View source for Accountability

{{Short description|Concept of responsibility in ethics, governance and decision-making}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=December 2019}}

In [[ethics]] and [[governance]], '''accountability''' is equated with answerability, [[culpability]], [[legal liability|liability]], and the expectation of account-giving.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Dykstra|first=Clarence A.|date=February 1938|title=The Quest for Responsibility|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=33|issue=1|pages=1–25|doi=10.2307/1949761|jstor=1949761|s2cid=143587418 }}</ref>

As in an aspect of [[governance]], it has been central to discussions related to problems in the [[public sector]], [[nonprofit]], private ([[corporate]]), and individual contexts. In leadership roles,<ref>{{cite book|last=Williams|first=Reyes|year=2006|title=Leadership accountability in a globalizing world|location=London|publisher=Palgraave Macmillan}}</ref> accountability is the acknowledgment of and assumption of responsibility for actions, [[Product (business)|products]], decisions, and policies such as [[Business administration|administration]], governance, and implementation, including the obligation to report, justify, and be answerable for resulting consequences.

In governance, accountability has expanded beyond the basic definition of "being called to account for one's actions".<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite journal |last=Mulgan|first=Richard |year=2000|title='Accountability': An Ever-Expanding Concept?|journal=[[Public Administration (journal)|Public Administration]]|volume=78|issue=3|pages=555–573|doi=10.1111/1467-9299.00218}}
|2={{cite journal|last=Sinclair|first=Amanda |year=1995|title=The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses|journal=Accounting, Organizations and Society |volume=20|issue=2/3|pages=219–237|doi=10.1016/0361-3682(93)E0003-Y}}
}}</ref> It is frequently described as an account-giving relationship between individuals, e.g. "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct."<ref>{{cite book|last=Schedler|first=Andreas|editor=Andreas Schedler |editor2=Larry Diamond |editor3=Marc F. Plattner|title=The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies|chapter=Conceptualizing Accountability|publisher=Lynne Rienner Publishers|location=London|year=1999|isbn=978-1-55587-773-6|pages=13–28}}</ref>

Accountability cannot exist without proper accounting practices; in other words, an absence of accounting means an absence of accountability.{{cn|date=July 2023}} Another key area that contributes to accountability is good records management.<ref>{{cite journal | last=David | first=Rodreck | title=Contribution of records management to audit opinions and accountability in government | journal=South Africa Journal of Information Management | publisher=AOSIS | volume=19 | issue=1 | year=2017 | issn=1560-683X | doi=10.4102/sajim.v19i1.771 | page=| s2cid=168907338 | doi-access=free }}</ref>

==History and etymology==
The word ''accountability'' derives from the late Latin {{lang|la|accomptare}} (to account), a prefixed form of {{lang|la|computare}} (to calculate), which in turn is derived from {{lang|la|putare}} (to reckon).<ref>{{cite book|title=Oxford English Dictionary|edition=2nd}}{{page needed|date=July 2023}}</ref> While the word itself does not appear in English until its use in 13th century Norman England,<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite book|last=Dubnick|first=Melvin|editor=Charles Sampford |editor2=Noel Preston |editor3=C. A. Bois|title=Public Sector Ethics: Finding And Implementing Values|url=https://archive.org/details/publicsectorethi00samf|url-access=limited|chapter=Clarifying Accountability: An Ethical Theory Framework|publisher=The Federation Press/Routledge|location=Leichhardt, NSW, Australia|year=1998|pages=[https://archive.org/details/publicsectorethi00samf/page/n78 68]–81}}
|2={{cite journal|last=Seidman|first=Gary I|date=Winter 2005|title=The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know About the Sovereign's Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III|journal=St. Louis University Law Journal|volume=49|issue=2|pages=393–480}}
}}</ref> the concept of account-giving has ancient roots in record-keeping activities related to governance and money-lending systems that first developed in [[Ancient Egypt]],<ref>{{cite journal|last=Ezzamel|first=Mahmoud|date=December 1997|title=Accounting, Control and Accountability: Preliminary Evidence from Ancient Egypt|journal=[[Critical Perspectives on Accounting]]|volume=8|issue=6|pages=563–601|doi=10.1006/cpac.1997.0123}}</ref> [[Israel]],<ref>{{cite book|last=Walzer|first=Michael|editor=Ian Shapiro|title=the Rule of Law|chapter=The Legal Codes of Ancient Israel|publisher=New York University Press|location=NY|year=1994|pages=101–119}}</ref> [[Babylon]],<ref>{{cite journal|last=Urch|first=Edwin J.|date=July 1929|title=The Law Code of Hammurabi|journal=American Bar Association Journal|volume=15|issue=7|pages=437–441}}</ref> [[Greece]],<ref>{{cite book|last=Roberts|first=Jennifer T.|title=Accountability in Athenian Government|url=https://archive.org/details/accountabilityin0000robe|url-access=registration|publisher=University of Wisconsin Press|location=Madison, WI|year=1982|isbn=9780299086800}}</ref> and later [[Ancient Rome|Rome]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=Plescia|first=Joseph|date=January 2001|title=Judicial Accountability and Immunity in Roman Law|journal=American Journal of Legal History|volume=45|issue=1|pages=51–70|doi=10.2307/3185349|jstor=3185349}}</ref>

== Political accountability==
Political accountability is when a politician makes choices on behalf of the people, and the people have the ability to reward or sanction the politician.<ref name=":0">{{cite book|title=Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance|last=Fearon|first=James|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1999|location=Cambridge, MA}}</ref> In representative democracies, citizens delegate power to elected officials through periodic elections, and such officials are empowered to represent or act in the citizens' interest.<ref name=":0" /> A challenge is how to see to it that those with such power, who presumably have divergent interests from the citizens, nonetheless act in their best interests.<ref name=":1">{{cite book|title=Democracy, accountability, and representation |last1=Przeworski|first1= Adam |last2=Stokes|first2= Susan Carol |last3=Manin|first3=Bernard |date=2003 |publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9780521641531|oclc=58400209}}</ref> Citizens can rely on rewards or sanctions to reward or threaten politicians who might otherwise act in a manner that is antithetical to the people's interest.<ref name=":1" /> Accountability occurs when citizens only vote to re-elect representatives who act in their interests, and if representatives then select policies that will help them be re-elected.<ref name=":1" /> "Governments are 'accountable' if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately, so that those incumbents who act in the best interest of the citizens win reelection and those who do not lose them."<ref name=":1" />

Representatives can be held accountable through two mechanisms: electoral replacement and rational anticipation.<ref name=":2">{{cite journal|last1=Stimson|first1=James A.|last2=MacKuen|first2=Michael B.|last3=Erikson|first3=Robert S.|title=Dynamic Representation|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=98|issue=3|pages=543–565}}</ref> In electoral replacement, citizens vote to replace representatives who are out of step with their interests. Rational anticipation requires that representatives anticipate the consequences of being out of step with their constituency and then govern in accordance with citizens' wishes to avoid negative consequences.<ref name=":2" /> Accountability can still be achieved even if citizens are not perfectly knowledgeable about their representatives' actions; as long as representatives believe that they will be held accountable by citizens, they will still be motivated to act in accordance with the citizens' interests.<ref>{{cite book|title=The logic of congressional action.|last=Arnold|first= R. Douglas|year=1990|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn=0300056591|oclc=472546186|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/logicofcongressi00arno}}</ref>

=== Electoral accountability===
Electoral accountability refers to citizens using their vote to sanction or reward politicians.<ref name=":1" />

