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{{Short description|1980 U.S. foreign policy}}
[[File:Jimmy Carter Library and Museum 98.JPG|thumb|right|Document related to the Carter Doctrine]]
The '''Carter Doctrine''' was a policy proclaimed by [[President of the United States|United States president]] [[Jimmy Carter]] in his [[State of the Union|State of the Union Address]] on January 23, 1980, which stated that the U.S. would use military force, if necessary, to defend its [[national interest]]s in the [[Persian Gulf]]. It was a response to the [[Soviet Union]]'s [[Soviet–Afghan War|intervention in Afghanistan]] in 1979, and it was intended to deter the Soviet Union, the country's [[Cold War]] adversary, from seeking [[hegemony]] in the Persian Gulf region.

The following key sentence, written by [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], Carter's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Adviser]], concludes the section:

<blockquote>Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
</blockquote>

Brzezinski modeled the wording on the [[Truman Doctrine]],<ref>[[Zbigniew Brzezinski|Brzezinski, Zbigniew]]. ''Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981''. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983. {{ISBN|0-374-23663-1}}. pg. 444.</ref> and insisted the sentence be included in the speech "to make it very clear that the Soviets should stay away from the Persian Gulf."<ref>{{Citation |url=http://www.artsandmedia.net/cgi-bin/dc/newsdesk/2003/03/18_centcom_1 |title=A Cold War Legacy of Persian Gulf Conflict |last=Huang |first=Jennifer |publisher=Newsdesk.org |work=Independent Arts and Media |date=March 19, 2003 |access-date=2008-10-16 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080819194536/http://www.artsandmedia.net/cgi-bin/dc/newsdesk/2003/03/18_centcom_1 |archive-date=August 19, 2008 }}</ref>

In ''[[The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power]]'', author [[Daniel Yergin]] notes that the Carter Doctrine "bore striking similarities" to a 1903 British declaration in which British [[Foreign Secretary (United Kingdom)|Foreign Secretary]] [[Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne|Lord Lansdowne]] warned [[Russian Empire|Russia]] and [[German Empire|Germany]] that the British would "regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal."<ref>{{harv|Yergin|1991|pp=140, 702}}</ref>

==Background==
[[File:Oil_and_Gas_Infrastructure_Persian_Gulf_(large).gif|thumb|upright=1.5|Oil and gas resources in the [[Persian Gulf]] region]]
The Persian Gulf region was first proclaimed to be of national interest to the United States during [[World War II]]. [[Petroleum]] is centrally important to modern armies. The U.S., the world's leading oil producer at the time, supplied most of the oil for the [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] armies. Many American strategists were concerned that the war would dangerously reduce the country's oil supply and so they sought to establish good relations with [[Saudi Arabia]], a kingdom with large oil reserves. On February 16, 1943, U.S. president [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] stated that, "the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States."<ref>{{harv|Klare|2004|p=33}}</ref>

On February 14, 1945, while returning from the [[Yalta Conference]], Roosevelt met with Saudi king [[Ibn Saud]] on the [[Great Bitter Lake]] in the [[Suez Canal]], the first time a U.S. president had visited the Persian Gulf. During [[Gulf War#Operation Desert Shield|Operation Desert Shield]] in 1990, [[United States Secretary of Defense|U.S. defense secretary]] [[Dick Cheney]] cited the landmark meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud as one of the justifications for sending troops to protect Saudi Arabia's border.<ref>{{harv|Klare|2004|p=36}}</ref>

In World War II, [[United Kingdom|Britain]] and the Soviet Union had [[Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran|jointly invaded and partitioned]] [[Pahlavi Iran|Iran]] in 1941 which was to end with the conclusion of the war. However, Soviet-aligned rebellions, the [[Azerbaijan People's Government]] and [[Republic of Mahabad]], created a crisis in the Allied occupation zone, the [[Iran crisis of 1946]], which was one of the first struggles of the Cold War. U.S. pressure on the Soviets to withdraw from Iran was one of the first postwar conflicts between the two superpowers.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hess |first=Gary R. |date=1974 |title=The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2148118 |journal=Political Science Quarterly |volume=89 |issue=1 |pages=117–146 |doi=10.2307/2148118 |jstor=2148118 |issn=0032-3195|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=LEFFLER |first=MELVYN P. |date=1983 |title=From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24911371 |journal=Diplomatic History |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=245–266 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-7709.1983.tb00394.x |jstor=24911371 |issn=0145-2096|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

