View source for Cross-strait relations

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{{Short description|Bilateral relations between China and Taiwan}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2023}}
{{Infobox bilateral relations|Cross–strait|map=PRC-ROC Locator.svg|CHN|TWN }}
{{Infobox Chinese
| s = 两岸关系
| t = 兩岸關係
| showflag = stp
| w = {{tonesup|Liang3-an4 kuan1-hsi4}}
| p = Liǎng'àn guānxì
| tp = Liǎng-àn guansì
| mps = Liǎng'àn guānshì
| gr = Leang'ann guanshih
| poj = Lióng-gān koan-hē
| tl = Lióng-gān kuan-hē
| h = Lióng-ngan kôan-he
| j = Loeng5 ngon6 gwaan1 hai6
| s2 = 海峡两岸关系
| t2 = 海峽兩岸關係
| showflag2 = stp
| w2 = Hai3-hsia2 Liang3-an4 kuan1-hsi4
| p2 = Hǎixiá Liǎng'àn guānxì
| tp2 = Hǎisiá Liǎng-àn guansì
| mps2 = Hǎishiá Liǎng'àn guānshì
| gr2 = Haeshya Leang'ann guanshih
| poj2 = Hái-kiap Lióng-gān koan-hē
| tl2 = Hái-kiap Lióng-gān kuan-hē
| h2 = Hói-kia̍p Lióng-ngan kôan-he
| j2 = Hoi2 haap6 Loeng5 ngon6 gwaan1 hai6
| s3 = 台海关系
| t3 = 臺海關係
| l3 = [[Taiwan Strait]] relations
| p3 = Táihǎi guān xì
| w3 = Tʻai2-hai3 kuan1-hsi4
| s4 = 陆台关系
| t4 = 陸臺關係
| l4 = Mainland–Taiwan relations
| p4 = Lù-Tái guān xì
| w4 = Lu4-Tʻai2 kuan1-hsi4
| s5 = 中台关系
| t5 = 中臺關係
| l5 = China–Taiwan relations
| p5 = Zhōng-Tái guān xì
| w5 = Chung1-Tʻai2 kuan1-hsi4
}}
'''Cross-strait relations''' (sometimes called '''Mainland–Taiwan relations''',<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gold |first=Thomas B. |title = The Status Quo is Not Static: Mainland-Taiwan Relations |journal=Asian Survey |date=March 1987 |volume=27 |issue=3 |pages=300–315 |doi=10.2307/2644806 |jstor=2644806 }}</ref> '''China–Taiwan relations''', '''PRC–ROC relations''', '''ROC–PRC relations''', or '''Taiwan–China relations'''<ref>{{cite news |last1=Blanchard |first1=Ben |last2=Lee |first2=Yimou |title=Factbox: Key facts on Taiwan-China relations ahead of Taiwan elections |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-election-factbox/factbox-key-facts-on-taiwan-china-relations-ahead-of-taiwan-elections-idUSKBN1Z3019 |access-date=7 June 2020 |work=[[Reuters]] |date=3 January 2020 |archive-date=6 April 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200406224537/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-election-factbox/factbox-key-facts-on-taiwan-china-relations-ahead-of-taiwan-elections-idUSKBN1Z3019 |url-status=live }}</ref>) are the political and economic relations between [[China]] (officially the People's Republic of China or PRC) and [[Taiwan]] (officially the Republic of China or ROC) across the [[Taiwan Strait]]. Due to the existing controversy over the status of Taiwan and the [[Chinese legitimacy question]], they are also not defined as [[diplomatic relations]] by either side.

The relationship has been complex and controversial due to the dispute regarding the [[political status of Taiwan]] after the island's administration was transferred from [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Japan]] to the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] in 1945, and the split between the PRC and ROC in 1949 as a result of the [[retreat of the government of Republic of China to Taiwan|ROC's retreat to the island]] after losing the [[Chinese Civil War]]. The essential questions are whether the two governments are still in a state of civil war over [[One China]], each holding one of two "regions" or parts of the same country (i.e. "[[one nation, two states]]"); whether they can be [[Chinese unification|unified]] under a "[[one country, two systems]]" framework; or whether they are now separate countries (either as [[Two Chinas]], or as "[[one China, one Taiwan]]"). The English expression "cross-strait relations" is considered to be a neutral term that avoids reference to the political status of either side.

After the [[Japanese surrender]] at the end of the [[Second World War]] in 1945, the administration of Taiwan was transferred from the [[Empire of Japan]] (who had [[Treaty of Shimonoseki|annexed Taiwan as a spoil of war]] through the [[First Sino-Japanese War]]) to the Republic of China, who was one of the "[[Four Policemen|Big Four]]" of [[Allies of World War II|Allied Nations]], although questions remain regarding the legal language used in the [[Treaty of San Francisco]]. In 1949, with the Chinese Civil War turning decisively in favor of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP), the [[National Government of the Republic of China|Republic of China Government]] led by the [[Nationalist Party of China]] ([[Kuomintang]], or KMT) evacuated to Taiwan and established a provisional capital in [[Taipei]], while still claiming to be the legitimate government of all of China. The CCP [[proclamation of the People's Republic of China|proclaimed the establishment]] of the [[Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (1949-1954)|Central People's Government]] with [[Beijing]] as the capital, and the [[People's Liberation Army]] (PLA) subsequently conquered and quelled all of mainland China, although the [[Battle of Kinmen|disastrous landing attempt at Kinmen]], the unexpected outbreak of the [[Korean War]] and the subsequent [[Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China|American involvement]] halted any further plans to invade Taiwan. The two sides then entered decades of stalemate and ''de facto'' [[ceasefire]] with sporadic episodes of naval skirmishes and island [[artillery barrage|shelling]]s, but no [[armistice]] or [[peace treaty]] has ever been signed, and debate continues as to whether the civil war has legally ended.<ref>{{cite book |title = The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict |first = Leslie C. |last = Green |year = 1993 |page=79 |publisher = Manchester University Press |isbn = 9780719035401 |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=vTaPAAAAMAAJ&q=Chinese |access-date = 24 August 2021}}</ref>

Since then, the relations between the governments in Beijing and Taipei have been characterized by limited contact, tensions, and instability. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the "[[Exclusive mandate#Mainland China and Taiwan|legitimate government]] of China". Since the democratization of Taiwan, the question regarding the [[political status of Taiwan|political and legal status of Taiwan]] has shifted focus to the choice between [[Chinese unification|political unification with the mainland]] or ''de jure'' [[Taiwanese independence]]. The PRC remains hostile to any formal declaration of independence and maintains its claim over Taiwan, citing its status as the only internationally recognized government of all of China since the [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758]] in 1971.

The administration of cross-strait relations of both sides are independent from the official diplomatic system. The Taiwanese government established the [[Mainland Affairs Council]] led by the [[Executive Yuan]], and China established the [[Taiwan Affairs Office]] in both the [[State Council of the People's Republic of China|State Council]] and the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Central Committee]], while the top decision-making body is [[Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs]] of the CCP. The communication between both sides are through two semi-official institutions: [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] by the ROC side, and the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits]] by the PRC side.

== History ==
=== Timeline ===
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|row1-1-text='''[[History of Taiwan|Taiwan]]'''
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|row1-1-at=1620
|row1-2-text=[[Siege of Fort Zeelandia|Siege of Zeelandia]]
|row1-2-at=1661
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|row1-3-text=[[Battle of Penghu]]
|row1-3-at=1683
|row1-4-text=[[Treaty of Tientsin|Opening of Taiwanese ports]]
|row1-4-at=1858.5
|row1-4-shift=-8em
|row1-5-text=[[Treaty of Shimonoseki]]
|row1-5-at=1895.3
|row1-5-shift=-2em
|row1-6-text=[[Surrender of Japan]]
|row1-6-at=1945.7
|row1-6-shift=-1em
|row1-7-text=Democratization
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|row2-1-text={{nowrap|[[Dutch Formosa|Dutch]] & [[Spanish Formosa|Spanish]]}}<br />{{flagicon|Netherlands}}&nbsp;{{flagicon|Spain|1506}}
|row2-1-colour=#DDDDDD
|row2-1-to=1662
|row2-2-text=[[Kingdom of Tungning|Tungning]]<br />[[File:Flag of Ming Cheng.svg|23px]]
|row2-2-colour=orange
|row2-2-to=1683
|row2-3-text=[[Taiwan under Qing rule|Qing]]<br />{{flagicon|Qing dynasty}}
|row2-3-colour=#FFF28E
|row2-3-to=1895.5
|row2-4-text=[[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Japan]]<br />{{flagicon|Empire of Japan|1870}}
|row2-4-colour=white
|row2-4-to=1945.8
|row2-5-text=[[Taiwan after World War II|Republic of China]]<br />{{flagdeco|Taiwan}}
|row2-5-colour=#9FCCFC

|row3=note
|row3-1-text='''[[History of China|Mainland]]'''
|row3-1-arrow=&nbsp;
|row3-1-at=1620
|row3-2-text=[[Qing conquest of the Ming]]
|row3-2-at=1644
|row3-3-text=[[First Opium War|Opium War]]
|row3-3-at=1840
|row3-4-text=[[Xinhai Revolution]]
|row3-4-at=1911.75
|row3-4-shift=-7em
|row3-5-text=[[Chinese Communist Revolution|Communist Revolution]]
|row3-5-at=1949.75
|row3-5-shift=-6em
|row3-6-text=[[Chinese economic reform|Economic reform]]
|row3-6-at=1979

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|row4-borderbottom= 1px solid #000;
|row4-1-text=[[Ming Dynasty|Ming]]
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|row4-1-to=1644
|row4-2-text=[[Qing Dynasty|Qing]]<br />[[Southern Ming|S. Ming]]
|row4-2-colour=#FFBF00
|row4-2-to=1662
|row4-3-text=[[Qing Dynasty|Qing]]<br />{{flagicon|Qing dynasty}}
|row4-3-colour=#FFF28E
|row4-3-to=1912
|row4-4-text={{nowrap|[[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]]}}<br />{{flagdeco|China|1912}}&nbsp;{{flagdeco|Republic of China}}
|row4-4-colour=#9FCCFC
|row4-4-to=1949.75
|row4-5-text={{nowrap|[[History of the People's Republic of China|People's Republic of China]]}}<br />{{flagdeco|PRC}}
|row4-5-colour=#ED8B8B

|row5=scale
|from=1625
|to=2025
|inc = 25
|axis-nudge=-0.8em
}}

'''Leaders of the two governments'''
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  id:kmt  value:powderblue  legend:Kuomintang
  id:dpp  value:drabgreen  legend:Democratic_Progressive_Party

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 bar:cn text:People's Republic of China
 bar:tw text:Republic of China

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  align:center mark:(line,black)
  bar:cn
  from: 15/11/2012 till: $now  text:"[[Xi Jinping]]"  color:ccp
  from: 15/11/2002 till: 15/11/2012  text:"[[Hu Jintao]]"  color:ccp
  from: 09/11/1989 till: 15/11/2002  text:"[[Jiang Zemin]]"  color:ccp
  from: 22/12/1978 till: 09/11/1989  text:"[[Deng Xiaoping]]"  color:ccp
  from: 09/09/1976 till: 22/12/1978  text:"[[Hua Guofeng|Hua G.]]"  color:ccp
  from: 01/01/1950 till: 09/09/1976  text:"[[Mao Zedong]]"  color:ccp
  bar:tw
  from: 20/05/2024  till: $now  text:"[[Lai Ching-te]]"  color:dpp 
  from: 20/05/2016  till: 20/05/2024 text:"[[Tsai Ing-wen]]"  color:dpp 
  from: 20/05/2008  till: 20/05/2016  text:"[[Ma Ying-jeou]]"  color:kmt
  from: 20/05/2000  till: 20/05/2008  text:"[[Chen Shui-bian]]"  color:dpp
  from: 13/01/1988  till: 20/05/2000  text:"[[Lee Teng-hui]]"  color:kmt
  from: 20/05/1978  till: 13/01/1988  text:"[[Chiang Ching-kuo]]"  color:kmt
  from: 05/04/1975  till: 20/05/1978  text:"[[Yen Chia-kan|Yen C.-K.]]"  color:kmt
  from: 01/01/1950  till: 05/04/1975  text:"[[Chiang Kai-shek]]"  color:kmt
</timeline>

=== Before 1949 ===
[[File:China map.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Territories currently administered by the two governments that formally use the name China: the [[China|People's Republic of China]] (PRC, in purple) and the [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] (ROC, in orange). The PRC currently actually rules the [[Mainland China|mainland]] (including [[Hong Kong]], [[Macau]], and [[Hainan]]), while the ROC currently actually rules  [[Taiwan island|Taiwan]] (including [[Kinmen]], [[Matsu Islands|Matsu]], [[Pratas Islands]], and [[Taiping Island]] & [[Zhongzhou Reef]] of the Spratly Islands). The size of minor islands is exaggerated in this map for ease of identification.]]
{{Main|History of cross-strait relations}}

The early history of cross-strait relations involved the exchange of cultures, people, and technology.<ref>Zhang, Qiyun. (1959) ''An outline history of Taiwan''. Taipei: China Culture Publishing Foundation</ref><ref>Sanchze-Mazas (ed.) (2008) ''Past human migrations in East Asia : matching archaeology, linguistics and genetics''. New York: Routledge.</ref><ref>[[Melissa J. Brown|Brown, Melissa J.]] (2004) ''Is Taiwan Chinese? : the impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities''. Berkeley: University of California Press</ref> However, no Chinese dynasty formally incorporated Taiwan in ancient times.<ref>{{cite book |last = Lian |first = Heng |author-link = Lian Heng |script-title = zh:臺灣通史 |trans-title = The General History of Taiwan |language = zh |oclc = 123362609 |date = 1920}}</ref> In the 16th and 17th centuries, Taiwan first caught the attention of [[Portugal|Portuguese]], then [[Netherlands|Dutch]] and [[Spain|Spanish]] explorers. After establishing their first settlement in Taiwan in 1624, the Dutch were defeated in 1662 by [[Koxinga]] (Zheng Chenggong), a [[Ming dynasty]] loyalist, who took the island and established the first formally [[Han Chinese]] regime in Taiwan. Koxinga's heirs used Taiwan as a base for launching raids into [[mainland China]] against the [[Manchu]] [[Qing dynasty]], before being defeated in 1683 by Qing forces. Taiwan was incorporated into [[Fujian]] Province in 1684.

With other powers increasingly eyeing Taiwan for its strategic location and resources in the 19th century, the administration began to implement a modernization drive.<ref>{{cite web|last=Teng|first=Emma J.|date=23 May 2019|url=https://oxfordre.com/asianhistory/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-155|title=Taiwan and Modern China|website=Oxford Research Encyclopedias|doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.155 |isbn=978-0-19-027772-7 |access-date=25 July 2023}}</ref> In 1887, Fujian-Taiwan Province was declared by Imperial decree. However, the fall of the Qing outpaced the development of Taiwan, and in 1895, following its defeat in the [[First Sino-Japanese War]], the Imperial government ceded Taiwan to [[Japan]] in perpetuity. Qing loyalists briefly resisted Japanese rule under the banner of the "[[Republic of Formosa]]" but were quickly put down by Japanese authorities.<ref>{{cite book |last=Morris |first=Andrew |year=2002 |editor=Stephane Corcuff |title=Memories of the Future: National Identity issues and the Search for a New Taiwan |contribution=The Taiwan Republic of 1895 and the Failure of the Qing Modernizing Project |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |place=New York |isbn=978-0-7656-0791-1 |pages=4–18}}</ref>

Japan ruled Taiwan until 1945. As part of the [[Empire of Japan]], Taiwan was a foreign jurisdiction in relation to the Qing dynasty until 1912, and then to the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] for the remainder of Japanese rule. From 1928 to 1942, the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation.<ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last1=Hsiao |first1=Frank S. T. |last2=Sullivan |first2=Lawrence R. |date=1979 |title=The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943 |journal=[[Pacific Affairs]] |volume=52 |issue=3 |pages=446 |doi=10.2307/2757657 |jstor=2757657}}</ref> In a 1937 interview with [[Edgar Snow]], [[Mao Zedong]] stated, "we will extend them (the Koreans) our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan."<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=van der Wees |first=Gerrit |date=3 May 2022 |title=When the CCP Thought Taiwan Should Be Independent |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/when-the-ccp-thought-taiwan-should-be-independent/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231108053621/https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/when-the-ccp-thought-taiwan-should-be-independent/ |archive-date=8 November 2023 |access-date=2023-11-09 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

In 1945, Japan was defeated in [[World War II]] and surrendered its forces in Taiwan to the Allies; the ROC, then ruled by the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), took custody of the island. The period of post-war KMT rule over China (1945–1949) was marked by conflict in Taiwan between local residents and the new KMT authority. The Taiwanese [[February 28 incident|rebelled on 28&nbsp;February 1947]], but the uprising was violently suppressed by the KMT. The seeds of the Taiwan independence movement were sown during this period.