Some researchers have considered accountability using [[Formal theory (political science)|formal theory]], which makes assumptions about the state of the world to draw larger conclusions. Voters can hold representatives accountable through the process of sanctioning—voting the [[incumbent]] out of office in response to poor performance.{{r|:1}} While politicians face a decrease in vote share as a result of poor performance, they are less likely to see an increase in vote share for good performance.<ref name=":4">{{cite journal |last1=Martin|first1=Lucy|last2=Raffler|first2=Pia |date=4 August 2019 |title=Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability |url=https://columbiapeseminar.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/martin_raffler_fault-lines.pdf |journal=American Journal of Political Science |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191206135401/https://columbiapeseminar.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/martin_raffler_fault-lines.pdf |archive-date=6 December 2019 |access-date=6 December 2019}}</ref> Selection—voters choosing candidates based on who will best represent their interests—is another method by which voters hold their representatives accountable.{{r|:1}} These methods of accountability can occur simultaneously, with voters holding representatives accountable using both sanctioning and selection.{{r|:1}} These conclusions rely on the assumption that voters do not observe the policy implemented by the incumbent, but do know their own welfare.{{clarify|how can you vote the incumbent out "in response to poor performance" if you "do not observe the policy implemented by the incumbent"?|date=July 2023}}{{r|:1}}

Some factors make it harder for voters to sanction incumbents. When politicians do not have control over outcomes, it becomes harder{{How|date=July 2023}} to hold them accountable.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, when organizations are unable to monitor elections and provide information to voters, then voters struggle to sanction the incumbent.<ref name=":5">{{citation | last1=Grossman | first1=Guy | last2=Michelitch | first2=Kristin Grace | last3=Prato | first3=Carlo | title=The Effect of Sustained Transparency on Electoral Accountability | publisher=Center for Open Science | date=2 March 2022 | doi=10.31219/osf.io/qwcek }}</ref> When voters are better informed about the incumbent's performance, the incumbent is more vulnerable to voter sanctioning.<ref name=":5" /> Furthermore, when incumbents face sanctioning, challengers are more likely to enter the race.<ref name=":5" />

While elections provide a mechanism which can theoretically increase government accountability to citizens, they may instead lead to less egalitarian policy outcomes, because those who hold the government accountable tend to be from wealthier segments of society.<ref name=":29">{{Cite journal|last=Sances|first=Michael W.|date=January 2016|title=The Distributional Impact of Greater Responsiveness: Evidence from New York Towns|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/683026|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=78|issue=1|pages=105–119|doi=10.1086/683026|s2cid=155437616|issn=0022-3816|url-access=subscription}}</ref> For example, a study of elected versus appointed property assessors in the state of New York shows that the election of property assessors leads to policies that severely undertax wealthier homes relative to poorer homes.<ref name=":29" />

Studies on political accountability have emphasized the key role of elections in promoting accountability in democratic settings. It is through elections that citizens hold governments accountable for past performance.{{r|:1}}<ref>{{cite SSRN |last1=Besley|first1=Timothy J.|last2=Kudamatsu|first2=Masayuki|date=1 May 2007|title=Making Autocracy Work|language=en|ssrn=1127017}}</ref> 

==== Electoral manipulation ====
{{Further|Political corruption|Electoral fraud}}
The role of elections in fostering accountability is often undermined by electoral manipulation and fraud.<ref name=":02">{{cite book |title=Why governments and parties manipulate elections: theory, practice, and implications |author1=Simpser, Alberto |date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-30688-2|location=Cambridge|oclc=826857655}}</ref> By preventing citizens from removing leaders through elections based on their performance in office, electoral manipulation breaks down accountability and may undercut the consolidation of democratic institutions.<ref>{{cite thesis|url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bs339cm|title=Voting, Fraud, and Violence: Political Accountability in African Elections|last=Long|first=James Dunway|publisher=University of California San Diego|year=2014}}</ref>

Electoral manipulation is not rare; some estimates are that in the 1990s and 2000s, up to one fourth of elections suffered some form of substantial manipulation.<ref name=":02" /> This includes a large array of pre-election and election-day tactics, such as outlawing rival parties and candidates, employing violence and [[intimidation]], and manipulating voter registration and vote count.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Schedler|first=Andreas|date=2002|title=The Menu of Manipulation|journal=Journal of Democracy|language=en|volume=13|issue=2|pages=36–50|doi=10.1353/jod.2002.0031|s2cid=154830665|issn=1086-3214}}</ref> Some efforts to improve accountability by preventing electoral manipulation and fraud have obtained a certain measure of success, such as using cell phone applications for monitoring and disseminating polling station results<ref name=":12b">{{cite journal|last1=Callen|first1=Michael|last2=Long|first2=James D.|date=2015|title=Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=105|issue=1|pages=354–381|doi=10.1257/aer.20120427|s2cid=7016902 |issn=0002-8282|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102931/1/In.pdf}}</ref> and employing domestic or international election observers.<ref name=":22">{{cite journal|last1=Ichino|first1=Nahomi|last2=Schündeln|first2=Matthias|date=2012|title=Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana|journal=The Journal of Politics|language=en|volume=74|issue=1|pages=292–307|doi=10.1017/S0022381611001368|s2cid=10426326|issn=0022-3816|url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9282597|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{cite journal|last1=Beaulieu|first1=Emily|last2=Hyde|first2=Susan D.|date=2009|title=In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=42|issue=3|pages=392–415|doi=10.1177/0010414008325571|s2cid=155078768|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> However, governments may simply alter the type of manipulation or where it occurs in order to deceive observers and monitoring agencies.<ref name=":22" /><ref name=":32" />

Governments, politicians, and political parties are more likely to resort to electoral manipulation and fraud when they believe they might be removed from office and when they face few institutional constraints to their power.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Hafner-Burton|first1=Emilie Marie|last2=Hyde|first2=Susan D.|last3=Jablonski|first3=Ryan S.|date=6 September 2012 |title=When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence? |journal=British Journal of Political Science |language=en|location=Rochester, N.Y. |ssrn=1667063}}</ref> Low political competition has also been linked to some forms of manipulation, such as abolishing presidential term limits.<ref>{{cite journal|last=McKie|first=Kristin|date=2019|title=Presidential Term Limit Contravention: Abolish, Extend, Fail, or Respect?|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=52|issue=10|pages=1500–1534|doi=10.1177/0010414019830737|s2cid=159155380|issn=0010-4140|doi-access=free}}</ref> Well-connected{{How|date=July 2023}} candidates are more likely to resort to vote count fraud.<ref name=":12b" /> Governments may engage in electoral manipulation not only to obtain victory at a given election or to remain in office longer, but also for post-election reasons, such as reducing the strength of the opposition or increasing their own bargaining power in the subsequent period.<ref name=":02" />

=== Administrative ===
==== Common goods ====
Politicians may be incentivized to provide [[common good]]s as a means of accountability.{{clarify|reason=how is providing public goods a means of accountability?|date=July 2023}}<ref name=":15">{{cite journal|last1=Batley|first1=Richard|last2=Mcloughlin|first2=Claire|date=October 2015|title=The Politics of Public Services: A Service Characteristics Approach|journal=World Development|language=en|volume=74|pages=275–285|doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.05.018|doi-access=free}}</ref> The ability of voters to attribute the credit and blame of outcomes also determines the extent of public goods provision.<ref name=":15" /><ref name=":16">{{cite journal | last1=Martin | first1=Lucy | last2=Raffler | first2=Pia J. | title=Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability | journal=American Journal of Political Science | publisher=Wiley | volume=65 | issue=1 | date=7 June 2020 | issn=0092-5853 | doi=10.1111/ajps.12530 | pages=210–224| s2cid=209526364 }}</ref> Research suggests that public goods provision {{vague|text=is conditional on|reason=conditional in what way? provision to whom by whom? who attributes the outcomes?|date=July 2023}} being able to attribute outcomes to politicians as opposed to civil servants.<ref name=":16" /> This attribution can be enhanced by more short-run and visible inputs and outcomes such as famine relief or access to drinking water, whereas lower-visibility issues such as sanitation and education may be more difficult to attribute credit for and thus less likely to provide for.<ref name=":15" />

