View source for Nuclear program of Iran

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[[File:Arak_Heavy_Water4.JPG|thumb|The [[IR-40]] facility in [[Arak, Iran|Arak]]]]
{{Nuclear power in Iran}}
The [[Nuclear technology|nuclear]] program of [[Iran]] is one of the most scrutinized nuclear programs in the world. Although the Iranian government maintains that the purpose of it is for civilian and peaceful uses, some have claimed that they are covertly developing [[nuclear weapons]], with [[Israel]] being the fiercest proponent of this claim. This is a current point of contention in [[Iran-Israel relations]], with an [[Iran-Israel war|armed conflict]] currently being waged between the countries over the program.

Iran's nuclear program began in the 1950s under the [[Pahlavi Iran|Pahlavi dynasty]] with [[United States|US]] support. It expanded in the 1970s with plans for power reactors, paused after the 1979 [[Iranian Revolution]], and resumed secretly during the 1980s [[Iran–Iraq War]]. In the 1990s, Iran pursued a full [[nuclear fuel cycle]] and acquired centrifuge technology through illicit networks, including ties with [[Pakistan]] and [[North Korea]]. Undeclared enrichment sites at Natanz and Arak were exposed in 2002, and [[Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant|Fordow]], an underground fuel enrichment site, was revealed in 2009.

Iran's nuclear program has been a focal point of international scrutiny for decades. In 2003, Iran suspended its [[AMAD Project|formal nuclear weapons program]], and claims its program is for peaceful purposes only,<ref name="nocredible">{{Cite web |date=2024-12-17 |title=No 'credible civilian' purpose for Iran uranium: UK, France, Germany |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241217-no-credible-civilian-purpose-for-iran-uranium-uk-france-germany |access-date=2025-04-28 |website=France 24 |language=en}}</ref> yet analysts and the IAEA have criticized such claims. Iran is currently enriching uranium to 60% purity (close to [[Weapons-grade nuclear material#Weapons-grade uranium|weapons-grade]]), and has been accelerating its nuclear advancements by installing more advanced centrifuges. Estimates suggest that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear bomb within a week and accumulate enough for seven within a month, raising fears that its breakout time has shortened drastically.<ref name=":11">{{Cite news |title=Iran's new leaders stand at a nuclear precipice |url=https://www.economist.com/international/2024/05/20/irans-new-leaders-stand-at-a-nuclear-precipice |access-date=2025-06-12 |newspaper=The Economist |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> The [[Destruction of Israel in Iranian policy|destruction of Israel]] is frequently cited as one of several strategic objectives behind Iran's nuclear ambitions.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last1=Allin |first1=Dana H. |title=The sixth crisis: Iran, Israel, America, and the rumors of war |last2=Simon |first2=Steven |date=2010 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-975449-6 |location=Oxford & New York |pages=24}}</ref> Concerns include [[nuclear proliferation]], [[nuclear terrorism]],<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last=Wilner |first=Alex S. |date=2012-01-01 |title=Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2012.647539 |journal=Comparative Strategy |volume=31 |pages=18–40 |language=EN |doi=10.1080/01495933.2012.647539 |issn=0149-5933}}</ref> and increased [[Iran and state-sponsored terrorism|support for terrorism and insurgency]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Freilich |first=Charles David |title=Israeli National Security: a New Strategy for an Era of Change |date=2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-060293-2 |location=New York |pages=83–85}}</ref>