China was soon engulfed in [[Chinese Civil War|full-scale civil war]]. In 1949, the conflict turned decisively against the KMT in favor of the CCP. On 1&nbsp;October 1949, [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Chairman]] [[Mao Zedong]] proclaimed the [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|founding of the People's Republic of China]] (PRC) in [[Beijing]]. The ROC government [[Retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan|retreated to Taiwan]], eventually declaring [[Taipei]] its temporary capital in December 1949.<ref>{{cite news |last=Whitman |first=Alden |title=The Life of Chiang Kai-shek: A Leader Who Was Thrust Aside by Revolution |url=https://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1031.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20010211180224/http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1031.html |archive-date=11 February 2001 |access-date=24 February 2017 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref>

=== Military stalemate to diplomatic war (1949–1979) ===
In October 1949, the PRC's attempt to capture the ROC-controlled island of [[Kinmen]] was thwarted in the [[Battle of Guningtou]], halting the PLA's advance towards Taiwan.<ref name="QiB">Qi, Bangyuan. Wang, Dewei. Wang, David Der-wei. [2003] (2003). The Last of the Whampoa Breed: Stories of the Chinese Diaspora. Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|0-231-13002-3}}. pg 2</ref> In November 1949, ROC forces repulsed the PRC at the [[Battle of Dengbu Island]] but were later forced to retreat after the PRC established air superiority.<ref name="museum">{{cite web|title=戡亂暨臺海戰役|trans-title=Counter-insurgency Campaign and Battle of the Taiwan Strait|url=http://museum.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=1444&p=12176|publisher=國軍歷史文物館|language=zh-tw|access-date=10 November 2021|archive-date=28 December 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111228112920/http://museum.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=1444&p=12176|url-status=live}}</ref> Other PRC amphibious operations in 1950 were more successful, leading to the [[Battle of Hainan Island|capture of Hainan Island]], the [[Wanshan Archipelago Campaign|Wanshan Islands]] off the [[Guangdong]] coast, and [[Zhoushan Island]] off [[Zhejiang]].<ref name="MacF">MacFarquhar, Roderick. Fairbank, John K. Twitchett, Denis C. [1991] (1991). The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|0-521-24337-8}}. pg 820.</ref> Additional PRC successes included the [[Battle of Dongshan Island]] and the [[Battle of Nanpeng Island]].

While in the process of losing mainland China, the ROC declared a "[[Guanbi policy|closure]]" of Chinese ports, and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships.<ref name="Tsang">Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang Tsang. The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership Between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950–1958. [2006] (2006). I.B. Tauris. {{ISBN|1-85043-842-0}}. p 155, p 115-120, p 139-145</ref> This also blocked direct traffic between northern and southern China.<ref>{{cite web|last=Cheung|first=Han|date=9 September 2018|title=Taiwan in Time: The 'closure' of the Taiwan Strait|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2018/09/09/2003700067|website=Taipei Times|access-date=20 March 2025}}</ref> On the mainland, the ROC government launched several [[Bombing of Shanghai (1949-1953)|air bombing raids on Shanghai]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Zhang|first=Ben|date=2017|title=1950年上海大轰炸|edition=1st|language=zh|trans-title=1950 Shanghai Bombing|isbn=9787552019704}}</ref> Meanwhile, approximately 12,000 [[Kuomintang in Burma|KMT soldiers retreated to Burma]], where they continued launching guerrilla attacks into southern China during the early 1950s.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kaufman|first=Victor S.|year=2001|title=Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd Nationalist Division|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=166|issue=166|pages=440–456|doi=10.1017/S0009443901000213|doi-broken-date=4 June 2025 |jstor=3451165|s2cid=154621512}}</ref>

[[File:USS Carpenter (DDE-825) underway in heavy seas on 20 August 1953 (80-G-628675).jpg|thumb|left|{{USS|Carpenter}} during a Taiwan Strait patrol on 20 August 1953]]
Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the U.S. initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the onset of the [[Korean War]] in June 1950. At this point, it became politically impossible in the U.S. to allow a total Communist victory over Chiang, so President [[Harry S. Truman]] ordered the [[U.S. Seventh Fleet]] into the [[Taiwan Strait]].<ref name="BushR">Bush, Richard C. [2005] (2005). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. {{ISBN|0-8157-1288-X}}.</ref> The U.S. fleet hindered the Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the PRC decided to send troops to Korea in October 1950.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Chen|first=Jian|year=1992|title=China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950–1951|journal=The Journal of American-East Asian Relations|volume=1|issue=1|pages=8–41|jstor=23613365}}</ref> The ROC proposed participation in the Korean War but was rejected.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Nam|first=Kwang Kyu|year=2020|title=U.S. Strategy and Role in Cross-Strait Relations: Focusing on U.S.-Taiwan Relations|journal=The Journal of East Asian Affairs|volume=33|issue=1|pages=155–176|jstor=45441015}}</ref> The battles on the coastal islands of the mainland continued. In 1952, the ROC won the [[Battle of Nanri Island]] with U.S. support. In 1953, the Communists secured victories in the [[Battle of Nanpeng Archipelago]], the [[Battle of Dalushan Islands]] and the [[Dongshan Island Campaign]]. At the end of the Korean War, approximately two-thirds of captured Communist Chinese soldiers, many of whom were originally KMT soldiers, were repatriated to Taiwan rather than China.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=4&post=7079|title=14,000 Who Chose Freedom|website=Taiwan Today|date=1 January 1964|access-date=22 December 2022|archive-date=20 September 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220920101928/https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?post=7079&unit=4|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite thesis|last=Chang|first=Cheng David|date=2011|title=To return home or "Return to Taiwan" : conflicts and survival in the "Voluntary Repatriation" of Chinese POWs in the Korean War|type=PhD|publisher=University of California, San Diego|url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/14d4n47s|access-date=22 December 2022|archive-date=21 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221221195138/https://escholarship.org/uc/item/14d4n47s|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2016/01/17/2003637384|title=The first anti-communist heroes|work=Taipei Times|date=17 January 2016|access-date=22 December 2022|archive-date=21 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221221195159/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2016/01/17/2003637384|url-status=live}}</ref>

[[File:Taiwan Strait.png|thumb|right|The [[Taiwan Strait]]]]
Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in [[Fujian Province, Republic of China|Fujian]] as vital for any future campaign to defeat the PRC and retake China. On 3&nbsp;September 1954, the [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]] began when the PLA started shelling Kinmen and threatened to take the [[Dachen Islands]].<ref name="Tsang"/> On 19&nbsp;January 1955, the PLA took nearby [[Yijiangshan Islands]], with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed or wounded in the defense. The [[United States Congress|U.S. Congress]] then passed the [[Formosa Resolution of 1955|Formosa Resolution]], authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands.<ref name="Tsang"/> The First Taiwan Strait Crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis was brought to a close during the [[Bandung Conference]].<ref name="Tsang"/> At the conference, the PRC articulated its [[Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence]] with Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] publicly stating, "[T]he Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States. The Chinese government is willing to sit down to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area."<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url= |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=35 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref> Two years of negotiations with the U.S. followed, although no agreement was reached on the Taiwan issue.<ref name=":2"/>

The [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]] began on 23 August 1958 with air and naval engagements between the PRC and the ROC military forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Kinmen (by the PRC) and [[Xiamen]] (by the ROC), and ended in November of the same year.<ref name="Tsang"/> PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the U.S. rejected [[Chiang Kai-shek]]'s proposal to bomb Chinese artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided [[amphibious assault ship]]s to land supply, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On 7&nbsp;September, the U.S. escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships, and the PRC refrained from firing. On 25&nbsp;October, the PRC announced an "even-day ceasefire"—the PLA would only shell Kinmen on odd-numbered days.
[[File:U.S. President Eisenhower visited TAIWAN 美國總統艾森豪於1960年6月訪問臺灣台北時與蔣中正總統-2.jpg|upright=1.1|thumb|U.S. President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], riding with President [[Chiang Kai-shek]], waves to onlookers during his visit to [[Taipei]], Taiwan in June 1960.]]
[[File:President Richard Nixon and Premier Chou En-Lai Shake Hands at the Nixons' Arrival in Peking, China.jpg|upright=1.1|thumb|U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] shakes hands with Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] during his visit to [[Beijing]], China in February 1972.]]
After the 1950s, the "war" became more symbolic than real, represented by on again, off again artillery bombardment towards and from Kinmen. In later years, live shells were replaced with propaganda sheets.<ref name="Independent2007">{{cite news |last1=O'Shaughnessy |first1=Hugh |title=Kinmen: The island that Chairman Mao couldn't capture |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/asia/kinmen-the-island-that-chairman-mao-couldn-t-capture-760206.html |access-date=16 August 2021 |work=[[The Independent]] |date=24 November 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816234916/https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/asia/kinmen-the-island-that-chairman-mao-couldn-t-capture-760206.html |archive-date=16 August 2021}}</ref> The ROC once initiated [[Project National Glory]], a plan to retake mainland China.<ref name="scmp1">{{cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/article/677614/details-chiang-kai-sheks-attempts-recapture-mainland-be-made-public|title=Details of Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to recapture mainland to be made public|work=[[South China Morning Post]]|date=22 April 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191021005036/https://www.scmp.com/article/677614/details-chiang-kai-sheks-attempts-recapture-mainland-be-made-public|archive-date=21 October 2019}}</ref> The project failed in the 1960s,<ref name="udn.com">{{cite news|last=Wang |first=Guangci |title=Project National Glory. Makung Naval Battle Defeat. Waking up from the dream of retaking the mainland. |newspaper=[[United Daily News]] |language=zh |date=20 April 2009 |url=http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/4857575.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090422012301/http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/4857575.shtml |archive-date=22 April 2009}}</ref> and the bombardment finally ceased after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States.<ref name="Independent2007"/> The PRC and the ROC have never signed any agreement or treaty to officially end the war.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3642104|title=Taiwan President rejects 'peace treaty' with China to avoid compromising national sovereignty|work=Taiwan News|date=20 February 2019|access-date=23 July 2023}}</ref> There were occasional defectors from both sides.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=4&post=7369|title=The Defectors' Story|website=Taiwan Today|date=1 July 1961|access-date=23 July 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/03/15/2003527832|title=Justin Lin faces arrests if he returns: MND|work=Taipei Times|date=15 March 2012|access-date=23 July 2023}}</ref>

Until the 1970s, the ROC had international recognition from most countries.<ref name=":Chen">{{Cite book |last=Chen |first=Dean P. |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |chapter=Xi Jinping and the Derailment of the KMT-CCP "1992 Consensus" |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|page=228}} The PRC government was recognized by [[Eastern Bloc|Soviet Bloc]] countries, members of the [[Non-Aligned Movement]], and some [[Western Bloc|Western nations]], such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Both governments claimed to be the legitimate government of China,<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Liff|first1=Adam P.|last2=Lin|first2=Dalton|year=2022|title=The 'One China' Framework at 50 (1972–2022): The Myth of 'Consensus' and Its Evolving Policy Significance|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=252|pages=977–1000|doi=10.1017/S030574102200131X|doi-access=free}}</ref> and each side referred to the other as "bandits".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://china.usc.edu/node/20130|title=Mao Zedong meets Richard Nixon, February 21, 1972|website=USC U.S.-China Institute|access-date=20 March 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/4094684|title=Photo of the Day: Communist Bandit Pastries spotted in Taiwan|work=Taiwan News|date=5 January 2021|access-date=20 March 2025}}</ref> Civil war propaganda permeated educational curricula on both sides.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Chen|first=Theodore Hsi-En|year=1951|title=Education and Propaganda in Communist China|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume=277|pages=135–145|doi=10.1177/000271625127700114 |jstor=1030259}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Su|first=Ya-Chen|year=2006|title=Political Ideology and Social Studies Curricula in Taiwan|journal=Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education|volume=34|issue=3|pages=353–364|doi=10.1080/13598660600927547}}</ref> Additionally, the ROC suppressed expressions of support for Taiwanese identity or Taiwan independence.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kallgren|first=Joyce K.|year=1963|title=Nationalist China: The Continuing Dilemma of the 'Mainland' Philosophy|journal=Asian Survey|volume=3|issue=1|pages=11–16|doi=10.2307/3024646|jstor=3024646}}</ref>

The ROC represented [[China and the United Nations|China at the United Nations]] until 1971, when the PRC replaced the ROC in the UN seat.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=228}}

===Thawing of relations (1979–1999)===
After the United States formally recognized the PRC and broke its official relations with the ROC in 1979, the PRC under the leadership of [[Deng Xiaoping]] shifted its strategy from liberating Taiwan to peaceful unification.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Cabestan|first=Jean-Pierre|year=2000|title=The Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Twenty Years of Development and Frustration|journal=China Review|pages=105–134|jstor=23453363}}</ref><ref name="sheng">{{cite book |last1=Sheng |first1=Lijun |title=China and Taiwan: Cross-strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian |date=2002 |publisher=Institute of Southeast Asian Studies |location=Singapore |isbn=1-84277-318-6 |pages=7–8}}</ref> The PRC moderated its rhetoric, referring to the "Taiwan authorities" instead of "Chiang's clique" and "peaceful reunification" instead of "liberating Taiwan."<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=228}} In the 1 January 1979 "New Year's Day Message to Taiwan Compatriots," the [[Standing Committee of the National People's Congress]] (NPC) stated that the PRC would "take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses."<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=228}}

Deng proposed a model for the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC which involved a high degree of autonomy within the Chinese state, similar to the model proposed to [[Hong Kong]] which would eventually become [[one country, two systems]]. Consistent with Deng's one country, two systems approach, NPC Standing Committee Chair [[Ye Jianying]] elaborated on peaceful unification under per his 30 September 1981 "Nine Points Proposal" in which Taiwan would have a high degree of autonomy following unification.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=228}} The Nine Points Proposal also talked of trade, transportation, and postal services as "[[Three Links]]" across the strait and "four exchanges" in the areas of culture, academics, economics, and sports.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=228}}

The ROC government under [[Chiang Ching-kuo]] maintained a [[Three Noes]] policy of no contact, no negotiation and no compromise to deal with the PRC government.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |author-link=Suisheng Zhao |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Is Beijing's Long Game on Taiwan about to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinksmanship, and Military Takeover |doi=10.4324/9781003521709}}</ref>{{Rp|page=11}} However, Chiang was forced to break from this policy during the May 1986 [[China Airlines Flight 334|hijacking of a China Airlines cargo plane]],<ref name=":12"/>{{Rp|page=11}} in which the Taiwanese pilot subdued other members of the crew and flew the plane to [[Guangzhou]]. In response, Chiang sent delegates to Hong Kong to discuss with PRC officials the return of the plane and crew, which was seen as a turning point in cross-strait relations.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-05-13-mn-5861-story.html|title=Hijacked Plane Will End 2 Chinas' 40-Year Silence : Taiwan to Negotiate on Aircraft|work=Los Angeles Times|date=13 May 1986|access-date=22 December 2022|archive-date=21 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221221191222/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-05-13-mn-5861-story.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/05/23/Plane-hijacked-to-China-returns-to-Taiwan/3971517204800/|title=Plane hijacked to China returns to Taiwan|work=UPI|date=23 May 1986|access-date=22 December 2022}}</ref>

[[File:紀念母親節街頭宣傳活動.jpg|thumb|left|A 1987 movement in Taipei calling for the right to visit relatives in mainland China]]
In 1987, Chiang became willing to open up cross-strait economic and cultural contacts.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=229}} That year, the ROC government began allowing visits to China. This benefited many, especially old KMT soldiers, who had been separated from their families in China for decades.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Ger|first=Yeong-kuang|year=2015|title=Cross-Strait Relations and the Taiwan Relations Act|journal=American Journal of Chinese Studies|volume=22|pages=235–252|jstor=44289169}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/05/12/2003360531|title=Cross-strait reunions celebrated|work=Taipei Times|date=12 May 2007|access-date=22 December 2022|archive-date=21 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221221191146/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/05/12/2003360531|url-status=live}}</ref> This catalyzed a thawing of relations between the two sides, but problems arising from increased contact necessitated a mechanism for regular negotiations. From the end of 1987 to June 1995, the two sides frequently exchanged envoys to develop formal and informal institutions and agencies for cross-strait relations.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=229}}

In 1988, [[22 point regulation|a guideline]] was approved by PRC to encourage ROC investments in the PRC.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://flk.npc.gov.cn/detail2.html?ZmY4MDgwODE2ZjNjYmIzYzAxNmY0MTRiYjQ3ZjIwYWQ%3D|title=国务院关于鼓励台湾同胞投资的规定|website=flk.npc.gov.cn|language=zh|access-date=22 December 2022|archive-date=21 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221221191207/https://flk.npc.gov.cn/detail2.html?ZmY4MDgwODE2ZjNjYmIzYzAxNmY0MTRiYjQ3ZjIwYWQ%3D|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1288&CGid=|title=Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for Encouraging Taiwan Compatriots to Invest in the Mainland|website=www.lawinfochina.com|access-date=22 December 2022|archive-date=21 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221221191217/http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1288&CGid=|url-status=live}}</ref> It guaranteed that ROC establishments would not be nationalized, exports would be free from tariffs, and ROC businessmen would be granted multiple visas for easy movement.

