View source for Gerrymandering

{{Short description|Form of political manipulation}}
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{{For|the film|Gerrymandering (film){{!}}''Gerrymandering'' (film)}}
{{Redirect|Gerrymander|the arachnids known as jerrymanders|Solifugae|the plants|Germander}}
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{{Use dmy dates|date=April 2023}}
{{Use American English|date=April 2023}}
[[File:DifferingApportionment.svg|thumb|upright=1.1|Boundaries drawn to apportion five "districts" result in varying color majorities, including no yellow and 5 blue (top left), 3 yellow and 2 blue (top right), and 2 yellow and 3 blue (lower examples matching "voter" proportions).]]
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'''Gerrymandering''', ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|dʒ|Er|i|m|æ|n|d|ər|ɪ|ŋ}} {{respell|JERR|ee|man|dər|ing}}, originally {{IPAc-en|ˈ|g|ɛr|i|m|æ|n|d|ər|ɪ|ŋ}} {{respell|GHERR|ee|man|dər|ing}})<ref>{{Cite web |date=15 June 2023 |title=Gerrymandering Definition & Meaning – Merriam-Webster |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gerrymandering}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Wells |first=John |author-link=John C. Wells |title=Longman Pronunciation Dictionary |date=3 April 2008 |publisher=Pearson Longman |isbn=978-1-4058-8118-0 |edition=3rd}}</ref> defined in the contexts of [[Representative democracy|representative electoral systems]], is the political manipulation of [[Boundary delimitation|electoral district boundaries]] to advantage a [[Political party|party]], group, or [[socioeconomic class]] within the constituency. 

The manipulation may involve "cracking" (diluting the voting power of the opposing party's supporters across many districts) or "packing" (concentrating the opposing party's voting power in one district to reduce their voting power in other districts).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.redistrictinggame.org/learnaboutmission2.php|title=The ReDistricting Game|publisher=USC Annenberg's Media Center|access-date=10 February 2017|archive-date=4 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161204145449/http://www.redistrictinggame.org/learnaboutmission2.php}}</ref> Gerrymandering can also be used to protect [[incumbent]]s. Wayne Dawkins, a professor at [[Morgan State University]], describes it as politicians picking their voters instead of voters picking their politicians.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/09/virginia-gerrymandering-voting-rights-act-black-voters|title=In America, voters don't pick their politicians. Politicians pick their voters |last=Dawkins|first=Wayne|date=9 October 2014|work=The Guardian }}</ref>

The term ''gerrymandering'' is a [[portmanteau]] of a [[salamander]] and [[Elbridge Gerry]],{{Efn|Pronounced with a [[Hard and soft G|hard "g"]], as if spelled "Gherry"}}<ref name="cokie">{{cite web |url=https://www.npr.org/2017/10/11/557051691/-askcokie-is-gerrymandering-rigging-americas-political-system |title=Ask Cokie: Is Gerrymandering Rigging America's Political System? |publisher=NPR Morning Edition |date=11 October 2017 |access-date=8 November 2020}}</ref> [[Vice President of the United States]] at the time of his death, who, as [[governor of Massachusetts]] in 1812, signed a bill that created a partisan district in the [[Boston]] area that was compared to the shape of a [[Cultural depictions of salamanders|mythological salamander]]. The term has negative connotations, and gerrymandering is almost always considered a corruption of the democratic process. The word ''gerrymander'' ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|dʒ|ɛr|i|ˌ|m|æ|n|d|ər|,_|ˈ|ɡ|ɛr|i|-}}) can be used both as a verb for the process and as a noun for a resulting district.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Big Book of Beastly Mispronunciations|last=Elster|first=Charles|publisher=Houghton Mifflin|year=2005|isbn=978-0-618-42315-6|location=Boston|page=224|oclc=317828351}}</ref><ref>{{Cite American Heritage Dictionary|gerrymander}}</ref>

==Etymology==

[[File:The Gerry-Mander Edit.png|thumb|250px|Printed in March 1812, this political cartoon was made in reaction to the newly drawn state senate election district of [[Essex County, Massachusetts|South Essex]] created by the Massachusetts legislature to favor the [[Democratic-Republican Party]]. The caricature satirizes the bizarre shape of the district as a dragon-like "monster", and Federalist newspaper editors and others at the time likened it to a [[Cultural depictions of salamanders|salamander]].]]

The word ''gerrymander'' (originally written ''Gerry-mander''; a [[portmanteau]] of the name ''Gerry'' and the animal ''[[salamander]]'') was used for the first time in the ''Boston Gazette''{{efn|Printed from 1803 to 1816; not to be confused with the original ''[[Boston Gazette]]'' (1719–1798).}} on 26 March 1812 in [[Boston, Massachusetts]], United States. This word was created in reaction to a redrawing of [[Massachusetts Senate]] election districts<!---and not US congressional districts--> under Governor [[Elbridge Gerry]], later [[Vice President of the United States]]. Gerry, who personally disapproved of the practice, signed a bill that redistricted [[Massachusetts]] for the benefit of the [[Democratic-Republican Party]]. When mapped, one of the contorted districts in the Boston area was said to resemble a mythological [[Cultural depictions of salamanders|salamander]].<ref name="Griffith 1907 72–73">{{cite book|last=Griffith|first=Elmer|title=The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=6o2HAAAAMAAJ |page=73 }} |pages=72–73|location=Chicago |publisher=Scott, Foresman and Co |year=1907 |oclc=45790508}}</ref> Appearing with the term, and helping spread and sustain its popularity, was a [[political cartoon]] depicting a strange animal with claws, wings, and a dragon-like head that supposedly resembled the oddly shaped district.

The cartoon was most likely drawn by [[Elkanah Tisdale]], an early-19th-century painter, designer, and engraver who lived in Boston at the time.<ref> No evidence has been found that famous American portrait painter [[Gilbert Stuart]] had any involvement with either the design, drawing, or naming of the cartoon or with the coining of the term. Detailed biographies and academic journal articles about Stuart make no reference to gerrymandering. The myth of Stuart's association with the original gerrymander has been reproduced and spread without verification or sources, from one reference book and Internet site to another. Modern scholars of Stuart agree that no proof has been found to credit him with the term or cartoon, and that he tended not to be involved with such issues. {{cite journal |first=Kenneth C. |last=Martis |title=The Original Gerrymander |journal=Political Geography |volume=27 |issue=4 |year=2008 |pages=833–839 |doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.09.003 }}</ref> Tisdale had the engraving skills to cut the woodblocks to print the original cartoon.<ref>{{cite journal |last=O'Brien |first=D. C. |title=Elkanah Tisdale: Designer, Engraver and Miniature Painter |journal=Connecticut Historical Bulletin |volume=49 |issue=2 |year=1984 |pages=83–96 }}</ref> These woodblocks survive and are preserved in the [[Library of Congress]].<ref>Library of Congress. Original woodblocks for printing "Gerrymander" political cartoon. Geography and Map Reading Room. LCCN Permalink: http://lccn.loc.gov/2003620165.</ref> The creator of the term ''gerrymander'', however, may never be definitively established. Historians widely believe that the [[Federalist Party|Federalist]] newspaper editors [[Nathan Hale (journalist)|Nathan Hale]] and Benjamin and John Russell coined the term, but no definitive evidence shows who created or uttered the word for the first time.<ref name="Martis">{{cite journal |last=Martis |first=Kenneth C. |title=The Original Gerrymander |journal=[[Political Geography (journal)|Political Geography]] |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=833–839 |year=2008 |doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.09.003 }}</ref>

The redistricting was a notable success for Gerry's Democratic-Republican Party. In the [[1812 United States elections|1812 election]], both the [[Massachusetts House of Representatives|Massachusetts House]] and [[Governor of Massachusetts|governorship]] were comfortably won by [[Federalist Party|Federalists]], losing Gerry his job, but the redistricted state senate remained firmly in Democratic-Republican hands.<ref name="Griffith 1907 72–73" />

The word ''gerrymander'' was reprinted numerous times in Federalist newspapers in Massachusetts, [[New England]], and nationwide for the rest of 1812.<ref>The word ''gerrymander'' was used again in two Boston-area papers the next day. The first usage outside of the immediate Boston area appeared in the ''[[Newburyport Herald]]'' (Massachusetts) on 31 March, and the first use outside of Massachusetts came in the ''Concord Gazette'' (New Hampshire) on 14 April 1812.

The first use outside of New England was published in the ''New York Gazette and General Advertiser'' on 19 May. What may be the first use of the term to describe the [[redistricting]] in another state (Maryland) occurred in the ''Federal Republican'' (Georgetown, DC)<!-- Georgetown was technically distinct from the city of Washington until 1871. --> on 12 October 1812. All in all, at least 80 citations of the word are known from March through December 1812 in American newspapers. {{cite journal |first=Kenneth C. |last=Martis |title=The Original Gerrymander |journal=Political Geography |volume=27 |issue=4 |year=2008 |pages=833–839 |doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.09.003 }}</ref> This suggests an organized activity by the Federalists to disparage Gerry in particular and the growing Democratic-Republican Party in general. ''Gerrymandering'' soon began to be used to describe cases of district shape-manipulation for partisan gain in other states. According to the ''[[Oxford English Dictionary]],'' the word's acceptance was marked by its publication in a dictionary (1848) and in an encyclopedia (1868).<ref>Simpson, J. A., Weiner, E. S. C.  "Gerrymander",  ''Oxford English Dictionary.''  New York: Oxford University Press.</ref> Since the eponymous ''Gerry'' is pronounced with a [[hard g]] {{IPA|/ɡ/}} as in ''get'', the word ''gerrymander'' was originally pronounced {{IPAc-en|ˈ|g|ɛr|i|m|æ|n|d|ər}}, but pronunciation as {{IPAc-en|ˈ|dʒ|ɛr|i|m|æ|n|d|ər}}, with a soft g {{IPA|/dʒ/}} as in ''gentle,'' has become dominant. Residents of [[Marblehead, Massachusetts]], Gerry's hometown, continue to use the original pronunciation.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Stevens |first1=Chris |title=Supreme Court rules on Marblehead 'gerrymandering' letter |url=https://marblehead.wickedlocal.com/news/20180725/supreme-court-rules-on-marblehead-gerrymandering-letter |website=Wicked Local |access-date=26 January 2021 |archive-date=2 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210202084936/https://marblehead.wickedlocal.com/news/20180725/supreme-court-rules-on-marblehead-gerrymandering-letter }}</ref>

From time to time, other names have been suffixed with ''-{{zwj}}mander'' to tie a particular effort to a particular politician or group. Examples are the 1852 "[[Andrew Johnson#Congressman (1843–1853)|Henry-mandering]]", "Jerrymander" (referring to California Governor [[Jerry Brown]]),<ref>[[Thomas B. Hofeller]], "[http://www.politico.com/pdf/PPM116_rnc_hofeller_memo_051010.pdf The Looming Redistricting Reform; How will the Republican Party Fare?]", ''Politico'', 2011.</ref> "Perrymander" (a reference to Texas Governor [[Rick Perry]]),<ref>{{cite magazine |author=David Wasserman |date=19 August 2011 |title='Perrymander': Redistricting Map That Rick Perry Signed Has Texas Hispanics Up in Arms |url=http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/-perrymander-redistricting-map-that-rick-perry-signed-has-texas-hispanics-up-in-arms-20110819 |magazine=National Journal |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120509195817/http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/-perrymander-redistricting-map-that-rick-perry-signed-has-texas-hispanics-up-in-arms-20110819 |archive-date=9 May 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Mark Gersh |date=21 September 2011 |title=Redistricting Journal: Showdown in Texas—reasons and implications for the House, and Hispanic vote |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/redistricting-journal-showdown-in-texas-reasons-and-implications-for-the-house-and-hispanic-vote/ |work=CBS News |access-date=14 May 2012 |archive-date=22 September 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110922195655/http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20109665-503544.html |url-status=live }}</ref> "[[Tullymander]]" (after the Irish politician [[James Tully (Irish politician)|James Tully]]),<ref>{{cite book
|last1=Donald Harman
|first1=Akenson
|author-link1=Donald Akenson
|chapter=Chapter 12: Kildare Street to Fleet Street
|title=Conor
|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VDollk5D4ZsC&q=tullymander&pg=PA431
|volume=1
|publisher=McGill-Queen's Press – MQUP
|date=1994
|page=431
|isbn=978-0-7735-1256-6
|access-date=15 November 2016
|via=Google Books
|url-access=registration
|url=https://archive.org/details/conorbiographyof00aken_0
}}</ref> and "[[Bjelkemander]]" (referencing Australian politician [[Joh Bjelke-Petersen]]).

==Tactics==

[[File:Elkanah Tisdale, The Gerry-Mander Map, 1813 Cornell CUL PJM 1034 01.jpg|thumbnail|The image from above appearing in a news article by Elkanah Tisdale in 1813]]
Gerrymandering's primary goals are to maximize the effect of supporters' votes and minimize the effect of opponents' votes. A partisan gerrymander's main purpose is to influence not only the districting statute, but also the entire corpus of legislative decisions enacted in its path.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Schuck|first=Peter H.|date=1987|title=The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics|journal=Columbia Law Review|volume=87|issue=7|pages=1325–1384|doi=10.2307/1122527|jstor=1122527}}</ref> These can be accomplished in a number of ways:<ref name="ProP201111022">{{cite web|url=https://www.propublica.org/article/redistricting-a-devils-dictionary|title=Redistricting, a Devil's Dictionary|last1=Pierce|first1=Olga|last2=Larson|first2=Jeff|date=2 November 2011|publisher=[[ProPublica]]|access-date=25 December 2017|last3=Beckett|first3=Lois}}</ref>

* "Cracking" involves spreading voters of a particular type among many districts in order to deny them a sufficiently large [[voting bloc]] in any particular district.<ref name="ProP201111022" /> Political parties in charge of redrawing district lines may create more "cracked" districts as a means of retaining, and possibly even expanding, their legislative power. By "cracking" districts, a political party can maintain, or gain, legislative control by ensuring that the opposing party's voters are not the majority in specific districts.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/packing-cracking-supreme-court-takes-partisan-gerrymandering-090050994.html?_tsrc=jtc_news_index|title=Packing and cracking: The Supreme Court takes up partisan gerrymandering|access-date=29 March 2018|language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite news|url=https://www.policymap.com/2017/08/a-deeper-look-at-gerrymandering/|title=A Deeper Look at Gerrymandering {{!}} PolicyMap|date=1 August 2017|work=PolicyMap|access-date=12 April 2018|language=en-US|archive-date=11 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180411040846/https://www.policymap.com/2017/08/a-deeper-look-at-gerrymandering/}}</ref> For example, the voters in an urban area can be split among several districts in each of which the majority of voters are suburban, on the presumption that the two groups would vote differently, and the suburban voters would be far more likely to get their way in the elections.
* "Packing" is the practice of concentrating a large number of similar voters into a single district, thereby limiting their influence in other districts. This approach can sometimes be used to ensure representation for a community, such as by creating a [[majority-minority district]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Best |first1=Robin E. |last2=Donahue |first2=Shawn J. |last3=Krasno |first3=Jonathan |last4=Magleby |first4=Daniel B. |last5=McDonald |first5=Michael D. |date=March 2018 |title=Considering the Prospects for Establishing a Packing Gerrymandering Standard |url=https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/elj.2016.0392 |journal=Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy |volume=17 |issue=1 |pages=1–20 |doi=10.1089/elj.2016.0392 |issn=1533-1296}}</ref> However, it can also be used to diminish a group's overall electoral impact. When the party in control of redistricting holds a statewide minority, packing may be used strategically to concede a few districts while maintaining greater control over the remaining ones.<ref name="ProP2011110222">{{cite web |last1=Pierce |first1=Olga |last2=Larson |first2=Jeff |last3=Beckett |first3=Lois |date=2 November 2011 |title=Redistricting, a Devil's Dictionary |url=https://www.propublica.org/article/redistricting-a-devils-dictionary |access-date=25 December 2017 |publisher=[[ProPublica]]}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite news |date=1 August 2017 |title=A Deeper Look at Gerrymandering {{!}} PolicyMap |url=https://www.policymap.com/2017/08/a-deeper-look-at-gerrymandering/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180411040846/https://www.policymap.com/2017/08/a-deeper-look-at-gerrymandering/ |archive-date=11 April 2018 |access-date=12 April 2018 |work=PolicyMap |language=en-US}}</ref>
* "Hijacking" is a redistricting tactic that merges two districts, forcing two incumbents to compete for the same seat, ensuring that one of them loses.<ref name="ProP201111022" />
* "Kidnapping" moves an incumbent's home address into another district.<ref name="ProP201111022" /> Re-election can become more difficult when the incumbent no longer resides in the district or faces re-election in a new district with a new voter base. This is often employed against politicians who represent multiple urban areas; larger cities are removed from the district to make it more rural.

These tactics are typically combined in some form, creating a few "forfeit" seats for packed voters of one type to secure more seats and greater representation for voters of another type. This results in candidates of one party (the one responsible for the gerrymandering) winning by small majorities in most of the districts, and another party winning by a large majority in only a few.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://culturalistpress.com/what-is-gerrymandering-and-why-does-it-matter/|title=What is Gerrymandering and why does it matter?|access-date=27 February 2022|language=en-US}}</ref> Any party that endeavors to make a district more favorable to voting for it based on the physical boundary is gerrymandering.