Another condition determining how voters use the provision of public goods to hold leaders accountable is whether the prioritization of public goods is determined either directly via vote or delegated to a governing body.<ref name=":17">{{cite journal|last=Butler|first=Daniel M.|s2cid=155004601|date=22 August 2011|title=Can Learning Constituency Opinion Affect How Legislators Vote? Results from a Field Experiment|journal=Quarterly Journal of Political Science|volume=6|issue=1|pages=55–83|doi=10.1561/100.00011019}}</ref><ref name=":18">{{cite journal | last1=Beath | first1=Andrew | last2=Christia | first2=Fotini | last3=Enikolopov | first3=Ruben | title=Direct democracy and resource allocation: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan | journal=Journal of Development Economics | publisher=Elsevier BV | volume=124 | year=2017 | issn=0304-3878 | doi=10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.10.001 | pages=199–213| hdl=1721.1/127650 | url=http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/16/000158349_20120716094426/Rendered/PDF/WPS6133.pdf | hdl-access=free }}</ref> An experiment in New Mexico regarding proposed spending during the state's 2008 special summer legislative session provides evidence that legislators update their positions when learning about voters' policy preferences, indicating that a representative democracy can increase accountability when politicians learn about voters' preferences.<ref name=":17" /> A 2016 experiment in Afghanistan regarding rural development projects, however, finds that when voters directly prioritize their preferences at the ballot box, they perceive the quality of local government to be higher than when a governing committee prioritizes development projects.<ref name=":18" /> These contrasting outcomes highlight a debate between trustees and delegates, though the lack of objective superior outcomes in projects decided by vote as opposed to committee in the Afghanistan experiment indicate neither is superior to the other in determining which public goods should be given priority.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite journal|last=Rehfeld|first=Andrew|date=May 2009|title=Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy|journal=American Political Science Review|language=en|volume=103|issue=2|pages=214–230|doi=10.1017/S0003055409090261|s2cid=53957756|issn=0003-0554}}
|2={{cite journal|last1=Fox|first1=Justin|last2=Shotts|first2=Kenneth W.|date=October 2009|title=Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability|journal=The Journal of Politics|language=en|volume=71|issue=4|pages=1225–1237|doi=10.1017/S0022381609990260|s2cid=9879793|issn=0022-3816}}
}}</ref>

Other research indicates that voters use elections to hold politicians accountable for the provision of public goods.<ref name=":19">{{cite journal |last1=Min |first1=Brian |last2=Golden |first2=Miriam |author-link2=Miriam A. Golden |date=February 2014 |title=Electoral cycles in electricity losses in India |journal=Energy Policy |language=en |volume=65 |pages=619–625 |bibcode=2014EnPol..65..619M |doi=10.1016/j.enpol.2013.09.060}}</ref><ref name=":20">{{cite journal|last=Harding|first=Robin|date=October 2015|title=Attribution And Accountability: Voting for roads in Ghana|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=67|issue=4|pages=656–689|doi=10.1017/S0043887115000209|s2cid=20470554|issn=0043-8871|url=https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:219e71c2-1b53-41de-b418-b61f10bf2039}}</ref> In India, rural areas are charged a flat rate for electricity, but in the province of Uttar Pradesh, line loss—electricity that is consumed but not billed—is significantly higher in election years than non-election years, and increases in line loss reliably predict electoral gains.<ref name=":19" /> Voters rewarded incumbent politicians with a 12% increase in party seats in response to a 10% increase of unbilled electricity, in 2007 elections.<ref name=":19" /> In Ghana, the improvement of road conditions is linked to an increasing vote share for incumbent parties.<ref name=":20" /> Both of these research outcomes hinge on voters being able to attribute the service of public goods to politicians.<ref name=":19" /><ref name=":20" /><ref name=":16" />

Politicians may also have incentives to respond to pressure for public goods provision in electoral autocracies.<ref name=":21">{{cite journal|last=Miller|first=Michael K.|date=October 2015|title=Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=48|issue=12|pages=1526–1562|doi=10.1177/0010414015582051|s2cid=154285722|issn=0010-4140}}</ref><ref name=":23">{{cite journal|last=Miller|first=Michael K.|date=May 2015|title=Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en|volume=48|issue=6|pages=691–727|doi=10.1177/0010414014555443|s2cid=154879177|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> There is evidence that as autocratic governments lose seats in their party's legislatures, they respond by increasing spending on public goods such as education, healthcare, and pensions.<ref name=":21" /> There is further evidence suggesting higher quality of life, civil liberties, and human development in electoral autocracies, lending credence to the theory that autocratic rulers use elections as a bellwether against popular discontent and citizen opposition, and in turn increase public goods provision to dampen the grievances of disgruntled citizens, even in non-democracies.<ref name=":23" />

While the introduction of elections is generally thought to improve public goods provision, in some cases, researchers have shown that it may reduce its quality.<ref name=":30">{{Cite journal|last1=Pierskalla|first1=Jan H.|last2=Sacks|first2=Audrey|date=October 2020|title=Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia|journal=British Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=50|issue=4|pages=1283–1305|doi=10.1017/S0007123418000601|s2cid=149452970|issn=0007-1234|doi-access=free}}</ref> For example, the introduction of direct elections for local district office in Indonesia resulted in political interference in the hiring process for bureaucrats in the public education sector, reducing the quality of education provision; politicians were incentivized to dole out patronage positions in the education sector, especially in election years, and where such positions were added, student test scores were lower.<ref name=":30" />

== Non-electoral ==
Governments are held accountable if citizens can punish or reward the government to influence it to pursue their best interests.{{r|:1}} While scholars who study democratic theory emphasize the role of elections in ensuring accountability,<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite journal|last=Barro|first=Robert J.|date=March 1973|title=The control of politicians: An economic model|journal=Public Choice|volume=14-14|issue=1|pages=19–42|doi=10.1007/bf01718440|s2cid=154999534|issn=0048-5829}}
|2={{Cite journal|last1=Besley|first1=Timothy J.|last2=Burgess|first2=Robin|date=2002|title=The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India|journal=SSRN Working Paper Series|doi=10.2139/ssrn.319012|s2cid=8657561|issn=1556-5068|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2308/1/The_Political_Economy_of_Government_Responsiveness_Theory_and_Evidence_from_India.pdf}}
|3={{Cite journal|last=Ferejohn|first=John|date=1986|title=Incumbent performance and electoral control|journal=Public Choice|volume=50|issue=1–3|pages=5–25|doi=10.1007/bf00124924|s2cid=153577661|issn=0048-5829}}
|4={{Citation|last1=Manin|first1=Bernard|title=Elections and Representation|date=13 September 1999|work=Democracy, Accountability, and Representation|pages=29–54|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-64616-1|last2=Przeworski|first2=Adam|last3=Stokes|first3=Susan C.|doi=10.1017/cbo9781139175104.002}}
|5={{Cite book|last=Schumpeter|first=Joseph A.|date=5 April 2010|title=Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy|doi=10.4324/9780203857090|isbn=9780203857090}}
}}</ref> another strand of scholars investigates non-electoral forms of accountability in democracies and non-democracies<ref name="Madestam 1633–1685">{{Cite journal|last1=Madestam|first1=Andreas|last2=Shoag|first2=Daniel|last3=Veuger|first3=Stan|last4=Yanagizawa-Drott|first4=David|date=30 September 2013|title=Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement*|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|volume=128|issue=4|pages=1633–1685|doi=10.1093/qje/qjt021|issn=0033-5533|url=https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/137648/1/Do_political_protests_akz_man.pdf}}</ref><ref name="Bratton 419">{{Cite journal|last1=Bratton|first1=Michael|last2=van de Walle|first2=Nicolas|date=July 1992|title=Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=24|issue=4|pages=419|doi=10.2307/422153|issn=0010-4159|jstor=422153}}</ref><ref name=":24">{{Cite journal|last1=Anderson|first1=Sarah E.|last2=Buntaine|first2=Mark T.|last3=Liu|first3=Mengdi|last4=Zhang|first4=Bing|date=8 May 2019|title=Non-Governmental Monitoring of Local Governments Increases Compliance with Central Mandates: A National-Scale Field Experiment in China|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=63|issue=3|pages=626–643|doi=10.1111/ajps.12428|s2cid=164557135|issn=0092-5853|url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6ss13791}}</ref><ref name=":26">{{Cite journal|last1=Baldwin|first1=Kate|last2=Holzinger|first2=Katharina|date=16 June 2019|title=Traditional Political Institutions and Democracy: Reassessing Their Compatibility and Accountability|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=52|issue=12|pages=1747–1774|doi=10.1177/0010414019852686|s2cid=197832991|issn=0010-4140|url=http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-icfg5bmham6a3}}</ref> and the conditions that make unelected leaders represent the interests of the general public.<ref name=":25">{{Cite journal|last=Tsai|first=Lily|date=2007|title=Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=101|issue=2|pages=355–372|doi=10.1017/S0003055407070153|s2cid=146348780}}</ref><ref name=":27">{{Cite book|title=The Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Democratic Africa|last=Baldwin|first=Kate|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2015}}</ref><ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite book|title=Making autocracy work|last=Besley|first=Timothy J.|date=2007|publisher=Centre for Economic Policy Research|oclc=255778387}}
|2={{Cite journal|last=Baldwin|first=Kate|title=Elected MPs, Traditional Chiefs, and Local Public Goods: Evidence on the Role of Leaders in Co-Production From Rural Zambia|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=52|issue=12|pages=1925–1956|doi=10.1177/0010414018774372|issn=0010-4140|year=2019|s2cid=158062055}}
}}</ref>