In 1990, under the presidency of [[Lee Teng-hui]], the [[National Unification Council]] was established in Taiwan.<ref name="sheng"/> The following year, the [[Guidelines for National Unification]] were adopted, and the [[period of mobilization for the suppression of Communist rebellion]] was terminated. Seeking to negotiate with China on operational issues without affirming the other side's legitimacy, the ROC government created the [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] (SEF),<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=229}} a nominally non-governmental institution directly led by the [[Mainland Affairs Council]] (MAC), an instrument of the [[Executive Yuan]] in 1991. The PRC established the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits]] (ARATS),<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=229}} directly led by the [[Taiwan Affairs Office]] of the [[State Council of the People's Republic of China|State Council]]. This system, described as "white gloves", allowed the two governments to engage with each other on a semi-official basis without compromising their respective sovereignty policies.<ref name="cw">{{cite news |last1=Chou |first1=Hui-ching |title=How the '1992 Consensus' Colors Taiwan's Fate |url=https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=2214 |access-date=8 January 2022 |work=Commonwealth Magazine |date=7 December 2018 |archive-date=6 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210706092749/https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=2214 |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 1 August 1992, the ROC's [[National Unification Council]] passed the "Definition of One China Resolution," stating: "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different ... Our side believes that one China should mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China."<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=229}}

This resolution became the basis for quasi-governmental negotiations between SEF and ARATS from October to November 1992.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=229}} Led by [[Koo Chen-fu]] and [[Wang Daohan]], these talks culminated in the 1993 [[Wang–Koo summit]]. Both sides agreed to confer ambiguity on questions of sovereignty in order to engage on operational questions affecting both sides.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Chiu|first=Hungdah|year=1994|title=The Koo-Wang Talks and Intra-Chinese Relations|journal=American Journal of Chinese Studies|volume=2|issue=2|pages=219–262|jstor=44288492}}</ref> The ambiguity of the [[1992 Consensus]] allowed the PRC to emphasize that both sides of the strait upheld the position of one China and allowed the ROC to emphasize that it was the one China to which both the mainland and Taiwan belonged.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=230}} This facilitated the improvement of cross-strait relations in the early 1990s.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=230}}

Nonetheless, the rhetoric of ROC President Lee Teng-hui increasingly leaned towards advocating Taiwan independence.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Jacobs|first1=J. Bruce|last2=Liu|first2=I-hao Ben|year=2007|title=Lee Teng-Hui and the Idea of 'Taiwan'|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=190|pages=375–393|doi=10.1017/S0305741007001245|jstor=20192775|s2cid=154384016 }}</ref> Prior to the 1990s, the ROC had been a one-party authoritarian state committed to eventual unification with China. However, democratic reforms reshaped attitudes of the general public, which in turn began influencing policy in Taiwan. As a result, the ROC government shifted away from its commitment to [[One China]] and towards a separate political identity for Taiwan. In 1993, Taiwan applied to rejoin the United Nations, while China responded by issuing its first [[white paper]] on the Taiwan issue, reaffirming its sovereignty over the island.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Wu|first=Yu-Shan|year=1994|title=Taiwan in 1993: Attempting a Diplomatic Breakthrough|journal=Asian Survey|volume=34|issue=1|pages=46–54|doi=10.2307/2644956|jstor=2644956}}</ref>

In January 1995, [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP General Secretary]] [[Jiang Zemin]] announced the PRC's "Eight-Point Proposal" discussing a gradual process of cross-strait rapprochement and negotiation leading to eventual unification.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=231}} The Eight-Point Proposal emphasized maintaining the status quo, facilitating economic exchanges and the Three Links, and seeking to deter Taiwan from separating from the mainland.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=231}} As long as Taiwan was committed to the One China principle, than the PRC stated that it would consider Taiwan concerns like renouncing the use of force or treating the Taipei government as an equal political entity.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=231}}

[[File:USS Independence (CV-62) underway at sea on 10 March 1996.jpeg|thumb|left|{{USS|Independence|CV-62|6}} underway during the [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]] ]]
In June 1995, Lee visited the United States and delivered a speech to an invited audience at [[Cornell University]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/06/09/Taiwans-Lee-speaks-at-Cornell/4706802670400/|title=Taiwan's Lee speaks at Cornell|work=UPI|date=9 June 1995|access-date=23 September 2023}}</ref> In response to Taiwan's diplomatic moves, the PRC postponed the second Wang–Koo summit indefinitely.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Ming|first=Chu-cheng|year=1996|title=Political Interactions Across the Taiwan Straits|journal=China Review|pages=175–200|jstor=23453144}}</ref> The PLA attempted to influence the [[1996 Taiwanese presidential election]] by conducting a missile exercise, leading to the [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]].<ref>{{cite journal|last=Porch|first=Douglas|year=1999|title=The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy|journal=Naval War College Review|volume=52|issue=3|pages=15–48|jstor=44643008}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Scobell|first=Andrew|year=2000|title=Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis|journal=Political Science Quarterly|volume=115|issue=2|pages=227–246|doi=10.2307/2657901|jstor=2657901}}</ref> Following the crisis and the growing influence of a pro-independence element in Taiwan politics, the PRC increased its focus on modernizing its military to deter Taiwan independence and deter U.S.-involvement.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=231}}

In May 1998, the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] convened a Work Conference on Taiwan Affairs which stated that the whole party and the whole nation should work together for peaceful unification.<ref name=":12"/>{{Rp|page=11}} The next month, the ARATS and the SEF resumed contact and the second Wang–Koo summit was held in [[Shanghai]], China.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Cabestan|first=Jean-Pierre|year=1999|title=Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu Meet Again: A Political Dialogue... of the Deaf?|journal=China Perspectives|volume=21|issue=21 |pages=25–27|jstor=24051197}}</ref> Jiang also received the Taiwanese representatives in [[Beijing]].

=== Hostile non-contact (1999–2008) ===
[[File:Xiamen 一国两制统一中国 20170725.jpg|thumb|A slogan promoting "[[one country, two systems]]" has stood along the coastline of [[Xiamen]] since 1999.]]
[[File:Taipei Station with UN-for-Taiwan banner 20080318.jpg|thumb|A "[[United Nations|UN]] for Taiwan" banner at [[Taipei Railway Station]] in 2008]]
While Wang Daohan's return visit to Taiwan was scheduled, Lee Teng-hui described cross-strait relations as "state-to-state or at least special state-to-state relations" in July 1999.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Hu|first=Weixing|year=2000|title='Two-state' Theory versus One-China Principle: Cross-strait Relations in 1999|journal=China Review|pages=135–156|jstor=23453364}}</ref> PRC leadership interpreted Lee's statement as a sign that Taiwan would take steps toward independence.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Cunningham |first=Fiona S. |title=Under the Nuclear Shadow: China's Information-Age Weapons in International Security |date=2025 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-26103-4 |location=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=98}} Lee's [[two-states theory]] postponed Wang's visit indefinitely and the PRC issued a white paper entitled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue" in February 2000, before the [[2000 Taiwanese presidential election]].<ref>{{cite journal|last=Sheng|first=Lijun|year=2001|title=Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations|journal=Contemporary Southeast Asia|volume=23|issue=1|pages=122–148|jstor=25798531}}</ref> In the white paper, the PRC warned against conduct it would view as separatism and stated that the PRC would consider the use of force if Taiwan sought to indefinitely avoid meaningful talks with the PRC.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=231}}

[[Chen Shui-bian]] of the pro-independence [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP) was elected [[President of the ROC]] in 2000. Before the KMT handed over power to the DPP, chairman of the [[Mainland Affairs Council]] [[Su Chi]] suggested a new term 1992 Consensus as a common point that was acceptable to both sides so that Taiwan and China could keep up cross-strait exchanges.<ref>{{cite news|url= https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106|title= Su Chi admits the '1992 consensus' was made up|work=Taipei Times|date=22 February 2006|access-date=23 September 2023}}</ref> Chen expressed some willingness to accept the 1992 Consensus, but backed down after backlash within his own party.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Cheng |first1=Allen T. |title=Did He Say 'One China'? |url=http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0714/nat.taiwan.html |date=14 July 2000 |access-date=11 March 2021 |work=[[Asiaweek]] |archive-date=30 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210730221230/http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0714/nat.taiwan.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> In his inaugural speech, Chen Shui-bian pledged to the [[Four Noes and One Without]], in particular, promising to seek neither independence nor unification as well as rejecting the concept of special state-to-state relations expressed by his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, as well as establishing the [[Three Links#Limited liberalization|Mini-three Links]]. Furthermore, he pursued a policy of normalizing economic relations with the PRC.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lin |first1=Syaru Shirley |title=Taiwan's China Dilemma |date=29 June 2016 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0804799287 |pages=96–98}}</ref> The PRC did not engage Chen's administration, but meanwhile in 2001 Chen lifted the 50-year ban on direct trade and investment with the PRC.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/08/world/taiwan-lifts-restrictions-on-investment-in-china.html|title=Taiwan Lifts Restrictions on Investment in China|work=The New York Times|date=8 November 2001|access-date=23 September 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Taiwan – timeline |work=BBC News |date=9 March 2011 |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1286033.stm |access-date=6 January 2012 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111209042911/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1286033.stm |archive-date=9 December 2011 }}</ref> In November 2001, Chen repudiated "One China" and called for talks without preconditions.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wang |first1=Vincient Wei-cheng |title=The Chen Shui-Bian Administrations MainlandPolicy: Toward a Modus Vivendi or ContinuedStalemate? |journal=Politics Faculty Publications and Presentations |date=2002 |page=115}}</ref> On 3&nbsp;August 2002, Chen defined the cross-strait relations as [[One Country on Each Side]] (namely, that China and Taiwan are two different countries). The PRC subsequently cut off official contact with the ROC government.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Glaser |first1=Bonnie |title=China's Taiwan Policy in the Wake of 'One Country on Each Side' |journal=The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy |date=30 November 2010 |volume=24 |issue=6 |pages=515–524 |doi=10.1080/10803920216379|s2cid=154365745 }}</ref>

[[Hu Jintao]] became [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]] in late 2002, succeeding Jiang as [[Paramount leader|top leader]] of the PRC.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=233}} Hu urged Taiwan's DPP administration to resume cross-strait dialogue on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=233}} China continued its military build-up against Taiwan and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Tung|first=Chen-yuan|year=2005|title=Cross-Strait Relations After Taiwan's 2004 Presidential Election: A New Era of Constructive Interaction or Spiral Conflicts?|journal=American Journal of Chinese Studies |pages=79–102|jstor=44288783}}</ref> After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, China issued a [[May 17 Statement|statement before Chen's inaugural speech]], indicating that preventing Taiwan's ''de jure'' independence was the top priority of Beijing's Taiwan policy.<ref name="Huang2017"/> In March 2005, the [[10th National People's Congress]] passed the [[Anti-Secession Law]], which authorized military action if Taiwan were to declare formal independence.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-03-14/china-passes-taiwan-anti-secession-law/1533042|title=China passes Taiwan anti-secession law|work=ABC News|date=14 March 2005|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref>

[[File:Kuomintang nanjing.jpg|thumb|[[Lien Chan]] touring the [[Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum]] with the [[2005 Pan–Blue visits to mainland China|Kuomintang delegation to mainland China]] in 2005]]
Meanwhile, the PRC administration sought to engage with apolitical or politically non-independence-leaning groups in Taiwan. The CCP increased contacts on a party-to-party basis with the KMT,<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=138}} then the opposition party in Taiwan, due to their support for the 1992 Consensus.  The increased contacts culminated in the [[2005 Pan-Blue visits to China]], including a meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman [[Lien Chan]] in April 2005.<ref>{{cite news |last = Sisci |first = Francesco |title = Strange cross-Taiwan Strait bedfellows |work = Asia Times |date = 5 April 2005 |url = http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD05Ad08.html |access-date = 15 May 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080512150111/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD05Ad08.html |archive-date = 12 May 2008 |url-status = dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Zhong |first=Wu |title=KMT makes China return in historic trip to ease tensions |work=The Standard |date=29 March 2005 |url=http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Front_Page/GC29Aa02.html |access-date=16 May 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080602220112/http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Front_Page/GC29Aa02.html |archive-date=2 June 2008 }}</ref> It was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.<ref>{{Cite news |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/04/30/2003252532 |title=Lien, Hu share 'vision' for peace |last=Hong |first=Caroline |date=30 April 2005 |work=Taipei Times |access-date=3 June 2016}}</ref><ref name=AP-Guardian-2005-04-29>{{cite news |agency=Associated Press |title=Taiwanese opposition leader in Beijing talks |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/apr/29/china |work=The Guardian |date=29 April 2005}}</ref><ref name=TP-2005-03-28>{{cite news |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/03/28/2003248069 |title=KMT delegation travels to China for historic visit |work=Taipei Times |date=28 March 2005 |access-date=18 November 2014 |last=Hong |first=Caroline}}</ref>

=== Resumption of high level contact (2008–2016) ===
In 2008, the KMT won a large majority in the [[2008 Taiwanese legislative election|legislative election]] and its candidate [[Ma Ying-jeou]] won the following [[2008 Taiwanese presidential election|Taiwanese presidential election]] on 22&nbsp;March.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/03/23/2003406711 |title=Decisive victory for Ma Ying-jeou |work=Taipei Times |date=23 March 2008 |access-date=10 April 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203003328/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/03/23/2003406711 |archive-date=3 December 2013 }}</ref> Ma advocated that cross-strait relations should shift from "mutual non-recognition" to "[[Mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of authority to govern|mutual non-denial]]".<ref>{{cite web |title=晤諾貝爾得主 馬再拋兩岸互不否認 |trans-title=Meeting Nobel laureates, Ma again speaks of mutual non-denial |work=Liberty Times |date=19 April 2008 |url=https://www.libertytimes.com/2008/new/apr/19/today-p3.htm |access-date=2 June 2008 |language=zh |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080525092217/http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/apr/19/today-p3.htm |archive-date=25 May 2008 }}</ref> He stated that the relations are neither between two Chinas nor two states. It is a special relationship.<ref>{{cite news|title=Taiwan and China in 'special relations': Ma |work=China Post |date=4 September 2008 |url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080906092524/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm |archive-date=6 September 2008}}</ref> Cross-strait cooperation increased during Ma's tenure.<ref name=":054">{{Cite book |last=Lampton |first=David M. |title=Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |isbn=978-1-5381-8725-8 |location=Lanham, MD |pages=230 |author-link=David M. Lampton}}</ref> During Ma's administration, the two sides signed 23 agreements and held eleven [[Cross-strait high-level talks|high-level talks]].<ref name=":122222">{{Cite book |last1=Fuh-sheng |first1=John |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |last2=Lin |first2=Yi-Tzu |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Butter or Guns: Taiwan's Economic Policy Toward China |doi=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=125}}

Both Hu Jintao and his new counterpart, Ma Ying-jeou, considered the 1992 Consensus to be the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On 26&nbsp;March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with the U.S. President [[George W. Bush]], in which he explained that the "1992 Consensus" shows that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition".<ref>{{cite news|title=Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet |publisher=Xinhuanet |date=27 March 2008 |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm |access-date=15 May 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080329213704/http://news.xinhuanet.com:80/english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm |archive-date=29 March 2008}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=26 March 2008 |title=Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgvan//eng/news/t418638.htm |publisher=Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Vancouver|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220102031422/https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgvan//eng/news/t418638.htm|archive-date=2 January 2022}}</ref><ref name="ft20080403">{{cite news |last=Hille |first=Kathrin |date=3 April 2008 |title=Hopes rise for Taiwan-China dialogue |url=https://www.ft.com/content/2a1e1adc-00c8-11dd-a0c5-000077b07658 |work=Financial Times |archive-date=6 January 2022 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20220106084016/https://www.ft.com/content/2a1e1adc-00c8-11dd-a0c5-000077b07658 |quote=According to a US account of the talks, Mr Hu said: It is China's consistent stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of 'the 1992 consensus', which sees both sides recognise there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition.}}</ref> There followed a series of meetings between the two sides. On 12&nbsp;April 2008, Hu Jintao held a meeting with ROC's then vice-president elect [[Vincent Siew]] as chairman of the [[Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation]] during the [[Boao Forum for Asia]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/04/13/2003409146|title=Siew and Hu meet at forum in Hainan|work=Taipei Times|date=13 April 2008|access-date=11 November 2023}}</ref> On 28&nbsp;May 2008, Hu met with the KMT chairman [[Wu Po-hsiung]], the first meeting between the heads of the CCP and the KMT as ruling parties.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.france24.com/en/20080528-china-hu-jintao-wants-improved-relations-with-taiwan-kuomintang-visit-beijing|title=China's Hu wants improved relations with Taiwan|work=France 24|date=28 May 2008|access-date=11 November 2023}}</ref> During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should recommence semi-official dialogue under the 1992 Consensus.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/05/29/China-leader-calls-for-cross-strait-talks/35121212058567/|title=China leader calls for cross-strait talks|work=UPI|date=29 May 2008|access-date=11 November 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/215116|title=吳胡共識 速兌現陸客觀光及包機|work=The Liberty Times|language=zh|date=29 May 2008|access-date=11 November 2023}}</ref>