In response to Iran's nuclear program, the international community [[International sanctions against Iran|imposed sanctions]] that severely impacted its economy, restricting its oil exports and limiting access to global financial systems.<ref>{{Cite web |title=What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal? |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal |access-date=2025-04-28 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |language=en}}</ref> Covert operations such as the [[Stuxnet]] cyberattack in 2010 sought to disrupt the program. In 2015, the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]] (JCPOA) was signed, imposing strict limitations on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.<ref>{{Cite web |title=UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-iran#:~:text=Resolution%202231's%20Principal%20Provisions |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250404052442/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-iran#:~:text=Resolution%202231's%20Principal%20Provisions |archive-date=April 4, 2025 |access-date=2025-04-28 |website=Arms Control Association |language=en}}</ref> In 2018, the [[United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action|United States withdrew from the agreement]], leading to re-imposed sanctions.<ref name=":12">{{Cite news |date=2018-05-08 |title=Read the Full Transcript of Trump's Speech on the Iran Nuclear Deal |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-speech-iran-deal.html |access-date=2025-04-28 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Since then, Iran's nuclear program has expanded dramatically, with enriched uranium stockpiles exceeding JCPOA limits by tens of times, some nearing weapons-grade purity.<ref name=":11" /> According to the IAEA, Iran is "the only non-nuclear-weapon state to produce such material".<ref name=":13">{{Cite web |date=2025-05-31 |title=Iran has amassed even more near weapons-grade uranium, UN watchdog says |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0 |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> The US and Iran have engaged in [[2025 United States–Iran negotiations|bilateral negotiations]] since April 2025, aiming to curb Iran's program for sanctions relief, though Iran's leaders have refused to stop enriching uranium.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Fassihi |first2=Farnaz |date=2025-06-11 |title=The Tough Choice Facing Trump in the Iran Nuclear Talks |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/10/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-talks.html |access-date=2025-06-12 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In October 2023, an IAEA report estimated Iran had increased its uranium stockpile 22 times over the 2015 agreed JCPOA limit. <ref name="timesofisrael20231116">{{Cite web |date=November 16, 2023 |title=Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium is 22 times above 2015 deal's limit, says IAEA |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-stockpile-of-enriched-uranium-is-22-times-above-2015-deals-limit-says-iaea/ |access-date=November 18, 2023 |website=The Times of Israel}}</ref> In the last months of the Biden administration, new intelligence persuaded US officials that Iran was exploring a [[Gun-type fission weapon|cruder design]] that could enable Iran to manufacture a nuclear weapon, undeliverable by missile, in a matter of months.<ref name=":02">{{Cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Barnes |first2=Julian E. |date=2025-02-03 |title=Iran Is Developing Plans for Faster, Cruder Weapon, U.S. Concludes |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/03/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapon.html |access-date=2025-02-05 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name="u701">{{cite web |last=Velde |first=James Van de |date=2025-03-11 |title=Iran Nuke Debate Is Another Narrative Collapse |url=https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/03/11/iran_nuke_debate_is_another_narrative_collapse_1096780.html |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=RealClearDefense}}</ref><ref name="p952">{{cite web |date=2025-03-28 |title=Iran's Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential |url=https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable-weapon-potential |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=Iran Watch}}</ref><ref name="b202">{{cite web |last=Bryen |first=Stephen |date=2025-02-04 |title=Iran speeding up work on its nukes, two new reports say |url=https://asiatimes.com/2025/02/iran-speeding-up-work-on-its-nukes-two-new-reports-say/ |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=Asia Times}}</ref> On 12 June 2025, the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) found Iran non-compliant with its nuclear obligations for the first time in 20 years.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |title=UN nuclear watchdog finds Iran in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguards obligations |url=https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/12/un-nuclear-watchdog-finds-iran-in-non-compliance-with-nuclear-obligations |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=Euro News}}</ref><ref>[https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164291 Atomic watchdog says Iran not complying with nuclear safeguards
], UN News, 12 June 2025.</ref> Iran retaliated by launching a new enrichment site and installing [[Zippe-type centrifuge|advanced centrifuges]].<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Pleitgen |first=Mostafa Salem, Frederik |date=2025-06-12 |title=Iran threatens nuclear escalation after UN watchdog board finds it in breach of obligations |url=https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/12/middleeast/iran-threatens-nuclear-escalation-iaea-intl |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> One day later, Israel [[June 2025 Israeli strikes on Iran|launched coordinated strikes across Iran]], targeting nuclear facilities and damaging Natanz and other sites.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Shotter |first1=James |last2=Sevastopulo |first2=Demetri |last3=England |first3=Andrew |last4=Bozorgmehr |first4=Najmeh |date=2025-06-13 |title=Israel launches air strikes against Iran commanders and nuclear sites |url=https://www.ft.com/content/46b1a363-c805-4800-abbf-6b47b9602ef2 |access-date=2025-06-13 |work=Financial Times}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Fassihi |first1=Farnaz |last2=Nauman |first2=Qasim |last3=Boxerman |first3=Aaron |last4=Kingsley |first4=Patrick |last5=Bergman |first5=Ronen |date=2025-06-13 |title=Israel Strikes Iran's Nuclear Program, Killing Top Military Officials: Live Updates |url=https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/12/world/israel-iran-us-nuclear |access-date=2025-06-13 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>{{TOC limit|5}}

