View source for 1992 Consensus

{{Short description|Notion in the relations across the Strait of Taiwan}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=May 2024}}
{{Infobox Chinese
|t= 九二共識|s= 九二共识
|l= Nine-Two Consensus
|p= Jiǔ-Èr Gòngshí (in [[China]])<br />Jiǔ-Èr Gòngshì (in [[Taiwan]])
|w= Chiu³-Êrh⁴ Kong⁴-shih² (in [[China]])<br />Chiu³-Êrh⁴ Kong⁴-shih⁴ (in [[Taiwan]])
|j= gau2 ji6 gung6 sik1
|poj= Kiú-jī Kiōng-sek}}
The '''1992 Consensus''' is a political term referring to the alleged outcome of a meeting in 1992 between the semi-official representatives of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP)-led [[China|People's Republic of China]] (PRC) in [[mainland China]] and the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT)-led [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] (ROC) on [[Taiwan (island)|Taiwan]].  The consensus is often credited with establishing a diplomatic foundation for semi-official cross-strait exchanges beginning in the early 1990s and is a precondition set by the PRC for engaging in cross-strait dialogue.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Grossman |first1=Derek |title=Is the '1992 Consensus' Fading Away in the Taiwan Strait? |url=https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/is-the-1992-consensus-fading-away-in-the-taiwan-strait.html |website=[[RAND Corporation]] |date=3 June 2020 |access-date=10 March 2021}}</ref><ref name="rand2020">{{cite web |last1=Derek |first1=Grossman |last2=Millan |first2=Brandon Alexander |title=Taiwan's KMT May Have a Serious '1992 Consensus' Problem |url=https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/09/taiwans-kmt-may-have-a-serious-1992-consensus-problem.html |website=[[Rand Corporation]] |date=25 September 2020 |access-date=11 March 2021}}</ref>

Whether the meetings truly resulted in a consensus is disputed within the ROC. The KMT understanding of the consensus is "one China, different interpretations" (一中各表, 一個中國各自表述), i.e. that the ROC and PRC "agree" that there is [[One China]], but [[Policy of deliberate ambiguity|disagree]] about what "China" means (i.e. ROC vs. PRC).  The PRC's position is that there is one China (including Taiwan), of which PRC is the sole [[Two Chinas|legitimate representative of China]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.storm.mg/article/301816|title=新華社發佈報導禁用詞：「中華民國、臺灣政府」通通不准用，「九二共識」不可提「一中各表」|trans-title=Xinhua News Agency publishes report on banned terms: "Republic of China", "Taiwan government" are both not allowed to be used. The "1992 consensus" cannot mention "One China, Separate Interpretation".|language=zh|date=2017-07-20|access-date=2018-05-14}}</ref> This discrepancy has been criticized by Taiwan's [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP) who has been the ruling party since 2016. The DPP has never acknowledged the meetings achieved "consensus,"<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Chen |first1=Yu-Jie |last2=Cohen |first2=Jerome A. |title=China-Taiwan relations re-examined: the "1992 consensus" and Cross-Strait agreement |url=https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=alr |journal=Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository |publisher=[[University of Pennsylvania Law School]] |date=2019 |access-date=20 July 2024|quote= Unlike her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen has not recognized the existence of the “1992 Consensus.” Yet, she has tried to reach a middle ground between Beijing’s stance and that of her own party, the DPP. In her inaugural speech, she carefully worded her position, acknowledging the first meeting between [[Straits Exchange Foundation|SEF]] and [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits|ARATS]] in 1992 as “historical fact.” She stated that the meeting had “arrived at various joint acknowledgments and understandings” and was conducted “in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences,” a phrase often used by Beijing... In other words, while Tsai did not accept the “1992 Consensus,” she acknowledged that the 1992 meeting took place in a positive spirit that should lay the groundwork for sustaining crossstrait peace.<br> ...Under international law, the 1992 SEF-ARATS exchanges would not amount to a legally binding agreement on the meaning of “One China” and other sovereignty questions. While SEF and ARATS apparently possessed the capacity to represent their own governments in concluding agreements on cross-strait cooperation, the intention of each organization was to sign legal instruments recording their agreement on the specific matters under negotiation... The parties never evinced an intention to conclude an agreement on sovereignty matters involving the notion of “One China” precisely because they could not reach agreement on the thorny issues involved. Instead, they bypassed the “One China” issues and went on to conclude formal written agreements on technical matters. In other words, the element of intent to create legal obligations on sovereignty questions did not exist. This is evident from the caution of SEF—it carefully avoided committing itself to a written agreement with regard to the all-important political issue and suggested that each side orally state its differing position separately. This poses a contrast with the formal agreements later concluded by the two organizations on various economic and technical matters. None of these cross-strait agreements touched upon the “One China” issue, and all were concluded without regard to it. }}</ref> and also rejects any claim that both sides of the [[Taiwan Strait]] are "One China."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&sms=BF821F021B282251&s=DC2AE73162A42D37|title=The DPP Administration's Logic and Policy on China|publisher=[[Mainland Affairs Council]]|access-date=10 December 2022|archive-date=10 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210113902/https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=BEC36A4A0BB0663C&sms=BF821F021B282251&s=DC2AE73162A42D37|url-status=live}}</ref> 