[[File:Voa chinese Chiang Pin-kung Kao-Koong-lian.jpg|thumb|right|[[Chiang Pin-kung]] (left) represented the SEF at the [[Cross-strait high-level talks|Chen–Chiang Summit]] in October 2011.]]
Cross-strait high-level talks between the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits|ARATS]] and the [[Straits Exchange Foundation|SEF]] reopened in June 2008, with the [[First Chen–Chiang summit|first meeting]] held in Beijing. On 13&nbsp;June, [[Chen Yunlin]], President of the ARATS, and [[Chiang Pin-kung]], President of the SEF, signed agreements stating that direct charter flights between the two sides would begin,<ref>{{cite news |script-title=zh:海峡两岸包机会谈纪要（全文）|trans-title=Cross-Strait charter flights neogitation memorandum (full text) |agency=Xinhua News Agency |date=13 June 2008 |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-06/13/content_8360544.htm |access-date=15 June 2008 |language=zh |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090213204559/http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-06/13/content_8360544.htm |archive-date=13 February 2009 }}</ref> and that Taiwan would allow the entry of up to 3,000 visitors from China daily.<ref>{{cite news |script-title=zh:海峡两岸关于大陆居民赴台湾旅游协议（全文）|trans-title=Cross-Strait agreement on mainland residents visiting Taiwan for tourism (full text) |agency=Xinhua News Agency |date=13 June 2008 |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-06/13/content_8360914.htm |access-date=15 June 2008 |language=zh |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090213204603/http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-06/13/content_8360914.htm |archive-date=13 February 2009 }}</ref> After [[Second Chen–Chiang summit|Chen and Chiang's second meeting]], the first direct flights and shipments began on 15&nbsp;December 2008.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/11/05/2003427809|title=Chen and Chiang sign four agreements|work=Taipei Times|date=5 November 2008|access-date=21 March 2025}}</ref><ref name="TheTimes">{{Cite news|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5346905.ece|title=Direct flights between China and Taiwan mark new era of improved relations|last1=Yu|first1=Sophie|last2=Macartney|first2=Jane|date=16 December 2008|newspaper=The Times|access-date=4 June 2009|location=London|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100525093807/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5346905.ece|archive-date=25 May 2010}}</ref> On 31 December 2008, Hu Jintao made six proposals on cross-strait relations, stating that both sides of the strait should "make pragmatic explorations in their political relations under the special circumstances where the country has not yet been unified."<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=334}}<ref>{{cite news|last=Tung|first=Chen-Yuan|date=6 January 2009|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/01/06/2003433064|title=Hu's six points: proceed with care|work=Taipei Times|access-date=21 March 2025}}</ref>

The financial relationship between the two areas improved in 2009 when the ROC's financial regulator, the [[Financial Supervisory Commission (Taiwan)|Financial Supervisory Commission]], announced that Chinese investors would be permitted to invest in Taiwan's money markets for the first time since 1949. Investors could apply to purchase Taiwan shares, provided that their holdings did not exceed one-tenth of the value of the firm's total shares.<ref name="tol2009">{{cite news|url=http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article6199775.ece |title=Taiwan opens up to mainland Chinese investors |date=1 May 2009 |access-date=4 May 2009 |work=[[The Times]] |location=London |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090508083450/http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article6199775.ece |archive-date=8 May 2009 }}</ref> In 2010, the [[Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement]] (ECFA) removed tariffs on hundreds of products. While the deal favored Taiwan, Beijing hoped to gain political advantages in its long-standing unification campaign.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/10442557|title=Taiwan and China sign landmark trade agreement|work=BBC|date=29 June 2010|access-date=21 March 2025}}</ref>

As Taiwan's risk factor as a flashpoint has significantly decreased in relation to China,<ref name="tol2009"/> a 2010 report from Taiwan's [[Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China)|Ministry of National Defense]] stated that China's charm offensive is only accommodating on issues that do not undermine its claim to Taiwan. The report also warned that the PRC would invade if Taiwan declared independence, developed weapons of mass destruction, or suffered from civil chaos.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201008310023|title=China military budget rises sharply: defense ministry|work=Focus Taiwan|date=31 August 2010|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref> President Ma has repeatedly called for the PRC to dismantle the missile batteries targeting Taiwan's cities.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/01/18/2003434041|title=Ma calls on PRC to remove missiles|work=Taipei Times|date=18 January 2009|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/world/taiwan-s-ma-urges-china-to-scrap-missiles-idUSTRE59I0NV/|title=Exclusive: Taiwan's Ma urges China to scrap missiles|work=Reuters|date=19 October 2009|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref> Additionally, Ma has urged the PRC to embrace [[Sun Yat-sen]]'s call for freedom and democracy.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/china--urges-reunification-at-100th-anniversary-of-demise-of-last-dynasty-131443988/146432.html|title=China Urges Reunification at 100th Anniversary of Demise of Last Dynasty|work=VOA|date=9 October 2011|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref>

In 2012, Ma Ying-jeou won his [[2012 Taiwanese presidential election|second presidential election]], and the KMT maintained its majority in [[2012 Taiwanese legislative election|Taiwan's legislature]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-re-elects-china-friendly-president/a-15666586|title=Victory celebration|work=DW|date=14 January 2012|access-date=22 March 2025}}</ref> In the same year, [[Xi Jinping]] succeeded Hu Jintao as [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]], as well as the [[Paramount leader|PRC top leader]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.dw.com/en/china-names-xi-jinping-as-party-chief/a-16381093|title=China unveils new leadership|work=DW|date=15 November 2012|access-date=22 March 2025}}</ref> Xi continued Hu's Taiwan policy, and offered 31 new measures to improve Taiwan's economic integration with the mainland in June 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201306160027.aspx |title=China unveils 31 measures to promote exchanges with Taiwan |work=focustaiwan.tw |date=16 June 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203084647/http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201306160027.aspx |archive-date=3 December 2013 }}</ref> The [[Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement]] (CSSTA) was signed in Shanghai during the ninth cross-strait high-level talks, opening the service sectors on both sides to further exchanges.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/06/22/2003565371|title=Cross-strait service trade pact signed|work=Taipei Times|date=22 June 2013|access-date=22 March 2025}}</ref> Xi further expressed his intention regarding Taiwan when he met Taiwan's former vice president, Vincent Siew, at the [[APEC Indonesia 2013|2013 APEC summit]], stating that these issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/world/chinas-xi-says-political-solution-for-taiwan-cant-wait-forever-idUSBRE99503Q/|title=China's Xi says political solution for Taiwan can't wait forever|work=Reuters|date=6 October 2013|access-date=22 March 2025}}</ref>

[[File:2014 Wang-Zhang Meeting.png|thumb|[[2014 Wang-Zhang Meeting]] in Taiwan]]
While Xi met with Siew at the summit, [[Wang Yu-chi]], Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, spoke with [[Zhang Zhijun]], Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office, with each addressing the other by his official title. Both called for the establishment of a regular dialogue mechanism between their two agencies.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201310060010.aspx |title=Taiwan, Chinese ministers meet in groundbreaking first |website=focustaiwan.tw |date=6 October 2013 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131224095200/http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201310060010.aspx |archive-date=24 December 2013 }}</ref> [[2014 Wang–Zhang meetings|The two ministers met]] in [[Nanjing]] on 11&nbsp;February 2014, making the first official, high-level, government-to-government contact between the two sides since 1949.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/02/12/2003583307 |title=MAC Minister Wang in historic meeting |website=Taipei Times |date=12 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303225354/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/02/12/2003583307 |archive-date=3 March 2016 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/world/asia/china-and-taiwan-hold-first-official-talks-since-civil-war.html |title=China and Taiwan Hold First Direct Talks Since '49 |date=12 February 2014 |work=The New York Times |access-date=3 April 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160404190554/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/world/asia/china-and-taiwan-hold-first-official-talks-since-civil-war.html |archive-date=4 April 2016 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/chinataiwan-talks-pave-way-for-leaders-to-meet-20140212-hvc44.html |title=China-Taiwan talks pave way for leaders to meet |work=The Sydney Morning Herald |date=12 February 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140509132836/http://www.smh.com.au/world/chinataiwan-talks-pave-way-for-leaders-to-meet-20140212-hvc44.html |archive-date=9 May 2014 }}</ref> Zhang visited Taiwan from 25 to 28&nbsp;June 2014, becoming the first ministerial-level PRC official to do so.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/06/25/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/first-minister-level-chinese-official-heads-to-taipei-for-talks/|title=First minister-level Chinese official heads to Taipei for talks|date=25 June 2014|newspaper=Japan Times|issn=0447-5763|access-date=4 June 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140627221249/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/06/25/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/first-minister-level-chinese-official-heads-to-taipei-for-talks/ |archive-date=27 June 2014 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

[[File:2014-03-30 太陽花在凱道 20140330-19-03-27-P3301501 (13517330763).jpg|thumb|left|[[Sunflower Student Movement]] against the [[Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement|CSSTA]] in Taipei]]
At the same time that official talks between the two sides began, the CSSTA, awaiting review by the [[Legislative Yuan]], faced internal opposition in Taiwan, which ultimately led to the outbreak of the [[Sunflower Student Movement]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/03/19/2003586009|title=Opposition, groups protest trade pact|work=Taipei Times|date=19 March 2014|access-date=22 March 2025}}</ref> Citizens occupied the Legislative Yuan for 23 days, protesting against the ruling KMT's attempt to push the CSSTA through.<ref>{{cite web|last=Cole|first=J. Michael|date=11 April 2014|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/sunflowers-end-occupation-of-taiwans-legislature/|title=Sunflowers End Occupation of Taiwan's Legislature|website=The Diplomat|access-date=22 March 2025|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250223134257/https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/sunflowers-end-occupation-of-taiwans-legislature/|archive-date=23 February 2025}}</ref> The protesters felt that the trade pact with China would leave Taiwan vulnerable to political pressure from Beijing.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/hundreds-of-thousands-protest-against-trade-pact-in-taiwan/ |title=Hundreds of Thousands Protest Against Trade Pact in Taiwan |first=J. Michael|last=Cole|date=31 March 2014|work=The Diplomat |access-date=3 April 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160401102749/https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/hundreds-of-thousands-protest-against-trade-pact-in-taiwan/ |archive-date=1 April 2016 }}</ref> In the end, the agreement was not ratified by the legislature.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202306260012|title=Taiwan presidential hopefuls reheat decade-old China trade deal debate|work=Focus Taiwan|date=26 June 2023|access-date=3 November 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230627112736/https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202306260012|archive-date=27 June 2023}}</ref> Subsequent talks on other cross-strait trade agreements were suspended.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Huang|first1=Chiao-wen|last2=Low|first2=Y.F.|title=Trade-in-goods pact with China unlikely this year: official|url=http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406090011.aspx|access-date=22 March 2025|work=Focus Taiwan|date=9 June 2014|archive-date=30 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190330104854/http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406090011.aspx|url-status=live}}</ref> In September 2014, Xi Jinping adopted a more uncompromising stance than his predecessors, calling for the "one country, two systems" model to be applied to Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news|last=Chou|first=Chih-chieh|date=13 October 2014|url=http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20141013000011&cid=1703|title=Beijing seems to have cast off the 1992 Consensus|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141103005607/http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20141013000011&cid=1703 |archive-date=3 November 2014|work=Want China Times}}</ref> It was noted that the model had not been mentioned by the PRC for quite some time.<ref name="Huang2017">{{cite book|last=Huang|first=Jing|editor-last=Dittmer|editor-first=Lowell|year=2017|title=Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace|chapter=Xi Jinping's Taiwan Policy: Boxing Taiwan In with the One-China Framework|edition=1|publisher=University of California Press|pages=245|jstor=10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.16}}</ref> Taiwan's ruling KMT later suffered a historic defeat in the [[2014 Taiwanese local elections]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Yeh|first=Ricky|date=9 December 2014|title=Why the KMT Failed in Taiwan's Local Elections|url=https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/why-the-kmt-failed-in-taiwans-local-elections-2/|website=The Diplomat|access-date=22 March 2025|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141226003708/https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/why-the-kmt-failed-in-taiwans-local-elections-2/|archive-date=26 December 2014}}</ref>

[[File:2015 Ma–Xi Meeting 08.jpg|thumb|[[First Ma–Xi meeting|2015 Ma–Xi meeting]] in [[Singapore]]]]
With the prospect of Taiwan's DPP taking control of the presidency and legislature in the upcoming [[2016 Taiwanese general election|2016 elections]],<ref>{{cite news|last=Minnick|first=Wendell|date=14 November 2015|title=Analysis: Was Ma-Xi Meeting a Historic Summit or Farewell Dinner?|url=https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2015/11/13/analysis-was-ma-xi-meeting-a-historic-summit-or-farewell-dinner/|work=Defense News|access-date=22 March 2025}}</ref> [[First Ma–Xi meeting|Ma and Xi met]] on 7 November 2015 in [[Singapore]], marking the first meeting between leaders of the two sides since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Huang|first1=Cary|title=Xi's a mister, so is Ma: China and Taiwan have an unusual solution for an old problem|url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1875810/xis-mister-so-ma-china-and-taiwan-have-unusual-solution|access-date=12 November 2015|work=South China Morning Post|date=5 November 2015}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2015/11/07/450352/Cross-strait-leaders.htm|title=Cross-strait leaders meet after 66 years of separation|last=Chiao|first=Yuan-Ming|date=7 November 2015|work=China Post|access-date=3 June 2016|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151110044804/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2015/11/07/450352/Cross-strait-leaders.htm|archive-date=10 November 2015}}</ref> They met within their capacity as "Leader of Mainland China" and "Leader of Taiwan" respectively and addressed each other as "mister".<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=236}} No major agreements were reached on the occasion, however, a [[hotline]] connecting the head of the Mainland Affairs Council and the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office was established at the end of 2015.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34742680|title=China and Taiwan leaders hail historic talks|work=BBC|date=7 November 2015|access-date=3 November 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=240835&ctNode=2182 |title=Hotline established for cross-strait affairs chiefs |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304115256/http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=240835&ctNode=2182 |archive-date=4 March 2016 |access-date=14 January 2016 }}</ref>

===Deteriorating relations (2016–present)===
In the [[2016 Taiwanese general election]]s, [[Tsai Ing-wen]] and the DPP captured landslide victories.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Tai|first1=Ya-chen|last2=Chen|first2=Chun-hua|last3=Huang|first3=Frances|title=Turnout in presidential race lowest in history|url=http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201601170015.aspx|access-date=17 January 2016|agency=Central News Agency|date=17 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160119154047/http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201601170015.aspx|archive-date=19 January 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Tsai initially pursued a similar strategy as Chen Shui-bian, but after winning the election she received a similarly frosty reception from the PRC.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Romberg|first1=Alan D.|url=https://www.hoover.org/research/1992-consensus-adapting-future|title=The "1992 Consensus"—Adapting to the Future?|website=[[Hoover Institution]]|date=1 March 2016|access-date=10 March 2021}}</ref><ref name="TT2016">{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/05/21/2003646796|title=Tsai's inauguration speech 'incomplete test paper': Beijing|work=[[Taipei Times]]|date=21 May 2016|access-date=20 May 2020|archive-date=7 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200607072245/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/05/21/2003646796|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/tsais-refusal-to-affirm-the-1992-consensus-spells-trouble-for-taiwan/|title=Tsai's Refusal to Affirm the 1992 Consensus Spells Trouble for Taiwan|last1=Wong|first1=Yeni|last2=Wu|first2=Ho-I|last3=Wang|first3=Kent|work=The Diplomat|date=26 August 2016|access-date=4 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171004190212/https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/tsais-refusal-to-affirm-the-1992-consensus-spells-trouble-for-taiwan/|archive-date=4 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> On 12 March 2016, Xi stated that the 1992 Consensus was "the greatest common denominator and political bottom line for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations".<ref name=":12"/>{{Rp|page=13}}