== Motivations ==
[[File:Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Army_Day_2016_(189).jpg|thumb|The words "[[Death to Israel]]" in Persian displayed on a parade in Iran. Iran's nuclear program is seen as a means to [[Destruction of Israel in Iranian policy|destroy Israel or threaten its existence]].<ref name=":0" />]]
Iran's nuclear program is commonly viewed as serving several purposes, according to widely cited analyses.<ref name=":0" /> The program is seen as a means to [[Destruction of Israel in Iranian policy|destroy Israel or threaten its existence]].<ref name=":0" /> The United States has maintained that a nuclear-capable Iran would likely use its capabilities to attempt the annihilation of Israel.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sharma |first=Anu |title=Through the looking glass: Iran and its foreign relations |date=2022 |publisher=Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |isbn=978-1-032-23149-5 |location=London New York, NY |pages=63}}</ref> It has also been argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would likely intensify its efforts to destroy Israel under the protection of a nuclear deterrent, resulting in catastrophic consequences.<ref name=":92">{{Cite web |last=Goldberg |first=Jeffrey |date=2015-03-09 |title=The Iranian Regime on Israel's Right to Exist |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/Iranian-View-of-Israel/387085/ |access-date=2025-06-05 |website=The Atlantic |language=en}}</ref> 

Iran's nuclear program is also believed to function as a tool to protect the Iranian regime and nation from foreign aggression and external dominance.<ref name=":0" /> It may also serve as an instrument of Iranian aggression and hegemony, projecting power in the region.<ref name=":0" /> Scholars argue that a nuclear-armed Iran could feel emboldened to increase its [[Iran and state-sponsored terrorism|support for terrorism and insurgency]], core elements of its strategy, while deterring retaliation through its newfound nuclear leverage.<ref name=":10">{{Citation |last=Nader |first=Alireza |title=Nuclear Iran and Terrorism |date=2013 |work=Iran After the Bomb |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhtg2.10 |access-date=2025-02-24 |series=How Would a Nuclear-Armed Tehran Behave? |pages=25–30 |publisher=RAND Corporation |jstor=10.7249/j.ctt5hhtg2.10 }}</ref> The potential transfer of nuclear technology or weapons to radical states and terrorist organizations heightens fears of [[nuclear terrorism]].<ref name=":9" /> 

The program has also been closely tied to Iranian techno-nationalist pride, symbolizing scientific progress and national independence.<ref name=":0" />