The Persian Gulf was still regarded as an area of vital importance to the U.S. during the [[Cold War]]. Three Cold War [[United States presidential doctrines|American presidential doctrines]] (the [[Truman Doctrine|Truman]], [[Eisenhower Doctrine|Eisenhower]], and [[Nixon Doctrine]]s) played roles in forming the Carter Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine, which stated that the U.S. would send military aid to countries threatened by Soviet aggression, was used to strengthen both Iran and Saudi Arabia's security. In October 1950, President [[Harry S. Truman]] wrote to Ibn Saud that "the United States is interested in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. No threat to your Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States."<ref>{{harv|Yergin|1991|p=428}}</ref>

The Eisenhower Doctrine called for U.S. troops to be sent to the [[Middle East]] to defend American allies against their Soviet-backed adversaries. Ultimately, the Nixon Doctrine's application provided military aid to Iran and Saudi Arabia so that U.S. allies could ensure peace and stability there. In 1979, the [[Iranian revolution]] and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted the restatement of U.S. interests in the region in the form of the Carter Doctrine.<ref>{{harv|Klare|2004|pp=33–45}}</ref> The [[Second Yemenite War|Yemenite War of 1979]], with Soviet support to [[South Yemen]], may also have been a "smaller shock" contributing to the crisis of that year, and Carter's foreign policy shift.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Jimmy Carter and the Second Yemenite War: A Smaller Shock of 1979?|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/jimmy-carter-and-second-yemenite-war-smaller-shock-1979|access-date=2021-11-13|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|language=en}}</ref> National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advised Carter that the United States's "greatest vulnerability" lay on an arc "stretching from [[Chittagong]] through [[Islamabad]] to [[Aden]]." [[Henry Kissinger]] gave Carter similar advice.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Collins|first=N.W.|title=Grey wars : a contemporary history of U.S. special operations|date=2021|isbn=978-0-300-25834-9|location=New Haven|oclc=1255527666}}</ref>

In July 1979, responding to a [[1979 oil crisis|national energy crisis]] that resulted from the Iranian revolution, Carter delivered his "Crisis of Confidence" speech, urging Americans to reduce their energy use to help lessen U.S. dependence on foreign oil supplies.<ref name="Crisisconfidence">{{citation |last=Carter|first=Jimmy|title=Crisis of Confidence|publisher=[[The Carter Center]]|url=http://www.cartercenter.org/news/editorials_speeches/crisis_of_confidence.html|access-date=2008-07-27}}</ref> In 2008, some scholars claimed that Carter's energy plan, had it been fully enacted, would have prevented some of the economic difficulties caused by [[United States energy independence|American dependency on foreign oil]].<ref name="Wheelan">{{citation |last=Wheelan|first=Joseph|title=Second Hearing for Carter|newspaper=[[Atlanta Journal-Constitution]]|date=2008-07-15|url=http://www.ajc.com/search/content/opinion/stories/2008/07/15/energyed.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080730011920/http://www.ajc.com/search/content/opinion/stories/2008/07/15/energyed.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=2008-07-30|access-date=2008-07-27}} [http://hnn.us/article/52030 Reprinted] at [[History News Network]]</ref>