[[File:總統蔡英文與前總統馬英九步出總統府 (26851536660).jpg|thumb|[[Tsai Ing-wen]] succeeded [[Ma Ying-jeou]] as the ROC President in May 2016.]]
In her inauguration speech, President Tsai acknowledged that the talks surrounding the 1992 Consensus took place without agreeing that a consensus was reached. She credited the talks with spurring 20 years of dialogue and exchange between the two sides. She hoped that exchanges would continue on the basis of these historical facts, as well as the existence of the Republic of China's constitutional system and the democratic will of the Taiwanese people.<ref name="inaug1">{{cite web|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201605200008|title=Full text of President Tsai's inaugural address|date=20 May 2016|access-date=20 May 2020|work=[[Central News Agency (Republic of China)|Central News Agency]]|archive-date=19 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200519023056/https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201605200008|url-status=live}}</ref> In response, Beijing called Tsai's answer an "incomplete test paper" because Tsai did not agree to the content of the 1992 Consensus.<ref name="TT2016"/> On 25&nbsp;June 2016, Beijing suspended official cross-strait communications,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/world/asia/china-suspends-diplomatic-contact-with-taiwan.html|title=China Suspends Diplomatic Contact With Taiwan|work=[[The New York Times]]|last=Hernández|first=Javier C.|access-date=20 May 2020|date=25 June 2016|archive-date=30 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200430122206/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/world/asia/china-suspends-diplomatic-contact-with-taiwan.html|url-status=live}}</ref> with any remaining cross-strait exchanges thereafter taking place through unofficial channels.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/cross-strait-chill-freezes-out-taiwan-in-its-efforts-to-deal-with-coronavirus|title=Cross-strait chill freezes out Taiwan in its efforts to deal with coronavirus outbreak|work=[[The Straits Times]]|date=4 February 2020|last=Goh|first=Sui Noi|access-date=20 May 2020|archive-date=7 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200607072241/https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/cross-strait-chill-freezes-out-taiwan-in-its-efforts-to-deal-with-coronavirus|url-status=live}}</ref>

The Tsai administration blocked former President Ma Ying-jeou from visiting Hong Kong,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201606010017.aspx |title=Former president Ma to visit Hong Kong – Focus Taiwan |date=June 2016 |access-date=7 August 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160604133852/http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201606010017.aspx |archive-date=4 June 2016 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Ramzy |first1=Austin |title=Taiwan Bars Ex-President From Visiting Hong Kong |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/world/asia/taiwan-hong-kong-ma-ying-jeou.html?_r=0 |access-date=7 August 2016 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=14 June 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160623123702/http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/world/asia/taiwan-hong-kong-ma-ying-jeou.html?_r=0 |archive-date=23 June 2016 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Full text of former President Ma Ying-jeou's video speech at SOPA |url=http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201606160001.aspx |access-date=7 August 2016 |agency=Central News Agency |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160724082320/http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201606160001.aspx |archive-date=24 July 2016 }}</ref> but eight non-DPP magistrates and mayors from Taiwan visited Beijing in 2016.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2016/09/19/478797/Local-govt.htm |title=Local gov't officials hold meeting with Beijing |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160923125855/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2016/09/19/478797/Local-govt.htm |archive-date=23 September 2016 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/09/18/2003655377 |title=Local government heads arrive in Beijing for talks – Taipei Times |date=18 September 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160919225447/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/09/18/2003655377 |archive-date=19 September 2016 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=18257 |title=Kuomintang News Network |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160924113429/http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=18257 |archive-date=24 September 2016 }}</ref> Their visit aimed to reset and restart cross-strait relations after Tsai took office. The eight local leaders reiterated their support for [[One China]] under the 1992 Consensus. In response, Tsai presented the "New Four Noes" in her first [[National Day of the Republic of China|National Day]] speech, stating that "our pledges will not change, and our goodwill will not change; but we will not bow to pressure, and we will of course not revert to the old path of confrontation".<ref name=":1222">{{Cite book |last=Xin |first=Qiang |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Selective Engagement: Mainland China's Dual-Track Taiwan Policy |doi=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=66}}

In October 2017, Tsai Ing-wen expressed hopes that both sides would restart their cross-strait relations after the [[19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]], and argued that new practices and guidelines governing mutual interaction should be examined.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://chinapost.nownews.com/20171003-156963|title=President Tsai calls for new model for cross-strait ties {{!}} ChinaPost|website=ChinaPost|date=3 October 2017|access-date=4 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171004135620/https://chinapost.nownews.com/20171003-156963|archive-date=4 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/10/04/2003679676|title=Tsai renews call for new model on cross-strait ties – Taipei Times|website=taipeitimes.com|date=4 October 2017|access-date=4 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171003211056/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/10/04/2003679676|archive-date=3 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> However, Xi Jinping emphasized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan in his opening speech at the 19th National Congress.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-says-china-will-oppose-any-behaviours-that-try-to-separate-the-country|title=19th Party Congress: Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China will be thwarted|last=hermesauto|date=18 October 2017|work=The Straits Times|access-date=19 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018112744/http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-says-china-will-oppose-any-behaviours-that-try-to-separate-the-country|archive-date=18 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> At the same time, he offered the chance for open talks and "unobstructed exchanges" with Taiwan as long as the government moved to accept the 1992 Consensus.<ref name=":0"/><ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.ifeng.com/a/20171018/52687601_0.shtml|script-title=zh:习近平：我们有足够能力挫败"台独"分裂图谋_新改革时代|website=news.ifeng.com|access-date=19 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171019104152/http://news.ifeng.com/a/20171018/52687601_0.shtml|archive-date=19 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> Xi stated that people from Taiwan could receive national treatment in pursuing careers on the mainland and in February 2018 the PRC government announced 31 preferential policies for Taiwan people on matters of industry, finance, taxation, land use, employment, education, and health care.<ref name=":12"/>{{Rp|page=13}} Among other measures, beginning 1 September 2018 Taiwan people who live on the mainland for six months and have stable jobs are eligible to obtain residence permits.<ref name=":12"/>{{Rp|pages=13–14}} By the end of February 2018, 24 provinces and 72 cities had introduced preferential policies for people from Taiwan.<ref name=":1222"/>{{Rp|page=72}}

Beginning in the mid-to-late 2010s, Beijing has significantly restricted the number of Chinese tour groups allowed to visit Taiwan in order to place pressure upon President Tsai Ing-wen.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/world/asia/taiwan-china-tourism.html|title=With Chinese Tourism Down, Taiwan Looks to Lure Visitors From Southeast Asia|work=The New York Times|date=17 May 2017|access-date=11 November 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170517230606/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/world/asia/taiwan-china-tourism.html|archive-date=17 May 2017}}</ref> During Tsai's first presidential term, seven countries shifted their diplomatic recognition to the PRC.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Shattuck |first=Thomas J. |year=2020 |title=The Race to Zero?: China's Poaching of Taiwan's Diplomatic Allies |journal=[[Orbis (journal)|Orbis]] |volume=64 |issue=2 |pages=334–352 |doi=10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.003 |pmc=7102519 |pmid=32292214}}</ref> The [[People's Liberation Army Air Force]] conducted circumnavigations around Taiwan, strengthening the PLA's conventional strategic deterrence.<ref name=":1222"/>{{Rp|page=67}}<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Beauchamp-Mustafaga|first1=Nathan|last2=Grossman|first2=Derek|last3=Ma|first3=Logan|date=13 September 2017|title=Chinese Bomber Flights Around Taiwan: For What Purpose?|url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2017/09/chinese-bomber-flights-around-taiwan-for-what-purpose.html|website=RAND|access-date=22 March 2025}}</ref> China was also accused of conducting [[hybrid warfare]] against Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news |title=China's Hybrid Warfare and Taiwan |url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-hybrid-warfare-and-taiwan/ |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |date=13 January 2018 |access-date=16 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014064316/https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-hybrid-warfare-and-taiwan/ |archive-date=14 October 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/03/13/814709530/with-odds-against-it-taiwan-keeps-coronavirus-corralled |title=With Odds Against It, Taiwan Keeps Coronavirus Corralled |newspaper=NPR |date=13 March 2020 |access-date=14 March 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200321181015/https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/03/13/814709530/with-odds-against-it-taiwan-keeps-coronavirus-corralled |archive-date=21 March 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref> ROC political leaders, including President Tsai and Premier [[Lai Ching-te]], as well as international media outlets, have repeatedly accused the PRC of spreading [[fake news]] via social media to create divisions in Taiwanese society and [[Foreign electoral intervention|influence voters]].<ref>{{cite news |title='Fake news' rattles Taiwan ahead of elections |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/news-rattles-taiwan-elections-181123005140173.html |work=Al-Jazeera |date=23 November 2018 |access-date=16 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181214075425/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/news-rattles-taiwan-elections-181123005140173.html |archive-date=14 December 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Analysis: 'Fake news' fears grip Taiwan ahead of local polls |url=https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200fqlq |publisher=BBC Monitoring |date=21 November 2018 |access-date=16 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181214164847/https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200fqlq |archive-date=14 December 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Fake news: How China is interfering in Taiwanese democracy and what to do about it |url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3580979 |work=Taiwan News |date=23 November 2018 |access-date=16 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181214213851/https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3580979 |archive-date=14 December 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=China's hybrid warfare against Taiwan |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/14/chinas-hybrid-warfare-against-taiwan/?noredirect=on |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=14 December 2018 |access-date=16 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014064330/https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/14/chinas-hybrid-warfare-against-taiwan/?noredirect=on |archive-date=14 October 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In a January 2019 speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," Xi Jinping called for "peaceful reunification with Taiwan" in accordance with the "One China principle" and the 1992 Consensus.<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|page=240}} In Xi's view, the Taiwan issue emerged from China's weakness dating back to the Opium Wars and after World War II, the "two sides of the Taiwan straits fell into a special state of protracted political confrontation due to the civil war in China and the interferences of foreign forces."<ref name=":Chen"/>{{Rp|pages=240–241}}

[[File:Harcourt Road tear smoke view1 20190612.jpg|thumb|left|[[2019–2020 Hong Kong protests|Hong Kong protests]] were considered a contributing factor in the [[2020 Taiwanese general election|2020 Taiwanese elections]] ]]
In response, Tsai emphasized that she has never accepted the 1992 Consensus.<ref>{{cite web|title= President Tsai issues statement on China's President Xi's "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan"|url=https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621|website=english.president.gov.tw|date=2 January 2019}}</ref> Tsai made a shift from not publicly accepting the 1992 Consensus to directly rejecting it, stating that there's no need to talk about the 1992 Consensus anymore, because this term has already been defined by Beijing as "one country, two systems."<ref>{{cite news|title=Taiwan's President, Defying Xi Jinping, Calls Unification Offer "Impossible"|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/taiwan-xi-jinping-tsai-ing-wen.html|work=The New York Times|date=5 January 2019|access-date=4 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190105130541/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/asia/taiwan-xi-jinping-tsai-ing-wen.html|archive-date=5 January 2019}}</ref> Tsai, who supported the [[2019–2020 Hong Kong protests]], pledged that as long as she is Taiwan's president, she will never accept the "one country, two systems."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201906100017|title=Tsai, Lai voice support for Hong Kong extradition bill protesters|work=Foucs Taiwan|date=10 June 2019|access-date=4 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200701070905/https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201906100017|archive-date=1 July 2020}}</ref> In January 2020, re-elected Tsai Ing-wen argued that Taiwan already was an independent country called the "Republic of China (Taiwan)", further arguing that the mainland Chinese authorities had to recognize that situation.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/tsai-ing-wen-says-china-must-face-reality-of-taiwans-independence |title=Tsai Ing-wen says China must 'face reality' of Taiwan's independence |website=[[TheGuardian.com]] |date=15 January 2020 |access-date=3 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203232346/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/tsai-ing-wen-says-china-must-face-reality-of-taiwans-independence |archive-date=3 February 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The Taiwanese public turned further against mainland China, due to fallout from the Hong Kong protests and also due to the PRC's continued determination to keep the ROC out of the [[World Health Organization#Membership and participation of the Republic of China|World Health Organization]] during the [[COVID-19 pandemic]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Taiwan opposition seeks distance from China after poll defeat |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/taiwan-opposition-seeks-distance-from-china-after-poll-defeat-idUSKBN23E00D |access-date=8 June 2020 |work=Reuters |date=7 June 2020 |language=en |archive-date=8 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200608011848/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/taiwan-opposition-seeks-distance-from-china-after-poll-defeat-idUSKBN23E00D |url-status=live }}</ref>
The opposition KMT also appeared to distance itself from the Chinese mainland in 2020, stating it would review its unpopular advocacy of closer ties with the PRC. In March 2021, KMT chairman [[Johnny Chiang]] rejected "one country, two systems" as a feasible model for Taiwan, citing Beijing's response to protests in Hong Kong as well as the value that Taiwanese place in political freedoms.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Blanchard |first1=Ben |last2=Lee |first2=Yimou |title=Taiwan opposition chief in no rush for China meeting |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/taiwan-opposition-chief-in-no-rush-for-china-meeting-idUSKCN2AU0IV |access-date=11 March 2021 |archive-date=9 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309071434/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/taiwan-opposition-chief-in-no-rush-for-china-meeting-idUSKCN2AU0IV |url-status=live }}</ref>

The [[Hong Kong Economic, Trade and Cultural Office]] in Taiwan suspended its operation indefinitely in 2021, followed by the [[Macau Economic and Cultural Office]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Cheung|first1=Stanley|last2=Yeh|first2=Joseph|date=16 June 2021|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202106160013|title=Macao office in Taipei suspends operation following HK office closure|publisher=Focus Taiwan|access-date=17 June 2021|archive-date=17 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210617091726/https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202106160013|url-status=live}}</ref> In October 2021, Tsai stated her "four commitments" in a National Day speech, including that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6175|title=President Tsai delivers 2021 National Day Address|website=Office of the President|date=10 October 2021|access-date=9 May 2025}}</ref> The PRC denounced Tsai's speech as "incited confrontation and distorted facts", and added that seeking Taiwanese independence was closing doors to dialogue.<ref>{{cite news |title=China denounces Taiwan president's speech |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-denounces-taiwan-presidents-speech-2021-10-10/ |access-date=10 October 2021 |work=[[Reuters]] |date=10 October 2021 |archive-date=10 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211010122124/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-denounces-taiwan-presidents-speech-2021-10-10/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Following a [[Freedom pineapples|ban on the importation of pineapples from Taiwan]] and wax apples in 2021, the Chinese government banned the import of [[Grouper|grouper fish]] in June 2022, claiming they had found banned chemicals and excessive levels of other substances.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/22/business/china-taiwan-grouper-ban.html | title=First Pineapples, Now Fish: To Pressure Taiwan, China Flexes Economic Muscle | newspaper=The New York Times | date=22 June 2022 | last1=Chien | first1=Amy Chang | access-date=27 June 2022 | archive-date=27 June 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220627162329/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/22/business/china-taiwan-grouper-ban.html | url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-halts-taiwan-sugar-apple-wax-apple-imports-prevent-disease-2021-09-19/ | title=Taiwan threatens to take China to WTO in new spat over fruit | newspaper=Reuters | date=19 September 2021 | access-date=27 June 2022 | archive-date=27 June 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220627162442/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-halts-taiwan-sugar-apple-wax-apple-imports-prevent-disease-2021-09-19/ | url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:Pelosi And Tsai Wave Hands by Chien.jpg|thumb|ROC President Tsai Ing-wen with U.S. House Speaker [[Nancy Pelosi]] on 3&nbsp;August 2022]]
On 2 August 2022, U.S. House Speaker [[Nancy Pelosi]] [[2022 visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan|visited Taiwan]], which China viewed as a violation of its sovereignty.<ref>{{cite web|title=US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi arrives in Taiwan, China says visit 'seriously infringes' upon its sovereignty|website=CNA|date=2 August 2022|url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/nancy-pelosi-arrives-taiwan-us-house-speaker-2852841|access-date=9 July 2023|archive-date=4 August 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804131648/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/nancy-pelosi-arrives-taiwan-us-house-speaker-2852841|url-status=live}}</ref> In response, the PLA conducted [[2022 Chinese military exercises around Taiwan|unprecedented live-fire drills]] from 4 to 7 August in six zones around Taiwan, involving live ammunition, air assets, naval forces, and ballistic missiles.<ref name="Zheng">{{cite web |last=Zheng |first=Sarah |date=2 August 2022 |title=China Plans Four Days of Military Drills in Areas Encircling Taiwan |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-02/china-announces-military-drills-encircling-taiwan-from-aug-4-7-l6cc5ljn |access-date=3 August 2022 |website=Bloomberg }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Davidson |first1=Helen |last2=Ni |first2=Vincent |date=3 August 2022 |title=China to begin series of unprecedented live-fire drills off Taiwan coast |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/03/china-to-begin-series-unprecedented-live-fire-drills-off-coast-of-taiwan |access-date=4 August 2022 |website=The Guardian |language=en |archive-date=4 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804035722/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/03/china-to-begin-series-unprecedented-live-fire-drills-off-coast-of-taiwan |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=China Reacts Aggressively to Pelosi's Taiwan Visit {{!}} Arms Control Association |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-09/news/china-reacts-aggressively-pelosis-taiwan-visit |date=September 2022 |access-date=9 December 2022 |website=www.armscontrol.org |archive-date=9 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221209205144/https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-09/news/china-reacts-aggressively-pelosis-taiwan-visit |url-status=live }}</ref> Taiwan deployed ships and aircraft, but no military conflict occurred, though tensions escalated. China ended the exercises on 10&nbsp;August but stated that regular "patrols" would be launched in the Taiwan Strait.<ref name=":4">{{Cite news |date=10 August 2022 |title=China Says Taiwan Military Drills Over, Plans Regular Patrols |language=en |work=Bloomberg.com |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-10/china-says-taiwan-military-drills-over-plans-regular-patrols |access-date=14 August 2022 }}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite news |last1=Pollard |first1=Martin Quin |last2=Lee |first2=Yimou |date=11 August 2022 |title=China military 'completes tasks' around Taiwan, plans regular patrols |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-extends-military-drills-around-taiwan-after-pelosi-visit-2022-08-10/ |access-date=14 August 2022 |archive-date=4 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220904183924/https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-extends-military-drills-around-taiwan-after-pelosi-visit-2022-08-10/ |url-status=live }}</ref> China also released its first [[The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era|white paper on Taiwan's status]] since 2000, once again urging Taiwan to unify under the "one country, two systems" framework, but omitted a previous statement that no troops would be sent to Taiwan after unification. In response, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council called the white paper "wishful thinking and disregarding facts."<ref>{{Cite web |date=10 August 2022 |title=Beijing's Taiwan white paper: the messages for home and abroad |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3188367/mainland-china-releases-white-paper-declaring-beijings-greatest |access-date=10 August 2022 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=11 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220811033022/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3188367/mainland-china-releases-white-paper-declaring-beijings-greatest |url-status=live }}</ref>