=== Political protests ===
Political changes after protests can be the result of the protests ''per se'', or symptoms of shifts in political preferences underneath the observable phenomena of the protests. One study of the [[Tea Party movement]] in the United States has shown that protests ''per se'' have an impact on political change.<ref name="Madestam 1633–1685"/>

Other scholars studied the effect of protests on political changes in developing countries. Mass protests instigated by economic hardship and political repression occurred in 16 [[Sub-Saharan Africa|sub-Saharan]] African countries, and 21 governments in the region implemented significant political reforms, such as the adoption of multi-party elections.<ref name="Bratton 419"/> Authoritarian regimes in Africa distorted the market and reduced the cost of farm produce in favor of urban workers at the cost of rural farmers in the 1980s to prevent urban unrest, which is more visible and easier to mobilize than rural protests.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Bates|first=Robert|title=Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies|publisher=University of California Press|year=1981}}</ref>

=== Selectorates ===
Belsky ''et al.'' point out that whereas, under more democratic governance, accountability is built into the institution of the state by a habit of regular elections, accountability in autocratic regimes<ref name=":28">{{citation|last1=Besley|first1=Timothy J.|last2=Kudamatsu|first2=Masayuki|title=Making Autocracy Work|date=May 2007|series=LSE STICERD Research Paper No. DEDPS48|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3764/1/Making_Autocracy_Work.pdf}}</ref> relies on a selectorate—a group that legitimizes or delegitimizes the autocrat's powers according to [[selectorate theory]]. Selectorates are those on whom a leader depends in order to hold onto power, and those who have the ability to depose a leader.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bueno de Mesquita |first1=Bruce |last2=Morrow |first2=James D. |last3=Siverson |first3=Randolph M. |last4=Smith |first4=Alastair |date=17 September 2002 |title=Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=32 |issue=4 |pages=559–590 |doi=10.1017/s0007123402000236 |doi-broken-date=1 November 2024 |issn=0007-1234 |s2cid=40514840}}</ref> When a selectorate's hold on power is not overly dependent on the leader in office, selectorates can remove poorly performing leaders, and this accountability by selectorates renders it possible for autocracies to perform better for the benefit of all.<ref name=":28" /> Beyond that, institutions{{Specify|reason=what sorts of institutions?|date=July 2023}} can act as credible restraints on autocracy as well.{{How|date=July 2023}}

=== Civil societies ===
In democracies, voluntary associations, interest groups, and associational activity can improve the performance of the government.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite journal|last1=Boix|first1=Carles|last2=Posner|first2=Daniel N.|s2cid=4503343|date=October 1998|title=Social Capital: Explaining Its Origins and Effects on Government Performance|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=28|issue=4|pages=686–693|doi=10.1017/s0007123498000313|issn=0007-1234}}
|2={{Cite journal|last1=EDWARDS|first1=BOB|last2=FOLEY|first2=MICHAEL W.|date=September 1998|title=Civil Society and Social Capital Beyond Putnam|journal=American Behavioral Scientist|volume=42|issue=1|pages=124–139|doi=10.1177/0002764298042001010|s2cid=144681913|issn=0002-7642}}
|3={{Cite book|title=Civil Society: The critical History of an Idea|last=Ehrenberg|first=John|publisher=New York University Press|year=1999}}
|4={{Cite book|title=Making Democracy Work|last1=Putnam|first1=Robert D.|last2=Leonardi|first2=Robert|last3=Nonetti|first3=Raffaella Y.|s2cid=155009926|date=27 May 1994|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-2074-0|doi = 10.2307/j.ctt7s8r7}}
}}</ref> One study showed that civil society organizations such as [[Non-governmental organization|NGOs]] can increase the performance of local government according to the central government's standards by monitoring and disclosing information about local government performance in authoritarian regimes like China.<ref name=":24" /> Solidarity groups in rural China, in which members share moral obligations and interests, can hold local officials accountable as well<ref name=":25" /> when (i) the solidarity group encompasses everyone under the local government's jurisdiction, and (ii) local officials are embedded in the group as members. The social standing and recognition of these groups encourages local officials to perform well, as they value high moral standing in the group.<ref name=":25" />

At the local level, various accountability measures exist that impact the job performance of elected officials.<ref name=":6">{{cite journal|last=Ofosu|first=George Kwaku|date=2 August 2019|title=Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=113|issue=4|pages=963–979|doi=10.1017/s0003055419000479|s2cid=201385531|issn=0003-0554|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101596/1/ofosu_fairelections.pdf}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{cite journal|last=Carreri|first=Maria|s2cid=160023663|date=2018|title=Can Good Politicians Compensate for Bad Institutions? Evidence from an Original Survey of Italian Mayors|journal=SSRN Working Paper Series|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3239492|issn=1556-5068}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{cite journal|last1=Berry|first1=Christopher R.|last2=Howell|first2=William G.|date=August 2007|title=Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=69|issue=3|pages=844–858|doi=10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00579.x|s2cid=42972242|issn=0022-3816}}</ref> In Uganda, civil society organizations (CSOs) that divulge to the public how well an incumbent is performing their job duties, in a district with an upcoming competitive election, increase the performance of the politician for the rest of their term.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Grossman|first1=Guy|last2=Michelitch|first2=Kristin|s2cid=15659219|date=1 February 2018|title=Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections: A Field Experiment in Uganda|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=112|issue=2|pages=280–301|doi=10.1017/s0003055417000648|issn=0003-0554}}</ref> In contrast to these works, a [[meta-analysis]] released in 2019 uncovers no effects from CSO voter information campaigns on political accountability after examining the results from seven trials across six countries.<ref>{{cite book |date=4 July 2019|editor-last=Dunning|editor-first=Thad|editor2-last=Grossman|editor2-first=Guy|editor3-last=Humphreys|editor3-first=Macartan|editor4-last=Hyde|editor4-first=Susan D.|editor5-last=McIntosh|editor5-first=Craig|editor6-last=Nellis|editor6-first=Gareth|title=Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning|doi=10.1017/9781108381390|isbn=9781108381390|s2cid=243627947}}</ref> In Ghana, election-day monitoring of polling centers for district-level positions, as well as an increase in the awareness of monitoring in an upcoming election, increases job performance among incumbents, who spend more of their annual [[Constituency Development Fund]] allocations from the central government on public goods for the electorate.<ref name=":6" /> In locales with weaker institutions, when citizens elect leaders with higher levels of competency, these officials have a greater ability to overcome the barriers of bad informal institutions, and deliver more goods and long-term investment projects for the constituency without needing to raise taxes.<ref name=":7" /> Additionally, many local elections are for positions that involve performing jobs with a single function, such as a school board member or a [[sheriff]]. These elected officials are held accountable to their positions mainly through information provided to the public through the media.<ref name=":8" /> When the media focuses attention on data trends associated with these positions, constituents are then able to use this information to retrospectively vote for or against an incumbent based on their performance in office.<ref name=":8" />

