View source for Camp David Accords

{{Short description|1978 political agreement between Egypt and Israel}}
{{Distinguish|Camp David Principles}}
{{pp-extended|small=yes}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=July 2024}}
{{Infobox treaty
| name                 = Camp David Accords
| long_name            = Framework for Peace in the Middle East and Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel
| image                = Close up of Menahem Begin, Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat at Camp David., 09-07-1978 - NARA - 181133.tif
| image_width          = 300px
| image_alt            =
| caption              = Celebrating the signing of the Camp David Accords: [[Menachem Begin]], [[Jimmy Carter]], [[Anwar Sadat]]
| type                 = Bilateral treaty
| context              =
| date_drafted         =
| date_signed          = {{Start date|df=yes|1978|9|17}}{{sfn|Quandt|1988|p=2}}
| location_signed      = [[Washington, D.C.]], [[United States]]
| date_sealed          =
| date_effective       =
| condition_effective  =
| date_expiration      =
| date_expiry          =
| mediators            =
| negotiators          =
| original_signatories = 
| signatories          = {{plainlist|
* {{flagd|Israel}} [[Menachem Begin]]
* {{flagd|Egypt|1972}} [[Anwar Sadat]]
* {{flagd|United States}} [[Jimmy Carter]]}}
| parties              ={{plainlist|
* {{flag|Egypt|1972}}
* {{flag|Israel}}}}
| ratifiers            = {{plainlist|
* {{flag|Egypt|1972}}
* {{flag|Israel}}}}
| depositor            =
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| language             = {{plainlist|
* [[English language|English]]
* [[French language|French]]}}
| languages            =
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}}

The '''Camp David Accords''' were a pair of political agreements signed by [[President of Egypt|Egyptian president]] [[Anwar Sadat]] and [[Prime Minister of Israel|Israeli prime minister]] [[Menachem Begin]] on 17 September 1978,{{sfn|Quandt|1988|p=2}} following twelve days of secret negotiations at [[Camp David]], the country retreat of the [[president of the United States]] in [[Maryland]].<ref name="TEXTOFACCORDS">[http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Camp%20David%20Accords Camp David Accords&nbsp;– Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110903011255/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Camp%20David%20Accords |date=3 September 2011 }}</ref> The two framework agreements were signed at the [[White House]] and were witnessed by [[Presidency of Jimmy Carter|President Jimmy Carter]]. The second of these frameworks (''A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel'') led directly to the 1979 [[Egypt–Israel peace treaty]]. Due to the agreement, Sadat and Begin received the shared 1978 [[Nobel Peace Prize]]. The first framework (''A Framework for Peace in the Middle East''), which dealt with the [[Palestinian territories]], was written without participation of the Palestinians and was condemned by the United Nations.

The agreement sparked broad discontent throughout much of the Arab world, as it was perceived as a unilateral peace initiative that neglected the establishment of a Palestinian state, ultimately seen as weakening the cohesion of the Arab position.

==Preceding diplomacy==

===Carter Initiative===
Carter's and Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]]'s exploratory meetings gave a basic plan for reinvigorating the peace process based on a [[Geneva Conference (1973)|Geneva Peace Conference]] and had presented three main objectives for Arab–Israeli peace: Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace, Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories gained in the [[Six-Day War]] through negotiating efforts with neighboring Arab nations to ensure that Israel's security would not be threatened, and securing an undivided Jerusalem.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1482.html|title=Camp David Accords: Jimmy Carter Reflects 25 Years Later|website=cartercenter.org}}</ref>

The Camp David Accords were the result of 14 months of diplomatic efforts by Egypt, Israel, and the United States that began after Jimmy Carter became president.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1989, pp. 229-228">Stein, Kenneth. ''Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab–Israeli Peace''. Taylor & Francis, 1999, pp. 228–229</ref> The efforts initially focused on a comprehensive resolution of disputes between Israel and the Arab countries, gradually evolving into a search for a bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt.<ref>"Stein, Kenneth 2000, pp. 229–228"</ref>

Upon assuming office on 20 January 1977, President Carter moved to rejuvenate the [[Middle East]] peace process that had stalled throughout the 1976 presidential [[Political campaign|campaign]] in the [[United States]]. Following the advice of a [[Brookings Institution]] report, Carter opted to replace the incremental, bilateral peace talks which had characterized [[Henry Kissinger]]'s [[shuttle diplomacy]] following the 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]] with a comprehensive, multilateral approach. The Yom Kippur War further complicated efforts to achieve the objectives written in [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242]].