Despite political divisions in Taiwan, the [[Constitution of the Republic of China]] still reflects the original Kuomintang-era position that both Taiwan and mainland China are part of one China under the ROC. This constitutional framework has not been formally amended and stands in contrast to the Democratic Progressive Party’s Taiwan-centered policy, which regards Taiwan and the mainland as separate entities.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-06 |title=Talking Points: What Does ROC Law Say About Taiwan? |url=https://usali.org/publications/talking-points-what-does-roc-law-say-about-taiwan-wk6w8 |access-date=2025-06-15 |website=U.S.-Asia Law Institute |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=MacLeod |first=Andrew |date=2022-07-12 |title=When people say the West should support Taiwan, what exactly do they mean? |url=http://theconversation.com/when-people-say-the-west-should-support-taiwan-what-exactly-do-they-mean-186744 |access-date=2025-06-15 |website=The Conversation |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Taiwanese Presidents Will Not and Can Not Unilaterally Change Taiwan’s Status |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/taiwanese-presidents-will-not-and-can-not-unilaterally-change-taiwans-status/ |access-date=2025-06-15 |website=thediplomat.com |language=en-US}}</ref>

Critics argue that the term “1992 Consensus” was not actually used at the time of the 1992 meeting. Instead, it was coined later, in April 2000 by [[Su Chi]], a former [[National Security Council (Republic of China)|National Security Council]] secretary-general - eight years after the meeting took place.<ref>{{cite news |last=Wang |first=Chris |title=Tsai details DPP's cross-strait policies |work=Taipei Times |page=1 |date=2011-08-24 |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/08/24/2003511508}}</ref> Former [[President of the Republic of China|President of ROC]] [[Lee Teng-hui]], a Kuomintang (KMT) leader during his 1988–2000 term, expressed skepticism about the 1992 Consensus in 2006.<ref name="Shih Hsiu-chuan 2006-02-22">{{cite news |author=Shih Hsiu-chuan |title=Su Chi admits the '1992 consensus' was made up |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106 |date=February 22, 2006 |newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] |access-date=Jun 10, 2017}}</ref> Later, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President [[Tsai Ing-wen]], who served from 2016 to 2024, criticized the consensus in a January 2019 speech, associating it with the PRC’s "[[one country, two systems]]" framework.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Feng |first1=John |title=Taiwan's Pro-China Opposition Suffers Identity Crisis as Chief Admits Beijing Threat |url=https://www.newsweek.com/taiwans-pro-china-opposition-suffers-identity-crisis-chief-admits-beijing-threat-1575078 |access-date=10 March 2021 |work=[[Newsweek]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Highlights of Xi's speech at Taiwan message anniversary event |url=https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/02/WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069_1.html |access-date=10 March 2021 |work=[[China Daily]]}}</ref>

== History ==
On 1 August 1992, the ROC's [[National Unification Council]] passed the "Definition of One China Resolution," stating: "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different ... Our side believes that one China should mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China."<ref name=":Chen">{{Cite book |last=Chen |first=Dean P. |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |chapter=Xi Jinping and the Derailment of the KMT-CCP "1992 Consensus" |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|page=229}} This resolution provided the basis for a series of talks between the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait]] (ARATS) of the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC) and the [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] (SEF) of the [[Republic of China]] (ROC).<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=229}}