=== Public opinion polls ===
Approval ratings generated through public opinion polling create a measure of job performance during an incumbent's term that has implications for whether the official will retain their seat, or if reelection will even be sought.<ref name=":9">{{cite journal|last=Highton|first=Benjamin|date=May 2008|title=Job Approval and Senate Election Outcomes in the United States|journal=Legislative Studies Quarterly|volume=33|issue=2|pages=245–261|doi=10.3162/036298008784311019|issn=0362-9805}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Adam R.|last2=Jacobson|first2=Gary C.|s2cid=154373150|date=December 2008|title=Party, Performance, and Strategic Politicians: The Dynamics of Elections for Senator and Governor in 2006|journal=State Politics & Policy Quarterly|volume=8|issue=4|pages=384–409|doi=10.1177/153244000800800403|issn=1532-4400}}</ref> These approval ratings predict election outcomes when combined with other factors included in [[Bayesian network|Bayesian]] Model Averaging forecasts.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Erikson|first1=Robert S.|last2=Bafumi|first2=Joseph|last3=Wilson|first3=Bret|date=October 2001|title=Was the 2000 Presidential Election Predictable?|journal=Political Science & Politics|language=en|volume=34|issue=4|pages=815–819|doi=10.1017/S1049096501000750|s2cid=153487954|issn=1049-0965}}</ref> In the United States, senator job approval ratings affect whether a senator will retire, the quality of candidates that seek to challenge them, the amount of money the senator can raise to seek reelection if they decide to run, and the outcome of the election itself.<ref name=":9" /> Strategic incumbent senators will seek reelection less when their approval ratings are low during their time in office.<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":10" />
=== Shared interests ===
Traditional leaders in [[Zambia]] provide local public goods despite the fact that they lack an electoral incentive to do so.<ref name=":27" /> Many customary chiefs never leave the communities they lead and depend on local sources for a significant portion of their income; thus, traditional leaders may facilitate bringing in local public goods and benefit from the community's development over time just like stationary bandits{{definition needed|reason=what are "stationary bandits"??|date=July 2023}} in Olson's argument.{{definition needed|reason=what is "Olson's argument"?|date=July 2023}}<ref name=":26" /><ref name=":27" />

== Accountability and corruption ==
Political corruption refers to "the misuse or the abuse of public office for private gains". Corrupt practices include fraud, appropriation of public funds, and accepting bribes.<ref name=":11">{{cite journal|last1=De Vries|first1=Catherine E.|last2=Solaz|first2=Hector|date=11 May 2017|title=The Electoral Consequences of Corruption|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=20|issue=1|pages=391–408|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-052715-111917| doi-access=free|issn=1094-2939}}</ref><ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite journal|last1=Ferraz|first1=Claudio|last2=Finan|first2=Frederico|date=1 May 2008|title=Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes|url=https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/123/2/703/1930865|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|language=en|volume=123|issue=2|pages=703–745|doi=10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703|citeseerx=10.1.1.222.8752|s2cid=8148400|issn=0033-5533}}
|2={{cite book|title=Helping Countries Combat Corruption. The Role of the World Bank|publisher=World Bank|year=1997}}
}}</ref> Corruption can cause people to negatively evaluate politicians, since citizens may perceive corruption as a signal of poor performance, motivating them to sanction an incumbent.<ref name=":13">{{cite journal|last1=Chong|first1=Alberto|last2=De La O|first2=Ana L.|last3=Karlan|first3=Dean|last4=Wantchekon|first4=Leonard|date=1 January 2015|title=Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=77|issue=1|pages=55–71|doi=10.1086/678766|s2cid=8379010|issn=0022-3816}}</ref> As the model of [[retrospective voting]] suggests that voters incentivize good politicians' behavior by rewarding good performance and punishing bad performance, citizens are expected to sanction corrupt politicians.<ref name=":11" /> However, studies suggest that though voters have a distaste for corruption, they often fail to punish corrupt incumbents; some of them receive benefits from their representatives' corrupt practices, and prefer to retain this type of politician.<ref name=":12">{{cite journal|last1=Klašnja|first1=Marko|last2=Little|first2=Andrew T.|last3=Tucker|first3=Joshua A.|date=July 2018|title=Political Corruption Traps*|journal=Political Science Research and Methods|language=en|volume=6|issue=3|pages=413–428|doi=10.1017/psrm.2016.45|s2cid=155201513|issn=2049-8470}}</ref><ref name=":11" /> In high-corruption contexts, voters may become more tolerant of or even prefer corrupt politicians because others are also perceived as corrupt, leading to a corrupt [[Equilibrium point|equilibrium]] "where voters are generally willing to retain corrupt politicians", referred to as a "political corruption trap".<ref name=":12" /> This high corruption equilibrium is difficult to break due to interaction between corrupt politicians, voters who tolerate and retain corrupt politicians, and potential entrants or challengers who also engage in corrupt practices, leading to the maintenance of corruption.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":14">{{cite book|title=Routledge handbook of comparative political institutions|last1=Gandhi|first1=Jennifer|last2=Ruiz-Rufino|first2=Rubén|year=2015 |isbn=978-1-315-73137-7 |publisher=Routledge |location=Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon|oclc=907374446}}</ref> Economic development is associated with a decrease in corruption.<ref name=":14" /> Freedom of the press contributes to the reduction of corruption by exposing corrupt actions.<ref name=":14" /> Documentation on how a corrupt government (e.g. [[Alberto Fujimori]]'s government from 1998 to 2000 in [[Peru]]) can strategically undermine [[Separation of powers#Checks and balances|checks-and-balances]] institutions, suggests that the news media—i.e. newspapers and mainly television—is crucial to the dissemination of information to the public.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Mcmillan|first1=John|last2=Zoido|first2=Pablo|date=December 2004|title=How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru|journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives|language=en|volume=18|issue=4|pages=69–92|doi=10.1257/0895330042632690|s2cid=219372153|issn=0895-3309|url=https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1173.pdf}}</ref> There is also evidence about the importance of local media, such as local radio stations, in holding corrupt incumbents accountable and in promoting non-corrupt politicians.{{cn|date=July 2023}} Information about corruption may not only lead to vote losses for the incumbent parties, but also for challenging parties, as well the erosion of partisan attachments, which implies that information about corruption also provokes citizens' disengagement from the political process.<ref name=":13" />