Israel's prime minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] and his successor, [[Menachem Begin]], were both skeptical of an international conference.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1989, pp. 229-228" /> While Begin, who took office in May 1977, officially favored the reconvening of the conference, perhaps even more vocally than Rabin, and even accepted the Palestinian presence, in actuality the Israelis and the Egyptians were secretly formulating a framework for bilateral talks. Even earlier, Begin had not been opposed to returning the [[Sinai Peninsula|Sinai]], but a major future obstacle was his firm refusal to consider relinquishing control over the [[West Bank]].<ref>[[George Lenczowski]], ''American Presidents and the Middle East'', Duke University Press, 1990 p. 164. {{ISBN|978-0-8223-0972-7}}. From [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], ''Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977–1981'', (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), p. 88.<blockquote>[Carter] outlined to Begin his program, which consisted of five points: (1) achieve a comprehensive peace affecting all of Israel's neighbors: (2) peace to be based on UN Resolution 242: (3) peace would involve open borders and free trade; (4) peace would call for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories to secure borders; (5) a Palestinian entity (but not an independent nation) should be created.  Begin responded that he could accept all of these points except the Palestinian entity.</blockquote></ref>

===Participating parties===
[[File:Six Day War Territories.svg|thumb|upright|right|Territory held by Israel: {{legend|#ffffd0|before the [[Six-Day War]]}} {{legend|#f7d3aa|after the war}}]]
Carter visited the heads of government on whom he would have to rely to make any peace agreement feasible. By the end of his first year (1977) in office, Carter had met with [[Anwar El Sadat]] of [[Egypt]], [[Hussein of Jordan]], [[Hafez al-Assad]] of [[Syria]], and [[Yitzhak Rabin]] of [[Israel]]. The new Israeli prime minister [[Menachem Begin]] however, taking over the office from Yitzhak Rabin in June 1977, specifically demanded that the [[PLO]] would be excluded from peace talks.<ref name=Filiu2014/> Despite the fact that Jordan’s King Hussein supported Sadat's peace initiative, Hussein refused to take part in the peace talks; Menachem Begin offered Jordan little to gain and Hussein also feared he would isolate Jordan from the Arab world and provoke Syria and the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]] if he engaged in the peace talks as well.<ref name=olp>{{cite web|url=http://countrystudies.us/jordan/19.htm|title=Jordan – The Camp David Accords|website=countrystudies.us}}</ref> Hafez al-Assad, who had no interest in negotiating peace with Israel,<ref name=ldmm>''The Middle East: ten years after Camp David'', William B. Quandt, p. 9</ref> also refused to come to the United States.

===Sadat Initiative===
[[File:Camp David, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, 1978.jpg|right|thumb|250px|[[Anwar Sadat]], [[Jimmy Carter]] and [[Menachem Begin]] (left to right), at [[Camp David]], September 1978]]

Sadat first spoke about the possibility of peace with Israel in February 1971; Egypt was the initiator of many moves in the 1970s.{{sfn|Quandt|1988|p=2}} On 9 November 1977, he startled the world by announcing his intention to go to [[Jerusalem]] and speak before the [[Knesset]]. Shortly afterward, the Israeli government cordially invited him to address the Knesset in a message passed to Sadat via the [[List of ambassadors of the United States to Egypt|US ambassador to Egypt]]. Ten days after his speech, Sadat [[Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem|arrived for the groundbreaking three-day visit]], which launched the first peace process between Israel and an Arab state. As would be the case with later Israeli–Arab peace initiatives, Washington was taken by surprise; the White House and State Department were particularly concerned that Sadat was merely reaching out to reacquire Sinai as quickly as possible, putting aside the Palestinian problem. Considered as a man with strong political convictions who kept his eye on the main objective, Sadat had no ideological base, which made him politically inconsistent.<ref>Stein 1999, p. 7.</ref> The Sadat visit came about after he delivered a speech in Egypt stating that he would travel anywhere, "even Jerusalem," to discuss peace.<ref>Feron, James. [https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3DC1E30F93AA35750C0A964958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 "Menachem Begin, Guerrilla Leader Who Became Peacemaker."] ''[[The New York Times]]''.  9 March 1992.  15 February 2009.</ref> That speech led the Begin government to declare that, if Israel thought that Sadat would accept an invitation, Israel would invite him. In Sadat's [[Knesset]] speech he talked about his views on peace, the status of [[Israeli occupied territories|Israel's occupied territories]], and the Palestinian refugee problem. This tactic went against the intentions of both the West and the East, which were to revive the [[Geneva Conference (1973)|Geneva Conference]].