=== 1992 ARATS-SEF meeting and Wang-Koo summits ===

In November 1992, a meeting between ARATS and SEF occurred in [[British Hong Kong]]. On 1 November 1992, SEF issued a press release stating that "each side expresses its own interpretation verbally in order to solve this sticky problem of [One China] and thereby reaffirmed the August 1st NUC resolution as SEF's interpretation of One China."<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=229}}

ARATS telephoned SEF and stated that it "fully respected and accepted" Taipei's proposal to use verbal declarations for each side's position on this issue.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=229}} On 16 November, ARATS sent a letter to SEF formally confirming that position and stating, "both sides of the strait uphold the principle of one China, and actively seek national unification, but the political interpretation of the one China will not be referred to in the cross-strait negotiations on functional issues."<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|pages=229–230}}

The conclusion they reached was intended as a means of side-stepping the conflict over the [[political status of Taiwan]].{{citation needed|date=March 2021}} At the time of the meeting, Hong Kong was under [[History of Colonial Hong Kong (1800s–1930s)|British rule]] and therefore considered neutral territory by both sides.{{Citation needed|date=April 2021}} In the KMT's view, the consensus is about "one China, respective interpretations."<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=230}}

As a result of the 1992 meeting, ARATS Chairman [[Wang Daohan]] and SEF Chairman [[Koo Chen-fu]] met in [[Singapore]] on April 27, 1993, in what became known as the [[Wang-Koo summit]]. They concluded agreements on document authentication, postal transfers, and a schedule for future ARATS-SEF meetings.  Talks were delayed as tensions rose in the [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]], but in October 1998 a second round of Wang-Koo summit were held in [[Shanghai]]. Wang and Koo agreed to meet again in Taiwan in the autumn of 1999, but the meeting was called off by the PRC side when then President [[Lee Teng-hui]] proposed his [[Special state-to-state relations|Two-states Theory]] of "special state-to-state relations".<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=230}}

After Lee began a more independence-oriented policy in the mid-1990s, the PRC began describing "one China, respective interpretations" as a "deliberate distortion" used by independence advocates as a "disguise" for either "two Chinas" or Taiwan's formal separation.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=230}}

=== Chen Shui-bian and Hu Jintao era===

The leader of the liberal Democratic Development Party (DPP), [[Chen Shui-bian]] made his famous [[Four Noes and One Without]] proposal during his campaign in the presidential election in 2000. The proposal did not directly include the 1992 Consensus, but showed an intention to maintain the ambiguous status quo, which reflected largely the idea of the Consensus. The election ended with the first president-elected from the opposition party, and led to a shift of foreign policy. Chen's victory in 2000 prompted former SEF official [[Su Chi]] to coin the term "1992 Consensus" in order to capture the broadest consensus between different parties in Taiwan over the outcome of the 1992 meeting.<ref name="Shih Hsiu-chuan 2006-02-22" /> President [[Chen Shui-bian]] initially expressed some willingness to accept the 1992 Consensus, a precondition set by the PRC for dialogue, but backed down after backlash within his own party.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Cheng |first1=Allen T. |title=Did He Say 'One China'? |url=http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0714/nat.taiwan.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210730221230/http://edition.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0714/nat.taiwan.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=30 July 2021 |access-date=11 March 2021 |work=[[Asiaweek]]}}</ref>

During his presidency, Chen made different statements about the ambiguous status quo and his policy towards PRC, but the government of PRC generally didn't echo any of his speech. Despite the frozen atmosphere between the governments from the two sides of the strait, business and economic interactions thrived in Chen's presidency.