==Effects==

Gerrymandering is effective because of the [[wasted vote effect]]. Wasted votes are votes that did not contribute to electing a candidate, either because they were in excess of the number needed for victory or because the candidate lost. By moving geographic boundaries, the incumbent party packs opposition voters into a few districts they will already win, wasting the extra votes. Other districts are more tightly constructed, with the opposition party allowed a bare minority count, thereby wasting all the minority votes for the losing candidate. These districts constitute the majority of districts and are drawn to produce a result favoring the incumbent party.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/231865/gerrymandering|title=gerrymandering – politics|encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica|date=10 June 2023 }}</ref>

A quantitative measure of the effect of gerrymandering is the [[efficiency gap]], computed from the difference in the wasted votes for two different political parties summed over all the districts.<ref name="82UofCLawReview">{{Cite journal|last1=Stephanopoulos|first1=Nicholas|last2=McGhee|first2=Eric|year=2014|title=Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap|journal=University of Chicago Law Review|volume=82|page=831|ssrn=2457468}}</ref><ref name="NewRepublic20140702">{{Cite magazine|last=Stephanopoulos|first=Nicholas|date=2 July 2014|title=Here's How We Can End Gerrymandering Once and for All|url=https://newrepublic.com/article/118534/gerrymandering-efficiency-gap-better-way-measure-gerrymandering|magazine=The New Republic|access-date=22 November 2016}}</ref> Citing in part an efficiency gap of 11.7 to 13.0%, a U.S. District Court in 2016 ruled against the 2011 drawing of [[2018 Wisconsin State Assembly election|Wisconsin]] legislative districts. In the 2012 election for the state legislature, that gap in wasted votes meant that one party had 48.6% of the two-party votes, but won 61% of the 99 districts.<ref name="nyt20161121">{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/wisconsin-redistricting-found-to-unfairly-favor-republicans.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220102/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/wisconsin-redistricting-found-to-unfairly-favor-republicans.html |archive-date=2 January 2022 |url-access=limited |url-status=live|title=Judges Find Wisconsin Redistricting Unfairly Favored Republicans|last=Wines|first=Michael|newspaper=New York Times|access-date=22 November 2016|date=21 November 2016}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

The wasted vote effect is strongest when a party wins by narrow margins across multiple districts, but gerrymandering narrow margins can be risky when voters are less predictable. To minimize the risk of demographic or political shifts swinging a district to the opposition, politicians can create more packed districts, leading to more comfortable margins in unpacked ones.

===Effect on electoral competition===

[[File:Gerrymandering 9-6.png|thumb|upright=1.2|How gerrymandering can influence electoral results on a [[Voting system#Majoritarian systems|non-proportional system]]. For a state with 3 equally sized districts, 15 voters and 2 parties:
{{Legend|#cacdff|text='''■'''|textcolor=#642eff|Plum – 9 voters}}
{{Legend|#cacdff|text='''⬤'''|textcolor=#ff6600|Orange – 6 voters}}
{{ordered list
| list-style-type = lower-alpha
| item_style = margin-left: -25px;|3–0 win to ''Plum''—a disproportional result considering the statewide 9:6 ''Plum'' majority.|''Orange'' wins the central ('''+''' shaped) district while ''Plum'' wins the upper and lower districts.  The 1–2 result reflects the statewide vote ratio.|Gerrymandering techniques ensure a 2–1 win to the statewide minority ''Orange'' party.
}}]]
<!-- We should mention the claim that contention over districts creates a major distraction for the legislature -->

Some political science research suggests that contrary to common belief, gerrymandering does not decrease electoral competition and can even increase it. Some say that, rather than packing the voters of their party into uncompetitive districts, party leaders tend to prefer to spread their party's voters into multiple districts so that their party can win more races.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Masket |first1=Seth E. |last2=Winburn |first2=Jonathan |last3=Wright |first3=Gerald C. |title=The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won't Affect Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It |journal=PS: Political Science & Politics |date=January 2012 |volume=45 |issue=1 |pages=39–43 |doi=10.1017/S1049096511001703 |s2cid=45832354 }}</ref> (See scenario '''(c)''' in the box.) This may lead to increased competition. Instead of gerrymandering, some researchers find that other factors, such as partisan polarization and the incumbency advantage, have driven the recent{{when?|date=January 2025}} decreases in electoral competition.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Forgette |first1=Richard |last2=Winkle |first2=John W. |title=Partisan Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act |journal=Social Science Quarterly |date=March 2006 |volume=87 |issue=1 |pages=155–173 |doi=10.1111/j.0038-4941.2006.00374.x }}</ref> Similarly, a 2009 study found that "congressional polarization is primarily a function of the differences in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same districts rather than a function of which districts each party represents or the distribution of constituency preferences."<ref>{{cite journal|last1=McCarty|first1=Nolan|last2=Poole|first2=Keith T.|last3=Rosenthal|first3=Howard|date=July 2009|title=Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?|url=http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~miaryc/PEW/Nolan_McCarty_PEWCaltech.pdf|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=53|issue=3|pages=666–680|citeseerx=10.1.1.491.3072|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00393.x|access-date=24 October 2017|archive-date=30 June 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100630200505/http://www.hss.caltech.edu/%7Emiaryc/PEW/Nolan_McCarty_PEWCaltech.pdf}}</ref>

One state in which gerrymandering has arguably had an adverse effect on electoral competition is California. In 2000, a bipartisan redistricting effort redrew congressional district lines in ways that all but guaranteed incumbent victories; as a result, California had only one congressional seat change hands between 2000 and 2010. In response to this obvious gerrymandering, a 2010 referendum in California gave the power to redraw congressional district lines to the [[California Citizens Redistricting Commission]], which had been created to draw California State Senate and Assembly districts by a 2008 referendum. In stark contrast to the redistricting efforts that followed the 2000 census, the redistricting commission has created a number of the most competitive congressional districts in the country.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/california-congressional-delegation-braces-for-change.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220102/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/california-congressional-delegation-braces-for-change.html |archive-date=2 January 2022 |url-access=limited |url-status=live|title=New Faces Set For California in the Capitol|last=Nagourney|first=Adam|date=14 February 2012|newspaper=The New York Times}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

===Increased incumbent advantage and campaign costs===
The effect of gerrymandering for incumbents is particularly advantageous, as they are far more likely to be re-elected under conditions of gerrymandering. For example, in 2002, according to political scientists [[Norman Ornstein]] and [[Thomas E. Mann|Thomas Mann]], only four challengers were able to defeat incumbent members of the U.S. Congress, the lowest number in modern American history.<ref name="7_buck_trust.html">{{cite web|url=http://www.centrists.org/pages/2004/07/7_buck_trust.html|title=Iowa's Redistricting Process: An Example of the Right Way to Draw Legislative|date=22 July 2004|publisher=Centrists.Org|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091107114029/http://www.centrists.org/pages/2004/07/7_buck_trust.html|archive-date=7 November 2009|access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref> Incumbents are likely to be of the majority party orchestrating a gerrymander, and are usually easily renominated in subsequent elections, including incumbents among the minority.

Mann, a senior fellow of governance studies at the [[Brookings Institution]], has also noted, "Redistricting is a deeply political process, with incumbents actively seeking to minimize the risk to themselves (via bipartisan gerrymanders) or to gain additional seats for their party (via partisan gerrymanders)".<ref>Mann, Thomas E. "Redistricting Reform." The Brookings Institution. Brookings.edu, 1 June 2005. Web. 5 February 2013. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2005/06/01politics-mann></ref> The bipartisan gerrymandering Mann mentions refers to the fact that legislators often draw distorted legislative districts even when doing so does not give their party an advantage.

Gerrymandering of state legislative districts can effectively guarantee an incumbent's victory by "shoring up" a district with higher levels of partisan support, without disproportionately benefiting a particular political party. This can be highly problematic from a governance perspective, because forming districts to ensure high levels of partisanship often leads to higher levels of partisanship in legislative bodies. If a substantial number of districts are designed to be polarized, then those districts' representation will also likely act in a heavily partisan manner, which can create and perpetuate partisan gridlock.

Gerrymandering can thus have a deleterious effect on the principle of democratic accountability. With uncompetitive seats/districts reducing the fear that incumbent politicians may lose office, they have less incentive to represent their constituents' interests, even when those interests conform to majority support for an issue across the electorate as a whole.{{Citation needed|date=January 2014}} Incumbent politicians may look out more for their party's interests than for those of their constituents.{{Citation needed|date=January 2014}}

Gerrymandering can affect campaign costs for district elections. If districts become increasingly stretched out, candidates may incur higher costs for transportation and [[campaign advertising]] across a district.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ced.org/reports/solving-the-problem-of-partisan-gerrymandering|title=Let the Voters Choose|date=13 March 2018|work=Committee for Economic Development|access-date=7 June 2019}}</ref> The incumbent's advantage in campaign fundraising is another benefit of having a gerrymandered seat.

===Less descriptive representation===
Gerrymandering also has significant effects on the [[representation (politics)|representation]] voters receive in gerrymandered districts. Because gerrymandering can be designed to increase the number of wasted votes among the electorate, the relative representation of particular groups can be drastically altered from their actual share of the voting population. This effect can significantly prevent a gerrymandered system from achieving proportional and [[descriptive representation]], as the winners of elections are increasingly determined by who is drawing the districts, rather than the voters' preferences.

Gerrymandering may be advocated to improve representation within the legislature among otherwise underrepresented minority groups by packing them into a single district. This can be controversial, as it may lead to those groups' remaining marginalized in the government as they become confined to a single district. Candidates outside that district no longer need to represent them to win elections.

As an example, much of the redistricting conducted in the U.S. in the early 1990s involved the intentional creation of additional "majority-minority" districts where racial minorities such as African Americans were packed into the majority. This "maximization policy" drew support from both the Republican Party (which had limited support among African Americans and could concentrate its power elsewhere) and by minority representatives elected as Democrats from these constituencies, who then had safe seats. <!-- cite a famous politician or political scientist that has a good quote of this here -->

The 2012 election provides a number of examples of how partisan gerrymandering can adversely affect the descriptive function of states' congressional delegations. In Pennsylvania, for example, Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives received 83,000 more votes than Republican candidates, yet the Republican-controlled redistricting process in 2010 resulted in Democrats losing to their Republican counterparts in 13 of Pennsylvania's 18 districts.<ref>Ting, Jan C. "Boehner and House Republicans Lack Mandate to Oppose Obama." NewsWorks. NewsWorks.Org, 14 December 2012. Web. 5 February 2013.
[https://whyy.org/articles/boehner-and-house-republicans-lack-mandate-to-oppose-obama/]
</ref>

In the seven states where Republicans had complete control over the redistricting process, Republican House candidates received 16.7 million votes and Democratic House candidates received 16.4 million. The redistricting resulted in Republican victories in 73 out of the 107 affected seats; in those seven states, Republicans received 50.4% of the votes but won in over 68% of the congressional districts.<ref>Wang, Sam. "The Great Gerrymander of 2012." The New York Times. 2 February 2013. Web. 5 February 2013.
[https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html]
</ref> While it is but one example of how gerrymandering can have a significant effect on election outcomes, this kind of disproportional representation of the public will seems problematic for the legitimacy of democratic systems, regardless of one's political affiliation.

In [[Michigan]], redistricting was conducted by a Republican legislature in 2011.<ref name=":3">{{cite web|url=http://ballotpedia.org/Redistricting_in_Michigan|title=Redistricting in Michigan|work=ballotpedia.org}}</ref> Federal congressional districts were designed so that cities such as [[Battle Creek]], [[Grand Rapids]], [[Jackson, Michigan|Jackson]], [[Kalamazoo]], [[Lansing]], and [[East Lansing]] were separated into districts with large conservative-leaning hinterlands that diluted the Democratic votes in those cities in Congressional elections.<ref name=":3" />

===Incumbent gerrymandering===
Gerrymandering can also be done to help incumbents as a whole, effectively making every district a packed one and greatly reducing the potential for competitive elections. This is particularly likely to occur when the minority party has significant obstruction power: unable to enact a partisan gerrymander, the legislature instead agrees to ensure its own reelection.

In an unusual occurrence in 2000, for example, the two dominant parties in California [[Redistricting in California|cooperatively redrew]] both state and federal legislative districts to preserve the status quo, insulating the incumbents from unpredictable voting. This move proved completely effective, as no state or federal legislative office changed party in the [[2004 U.S. House election|2004 election]], although 53 congressional, 20 state senate, and 80 state assembly seats were potentially at risk.

In 2006, the term "70/30 district" came to signify the equitable split of two evenly split (i.e. 50/50) districts. The resulting districts gave each party a guaranteed seat and retained their respective power base.

Since the first handshake deal in 1981, whereby Republicans informally controlled the state senate redistricting process and Democrats informally controlled the state assembly redistricting process, New York has experienced some of the nation's least competitive legislative elections. One study by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School found that over one 10-year period, as many members of the state legislature died in office as were defeated in elections. More than 99% of the incumbents contesting a primary or general election won their races.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Seabrook |first=Nick |date=2022 |title=One Person, One Vote: A Surprising History of Gerrymandering in America |location=New York |publisher=Pantheon Books |pages=232–233 |isbn=978-0-593-31586-6 |oclc=1286675891}}</ref>

===Prison-based gerrymandering===
Prison-based gerrymandering occurs when prisoners are counted as residents of a district, increasing its population with nonvoters when assigning political apportionment. This phenomenon violates the principle of [[one person, one vote]] because, although many prisoners come from (and return to) urban communities, they are counted as "residents" of the rural districts that contain large prisons, artificially inflating the political representation in districts with prisons at the expense of voters in districts without them.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2006/05/20/NYT-gerrymandering|title=Prison-Based Gerrymandering|date=20 May 2006|newspaper=The New York Times|type=Editorial}}</ref> Others contend that prisoners should not be counted as residents of their original districts when they do not reside there and are [[disenfranchisement|not legally eligible to vote]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/NYS_A9710-D.html|title=New York Prison-Based Gerrymandering Bill – Policy|website=www.prisonersofthecensus.org}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/NYS_A11597.html|title=New York Prison-Based Gerrymandering Technical Amendment|website=www.prisonersofthecensus.org}}</ref>

US states Michigan, Colorado, Virginia, and Tennessee have all passed laws that restrict prison-based gerrymandering. In 2014, Massachusetts passed a resolution that asked the Census Bureau to stop counting incarcerated people as residents in the district where they are incarcerated. Pennsylvania also voted to redraw districts in a way that avoids prison-based gerrymandering.<ref>{{Cite web |last=PennLive.com |first=Spotlight PA {{!}} For |date=2021-08-24 |title=In major shift, Pa. panel votes to count incarcerated people in home districts, not state prisons |url=https://www.pennlive.com/news/2021/08/in-major-shift-pa-panel-votes-to-count-incarcerated-people-in-home-districts-not-state-prisons.html |access-date=2025-03-13 |website=pennlive |language=en}}</ref>

==Changes to achieve competitive elections==
[[File:map22007.gif|thumb|250px|Electoral divisions in the Sydney area in 2007, drawn by the politically independent [[Australian Electoral Commission]]]]
Due to the perceived issues associated with gerrymandering and its effect on competitive elections and democratic accountability, numerous countries have enacted reforms making the practice more difficult or less effective. Countries such as the UK, Australia, Canada, and most of those in Europe have transferred responsibility for defining constituency boundaries to neutral or cross-party bodies. In Spain, they have been constitutionally fixed since 1978.<ref name="ES_Const" /> [[Open list|Open]] [[party-list proportional representation]] makes gerrymandering obsolete by erasing district lines and empowering voters to rank a list of candidates any party puts forth. This method is used in Austria, Brazil, Sweden, and Switzerland.{{citation needed|date=April 2022}}

In the U.S., such reforms are controversial and face particularly strong opposition from groups that benefit from gerrymandering. In a more neutral system, they might lose considerable influence.

=== Redistricting by neutral or cross-party agency ===
The most commonly advocated electoral reform proposal targeted at gerrymandering is to change the redistricting process. Under these proposals, an independent and presumably objective commission is created specifically for redistricting, rather than having the legislature do it.

This is the system used in the UK, where independent [[boundary commissions (United Kingdom)|boundary commissions]] determine the boundaries for [[United Kingdom constituencies|constituencies]] in the [[British House of Commons|House of Commons]] and the [[Devolution in the United Kingdom|devolved legislatures]], subject to ratification by the body in question (almost always granted without debate). A similar situation exists in Australia, where the independent [[Australian Electoral Commission]] and its state-based counterparts determine electoral boundaries for federal, state, and local jurisdictions.

To help ensure neutrality, members of a redistricting agency may be appointed from relatively apolitical sources, such as retired judges or longstanding members of the civil service, possibly with requirements for adequate representation among competing political parties. Additionally, members of the board can be denied information that might aid in gerrymandering, such as the demographic makeup or voting patterns of the population.

As a further constraint, [[Consensus decision-making|consensus]] requirements can be imposed to ensure that the resulting district map reflects a wider perception of fairness, such as a requirement for a supermajority approval of the commission for any district proposal, but consensus requirements can lead to deadlock, as occurred in [[Missouri]] following the 2000 census. There, the equally numbered partisan appointees were unable to reach consensus in a reasonable time, so the courts had to determine district lines.

In the U.S. state of [[Iowa]], the nonpartisan Legislative Services Bureau (LSB, akin to the [[U.S. Congressional Research Service]]) determines electoral district boundaries. Aside from satisfying federally mandated contiguity and population equality criteria, the LSB mandates unity of counties and cities. Consideration of political factors such as location of incumbents, previous boundary locations, and political party proportions is specifically forbidden. Since Iowa's counties are chiefly regularly shaped [[polygons]], the LSB process has led to districts that follow county lines.<ref name="7_buck_trust.html" />

In 2005, the U.S. state of [[Ohio]] had a ballot measure to create an independent commission whose first priority was competitive districts, a sort of "reverse gerrymander". A complex mathematical formula was to be used to determine the competitiveness of a district. The measure failed voter approval chiefly due to voter concerns that communities of interest would be broken up.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.smartvoter.org/2005/11/08/oh/state/issue/4/|title=Issue 4: Independent Redistricting Process – Ohio State Government|publisher=Smartvoter.org|access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref>

In 2017, Representative [[John Delaney (Maryland politician)|John Delaney]] submitted the [[Open Our Democracy Act of 2017]] to the [[U.S. House of Representatives]] as a means to implement nonpartisan redistricting. It ultimately did not pass.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Delaney |first=John K. |date=2017-07-10 |title=Text - H.R.2981 - 115th Congress (2017-2018): To require all candidates for election for the office of Senator or Member of the House of Representatives to run in an open primary regardless of political party preference or lack thereof, to limit the ensuing general election for such office to the two candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in such open primary, and for other purposes. |url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2981/text |access-date=2025-02-28 |website=www.congress.gov}}</ref>

=== Redistricting by partisan competition ===
Many redistricting reforms seek to remove partisanship to ensure fairness in the redistricting process. The [[I cut, you choose|I-cut-you-choose]] method achieves fairness by putting the two major parties in direct competition. I-cut-you-choose is a [[fair division]] method to divide resources amongst two parties, regardless of which party cuts first.<ref>{{cite arXiv|title=A partisan districting protocol with provably nonpartisan outcomes|last1=Pegden|first1=Wesley|date=24 October 2017 <!-- |publisher=Cornell University --> |class=cs.GT|eprint=1710.08781}}</ref> This method typically relies on assumptions of contiguity of districts, but ignores all other constraints such as keeping communities of interest together.  This method has been applied to nominal redistricting problems,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/02/how-the-i-cut-you-choose-method-of-redistricting-could-fix-a-broken-system.html|title=A new method of redistricting could solve gerrymandering|last1=Riedel|first1=Will|date=27 February 2018|publisher=Slate.com|access-date=12 December 2020}}</ref> but it generally has less public interest than other types of redistricting reforms. The I-cut-you-choose concept was popularized by the board game ''Berrymandering''. Problems with this method arise when minor parties are shut out of the process, which will reinforce the [[two-party system]]. Additionally, while this method is provably fair to the two parties creating the districts, it is not necessarily fair to the communities they represent.