The gesture stemmed from an eagerness to enlist the help of the NATO countries in improving the ailing Egyptian economy, a belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and a hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and her other Arab neighbors and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin's response to Sadat's initiative, though not what Sadat or Carter had hoped, demonstrated a willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Begin also saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country's best interests. It would afford Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt instead of with a larger [[Arab]] delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel felt Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern communists. In addition, the commencement of direct negotiations between leaders&nbsp;– summit diplomacy&nbsp;– would distinguish Egypt from her Arab neighbors. Carter's people apparently had no inkling of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat's representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadat's initiative. Indeed, in a sense Egypt and Israel were ganging up to push Carter off his Geneva track. The basic message of Sadat's speech at the [[Knesset]] were the request for the implementation of [[U.N. Resolution 242|Resolutions 242]] and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 338|338]]. Sadat's visit was the first step to negotiations such as the preliminary Cairo Conference in December 1977.{{citation needed|date=September 2020}}

===Searching a negotiation modus===
{{more citations needed|section|date=September 2017}}<!--4 CN tags and one paragraph without references-->
[[File:Begin Brzezinski Camp David Chess.jpg|thumb|Begin and Brzezinski playing [[chess]] at Camp David]]
[[File:Sadat and Begin and their delegations at Camp David, September 17, 1978 (10729645586).jpg|thumb|250px|A 1978 meeting at [[Camp David]] with (seated, l-r) [[Aharon Barak]], [[Menachem Begin]], [[Anwar Sadat]], and [[Ezer Weizman]].]]

A mechanism had yet to be created for Israel and Egypt to pursue the talks begun by Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem.<ref name="Forward.com">{{Cite web|url=https://forward.com/opinion/13212/how-jimmy-carter-almost-derailed-peace-with-egypt-01709/|title=How Jimmy Carter Almost Derailed Peace With Egypt|date=24 April 2008|website=The Forward}}</ref> The Egyptian president suggested to Begin that Israel place a secret representative in the American embassy in Cairo. With American "cover," the true identity of the Israeli, who would liaise between the Egyptian and Israeli leaders, would be known only to the American ambassador in Cairo.<ref name="Forward.com"/>

Carter's acceptance of the proposed liaison scheme would have signaled American backing for Sadat's unprecedented peace initiative, but Carter rejected the proposal. However, Carter could not thwart the Israeli–Egyptian peace push. Within days Israeli journalists were allowed into Cairo, breaking a symbolic barrier, and from there the peace process quickly gained momentum. An Israeli–Egyptian working summit was scheduled for 25 December in Ismailiya, near the [[Suez Canal]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://peacenow.org/entries/archive3705|title=Americans for Peace Now: Archives|website=peacenow.org}}</ref>

== Proceedings of the Camp David meeting ==
Accompanied by their capable negotiating teams and with their respective interests in mind, the Israeli and Egyptian leaders [[Menachem Begin]] and [[Anwar Sadat]] converged on Camp David for 13 days of tense and dramatic negotiations from 5 to 17 September 1978.

Carter's advisers insisted on the establishment of an Egyptian–Israeli agreement which would lead to an eventual solution to the Palestine issue. They believed in a short, loose, and overt linkage between the two countries amplified by the establishment of a coherent basis for a settlement. However, Carter felt they were not "aiming high enough" and was interested in the establishment of a written "land for peace" agreement with Israel returning the [[Sinai Peninsula]] and [[West Bank]].<ref>{{cite news |url= http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc1482.html | title=Camp David Accords: Jimmy Carter Reflects 25 Years Later|access-date=1 February 2015 |date= 17 September 2003 |work=[[Carter Center]]}}</ref> Numerous times both the Egyptian and Israeli leaders wanted to scrap negotiations, only to be lured back into the process by personal appeals from Carter.

Begin and Sadat had such mutual antipathy toward one another that they only seldom had direct contact; thus Carter had to conduct his own microcosmic form of shuttle diplomacy by holding one-on-one meetings with either Sadat or Begin in one cabin, then returning to the cabin of the third party to relay the substance of his discussions. Begin and Sadat were "literally not on speaking terms," and "claustrophobia was setting in."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Quandt |first=William |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VRZ937MPRkoC |title=Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics |year=2011|publisher=Brookings Institution Press |isbn=978-0-8157-1344-9 |page=235}}</ref>

[[File:Carter, Brzezinski and Vance at Camp David, 1977.jpg|thumb|left|President Carter, National Security Advisor [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]], and Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]] at Camp David]]
A particularly difficult situation arose on the tenth stalemated day of the talks. The issues of [[Israeli settlement]] withdrawal from the Sinai and the status of the West Bank created what seemed to be an impasse. In response, Carter had the choice of trying to salvage the agreement by conceding the issue of the West Bank to Begin, while advocating Sadat's less controversial position on the removal of all settlements from the Sinai Peninsula. Or he could have refused to continue the talks, reported the reasons for their failure, and allowed Begin to bear the brunt of the blame.

