View source for Consensus theory of truth

{{Citations needed|date=August 2024}}{{Short description|Concept in epistemology}}
A '''consensus theory of truth''' is the process of taking statements to be [[Truth|true]] simply because people generally agree upon them.<ref name=Warburton>{{cite book|title=Thinking from A to Z|chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/thinkingfromtoz00warb/page/134|chapter-url-access=registration|author=Nigel Warburton|chapter=truth by consensus|pages=[https://archive.org/details/thinkingfromtoz00warb/page/134 134&ndash;135]|year=2000|publisher=Routledge|isbn=0-415-22281-8}}</ref>{{rp|134}}

==Varieties of consensus==
===Consensus gentium===

An ancient criterion of truth, the ''[[consensus gentium]]'' ([[Latin language|Latin]] for ''agreement of the people''), states "that which is universal among men carries the weight of truth" (Ferm, 64).  A number of consensus theories of truth are based on variations of this principle.  In some criteria the notion of universal consent is taken strictly, while others qualify the terms of consensus in various ways.  There are versions of consensus theory in which the specific population weighing in on a given question, the proportion of the population required for consent, and the period of time needed to declare consensus vary from the classical norm.

===Consensus as a regulative ideal===

A ''[[descriptive theory]]'' is one that tells how things are, while a ''[[normative theory]]'' tells how things ought to be.  Expressed in practical terms, a normative theory, more properly called a ''[[policy]]'', tells agents how they ought to act.  A policy can be an absolute imperative, telling agents how they ought to act in any case, or it can be a contingent directive, telling agents how they ought to act ''if'' they want to achieve a particular goal.  A policy is frequently stated in the form of a piece of advice called a ''[[heuristic]]'', a ''[[maxim (philosophy)|maxim]]'', a ''[[norm (philosophy)|norm]]'', a ''[[:wikt:rule|rule]]'', a ''[[slogan]]'', and so on.  Other names for a policy are a ''recommendation'' and a ''[[regulative principle]]''.

A regulative ideal can be expressed in the form of a description, but what it describes is an ideal state of affairs, a condition of being that constitutes its aim, end, goal, intention, or objective.  It is not the usual case for the actual case to be the ideal case, or else there would hardly be much call for a policy aimed at achieving an ideal.

Corresponding to the distinction between actual conditions and ideal conditions there is a distinction between actual consensus and ideal consensus.  A theory of truth founded on a notion of actual consensus is a very different thing from a theory of truth founded on a notion of ideal consensus.  Moreover, an ideal consensus may be ideal in several different ways.  The state of consensus may be ideal in its own nature, conceived in the matrix of actual experience by way of intellectual operations like abstraction, extrapolation, and limit formation.  Or the conditions under which the consensus is conceived to be possible may be formulated as idealizations of actual conditions.  A very common type of ideal consensus theory refers to a community that is an idealization of actual communities in one or more respects.

==Critiques==
It is very difficult to find any philosopher of note who asserts a ''bare'', ''naive'', or ''pure'' consensus theory of truth, in other words, a treatment of truth that is based on actual consensus in an actual community without further qualification.  One obvious critique is that not everyone agrees to consensus theory, implying that it may not be true by its own criteria.  Another problem is defining how we know that consensus is achieved without falling prey to an infinite regress. Even if everyone agrees to a particular proposition, we may not know that it is true until everyone agrees that everyone agrees to it. Bare consensus theories are frequent topics of discussion, however, evidently because they serve the function of reference points for the discussion of alternative theories.

If consensus equals truth, then truth can be made by forcing or organizing a consensus, rather than being discovered through experiment or observation, or existing separately from consensus. The principles of mathematics also do not hold under consensus truth because mathematical propositions build on each other. If the consensus declared 2+2=5 it would render the practice of mathematics where 2+2=4 impossible.