===Transparency regulations===
When a single political party controls both legislative houses of a state during redistricting, both Democrats and Republicans have displayed a marked propensity for couching the process in secrecy; in May 2010, for example, the [[Republican National Committee]] held a redistricting training session in Ohio where the theme was "Keep it Secret, Keep it Safe".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/12/13/study-of-gop-maps-points-to-politics.html|title=Study of GOP Maps Points to Politics|last1=Siegel|first1=Jim|date=13 December 2011|publisher=Dispatch.com|access-date=5 March 2013|archive-date=16 March 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140316033845/http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/12/13/study-of-gop-maps-points-to-politics.html}}</ref> A 2012 investigation by The [[Center for Public Integrity]] reviewed every state's redistricting processes for both transparency and potential for public input, and ultimately assigned 24 states grades of either D or F.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/01/14839356-behind-closed-doors-gop-and-dems-alike-cloaked-redistricting-in-secrecy|title=Behind Closed Doors: GOP and Dems Alike Cloaked Redistricting in Secrecy|last=Kusnetz|first=Nicholas|date=1 November 2012|work=NBC News}}</ref>

In response to these types of problems, redistricting transparency legislation has been introduced to [[US Congress]] a number of times in recent years, including the Redistricting Transparency Acts of 2010, 2011, and 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4918|title=Redistricting Transparency Act of 2010 (2010; 111th Congress H.R. 4918) – GovTrack.us|work=GovTrack.us|access-date=16 April 2013|archive-date=3 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130403102430/http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4918}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr419|title=Redistricting Transparency Act of 2011 (2011; 112th Congress H.R. 419) – GovTrack.us|work=GovTrack.us|access-date=16 April 2013|archive-date=29 September 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150929080910/https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr419}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr337|title=Redistricting Transparency Act of 2013 (2013; 113th Congress H.R. 337) – GovTrack.us|work=GovTrack.us|access-date=16 April 2013|archive-date=16 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131016064415/http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr337}}</ref> Such policy proposals aim to increase the transparency and responsiveness of the redistricting systems in the US. The merit of increasing transparency in redistricting processes is based largely on the premise that lawmakers would be less inclined to draw gerrymandered districts if they were forced to defend such districts in a public forum.

===Changing the voting system===
As gerrymandering relies on the wasted-vote effect, the use of a different voting system with fewer wasted votes can help reduce gerrymandering. In particular, the use of [[multimember district]]s alongside voting systems establishing [[proportional representation]] such as [[party-list proportional representation]] or [[single transferable voting]] can reduce wasted votes and gerrymandering. Semiproportional voting systems such as [[single nontransferable vote]] or [[cumulative voting]] are relatively simple and similar to ''[[first past the post]]'' and can also reduce the proportion of wasted votes and thus potential gerrymandering. Electoral reformers have advocated all three as replacement systems.<ref>See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution, 27 U.S.F.L.Rev. 781, 806 (1993) (arguing that the Single Transferable Voting systems maintain minority electoral opportunities); Steven J. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out: A Remedial Road Map for the Use of Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Act Remedies, 77 N.C.L.Rev. 1867, 1923 (1999) (concluding that ranked-ballot voting systems avoid minority vote dilution); Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 333, 350 (1998) (arguing that preferential voting systems enhance minority representation); and Alexander Athan Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote With the Voting Rights Act, 92 Colum.L.Rev. 1810, 1865–66 (1992) (arguing that Single Transferable Voting serves to preserve the minority party's right to representation).</ref>

Electoral systems with various forms of proportional representation are now found in nearly all European countries, resulting in multi-party systems (with many parties represented in the parliaments) with higher voter attendance in the elections,<ref>{{Citation|last1=Pintor|first1=Rafael López|title=Voter Turnout Rates from a Comparative Perspective|url=http://www.idea.int/publications/vt/upload/Voter%20turnout.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070216045624/http://www.idea.int/publications/vt/upload/Voter%20turnout.pdf |archive-date=16 February 2007 |url-status=live|access-date=7 March 2014|last2=Gratschew|first2=Maria|last3=Sullivan|first3=Kate}}</ref> fewer wasted votes, and a wider variety of political opinions represented.

Electoral systems with election of just one winner in each district (i.e., "winner-takes-all" electoral systems) and no proportional distribution of extra mandates to smaller parties tend to create two-party systems. This effect, labeled ''[[Duverger's law]]'' by political scientists, was described by [[Maurice Duverger]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Duverger|first=Maurice|url=http://archive.org/details/politicalparties0000duve|title=Political parties: their organization and activity in the modern state|date=1964|location=London  |publisher= Methuen|page= 217|isbn=978-0-416-68320-2}}</ref>

===Using fixed districts===
Another way to avoid gerrymandering is simply to stop redistricting altogether and use existing political boundaries such as state, county, or provincial lines. While this prevents future gerrymandering, any existing advantage may become deeply ingrained. The [[United States Senate]], for instance, has more competitive elections than the House of Representatives due to the use of existing state borders rather than gerrymandered districts—Senators are elected by their entire state, while Representatives are elected in legislatively drawn districts.

The use of fixed districts creates an additional problem, however, in that fixed districts do not take into account changes in population. Individual voters can come to have very different degrees of influence on the legislative process. This [[malapportionment]] can greatly affect representation after long periods of time or large population movements. In the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] during the [[Industrial Revolution]], several constituencies that had been fixed since they gained representation in the [[Parliament of England]] became so small that they could be won with only a handful of voters (''[[rotten borough]]s''). Similarly, in the U.S. the [[Alabama Legislature]] refused to redistrict for more than 60 years, despite major changes in population patterns. By 1960 less than a quarter of the state's population controlled the majority of seats in the legislature.<ref>Dr. Michael McDonald, U.S. Elections Project: Alabama Redistricting Summary [http://elections.gmu.edu/Redistricting/AL.htm Dept. of Public and International Affairs George Mason University]. Retrieved 6 April 2008. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080624024455/http://elections.gmu.edu/Redistricting/AL.htm|date=24 June 2008}}</ref> This practice of using fixed districts for state legislatures was effectively banned in the United States after the ''[[Reynolds v. Sims]]'' Supreme Court decision in 1964, establishing a rule of [[one man, one vote]].

===Objective rules to create districts===
Another means to reduce gerrymandering is to create objective, precise criteria with which any district map must comply. Courts in the United States, for instance, have ruled that congressional districts must be contiguous in order to be constitutional.<ref>[[wikisource:Reynolds v. Sims|Reynolds v. Sims]] states that "a state legislative apportionment scheme may properly give representation to various political subdivisions and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory if substantial equality among districts is maintained." See also [[Reynolds v. Sims|the Wikipedia article]].</ref> This, however, is not a particularly effective constraint, as very narrow strips of land with few or no voters in them may be used to connect separate regions for inclusion in one district, as is the case in [[Texas's 35th congressional district]].

Depending on the distribution of voters for a particular party, metrics that maximize compactness can be opposed to metrics that minimize the efficiency gap.  For example, in the United States, voters registered with the Democratic Party tend to be concentrated in cities, potentially resulting in a large number of "wasted" votes if compact districts are drawn around city populations.  Neither of these metrics take into consideration other possible goals,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/hating-gerrymandering-is-easy-fixing-it-is-harder/|title=Hating Gerrymandering Is Easy. Fixing It Is Harder.|last=Wasserman|first=David|date=25 January 2018|website=[[FiveThirtyEight]]}}</ref> such as proportional representation based on other demographic characteristics (such as race, ethnicity, gender, or income), maximizing competitiveness of elections (the greatest number of districts where party affiliation is 50/50), avoiding splits of existing government units (like cities and counties), and ensuring representation of major interest groups (like farmers or voters in a specific transportation corridor), though any of these could be incorporated into a more complicated metric.

====Minimum district to convex polygon ratio====
{{More citations needed section|date=February 2022}}
[[File:Polygons of Georgia Districts 8 and 10.png|thumb|upright=1.3|Smallest possible convex polygons drawn around the [[Georgia's 8th congressional district|8th]] (left) and [[Georgia's 10th congressional district|10th]] congressional districts in Georgia, 2012. To avoid penalizing large areas, the measure is the ratio of the area of the district to the area of the polygon. District 8 will get a lower score than District 10.]]
One method is to define a minimum district to [[convex polygon]] ratio.{{Definition needed|date=July 2016}} To use this method, every proposed district is circumscribed by the smallest possible convex polygon (its [[convex hull]]; think of stretching a rubberband around the outline of the district). Then, the area of the district is divided{{explain|date=December 2015}} by the area of the polygon; or, if at the edge of the state, by the portion of the area of the polygon within state boundaries.

The advantages of this method are that it allows a certain amount of human intervention to take place (thus solving the Colorado problem of [[#Shortest splitline algorithm|splitline districting]]); it allows the borders of the district to follow existing jagged subdivisions, such as neighborhoods or voting districts (something isoperimetric rules would discourage); and it allows concave coastline districts, such as the Florida gulf coast area. It would mostly eliminate bent districts, but still permit long, straight ones. However, since human intervention is still allowed, the gerrymandering issues of packing and cracking would still occur, just to a lesser extent.

====Shortest splitline algorithm====
The [[Center for Range Voting]] has proposed<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.RangeVoting.org/GerryExamples.html|title=Gerrymandering and a cure—shortest splitline algorithm|publisher=RangeVoting.org|access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref> a way to draw districts by a simple [[algorithm]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.rangevoting.org/|title=RangeVoting.org – Center for Range Voting – front page|website=www.rangevoting.org}}</ref> The algorithm uses only the shape of the state, the number {{var|N}} of districts wanted, and the population distribution as inputs. The algorithm (slightly simplified) is:

# Start with the boundary outline of the state.
# Let {{var|N}}=A+B where {{var|N}} is the number of districts to create, and A and B are two whole numbers, either equal (if {{var|N}} is even) or differing by exactly one (if {{var|N}} is odd). For example, if {{var|N}} is 10, each of {{var|A}} and {{var|B}} would be 5. If {{var|N}} is 7, {{var|A}} would be 4 and {{var|B}} would be 3.
# Among all possible straight lines that split the state into two parts with the population ratio A:B, choose the ''shortest''. If there are two or more such shortest lines, choose the one that is most north–south in direction; if there is still more than one possibility, choose the westernmost.
# We now have two hemi-states, each to contain a specified number (namely {{var|A}} and {{var|B}}) of districts. Handle them recursively via the same splitting procedure.
# Any human residence that is split in two or more parts by the resulting lines is considered to be a part of the most north-eastern of the resulting districts; if this does not decide it, then of the most northern.

This district-drawing algorithm has the advantages of simplicity, ultra-low cost, a single possible result (thus no possibility of human interference), lack of intentional bias, and it produces simple boundaries that do not meander needlessly. It has the disadvantage of ignoring geographic features such as rivers, cliffs, and highways and cultural features such as tribal boundaries. This landscape oversight causes it to produce districts different from those a human would produce. Ignoring geographic features can induce very simple boundaries.

While most districts produced by the method will be fairly compact and either roughly rectangular or triangular, some of the resulting districts can still be long and narrow strips (or triangles) of land.

Like most automatic redistricting rules, the shortest splitline algorithm will fail to create majority-minority districts, for both ethnic and political minorities, if the minority populations are not very compact. This might reduce minority representation.

Another criticism of the system is that splitline districts sometimes divide and diffuse the voters in a large metropolitan area. This condition is most likely to occur when one of the first splitlines cuts through the metropolitan area. It is often considered a drawback of the system because residents of the same agglomeration are assumed to be a community of common interest. This is most evident in the splitline allocation of [[Colorado]].<ref>{{Cite web | url = http://www.rangevoting.org/SSHR/co_final.png| title = Untitled | website = rangevoting.org| access-date = 30 June 2021}}</ref>
However, in cases when the splitline divides a large metropolitan area, it is usually because that large area has enough population for multiple districts. In cases which the large area only has the population for one district, then the splitline usually results in the urban area being in one district with the other district being rural.

As of July 2007, shortest-splitline redistricting pictures, based on the results of the 2000 census, are available for all 50 states.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.RangeVoting.org/SplitLR.html|title=Splitline districtings of all 50 states + DC + PR|publisher=RangeVoting.org|access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref>

====Minimum isoperimetric quotient====
{{See also|Compactness measure of a shape|Polsby–Popper test}}
It is possible to define a specific minimum [[isoperimetric quotient]],<ref name="siam.org">{{cite journal |last1=Case |first1=James |title=Flagrant Gerrymandering: Help from the Isoperimetric Theorem? |journal=SIAM News |date=November 2007 |volume=40 |issue=9 |url=https://archive.siam.org/news/news.php?id=1237 }}</ref> proportional to the ratio between the area and the square of the perimeter of any given congressional voting district. Although technologies presently exist to define districts in this manner, there are no rules in place mandating their use, and no national movement to implement such a policy. One problem with the simplest version of this rule is that it would prevent incorporation of jagged natural boundaries, such as rivers or mountains; when such boundaries are required, such as at the edge of a state, certain districts may not be able to meet the required minima. One way of avoiding this problem is to allow districts which share a border with a state border to replace that border with a polygon or semi-circle enclosing the state boundary as a kind of virtual boundary definition, but using the actual perimeter of the district whenever this occurs inside the state boundaries. Enforcing a minimum isoperimetric quotient would encourage districts with a high ratio between area and perimeter.<ref name="siam.org" />

====Efficiency gap calculation====
{{Main|Efficiency gap}}
The efficiency gap is a simply-calculable measure that can show the effects of gerrymandering.<ref name="TheNewRepublic">{{cite magazine|url=https://newrepublic.com/article/118534/gerrymandering-efficiency-gap-better-way-measure-gerrymandering|title=Here's How We Can End Gerrymandering Once and for All|magazine=The New Republic|author=Nicholas Stephanopoulas|date=3 July 2014|access-date=8 May 2018}}</ref> It measures wasted votes for each party: the sum of votes cast in losing districts (losses due to cracking) and excess votes cast in winning districts (losses due to packing).  The difference in these wasted votes are divided by total votes cast, and the resulting percentage is the efficiency gap.

In 2017, Boris Alexeev and Dustin Mixon proved that "sometimes, a small efficiency gap is only possible with bizarrely shaped districts". This means that it is mathematically impossible to always devise boundaries which would simultaneously meet certain Polsby–Popper and efficiency gap targets,<ref>{{cite journal|title=An Impossibility Theorem for Gerrymandering|journal=[[American Mathematical Monthly]]|volume=125|issue=10|year=2018|last1=Alexeev|first1=Boris|last2=Mixon|first2=Dustin G.|pages=878–884|doi=10.1080/00029890.2018.1517571|arxiv=1710.04193|s2cid=54570818}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://news.osu.edu/you-cant-tell-a-gerrymandered-district-by-its-shape/|title=You can't tell a gerrymandered district by its shape|date=25 October 2017|work=news.osu.edu|publisher=[[Ohio State University]]|access-date=16 September 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.quantamagazine.org/when-math-gets-impossibly-hard-20200914/|title=When Math Gets Impossibly Hard|last=Richeson|first=David S.|date=14 September 2020|work=[[Quanta Magazine]]|access-date=16 September 2020}}</ref>

Given such theoretical difficulties, a robust, however sub-optimal, anti-gerrymandering rule may be as simple as identifying all maps satisfying a rough efficiency measure, like expected outcome matching voter affiliation proportions, then choosing the one most compact.

==Gerrymandering in Different Voting systems==
===First-past-the-post===
{{Main|First-past-the-post voting}}

Gerrymandering is most likely to emerge in majoritarian systems, where the country is divided into several voting districts and the candidate with the most votes wins the district. If the ruling party is in charge of drawing the district lines, it can abuse the fact that in a majoritarian system all votes that do not go to the winning candidate are essentially irrelevant to the composition of a new government. Even though gerrymandering can be used in other voting systems, it has the most significant impact on voting outcomes in first-past-the-post systems.<ref>{{cite web |title=Majoritarian electoral systems are more prone to gerrymandering than proportional systems |url=http://www.democraticaudit.com/2016/06/01/majoritarian-electoral-systems-are-more-prone-to-gerrymandering-than-proportional-systems/ |website=Democratic Audit |date=1 June 2016}}</ref> Partisan redrawing of district lines is particularly harmful to democratic principles in majoritarian two-party systems. In general, two party systems tend to be more polarized than proportional systems.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Feuerherd |first1=Peter |title=Is Gerrymandering to Blame for Our Polarized Politics? |url=https://daily.jstor.org/is-gerrymandering-to-blame-for-our-polarized-politics/ |website=JSTOR Daily |date=19 March 2018}}</ref> Possible consequences of gerrymandering in such a system can be an amplification of polarization in politics and a lack of representation of minorities, as a large part of the constituency is not represented in policy making. However, not every state using a first-past-the-post system is being confronted with the negative impacts of gerrymandering. Some countries, such as Canada and the UK, authorize non-partisan organizations to set constituency boundaries in attempt to prevent gerrymandering.<ref>{{cite web |title=Solving the Problem of Partisan Gerrymandering |url=https://www.conference-board.org/publications/TCB-ced-solving-gerrymandering-problem |website=Committee for Economic Development of The Conference Board |publisher=CED |access-date=15 May 2019}}</ref>

===Proportional systems===
{{Main|Proportional representation}}
The introduction of a proportional system is often proposed as the most effective solution to partisan gerrymandering.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Yglesias |first1=Matthew |title=The real fix for gerrymandering is proportional representation |url=https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/11/16453512/gerrymandering-proportional-representation |website=Vox |access-date=15 May 2019 |date=11 October 2017}}</ref> In such systems, the entire constituency is being represented proportionally to their votes. Even though voting districts can be part of a proportional system, the redrawing of district lines would not benefit a party, as those districts are mainly of organizational value, except where the [[district magnitude]] is small or a system which favors larger parties, such as [[D'Hondt method|d'Hondt]], is used.  For example, instead of having three districts, a single large district would exist where the top three candidates in the election would all represent the district.  It would be harder to gerrymander a district where there are multiple winners from that district.