Scholarly literature about corruption finds mixed results about the role of political institutions on the level of a country's corruption.<ref name=":14" /> For example, some scholarly research suggests that more horizontal accountability, or oversight across branches of government, would generally decrease corruption.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Kiewiet|first1=D. Roderick|title=The Logic of Delegation|last2=McCubbins|first2=Mathew D.|date=1991-06-18|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-43531-2|language=en}}</ref> However, other research shows that increased oversight could increase corruption when actors in one branch can pressure actors in another to collude; in Ghana, bureaucrats are more likely to engage in corruption on behalf of politicians when politicians have higher levels of discretion to oversee the bureaucracy (e.g., by threatening to transfer noncompliant bureaucrats).<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brierley|first=Sarah|date=2020|title=Unprincipled Principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12495|journal=American Journal of Political Science|language=en|volume=64|issue=2|pages=209–222|doi=10.1111/ajps.12495|s2cid=202313542|issn=1540-5907|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

Low accountability for corruption is difficult to combat, and some anti-corruption activities may also lead to perverse consequences.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Fisman |first1=Raymond |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VXgLDgAAQBAJ&dq=corruption+fisman&pg=PP1 |title=Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know |last2=Golden |first2=Miriam A. |author-link2=Miriam A. Golden |date=2017 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-046397-7 |language=en}}</ref> For example, in places where private sector work pays better than public sector work (e.g., China), highly qualified individuals engaging in public sector work may only find such work attractive because it allows for further compensation through corrupt activities. Government anti-corruption activities can therefore decrease the quality and overall representativeness of the bureaucracy as a result.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jiang|first1=Junyan|last2=Shao|first2=Zijie|last3=Zhang|first3=Zhiyuan|date=n.d.|title=The Price of Probity: Anticorruption and Adverse Selection in the Chinese Bureaucracy|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=52|language=en|pages=41–64|doi=10.1017/S0007123420000393|s2cid=234411216|issn=0007-1234}}</ref> On the other hand, there is evidence that, despite strategic evasion and unintentional consequences, anti-corruption initiatives are beneficial, as they lower malfeasance and increase social welfare, even where strategic evasion is relatively large.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Fisman |first1=Raymond |last2=Golden |first2=Miriam |author-link2=Miriam A. Golden |date=26 May 2017 |title=How to fight corruption |journal=Science |language=en |volume=356 |issue=6340 |pages=803–804 |bibcode=2017Sci...356..803F |doi=10.1126/science.aan0815 |issn=0036-8075 |pmid=28546172 |s2cid=206658780}}</ref>

== Police accountability ==
{{excerpt|Police accountability}}
== Organizational ==
===Ethical===
{{See also|Social accounting|Environmental accounting}}

Within an organization, the principles and practices of ethical accountability aim to improve both the internal standard of individual and group conduct as well as external factors, such as sustainable economic and ecologic strategies. Also, ethical accountability plays an important role in academic fields, such as laboratory experiments and field research. Debates around the practice of ethical accountability on the part of researchers in {{vague|text=the social field|date=July 2023}} – whether professional or others – were explored by Norma R.A. Romm in her work on ''Accountability in Social Research'',<ref name=romm>{{cite book|last=Romm|first=Norma R.A.|title=Accountability in Social Research|year=2001|publisher=Klower Academic|location=New York|isbn=978-0-306-46564-2|url=https://www.springer.com/social+sciences/book/978-0-306-46564-2?detailsPage=reviews}}</ref> and elsewhere.<ref name=truman>{{cite web|last=Truman|first=Carole|title=Review of New Racism: Revisiting Researcher Accountabilities|url=http://www.socresonline.org.uk/16/2/reviews/3.html|publisher=Sociological Research Online|access-date=27 August 2012|year=2010}}</ref> Researcher accountability implies that researchers are cognizant of, and take some responsibility for, the potential impact of their ways of doing research – and of writing it up – on the social fields of which the research is part. Accountability is linked to considering carefully, and being open to challenge in relation to, one's choices concerning how research agendas are framed and the styles in which research results are written.

=== Security ===
{{Anchor|Security accountability}}The traceability of actions performed on a system to a specific system entity (user, process, device) also affects accountability. For example, the use of unique [[user ID|user identification]] and [[password|authentication]] supports accountability, and the use of shared user IDs and passwords degrades accountability.

===Individuals within organizations===
Because many individuals in large organizations contribute in many ways to decisions and policies, it is difficult even in principle to identify who should be accountable for the results. This is what is known, following [[Dennis F. Thompson]], as "the problem of many hands".<ref>{{cite book | last=Thompson | first=Dennis F. | chapter=The Problem of Many Hands| title=Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business and Healthcare | publisher=Cambridge University Press | date=2005 | isbn=978-0-521-54722-2 | pages=33–49}}</ref> It creates a dilemma for accountability. If individuals are held accountable or responsible, individuals who could not have prevented the results are either unfairly punished, or they "take responsibility" in a symbolic ritual without suffering any consequences. If only organizations are held accountable, then all individuals in the organization are equally blameworthy or all are excused.

Various solutions have been proposed. One is to broaden the criteria for individual responsibility so that individuals are held accountable for not anticipating failures in the organization. Another solution, recently proposed by Thompson, is to hold individuals accountable for the design of the organization, both retrospectively and prospectively.<ref>{{cite journal | last=Thompson | first=Dennis F. | title=Responsibility for Failures of Government: The Problem of Many Hands | journal=The American Review of Public Administration | publisher=SAGE Publications | volume=44 | issue=3 | date=9 March 2014 | issn=0275-0740 | doi=10.1177/0275074014524013 | pages=259–273| s2cid=154304430 | url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12172792 | url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Accountability is an element of a [[responsibility assignment matrix]] which indicates who is ultimately answerable for the correct and thorough completion of a deliverable or task, as well as the delegation of the work to those responsible.

===Public and private overlap===
With the increase in public service provided by private entities, especially in Britain and the United States, some have called for increased political accountability mechanisms for otherwise non-political entities. Legal scholar Anne Davies, for instance, argues that the line between public institutions and private entities like corporations is becoming blurred in certain areas of public service in the United Kingdom, and that this can compromise political accountability in those areas. She and others argue that some administrative law reform is necessary to address this accountability gap.{{cn|date=July 2023}}

With respect to the public/private overlap in the United States, public concern over the contracting of government services (including military) and the resulting accountability gap was highlighted following the [[Nisour Square massacre]] perpetrated by the Blackwater security firm in Iraq.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ed_harriman/2007/09/blackwater_poisons_the_well.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080412224819/http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ed_harriman/2007/09/blackwater_poisons_the_well.html|archive-date=2008-04-12 |title=Blackwater poisons the well |publisher=Guardian |date=28 September 2007 |access-date=26 August 2009 | location=London | first=Ed | last=Harriman}}</ref>

== In education ==
As defined by National Council on Measurement in Education (NCME), accountability is "[a] program, often legislated, that attributes the responsibility for student learning to teachers, school administrators, or students. Test results typically are used to judge accountability, and often consequences are imposed for shortcomings."<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ncme.org/ncme/NCME/Resource_Center/Glossary/NCME/Resource_Center/Glossary1.aspx?hkey=4bb87415-44dc-4088-9ed9-e8515326a061#anchorA |title=Glossary of Important Assessment and Measurement Terms |publisher=National Council on Measurement in Education |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170722194028/http://www.ncme.org/ncme/NCME/Resource_Center/Glossary/NCME/Resource_Center/Glossary1.aspx?hkey=4bb87415-44dc-4088-9ed9-e8515326a061#anchorA |archive-date=22 July 2017 |access-date=6 December 2019}}</ref>

Student accountability is traditionally based on school and classroom rules, combined with sanctions for infringement.