Carter chose to continue and for three more days negotiated. During this time, Carter even took the two leaders to the nearby [[Gettysburg National Military Park]] in the hopes of using the [[American Civil War]] as a simile to their own struggle.<ref name="Conant2015">{{cite book|author=Sean Conant|title=The Gettysburg Address: Perspectives on Lincoln's Greatest Speech|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_bmyBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA315|year=2015|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-022746-3|pages=315–}}</ref>

Consequently, the 13 days marking the Camp David Accords were considered a success, in part due to Carter's determination in obtaining an Israeli–Egyptian agreement, which represented considerable time focused on a singular international problem. Additionally, Carter was beneficiary to a fully pledged American foreign team. Likewise, the Israeli delegation had a stable of excellent talent in Ministers [[Moshe Dayan|Dayan]] and [[Ezer Weizman|Weizman]] and legal experts Dr. [[Meir Rosenne]] and [[Aharon Barak]]. Furthermore, the absence of the media contributed to the Accord's successes: there were no possibilities provided to either leader to reassure his political body or be driven to conclusions by members of his opposition. An eventual scrap of negotiations by either leader would have proven disastrous, resulting in taking the blame for the summit's failure as well as a disassociation from the White House. Ultimately, neither Begin nor Sadat was willing to risk those eventualities. Both of them had invested enormous amounts of political capital and time to reach an agreement.<ref>Stein 1999, p. 252.</ref>

==Partial agreements==
[[File:Sadat and Begin clean3.jpg|thumb|Egyptian president [[Anwar Sadat]] and Israeli prime minister [[Menachem Begin]] acknowledge applause during a joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C., during which President [[Jimmy Carter]] announced the results of the Camp David Accords, 18 September 1978.]]
{{Listen
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|title="Remarks on the Signing of the Camp David Accords"
|description=[[Jimmy Carter]], seated with Egyptian president [[Anwar Sadat]] and Israeli prime minister [[Menachem Begin]], makes statements at a [[Joint session of the United States Congress]] following the Camp David Accords.
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The Camp David Accords comprise two separate agreements: ''"A Framework for Peace in the Middle East"'' and ''"A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel"'', the second leading towards the [[Egypt–Israel peace treaty]] signed in March 1979. The agreements and the peace treaty were both accompanied by "side-letters" of understanding between Egypt and the U.S. and Israel and the U.S.<ref>[http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/campdavid/letters.phtml "The Camp David Accords."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051018045054/http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/campdavid/letters.phtml |date=18 October 2005 }} ''[[Jimmy Carter Library and Museum]]''. 21 July 2001. 28 April 2008.</ref>

===Framework for Peace in the Middle East===
The preamble of the ''"Framework for Peace in the Middle East"'' starts with the basis of a peaceful settlement of the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]]:<ref name=Framework_PME>Jimmy Carter Library, [http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml ''The Framework for Peace in the Middle East''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131216211951/http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml |date=16 December 2013 }}, 17 September 1978</ref>

{{Blockquote|text=The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.}}

The framework itself consists of 3 parts. The first part of the framework was to establish an autonomous self-governing authority in the [[West Bank]] and the [[Gaza Strip]] and to fully implement [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242|Resolution 242]].{{citation needed|date=November 2020}}

The Accords recognized the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people", a process to be implemented guaranteeing the full autonomy of the people within a period of five years. The Israeli prime minister [[Menachem Begin|Begin]] insisted on the adjective "full" to ensure that it was the maximum political right attainable;<ref name="TEXTOFACCORDS"/> however, Begin also specifically insisted that "on no condition will there be a Palestinian state".<ref name=Filiu2014/> This so-called 'full autonomy' was to be discussed with the participation of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza was agreed to occur after an election of a self-governing authority to replace Israel's military government.<ref name="TEXTOFACCORDS"/> The Accords did not mention the Golan Heights, Syria, or Lebanon. This was not the comprehensive peace that Kissinger, Ford, Carter, or Sadat had in mind during the previous American presidential transition.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1999, p.254">Stein, 1999, p. 254.</ref> It was less clear than the agreements concerning the Sinai, and was later interpreted differently by Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The [[positions on Jerusalem|fate of Jerusalem]] was deliberately excluded from this agreement.<ref>Gold, 175</ref>

The second part of the framework dealt with Egyptian–Israeli relations, the real content worked out in the second Egypt–Israel framework. The third part, "Associated Principles," declared principles that should apply to relations between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors.

==== West Bank, Gaza and "the Palestinian problem" ====
* ''Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.''
* (1.) ''Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government.''
* (2.) ''Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.''
* (3.) ''When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. ... The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements.''