===Mixed systems===
{{Main|Mixed electoral system}}
In mixed systems that use proportional and majoritarian voting principles, the usage of gerrymandering is a constitutional obstacle that states have to deal with. In mixed systems, the advantage a political actor can potentially gain from redrawing district lines is much less than in majoritarian systems. In addition, voting districts are mostly being used to avoid that elected parliamentarians are getting too detached from their constituency. The principle that determines the representation in parliament is usually the proportional aspect of the voting system. Seats in parliament are being allocated to each party in accordance to the proportion of their overall votes. In most mixed systems, winning a voting district merely means that a candidate is guaranteed a seat in parliament but does not expand a party's share in the overall seats.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wattenberg |first1=Martin P. |last2=Shugart |first2=Matthew Soberg |title=Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology |date=6 February 2003 |doi=10.1093/019925768X.001.0001 |publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-160024-1 }}</ref> Gerrymandering can still be used to manipulate the outcome in voting districts. In most democracies with a mixed system, non-partisan institutions are in charge of drawing district lines and gerrymandering is a less common phenomenon.

==Use of databases and Computer Technology==
{{See also|Geographic information system}}

The introduction of modern computers alongside the development of elaborate [[voter database]]s and special districting software has made gerrymandering a far more precise science. Using such databases, political parties can obtain detailed information about every household including political party registration, previous campaign donations, and the number of times residents voted in previous elections and combine it with other predictors of voting behavior such as age, income, race, or education level. With this data, gerrymandering politicians can predict the voting behavior of each potential district with an astonishing degree of precision, leaving little chance for creating an accidentally competitive district.

On the other hand, the introduction of modern computers would allow the United States Census Bureau to calculate more equal populations in every voting district that are based only on districts being the most compact and equal populations. This could be done easily using their Block Centers based on the Global Positioning System rather than street addresses.  With this data, gerrymandering politicians will not be in charge, thus allowing competitive districts again.

Online web apps such as [[Dave's Redistricting]] have allowed users to simulate redistricting states into legislative districts as they wish.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Bradlee |first1=Dave |title=Dave Bradlee |url=http://gardow.com/davebradlee/default.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180914232025/http://gardow.com/davebradlee/default.html |archive-date=14 September 2018 |access-date=3 September 2018 |website=Gardow.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Wang |first1=Sam |date=2 February 2013 |title=The Great Gerrymander of 2012 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-2012.html |access-date=3 September 2018 |website=The New York Times}}</ref> According to Bradlee, the software was designed to "put power in people's hands," and so that they "can see how the process works, so it's a little less mysterious than it was 10 years ago."<ref>{{cite web |last1=Korte |first1=Gregory |title=Technology allows citizens to be part of redistricting process |url=https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-03-21-redistricting21_ST_N.htm |access-date=3 September 2018 |website=USA Today}}</ref>

[[Markov chain Monte Carlo|Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)]] can measure the extent to which redistricting plans favor a particular party or group in election, and can support automated redistricting simulators.<ref name="B Fifield, M Higgins, K Imai, A Tarr, 2015">{{cite web |last1=Fifield |first1=B. |last2=Higgins |first2=M. |last3=Imai |first3=K. |last4=Tarr |first4=A. |date=2015 |title=A new automated redistricting simulator using markov chain monte carlo |url=https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/research/files/redist |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200801022433/https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/research/files/redist |archive-date=1 August 2020 |access-date=9 March 2019 |type=Working Paper}}</ref>

== Means of Proving Gerrymandering ==
Gerrymandering is widely acknowledged as a significant issue in electoral politics, yet proving it remains a complex challenge. Unlike clear-cut cases of voter suppression, gerrymandering often involves subtle manipulations of district boundaries that are difficult to quantify definitively. Traditional methods for detecting it rely on statistical tests and partisan symmetry measures, but these approaches face limitations in legal and computational contexts. 

'''Prominent Research and Considerations'''

'''Past Research and Thought on Gerrymandering'''

Historically, research on gerrymandering was primarily focused on establishing theoretical models to understand the political manipulation of electoral maps. Early scholars emphasized the role of "partisan symmetry" and "wasted votes" as tools for identifying gerrymandering. The concept of "partisan symmetry," proposed by political scientists like Gary King and Robert M. Browning in the 1980s, posits that electoral districts should offer equal representation for political parties, ensuring that one party's vote share is translated into a proportionate number of seats. This early work laid the foundation for later mathematical models used in identifying gerrymandered maps.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The concept of partisan symmetry {{!}} GARY KING |url=https://gking.harvard.edu/publications/term/1586 |access-date=2025-03-15 |website=gking.harvard.edu |language=en}}</ref>

The introduction of computational models in the early 2000s marked a significant shift in how researchers viewed gerrymandering. In particular, the development of Monte Carlo simulations in redistricting research allowed for the creation of randomized district maps, which provided a basis for comparing actual districts with "neutral" or unbiased maps. These simulations were first used by political scientists like Moon and McDonald in 2004 to assess how likely it was that district boundaries were manipulated to favor one political party. While useful, early simulations were often criticized for their computational limitations and inability to account for the complex social and political considerations behind districting processes.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Brunell |first=Thomas L. |date=January 2006 |title=Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts Eliminates Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes toward Congress |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/abs/rethinking-redistricting-how-drawing-uncompetitive-districts-eliminates-gerrymanders-enhances-representation-and-improves-attitudes-toward-congress/BC34DD3D96E5C0B706E2E732E0B3F6E1 |journal=PS: Political Science & Politics |language=en |volume=39 |issue=1 |pages=77–85 |doi=10.1017/S1049096506060173 |issn=1537-5935}}</ref>

'''Recent Developments and Evolving Perspectives'''

In recent years, however, there has been a surge of more advanced computational techniques to quantify gerrymandering. The development of algorithms that generate thousands of alternative district maps, such as "Redist," and their ability to compare these with actual maps has improved the precision of identifying gerrymandering.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Siliezar |first=Juan |date=2022-11-03 |title=An algorithm to detect gerrymandering |url=https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2022/11/an-algorithm-to-detect-gerrymandering/?utm_source=chatgpt.com |access-date=2025-03-15 |website=Harvard Gazette |language=en-US}}</ref> These advancements go beyond the earlier focus on partisan symmetry and now incorporate various statistical measures of map compactness, efficiency gaps, and the proportionality of voting outcomes. This shift to data-driven approaches represents a significant departure from past methodologies, which often relied more on subjective legal arguments and less on objective mathematical models.

Furthermore, legal scholars have begun to acknowledge the complexities of both racial and partisan considerations in gerrymandering cases, reflecting a more nuanced understanding than in earlier decades. In the past, courts were primarily concerned with protecting minority voting rights under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which often led to rulings based on race-focused redistricting. Recent scholarship, however, has illuminated how race and partisanship are often intertwined in redistricting decisions, making it more challenging to separate legal claims based on these two factors. Legal challenges in cases like North Carolina and Wisconsin have sparked new debates on how to approach partisan gerrymandering in the absence of a clear constitutional standard. In contrast to earlier decades, where courts were more likely to allow political considerations in redistricting, current trends show a growing sensitivity to the interplay of race, politics, and fairness.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Admin |first=Southern California Law Review |date=2023-04-24 |title=Race and Politics: The Problem of Entanglement in Gerrymandering Cases |url=https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/2023/04/24/race-and-politics-the-problem-of-entanglement-in-gerrymandering-cases/?utm_source=chatgpt.com |access-date=2025-03-15 |website=Southern California Law Review |language=en-US}}</ref>

'''Recent Research and Scholarship (2020s)'''

Recent research, such as a 2025 study on empirical power analysis, examines the reliability of hypothesis testing to detect gerrymandering, demonstrating how certain conditions can lead to false negatives or inconclusive results.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Clark |first1=Ranthony A. |title=Empirical Power Analysis of a Statistical Test to Quantify Gerrymandering |date=2025-01-10 |arxiv=2501.05761 |last2=Glenn |first2=Susan |last3=Lee |first3=Harlin |last4=Villar |first4=Soledad}}</ref> Additionally, mathematicians like Jonathon Mattingly have been developing standardized district fairness assessments, aiming to create more precise tools for identifying gerrymandering.<ref>{{Cite web |title=DCII Big Challenges Series: Jonathon Mattingly, March 6 – Andrea K. Barreiro |url=https://people.smu.edu/abarreiro/2025/02/28/dcii-big-challenges-series-jonathon-mattingly-march-6/?utm_source=chatgpt.com |access-date=2025-03-15 |website=people.smu.edu}}</ref> These advancements highlight the ongoing effort to make gerrymandering easier to prove using objective, data-driven methods.

Beyond statistical modeling, legal battles continue to shape the fight against gerrymandering. A 2025 Supreme Court ruling on racial gerrymandering in Louisiana found that a congressional district had been unconstitutionally drawn to weaken Black voter influence.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tandanpolie |first=Tatyana |date=2025-03-11 |title=The Supreme Court — and Black voters — may decide who controls the next Congress |url=https://www.salon.com/2025/03/11/the--and-black--may-decide-controls-the-next-congress/?utm_source=chatgpt.com |access-date=2025-03-15 |website=Salon |language=en}}</ref> This decision underscores the judiciary's role in addressing discriminatory redistricting, even as the Court has historically hesitated to intervene in cases of partisan gerrymandering. 

Legal scholars like Michael Gentithes argue that, despite these challenges, extreme gerrymandering can still be contested through strategic litigation.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Cooper |first=Lance |date=2025-02-06 |title=Recent Supreme Court Rulings and Extreme Gerrymandering |url=https://federalism.org/library/news/recent-supreme-court-rulings-and-extreme-gerrymandering/ |access-date=2025-03-15 |website=Center for the Study of Federalism |language=en-US}}</ref> The evolving legal landscape suggests that while gerrymandering remains a persistent issue, courts may still serve as a check against the most egregious forms of district manipulation.

In addition to legal and mathematical approaches, policymakers are considering alternative electoral structures to mitigate gerrymandering. One proposed solution is the implementation of multi-member districts with proportional representation, which could reduce the incentives for manipulating district lines. Other discussions focus on independent redistricting commissions and algorithm-driven mapping tools to remove partisan influence from the process.<ref>{{Cite web |author=Michael Li |author2=Peter Miller |date=2024-12-20 |title=Proportional Representation Can Reduce the Impact of Gerrymandering |website=Brennan Center for Justice |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/proportional-representation-can-reduce-impact-gerrymandering?utm_source=chatgpt.com |access-date=2025-03-15 |language=en}}</ref> While proving gerrymandering remains challenging due to its technical and legal complexities, these emerging solutions offer promising avenues for creating a fairer and more representative electoral system.

== Difference from malapportionment ==
Gerrymandering in its original sense should not be confused with [[malapportionment]], whereby the number of eligible voters per elected representative can vary widely. In Australia, however, the term was widely used to refer to malapportionment. Moreover, the ''-mander'' suffix was applied to particular malapportionments, such as the [[Playmander]] in South Australia. 

Sometimes political representatives use both gerrymandering and malapportionment to try to maintain power.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/gerrymandering|title=gerrymandering {{!}} politics|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia Britannica|access-date=27 May 2017|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine|last=Barasch|first=Emily|title=The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twisted-history-of-gerrymandering-in-american-politics/262369/|magazine=The Atlantic|language=en-US|access-date=27 May 2017}}</ref> One of the earliest examples of [[malapportionment]], [[rotten boroughs]], was practiced in England from the 13th century until the [[Reform Act 1832|1832 reform act]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Seabrook |first=Nick |date=2022 |title=One Person, One Vote: A Surprising History of Gerrymandering in America |edition=First |location=New York |publisher=Pantheon Books |isbn=978-0-593-31586-6 |oclc=1286675891}}</ref> A striking modern example of [[malapportionment]] is the [[U.S. senate]], where states receive equal representation despite widely varying populations.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Griffin |first=John D. |date=2006 |title=Senate Apportionment as a Source of Political Inequality |journal=Legislative Studies Quarterly |volume=31 |issue=3 |pages=405–432 |doi=10.3162/036298006X201869 |jstor=40263393 |issn=0362-9805}}</ref>

==Historical Examples by Country==
Several western democracies, notably [[Israel]], the [[Netherlands]] and [[Slovakia]] employ an electoral system with only one (nationwide) voting district for election of national representatives. This precludes gerrymandering.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.vox.com/cards/gerrymandering-explained/how-do-other-countries-handle-redistricting|title=How do other countries handle redistricting?|date=15 April 2014|website=vox.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_beh.htm|title=The Electoral System in Israel|access-date=8 October 2018|website=Official Website of the Knesset}}</ref> Other European countries such as [[Austria]], the [[Czech Republic]] or [[Sweden]], among many others, have electoral districts with fixed boundaries (usually one district for each administrative division). The number of representatives for each district can change after a census due to population shifts, but their boundaries do not change. This also effectively eliminates gerrymandering.

Additionally, many countries where the president is directly elected by the citizens (e.g. [[France]], [[Poland]], among others) use only one electoral district for their presidential election with the winner of the popular vote winning the position, despite using multiple districts to elect representatives.

===Australia===
====National====
Gerrymandering has not typically been considered a problem in the national [[Australian electoral system]] largely because drawing of electoral boundaries has typically been done by non-partisan [[Australian Electoral Commission|electoral commissions]]. There have been historical cases of [[malapportionment]], whereby the distribution of electors to electorates was not in proportion to the population [[Electoral system of Australia#Gerrymandering and malapportionment|in several states]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rydon |first=Joan |date=1968 |title="Malapportionment"—Australian style |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00323266808401138 |journal=Politics |language=en |volume=3 |issue=2 |pages=133–147 |doi=10.1080/00323266808401138 |issn=0032-3268 |via=Taylor & Francis}}</ref> though most of these have been eliminated over time.

In 1996, the [[High Court of Australia]] in ''[[McGinty v Western Australia]]'' confirmed the constitutional legality of electoral systems where different constituencies were differently weighted from others in the same system; in particular, the case approved Western Australia's system, described below.

====South Australia====
{{main|Playmander}}
[[Sir Thomas Playford]] was [[Premiers of the Australian states|Premier]] of the state of [[South Australia]] from 1938 to 1965 as a result of a system of malapportionment, which became known as the [[Playmander]].<ref>{{cite book|last = Tilby Stock|first = Jenny|year = 1996|chapter = The 'Playmander': its origins, operations and effect on South Australia|editor1-last = O'Neil|editor1-first = Bernard|editor2-last = Raftery|editor2-first = Judith|editor3-last = Round|editor3-first = Kerrie|title = Playford's South Australia: Essays on the History of South Australia, 1933–1968|publisher = Association of Professional Historians|pages = 73–90|isbn = 978-0-646-29092-8}}</ref>

====Queensland====
{{Main|Bjelkemander}}
In the state of [[Queensland]], malapportionment combined with a gerrymander under [[National Party of Australia – Queensland|Country Party]] Premier Sir [[Joh Bjelke-Petersen]] (knighted by [[Queen Elizabeth II]] at his own request) became nicknamed the [[Bjelkemander]] in the 1970s and 1980s.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Orr|first1=Graham D.|last2=Levy|first2=Ron|title=Electoral Malapportionment: Partisanship, Rhetoric and Reform in the Shadow of the Agrarian Strong-Man|journal=[[Griffith Law Review]]|year=2009|volume=18|issue=3|pages=638–665|ssrn=1579826|doi=10.1080/10854659.2009.10854659|s2cid=145695031}}</ref>

The malapportionment had been originally designed to favor rural areas in the 1930s-1950s by a [[Australian Labor Party|Labor]] government who drew their support from agricultural and mine workers in rural areas. This helped Labor to stay in government from 1932 to 1957. As demographics and political views shifted over time, this system came to favor the Country Party instead.

The Country Party led by [[Frank Nicklin]] came to power in 1957, deciding to keep the malapportionment that favored them. In 1968, Joh Bjelke-Petersen became leader of the Country Party and [[Premier of Queensland|Premier]]. In the 1970s, he further expanded the malapportionment and gerrymandering which then became known as the ''Bjelkemander''. Under the system, electoral boundaries were drawn so that rural electorates had as few as half as many voters as metropolitan ones and regions with high levels of support for the Labor Party were concentrated into fewer electorates, allowing Bjelke-Petersen's government to remain in power for despite attracting substantially less than 50% of the vote. One district had non-contiguous parts.

In the [[1986 Queensland state election|1986 election]], for example, the [[National Party of Australia|National Party]] received 39.64% of the first preference vote and won 49 seats (in the 89 seat Parliament) whilst the Labor Opposition received 41.35% but won only 30 seats.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://elections.uwa.edu.au/elecdetail.lasso?keyvalue=801|title=Parliament of Queensland, Assembly election, 1 November 1986|author=Australian Government and Politics Database|access-date=17 July 2013|archive-date=12 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170312175630/http://elections.uwa.edu.au/elecdetail.lasso?keyvalue=801}}</ref> Bjelke-Petersen also used the system to disadvantage [[Liberal Party of Australia|Liberal Party]] (traditionally allied with the Country Party) voters in urban areas, allowing Bjelke-Petersen's Country Party to rule alone, shunning the Liberals.

Bjelke-Petersen also used Queensland Police brutality to quell protests, and Queensland under his government was frequently described as a [[police state]]. In 1987 he was eventually forced to resign in disgrace after the [[Fitzgerald Inquiry]] revealed wide-ranging corruption in his cabinet and the Queensland Police, resulting in the prosecution and jailing of Country Party members. Before resigning, Bjelke-Petersen asked the Governor of Queensland to sack his own cabinet, in an unsuccessful attempt to cling to power. Labor won the next election, and have remained the dominant party in Queensland since then. The Country Party and Liberal Party eventually merged in Queensland to become the [[Liberal National Party of Queensland|Liberal-National Party]], while the Country Party in other states was renamed as the National Party.