The 1979 oil crisis also led to a vast surge in energy wealth for the oil-rich Soviet Union, which along the lines of [[resource curse]] literature, has been hypothesized to have caused the boldness of the Soviet [[Politburo]] in the intervention in Afghanistan in the first place.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Brown|first=James D. J.|date=2013-01-01|title=Oil Fueled? The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan|journal=Post-Soviet Affairs|volume=29|issue=1|pages=56–94|doi=10.1080/1060586X.2013.778543|s2cid=153875812 |issn=1060-586X|doi-access=free}}</ref> Previously, the Soviet Union's "[[Third World]]" strategy combined largely cautious support of revolutions with covert action. However, the invasion of Afghanistan indicated that Soviet policy had become more direct and belligerent. This was seen to advance a long-term Soviet geopolitical goal, the acquisition of strategic presence on the Indian Ocean, closer to the realm of possibility.<ref name=":1" /> This caused previous critics of [[Containment|containment policy]] to become some of its major supporters.

Over the course of January 1980 in response to the invasion, Carter withdrew the [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks|SALT II treaty]] from consideration before the [[United States Senate|Senate]],<ref>{{Cite web|last=Andrew Glass|title=Carter withdraws SALT II accord, Jan. 2, 1980|url=http://politi.co/2qejDLf|access-date=2021-11-13|website=POLITICO|date=January 2018 |language=en}}</ref> recalled U.S. ambassador [[Thomas J. Watson Jr.|Thomas J. Watson]] from [[Moscow]],<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Walsh|first1=Edward|last2=Goshko|first2=John M.|date=1980-01-03|title=U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Recalled|language=en-US|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/01/03/us-ambassador-to-moscow-recalled/11954a73-b0b4-435a-8fde-170d3c757217/|access-date=2021-11-13|issn=0190-8286}}</ref> [[United States grain embargo against the Soviet Union|curtailed grain sales]] to the Soviet Union,<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|last=G|first=Jeffrey|title=The Soviet Grain Embargo|url=https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-soviet-grain-embargo|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170217200213/http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-soviet-grain-embargo|url-status=unfit|archive-date=February 17, 2017|access-date=2021-11-13|website=The Heritage Foundation|language=en}}</ref> and suspended high-technology exports to the Soviet Union.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":1" />

==Doctrine==
Carter, in his State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980, after stating that Soviet troops in Afghanistan posed "a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil," proclaimed:<ref>{{Cite web|title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy - Office of the Historian|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d138|access-date=2022-01-06|website=history.state.gov}}</ref>

:The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the [[Indian Ocean]] and close to the [[Straits of Hormuz]], a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

: This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

: Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

: Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

==Implementation==
The Carter administration began to build up the [[Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force|Rapid Deployment Force]], which would eventually become [[United States Central Command|CENTCOM]]. In the interim, the administration asked Congress to restart [[Selective Service System|Selective Service]] registration, proposed a five percent increase in military spending for each of the next five years, and expanded U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.<ref name="Herring">{{cite book |last= Herring |first= George C. |title= From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 |year= 2008 |location= New York |publisher= Oxford University Press |isbn= 9780195078220 |url-access= registration |url= https://archive.org/details/fromcolonytosupe00herr }}</ref>{{rp|855}}<ref>{{cite book|last=Patterson|first=James T.|year=2005|location=New York|publisher=Oxford University Press|title=Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore|isbn=978-0-19-512216-9 |url=https://archive.org/details/restlessgiantuni00patt_0|url-access=registration}}</ref>{{rp|123}}

A negative response came from retired strategist and diplomat [[George F. Kennan]].<ref>{{cite book|author=Thomas G. Paterson|title=Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan|publisher=Oxford University Press|url=https://archive.org/details/meetingcommunist00pate|url-access=registration|year=1989|page=[https://archive.org/details/meetingcommunist00pate/page/144 144]|isbn=978-0-19-504533-8 }}</ref> U.S. senator [[Ted Kennedy]] charged that Carter had overreacted, exaggerated the Soviet threat, and failed to act diplomatically. Kennedy repeated these allegations during his [[1980 Democratic Party presidential primaries|1980 Democratic presidential primary bid]], in which he was defeated.<ref>{{cite book|author=Burton Hersh|title=Edward Kennedy: An Intimate Biography|publisher=Catapult|url=https://archive.org/details/edwardkennedyint00hers|url-access=registration|year=2010|page=[https://archive.org/details/edwardkennedyint00hers/page/529 529]|isbn=9781582436289 }}</ref>