Another set of Chinese military exercises around Taiwan called "[[2023 Chinese military exercises around Taiwan|Joint Sword]]" began on 8 April 2023, after president Tsai visited U.S. Speaker [[Kevin McCarthy]] in California.<ref>{{cite news |title=China Sends Warships, Fighter Jets Near Taiwan Following President's Meeting With US Speaker McCarthy |url=https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/china-sends-warships-fighter-jets-near-taiwan-following-presidents-meeting-with-us-speaker-mccarthy/4222960/ |access-date=8 April 2023 |work=[[WNBC]] |date=8 April 2023 |archive-date=8 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230408092718/https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/china-sends-warships-fighter-jets-near-taiwan-following-presidents-meeting-with-us-speaker-mccarthy/4222960/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-65223970 |title=China simulates hitting 'key targets' on Taiwan |work=BBC |access-date=10 April 2023 |archive-date=10 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230410023716/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-65223970 |url-status=live }}</ref> In June 2023, [[Wang Huning]], the [[chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference]], unveiled a plan to transform Fujian province into a [[Fujian Demonstration Zone|demonstration zone]] for "Taiwan’s economic integration into China".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Chung |first1=Li-hua |last2=Chin |first2=Jonathan |last3=Chung |first3=Jake |date=18 June 2023 |title=MAC rejects Fujian plan |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/06/18/2003801721 |access-date=18 December 2024 |work=[[Taipei Times]]}}</ref> Under the plan, the Chinese government would boost economic and transportation cooperation with Taiwan and make it easier for Taiwanese people to live, buy property, access social services and study in Fujian.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Davidson |first=Helen |date=2023-09-13 |title=China unveils Taiwan economic 'integration' plan as warships conduct manoeuvres off coast |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/13/china-unveils-taiwan-economic-integration-plan-as-warships-conduct-manoeuvres-off-coast |access-date=2025-02-01 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

Before the [[2024 Taiwanese general election|2024 Taiwanese election]], China began ending preferential import tariffs under the [[Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement|ECFA]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5063830|title=China ends preferential tax status for 12 Taiwan goods|work=Taiwan News|date=21 December 2023|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref> After [[Lai Ching-te]]'s election, China declared that the DPP could not represent mainstream Taiwanese opinion.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Taiwan-elections/China-says-DPP-cannot-represent-Taiwan-after-Lai-s-election-win|title=China says DPP 'cannot represent' Taiwan after Lai's election win|work=Nikkei Asia|date=14 January 2024|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref> Tensions rose following the [[2024 Kinmen Chinese motorboat capsizing incident|capsizing of a Chinese motorboat in Kinmen waters]], which resulted in two deaths.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/02/15/2003813590|title=Two dead after Chinese speedboat capsizes in Kinmen waters|work=Taipei Times|date=15 February 2024|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref> Upon taking office, Lai affirmed that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other, prompting China to conduct [[Joint Sword-2024|military exercises]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-starts-military-drills-around-taiwan-days-after-new-president-takes-office-2024-05-23/|title=China launches 'punishment' war games around Taiwan|work=Reuters|date=24 March 2024|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-holds-military-drills-taiwan-warn-independence-rcna175231|title=China holds military drills around Taiwan to warn against independence|work=NBC News|date=14 October 2024|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref> Subsequently, China suspended preferential tariff arrangements on 134 items under the ECFA.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Kang |first=Taejun |date=May 30, 2024 |title=China suspends tariff arrangements on 134 items under Taiwan trade deal |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-taiwan-trade-05302024235419.html |access-date=May 31, 2024 |work=[[Radio Free Asia]]}}</ref> In addition, China threatened the death penalty for independence advocates and, in September 2024, sentenced a Taiwanese individual to nine years for "[[Secession in China|separatism]]."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-issues-guidelines-criminal-punishment-diehard-taiwan-separatists-2024-06-21/|title=China threatens death penalty for 'diehard' Taiwan separatists|work=Reuters|date=21 June 2024|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref><ref name=":6">{{Cite news |date=2024-09-06 |title=China jails Taiwanese person on separatism charge for first time |url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-jails-taiwanese-person-on-separatism-charge-for-first-time |access-date=2024-09-06 |work=[[The Straits Times]] |language=en |issn=0585-3923}}</ref>

In 2025, Taiwan charged the captain of a Chinese-crewed cargo ship suspected of deliberately damaging a subsea communications cable near the [[Penghu|Penghu Islands]], marking the first such prosecution amid concerns over grey zone maritime activities.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Taiwan charges captain of China-linked ship with damaging subsea cable |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/11/taiwan-charges-captain-of-china-linked-ship-with-damaging-subsea-cable |access-date=2025-04-17 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref> In response to rising [[Chinese intelligence activity abroad|espionage activity]], Lai announced his intention to reinstate military trials for active-duty personnel and labeled China a "foreign hostile force" under the [[Anti-Infiltration Act]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Fang|first1=Wei-li|last2=Khan|first2=Fion|date=14 March 2025|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2025/03/14/2003833400|title=Military courts to be reinstated: Lai|work=Taipei Times|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/14/taiwan-president-lai-ching-te-china-hostile-force-speech|title=Taiwan's president labels China a 'foreign hostile force' and ramps up security measures citing 'infiltration'|work=The Guardian|date=14 March 2025|access-date=15 March 2025}}</ref>

== Semi-official relations ==
[[File:Straits Exchange Foundation Dazhi Headquarters.JPG|thumb|[[Straits Exchange Foundation]] headquarter office in [[Taipei]], Taiwan]]
[[File:Chiang Wan-an and Gong Zheng shaking hands.jpg|thumb|[[Politics of Shanghai|Shanghai Mayor]] [[Gong Zheng]] and [[Mayor of Taipei|Taipei Mayor]] [[Chiang Wan-an]] shaking hands at the 2023 [[Shanghai-Taipei City Forum]]]]
Semi-governmental contact is maintained through the [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] (SEF) and the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits]] (ARATS). Although formally privately constituted bodies, the SEF and the ARATS are both directly led by the Executive Government of each side: the SEF by the Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC's Executive Yuan, and the ARATS by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC's State Council. The heads of the two bodies are both full-time appointees and do not hold other government positions.

Semi-official representative offices between the two sides are the PRC's [[Cross-Strait Tourism Exchange Association]] (CSTEA) in Taiwan, and ROC's [[Taiwan Strait Tourism Association]] (TSTA) in China.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=961|title=Taipei, Beijing to open reciprocal tourism offices|website=Taiwan Today|date=11 February 2010|access-date=30 December 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/taiwan-china-open-first-semi-official-offices-political-challenges-linger-93667274/117564.html|title=Taiwan, China Open First Semi-Official Offices|work=VOA|date=12 May 2010|access-date=30 December 2023}}</ref> Both were established in May 2010.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.roc-taiwan.org/ct.asp?xItem=141059&ctNode=1596&mp=212|title=Taiwan Strait Tourism Association opens office in Beijing|website=roc-taiwan.org|date=13 May 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140302202743/http://www.roc-taiwan.org/ct.asp?xItem=141059&ctNode=1596&mp=212|archive-date=2 March 2014|access-date=30 December 2023}}</ref> However, the duties of these offices are limited only to tourism-related affairs.

The Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party maintained regular dialogue via the [[Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum|KMT–CCP Forum]] from 2006 to 2016.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2016/04/05/2003643202|title=EDITORIAL: Rise and fall of the KMT-CCP forum|work=Taipei Times|date=5 April 2016|access-date=25 December 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=2031|title=Does the KMT Still Have a Cross-Strait Role?|website=CommonWealth Magazine|date=20 July 2018|access-date=25 December 2023}}</ref> This was called a "second rail" in Taiwan and helped to maintain political understanding between the two parties.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20161015000334-260102?chdtv|title=扮演第二軌角色 郝龍斌：國共論壇應聚焦經貿|work=China Times|language=zh|date=15 October 2016|access-date=25 December 2023}}</ref>

The [[Shanghai-Taipei City Forum]] is an annual forum between the cities of Shanghai and Taipei. Launched in 2010 by then-[[Taipei Mayor]] [[Hau Lung-pin]] to promote city-to-city exchanges, it led to Shanghai's participation in the [[Taipei International Flora Exposition]] end of that year.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2015/08/18/443558/Ko-heads.htm |title=Ko heads to meeting in Shanghai |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150818082250/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2015/08/18/443558/Ko-heads.htm |archive-date=18 August 2015 }}</ref> Both Taipei and Shanghai are the first two cities across the Taiwan Strait that carries out exchanges. The forum proceeded even though [[Ko Wen-je]] was the non-KMT mayor of Taipei from 2014 to 2022.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/08/18/2003625606 |title=Ko seeks goodwill, trust in Shanghai |website=Taipei Times |date=18 August 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150818131347/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/08/18/2003625606 |archive-date=18 August 2015 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2007899|title=Annual Taipei-Shanghai City Forum opens amid controversy|work=Radio Taiwan International|date=19 July 2022|access-date=25 December 2023}}</ref>

Another mode of contact is through private bodies accredited by the respective governments to negotiate technical and operational aspects of issues between the two sides. Called the "[[Macau]] mode", this avenue of contact was maintained even through the years of the Chen Shui-bian administration.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.waou.com.mo/2005/08/31/%E5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8%E5%AE%9C%E5%BC%B7%E5%8C%96%E6%93%B4%E5%A4%A7%E3%80%8C%E6%BE%B3%E9%96%80%E6%A8%A1%E5%BC%8F%E3%80%8D%E7%9A%84%E5%AF%A6%E6%96%BD%E7%AF%84%E7%96%87%20%E5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8%E5%AE%9C%E5%BCb/|title=兩岸宜強化擴大「澳門模式」的實施範疇|work=Jornal San Wa Ou|language=zh|date=31 August 2005|access-date=25 December 2023}}</ref>

== Transportation ==
[[File:Air China Airbus A330-343X B-6530 Departing from Taipei Songshan Airport 20150103c.jpg|thumb|An [[Air China]] Airbus A330-300 at [[Taipei Songshan Airport]]]]
[[File:COSCO Star Shipped in Keelung Port 20131227b.jpg|thumb|''COSCO Star'' operates direct maritime passenger and cargo [[roll-on/roll-off]] services between China and Taiwan]]
The PRC proposed [[Three Links]] to open up postal, transportation and trade links between mainland China and Taiwan. Before 2003, travelers had to make a time-consuming stopover at a third destination, usually Hong Kong or Macau.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://taiwantoday.tw/print.php?unit=4&post=4354|title=Closer Than Ever|website=Taiwan Today|date=1 December 2008|access-date=29 December 2023}}</ref> [[Cross-strait charter]] flights during [[Chinese New Year]] took off in 2003. However, the charter flights still had to land in Hong Kong. The transportation model was improved in 2005 as the flights had to fly over Hong Kong's [[flight information region]] without landing. It was not until 2008 that direct flights and cargo shipments began.<ref name="TheTimes"/> As of 2015, 61 mainland Chinese cities are connected with eight airports in Taiwan. The flights operate every day, totaling 890 round-trip flights across the Taiwan Strait per week.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201507030019.aspx |title=Cross-strait scheduled flights increased to 890 per week |work=Focus Taiwan |date=3 July 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150704192446/http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201507030019.aspx |archive-date=4 July 2015 }}</ref>

Taiwan residents cannot use the [[Republic of China passport]] to travel to mainland China, and mainland China residents cannot use the [[People's Republic of China passport]] to travel to Taiwan, as neither the ROC nor the PRC considers this international travel. The PRC government requires Taiwan residents to hold a [[Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents]] when entering mainland China, whereas the ROC government requires mainland Chinese residents to hold the [[Exit & Entry Permit (Republic of China)|Exit and Entry Permit for the Taiwan Area of the Republic of China]] to enter the Taiwan Area.

==Economy==
China is one of Taiwan's most important target for outward [[foreign direct investment]] (FDI).<ref>{{cite web|last1=Kuo|first1=Anthony|last2=Kao|first2=Ming-Sung|date=23 April 2018|title=Taiwan's FDI: Why Outflows are Greater than Inflows|url=https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/04/23/taiwans-fdi-why-outflows-are-greater-than-inflows/|website=taiwaninsight.org|access-date=29 December 2023}}</ref> From 1991 to 2022, more than US$200&nbsp;billion has been invested in China by Taiwanese companies, comprising over half of Taiwan's outward FDI annually before 2016.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://dir.moea.gov.tw/english/news_bsAn.jsp|title=Statistics|website=Department of Investment Review, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C.|access-date=29 December 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.storm.mg/article/5311885|title=30年來首次！台灣對星國投資超越中國 童振源曝這2企業「占總投資逾8成」|work=The Stom Media|language=zh|date=19 January 2025|access-date=23 January 2025}}</ref> Much of Taiwanese-owned manufacturing, particularly in the electronics sector and the apparel sector, takes place in the PRC, with major companies like [[TSMC]], [[Foxconn]], and [[United Microelectronics Corporation|UMC]] establishing subsidiaries there.<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |title=Greening East Asia: The Rise of the Eco-Developmental State |date=2020 |publisher=[[University of Washington Press]] |isbn=978-0-295-74791-0 |editor-last=Esarey |editor-first=Ashley |location=Seattle |jstor=j.ctv19rs1b2 |editor-last2=Haddad |editor-first2=Mary Alice |editor-last3=Lewis |editor-first3=Joanna I. |editor-last4=Harrell |editor-first4=Stevan}}</ref>{{Rp|page=11}}<ref name=":1222"/>{{Rp|page=74}} The investments helped the Taiwanese economy but also propelled China's economic rise.<ref>{{cite book|author1-link=Shelley Rigger|last=Rigger|first=Shelley|year=2021|title=The Tiger Leading the Dragon: How Taiwan Propelled China's Economic Rise|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers|isbn=978-1442219595}}</ref>

China is also Taiwan's largest trading partner, accounting for over 20 percent of total trade.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://cuswebo.trade.gov.tw/FSCE000F/FSCE000F|title=Trade Statistics|website=International Trade Administration, MOEA|access-date=29 December 2023}}</ref> China and Hong Kong together account for over 30 percent of Taiwan's exports. In 2022, Taiwan's trade surplus with mainland China and Hong Kong amounted to $100.4 billion.<ref>{{cite web|last=Zhu|first=Zhiqun|date=26 April 2023|title=Is Beijing 'Internationalizing' Cross-Strait Trade?|url=https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/is-beijing-internationalizing-cross-strait-trade/|website=The Diplomat|access-date=29 December 2023}}</ref> Electronic components, including semiconductor chips, lead in Taiwan's total exports to China.<ref>{{cite news|last=Zheng|first=Sarah|title=China Reliance on Taiwan Would Make Trade Retaliation Costly|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-17/china-s-reliance-on-taiwan-would-make-trade-retaliation-costly|work=Bloomberg|date=17 August 2022}}</ref>

Neither China nor Taiwan is comfortable with mutual economic dependence, and each government has been driven to seek alternatives.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Mark|first1=Jeremy|last2=Graham|first2=Niels|date=17 November 2023|title=Relying on old enemies: The challenge of Taiwan's economic ties to China|url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/relying-on-old-enemies-the-challenge-of-taiwans-economic-ties-to-china/|website=Atlantic Council|access-date=29 December 2023}}</ref> China issued a "[[Made in China 2025]]" plan in 2015 to promote manufacturing.<ref>{{cite web|last=Kania|first=Elsa B.|date=1 February 2019|url=https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/made-in-china-2025-explained/|title=Made in China 2025, Explained|website=The Diplomat|access-date=23 January 2025}}</ref> On the other hand, Taiwan has tried to reduce its economic reliance on mainland China through its "[[New Southbound Policy]]" since 2016. In 2022, Taiwan's total investments in the countries targeted by the policy outstripped investments in China for the first time.<ref>{{cite news|title=It is time to divert Taiwan's trade and investment from China |url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/03/06/it-is-time-to-divert-taiwans-trade-and-investment-from-china |newspaper=The Economist|date=6 March 2023}}</ref> The number of Taiwanese working in China, including Hong Kong and Macau, also fell from over 400,000 before the [[COVID-19 pandemic]] to 217,000 in 2023.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://news.tvbs.com.tw/english/2717268#:~:text=TAIPEI%20%28TVBS%20News%29%20%E2%80%94%20The%20number%20of%20Taiwanese,to%20the%20previous%20year%2C%20the%20Directorate-General%20of%20Bud|title=Taiwanese overseas workers hit 621K in 2023|work=TVBS|date=13 December 2024|access-date=23 January 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://money.udn.com/money/story/10869/8422024|title=台積電美國設廠效應 2023年赴美工作者12.8萬人創新高|work=經濟日報|language=zh|date=12 December 2024|access-date=23 January 2025}}</ref> The proportion of Taiwanese overseas workers in China has dropped from a peak of 62% in 2011 to 35% in 2023.