====Western Australia====
The [[Western Australian Legislative Council]] was long gerrymandered via a malapportionment that clearly favored the rural conservative National Party, with the state split into electoral regions with significant differences in voter numbers. After the Labor Party won a landslide victory in both houses in the [[2021 Western Australian state election]], they abolished the electoral region system, replacing it with a single statewide constituency electing 37 members via optional preferential voting that creates a one-vote, one-value system.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Shine |first1=Rhiannon |last2=Perpitch |first2=Nicolas |date=16 November 2021 |title=WA government uses majority to introduce sweeping changes to electoral system |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-17/wa-government-uses-majority-to-overhaul-wa-electoral-system/100625010 |access-date=2024-10-22 |website=ABC News}}</ref>

====City of Sydney Council====
In 2014 the conservative Liberal Party NSW State Government gerrymandered the local [[City of Sydney]] council elections as part of their continued attempts to remove [[Clover Moore]] from elected positions. Moore had already been removed as a state government representative by laws banning serving simultaneously as a state representative and a local council member, and their attempt to remove her from the Council saw the State Government introduce a law giving all businesses in the area two votes and requiring the council to constantly update the electoral roll and inform each business of its eligibility to vote. Moore called the laws an "undemocratic gerrymander" and election analyst [[Antony Green]] said the changes were "clearly an attempt to disadvantage Clover Moore". The laws were specific to the City of Sydney council and not rolled out across the rest of the state councils. The attempt failed, and Moore retained her position as Lord Mayor of Sydney through multiple further elections.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.sbs.com.au/news/the-feed/article/comment-why-clover-moore-is-better-at-politics-than-everyone-else/5xno6tpjt | title=Comment: Why Clover Moore is better at politics than everyone else }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/clover-moores-power-under-threat-after-more-than-20000-business-voters-enrolled-20160808-gqn92d.html | title=Clover Moore's power under threat after more than 20,000 'business' voters enrolled | date=8 August 2016 }}</ref>

===Bahamas===
The [[1962 Bahamian general election]] was likely influenced by gerrymandering.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Elections in the Americas: a data handbook|author=Nohlen, Dieter |year=2005|isbn=0-19-925358-7|location=New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |oclc=58051010}}</ref> The election was the first to allow [[universal suffrage]]. The [[Progressive Liberal Party]] (PLP) received 44% of the vote, while the [[United Bahamian Party]] (UBP) won only 36% of the vote. The other 20% was for [[Third party (politics)|third parties]] and independents.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hughes |first=Colin A. |title=Race and politics in the Bahamas |date=1981 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |isbn=0-312-66136-3 |location=New York |oclc=7550764}}</ref> Despite receiving a majority of the votes, the PLP won only 8 of the 33 seats in the [[Parliament of the Bahamas|House of Assembly]], while the UBP won 18 seats.<ref>{{Cite web |date=27 September 2021 |title=General Elections 1962 – UBP Wax Lyrical About Losing – Winning Came As A Surprise |url=https://bahamianology.com/general-elections-1962-ubp-wax-lyrical-about-losing-winning-came-as-a-surprise/ |access-date=7 December 2022 |website=Bahamianology |language=en-US}}</ref>

===Canada===
Gerrymandering used to be prominent in [[Canadian politics]], but is no longer prominent, after independent [[redistricting commission|electoral boundary redistribution commission]]s were established in all provinces.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=Prokop|first=Andrew|date=15 April 2014|title=How Canada ended gerrymandering|url=https://www.vox.com/2014/4/15/5604284/us-elections-are-rigged-but-canada-knows-how-to-fix-them|access-date=8 April 2021|website=Vox|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Courtney |first1=John C. |title=Redistricting: What the United States Can Learn from Canada |journal=Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy |date=September 2004 |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=488–500 |doi=10.1089/1533129041492123 }}</ref> Early in [[Canada|Canadian]] history, both the federal and provincial levels used gerrymandering to try to maximize partisan power. When [[Alberta]] and [[Saskatchewan]] were admitted to [[Canadian Confederation|Confederation]] in 1905, their original district boundaries were set forth in the respective [[Alberta Act|Alberta]] and [[Saskatchewan Act]]s. Federal [[Liberal Party of Canada|Liberal]] [[cabinet (government)|cabinet]] members devised the boundaries to ensure the election of provincial Liberal governments.<ref>Breen, David. "The Turner Thesis and the Canadian West: A Closer Look at the Ranching Frontier." In ''Essays on Western History.'' Thomas, Lewis G., ed. (University of Alberta
Press: Edmonton, 1976), 153–54. {{ISBN|0-88864-013-7}}</ref> [[British Columbia]] used a combination of [[single-member]] and [[Dual-member proportional representation|dual-member constituencies]] to solidify the power of the center-right [[British Columbia Social Credit Party]] until [[1991 British Columbia general election|1991]].

Since responsibility for drawing federal and provincial electoral boundaries was handed over to independent agencies, the problem has largely been eliminated at those levels of government. [[Manitoba]] was the first province to authorize a non-partisan group to define constituency boundaries in the 1950s.<ref name=":0" /> In 1964, the [[Government of Canada|federal government]] delegated the drawing of boundaries for [[Electoral district (Canada)|federal electoral districts]] to the non-partisan agency [[Elections Canada]] which answers to [[Parliament of Canada|Parliament]] rather than the government of the day.

As a result, gerrymandering is not generally a major issue in Canada except at the civic level.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Silver |first1=Jim |title=The failure of civic reform movements in Winnipeg civic elections: 1971–1992 |date=1995 |hdl=10680/1046 |hdl-access=free |publisher=Institute of Urban Studies |oclc=938955594 }}</ref> Although city wards are recommended by independent agencies, [[city councils]] occasionally overrule them. That is much more likely if the city is not homogenous and different neighborhoods have sharply different opinions about city policy direction.

In 2006, a controversy arose in [[Prince Edward Island]] over the [[Government of Prince Edward Island|provincial government]]'s decision to throw out an electoral map drawn by an independent commission. Instead, they created two new maps. The government adopted the second of them, which was designed by the [[caucus]] of the governing [[Progressive Conservative Party of Prince Edward Island]]. Opposition parties and the media attacked Premier [[Pat Binns]] for what they saw as gerrymandering of districts. Among other things, the government adopted a map that ensured that every current [[Member of the Legislative Assembly]] from the premier's party had a district to run in for re-election, but in the original map, several had been redistricted.<ref>{{cite news |title=No Christmas election: Binns |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/no-christmas-election-binns-1.608298 |work=[[cbc.ca]] |date=16 November 2006 }}</ref> However, in the [[2007 Prince Edward Island general election|2007 provincial election]] only seven of 20 incumbent Members of the Legislative Assembly were re-elected (seven did not run for re-election), and the government was defeated.

===Chile===

The [[Military dictatorship of Chile (1973–1990)|military government]] which ruled [[Chile]] from 1973 to 1990 was ousted in a [[1988 Chilean national plebiscite|national plebiscite]] in October 1988. Opponents of General [[Augusto Pinochet]] voted NO to remove him from power and to trigger democratic elections, while supporters (mostly from the right-wing) voted YES to keep him in office for another eight years.

Five months prior to the plebiscite, the regime published a law regulating future elections and referendums, but the configuration of electoral districts and the manner in which [[National Congress of Chile|National Congress]] seats would be awarded were only added to the law seven months after the referendum.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=30082&tipoVersion=0 |title=Ley-18700 06-May-1988 Ministerio del Interior |publisher=Leychile.cl |access-date=19 December 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idLey=18799 |title=Ley-18799 26-May-1989 Ministerio del Interior |publisher=Leychile.cl |access-date=19 December 2010}}</ref>

For the [[Chamber of Deputies of Chile|Chamber of Deputies]] (lower house), [[Electoral division of Chile|60 districts]] were drawn by grouping (mostly) neighboring [[Communes of Chile|communes]] (the smallest administrative subdivision in the country) within the same [[Regions of Chile|region]] (the largest). It was established that two deputies would be elected per district, with the most voted coalition needing to outpoll its closest rival by a margin of more than 2-to-1 to take both seats. The results of the 1988 plebiscite show that neither the "NO" side nor the "YES" side outpolled the other by said margin in any of the newly established districts. They also showed that the vote/seat ratio was lower in districts which supported the "YES" side and higher in those where the "NO" was strongest.<ref>[http://flacsochile.org/biblioteca/pub/memoria/1989/000261.pdf Documento de trabajo. Programa FLACSO-Chile. Número 428, septiembre 1989] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171109022850/http://flacsochile.org/biblioteca/pub/memoria/1989/000261.pdf |date=9 November 2017 }}. FLACSO Chile Biblioteca.</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Navia |first1=Patricio |last2=Rojas |first2=Priscilla |title=Representación y tamaño de los distritos electorales en Chile, 1988–2002 |trans-title=Representation and size of electoral districts in Chile, 1988–2002 |language=es |journal=Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) |date=2005 |volume=25 |issue=2 |pages=91–116 |doi=10.4067/S0718-090X2005000200004 |doi-access=free }}</ref> In spite of this, at the [[1989 Chilean general election|1989 parliamentary election]], the center-left opposition was able to capture both seats (the so-called ''doblaje'') in twelve out of 60 districts, winning control of 60% of the Chamber.

[[Senate of Chile|Senate]] constituencies were created by grouping all lower-chamber districts in a region, or by dividing a region into two constituencies of contiguous lower-chamber districts. The 1980 Constitution allocated a number of seats to appointed senators, making it harder for one side to change the Constitution by itself. The opposition won 22 senate seats in the 1989 election, taking both seats in three out of 19 constituencies, controlling 58% of the elected Senate, but only 47% of the full Senate. The unelected senators were eliminated in the 2005 constitutional reforms, but the electoral map has remained largely untouched (two new regions were created in 2007, one of which altered the composition of two senatorial constituencies; the first election to be affected by this minor change took place in 2013).

===Croatia===
During the process of declaration and recognition of [[independence of Croatia]] the [[Administrative divisions of Croatia|administrative divisions]] of the country was reorganized into [[Counties of Croatia|20 newly established counties]] and the city of [[Zagreb]].<ref name="Stjepanović">{{cite journal |last=Stjepanović |first=Dejan |date=2015 |title=Territoriality and Citizenship: Membership and Sub-State Polities in Post-Yugoslav Space |journal=[[Europe-Asia Studies]] |volume=67 |issue=7 |pages=1030–1055 |doi=10.1080/09668136.2015.1068743 |s2cid=197764089  |hdl=20.500.11820/1da5fc55-7219-4a16-be44-780d7168a0d9 |url=https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/12810217/CITSEE_WORKING_PAPER_2012_22.pdf |hdl-access=free }}</ref> All of the counties had [[Croat]] ethnic majority and were in part established as a gerrymandering effort to delegitimize [[Republic of Serbian Krajina]] [[secession]] as well as any [[Regionalism (politics)|regionalist]] requests in the historic provinces of [[Istria]] and [[Dalmatia]] while at the same time strengthening [[dominant-party]]'s control over the [[Chamber of Counties]].<ref name="Stjepanović"/> Following the end of the [[Croatian War of Independence]] and during the [[UNTAES]] administration in [[Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia (1995–1998)|Eastern Slavonia]] Serb political leader [[Vojislav Stanimirović (politician)|Vojislav Stanimirović]] accused Croatian authorities of intentional division of the Serb community in the region into [[Osijek-Baranja]] and [[Vukovar-Srijem County]] with an aim to dilute their political initiatives.<ref name="Babić">{{cite journal |last = Babić |first = Nikica |date = 2011 |title = Srpska oblast Istočna Slavonija, Baranja i Zapadni Srijem – od "Oluje" do dovršetka mirne reintegracije hrvatskog Podunavlja (prvi dio) |url = https://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=116219&lang=en |journal = Scrina Slavonia |volume = 11 |issue = 1 |pages = 393–454}}</ref>

[[Croatian Parliament electoral districts]] were also described as a form of gerrymandering preventing genuine political competition with each district selecting the same number of MPs while districts' population varied over the legally permitted ±5 percent.<ref name="Kotarski">{{cite journal |last=Kotarski |first=Kristijan |date=2021 |title=When EU Political Convergence Fails in New Member States: Corporate and Party State Capture in Croatia and the Czech Republic |journal=[[Europe-Asia Studies]] |volume=73 |issue=4 |pages=740–765 |doi=10.1080/09668136.2020.1864297 |s2cid=234030361  }}</ref> In 2010 [[Constitutional Court of Croatia]] stated in a report that population discrepancies among electoral districts is higher than ±5 percent and that districts' borders should be redrawn to address the concern.<ref name="Hina-Jutarnji-2015">{{cite web |author=n.a. |date=29 September 2015 |access-date=26 November 2022 |title=Ustavni sud odbio ocijeniti ustavnost Zakona o izbornim jedinicama |publisher=[[Jutarnji list]] |url=https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/ustavni-sud-odbio-ocijeniti-ustavnost-zakona-o-izbornim-jedinicama-305605 }}</ref> [[2021 Croatian census]] indicated even further differences in population with the difference in needed number of votes in the smallest ([[Croatian Parliament electoral districts#Electoral district IV|Electoral district IV]]) and the largest ([[Croatian Parliament electoral districts#Electoral district VII|Electoral district VII]]) district for a single parliamentary mandate being 10,5 thousands votes.<ref name="Puljić Šego">{{cite web |author=Iva Puljić Šego |date=28 October 2022 |access-date=26 November 2022 |title=N1 doznaje: Ne ispuni li se jedan uvjet, Ustavni sud može i zabraniti izbore |publisher=[[N1 (TV channel)]] |url=https://n1info.hr/vijesti/n1-doznaje-ne-ispuni-li-se-jedan-uvjet-ustavni-sud-moze-i-zabraniti-izbore/ }}</ref> In October 2022 President of the Constitutional Court of Croatia [[Miroslav Šeparović]] warned that this situation may jeopardize constitutionality of the following elections in Croatia.<ref name="Iva Boban Valečić">{{cite web |author=Iva Boban Valečić |date=28 October 2022 |access-date=26 November 2022 |title=Miroslav Šeparović upozorava: Nezamislivo je da idemo na izbore bez promjene izbornih jedinica! To će biti neustavno |publisher=[[Večernji list]] |url=https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/miroslav-separovic-upozorava-nezamislivo-je-da-idemo-na-izbore-bez-promjene-izbornih-jedinica-to-ce-biti-neustavno-1628850}}</ref>

===El Salvador===

On 30 December 2022, Salvadoran President [[Nayib Bukele]] tweeted that he believed that the country's [[Municipalities of El Salvador|262 municipalities]] should be reduced to 50.<ref name="PLmun1">{{cite web|url=https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2023/01/04/reforma-de-municipios-en-el-salvador-crea-fricciones|title=Reforma de Municipios en El Salvador Crea Fricciones|trans-title=Municipality Reform in El Salvador Creates Frictions|language=es|work=[[Prensa Latina]]|date=4 January 2023|access-date=5 January 2023|archive-date=5 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230105080223/https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2023/01/04/reforma-de-municipios-en-el-salvador-crea-fricciones}}</ref> Opposition politicians accused him of attempting to gerrymander the municipalities and consolidate his power ahead of the [[2024 Salvadoran general election|2024 general election]].<ref name="ESmun1">{{cite web|url=https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/reduccion-municipios-debe-ser-base-censo/1029562/2023/|title=Reducción de Municipios Debe Ser con Base en Censo, Señala VAMOS|trans-title=Municipality Reduction Should be Based on Census, Signals VAMOS|date=4 January 2022|access-date=5 January 2022|first1=Eugenia|last1=Velásquez|work=[[El Diario de Hoy|El Salvador.com]]}}</ref><ref name="ESmun2">{{cite web|url=https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/alcaldias-asamblea-legislativa-nayib-bukele/1028982/2023/|title=Intención de Bukele de Reducir Municipios es para Concentrar Más Poder, Afirman Expertos|trans-title=Bukele's Intention to Reduce Municipalities is to Concentrate More Power, Affirm Experts|language=es|work=[[El Diario de Hoy|El Salvador.com]]|date=3 January 2023|access-date=5 January 2023|first1=Eugenia|last1=Velásquez}}</ref><ref name="Esmun4">{{cite web|url=https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/accion-ciudadana-reduccion-municipal/1029584/2023/|title=Reducir Municipios Generaría un Efecto para Deteriorar las Elecciones Municipales, Reitera Acción Ciudadana|trans-title=Reducing Municipalities Will Generate and Effect to Deteriorate the Municipal Elections, Reiterates Citizen Action|date=5 January 2023|access-date=5 January 2023|language=es|work=[[El Diario de Hoy|El Salvador.com]]|first1=Abigail|last1=Parada}}</ref> On 20 February 2023, [[List of presidents of the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador|Legislative Assembly President]] [[Ernesto Castro]] announced that the [[Nuevas Ideas]] (NI) political party was formally evaluating a proposal to reduce the number of municipalities as suggested by Bukele.<ref name="LPG64">{{cite web|url=https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Oficialismo-evalua-proponer-reduccion-en-el-numero-de--los-municipios-y-diputados-20230220-0100.html|title=Oficialismo Evalúa Proponer Reducción en el Número de los Municipios y Diputados|trans-title=Officials Evaluate Proposing Reduction in the Number of Municipalities and Deputies|language=es|date=21 February 2023|access-date=21 February 2023|work=[[La Prensa Gráfica]]|first1=Lissette|last1=Mondragón}}</ref>

===France===
France is one of the few countries to let legislatures redraw the map with no check.<ref>Balinski & Baïou (2002), ''Découpage électoral'', Pour la science</ref> In practice, the [[Parliament of France]] sets up an executive commission. Districts called ''[[arrondissement]]s'' were used in the [[French Third Republic|Third Republic]] and under the [[French Fifth Republic|Fifth Republic]] they are called ''circonscriptions''. During the Third Republic, some reforms of arrondissements, which were also used for administrative purposes, were largely suspected to have been arranged to favor the [[kingmaker]] in the [[National Assembly (France)|National Assembly]], the [[Radical Party (France)|Radical Party]].

The dissolution of [[Seine (department)|Seine]] and [[Seine-et-Oise]] départements by [[de Gaulle]] was seen as a case of gerrymandering to counter communist influence around Paris.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://21maps.com/quand-la-politique-decoupe-la-geographie|title=Quand la politique découpe la géographie • 21Maps|date=15 March 2018|website=21maps.com}}</ref>

In the modern regime, there were three designs: in 1958 (regime change), 1987 (by [[Charles Pasqua]]) and 2010 (by [[Alain Marleix]]), three times by conservative governments. Pasqua's drawing was known to have been particularly good at gerrymandering, resulting in 80% of the seats with 58% of the vote in [[1993 French legislative election|1993]], and forcing Socialists [[1997 French legislative election|in the 1997 snap election]] to enact multiple pacts with smaller parties in order to win again, this time as a coalition. In 2010, the Sarkozy government created 12 districts for expats.