==History==
{{See also|Timeline of the nuclear program of Iran}}

=== Origins under the Shah (1950s–1970s) ===
[[File:Atomic women Iran.JPG|thumb|An Iranian newspaper clip from 1968 reads: "A quarter of Iran's nuclear energy scientists are women." The photograph shows some female Iranian PhDs posing in front of [[Tehran]]'s research reactor.]]Iran's nuclear ambitions began under the rule of Shah [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], with support from the United States and Western Europe. In 1957, Iran and the US signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement as part of President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Dwight Eisenhower]]’s "Atoms for Peace" program. This led to the construction of Iran's first nuclear research facility at Tehran. In November 1967, the [[Tehran Research Reactor]] (TRR) went critical – a 5 megawatt (thermal) light-water reactor, which initially ran on highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel at 93% U-235, provided by the US, and was later converted in 1993 to use 20% enriched uranium with Argentine. Iran became one of the original signatories of the [[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons|NPT]] when it entered into force in March 1970, committing as a non-nuclear-weapon state not to pursue nuclear arms.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=A History of Iran's Nuclear Program {{!}} Iran Watch |url=https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program#:~:text=By%20the%20mid,fuel%20cycle%20in%20the%201970s |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=www.iranwatch.org}}</ref>

By the mid-1970s, the Shah expanded Iran's nuclear energy ambitions. In 1974 he established the [[Atomic Energy Organization of Iran]] (AEOI) and announced plans to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity from a network of nuclear power plants over 20 years. Contracts were signed with Western firms: Iran paid over $1 billion for a 10% stake in the French [[Eurodif]] consortium's uranium enrichment plant, and [[West Germany]]'s [[Siemens|Kraftwerk Union]] ([[Siemens]]) agreed to build two 1,200 MWe pressurized water reactors at [[Bushehr]]. Construction of the [[Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant]] began in 1975, and Iran also negotiated with France's Framatome to supply additional reactors. Plans were made for a full domestic nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and fuel fabrication, with a new Nuclear Technology Center established at Isfahan.<ref name=":1" />

=== Post-revolution revival and war impact (1979–1980s) ===
This ambitious program slowed dramatically after the [[Iranian Revolution|1979 Islamic Revolution]]. The Shah was deposed and Iran’s new leaders under Ayatollah [[Ruhollah Khomeini]] were initially hostile to nuclear technology, seeing it as a symbol of Western influence. Many ongoing nuclear projects were shelved or canceled. The [[Iran–Iraq War]] (1980–1988) derailed the nuclear program: resources were diverted to the war effort, and Iraq targeted Iran's nuclear infrastructure. The partially built Bushehr reactor site was bombed multiple times by Iraqi warplanes, and Siemens withdrew from the project, leaving the reactor shells heavily damaged. By the late 1980s, Iran's nuclear program had effectively been put on hold.<ref name=":1" />

=== Secret expansion and weaponization efforts (1990s–2002) ===
By the early 1990s, Iran's nuclear program accelerated on two parallel tracks: one overtly civilian and one covert. Openly, Iran continued working with Russia and China to build peaceful nuclear infrastructure. Bushehr's reactor project moved forward under Russian engineers (though plagued by delays until it finally came online in 2011), and China helped Iran with nuclear research and uranium mining expertise.<ref name=":1" /> Less transparently, Iran was building a secret enrichment capability and exploring technologies relevant to nuclear weapons, away from the eyes of inspectors.<ref name=":1" />

Iran's covert procurement of enrichment technology bore fruit in the 1990s. Thousands of centrifuge components, tools, and technical drawings obtained from [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]]'s network were used to set up secret pilot enrichment workshops.<ref name=":1" /> Experiments with [[Uranium hexafluoride|uranium hexafluoride gas]] were conducted in undeclared facilities in Tehran (such as the Kalaye Electric Company) in the late 1990s.<ref name=":1" /> In 2000, Iran completed a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan , based on a Chinese design, to produce uranium hexafluoride feedstock for enrichment.<ref name=":1" /> It also developed domestic sources of uranium: the [[Saghand]] mine in [[Yazd province]] (with Chinese assistance) and the [[Gchine uranium mine|Gchine]] mine and mill near the Gulf coast. The Gchine uranium mine became operational in 2004 and is now believed to have originally been part of a military-run nuclear effort, kept hidden from the IAEA until revealed in 2003. These steps gave Iran independent access to the raw materials and precursor processes for a weapons-capable nuclear fuel cycle.<ref name=":1" />