The framework merely concerned autonomy of the inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza. It neither mentions the [[status of Jerusalem]], nor the [[Palestinian Right of Return]].<ref name=Framework_PME/>

==== Criticism on the concept of 'autonomy' ====
The French historian, arabist, orientalist and professor [[Jean-Pierre Filiu]], diplomatic adviser to three French ministers between 1990 and 2002, and also U.S.-born (with Palestinian roots) historian and Professor [[Rashid Khalidi]], in the years 2013–2014  criticised the concept of '[[autonomy]]' as used in the Camp David Accords: it is "devoid of meaning and content", it does not facilitate Palestinian's "right to liberty and self-determination" (etc.).<ref name=Filiu2014>{{cite book|author=Jean-Pierre Filiu|title=Gaza: A History - Jean-Pierre Filiu|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Gaza&pg=PA|year=|publisher=Oxford University Press, 2014 |isbn=978-0-19-020189-0}}</ref><ref name=Khalidi,2013>{{cite book|author=Rashid Khalidi|title=Brokers of Deceit: How the US Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Brokers_of_Deceit&pg=PA|year=|publisher=Beacon Press, 2013 |isbn=978-0-8070-4475-9|quote=Even though Yitzhak Rabin was the first Israeli prime minister to accept formally the idea that the Palestinians were a people, he never officially conceded that this people had the right of national self-determination and statehood. These terms consequently occur nowhere in the 1993 agreements. Thus, although they nominally accepted that the Palestinians were a people, the Oslo accords in fact did no more than formally consecrate Begin’s scheme: we have seen that the canny Polish-born lawyer understood that the terms he had obdurately insisted on at Camp David in 1978 “‘guarantee that under no condition’ can a Palestinian state be created.”}}</ref> The Israeli prime minister [[Menachem Begin]], these professors say, had emphatically construed an 'autonomy'-concept that did not include<ref name=Filiu2014/> (or according to Begin not even allowed for<ref name=Khalidi,2013/>) a Palestinian state to be created. This flawed non-[[sovereignty]]-concept would be repeated in the 1993 [[Oslo Accords]], Khalidi asserted.<ref name=Khalidi,2013/>

====UN Rejection of the Middle East Framework====
The [[UN General Assembly]] rejected the ''Framework for Peace in the Middle East'', because the agreement was concluded without participation of UN and PLO and did not comply with the Palestinian right of return, of self-determination and to national independence and sovereignty. In December 1978, it declared in ''Resolution 33/28 A'' that agreements were only valid if they are within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and its resolutions, include the Palestinian right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and concluded with the participation of the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]].<ref>UNGA, 7 December 1978, [https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/45650594884CB837852560DD0051C2AF ''Resolution 33/28 A. Question of Palestine''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140111144829/http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/45650594884CB837852560DD0051C2AF |date=11 January 2014 }} (doc.nr. A/RES/33/28)</ref> On 6 December 1979, the UN condemned in ''Resolution 34/70'' all partial agreements and separate treaties that did not meet the Palestinian rights and comprehensive solutions to peace; it condemned Israel's continued occupation and demanded withdrawal from ''all'' occupied territories.<ref>UNGA, 6 December 1979, [https://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6118CF31EC9EB7FB852560DA006E47F3 ''Resolution 34/70. The situation in the Middle East''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140111145137/http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6118CF31EC9EB7FB852560DA006E47F3 |date=11 January 2014 }} (doc.nr. A/RES/34/70)</ref> On 12 December, in ''Resolution 34/65 B'', the UN rejected more specific parts of the Camp David Accords and similar agreements, which were not in accordance with mentioned requirements. All such partial agreements and separate treaties were strongly condemned. The part of the Camp David accords regarding the Palestinian future and all similar ones were declared invalid.<ref>UNGA, 12 December 1979, [https://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/1CFBE54A74E1AB8B852560DA006DE34D ''Resolution 34/65 B. Question of Palestine''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120329074242/http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/1CFBE54A74E1AB8B852560DA006DE34D |date=29 March 2012 }}. [doc.nr. A/RES/34/65 (A-D)]</ref>

===Framework Peace Treaty Egypt and Israel===
[[File:Sinai-Airbases.png|thumb|Abandoned [[Israeli Air Force|IAF]] bases on the [[Sinai Peninsula]] (red) and newly established bases in southern Israel (blue)]]
The second framework<ref name=Framework_CPTEI>Jimmy Carter Library, [http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/frame.phtml ''Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130216152443/http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/frame.phtml |date=16 February 2013 }}</ref> outlined a basis for the [[Egypt–Israel peace treaty|peace treaty]] six months later, in particular deciding the future of the [[Sinai Peninsula]]. Israel agreed to withdraw its armed forces from the Sinai, gave up its four air bases that had been built there since the [[Six-Day War]] (see map to the right), evacuate its 4,500 civilian inhabitants, and restore it to Egypt in return for normal diplomatic relations with Egypt, guarantees of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and other nearby waterways (such as the [[Straits of Tiran]]), and a restriction on the forces Egypt could place on the Sinai peninsula, especially within 20–40&nbsp;km from Israel. This process would take three years to complete.  Israel also agreed to limit its forces a smaller distance (3&nbsp;km) from the Egyptian border, and to guarantee free passage between Egypt and Jordan. With the withdrawal, Israel also returned Egypt's Abu-Rudeis oil fields in western Sinai, which contained long term, commercially productive wells.