The [[Conseil Constitutionnel|Constitutional council]] was called twice by the opposition to decide about gerrymandering, but it never considered partisan disproportions. However, it forced the Marleix committee to respect an 80–120% population ratio, ending a tradition dating back to the Revolution in which ''départements'', however small in population, would send at least two MPs.

{{Multiple image|total_width = 400
|image1=Circonscriptions nouvelle caledonie 1.svg
|image2=Résultats par commune référendum Nouvelle Calédonie 2020.png
|footer=On the left-hand side, the ''circonscriptions''; the [[2020 New Caledonian independence referendum|2020 independence referendum]] map on the right.
}}
The constituencies in [[New Caledonia]] are accused of being adjusted to ensure a loyalist win. The [[New Caledonia's 1st constituency|1st constituency]] combines the [[Loyalty Islands]] (a separatist province)<ref name=RNZ>{{cite web|url=https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/517954/emmanuel-macron-s-gamble-on-new-caledonia-s-crisis|title=Emmanuel Macron's gamble on New Caledonia's crisis|date=28 May 2024|access-date=3 September 2024|author=Patrick Decloitre|work=[[Radio New Zealand]]}}</ref> with the capital [[Noumea]], while the [[New Caledonia's 2nd constituency|2nd constituency]] combines the rural separatist-dominated [[North Province, New Caledonia|North Province]]<ref name=RNZ/> with most of the [[South Province, New Caledonia|South Province]].<ref name=IB>{{cite web|url=https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/tjibaou-and-metzdorf-win-new-caledonias-seats-in-french-national-assembly/|title= Tjibaou and Metzdorf win New Caledonia's seats in French National Assembly|author=Nic Maclellan|date=July 8, 2024|access-date=3 September 2024|work=[[Islands Business]]}}</ref> There had been no separatist deputy from the [[1986 French legislative election|1986]] to the [[2024 French legislative election|2024]] election with the victory of [[Emmanuel Tjibaou]].<ref name=IB/>

In the [[1998 French regional elections|1998 regional election]], the [[Savoyan League]] won one seat but it could not run for re-election in 2004 because they now had to propose lists in every departments of [[Rhône-Alpes]].<ref name="Faucigny 2012">{{cite news|first=Patrick-Alain|last=Bertoni|url=http://www.pour-la-savoie.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012.10.21-LS-LE-POISON-DE-LA-DIVISION.pdf|title=Ligue savoisienne, congrès du Bois : "Le poison de la division" rendu responsable de sa soustraction du paysage politique|work=[[Le Faucigny]]|date=1 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211201012620/http://www.pour-la-savoie.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012.10.21-LS-LE-POISON-DE-LA-DIVISION.pdf#federation=archive.wikiwix.com&tab=url|archive-date=1 December 2021|access-date=2 May 2025|url-status=bot: unknown}}</ref>

===Germany===<!--I rewrote this paragraph. Somebody please review it.-->

Since [[Germany]] utilizes a [[proportional representation]] system, gerrymandering is rarely a problem. There is, however, one situation in which gerrymandering can affect an election. In Germany for a party to win any seat, it has to win at least 5% of the vote or three constituencies. This latter rule was applied most recently in the [[2021 German federal election|2021 federal election]], in which the [[The Left (Germany)|Left]] entered the [[Bundestag]] despite winning less than 5% of the vote.

In 2000 the electoral constituencies were redrawn and the PDS, which entered the Bundestag in the elections of 1994 and 1998 with this rule, accused the SPD, who were in power at the time of redrawing the constituencies, of gerrymandering them by breaking up districts in East Berlin, a PDS stronghold, and combining them with West Berlin. In the [[2002 German federal election|2002 federal election]] the PDS lost their third constituency and entered the Bundestag with only two seats. Had they won a third direct seat, they would have qualified for an additional 25 seats.

Another scenario in which gerrymandering can affect German federal election is when a party wins more constituencies than their overall share of the popular vote—those extra seats, called "[[Overhang seat|Überhangmandate]]", remain. In the [[2009 German federal election|Bundestag election of 2009]], [[Angela Merkel]]'s [[CDU/CSU]] gained 24 such extra seats, while no other party gained any;<ref name=":2">{{cite web |title=Overhang mandates – The Federal Returning Officer |url=https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/service/glossar/u/ueberhangmandate.html |access-date=10 May 2020 |publisher=Statistisches Bundesamt}}</ref> this skewed the result so much that the [[Federal Constitutional Court of Germany]] issued two rulings declaring the existing election laws invalid and requiring the Bundestag to pass a new law limiting such extra seats to no more than 15. In 2013, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court ruled on the constitutionality of Überhangmandate. From then on each other party would receive seats as well to remedy the disproportion, thereby making it impossible to have disproportionate election results.

===Greece===
{{expand section|with=[[1920 Greek legislative election]]|date=August 2024}}
Gerrymandering has been rather common in [[Greece|Greek]] history since organized parties with national ballots only appeared after the 1926 Constitution.{{clarify|reason=Why was it common if there were no parties? Also, why was there then only one case BEFORE it?|date=October 2013}} The only case before that was the creation of the Piraeus electoral district in 1906, in order to give the Theotokis party a safe district.

A notable case of gerrymandering in Greece was in the [[1956 Greek legislative election|1956 legislative election]]. While in previous elections the districts were based on the [[prefecture]] level (νομός),<ref>{{Cite web |last=Grilla |first=Michael |date=22 May 2007 |title=www.eleftheria.gr |url=https://www.eleftheria.gr/index.php?MDL=pages&page=article&SiteID=MTg5Ng==&all=1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927043250/https://www.eleftheria.gr/index.php?MDL=pages&page=article&SiteID=MTg5Ng==&all=1 |archive-date=27 September 2007 |access-date=7 December 2022 |website=www.eleftheria.gr |language=el}}</ref> for 1956 the country was split in districts of varying sizes, some being the size of prefectures, some the size of sub-prefectures (επαρχία) and others somewhere in between. In small districts the winning party would take all seats, in intermediate size, it would take most and there was proportional representation in the largest districts. The districts were created in such a way that small districts were those that traditionally voted for the right while large districts were those that voted against the right.

This system has become known as the three-phase (τριφασικό) system or the [[baklava]] system (because, as baklava is split into full pieces and corner pieces, the country was also split into disproportionate pieces). The opposition, being composed of the center and the left, formed a coalition with the sole intent of changing the electoral law and then calling new elections. Even though the centrist and leftist opposition won the popular vote (1,620,007 votes against 1,594,992), the right-wing [[National Radical Union|ERE]] won the majority of seats (165 to 135) and was to lead the country for the next two years.<ref>{{cite book |last=Dimitras |first=Panayote Elias |chapter=Electoral Systems in Greece |date=1994 |title=Eastern European Development and Public Policy |pages=143–175 |editor-last=Nagel |editor-first=Stuart S. |location=London |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-23366-3_10 |isbn=978-1-349-23366-3 |editor2-last=Rukavishnikov |editor2-first=Vladimir}}</ref>

===Hong Kong===
In [[Hong Kong]], functional constituencies are demarcated by the government and defined in statutes, making them prone to gerrymandering. The functional constituency for the information technology sector was particular criticized for gerrymandering and voteplanting.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a%3Do%26d%3D5000859099 |title=Functional Representation in Hong Kong: Problems and Possibilities by Rowena y. F. Kwok, Elaine y. M. Chan |access-date=29 March 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120525081357/http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000859099 |archive-date=25 May 2012 }}</ref>

There are also [[2019 Hong Kong local elections#Gerrymandering concerns|gerrymandering concerns]] in the constituencies of [[District Council of Hong Kong|district councils]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wong |first1=Stan Hok-Wui |title=Gerrymandering in Electoral Autocracies: Evidence from Hong Kong |journal=British Journal of Political Science |year=2019 |volume=49 |issue=2 |pages=579–610 |doi=10.1017/S0007123416000685 |s2cid=157107999 }}</ref>

===Hungary===
In 2011, [[Fidesz]] politician [[János Lázár]] has proposed a redesign to Hungarian voting districts; considering the territorial results of previous elections, this redesign would favor right-wing politics according to the opposition.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://index.hu/belfold/2011/11/28/igy_lesz_jobboldali_magyarorszag/ |title=Index – Belföld – Így lesz jobboldali Magyarország |date=28 November 2011 |publisher=Index.hu |access-date=18 November 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzes/156/pid_hungarian_politics_in_depth_2011_week48.pdf |title=Gerrymandering Fidesz' way to re-election? |access-date=16 September 2020 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120426070629/http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzesek/PID_Hungarian%20Politics%20In-Depth_2011_Week48.pdf |archive-date=26 April 2012 }}</ref> Since then, the law has been passed by the Fidesz-majority [[National Assembly (Hungary)|National Assembly]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://index.hu/belfold/2011/12/23/elfogadtak_az_uj_valasztojogi_torvenyt/ |title=Index – Belföld – Elfogadták az új választójogi törvényt |date=23 December 2011 |publisher=Index.hu |access-date=18 November 2012}}</ref>  By the political think tanks and media close to the opposition, it took twice as many votes to gain a seat in some election districts as in some others. However, their findings are controversial.<ref>{{cite web |author=Hornyák József |url=http://www.vg.hu/kozelet/vg_online/kozelet_-_belfold/090112_capital_255559 |title=Fellebbez a Political Capital a választókerületi aránytalanságok miatt &#124; Közélet &#124; Világgazdaság Online |date=12 January 2009 |publisher=Vg.hu |access-date=18 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140312021118/http://www.vg.hu/kozelet/vg_online/kozelet_-_belfold/090112_capital_255559 |archive-date=12 March 2014 }}</ref> Gerrymandering was seen in the [[2018 Hungarian parliamentary election|2018 election results]].<ref>[https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/04/02/a-wild-gerrymander-makes-hungarys-fidesz-party-hard-to-dislodge A wild gerrymander makes Hungary's Fidesz party hard to dislodge, The Economist, 2022]</ref>

===Ireland===
Until the 1980s [[Dáil]] boundaries in [[Republic of Ireland|Ireland]] were drawn not by an independent commission but by government ministers. Successive arrangements by governments of all political characters have been attacked as gerrymandering. Ireland uses the [[single transferable vote]], and as well as the actual boundaries drawn, the main tool of gerrymandering has been the number of seats per constituency used, with three-seat constituencies normally benefiting the strongest parties in an area, whereas four-seat constituencies normally help smaller parties.

In 1947 the rapid rise of new party [[Clann na Poblachta]] threatened the position of the governing party [[Fianna Fáil]]. The government of [[Éamon de Valera]] introduced the [[Electoral (Amendment) Act 1947]], which increased the size of the Dáil from 138 to 147 and increased the number of three-seat constituencies from fifteen to twenty-two. The result was described by the journalist and historian [[Tim Pat Coogan]] as "a blatant attempt at gerrymander which no [[Northern Ireland|Six-County]] Unionist could have bettered."<ref name="coogan637">Tim Pat Coogan, ''De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow'' (Hutchinson, London, 1993) hardback. page 637 {{ISBN|0-09-175030-X}}</ref> The following February the [[1948 Irish general election|1948 general election]] was held and Clann na Poblachta secured ten seats instead of the nineteen they would have received proportional to their vote.<ref name="coogan637" />

In the mid-1970s, the Minister for Local Government, [[James Tully (Irish politician)|James Tully]], attempted to arrange the constituencies to ensure that the governing [[Fine Gael]]–[[Labour Party (Ireland)|Labour Party]] [[Government of the 20th Dáil|National Coalition]] would win a parliamentary majority. The [[Electoral (Amendment) Act 1974]] was planned as a major reversal of previous gerrymandering by Fianna Fáil (then in opposition). Tully ensured that there were as many three-seat constituencies as possible where the governing parties were strong, in the expectation that the governing parties would each win a seat in many constituencies, relegating Fianna Fáil to one out of three.

In areas where the governing parties were weak, four-seat constituencies were used so that the governing parties had a strong chance of still winning two. The election results created substantial change, as there was a larger than expected collapse in the vote. Fianna Fáil won a landslide victory in the [[1977 Irish general election]], two out of three seats in many cases, relegating the National Coalition parties to fight for the last seat. Consequently, the term "[[Tullymandering]]" was used to describe the phenomenon of a failed attempt at gerrymandering.

===India===
Gerrymandering in India is loosely claimed by many political analysts, however there is no conclusive evidence whether the exercise has benefited a particular political party or not.<ref>[https://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/forbes-india-investigation-indias-most-gerrymandered-constituencies/53011/1 Forbes India Investigation: India's most gerrymandered constituencies, Karthik Shashidhar, 2019]</ref> The last nationwide delimitation was done in 2009 and two successive elections threw two different results giving mandate to both the political parties one after another.

===Italy===
A hypothesis of gerrymandering was theorized by constituencies drawn by the electoral act of 2017, so-called [[Rosatellum]].<ref>{{cite journal |first=Fabio |last=Ratto Trabucco |title=Gerrymandering Hypothesis in the Italian Constituencies: the Case of Genoa's District |journal=Oñati Socio-Legal Series |date=7 March 2019 |volume=9 |issue=6/2019 |pages=1097–1117 |doi=10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1039 |url=http://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/view/1134|doi-access=free }}</ref>

===Kuwait===
From 1981 to 2005, Kuwait was divided into 25 [[Electoral districts of Kuwait|electoral districts]] in order to over-represent the government's supporters (the 'tribes').<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.asafas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/kias/pdf/kb4_1and2/08hiramatsu.pdf|title=The Changing Nature of the Parliamentary System in Kuwait|page=63 & 70|quote=Due to the gerrymandering on the part of the government, the "tribes" from the 1980s onwards, came to occupy a significant number of seats in the National Assembly.|access-date=23 April 2014|archive-date=30 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161130181148/http://www.asafas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/kias/pdf/kb4_1and2/08hiramatsu.pdf}}</ref> In July 2005, a new law for electoral reforms was approved which prevented electoral gerrymandering by cutting the number of electoral districts from 25 to 5. 
The [[government of Kuwait]] found that 5 electoral districts resulted in a powerful parliament with the majority representing the opposition. A new law was crafted by the government of Kuwait and signed by the Amir to gerrymander the districts to 10 allowing the government's supporters to regain the majority.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Coates Ulrichsen |first1=Kristian |title=Kuwait: Political crisis at critical juncture |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20026581 |access-date=1 April 2019 |publisher=BBC }}</ref>

===Lithuania===
{{Multiple image|total_width = 400
|image1=Elderships where Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance had majority of votes during 2020 Lithuania's parliamentary election.jpg
|image2=Lithuanian Seimas 2020 election second round – SMC results.svg
|footer=[[Elderships of Lithuania|Elderships]] won by the Polish minority [[Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance|LLRA–KŠS]] in [[2020 Lithuanian parliamentary election|2020]]. The governing [[Homeland Union|TS–LKD]] dominated [[Vilnius]].
}}
For the [[2024 Lithuanian parliamentary election]], the electoral districts were redrawn. 10 elderships of the [[Vilnius District Municipality]] which has a large Polish minority were merged with elderships of [[Vilnius]] to form the new Southern Vilnius district thus extending the total count of districts in Vilnius from 13 to 14. The [[Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance|LLRA–KŠS]] criticized the decision to rather choose Polish-dominated towns like [[Juodšiliai]] and [[Valčiūnai]] over Lithuanian-dominated towns like [[Riešė]] and [[Avižieniai]] to merge with Vilnius.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://kurierwilenski.lt/2023/12/06/zmiany-granic-okregow-wyborczych-dotkna-polska-mniejszosc-narodowa/|title=Zmiany granic okręgów wyborczych dotkną polską mniejszość narodową|date=December 6, 2023|access-date=August 8, 2024|author=Anna Pieszko|language=pl|work=[[Kurier Wileński]]}}</ref>

[[Riešė]] and [[Avižieniai]] remain in the Riešė district<ref>{{cite web|url=https://vrk.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=5bce6eb4495e46f5995aafc53aeb52cc|title=Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo rinkimų apygardų ribų žemėlapis|work={{ill|Central Election Commission of the Republic of Lithuania|lt|Vyriausioji rinkimų komisija}}|access-date=August 8, 2024|language=lt}}</ref> (previously known as [[Nemenčinė]] district) even though its predecessor was considered "way too large".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.vrk.lt/documents/10180/786874/Apra%C5%A1as/147306ff-5578-484b-b86d-6c7ebf67b783|page=9|title=2024 M. SEIMO RINKIMAI VIENMANDAČIŲ RINKIMŲ APYGARDŲ RIBŲ POKYČIAI (PRIIMTAS SPRENDIMAS)|work={{ill|Central Election Commission of the Republic of Lithuania|lt|Vyriausioji rinkimų komisija}}|access-date=August 8, 2024|language=lt|date=November 30, 2023}}</ref>

===Malaysia===
{{see also|List of Malaysian electoral districts}}
The practice of gerrymandering has been around in the country since its independence in 1957. The ruling coalition at that time, ''[[Barisan Nasional]]'' (BN; English: "National Front"), has been accused of controlling the election commission by revising the boundaries of constituencies. For example, during the [[2013 Malaysian general election|13th General Election in 2013]], Barisan Nasional won 60% of the seats in the [[Malaysian Parliament]] despite only receiving 47% of the popular vote.<ref>{{cite news |date=9 August 2014 |title=What's Malay for gerrymandering? |url=https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21611139-years-delineation-electoral-boundaries-will-determine-future-malaysian-politics-whats |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20230310004837/https://www.economist.com/asia/2014/08/09/whats-malay-for-gerrymandering |archive-date=10 March 2023 |access-date=9 November 2014 |newspaper=The Economist |location=Kuala Lumpur}}</ref> Malapportionment has also been used at least since 1974, when it was observed that in one state alone (Perak), the parliamentary constituency with the most voters had more than ten times as many voters as the one with the fewest voters.<ref>{{cite web |last=Ong |first=Kiang Ming |date=19 July 2013 |title=Malaysia among the most malapportioned countries in the world |url=https://dapmalaysia.org/english/2013/jul13/bul/bul5557.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170702171727/http://ongkianming.com/2013/07/19/press-statement-malaysia-among-the-most-malapportioned-countries-in-the-world/ |archive-date=2 July 2017 |access-date=19 February 2016}}</ref> These practices finally failed BN in the [[2018 Malaysian general election|14th General Election]] on 9 May 2018, when the opposing ''[[Pakatan Harapan]]'' (PH; English: "Alliance of Hope") won despite perceived efforts of gerrymandering and malapportionment from the incumbent.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chan |first=Tara Francis |date=10 May 2018 |title=In a historic election, Malaysia's allegedly corrupt prime minister lost to his 92-year-old former mentor who ran on behalf of a man he put in jail |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/malaysia-election-results-details-who-won-2018-5 |access-date=10 May 2018 |work=Business Insider |language=en-US}}</ref>