In 2005, the 1992 Consensus was invoked by the opposition parties who controlled the parliament. [[Lien Chan]], the chairman of the largest opposition party KMT and [[James Soong]], chairman of another opposition party People First Party (PFP), made [[2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China|separate trips to mainland China]] to conduct their party-to-party dialog separately with the ruling [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) across the strait. Both leaders explicitly endorsed the 1992 Consensus. However, no relevant legislation was made in the parliament for the result of the dialogues.{{citation needed|date=March 2021}}

=== Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao era===

The election of Ma Ying-jeou to the presidential office and the victory of KMT in the parliament election saw both sides of the Taiwan strait moving closer. In his inauguration speech on 20 May 2008, Ma stated that both sides of the strait reached a consensus in 1992, which saw "one China with different interpretations" and the ROC would resume talks with the PRC as soon as possible based on the 1992 Consensus.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.bcc.com.tw/bcc_event/520/520.htm |script-title=zh:中華民國第12任總統就職演說全文 |publisher=Broadcasting Corporation of China |language=zh |date=2008-05-20 |access-date=2008-05-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090330130153/http://www.bcc.com.tw/bcc_event/520/520.htm |archive-date=2009-03-30 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

In 2008, CCP invited the chairman of KMT, [[Wu Po-hsiung]], to engage in an intraparty dialog in Beijing where Wu met the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]], [[Hu Jintao]] on 28 May. After the meeting, the state news agency [[Xinhua News Agency|Xinhua]] reported that participants in the meeting declared that both sides across the strait will lay aside disputes, and work for a win-win situation on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/29/content_8279828.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090330142746/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/29/content_8279828.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 30, 2009 |title=KMT chairman appeals for more cross-Strait economic, cultural exchanges| publisher = Xinhua News Agency | date = 2008-05-29 | access-date=2008-05-30}}</ref> The semi-governmental dialog between the SEF from Taiwan and the ARATS from China was scheduled to re-open on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in June. The first priority for the SEF-ARATS meeting was the establishments of the [[three links]], especially direct flights between mainland China and Taiwan. On 4 July 2008, [[Cross-strait charter|Weekend direct chartered flights]] between mainland China and Taiwan commenced subsequent to the semi-official talk in Beijing.

In an interview by the Mexico-based newspaper ''[[El Sol de México]]'' on 2 September 2008, Ma was asked about his views on the subject of "[[two Chinas]]" and if there is a solution for the sovereignty issues between the two. The ROC President replied that the relations are not between two sovereign states, not between "two Chinas". "It is a [[Special non-state-to-state relations|special relationship]]", he said. Ma also stated that the sovereignty issues between the two cannot be resolved at present, and then quoted the 1992 Consensus, as a temporary measure until a solution becomes available.<ref>{{cite news|title=Taiwan and China in "special relations": Ma |publisher=China Post |date=2008-09-04 |url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm |access-date=4 September 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080906092524/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm |archive-date=6 September 2008 |url-status=live }}</ref> The spokesman for the ROC Presidential Office [[Wang Yu-chi]] later clarified the President's statement and said that the relations are between two regions of one country, based on the context of ROC Constitution, the [[Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area]] and the 1992 Consensus.<ref>{{cite news|title=Presidential Office defends Ma |work=Taipei Times |date=2008-09-05 |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/09/05/2003422339 |access-date=24 September 2008  |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080911200500/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/09/05/2003422339 |archive-date=11 September 2008 |url-status=live }}</ref>