In contrast, some educational establishments such as [[Sudbury Valley School|Sudbury schools]] believe that students are personally responsible for their acts, and that traditional schools do not permit students to choose their course of action fully; they do not permit students to embark on the course, once chosen; and they do not permit students to suffer the consequences of the course, once taken. Freedom of choice, freedom of action, freedom to bear the results of action are considered the three great freedoms that constitute personal responsibility. Sudbury schools claim that {{"'}}[[Value (ethics)|Ethics]]' is a course taught by life experience". They adduce that the essential ingredient for acquiring values—and for moral action—is personal responsibility, that schools will become involved in the teaching of morals when they become communities of people who fully respect each other's right to make choices, and that the only way the schools can become meaningful purveyors of ethical values is if they provide students and adults with real-life experiences that are bearers of moral import. Students are given complete responsibility for their own education and the school is run by a [[direct democracy]] in which students and staff are equals.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite book | last=Greenberg | first=Daniel | title=Education in America: A View from Sudbury Valley | chapter='Ethics' is a Course Taught By Life Experience| publisher=The Sudbury Valley School | date=1992 | isbn=978-1-888947-07-6 | pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YQn_BA76TF4C&pg=PA60 60]–62}}
|2={{cite web|last=Greenberg|first=Daniel|year=1987|url=http://www.sudval.com/05_underlyingideas.html#09|title=Back to Basics|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511175026/http://www.sudval.com/05_underlyingideas.html#09 |archive-date=11 May 2011}}
|3={{citation|last=Feldman|first=Jay|year=2001|url=https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED453128|title=The Moral Behavior of Children and Adolescents at a Democratic School}}
|4={{cite book | title=The Crisis in American Education: An Analysis and a Proposal | publisher=The Sudbury Valley School | date=1970 | isbn=978-1-888947-05-2 |chapter=Law and Order: Foundations of Discipline| pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MAqxzEss8k4C&pg=PA49 49]–55}}
|5={{cite book | last=Greenberg | first=Daniel | title=Education in America: A View from Sudbury Valley | publisher=The Sudbury Valley School | date=1992 | isbn=978-1-888947-07-6 | chapter=Democracy Must be Experienced to be Learned | pages=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YQn_BA76TF4C&pg=PA103 103]–107}}
|6={{cite journal|last=Reiss|first=Steven|year=2010|journal=Psychology Today|title=Whatever Happened to Personal Responsibility?}}
}}</ref>

==Media and accountability==

Econometric research has found that [[v:Media and corruption#Better media means less corruption|countries with greater press freedom tend to have less corruption.]]<ref>{{citation | last1 = Brunetti | first1 = Aymo | last2 = Weder | first2 = Beatrice
| author2-link = w:Beatrice Weder di Mauro | year = 2003
| title = A free press is bad news for corruption
| journal = Journal of Public Economics | volume = 87
| issue = 7–8 | pages = 1801–1824 | doi=10.1016/s0047-2727(01)00186-4}}</ref> Greater political accountability and lower corruption were more likely where newspaper consumption was higher, according to data from roughly 100 countries and from different states in the US.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{citation | last1 = Adserà | first1 = Alícia
| last2 = Boix | first2 = Carles | author2-link = Carles Boix
| last3 = Payne | first3 = Mark | year = 2000
| title = Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government
| work = Working Paper | issue = 438
| publisher = Inter-American Development Bank Research Department
| url = http://www.princeton.edu/~cboix/JLEO-paper.pdf
| access-date = 17 August 2014}}
|2={{citation | last1 = Adserà | first1 = Alícia
| last2 = Boix | first2 = Carles | author2-link = Carles Boix
| last3 = Payne | first3 = Mark | year = 2003
| title = Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government
| journal = Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization | volume = 19
| issue = 2
| pages = 445–490
| url = http://www.princeton.edu/~cboix/JLEO-paper.pdf
| access-date = 31 August 2014 | doi=10.1093/jleo/19.2.445| hdl = 10419/87999
| hdl-access = free}}
}}</ref> Congressmen{{Where|date=July 2023}} who receive less press coverage are less likely to produce a positive impact for their constituencies, are less likely to {{clarify|text=stand witness before|reason=Don't members of Congress usually preside over such hearings rather than appear as witnesses before them?|date=July 2023}} congressional hearings, and federal spending for their district is lower.<ref name="Snyder 2010 355–408">{{citation | last1 = Snyder | first1 = James M.
| last2 = Strömberg | first2 = David | year = 2010
| title = Press Coverage and Political Accountability
| journal = [[Journal of Political Economy]]
| volume=118 |issue=2 |pages=355–408 |doi=10.1086/652903
| citeseerx = 10.1.1.210.8371
| s2cid = 154635874
}}</ref> One explanation for the positive impact of media on accountability stems from Besley and Burgess' work.<ref name="Besley 2001 629–640">{{citation | last1 = Besley | first1 = Timothy
| last2 = Burgess | first2 = Robin | year = 2001
| title = Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media
| journal = [[European Economic Review]]
| volume=45 |issue = 4–6 |pages=629–640 |doi=10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00133-7
}}</ref> They argue that media resolves the information asymmetries between citizens and government and provides a way of overcoming obstacles preventing political action.<ref name="Besley 2001 629–640" /> When elected officials and the public gain information, the public is better equipped to hold politicians accountable and politicians are more responsive.<ref>{{citation | last1 = Barbera | first1 = Pablo| last2 = Casas | first2 = Andreu | last3 = Nagler | first3 = Jonathan | last4 = Egan | first4 = Patrick | last5 = Bonneau | first5 = Richard | last6 = Jost | first6 = John | last7 = Tucker | first7 = Joshua | year = 2019
| title = Who Leads? Who Follows? Measuring Issue Attention and Agenda Setting by Legislators and the Mass Public Using Social Media Data
| journal = [[American Political Science Review]]
| volume=113 |issue = 4 |pages=883–901 |doi=10.1017/S0003055419000352
| pmid = 33303996| pmc = 7672368| doi-access = free }}</ref><ref name="Snyder 2010 355–408" /> Ferraz & Finan demonstrate this in the Brazilian context. In their work, they find releasing audit reports prior to elections creates a more informed electorate which holds incumbent officials accountable.<ref name="Ferraz 2008 703–745">{{citation | last1 = Ferraz | first1 = Claudio
| last2 = Finan | first2 = Frederico| year = 2008
| title = Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes
| journal = [[Quarterly Journal of Economics]]
| volume=123 |issue=2 |pages=703–745 |doi=10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703
| s2cid = 8148400
}}</ref>

While evidence supports the positive impact of press freedom on political accountability, other work highlights the significance of factors such as media concentration and ownership as government tools for influencing or controlling news content.<ref>{{citation | last1 = Besley | first1 = Timothy
| last2 = Prat | first2 = Andrea| year = 2006
| title = Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability
| journal = [[American Economic Review]]
| volume=96 |issue=3 |pages=720–736 |doi=10.1257/aer.96.3.720
| s2cid = 13849989
| url = http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3767/1/Handcuffs_for_the_Grabbing_Hand_Media_Capture_and_Government_Accountability.pdf
}}</ref> Non-democratic regimes use media for a variety of purposes such as – (i) to enhance regime resilience, (ii) censor, or (iii) strategically distract the public.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{citation | last1 = Munger | first1 = Kevin
| last2 = Bonneau | first2 = Richard | last3 = Nagler | first3 = Jonathan | last4 = Tucker | first4 = Joshua | year = 2019
| title = Elites Tweet to Get Feet Off the Streets: Measuring Regime Social Media Strategies During Protest
| journal = Political Science Research and Methods
| volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=815–834 |doi=10.1017/psrm.2018.3
| doi-access = free }}
|2={{citation | last1 = King | first1 = Gary
| last2 = Pan | first2 = Jennifer | last3 = Roberts | first3 = Margaret | year = 2013
| title = How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression
| journal = [[American Political Science Review]]
| volume=107 |issue=2 |pages=326–343 |doi=10.1017/S0003055413000014
| s2cid = 53577293
| url = http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11878767| url-access = subscription }}
|3={{citation | last1 = King | first1 = Gary
| last2 = Pan | first2 = Jennifer | last3 = Roberts | first3 = Margaret | year = 2013
| title = How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument 
| journal = [[American Political Science Review]]
| volume=111 |issue=3 |pages=484–501 |doi=10.1017/S0003055417000144
| doi-access = free}}
}}</ref> Control of the media may also be especially beneficial to incumbents in new or developing democracies, who consider media control a spoil of office.<ref>{{citation | last1 = Boas | first1 = Taylor
| last2 = Hidalgo | first2 = F. Daniel | year = 2011
| title = Controlling the Airwaves: Incumbency Advantage and Community Radio in Brazil
| journal = [[American Journal of Political Science]]
| volume=55 |issue=4 |pages=869–885 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00532.x}}</ref>