==Implementation and outcomes==
[[File:Anti Kamp-David agreement demonstration in Damascus, Syria.jpg|thumb|248x248px|Anti Camp-David accords demonstration in [[Damascus]], [[Syria]], 1978.]]
The Camp David accords changed Middle Eastern politics. Notably, the perception of Egypt within the Arab world changed. With the most powerful of the Arab militaries and a history of leadership in the Arab world under [[Gamal Abdel Nasser|Nasser]], Egypt had more leverage than any of the other Arab states to advance Arab interests. Egypt was subsequently suspended from the [[Arab League]] from 1979 until 1989.

Jordan's King Hussein saw it as a slap to the face when Sadat volunteered Jordan's participation in deciding how functional autonomy for the Palestinians would work. Specifically, Sadat effectively said that Jordan would have a role in how the West Bank would be administered. Like the Rabat Summit Resolution, the Camp David Accords circumscribed Jordan's objective to reassert its control over the West Bank. Focusing as it did on Egypt, the Carter administration accepted Sadat's claim that he could deliver Hussein. However, with Arab world opposition building against Sadat, Jordan could not risk accepting the Accords without the support of powerful Arab neighbours, like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1999, p.254"/> Hussein consequently felt diplomatically snubbed. One of Carter's regrets was allowing Sadat to claim that he could speak for Hussein if Jordan refused to join the talks, but by then the damage was done to the Jordanians.<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1999, p.254"/>
[[File:Carter and Sadat White House2.jpg|right|thumb|United States President [[Jimmy Carter]] greeting Egyptian president [[Anwar Sadat]] at the [[White House]] shortly after the Camp David Accords went into effect, 8 April 1980.]]
The Camp David Accords also prompted the disintegration of a united Arab front in opposition to Israel. Egypt's realignment created a power vacuum that [[Saddam Hussein]] of [[Iraq]], at one time only a secondary power, hoped to fill. Because of the vague language concerning the implementation of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 242|Resolution 242]], the [[Palestinian people|Palestinian]] problem became the primary issue in the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]]. Many of the Arab nations blamed Egypt for not putting enough pressure on Israel to deal with the Palestinian problem in a way that would be satisfactory to them. Syria also informed Egypt that it would not reconcile with the nation unless it abandoned the peace agreement with Israel.<ref name=ldmm />

According to ''The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East'':

<blockquote>The normalization of relations [between Israel and Egypt] went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors were exchanged in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt's National Assembly the same month, and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In March 1980 regular airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel with crude oil".<ref>Sela, "Arab–Israel Conflict", 100{{Full citation needed|date=February 2018}}</ref></blockquote>

According to Kenneth Stein in ''Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab–Israeli Peace'':

<blockquote>The Accords were another interim agreement or step, but negotiations that flowed from the Accords slowed for several reasons. These included an inability to bring the Jordanians into the discussions; the controversy over settlements; the inconclusive nature of the subsequent autonomy talks; domestic opposition sustained by both Begin and Sadat and, in Sadat's case, ostracism and anger from the Arab world; the emergence of a what became a [[cold peace]] between Egypt and Israel; and changes in foreign policy priorities including discontinuity in personnel committed to sustaining the negotiating process[.]<ref name="Stein, Kenneth 1999, p.254"/></blockquote>

Historian Jørgen Jensehaugen argues<ref>Jørgen Jensehaugen. ''Arab–Israeli Diplomacy under Carter:  The US, Israel and the Palestinians'' (2018) p. 178, quoted [https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/4083976/h-diplo-roundtable-xx-36-j%C3%B8rgen-jensehaugen-arab-israeli on H-DIPLO])</ref> that by the time Carter left office in January 1981, he:
{{Blockquote|text=was in an odd position—he had attempted to break with traditional US policy but ended up fulfilling the goals of that tradition, which had been to break up the Arab alliance, side-line the Palestinians, build an alliance with Egypt, weaken the Soviet Union and secure Israel.}}