Since the governments on both sides of the strait do not recognize the other side's legitimacy, there is a lack of legal protection for cross-strait economic exchanges. The [[Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement]] (ECFA) was viewed as providing legal protection for investments.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Tan|first1=Alexander C.|last2=Ho|first2=Karl|chapter=Cross-Strait Relations and the Taiwan Voter|year=2017|title=The Taiwan Voter|pages=160–161|publisher=University of Michigan Press |jstor=j.ctvndv9z7.10|isbn=978-0-472-07353-5 }}</ref> In 2014, the [[Sunflower Student Movement]] effectively halted the [[Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement]] (CSSTA).

== Cultural exchanges ==
The [[National Palace Museum]] in Taipei and the [[Palace Museum]] in Beijing have collaborated on exhibitions.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/taiwan-museum-to-open-joint-exhibition-with-china/|title=Taiwan Museum To Open Joint Exhibition With China|work=CBS News|date=2 October 2009|access-date=2 January 2024}}</ref> Scholars and academics frequently visit institutions across the Taiwan Strait.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Miao|first1=Zong-Han|date=26 July 2023|title=The cautious restarting of cross-strait academic exchanges|url=https://www.thinkchina.sg/cautious-restarting-cross-strait-academic-exchanges|website=ThinkChina|access-date=2 January 2024}}</ref> Books published on each side are regularly re-published in the other side. However, restrictions on direct imports, [[Debate on traditional and simplified Chinese characters|different writing systems]], and [[censorship in China|censorship]] somewhat impede the exchange of books and ideas.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Lin|first1=Eric|date=October 2003|title=Rewriting the Book—Publishing in Cultural Greater China|url=https://www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/Articles/Details?Guid=aaf22eb5-9e80-47f2-95fa-e483c072d930&CatId=9&postname=Rewriting%20the%20Book--Publishing%20in%20Cultural%20Greater%20China|website=Taiwan Panorama|access-date=2 January 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Hetherington|first1=William|date=4 July 2022|title=Beijing blacklisting more Taiwanese books: source|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/07/04/2003781105|work=Taipei Times|access-date=3 January 2024}}</ref> Some cultural exchanges are even accused of being associated with China's [[United front (China)|united front]] work.<ref>{{cite news|title=China hopes Mazu, a sea goddess, can help it win over Taiwan|url=https://www.economist.com/china/2023/06/15/china-hopes-mazu-a-sea-goddess-can-help-it-win-over-taiwan|newspaper=The Economist|date=15 June 2023|access-date=3 January 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230815234401/https://www.economist.com/china/2023/06/15/china-hopes-mazu-a-sea-goddess-can-help-it-win-over-taiwan|archive-date=15 August 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Pomfret|first1=James|last2=Lee|first2=Yimou|date=21 December 2023|title=China wields Mazu 'peace goddess' religion as weapon in Taiwan election|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-wields-peace-goddess-religion-weapon-taiwan-election-2023-12-21/|work=Reuters|access-date=3 January 2024}}</ref>

Taiwanese students can apply to universities in the mainland China without taking China's nationwide unified examination, called [[Gaokao]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Lin|first1=Chen-ju|date=19 November 2018|orig-date=First published 2 July 2018|title=Why Are Taiwanese Students Choosing China For University?|url=https://www.taiwangazette.org/news/2018/11/18/why-are-taiwanese-students-choosing-china-for-university|work=The Taiwan Gazette|access-date=6 January 2024}}</ref> There are regular programs for school students from each side to visit the other.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://asianews.network/taiwan-teacher-dedicates-over-10-years-to-cross-strait-exchanges/|title=Taiwan teacher dedicates over 10 years to cross-Strait exchanges|work=China Daily|date=8 August 2023|access-date=2 January 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Haime|first1=Jordyn|date=14 March 2023|title=Why Chinese students are an increasingly rare sight in Taiwan|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/14/why-chinese-students-are-disappearing-from-taiwan|work=Al Jazeera|access-date=2 January 2024}}</ref> In 2019, there were 30,000 mainland Chinese and Hong Kong students studying in Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news|first1=Chih-chung|last1=Chen|first2=Chih-wei|last2=Hsu|first3=Joseph|last3=Yeh|date=2 October 2019|url=http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201910020009.aspx|title=Chinese students urged to cherish, respect freedom of speech|publisher=Focus Taiwan|access-date=10 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191003232303/http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201910020009.aspx|archive-date=3 October 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> There were also more than 7,000 Taiwanese students studying in Hong Kong that same year.<ref>{{cite news|first1=Pei-ju|last1=Teng|date=14 October 2019|url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3795370|title=Taiwan to provide legal assistance to its students in Hong Kong|publisher=Taiwan News|access-date=15 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191015001741/https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3795370|archive-date=15 October 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

Religious exchange has become frequent. Frequent interactions occur between worshipers of [[Matsu (goddess)|Matsu]], and also between [[Buddhists]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Wong|first1=Tessa|last2=Chang|first2=Joy|date=29 December 2023|title=The worshippers caught between China and Taiwan|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67779220|work=BBC News|access-date=2 January 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Ho|first1=Ming-sho|date=30 November 2022|title=China's Influence Campaigns Among Taiwan's Religious Organizations|url=https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/30/china-s-influence-campaigns-among-taiwan-s-religious-organizations-pub-88479|website=Carnegie Europe|access-date=2 January 2024}}</ref> Taiwan Buddhist organization [[Tzu Chi]] is the first overseas non-governmental organization allowed to operate in China.<ref>{{cite news|title=Atheist China gives nod to Taiwan Buddhist group|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSPEK230242/|work=Reuters|date=11 March 2008|access-date=3 January 2024}}</ref>

== Humanitarian actions ==
Both sides have provided humanitarian aid to one another on several occasions. Following the [[2008 Sichuan earthquake]], an expert search and rescue team was sent from Taiwan to help rescue survivors in [[Sichuan]]. Shipments of aid materials were also provided under the coordination of the [[Red Cross Society of the Republic of China]] and charities such as [[Tzu Chi]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Jennings |first=Ralph |title=Politics aside, Taiwan gives generously in China quake aid |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-aid/politics-aside-taiwan-gives-generously-in-china-quake-aid-idUSTP28953020080516 |access-date=7 June 2020 |work=[[Reuters]] |date=15 May 2008 |archive-date=7 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200607085233/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-aid/politics-aside-taiwan-gives-generously-in-china-quake-aid-idUSTP28953020080516 |url-status=live }}</ref> One year later, China donated [[prefabricated home]]s to Taiwan for use by the victims of [[Typhoon Morakot]] in 2009.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.rti.org.tw/index_newsContent.aspx?nid=211427|title=美救災直升機、中千間組合屋下午抵台|work=Radio Taiwan International|language=zh|date=17 August 2009|access-date=23 January 2025|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090818151341/http://news.rti.org.tw/index_newsContent.aspx?nid=211427|archive-date=18 August 2009}}</ref>

Political disputes sometimes arose during humanitarian relief efforts. Taiwan declined China's offer of rescue teams and emergency supplies, accusing China of attempting to gain political advantage from the [[1999 Jiji earthquake]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Woollacott|first=Martin|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/sep/25/china.martinwoollacott|title=Taiwan-China feud flares over earthquake aid|work=The Guardian|date=25 September 1999|access-date=23 January 2025}}</ref> On another occasion, China accused Taiwan of using the [[COVID-19 pandemic]] as a means to pursue independence.<ref>{{cite news|first1=Nectar|last1=Gan|first2=Brad|last2=Lendon|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/15/asia/china-taiwan-coronavirus-ties-intl-hnk/index.html|title=Taiwan's success in fighting coronavirus has bolstered its global standing. This has infuriated Beijing|work=CNN|date=15 May 2020|access-date=23 January 2025}}</ref>

== Military==
{{split-section|Chinese invasion of Taiwan|date=May 2025}}
=== Growing military tensions ===
The People's Republic of China's persistent opposition to Taiwan's ''de facto'' autonomy has edged many times on the possibility and [[Military threat|threat]] of a [[military invasion]] of the latter territories with the aim of achieving its vision of [[Chinese unification]]. Such a threat has become increasingly tangible in the course of the 2020s, driven by the expressed willingness of mainland political leadership to pursue a military intervention, its parallel build-up of forces and recurrent exercises around Taiwan; as a consequence, Taiwan has also pursued forms of military preparation and international political alignment to discourage and possibly resist such intervention.<ref name="al1">{{cite web |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/10/china-reaffirms-threat-of-military-force-to-take-taiwan |title=China reaffirms threat of military force to take Taiwan |last= |first= |date=10 August 2022 |website=[[Al Jazeera English|Aljazeera]]|publisher= |access-date=19 August 2023 |quote=}}</ref><ref name="france1">{{cite web |url=https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220807-china-s-military-threat-to-taiwan-is-much-more-credible-than-it-was-20-years-ago|title=China's 'military threat' to Taiwan 'is much more credible than it was 20 years ago' |last= |first= |date=7 August 2022 |website=[[France24]]|publisher= |access-date=19 August 2023 |quote=}}</ref>

[[Lai Ching-te|Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te]] has emphasized the need for stronger measures to counter China's increased efforts to infiltrate and weaken Taiwan's defenses, particularly through espionage and psychological warfare. In response, Taiwan has proposed stricter laws, including reinstating military trials for espionage and restricting access to Taiwanese identification for Chinese nationals. China's frequent military exercises near Taiwan's airspace and waters, including recent incursions and information leaks by retired Taiwanese military personnel, have heightened concerns. Taiwan has bolstered its defense with new weapons and extended mandatory military service to one year. China continues to assert territorial claims over Taiwan, and in 2025, the island marked the 20th anniversary of China's Anti-Secession Act, which outlines conditions under which China might use force to reclaim Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-03-13 |title=Taiwan's leader says tougher measures needed to counter stepped-up Chinese infiltration and spying |url=https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-spying-president-lai-defenses-31be72adb44f826d265cdc17a6559cbd |access-date=2025-03-20 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-03-16 |title=Taiwan marathon organizers apologize after giving out prizes in the shape of a Chinese machine gun |url=https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-china-trophy-machine-gun-ab1fb784b9c450bc13f93d4e87b8415c |access-date=2025-03-20 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref>

=== Possibility of a Chinese invasion ===
{{See also|PLA Navy landing barges}}
[[File:Bailey bridge barge.webp|thumb|3D sketch of a [[bailey bridge]] barge dock being developed by China to potentially invade Taiwan]]
Speculation about the odds of war between China and Taiwan is rife. The Deputy Director-General of Taiwan's [[National Security Bureau (Taiwan)|National Security Bureau]], Chen Wen-fan, stated in 2020 that Xi Jinping intends to solve the "Taiwan Problem" by 2049.<ref>{{cite web |last = Liao |first = George |title = Taiwan official details China's plan to solve Taiwan 'problem' by 2049: US military journal |url = https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4034891 |date = 21 October 2020 |publisher = Taiwan News |access-date = 24 November 2020 |archive-date = 25 November 2020 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201125150928/https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4034891 |url-status = live }}</ref> In 2022, U.S. Pacific Command described the situation of cross-strait relations as being dire, as China was amassing the largest build-up of military personnel and assets seen since World War II.<ref>{{cite web |last=Brest |first=Mike |url=https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/chinas-enacting-largest-military-buildup |title=China pursuing 'largest military buildup in history since WWII,' US commander says |publisher=Washington Examiner |date=24 June 2022 |access-date=6 August 2022 |archive-date=3 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220803172934/https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/chinas-enacting-largest-military-buildup |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Michael M. Gilday|Admiral Mike Gilday]], Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, warned that the American military must be prepared for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2024.<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 October 2022 |title=US Navy chief warns China could invade Taiwan before 2024 |work=Financial Times |url=https://www.ft.com/content/1740a320-5dcb-4424-bfea-c1f22ecb87f7 |access-date=20 October 2022 |archive-date=20 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221020050437/https://www.ft.com/content/1740a320-5dcb-4424-bfea-c1f22ecb87f7 |url-status=live }}</ref> A poll conducted by the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] (CSIS) summarized that China is determined to unify with Taiwan and the potential for a military crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait is very real.<ref>{{Cite web |date=12 September 2022 |title=Surveying the Experts: China's Approach to Taiwan |url=https://chinapower.csis.org/survey-experts-china-approach-to-taiwan/ |access-date=22 October 2022 |website=ChinaPower Project |language=en-US |archive-date=22 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221022070029/https://chinapower.csis.org/survey-experts-china-approach-to-taiwan/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The poll also showed that China is willing to wait to unify with Taiwan peacefully, but would immediately invade if Taiwan declared independence.