Carter's successor, [[Ronald Reagan]], extended the policy in October 1981 with what is sometimes called the "Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine,"{{Citation needed|date=August 2023}} which proclaimed that the United States would intervene to protect Saudi Arabia, whose security was believed to be threatened during the [[Iran–Iraq War]]. Thus, while the Carter Doctrine warned away ''outside'' forces from the region, the Reagan Corollary pledged to secure ''internal'' stability. According to diplomat [[Howard Teicher]], "with the enunciation of the Reagan Corollary, the policy groundwork was laid for [[Gulf War|Operation Desert Storm]]."<ref>[[Teicher, Howard]] and Gayle Radley Teicher. ''Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush''. New York: Morrow, 1993. pp. 145-6</ref>

While framed as a Cold War policy, the Carter Doctrine aimed to support U.S. grand strategy by ensuring the security of Israel, which was recognized by the U.S. on May 14, 1948. During the Cold War, Israel was an important ally in countering Soviet influence in the region. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. has continued to provide significant assistance to Israel, focusing on maintaining its [[Qualitative Military Edge]] (QME) and promoting stability with neighboring countries.<ref>{{cite report |last1=Wunderle |first1=William |last2=Briere |first2=Andre |title=U.S. Foreign Policy and Israel's Qualitative Military Edge: The Need for a Common Vision |date=January 24, 2008 |publisher=The Washington Institute for Near East Policy |url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3468 |access-date=July 19, 2025}}</ref>

==See also==
* [[Iran–United States relations]]
* [[Reagan Doctrine]]

==Notes==
<references/>

==References==
{{wikisource|Jimmy Carter's Third State of the Union Address}}
{{Refbegin}}
* {{citation|author-link=Michael Klare|last=Klare|first=Michael|title=Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency|location=New York|publisher=Henry Holt|year=2004}}
* Meiertöns, Heiko (2010): ''The Doctrines of US Security Policy - An Evaluation under International Law'', Cambridge University Press, {{ISBN|978-0-521-76648-7}} 
* Smith, Gaddis. ''Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years''  (1986)
* Stork, Joe. "The Carter doctrine and US bases in the Middle East." ''Merip Reports'' 90 (1980): 3-14. [http://pages.pomona.edu/~vis04747/h124/readings/stork_carter_doctrine.pdf online]
* {{citation|last=Yergin|first=Daniel|title=[[The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power]]|location=New York|publisher=Simon & Schuster|year=1991}}
{{Refend}}

==External links==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20120915113622/http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd63.pdf National Security Directive-63] ([[PDF]]), a policy outline written by Brzezinski and signed by Carter, giving an overview of the goals of the Carter Doctrine.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20121215044809/http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552642 Carter Doctrine and the Gulf War] from the [https://web.archive.org/web/20120312181034/http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552494/browse?type=title Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives]
* [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=33079 1980 State of the Union Address], from the American Presidency Project.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20130225173708/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/Jan-Feb/grinter.html ''Carter Doctrine in Perspective'', US Air Force’s College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) at Maxwell Air Force Base]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20041221070445/http://www.globalpublicmedia.com/transcripts/245 Interview with Michael Klare], in which he cites the Carter Doctrine as one of the causes of the 2003 [[Iraq War]].

{{Presidency of Jimmy Carter}}
{{Cold War}}
{{Foreign relations of the United States |expanded=DPC}}

[[Category:1980 in American politics]]
[[Category:1980 in international relations]]
[[Category:Cold War history of the United States]]
[[Category:Foreign policy doctrines of the United States]]
[[Category:Jimmy Carter]]
[[Category:Presidency of Jimmy Carter]]
[[Category:United States–Middle Eastern relations]]
[[Category:January 1980 in the United States]]