===Malta===
The [[Labour Party (Malta)|Labour Party]] that won in [[1981 Maltese general election|1981]], even though the [[Nationalist Party (Malta)|Nationalist Party]] got the most votes, did so because of its gerrymandering. A 1987 constitutional amendment awarding compensatory seats to make the final seat tally closer reflect actual vote share prevented that situation from reoccurring.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Nohlen |first1=Dieter |title=Elections in Europe: a data handbook |last2=Stöver |first2=Philip |publisher=Nomos |year=2010 |isbn=978-3-8329-5609-7 |edition=1st |location=Baden-Baden, Germany |language=en |oclc=617565273}}</ref>

===Nepal===
After the restoration of democracy in 1990, [[Politics of Nepal|Nepali politics]] has well exercised the practice of gerrymandering with the view to take advantage in the election. It was often practiced by [[Nepali Congress]], which remained in power in most of the time. Learning from this, the reshaping of constituency was done for constituent assembly and the opposition now wins elections.{{Citation needed|date=June 2023}}

In 2015, the government rewrote the [[Constitution of Nepal]], which included a rewriting of electoral boundaries. Parties in the southern region of [[Terai]] believe the new boundaries discriminated against marginalized groups, like the [[Madheshi people|Madhesis]], Tharus, and [[Janajati]]s, and that the boundaries "packed" the groups. Protesting occurred in Terai and other areas in southern Nepal, raising concern from across the country.<ref>{{Cite news |date=19 September 2015 |title=Why is Nepal's new constitution controversial? |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34280015 |access-date=8 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=4 August 2017 |title='Gerrymandering' warned |url=https://kathmandupost.com/miscellaneous/2017/08/04/gerrymandering-warned |access-date=8 December 2022 |website=kathmandupost.com |language=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=1 June 2017 |title=Necessity or gerrymandering? {{!}} From the Nepali Press {{!}} Nepali Times |url=https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/from-nepali-press/himalkhabar.com,%2023%20May,3740 |access-date=8 December 2022 |website=archive.nepalitimes.com |archive-date=8 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221208014716/https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/from-nepali-press/himalkhabar.com,%2023%20May,3740 }}</ref>

===Philippines===
[[Legislative districts of the Philippines|Congressional districts in the Philippines]] were originally based on an ordinance from the 1987 [[Constitution of the Philippines|Constitution]], which was created by the [[Constitutional Commission]], which was ultimately based on legislative districts as they were drawn in 1907. The same constitution gave [[Congress of the Philippines]] the power to legislate new districts, either through a national redistricting bill or piecemeal redistricting per province or city. Congress has never passed a national redistricting bill since the approval of the 1987 constitution, while it has incrementally created 34 new districts, out of the 200 originally created in 1987.

This allows Congress to create new districts once a place reaches 250,000 inhabitants, the minimum required for its creation. With this, local dynasties, through congressmen, can exert influence in the district-making process by creating bills carving new districts from old ones. In time, as the population of the Philippines increases, these districts, or groups of it, will be the basis of carving new provinces out of existing ones.

An example was in [[Camarines Sur]], where two districts were divided into three districts which allegedly favors the Andaya and the Arroyo families; it caused Rolando Andaya and [[Dato Arroyo]], who would have otherwise run against each other, run in separate districts, with one district allegedly not even surpassing the 250,000-population minimum.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.philstar.com/nation/558593/noynoy-hits-creation-camarines-sur-district-dato |title= Noynoy hits creation of Camarines Sur district for Dato |date=18 March 2010 |first=Aurea |last=Calica |work=[[The Philippine Star]] |access-date=30 July 2013}}</ref> The [[Supreme Court of the Philippines|Supreme Court]] later ruled that the 250,000 population minimum does not apply to an additional district in a province.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.philstar.com/headlines/564542/supreme-court-ruling-camsur-clears-senate |title=  Supreme Court ruling on Camsur clears Senate |date=9 April 2010 |first=Christina |last=Mendez |work=[[The Philippine Star]] |access-date=30 July 2013}}</ref> The resulting splits would later be the cause of another gerrymander, where the province would be split into a new province called [[Nueva Camarines]]; the bill was defeated in the Senate in 2013.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/06/08/13/senate-fails-pass-nueva-camarines-measure |title=Senate fails to pass Nueva Camarines measure |date=8 June 2013 |first=Christina |last=Mendez |work=[[The Philippine Star]] |publisher=ABS-CBNnews.com |access-date=30 July 2013}}</ref>

===Singapore===
{{See also|Group representation constituency}}
<!-- This section is linked from [[Singapore]] -->
In recent decades, critics have accused the ruling [[People's Action Party]] (PAP) of unfair electoral practices to maintain significant majorities in the [[Parliament of Singapore]]. Among the complaints are that the government uses gerrymandering.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ming En |first=Siau |title='More detailed explanation needed to fend off gerrymandering claims' |url=https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/more-detailed-explanation-neededto-fend-gerrymandering-claims |access-date=2024-10-22 |website=TODAY |language=en}}</ref> The [[Elections Department]] was established as part of the executive branch under the [[Prime Minister's Office (Singapore)|Prime Minister of Singapore]], rather than as an independent body.<ref>[http://www.pmo.gov.sg/AboutPMOffice/OurDepartments/ Prime Minister's Office], Our Departments {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080607102642/http://www.pmo.gov.sg/AboutPMOffice/OurDepartments/ |date=7 June 2008 }}</ref> Critics have accused it of giving the ruling party the power to decide polling districts and polling sites through electoral engineering, based on poll results in previous elections.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Norris |first=Pippa |author-link=Pippa Norris |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/electoral-engineering/29A26685EB4B654D1B85E57679EFA3FB |title=Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior |date=2004 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-82977-9 |location=Cambridge |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511790980}}</ref>

Members of opposition parties claim that the [[Group Representation Constituency]] system is "synonymous to gerrymandering", pointing out examples of [[Cheng San GRC]] and [[Eunos GRC]] which were dissolved by the Elections Department with voters redistributed to other constituencies after opposition parties gained ground in elections.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Lim |first1=Lydia |last2=Hussain |first2=Zakir |date=2 August 2008 |title=Insight: GRCs: 20 years on |url=https://wpsn.wordpress.com/2008/08/02/st-02-08-2008/ |newspaper=Straits Times |location=Singapore |access-date=8 August 2015}}</ref>

=== South Africa ===
The landmark [[1948 South African general election|1948 general election]] was influenced by provisions of the [[South Africa Act 1909|Constitution]] granting rural areas more constituencies in [[Parliament of South Africa|Parliament]] than urban areas. Thus the [[white-supremacist]] [[National Party (South Africa)|National Party]] won a plurality against the more moderate [[United Party (South Africa)|United Party]] despite receiving fewer votes and implemented [[apartheid]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Clark|first=Nancy L.|title=South Africa: the rise and fall of apartheid|date=2016|author2=William H. Worger|isbn=978-1-138-12444-8|edition=Third |location=Abingdon, Oxon |publisher=Routledge |oclc=883649263}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Book 4: Industrialisation, Rural Change and Nationalism - Chapter 3 - Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s by Albert Grundlingh {{!}} South African History Online|url=https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-4-industrialisation-rural-change-and-nationalism-chapter-3-afrikaner-nationalism-1930s|access-date=8 November 2021|website=www.sahistory.org.za}}</ref>

=== Spain ===
[[File:Geografía electoral de la provincia de Murcia (1903-1923).svg|300px|thumb|Electoral map of the [[Region of Murcia|province of Murcia]] during the [[Restoration (Spain)|Bourbon Restoration]]. The particular configuration of the [[Cartagena, Spain|Cartagena]] constituency, divided into three geographically isolated territories, has been identified by Ruiz Abellán (1991) as a case of gerrymandering aimed at neutralizing the vote of Cartagena and the mining areas by adding rural votes, which were more susceptible to control by the [[Caciquism|political establishment]].<ref>{{cite book |last1= Ruiz Abellán |first1= Eduardo |year= 1991 |chapter= Distritos, secciones y electores |title= Modernización política y elecciones generales en Murcia durante el reinado de Alfonso XIII (1903–1923) |language= Spanish |location= Murcia |publisher= Real Academia Alfonso X el Sabio |pages= 147–157 |isbn= 978-84-87408-25-0 }}</ref>]]
{{main|Elections in Spain}}

Until the establishment of the [[Second Spanish Republic]] in 1931, [[Spain]] used both single-member and multi-member constituencies in [[Elections in Spain|general elections]]. Multi-member constituencies were only used in some big cities. Some gerrymandering examples included the districts of [[Vilademuls]] or [[Torroella de Montgrí]] in [[Catalonia]]. These districts were created in order to prevent the [[Federal Democratic Republican Party]] from winning a seat in [[Figueres]] or [[La Bisbal]] and [[Turno|to secure a seat for the dynastic parties]]. Since 1931, the constituency boundaries have matched the [[Provinces of Spain|provincial]] boundaries.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Balcells |first1=Albert |last2=B. Culla |first2=Joan |last3=Mir |first3=Conxita |title=Les eleccions generals a Catalunya de 1901 a 1923 |date=1982 |publisher=Fundació Jaume Bofill |location=Barcelona |page=424 |url=http://www.fbofill.cat/sites/default/files/ee_04_0.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160428100708/http://www.fbofill.cat/sites/default/files/ee_04_0.pdf |archive-date=28 April 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>

After the [[Francoist dictatorship]], during the [[Spanish transition to democracy|transition to democracy]], these fixed provincial constituencies were reestablished in Section 68.2 of the current [[1978 Spanish Constitution]], so gerrymandering is impossible in general elections.<ref name="ES_Const">{{cite book |title=Constitution of Spain in English |date=1978 |publisher=Government of Spain |location=Madrid |page=35 |url=http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121119090314/http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf |archive-date=19 November 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref> There are not ''[[Single-member district|winner-takes-all]]'' elections in Spain except for the tiny territories of [[Ceuta]] and [[Melilla]] (which only have one representative each); everywhere else the number of representatives assigned to a constituency is [[proportional representation|proportional]] to its population and calculated according to a national law, so tampering with under- or over-representation is difficult too.<ref name= "esLOREGnac">{{cite web |url=https://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/loreg/contenido?idContenido=2688735&idLeyJunta=1&idLeyModificacion=2688205&p=1379061423059&paux=1379061423059&template=Loreg/JEC_Contenido |title=Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General – Título II (Disposiciones especiales para la elección de diputados y senadores) |date=4 October 2022 |website=Junta Electoral Central |publisher=[[Junta Electoral Central]] |access-date=25 November 2023 |language=es |quote=See Capítulo III – Sistema Electoral, esp. arts. 161–164}}</ref><ref name= "esHowSpanishSystemWorks">{{cite web |url=https://www.elnacional.cat/en/politics/how-does-a-spanish-general-election-work-2023_1057209_102.html |title=How does a Spanish general election work?  |last1=King |first1=Rob |last2=Southon |first2=Robert |date=23 July 2023 |publisher=El Nacional |access-date=25 November 2023}}</ref>

[[Spain (European Parliament constituency)|European]], some [[Autonomous communities of Spain|regional]] and municipal elections are held under single, [[at-large]] multi-member constituencies with [[proportional representation]] and gerrymandering is not possible either.<ref name= "esLOREGmun">{{cite web |url=https://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/loreg/contenido?idContenido=2689234&idLeyJunta=1&idLeyModificacion=2688205&p=1379061423059&paux=1379061423059&template=Loreg/JEC_Contenido |title=Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General – Título III (Disposiciones especiales para las elecciones municipales) |date=4 October 2022 |website=Junta Electoral Central |publisher=[[Junta Electoral Central]] |access-date=25 November 2023 |language=es |quote=See Capítulo IV – Sistema Electoral, esp. arts. 179–181}}</ref><ref name= "esLOREGeur">{{cite web |url=https://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/loreg/contenido?idContenido=2688743&idLeyJunta=1&idLeyModificacion=2688205&p=1379061423059&paux=1379061423059&template=Loreg/JEC_Contenido |title=Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General – Título VI (Disposiciones especiales para las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo) |date=4 October 2022 |website=Junta Electoral Central |publisher=[[Junta Electoral Central]] |access-date=25 November 2023 |language=es |quote=See Capítulo IV – Sistema Electoral.}}</ref>

In fact, there is not even a direct translation of the term "gerrymandering" into Spanish and first-generation [[Hispanic and Latino Americans]] have struggled with such an unfamiliar concept in the [[Spanish-speaking world]].<ref name= "esNoGerrymandering">{{cite web |url=https://ethnicmediaservices.org/spanish-translations/como-se-dice-gerrymandering-en-espanol/ |title=¿Cómo se dice "gerrymandering" en español?  |last=Marrero |first=Pilar |date=14 July 2021 |publisher=Ethnic Media Services |access-date=25 November 2023 |language=es}}</ref>

=== Sri Lanka ===
Sri Lanka's new [[Local government in Sri Lanka|Local Government]] elections process has been the talking point of gerrymandering since its inception.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=138097|title=The Island|website=www.island.lk|access-date=12 February 2018|archive-date=12 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180212201656/http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=138097}}</ref> Even though that talk was more about the ward-level, it is also seen in some local council areas too.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.lgpc.gov.lk/downloads/2017Feb_WardMaps/VAVUNIYA/05_Vavuniya_VavuniyaSouth(Sinhala)PS.pdf|title=Ward Map of Vavuniya South (Sinhala) Pradeshiya Sabha – Vavuniya District|access-date=12 February 2018|archive-date=12 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180212201942/http://www.lgpc.gov.lk/downloads/2017Feb_WardMaps/VAVUNIYA/05_Vavuniya_VavuniyaSouth(Sinhala)PS.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.lgpc.gov.lk/downloads/2017Feb_WardMaps/VAVUNIYA/04_Vavuniya_VavuniyaSouth(Tamil)PS.jpg|title=Ward Map of Vavuniya South (Tamil) Pradeshiya Sabha – Vavuniya District|access-date=12 February 2018|archive-date=12 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180212201948/http://www.lgpc.gov.lk/downloads/2017Feb_WardMaps/VAVUNIYA/04_Vavuniya_VavuniyaSouth(Tamil)PS.jpg}}</ref>

===Sudan===
In the [[2010 Sudanese general election|election of 2010]], there were numerous examples of gerrymandering throughout the entire country of [[Sudan]]. A report from the Rift Valley Institute uncovered violations of Sudan's electoral law, where constituencies were created that were well below and above the required limit. According to Sudan's National Elections Act of 2008, no constituency can have a population that is 15% greater or less than the average constituency size. The Rift Valley Report uncovered a number of constituencies that are in violation of this rule. Examples include constituencies in [[Jonglei]], [[Warrap (state)|Warrap]], [[South Darfur]], and several other states.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.riftvalley.net/resources/file/Electoral%20Designs%20-%20Report%20on%20elections%20in%20Sudan.pdf |title=Rift Valley Report |access-date=19 December 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140426171620/http://www.riftvalley.net/resources/file/Electoral%20Designs%20-%20Report%20on%20elections%20in%20Sudan.pdf |archive-date=26 April 2014 }}</ref>

===Turkey===
[[Turkey]] has used gerrymandering in the city of [[Istanbul]] in the [[2009 Istanbul mayoral election|2009 municipal elections]]. Just before the election Istanbul was divided into new districts. Large low income neighborhoods were bundled with the rich neighborhoods to enable the [[Justice and Development Party (Turkey)|AKP]] to win the municipal elections.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akp-redraws-turkey-despite-opposition-ire-34521|title=AKP redraws Turkey despite opposition ire|date=2012|work=Hürriyet Daily News|access-date=16 January 2018}}</ref>

===United Kingdom===

====Northern Ireland====
=====Parliamentary Elections=====
Prior to the establishment of [[Irish Home Rule|Home Rule]] in [[Northern Ireland]], the UK government had installed the [[single transferable vote]] (STV) system in Ireland to secure fair elections in terms of proportional representation in its [[Parliament of Northern Ireland|Parliaments]]. After two elections under that system, [[House of Commons (Method of Voting and Redistribution of Seats) Act (Northern Ireland) 1929|in 1929]] Stormont changed the electoral system to be the same as the rest of the [[United Kingdom]]: a single-member [[first past the post]] system. The only exception was for the election of four Stormont MPs to represent the [[Queen's University of Belfast]]. Some believe that the boundaries were gerrymandered to under-represent Nationalists.<ref name="coogan637" /> Other geographers and historians, for instance Professor [[John H. Whyte]], disagree.<ref name="whyte" /><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/hnihoc.htm |title=Northern Ireland House of Commons, 1921–1972 |publisher=Ark.ac.uk |access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref> They have argued that the electoral boundaries for the [[Parliament of Northern Ireland]] were not gerrymandered to a greater level than that produced by any single-winner election system, and that the actual number of Nationalist MPs barely changed under the revised system (it went from 12 to 11 and later went back up to 12). Most observers{{who?|date=May 2025}} have acknowledged that the change to a single-winner system was a key factor, however, in stifling the growth of smaller political parties, such as the [[Northern Ireland Labour Party]] and [[Independent Unionist]]s. In the 1967 election, Unionists won 35.5% of the votes and received 60% of the seats, while Nationalists got 27.4% of the votes but received 40% of the seats. This meant that both the Unionist and Nationalist parties were over-represented, while the Northern Ireland Labour Party and [[Independent politician|Independents]] (amounting to more than 35% of the votes cast) were severely under-represented.

After Westminster reintroduced direct rule in 1973, it restored the single transferable vote (STV) for [[1973 Northern Ireland Assembly election|elections]] to the [[Northern Ireland Assembly (1973)|Northern Ireland Assembly]] in the following year, using the same definitions of constituencies as for the Westminster Parliament. Currently, in Northern Ireland, all elections use STV except those for positions in the [[Westminster Parliament]], which follow the pattern in the rest of the United Kingdom by using "first past the post."