In the late 1990s Iran launched a nuclear weapons research program, codenamed the [[AMAD Project]], under the aegis of the Iranian Ministry of Defense. According to later IAEA findings, the AMAD Project (led by [[Mohsen Fakhrizadeh]], a top nuclear scientist) aimed to design and build an arsenal of five nuclear warheads by the mid-2000s.<ref name=":1" /> Between 1999 and 2003, this secret program managed to acquire and improve warhead designs (reportedly including a re-engineered [[Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction|Pakistani design]]), conducting high-explosive tests and detonator development for an implosion-type bomb, manufacturing some nuclear weapon components with surrogate materials, and integrating a warhead design into Iran's [[Shahab-3]] ballistic missile system.<ref name=":1" /> The main thing Amad lacked was [[fissile material]], since Iran had not yet produced weapons-grade uranium or plutonium for a bomb core. Still, the scope of Amad demonstrated that Iran was exploring the bomb option in violation of its NPT pledge.<ref name=":1" />

Throughout the 1990s, Iranian entities also received steady assistance from foreign sources. Some Russian and Chinese companies provided Iran with expertise and equipment for its nuclear projects.<ref name=":1" /> For example, Chinese technicians conducted uranium exploration in Iran and allegedly supplied blueprints that aided Iran’s construction of the Isfahan conversion facility.<ref name=":1" /> Iran’s scientists also gained know-how from Pakistan's secret network and from academic exchanges abroad. That enabled Iran to secretly establish the critical facilities that could produce weapons-usable material: large uranium enrichment plants and a heavy-water reactor project.<ref name=":1" />

By the early 2000s, two key clandestine facilities were nearing completion: a uranium enrichment center at [[Natanz]] (in central Iran), built to house thousands of centrifuges, and a [[heavy water]] production plant alongside a 40 MW heavy-water reactor ([[IR-40]]) near [[Arak, Iran|Arak]]. These facilities, which had been kept secret from the IAEA, were intended for ostensibly civilian purposes but had clear weapons potential. Enrichment at Natanz could yield high-enriched uranium for bombs, while the Arak reactor (once operational) could produce plutonium in its spent fuel, and the heavy water plant would supply the reactor's coolant.<ref name=":1" /> In August 2002, an exiled [[Iranian opposition]] group, the [[National Council of Resistance of Iran]] (NCRI), exposed the existence of Natanz and Arak.<ref name=":1" /> Satellite imagery soon confirmed construction at these sites. The revelation that Iran had built major nuclear facilities in secret, without required disclosure to the IAEA, ignited an international crisis and raised questions about the program's true aim.<ref name=":1" />

=== Exposure and International Confrontation (2002–2013) ===
[[File:Tehran_Declaration_-_21_October_2003_-_Joschka_Fischer,_Hassan_Rouhani,_Dominique_de_Villepin_and_Jack_Straw.png|thumb|The Tehran Declaration on 21 October 2003, from right to left: [[Joschka Fischer]], [[Hassan Rouhani]], [[Dominique de Villepin]] and [[Jack Straw]].]]
In late 2003, Iran was facing the prospect of censure and agreed to a degree of cooperation. In October 2003, Iran and the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany (the "EU-3") struck the Tehran Agreement: Iran pledged to temporarily suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, allow more intrusive inspections by signing the Additional Protocol, and clarify past nuclear work.<ref name=":1" /> This deal, reached just ahead of an IAEA Board of Governors deadline, was intended to build confidence while a longer-term solution was negotiated.<ref name=":1" /> However, Iran's cooperation was halting and incomplete.<ref name=":1" />