CCP and its leader Hu didn't evaluate any new meaning of the Consensus from the other side of the strait. A phone call between the heads of state of China and [[United States of America|United States]], the most important ally of Taiwan, occurred in 2008. The English website of Xinhua reported that [[Hu Jintao]] told President [[George W. Bush]] that it is PRC's "consistent stand that the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, which sees both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition".<ref name=ft20080403>{{cite news |last=Hille |first=Kathrin |date=3 April 2008 |title=Hopes rise for Taiwan-China dialogue |url=https://www.ft.com/content/2a1e1adc-00c8-11dd-a0c5-000077b07658 |work=Financial Times |archive-date=6 January 2022 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20220106084016/https://www.ft.com/content/2a1e1adc-00c8-11dd-a0c5-000077b07658 |quote=According to a US account of the talks, Mr Hu said: It is China's consistent stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of 'the 1992 consensus', which sees both sides recognise there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition. |access-date=23 January 2022 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=PRCVancouver20080326>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.--> |date=26 March 2008 |title=Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet |url=https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cgvan//eng/news/t418638.htm |publisher=Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China in Vancouver}}</ref><ref name=bw20080327>{{Cite web |url=http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20080327005800/en/CORRECTED-Press-Briefing-National-Security-Advisor-Stephen#.VUoRqtNViko |title=Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on the President's Trip to the NATO Summit |publisher=White House Press Office |agency=Business Wire |archive-date=2015-09-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150930143911/http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20080327005800/en/CORRECTED-Press-Briefing-National-Security-Advisor-Stephen#.VUoRqtNViko |url-status=dead |quote=He said that it is China's consistent stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of the 1992 consensus, which sees both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definitions.}}</ref> The Chinese version of the same agency only mentioned that the resumption of the talks should be on the basis of the 1992 Consensus without expanding into the meaning of the Consensus.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-03/26/content_7865604.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080401223404/http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-03/26/content_7865604.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=April 1, 2008 |script-title=zh:胡锦涛:在"九二共识"基础上恢复两岸协商谈判|language = zh | publisher = Xinhua News Agency | date = 2008-03-27 | access-date=2008-05-30}}</ref> On 12 January 2011, Xinhua reiterated Beijing's position on this issue by saying that "under which both sides adhere to the One-China Principle", which is a highlight of the first half of the Consensus.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-01/12/c_13687724.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121107083009/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-01/12/c_13687724.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=November 7, 2012 |title=Chinese spokeswoman stresses importance of '1992 consensus' to improving cross-Strait relations |publisher=News.xinhuanet.com |date=2011-01-12 |access-date=2011-09-11}}</ref>

During the [[Ma-Xi meeting|cross-strait summit]] in 2015, the Consensus was stressed by both Ma and [[Xi Jinping]], the successor of Hu Jintao.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Bush |first1=RIchard C. |title=What the historic Ma-Xi meeting could mean for cross-Strait relations |url=https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/11/09/what-the-historic-ma-xi-meeting-could-mean-for-cross-strait-relations/ |access-date=10 March 2021 |work=[[Brookings Institution]]}}</ref>  During the meetings, Ma brought up the second half of the Consensus "different interpretations of one China" in front of the leader of China, but Xi made no remarkable response.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Hsu |first1=Stacy |title=MAC releases Ma-Xi meeting transcript |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/11/10/2003632096 |access-date=10 March 2021 |work=[[Taipei Times]]}}</ref>

=== Tsai Ing-wen and Xi Jinping era ===

In her 2016 campaign, [[Tsai Ing-wen]] did not challenge the 1992 consensus, but did not explicitly accept it either, referring instead to "existing realities and political foundations".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Romberg |first1=Alan D. |url=https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/clm49ar.pdf |title=The "1992 Consensus"—Adapting to the Future? |website=[[Hoover Institution]] |access-date=10 March 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Tsai's inauguration speech 'incomplete test paper': Beijing |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/05/21/2003646796 |website=[[Taipei Times]] |date=21 May 2016 |access-date=10 March 2021}}</ref>

After Tsai's victory in the presidential election of Taiwan, [[Chinese Communist Party]] [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|general secretary]] Xi Jinping stated on 12 March 2016, that the 1992 Consensus was "the greatest common denominator and political bottom line for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations".<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |author-link=Suisheng Zhao |title=The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781032861661 |editor-last=Zhao |editor-first=Suisheng |editor-link=Suisheng Zhao |location=London and New York |pages= |chapter=Is Beijing's Long Game on Taiwan about to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinksmanship, and Military Takeover |doi=10.4324/9781003521709}}</ref>{{Rp|page=13}}

