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{{more footnotes|date=June 2023}}

In the [[philosophy of language]], the distinction between '''concept and object''' is attributable to the German philosopher [[Gottlob Frege]] in 1892 (in his paper "'''Concept and Object'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA; 'Concept and object' redirects here.-->"; German: "Über<!--[sic; see 'Talk:Gottlob Frege#Ueber']--> Begriff und Gegenstand").

==Overview==
According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists of an expression (a [[proper names|proper name]] or a general term plus the definite article) that signifies an object together with a predicate (the [[copula (linguistics)|copula]] "is", plus a general term accompanied by the indefinite article or an adjective) that signifies a concept. Thus "Socrates is a philosopher" consists of "Socrates", which signifies the object ''Socrates'', and "is a philosopher", which signifies the concept of ''being a philosopher''.

The distinction was of fundamental importance to the development of logic and mathematics. Frege's distinction helped to clarify the notions of a [[set theory|set]], of the membership relation between element and set, and of [[empty set|empty]] and [[infinite set]]s. However, Frege's conception of a class (in his terminology an extension of a concept) differs from the current iterative conception of a set.

Frege's distinction leads to the famous difficulty or "awkwardness of language" that some expressions which purport to signify a concept — Frege's example is "the concept ''horse''" — are grammatically expressions that by his criterion signify an object. Thus "the concept ''horse'' is not a concept, whereas the city of Berlin is a city."

[[Anthony Kenny]] sought to justify the distinction, other philosophers such as Hartley Slater and [[Crispin Wright]] have argued that the distinguished category of ''entity'' cannot be associated with predication in the way that individual objects are associated with the use of [[singular term]]s.

== References ==
* Buckner, E. D. review of [[Mark Sainsbury (philosopher)|Sainsbury, R. M.]], [http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1343 ''Departing from Frege: Essays in the philosophy of language''], Routledge, 2002, {{ISBN|0-415-27255-6}}.
* [[Dummett, Michael|Michael Dummett]]. ''Frege: Philosophy of Language'', chap. 7, pp.&nbsp;211–219.
* [[Cora Diamond|Diamond, Cora]]. "What does a Concept-Script Do?", sec.II.
* Frege, G. "On Concept and Object", originally published as "Ueber<!--[sic; see 'Talk:Gottlob Frege#Ueber']--> Begriff und Gegenstand" in ''Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie'' 16, 1892, pp. 192-205, translated in Geach & Black 1952 pp.&nbsp;42–55.
*Furth, Montgomery. "Two Types of Denotation", in Studies in Logical Theory, ed. by N. Rescher (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968). 
* [[Peter Geach|Geach, P.]], ''Reference and Generality'', Ithaca NY 1962.
* Geach, P. & [[Max Black|Black M.]], Translations from the Philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford 1952
* Parsons, Terence.  "Why Frege should not have said `the Concept Horse is not A Concept'," History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (1986) 449–65.
* Proops, Ian. "What is Frege's 'concept horse problem,'?" in Potter and Sullivan "Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation" 2013 (Oxford University Press).[https://www.academia.edu/2776401/What_is_Freges_Concept_horse_Problem_]
* [[Michael Resnik|Resnik, Michael David]]. "Frege's Theory of Incomplete Entities," especially sections 5–7.
* [[Bertrand Russell|Russell, B]]. Principles of Mathematics, § 21, and §§ 475–496.
* Slater, B. H.  [http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol4/frege.html  "Concept And Object In Frege"], 2000 (Minerva).
* Wright, C. "Why Frege does not deserve his grain of salt: a Note on the Paradox of "The Concept Horse" and the Ascription of Bedeutungen to Predicates", ''Grazer Philosophische Studien'' 5 (1998).
[[Category:Concepts in the philosophy of language]]