The [[People's Liberation Army]]'s current capacity of carrying out and winning such a war is a matter of debate, ranging mostly on the analysis whether it has the power to take the self-governing island despite the heavy costs foreseen. The perceived failure of the Russian army in rapidly occupying [[Ukraine]], turning into a protracted conflict with destabilizing repercussions inside [[Russia]] itself, is believed to weigh on PRC decision making.<ref name=cnn1>{{cite web |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/31/asia/china-taiwan-invasion-scenarios-analysis-intl-hnk-ml/index.html |title=China has the power to take Taiwan, but it would cost an extremely bloody price  |last= |first= |date=1 June 2022 |website=[[CNN]]|publisher= |access-date=19 August 2023 |quote=}}</ref><ref name=con1>{{cite web |url=https://theconversation.com/war-in-ukraine-is-a-warning-to-china-of-the-risks-in-attacking-taiwan-211251 |title=War in Ukraine is a warning to China of the risks in attacking Taiwan |last= |first= |date=16 August 2023 |website=[[The Conversation (website)|The Conversation]]|publisher= |access-date=19 August 2023 |quote=}}</ref><ref name=deutsch1>{{cite web |url=https://www.dw.com/en/can-china-impose-military-force-against-taiwan/a-56988658|title=Can China impose military force against Taiwan? |last= |first= |date=25 March 2021 |website=[[Deutsche Welle]]|publisher= |access-date=19 August 2023 |quote=}}</ref>

=== Geopolitical strategies and alliances ===
{{See also|China–United States relations|Taiwan–United States relations|American defense of Taiwan}}

The consolidation of Chinese hegemony in the [[Indo-Pacific]] and the immediate economic repercussions of the disruption to commodities logistics and electronic technology production are its main concerns in relation to Taiwan's security.<ref name=india1/>

The United States of America officially follows the "One-China policy", encouraging China and Taiwan to resolve their differences through dialogue, while also supporting Taiwan's efforts to enhance its self-defense under the [[Taiwan Relations Act]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jingdong |first1=Yuan |title=The United States and stability in the Taiwan Strait |journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |date=12 Mar 2023 |volume=79 |issue=2 |pages=80–86 |doi=10.1080/00963402.2023.2178176 |doi-access=free |bibcode=2023BuAtS..79b..80Y }}</ref> The U.S. has conducted military exchanges with Taiwan,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/10/new-bills-strengthen-us-taiwan-relations-angering-china.html|title=Chinese media warns the US of 'retaliations' from 'all sides' after new Taiwan bills passed|first=Nyshka|last=Chandran|website=[[CNBC]]|date=10 January 2018|access-date=17 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180217141948/https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/10/new-bills-strengthen-us-taiwan-relations-angering-china.html|archive-date=17 February 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2137610/donald-trump-signs-taiwan-travel-act-despite-warning-mainland-china|title=Beijing 'strongly dissatisfied' as Trump signs Taiwan Travel Act|work=South China Morning Post|access-date=22 March 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180321174903/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2137610/donald-trump-signs-taiwan-travel-act-despite-warning-mainland-china|archive-date=21 March 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> and U.S. military vessels have occasionally transited the Taiwan Strait.<ref name=":1">{{cite web|url=https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-whats-changed-under-trump|title=U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What's Changed Under Trump?|website=Council on Foreign Relations|access-date=25 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190705084819/https://www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-whats-changed-under-trump|archive-date=5 July 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Chinese leader [[Xi Jinping]] requested that U.S. President [[Joe Biden|Biden]] change the U.S. position to explicitly oppose Taiwan's independence, but the U.S. maintained that it "does not support" Taiwan independence.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Hunnicutt|first1=Trevor |last2=Chen |first2= Laurie |last3=Lee |first3=Yimou |date=29 October 2024|title=Exclusive: China's Xi pressed Biden to alter language on Taiwan |newspaper=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-pressed-biden-alter-language-taiwan-sources-say-2024-10-29/|access-date=29 October 2024}}</ref> After President [[Donald Trump|Trump]] returned to the White House in 2025, the [[United States Department of State|U.S. State Department]] removed the phrase "we do not support Taiwan independence" from the fact sheet on its website.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://apnews.com/article/china-taiwan-us-statement-independence-8374f7675d25a747f00364617b1bc970|title=China says US has 'gravely backpedaled' on Taiwan|work=The Associated Press|date=17 February 2025|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref>

Aside from the United States, Australia,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-11-24/hmas-toowoomba-confronted-by-chinese-navy-transits-taiwan-strait/103147982|title=China reacts after Australian warship HMAS Toowoomba transits Taiwan Strait|work=ABC News|date=24 November 2023|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref> Canada,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/china-condemnation-canadian-warship-taiwan-strait-1.7460907|title=China says Canada 'deliberately stirred up trouble' with warship sailing in Taiwan Strait|work=CBC|date=16 February 2025|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref> France,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/10/30/2003826102|title=French Navy sails frigate through Taiwan Strait|work=Taipei Times|date=30 October 2024|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref> Germany,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/german-navy-makes-rare-transit-sensitive-taiwan-strait-2024-09-13/|title=German navy makes rare transit of sensitive Taiwan Strait|work=Reuters|date=13 September 2024|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref> Japan,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/03/0d1d257ce195-update1-japan-msdf-destroyer-sailed-taiwan-strait-in-feb-1st-since-sept.html|title=Japan MSDF destroyer sailed Taiwan Strait in Feb., 1st since Sept.|work=Kyodo News|date=1 March 2025|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref> New Zealand,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/529229/nz-naval-vessel-sailing-through-taiwan-strait-routine-movement-defence-minister|title=NZ naval vessel sailing through Taiwan Strait 'routine movement' - Defence Minister|work=RNZ|date=27 September 2024|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref> and the United Kingdom<ref>{{cite news|url=https://news.sky.com/story/china-accuses-british-navy-of-evil-intentions-as-uk-warship-sails-through-taiwan-strait-12419546|title=China accuses British navy of 'evil intentions' as UK warship sails through Taiwan Strait|work=Sky News|date=28 September 2021|access-date=14 March 2025}}</ref> all had naval vessels transit the Taiwan Strait in the 2020s. Some analysts see India as an approximation to the United States as a visible positioning as well as a growing liability, amounting to the possibility of the country being dragged into the war.<ref name=india1>{{cite web |url=https://scroll.in/article/1055777/what-should-india-do-if-china-invades-taiwan|title=What should India do if China invades Taiwan? |last= |first= |date=25 March 2021 |website=[[Scroll]]|publisher= |access-date=18 September 2023 |quote=}}</ref>

=== Historical parallels ===
In response to Chinese military threats and recent drills near its coast in February 2025, Taiwan's defense ministry warned that history, including [[World War II]], showed that aggression leads to failure. Marking 80 years since the war's end, Taiwan compared China's actions to past invaders, accusing [[Beijing]] of destabilizing the region. Taiwan, once a [[Japanese colonial empire|Japanese colony]], has a complex wartime history, with some Taiwanese fighting for Japan. Meanwhile, [[Xi Jinping]] plans to attend [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Russia's World War Two commemorations]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Blanchard |first=Ben |date=28 February 2025 |editor-last=Doyle |editor-first=Gerry |title=Taiwan tells China World War Two shows aggression will end in failure |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-tells-china-world-war-two-shows-aggression-will-end-failure-2025-02-28/ |access-date=4 March 2025 |website=Reuters}}</ref>

== Public opinion ==
===China===
A 2019 phone survey conducted in nine major cities found that 53.1% of respondents supported using military force for unification with Taiwan while 39.1% stated that they would oppose military force under any circumstance.<ref name=":122">{{Cite book |last1=Liu |first1=Adam Y. |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |last2=Li |first2=Xiaojun |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Assessing Public Support for (Non-)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China |doi=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=37}} A survey conducted between 2020 and 2021 showed that 55 percent of the respondents accepted launching a war to unify with Taiwan entirely while 33 percent of them opposed.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last1=Liu |first1=Adam Y. |last2=Li |first2=Xiaojun |date=2024-01-02 |title=Assessing Public Support for (Non)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China |journal=[[Journal of Contemporary China]] |language=en |volume=33 |issue=145 |pages=1–13 |doi=10.1080/10670564.2023.2209524 |issn=1067-0564}}</ref> 22 percent of the respondents accepted the two sides of the Taiwan Strait keeping separate political systems, with unification not necessarily being the end game.<ref name=":7" />

Another survey conducted in 2022 showed Chinese respondents were split between those favoring tough policies on Taiwan and those favoring friendly ones.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Kironska|first1=Kristina|last2=Turcsányi|first2=Richard|last3=Chen|first3=Rong|last4=Chen|first4=Yiju|last5=Chubb|first5=Andrew|last6=Iocovozzi|first6=James|last7=Šimalčík|first7=Matej|url=https://ceias.eu/destined-for-conflict-taiwan-china-survey/|title=Destined for conflict? Taiwanese and Chinese public opinions on Cross-Strait relations|website=Central European Institute of Asian Studies|date=22 November 2022|access-date=31 December 2023}}</ref>

A September 2024 poll by the [[Carter Center]] and [[Emory University]] found that 55 percent of mainland Chinese respondents agreed with the statement that "the Taiwan problem should not be resolved using force under any circumstances".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Han |first=Bochen |date=2025-05-01 |title=Most mainland Chinese citizens oppose use of force to unify with Taiwan: survey |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3308606/most-mainland-chinese-citizens-oppose-use-force-unify-taiwan-survey |access-date=2025-05-01 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref>

Young [[Jingoism|jingoistic]] [[Chinese nationalism|Chinese nationalists]] on the internet, also called [[Little Pink]], occasionally [[internet censorship circumvention|bypassed]] the [[Great Firewall]] to flood websites with messages and [[sticker (messaging)|stickers]] in protest against Taiwan independence.<ref name="cnn">{{cite web |date=22 January 2016 |title=Facebook trolling, military drills: China responds to Taiwan's new president |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/22/asia/taiwan-china-facebook-military-drills/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220154421/http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/22/asia/taiwan-china-facebook-military-drills/ |archive-date=20 December 2016 |website=[[CNN]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=Pichi Chuang |date=21 January 2016 |title=An army of Chinese trolls has jumped the Great Firewall to attack Taiwanese independence on Facebook |url=https://qz.com/598812/an-army-of-chinese-trolls-has-jumped-the-great-firewall-to-attack-taiwanese-independence-on-facebook/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161229050436/http://qz.com/598812/an-army-of-chinese-trolls-has-jumped-the-great-firewall-to-attack-taiwanese-independence-on-facebook/ |archive-date=29 December 2016 |website=[[Quartz (publication)|Quartz]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=21 January 2016 |title=Pro-China posts spam Taiwan President-elect Tsai's Facebook |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35368930 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170305215927/http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35368930 |archive-date=5 March 2017 |website=[[BBC News]]}}</ref>

===Taiwan===
{{Further| Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity}}
[[File:National Chengchi University identity survey.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|Results from an identity survey conducted each year since 1992 by the Election Study Center, [[National Chengchi University]].<ref name="nccu"/> Responses are Taiwanese (green), Chinese (red) or both Taiwanese and Chinese (hatched). Non-responses are shown as grey.]]
An annual poll conducted by the Election Study Center of [[National Chengchi University]] (NCCU) showed that the Taiwanese public preferred maintaining some form of the status quo, rather than choosing immediate Taiwan independence or unification with China.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963|title=Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland|website=Election Study Center, NCCU|date=12 July 2023|access-date=31 December 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Smith|first=Courtney Donovan|date=20 June 2023|title=Disinformation, misinformation and the NCCU Taiwan polls|url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4923417|work=Taiwan News|access-date=31 December 2023}}</ref> A regular survey released by the [[Mainland Affairs Council]] (MAC) yielded similar results.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.mac.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=E604BEC02D4251EF|title=「民眾對當前兩岸關係之看法」民意調查|website=Mainland Affairs Council|language=zh|date=5 December 2024|access-date=21 January 2025}}</ref> Another regular survey conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) indicated that the public preferred independence over unification.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/20241230-%E3%80%8C%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E4%BA%BA%E7%B5%B1%E7%8D%A8%E5%82%BE%E5%90%91%E7%9A%84%E6%96%B0%E7%99%BC%E5%B1%95%E3%80%8DTPOF%E5%8D%81%E4%BA%8C%E6%9C%88%E5%8D%B3%E6%99%82%E6%B0%91%E8%AA%BF%E4%B9%8B6.pdf|title=台灣人統獨傾向的新發展|website=Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation|language=zh|date=30 December 2024|access-date=21 January 2025}}</ref>

On people's national identity of being either "Taiwanese" or "Chinese," a majority of respondents identify as Taiwanese in either poll of the NCCU<ref name="nccu">{{cite web|url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961|title=Taiwanese / Chinese Identity|website=Election Study Center, NCCU|date=12 July 2023|access-date=31 December 2023}}</ref> or the TPOF.<ref>{{cite web|title=March 2023 Public Opinion Poll – English Excerpt|url=https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/20230321-TPOF-March-2023-Public-Opinion-Poll-%E2%80%93-English-Excerpt.pdf|website=Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation|date=21 March 2023|access-date=31 December 2023|archive-date=27 March 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230327093559/https://www.tpof.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/20230321-TPOF-March-2023-Public-Opinion-Poll-%E2%80%93-English-Excerpt.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> MAC polls have consistently shown support for the future of Taiwan to be decided by the people in Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Miao |first1=Zong-han |last2=Yen |first2=William |title=Majority support new approach to cross-strait interactions: poll |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201711030030 |access-date=3 June 2020 |work=Focus Taiwan |publisher=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)|Central News Agency]] |publication-place=Taipei |date=3 November 2017 |archive-date=3 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200603113031/https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201711030030 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Miu |first1=Tsung-han |last2=Huang |first2=Frances |title=75% of Taiwanese reject Beijing's view of '1992 consensus': poll |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201901170026 |work=Focus Taiwan |publisher=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)|Central News Agency]] |publication-place=Taipei |access-date=3 June 2020 |date=17 January 2019 |archive-date=3 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200603111645/https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/201901170026 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=90% of Taiwanese oppose Chinese military threats: MAC poll|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202011120017|work=Focus Taiwan|publisher=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)|Central News Agency]]|publication-place=Taipei|date=12 November 2020|access-date=13 November 2020|archive-date=13 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201113061414/https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202011120017|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2020, an annual poll conducted by [[Academia Sinica]] showed 73 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that "the Chinese government is a friend of Taiwan's," an increase of 15 percent from the previous year.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ios.sinica.edu.tw/msgNo/20200602-1?fbclid=IwAR2mHGDiaMvu7W8eBYATEBdDLfgdiF1VUbD8jSGQ6a3raal6foXdf4IWKb4|title=中央研究院社會學所「中國效應研究小組」（新聞稿）|date=3 June 2020|language=zh|website=Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica|access-date=3 January 2024}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Miao |first1=Zong-han |last2=Mazzetta |first2=Matthew |title=73 percent of Taiwanese say China's government not a 'friend': survey |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202006020030 |access-date=3 June 2020 |work=Focus Taiwan |publisher=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)|Central News Agency]] |publication-place=Taipei |date=2 June 2020 |archive-date=3 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200603012117/https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202006020030 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2024, an annual survey by Academia Sinica found that 80.6 percent of Taiwan residents believe Taiwan and China do not belong to the same country.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-07-19 |title=Survey: Taiwan residents view China as an increasing threat |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/survey-taiwan-residents-view-china-as-an-increasing-threat/7704584.html |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=[[Voice of America]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-07-20 |title=CSIS discusses poll on US, China views |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/07/20/2003821066 |access-date=2024-07-20 |website=[[Taipei Times]]}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|China|Taiwan|Politics}}
* [[Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum]]
* [[Cross-strait high-level talks]]
* [[Cross-Strait Peace Forum]]
* [[History of cross-strait relations]]
* [[Nissen dōsoron]]
{{Clear}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
{{Library resources box}}

; Books
* Beckershoff, A. (2023). ''Social Forces in the Re-Making of Cross-Strait Relations: Hegemony and Social Movements in Taiwan''. Routledge. {{ISBN|978-1-032-49800-3}}
* Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007). ''A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America''. Wiley. {{ISBN|0-471-98677-1}}
* Bush, R. (2006). ''Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait''. Brookings Institution Press. {{ISBN|0-8157-1290-1}}
* {{cite book |last1 = Cardenal |first1 = Juan Pablo |author1-link = Juan Pablo Cardenal |last2 = Araújo |first2 = Heriberto |author2-link = Heriberto Araújo |title = La silenciosa conquista china |location = Barcelona |publisher = Crítica |year = 2011 |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=jQ2fvBVpQpYC |pages = 261–272 |language = es |isbn = 9788498922578 }}
* Carpenter, T. (2006). ''America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan''. Palgrave Macmillan. {{ISBN|1-4039-6841-1}}
* Cole, B. (2006). ''Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects''. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-36581-3}}
* Copper, J. (2006). ''Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan''. Praeger Security International General Interest. {{ISBN|0-275-98888-0}}
* Gill, B. (2007). ''Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy''. Brookings Institution Press. {{ISBN|0-8157-3146-9}}
* Shirk, S. (2007). ''China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise''. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0-19-530609-0}}
* Tsang, S. (2006). ''If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics''. Routledge. {{ISBN|0-415-40785-0}}
* Tucker, N.B. (2005). ''Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis''. Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|0-231-13564-5}}
* [[Alan M. Wachman|Wachman, Alan M.]] (2007 ) ''Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity''. Stanford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0804755542}}

; Articles
* Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006). [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Book2006.pdf Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning]
* Sutter, Robert. [http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=497 Taiwan's Future: Narrowing Straits] (NBR Special Report, May 2011)
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20090205141202/http://www.iadialog.org/PublicationFiles/Erikson-Chen-1%20%282%29.pdf China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America], 21p.
* Review of [http://jan.ucc.nau.edu/nf4/MichaelCole.pdf Convergence or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait]: The Illusion of Peace? by J. Michael Cole, in ''Pacific Affairs'' (2017): 90, 573–575.

==External links==
{{Commons category|Cross-Strait relations}}
{{Wikiquote}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20130313005035/http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/ Taiwan Affairs Office website (PRC government department in charge of relations with Taiwan)]
* [http://www.mac.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=3 Mainland Affairs Council website (Taiwan government department in charge of Relations with PRC)]
* [http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20111027040750/http://acdis.illinois.edu/newsarchive/newsitem-taiwan-china-us-relations.html Taiwan-China-US Relations] – March 2010 radio interview with Professor T.Y. Wang (Illinois State University)
* [https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/the-evolution-of-chinas-interference-in-taiwan/ Tim Niven, "The Evolution of China's Interference in Taiwan" ''The Diplomat'', 1&nbsp;December 2023]

{{Cross-Strait relations}}
{{Foreign relations of China}}
{{Foreign relations of Taiwan}}
{{Chinese Civil War}}
{{China topics}}
{{Taiwan topics}}
{{Military of the Republic of China}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Cross-Strait Relations}}
[[Category:Cross-strait relations| ]]
[[Category:Bilateral relations of China|Taiwan]]
[[Category:Bilateral relations of Taiwan|China]]
[[Category:Politics of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Politics of Taiwan]]
[[Category:Taiwan Strait]]