic classical mechanics cannot explain the cosmological origins of the universe; today the early universe is modeled quantum mechanically.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lehners |first=Jean-Luc |date=June 2023 |title=Review of the no-boundary wave function |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0370157323001904 |journal=Physics Reports |language=en |volume=1022 |pages=1–82 |doi=10.1016/j.physrep.2023.06.002|arxiv=2303.08802 |bibcode=2023PhR..1022....1L }}</ref>

Nevertheless, the question of determinism in modern physics remains debated. On one hand, [[Albert Einstein]]'s [[theory of relativity]], which represents an advancement over Newtonian mechanics, is based on a deterministic framework. On the other hand, Einstein himself resisted the indeterministic view of quantum mechanics, as evidenced by his famous debates with [[Niels Bohr]], which continued until his death.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bishop |first1=Robert C. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Free Will |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-0195399691 |editor1-last=Kane |editor1-first=Robert |edition=2nd |location=Oxford & New York |page=90 |chapter=Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will |oclc=653483691 |quote= |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kzcFDsWg0GEC&pg=PA90}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Baggott |first1=Jim E. |title=Beyond Measure: Modern Physics, Philosophy, and the Meaning of Quantum Theory |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-19-852536-3 |location=Oxford & New York |page=203 |chapter=Complementarity and Entanglement |oclc=52486237 |quote= |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uVdjwsqrgz8C&q=scientific+consensus+determinism+bell+theorem&pg=PA203}}</ref>

Moreover, [[chaos theory]] highlights that even within a deterministic framework, the ability to precisely predict the evolution of a system is often limited. A deterministic system may appear random: two apparently identical starting points can result in vastly different results. Such [[dynamical systems]] are sensitive to [[initial conditions]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lorenz |first=Edward N. |title=The Essence of Chaos |date=2008 |publisher=Univ. of Washington Press |isbn=978-0-295-97514-6 |edition=Nachdr. |series=The Jessie and John Danz Lectures |location=Seattle}}</ref>{{rp|8}} Even if the universe followed a strict deterministic order, the human capacity to predict every event and comprehend all underlying causes would still be constrained this kind of sensitivity.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lorenzo |first=Edward |url=https://www.worldcat.org/title/ocm46653646 |title=The chaos avant-garde: memories of the early days of chaos theory |date=2000 |publisher=World Scientific |isbn=978-981-02-4404-0 |editor-last=Abraham |editor-first=Ralph |series=World Scientific series on nonlinear science. Series A |location=Singapore ; River Edge, NJ |chapter=The butterfly effect |oclc=ocm46653646 |editor-last2=Ueda |editor-first2=Yoshisuke}}</ref>{{rp|91}}

Adequate determinism (see [[#Varieties|Varieties]], above) is the reason that Stephen Hawking called [[Libertarianism (metaphysics)|libertarian free will]] "just an illusion".<ref name="GDesign"/>

== References ==
=== Notes ===
{{Reflist}}

=== Bibliography ===
{{Refbegin}}
* {{Cite book |last=Dennett |first=Daniel C. |title=Freedom Evolves |date=2003 |publisher=Viking |isbn=9780670031863 |location=New York |language=en |oclc=50339840}}
* {{Cite book |last=Earman |first=John |title=Philosophy of Physics |publisher=Elsevier B.V. |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-444-51560-5 |editor-last=Butterfield |editor-first=Jeremy |location=North Amsterdam, Amsterdam |pages=1369–1434 |language=en |chapter=Aspects of Determinism in Modern Physics |doi=10.1016/B978-044451560-5/50017-8 |oclc=162695073 |editor-last2=Earman |editor-first2=John}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Ellis |first=George F. R. |date=2006 |title=Physics and the Real World |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-005-9016-x |journal=Foundations of Physics |volume=36 |issue=2 |pages=227–262 |doi=10.1007/s10701-005-9016-x |bibcode=2006FoPh...36..227E |issn=0015-9018 |oclc=5649285161|url-access=subscription }}
* {{cite journal | last1 = Epstein | first1 = J.M. | year = 1999 | title = Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science | journal = Complexity | volume = IV | issue = 5| pages = 41–60 | doi=10.1002/(sici)1099-0526(199905/06)4:5<41::aid-cplx9>3.0.co;2-f| bibcode = 1999Cmplx...4e..41E| citeseerx = 10.1.1.118.546 }}
* {{Cite book |last1=Epstein |first1=Joshua M. |title=Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science From the Bottom Up |last2=Axtell |first2=Robert |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |year=1996 |isbn=9780262050531 |location=Washington, D.C. |oclc=35068114}}
*Harris, James A. (2005) ''Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy.'' Clarendon Press.
* {{cite journal | last1 = Kenrick | first1 = D. T. | last2 = Li | first2 = N. P. | last3 = Butner | first3 = J. | year = 2003 | title = Dynamical evolutionary psychology: Individual decision rules and emergent social norms | url = http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/normanli/KenrickLiButner2003.pdf| journal = Psychological Review | volume = 110 | issue = 1| pages = 3–28 | doi=10.1037/0033-295x.110.1.3 | pmid=12529056| citeseerx = 10.1.1.526.5218 | s2cid = 43306158 }}
* [[Albert Messiah]], ''Quantum Mechanics'', English translation by G. M. Temmer of ''Mécanique Quantique'', 1966, John Wiley and Sons, vol. I, chapter IV, section III.
* {{cite journal |author=Ernest Nagel |title=Determinism in history
|journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
|volume=20
|issue=3
|pages=291–317
|date=3 March 1960 
|doi=10.2307/2105051
 |jstor=2105051}} (Online version [http://www.drabruzzi.com/NAGEL_Determinism%20In%20History.pdf found here])
* {{cite book |title=The Philosophy of Science: A–M |editor1=Sahotra Sarkar |editor2=Jessica Pfeifer |author=John T Roberts |chapter=Determinism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UchIDBrAQEMC&pg=PA197 |pages=197 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0415977098 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2006}}
* Nowak A., Vallacher R.R., Tesser A., Borkowski W., (2000) "Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure", ''Psychological Review'' 107.
{{Refend}}

== Further reading ==
* [[George Musser]], "Is the Cosmos Random?  ([[Albert Einstein|Einstein]]'s assertion that God does not play dice with the universe has been misinterpreted)", ''[[Scientific American]]'', vol. 313, no. 3 (September 2015), pp.&nbsp;88–93.
* {{Cite book |last=Sapolsky |first=Robert M. |author-link=Robert Sapolsky |title=[[Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will]] |publisher=[[Penguin Press]] |location=New York |year=2023 |isbn=978-0-5255-6097-5}}

== External links ==
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Commons category}}
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Causal Determinism]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20050404080900/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv2-02 Determinism in History] from the ''Dictionary of the History of Ideas''
* [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwIntroIndex.htm Philosopher Ted Honderich's Determinism web resource]
* [http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/determinism.html Determinism on Information Philosopher]
* [http://www.determinism.com The Society of Natural Science] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126101052/http://www.determinism.com/ |date=26 January 2021 }}
* [http://www.chabad.org/article.asp?AID=3017 Determinism and Free Will in Judaism]
* [http://www.jottings.ca/john/cogitations.html Snooker, Pool, and Determinism]

{{Determinism}}

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