On 2 January 2019, Xi Jinping marked the 40th Anniversary message to Taiwan compatriots with a long speech calling for the adherence to the 1992 Consensus and vigorously opposing Taiwanese independence.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/07/8-key-things-to-notice-from-xi-jinpings-new-year-speech-on-taiwan/|title=8 key things to notice from Xi Jinping's New Year speech on Taiwan|last=Bush|first=Richard C.|date=2019-01-07|website=Brookings|language=en-US|access-date=2019-01-09}}</ref> He said the political resolution of the Taiwan issue will be the formula used in Hong Kong and Macau, the one country, two systems.<ref name=":0" /> The ROC President, [[Tsai Ing-wen]] responded to Xi's speech the same day. She stated that "the Beijing authorities' definition of the '1992 Consensus' is 'one China' and 'one country, two systems'", and that "we have never accepted the '1992 Consensus.'"<ref>{{cite news|title= President Tsai issues statement on China's President Xi's "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan"|date=2018-01-02|url=https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621}}</ref> Tsai later called for the PRC to conduct negotiations with the Taiwanese government to resolve the political status of Taiwan rather than engage in political consultations with individual Taiwanese political parties to advance their reunification goals.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2180830/taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen-open-cross-strait-talks-has-some|title=Taiwan's president open to cross-strait talks, but has some demands|date=2019-01-05|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|access-date=2019-01-09|author-last1=Chung|author-first1=Lawrence}}</ref> A January 2020 piece in ''[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]'' noted that the CCP, KMT, and DPP were all currently challenging their own conceptions of the 1992 consensus.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Liu |first1=Zihao |title=Is This the End of the 1992 Consensus? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/is-this-the-end-of-the-1992-consensus-2/ |website=thediplomat.com |publisher=The Diplomat |access-date=31 January 2020}}</ref> A task force convened by the Kuomintang's reform committee issued new guidelines on cross-strait relations in June 2020. The task force found that public trust in the consensus had declined due to the actions of Beijing and DPP. The consensus was described as "a historical description of past cross-strait interaction," and the task force proposed that the consensus be replaced with a commitment to "upholding the Republic of China’s national sovereignty; safeguarding freedom, democracy and human rights; prioritizing the safety of Taiwan; and creating win-win cross-strait relations."<ref>{{cite news |last1=Shih |first1=Hsiao-kuang |last2=Xie |first2=Dennis |title=KMT task force unveils four pillars for stable, peaceful cross-strait relations |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2020/06/20/2003738531 |access-date=20 June 2020 |work=Taipei Times |date=20 June 2020}}</ref>

Following the landslide defeat of the KMT in the [[2020 Taiwanese presidential election]], some commentators speculated that the KMT would remove the 1992 Consensus from the party platform due to its associations with "one country, two systems".<ref name="rand2020" />  However, KMT chairman [[Johnny Chiang]] ultimately kept the 1992 Consensus.  However, he rejected the "one country, two systems" as a feasible model for Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Blanchard |first1=Ben |last2=Lee |first2=Yimou |title=Taiwan opposition chief in no rush for China meeting |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-politics/taiwan-opposition-chief-in-no-rush-for-china-meeting-idUSKCN2AU0IV |access-date=11 March 2021|website=Reuters}}</ref> In 2021, the [[Taiwan Affairs Office]] stated that the meaning of the 1992 consensus is "both sides of the strait belong to one China, and work together to strive for national unification".<ref name="tao2021">{{cite news |title=江啟臣提九二共識立基於憲法 國台辦正告KMT：謀統不能模糊 |url=https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3484715|access-date=2021-03-31 |work=[[Liberty Times]] |date= 2021-03-31|language=zh-hant}}</ref>  The KMT platform under newly elected chairman [[Eric Chu]] also continued to include the 1992 consensus while rejecting "one country, two systems".<ref>{{cite news |last1=Wang |first1=Cheng-chung |last2=Liu |first2=Kuan-ting |last3=Liu |first3=Kay |title=KMT vows to 'defend Taiwan, protect democracy, fight for future' |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202110300015 |access-date=31 October 2021 |work=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)]]}}</ref> In 2022, Chu called the 1992 Consensus a "'no consensus' consensus."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Chin-yeh |first1=Chiang |last2=Pei-ju |first2=Teng |title='1992 consensus' key to KMT's engagement with Beijing: Eric Chu |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202206070019 |website=focustaiwan.tw |date=7 June 2022 |publisher=Focus Taiwan |access-date=22 June 2022}}</ref>