=====Local authority elections=====
{{Unbalanced|date=April 2020|section}}
<!-- I coun't find a more appropriate or inline template. I have put a POV tag below to highlight the problem. The problem is that An Phoblacht is a publication whose sole purpose is to disseminate a separatist or republican viewpoint to readers, and which has close links to Sinn Féin and the IRA. Also, the section (including a selection at the top of the article) is unbalanced in terms of explaining any counter-argument to the claim of gerrymandering in Northern Ireland. -->

Gerrymandering (in {{Langx|ga|Claonroinnt}}) in local elections was introduced in 1923 by the Leech Commission. This was a one-man commission: Sir John Leech, K.C. was appointed by [[Dawson Bates]], Northern Ireland's [[Minister of Home Affairs]], to redraw Northern Ireland's local government electoral boundaries.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bew|first1=Paul|last2=Patterson|first2=Henry|last3=Gibbon|first3=Peter|title=The state in Northern Ireland, 1921–72: political forces and social classes  |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RXm7AAAAIAAJ&q=leech |pages=  |publisher=Manchester University Press |year=1979 |isbn=978-0-7190-0814-6|oclc= }}</ref>{{rp|68}} Leech was also chairman of the Advisory Committee who recommended the release or continued detention of the persons that the Northern Irish government was interning without trial at that time.<ref>{{cite book |last= McConville |first= Sean |title=Irish Political Prisoners 1920–1962: Pilgrimage of Desolation |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=au_eDwAAQBAJ&q=Leech |pages= |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year= 2020 |isbn= 978-1-000-08274-6 |oclc= }}</ref> Leech's changes (gerrymandered electoral boundaries, abolishing proportional representation),<ref>McCluskey, Fergal, (2013), ''The Irish Revolution 1912-23: Tyrone'', Four Courts Press, Dublin, pg 126, ISBN 9781846822995</ref> together with a resultant boycott by the [[Irish Nationalist]] community, resulted in [[Irish unionism|Unionists]] gaining control of [[Londonderry County Borough Council]], [[Fermanagh County Council|Fermanagh]] and [[Tyrone County Council]]s, and retaking eight rural district councils. These county councils, and most of the district councils, remained under Unionist control despite the majority of their population being Catholic until the UK government imposed [[Direct rule (Northern Ireland)|Direct Rule]] in 1972.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Callanan |first1=Mark |title=Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out |last2=Keogan |first2=Justin F. |publisher=Institute of Public Administration |year=2003 |isbn=1-902448-93-6 |location=Dublin |pages=460–462}}</ref><ref name="Magill">{{Cite news |url=https://magill.ie/archive/north-crisis-realities-discrimination |date=1 September 1969 |title=The North in crisis-The realities of discrimination |work=[[Magill Magazine]]}}</ref><!-- <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/22187|title=Gerrymandering electoral boundaries {{!}} An Phoblacht|website=www.anphoblacht.com|access-date=29 August 2019}}</ref>{{POV statement|date=April 2020}}-->

Leech's new electoral boundaries for the 1924 Londonderry County Borough Council election reduced the number of wards from four to three, only one of which had a Nationalist majority. This resulted in election of a [[Unionists (Ireland)|Unionist]] council in every election, until the County Borough Council's replacement in 1969 by the unelected Londonderry Development Commission, in a city where [[Irish nationalism|Nationalists]] had a large majority and had won [[1920 Londonderry County Borough Council election|previous elections]].<ref name="Laffan">{{cite book |last=Laffan |first=Michael |title=The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916–1923 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zbz6p-O39aoC&q=labour+ireland+1920+394+seats&pg=PA327 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |page=327 |isbn= 978-1-139-42629-9|year=1999 }}</ref><ref name="whyte">{{cite web |url=http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/whyte.htm |title=CAIN: Issues – Discrimination: John Whyte, 'How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime, 1921–1968?' |publisher=Cain.ulst.ac.uk |access-date=5 August 2009 |archive-date=16 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190116023959/http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/whyte.htm }}</ref>

Some critics and supporters spoke at the time of "[[A Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People]]".<ref>See: Ferriter D. ''The Transformation of Ireland 1900–2000'' London: Profile Press 2004, p.281; {{ISBN|1-86197-307-1}}. Buckland P., ''The Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 1921–1939'' New York: Barnes & Noble; Dublin: Gill & MacMillan 1979, p.72 {{ISBN|0-06-490752-X}}. Cronin S., ''Irish Nationalism: A History of its Roots and Ideology'' New York: Continuum, 1981; p.177 {{ISBN|0-8264-0062-0}}. Tierney M., ''Modern Ireland 1850–1950'' Dublin; Gill and Macmillan, 1978; p.230. {{ISBN|0-7171-0886-4}}.</ref><!-- No context. No reference to the fact that the phrase "Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State" was used in direct response to the claim made by Éamon Devalera that the Irish Free State was a "Catholic nation". --> This passed also into local government, where supporters of the elected majorities were given jobs and appointments.<ref name= Magill /> [[Stephen Gwynn]] noted as early as 1911 that since the introduction of the [[Local Government (Ireland) Act 1898]]:

<blockquote>In [[County Armagh|Armagh]] there are 68,000 Protestants, 56,000 Catholics. The County Council has twenty-two Protestants and eight Catholics. In [[County Tyrone|Tyrone]], Catholics are a majority of the population, 82,000 against 68,000; but the electoral districts have been so arranged that Unionists return sixteen as against thirteen Nationalists (one a Protestant). This Council gives to the Unionists two to one majority on its Committees, and out of fifty-two officials employs only five Catholics. In [[County Antrim|Antrim]], which has the largest Protestant majority (196,000 to 40,000), twenty-six Unionists and three Catholics are returned. Sixty officers out of sixty-five are good Unionists and Protestants.<ref>Gwynn S.L. ''The Case for Home Rule'' (1911) pp. 104–105. (http://www.ucc.ie/celt/online/E900030.html book text here; accessed August 2010)</ref></blockquote>

Initially Leech drew the boundaries, but from the 1920s to the 1940s the [[Parliament of Northern Ireland|province-wide government]] redrew them to reinforce the gerrymander.<ref name="whyte" />{{rp|1(c)}}<ref>{{Cite news |first=Robert |last=Kee |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/clips/zmfqhyc |date=17 February 1981 |title=Gerrymandering in Londonderry in the late 1960s |publisher=BBC Bitesize}}</ref>

[[Cahir Healy]], the long time MP for Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone highlighted the extent of gerrymandering in County Borough Councils elections of the 1930s: Fermanagh reported 30,196 Nationalists and 24,272 Unionists yet Nationalists retained only seven seats while Unionists retained 12. Similar results occurred in County Tyrone: 70,595 Nationalists retained 11 seats while 56,981 Unionists held 16 seats.<ref>Healy, Cahir (1945), ''The Mutilation of a Nation : The Story behind Partition in Ireland'', The Derry Journal Ltd, pg 40, JSTOR, https://jstor.org/stable/community.29825522. Accessed 24 July 2023.</ref>

===United States===
{{main|Gerrymandering in the United States}}
[[File:TravisCountyDistricts.png|thumb|250px|U.S. congressional districts covering [[Travis County, Texas]] (outlined in red), in 2002, left, and 2004, right. In 2003, the majority Republicans in the Texas legislature [[2003 Texas redistricting|redistricted the state]], diluting the voting power of the heavily Democratic county by parceling its residents out to more Republican districts.]]
[[File:North Carolina 12th Congressional District (National Atlas).gif|thumb|''[[Shaw v. Reno]]'' was a [[United States Supreme Court]] case involving the [[redistricting]] and racial gerrymandering of [[North Carolina's 12th congressional district]] ''(pictured)''.]]

The United States, among the first countries with an elected representative government, was the source of the term ''gerrymander'' as stated above.

The practice of gerrymandering the borders of new states continued past the [[American Civil War]] and into the late 19th century. The [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]] used its control of Congress to secure the admission of more states in territories friendly to their party—the admission of [[Dakota Territory]] as two states instead of one being a notable example. By the rules for representation in the [[United States Electoral College|Electoral College]], each new state carried at least three electoral votes regardless of its population.<ref>Compare a map of the United States in 1860 [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/united_states/us_terr_1860.jpg] with a map from 1870 [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/united_states/us_terr_1870.jpg]. <!-- These images need to be put in wikimedia commons, rather than external links--></ref>

All [[redistricting in the United States]] has been contentious because it has been controlled by [[Political parties in the United States|political parties]] vying for power. As a consequence of the decennial [[census]] required by the [[United States Constitution]], districts for members of the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] typically need to be redrawn whenever the number of members in a state changes. In many states, state legislatures redraw boundaries for state legislative districts at the same time.

[[State legislature (United States)|State legislatures]] have used gerrymandering along racial lines both to decrease and increase minority representation in [[State governments of the United States|state governments]] and congressional delegations. In [[Ohio]], a conversation between Republican officials was recorded that demonstrated that redistricting was being done to aid their political candidates.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Schladen |first=Marty |date=2022-04-01 |title=LaRose would 'be fine with' chief justice's impeachment over redistricting rulings |url=https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2022/04/01/larose-would-be-fine-with-chief-justices-impeachment-over-redistricting-rulings/ |access-date=2023-05-23 |website=Ohio Capital Journal |language=en-US}}</ref> Furthermore, the discussions assessed the race of voters as a factor in redistricting, on the premise that African-Americans tend to back [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic Party]] candidates. Republicans removed approximately 13,000 [[African-American]] voters from the district of [[Jim Raussen]], a Republican candidate for the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]], in an apparent attempt to tip the scales in what was once a competitive district for Democratic candidates.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.wcpo.com/wcpo/localshows/iteam/cdd905.html |title=Republican Party Politics (Part II) |agency=Associated Press |publisher=[[WCPO]] |date=29 April 2002 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130515112805/http://www.wcpo.com/wcpo/localshows/iteam/cdd905.html |archive-date=15 May 2013 }}</ref>

With the [[civil rights movement]] and passage of the [[Voting Rights Act of 1965]], federal enforcement and protections of suffrage for all citizens were enacted. Gerrymandering for the purpose of reducing the political influence of a racial or ethnic minority group was prohibited. After the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, some states created "majority-minority" districts to enhance minority voting strength. This practice, also called "affirmative gerrymandering", was supposed to redress historic discrimination and ensure that [[Minorities in the United States|ethnic minorities]] would gain some seats and representation in government. In some states, bipartisan gerrymandering is the norm. State legislators from both parties sometimes agree to draw congressional district boundaries in a way that ensures the re-election of most or all incumbent representatives from both parties.<ref>{{cite news|title=In Virginia, an incumbent protection plan|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-virginia-an-incumbent-protection-plan/2013/09/27/0e08acfc-27c0-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html|access-date=21 April 2016|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=29 September 2013}}</ref>

Rather than allowing more political influence, some states have shifted redistricting authority from politicians and given it to non-partisan [[redistricting commission]]s. The states of [[Washington (state)|Washington]],<ref>[[Washington State Redistricting Commission]] {{cite web|url=http://www.redistricting.wa.gov |title=Washington State Redistricting Commission |publisher=Redistricting.wa.gov |access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref> [[Arizona]],<ref>[[Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission]] {{cite web|url=http://www.azredistricting.org |title=Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission |publisher=Azredistricting.org |access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref> and [[California]]<ref>[[California Proposition 11 (2008)|Proposition 11]], passed in 2008, and [[California Proposition 20 (2010)|Proposition 20]], passed in 2010</ref> have created [[standing committee]]s for redistricting following the [[2010 United States census|2010 census]]. It has been argued however that in California's case, gerrymandering still continued despite this change.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.propublica.org/article/how-democrats-fooled-californias-redistricting-commission|title=How Democrats Fooled California's Redistricting Commission — ProPublica|date=21 December 2011|website=ProPublica}}</ref> [[Rhode Island]]<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20071018002452/http://riredistricting.org/ Rhode Island Reapportionment Commission] Archived 18 October 2007.</ref> and [[New Jersey]]<ref>[[New Jersey Redistricting Commission]]</ref> have developed ''[[ad hoc]]'' committees, but developed the past two decennial reapportionments tied to new census data. Florida's amendments 5 and 6, meanwhile, established rules for the creation of districts but did not mandate an independent commission.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://projects.palmbeachpost.com/yourvote/ballot_question/florida/2010/amendment-5-and-6-2010/ |title=Election 2010: Palm Beach County & Florida Voting, Candidates, Endorsements &#124; The Palm Beach Post |publisher=Projects.palmbeachpost.com |access-date=19 December 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101208155829/http://projects.palmbeachpost.com/yourvote/ballot_question/florida/2010/amendment-5-and-6-2010/ |archive-date=8 December 2010 }}</ref>

[[2018 Michigan Proposal 2|Michigan voters in 2018]] approved a proposal to create an independent commission to draw new congressional maps following the [[2020 United States census]], thereby removing the responsibility from the state legislature. Additionally, [[May 2018 Ohio Issue 1|Ohio voters in 2018]] modified their existing redistricting statutes to have a commission draw new maps. However, the ability of the state legislature to draw congressional maps remained, and this proposes the risk of gerrymandering. Other states that have implemented commissions in the 2018 midterm cycle include [[Colorado]].

International election observers from the [[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, who were invited to observe and report on the [[2004 United States presidential election|2004 national elections]], expressed criticism of the U.S. congressional redistricting process and made a recommendation that the procedures be reviewed to ensure genuine competitiveness of Congressional election contests.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/usa/14028 |title=XI |format=PDF |access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref>

In June 2019, the [[United States Supreme Court]] ruled 5–4 in ''[[Lamone v. Benisek]]'' and ''[[Rucho v. Common Cause]]'' that [[Federal judiciary of the United States|federal courts]] lacked [[Federal jurisdiction (United States)|jurisdiction]] to hear challenges over partisan gerrymandering.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jun/27/supreme-court-gerrymandering-ruling-verdict-constutition-districting|title=US supreme court declines to block partisan gerrymandering|date=27 June 2019|website=The Guardian}}</ref>

===Venezuela===
Prior to the [[2010 Venezuelan parliamentary election|26 September 2010 legislative elections]], gerrymandering took place via an [[addendum]] to the electoral law by the [[National Assembly of Venezuela]]. In the subsequent election, [[Hugo Chávez]]'s political party, the [[United Socialist Party of Venezuela]] drew 48% of the votes overall, while the opposition parties (the [[Democratic Unity Roundtable]] and the [[Fatherland for All]] parties) collectively drew 52% of the votes. However, due to the re-allocation of electoral legislative districts prior to the election, Chávez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela was awarded over 60% of the spots in the National Assembly (98 deputies), while 67 deputies were elected for the two opposition parties combined.<ref>{{Cite news | title=The WP: Parliament election was an unmistakable rebuff to Chávez | url=http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/10/01/en_pol_esp_the-wp-parliament-e_01A4549411.shtml | newspaper=El Universal| location=Caracas| date=1 October 2010 | access-date=16 February 2017}}</ref>

==Related terms==
In a [[play on words]], the use of race-conscious procedures in [[jury selection]] has been termed "jurymandering".<ref>{{Cite journal|volume=68|journal=N.Y.U. L. Rev.|page=707|year=1993|title=Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure – A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection|author=King, Nancy J.|url=http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/nylr68&section=32}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|url=http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/thlp5&section=5|volume=5|journal=Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol'y 7|year=2001|title=Critical Evaluations of Hispanic Participation on the Grand Jury: Key-Man Selection, Jurymandering Language, and Representative Quotas|author=Fukurai, Hiroshi}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Politics}}
* [[Boundary problem (spatial analysis)]]
* [[Electoral fraud]]
* ''[[Gill v. Whitford]]''
* [[Modifiable areal unit problem]]
* [[Proposed Croat federal unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina]]
* [[Schelling's model of segregation]]
* [[Voter suppression]]

== Notes ==
{{Notelist}}

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==Further reading==
{{Library resources box}}
* La Raja, Raymond (11 May 2009). "[[doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.071105.095822|Redistricting: Reading Between the Lines]]". ''Annual Review of Political Science''. '''12''' (1): 203–223.
* McGhee, Eric (11 May 2020). "[https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060118-045351 Partisan Gerrymandering and Political Science]" ({{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200524150615/https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060118-045351 |date=24 May 2020 }}). ''Annual Review of Political Science''. '''23''' (1): 171–185.

==External links==
{{Wiktionary|gerrymander|gerrymandering}}
{{Commons category|Gerrymandering}}
* Articles from the [http://www.aceproject.org/ ACE Project]
** [http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdy/bdy_my Alleged Gerrymandering in Malaysia: Over-representation of rural districts] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928010507/http://www.aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdy/bdy_my |date=28 September 2007 }}
** [http://www.aceproject.org/regions-en/americas/americas-case-studies/chile-constitutional-and-electoral-reform-1998/ Ending the Gerrymander in Chile: the constitutional reforms of 1988] {{Dead link|date=November 2021}}
* [http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/index.cfm A handbook of electoral system Design] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091224082449/http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/index.cfm |date=24 December 2009 }} from [http://www.idea.int/ International IDEA]
* [http://www.abc.net.au/elections/federal/2004/items/200408/s1172393.htm Anti-Gerrymandering policy in Australia]
* [http://www.radioproject.org/2011/04/redrawing-lines-of-power-redistricting-2011/ Redrawing Lines of Power: Redistricting 2011] Making Contact, produced by National Radio Project. 12 April 2011.
* [https://redistricting.lls.edu/ideas-for-reform/ All About Redistricting – Ideas for Reform]
* {{cite magazine|last1=Honner|first1=Patrick|title=The Math Behind Gerrymandering and Wasted Votes|url=https://www.wired.com/story/the-math-behind-gerrymandering-and-wasted-votes/|magazine=WIRED|date=1 January 2018}}
* {{citation |work=[[Core.ac.uk]] |quote= [[Open access]] research papers |url= https://core.ac.uk/search?q=gerrymandering |title= Gerrymandering }}
* {{citation |work= [[BASE (Bielefeld Academic Search Engine)]] |publisher= [[Universitätsbibliothek Bielefeld]] |url= https://www.base-search.net/Search/Results?lookfor=gerrymandering |title= Gerrymandering }}
* [https://mggg.org/ Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group] – consortium of Boston-area researchers

{{Corruption}}
{{Discrimination}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Gerrymandering| ]]
[[Category:Constituencies]]
[[Category:Electoral geography]]
[[Category:Political corruption]]
[[Category:Political terminology of the United States]]
[[Category:Voter suppression]]
[[Category:Electoral fraud]]
[[Category:1810s neologisms]]
[[Category:Elbridge Gerry]]