An analysis of the evolution of mass media in the U.S. and Europe since World War II noted mixed results from the growth of the Internet: "The digital revolution has been good for freedom of expression [and] information [but] has had mixed effects on freedom of the press": It has disrupted traditional sources of funding, and new forms of Internet journalism have replaced only a tiny fraction of what's been lost.<ref name=Starr>{{citation | last = Starr| first = Paul
| year = 2012 | title = An Unexpected Crisis: The News Media in Post-industrial Democracies
| journal = International Journal of Press/Politics | volume = 17 | issue = 2
| pages = 234–242
| url = https://www.princeton.edu/~starr/articles/articles11/Starr_UnexpectedCrisis_2011.PDF
| access-date = 31 August 2014
| quote = Since 2000, the newspaper industry alone has lost an estimated “$1.6 billion in annual reporting and editing capacity... or roughly 30 per cent", but the new non-profit money coming into journalism has made up less than one-tenth that amount.| doi = 10.1177/1940161211434422
| s2cid = 146729965
}}</ref> [[Electoral reform in the United States#Citizen funding of news|Various systems have been proposed for increasing the funds available for investigative journalism]] that allow individual citizens to direct small amounts of government funds to news outlets or investigative journalism projects of their choice.

==Standards==
Accountability standards have been established that organizations can voluntarily commit to. Standards apply in particular to the non-profit world and to [[Corporate Social Responsibility]] initiatives. Accountability standards include the:
; [[INGO Accountability Charter]]: signed by a large number of [[NGOs]] to "demonstrate their commitment to accountability and transparency"<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/about-the-charter/ |title=About the Charter |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130517195312/http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/about-the-charter/ |archive-date=17 May 2013  |access-date=6 December 2019}}</ref>
; AccountAbility's AA1000 series: "principles-based standards to help organisations become more accountable, responsible and sustainable. They address issues affecting governance, business models and organizational strategy, as well as providing operational guidance on sustainability assurance and stakeholder engagement"<ref>Website: {{cite web |url=http://www.accountability.org/standards/index.html |title=AccountAbility {{!}} Setting the Standard for Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development – Standards |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130908225546/http://www.accountability.org/standards/index.html |archive-date=8 September 2013  |access-date=6 December 2019}}</ref>
; Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 2010 standards: for humanitarian organizations to help them "design, implement, assess, improve and recognize accountable programmes"<ref>Webpage: {{cite web |url=http://www.hapinternational.org/projects/standard/hap-2010-standard.aspx |title=HAP International RSS feed |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130703175310/http://www.hapinternational.org/projects/standard/hap-2010-standard.aspx |archive-date=3 July 2013 |access-date=28 July 2013}}</ref>
In addition, some non-profit organizations set up their own commitments to accountability:
; Accountability, Learning and Planning System (ALPS) by [[ActionAid]]: a framework that sets out key accountability requirements, guidelines, and processes<ref>ActionAid (2005). ''ALPS - Accountability, Learning, and Planning System''</ref>

==See also==
{{columns-list|
* {{annotated link|[[Accountability partner]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Accountability software]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Accountability for reasonableness]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Campaign finance reform in the United States]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Committee on Standards in Public Life]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Euthenics]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Exit, Voice, and Loyalty]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Model]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Freedom of information laws by country]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Good governance]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Government Accountability Office]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Moral responsibility]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[One World Trust]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Open government]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Right to be forgotten]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Security sector governance and reform]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Special district (United States)]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Supreme audit institution]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Transparency International]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[Worldwide Governance Indicators]]}}
* {{annotated link|[[World Bank's Inspection Panel]]}}
}}

==Footnotes==
{{reflist}}

==Further reading==
* {{cite book|last=Bovens|first=Mark|author-link=Mark Bovens|title=The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organisations|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1998}}
* {{cite journal|last=Bovens|first=Mark|author-link=Mark Bovens|title=Two concepts of accountability: accountability as a virtue and as a mechanism|journal=West European Politics|volume=33|year=2010|issue=5 |pages=946–967|doi=10.1080/01402382.2010.486119 |hdl=1874/204069 |s2cid=154886643 |hdl-access=free}}
* {{cite book|first=Sterling|last=Harwood|chapter=Accountability|editor-first=John K.|editor-last=Roth|title=Ethics: Ready Reference|publisher=Salem Press|year=1994}}
* {{cite journal|first1=David|last1=Luban|first2=Alan|last2=Strudler|first3=David|last3=Wasserman|title=Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy|journal=Michigan Law Review|volume=90|year=1992|issue=8 |pages=2348–2392|doi=10.2307/1289575 |jstor=1289575 |url=https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2350&context=mlr |url-access=subscription}}
* {{cite book|last=Mastop|first=Rosja|chapter=Characterising Responsibility in Organisational Structures: The Problem of Many Hands|title=Deontic Logic in Computer Science|editor-first1=G.|editor-last1=Governatori|editor-first2=G.|editor-last2=Sartor|location=Berlin|publisher=Springer-Verlag|year=2010|pages=274–287|isbn=978-3-540-70524-6}}
* {{cite journal | last1=Painter-Morland | first1=Mollie | last2=Deslandes | first2=Ghislain | title=Authentic leading as relational accountability: Facing up to the conflicting expectations of media leaders | journal=Leadership | publisher=SAGE Publications | volume=13 | issue=4 | date=2 April 2015 | issn=1742-7150 | doi=10.1177/1742715015578307 | pages=424–444| s2cid=2430595 | url=http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/27268/2/5038_Painter-Morland%20%281%29.pdf }}
* {{cite book | last=Romm | first=Norma R.A. | title=Accountability in Social Research | publisher=Springer Science & Business Media | date=2001-05-31 | isbn=978-0-306-46564-2}}
* {{cite book | last=Thompson | first=Dennis F. |chapter=The Responsibility of Advisers| title=Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business, and Healthcare | publisher=Cambridge University Press | publication-place=New York | year=2005 | pages=33–49| isbn=978-0-521-54722-2}}
* {{cite journal|last=Thompson|first=Dennis F.|title=Responsibility for Failures of Government: The Problem of Many Hands|journal=American Review of Public Administration|volume=44|number=3|year=2014|pages=259–273|doi=10.1177/0275074014524013 |s2cid=154304430 |url=http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12172792 |url-access=subscription}}
* {{cite book|last=Williams|first=Christopher|year=2006|title=Leadership accountability in a globalizing world|location=London|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan}}

==External links==
{{Wiktionary|accountability}}
{{Wikiquote}}
*{{Commons category-inline}}
*[http://www.accountabilitycircle.org Citizens' Circle for Accountability]

{{Euthenics}}
{{Social accountability}}
{{Virtues}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Accountability| ]]
[[Category:Democracy]]
[[Category:Euthenics]]
[[Category:Evaluation]]
[[Category:Issues in ethics]]
[[Category:Political corruption]]
[[Category:Social concepts]]