== Israeli public support ==
Although most Israelis supported the Accords, the [[Israeli settler|Israeli settler movement]] opposed them because Sadat's refusal to agree to a treaty in which Israel had any presence in the [[Sinai Peninsula]] at all meant they had to withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula.<ref>Sela, "Sinai Peninsula," 774</ref> Israeli settlers tried to prevent the government from dismantling their settlements, but were unsuccessful.<ref>Armstrong, 414</ref>

In Israel, there is lasting support of the Camp David Peace Accords, which have become a national consensus, supported by 85% of Israelis according to a 2001 poll taken by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Israel-based).<ref>Ronen, Joshua.  [http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/Hjerus1.html "Poll: 58% of Israelis back Oslo process."] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080502195917/http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/Hjerus1.html |date=2 May 2008 }} ''[[Tel Aviv University]]''.  7 June 2001.  28 April 2008.</ref>

==Assassination of Anwar Sadat==
{{Main|Assassination of Anwar Sadat}}
President Sadat's signing of the Camp David Accords on 17 September 1978 and his shared 1978 Nobel Peace Prize with Israeli prime minister Begin led to his assassination on 6 October 1981 by members of the [[Egyptian Islamic Jihad]] during the annual victory parade held in Cairo to celebrate Egypt's crossing of the Suez Canal. The president's personal protection was infiltrated by four members of this organization, who were hiding in a truck passing through the military parade with other military vehicles. As the truck approached the president, the leader of the belligerents – Lieutenant [[Khalid Islambouli]] – came out of the truck and threw three grenades towards the president; only one of the three exploded. The rest of the team opened fire with automatic assault rifles and struck President Sadat with 37 rounds. He was airlifted to a military hospital, where he died two hours after arriving.<ref name=onthisday>{{cite news |title=On this day: 6 October |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/6/newsid_2515000/2515841.stm |access-date=23 December 2012 |publisher=BBC}}</ref>

In total, 11 were killed from collateral gunfire and 28 were injured. Among the killed were the Cuban ambassador, an Omani general, and a Coptic Orthodox bishop. Among the wounded were [[Vice-President of Egypt|Egyptian Vice-President]] [[Hosni Mubarak]], [[Minister for Defence (Ireland)|Irish Defence Minister]] [[James Tully (Irish politician)|James Tully]], and four U.S. military liaison officers. One of the assassins was killed and the other three were wounded and taken into custody. The surviving assassins were tried and found guilty of assassinating the president and killing 10 others in the process; they were sentenced to capital punishment, and were executed on 15 April 1982.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=Lfo9AAAAIBAJ&pg=3096,3218494&dq= |title=Sadat Assassins are Executed |date=16 April 1982 |publisher=[[The Herald (Glasgow)|The Glasgow Herald]]}}</ref>

==Arab–Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties==
'''Treaties and meetings'''<!-- In ascending chronological order -->
* [[Paris Peace Conference, 1919]]
* [[Faisal–Weizmann Agreement]] (1919)
* [[1949 Armistice Agreements]]
* [[Geneva Conference (1973)]]
* Camp David Accords (1978)
* [[Egypt–Israel peace treaty]] (1979)
* [[Madrid Conference of 1991]]
* [[Oslo Accords]] (1993)
* [[Israel–Jordan peace treaty]] (1994)
* [[Camp David 2000 Summit]]
* [[Philadelphi Accord]] (2005)
* [[Abraham Accords]] (2020)

'''General articles'''
* [[International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict]]
* [[Israeli–Palestinian peace process]]
* [[List of Middle East peace proposals]]
* [[Projects working for peace among Israelis and Arabs]]