== Ambiguity and debate ==
{{Further|One China|Cross-Strait relations}}
The KMT has defined the 1992 Consensus as "one China with different interpretations", i.e. that both sides agreed that there was only a single China, but indirectly recognized and respected that both sides had different interpretations of that concept.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|pages=229–230}} The ambiguity of the 1992 Consensus allows the PRC to claim that both sides of the strait uphold the integrity of one China. On the other side, the same ambiguity allows the ROC to emphasize that it is the only China to which both the mainland and Taiwan belong.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=230}} This facilitated the development of cross-strait relations in the early 1990s.<ref name=":Chen" />{{Rp|page=230}}

The [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP), however, does not conceive the 1992 meeting as consensus-producing. It argues that the concept of 1992 Consensus strengthens the PRC's claim over the sovereignty of Taiwan and does no better to the security of Taiwan than the situation before the meeting.{{citation needed|date=December 2024}}

Some [[Taiwan independence|pro-independence]] supporters, such as former President Lee Teng-hui, point to a lack of documentation to argue that the consensus has never existed.<ref>[http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news_id=11757 "Lee denies existence of '1992 Consensus,'"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050414181233/http://th.gio.gov.tw/show.cfm?news_id=11757 |date=2005-04-14 }} ''The China Post'',  November 8, 2001</ref>

According to [[Raymond Burghardt]], the chair of the [[American Institute in Taiwan]], the [[United States]] representative office in Taiwan:
:"[There was] some language [in the faxes] that overlapped and some language that differed." Then Taiwan and China agreed to conduct dialog based on their statements written in those faxes. "That's what happened. Nothing more or nothing less," Burghardt said, adding that the KMT called this the '1992 Consensus', which was to some extent "confusing and misleading. To me, I'm not sure why you could call that a consensus."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/28/2003295010|title=AIT pans '1992 consensus\' - Taipei Times|date=February 28, 2006|website=www.taipeitimes.com}}</ref>

== Public opinion in Taiwan ==

In 2018, academics conducted a survey in Taiwan to assess Taiwanese understanding of the 1992 Consensus.  They gave respondents four possible meanings of the consensus:
: ''Historic'': On international affairs, both ROC and PRC claim to represent the whole Chinese people including both mainland and Taiwan.
: ''KMT definition'':  ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, the two governments belong to the same country waiting for unification.
: ''Incorrect'': ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, the two governments belong to two different countries.
: ''PRC definition'': PRC represents the whole Chinese people including both mainland and Taiwan, and ROC is the local government.

They found that 34% chose the KMT's definition (which was acceptable to 48%), 33% chose the incorrect definition (acceptable to 75%), 17% chose the historic relationship (acceptable to 40%), and 5% chose the PRC definition (acceptable to 10%), and 11% did not respond.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wang |first1=Austin |last2=Wu |first2=Charles K.S. |last3=Yeh |first3=Yao-Yuan |last4=Chen |first4=Fang-Yu |title=What Does the 1992 Consensus Mean to Citizens in Taiwan? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/what-does-the-1992-consensus-mean-to-citizens-in-taiwan/ |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |access-date=10 March 2021}}</ref><ref name="auto">{{cite journal |last1=Wang |first1=Horng-En |last2=Yeh |first2=Yao-Yuan |last3=Wu |first3=Charles K. S. |last4=Chen |first4=Fang-Yu |title=The non-consensus 1992 consensus |journal=Asian Politics & Policy |date=4 April 2021 |volume=13 |issue=2 |pages=212–227 |doi=10.1111/aspp.12576|s2cid=233561191 }}</ref>

A 2020 poll conducted by the Duke University Program in Asian Security Studies that asked "Some people argue that Taiwan and China should live under a policy of “One China, Two Rule” with ongoing exchanges. Do you support this statement?" found that 51.0% of respondents agreed and 39.5% of respondents disagreed.<ref name="auto"/>

==See also==
{{Portal|China|Taiwan}}
* [[Taiwan consensus]]
* [[Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area]]
*[[Mutual non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of authority to govern]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

{{Cross-Strait relations}}

[[Category:1992 in law|Consensus]]
[[Category:Cross-strait relations]]
[[Category:1992 in China|Consensus]]
[[Category:1992 in Taiwan]]
[[Category:2000 neologisms]]
[[Category:Conservatism in Taiwan]]
[[Category:Political compromises]]
[[Category:Chinese nationalism]]