[[Imre Lakatos]] characterizes it as a "watered down" form of provable [[truth]] propounded by some [[sociology of knowledge|sociologists of knowledge]], particularly [[Thomas Kuhn]] and [[Michael Polanyi]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Philosophical Papers|author=Imre Lakatos|author-link=Imre Lakatos|chapter=Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes|pages=8|year=1978|publisher=Cambridge University Press|chapter-url=http://www.csun.edu/~vcsoc00i/classes/s680f11/Lakatos.pdf|isbn=978-0-521-28031-0|access-date=1 October 2016}}</ref>

Philosopher [[Nigel Warburton]] argues that the truth by consensus process is not reliable, general agreement upon something does not make it true. Warburton says that one reason for the unreliability of the consensus theory of truth, is that people are gullible, easily misled, and prone to wishful thinking{{emdash}}they believe an assertion and espouse it as truth in the face of overwhelming evidence and facts to the contrary, simply because they wish that things were so.<ref name=Warburton/>{{rp|135}}

== See also ==
{{Portal|Society}}

* {{annotated link|Argumentum ad populum}}
* {{annotated link|Coherentism}}
* {{annotated link|Common knowledge}}
* {{annotated link|Confirmation holism}}
* {{annotated link|Consensus reality}}
* {{annotated link|Conventional wisdom}}
* {{annotated link|Jury trial}}
* {{Section link|Philosophy of history|History as propaganda: Is history always written by the victors?}}
* {{annotated link|Philosophy of history}}
* {{annotated link|Truthiness}}
* {{annotated link|Wikiality}}

===Related topics===
* {{annotated link|Belief}}
* {{annotated link|Conventionalism}}
* {{annotated link|Epistemology}}
* {{annotated link|Information}}
* {{annotated link|Inquiry}}
* {{annotated link|Knowledge}}
* {{annotated link|Pragmatism}}
* {{annotated link|Pragmaticism}}
* {{annotated link|Pragmatic maxim}}
* {{annotated link|Reproducibility}}
* {{annotated link|Scientific method}}
* {{annotated link|Testability}}
* {{annotated link|Verifiability theory of meaning}}

== References ==
{{reflist}}

== Sources ==
* [[Vergilius Ferm|Ferm, Vergilius]] (1962), "Consensus Gentium", p.&nbsp;64 in Runes (1962).
* [[Susan Haack|Haack, Susan]] (1993), ''Evidence and Inquiry:  Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology'', Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
* [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermas, Jürgen]] (1976), "What Is  Universal Pragmatics?", 1st published, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?", ''Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie'', [[Karl-Otto Apel]] (ed.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.  Reprinted, pp.&nbsp;1–68 in Jürgen Habermas, ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1979.
* Habermas, Jürgen (1979), ''Communication and the Evolution of Society'', Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, Massachusetts.
* Habermas, Jürgen (1990), ''Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action'', Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (trans.), Thomas McCarthy (intro.), [[MIT Press]], Cambridge, Massachusetts.
* Habermas, Jürgen (2003), ''Truth and Justification'', Barbara Fultner (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
* [[William James|James, William]] (1907), ''Pragmatism, A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, Popular Lectures on Philosophy'', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, New York.
* James, William (1909), ''The Meaning of Truth, A Sequel to 'Pragmatism''', Longmans, Green, and Company, New York, New York.
* [[Immanuel Kant|Kant, Immanuel]] (1800), ''Introduction to Logic''.  Reprinted, Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), Dennis Sweet (intro.), Barnes and Noble, New York, New York, 2005.
* [[Richard Kirkham|Kirkham, Richard L.]] (1992), ''Theories of Truth:  A Critical Introduction'', MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
* [[Nicholas Rescher|Rescher, Nicholas]] (1995), ''Pluralism:  Against the Demand for Consensus'', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
* [[Dagobert D. Runes|Runes, Dagobert D.]] (ed., 1962), ''Dictionary of Philosophy'', Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, New Jersey.

{{Theories of Truth}}

[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Consensus]]
[[Category:Consensus reality|Truth]]
[[Category:Philosophy of science]]
[[Category:Theories of truth]]