==See also==
{{columns-list|
* [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]]
* [[1956 Suez War]]
* 1967 [[Six-Day War]]
* 1970 [[War of Attrition]]
* 1973 [[Yom Kippur War]]
* [[Arab–Israeli conflict]]
* [[Arab League and the Arab–Israeli conflict]]
* [[Egypt–Israel relations]]
* [[Israeli–Palestinian conflict]]
* [[Palestinian autonomy talks]]
* [[History of the State of Palestine]]
}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
{{Refbegin|2}}
* Ashton, Nigel J. "Taking friends for granted: the Carter administration, Jordan and the Camp David Accords, 1977–80." ''Diplomatic History'' 41.3 (2017): 620–645. [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66755/7/Ashton_Taking_friends_for_granted_the_carter_administration_LSERO.pdf online]
* [[Yehuda Avner|Avner, Yehuda]], ''The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership'', The Toby Press, 2010. {{ISBN|978-1-59264-278-6}}
* [[Karen Armstrong|Armstrong, Karen]]. ''Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths''. New York: [[Ballantine Books]], 1996.
* Brams, Steven J., and Jeffrey M. Togman. "Camp David: Was the agreement fair?." ''Conflict Management and Peace Science'' 15.1 (1996): 99–112 [ online].
* Brands, H.W. ''Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945–1993'' (1994) [https://books.google.com/books?id=xV1tAAAAMAAJ excerpt] pp.&nbsp;143–153.
* [[Ahron Bregman|Bregman, Ahron]] ''Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America''.
* Eran, Oded. ''Arab–Israel Peacemaking''. Sela.
* [[Dore Gold|Gold, Dore]]. ''The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City''. Washington, DC: [[Regnery Publishing|Regnery Publishing, Inc.]], 2007.
* Findlay, Scott D., and Paul Thagard. "Emotional change in international negotiation: Analyzing the Camp David accords using cognitive-affective maps." ''Group Decision and Negotiation'' 23.6 (2014): 1281–1300. [http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.419.8746&rep=rep1&type=pdf online]
* Hinton, Clete A. ''Camp David Accords'' (2004)
* Meital, Yoram. ''Egypt's Struggle for Peace: Continuity and Change, 1967–1977''.
* Quandt, William B. ''Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics'' (1986), by leading political scientist
** Quandt, William B. "Camp David and peacemaking in the Middle East." ''Political Science Quarterly'' 101.3 (1986): 357–377. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2151620 online]
* [[Avraham Sela|Sela, Avraham]], ed. ''The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East''. New York: Continuum, 2002.
* {{cite book
 | first=William B.
 | last = Quandt
 | title=The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David
 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pYzO8zmNEmcC&pg=PA94
 | date=1988
 | publisher=Brookings Institution Press
 | isbn=978-0-8157-2052-2
 | pages=94–
}}
* Telhami, Shibley. "From Camp David to Wye: Changing Assumptions in Arab–Israeli Negotiations." The ''Middle East Journal'' (1999): 379–392. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/4329352 online]
* Telhami, Shibley. "Evaluating bargaining performance: The case of Camp David." ''Political Science Quarterly'' 107.4 (1992): 629–653. [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shibley_Telhami/publication/279407013_Evaluating_Bargaining_Performance_The_Case_of_Camp_David/links/5cd19d2ba6fdccc9dd93799e/Evaluating-Bargaining-Performance-The-Case-of-Camp-David.pdf online]
** Telhami, Shibley. ''Power and leadership in international bargaining: the path to the Camp David accords'' (Columbia UP, 1990).
{{Refend}}

===Primary sources===
* [[Yisrael Medad|Medad, Yisrael]], ed., [[Zvi Harry Hurwitz|Hurwitz, Zvi Harry]], ed. ''Peace in the Making The Menachem Begin – Anwar Sadat Personal Correspondence'', Gefen Publishing House, 2011. {{ISBN|978-965-229-456-2}}

===Other sources===
* [[Adam Curtis]]' 2004 documentary ''[[The Power of Nightmares]]'', in its second and third part, studies the Camp David Accords from the point of view of fundamentalist Muslims.

==External links==
{{Commons category|Camp David Accords}}
{{Wikisource|Camp David Accords}}
* [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Camp+David+Accords.htm Text of the Accords, Israeli government]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20110216081558/http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/index.phtml Text of Accords and additional material, Carter Library]
* [http://knesset.gov.il/process/docs/autonomy1977_eng.htm ''Israel's Self-Rule Plan'']. Knesset website, 28 December 1977
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20141110091752/https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552609 Interview with King Hussein] from the [https://web.archive.org/web/20120312181034/http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552494/browse?type=title Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives]
* [http://www.nysun.com/article/43906 2006 Egyptian public poll on attitudes to Israel] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081010130732/http://www.nysun.com/article/43906 |date=10 October 2008 }} and other countries, '''The Sun'' (New York) article. Alternate link to poll results from a [[BBC News]] [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6107160.stm article]
* [http://www.begincenter.org.il/ The Menachem Begin Heritage Foundation]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20080502195917/http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/Hjerus1.html Jaffe Center Poll on Israeli public Attitudes to the Peace Process]
* [https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F00E1DE1F3CF935A15753C1A9649C8B63 NY Times: Anti-Semitic 'Elders of Zion' Gets New Life on Egypt TV]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100612011440/http://www.ismi.emory.edu/PrimarySource/Camp_David__25th_Anniversary_Forum.pdf "Camp David 25th Anniversary Forum" (led by President Carter)]

{{Arab–Israeli diplomacy}}
{{Foreign relations of Israel}}
{{Foreign relations of Egypt}}
{{Egypt–Israel relations}}
{{Presidency of Jimmy Carter}}
{{Authority control}}

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[[Category:History of the foreign relations of the United States]]
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[[Category:Republic of Egypt]]
[[Category:September 1978 in the United States]]
[[Category:Treaties concluded in 1978]]
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