In 2004 and 2005, the IAEA uncovered inconsistencies and omissions in Iran's disclosures, such as experiments with plutonium separation and advanced P-2 centrifuge designs that Iran had failed to report.<ref name=":1" /> Iran's suspension of enrichment proved short-lived as soon it resumed certain nuclear activities.<ref name=":1" /> In June 2004, the IAEA's Board rebuked Iran for not fully cooperating.<ref name=":1" /> By September 2005, the Board found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards (a formal trigger for UN Security Council involvement).<ref name=":1" /> Iran reacted by ceasing voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and restarting enrichment work. In April 2006, President [[Mahmoud Ahmadinejad]] announced that Iran had enriched uranium to 3.5% U-235, low enriched uranium suitable for nuclear fuel, using a cascade of 164 centrifuges at Natanz.<ref name=":1" /> This marked Iran’s first public entry into the nuclear fuel-cycle capability club.<ref name=":1" />

The international community responded firmly. In July 2006, the UN Security Council passed [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696|Resolution 1696]] under Chapter VII, demanding Iran suspend all enrichment-related activities or face sanctions.<ref name=":1" /> When Iran defied this demand, the Security Council proceeded to adopt a series of escalating sanctions between 2006 and 2010.<ref name=":1" /> The first, [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737|Resolution 1737]] in December 2006, imposed sanctions targeting sensitive nuclear and missile programs and banned nuclear-related trade with Iran.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |title=Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran, 1967-2023 {{!}} Arms Control Association |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/timeline-nuclear-diplomacy-iran-1967-2023 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250603131932/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/timeline-nuclear-diplomacy-iran-1967-2023 |archive-date=2025-06-03 |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=www.armscontrol.org |language=en}}</ref> Further resolutions (1747 in 2007, 1803 in 2008, and 1929 in June 2010) broadened the sanctions to include arms embargos, asset freezes on key individuals and entities, and restrictions on financial dealings.<ref name=":2" /> These measures, backed by the US, Russia, China, and the EU alike, aimed to pressure Iran to halt enrichment. In parallel, the US and EU introduced their own tough sanctions, including US laws penalizing Iran's oil and gas investment (e.g. the [[Iran and Libya Sanctions Act|Iran Sanctions Act]] of 1996) and European moves to restrict trade and eventually embargo [[Energy in Iran|Iranian oil]] by 2012.<ref name=":2" />

Diplomatic efforts during 2005–2006 tried to resolve the standoff. The newly formed [[P5+1]] group (China, Russia, France, the UK, the US, plus Germany) offered Iran a package of incentives in mid-2006 to halt enrichment – including nuclear fuel guarantees and economic benefits.<ref name=":1" /> Iran, under the hardline Ahmadinejad administration, rejected the offer, insisting on its "right" to enrich under the NPT. As talks faltered, Iran steadily expanded its enrichment work. By 2007, Iran had installed roughly 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz and was enriching larger quantities of uranium.<ref name=":1" /> In 2007, a US [[National Intelligence Estimate]] (NIE) assessed with high confidence that while Iran had halted its structured nuclear weapons program in 2003, it was continuing to develop technical capabilities applicable to nuclear weapons.<ref name=":2" /> This finding somewhat tempered the urgency of the crisis, but concerns remained over Iran's growing stockpile of enriched uranium and its long-term intentions.

A significant development came in September 2009, when Western leaders exposed yet another secret Iranian facility. US President [[Barack Obama]], joined by France's [[Nicolas Sarkozy]] and Britain's [[Gordon Brown]], revealed intelligence on the [[Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant]], an underground enrichment site being built deep inside a mountain near [[Qom]]. Iran had not declared Fordow to the IAEA, violating its safeguards duty to report new facilities at the planning stage.<ref name=":1" /> Fordow's secret construction (begun in 2006) and fortified location heightened fears that Iran sought a secret bomb program resilient to military attack. Iran defended Fordow as a backup enrichment plant and belatedly declared it to the IAEA, but confidence in Iran's transparency was further eroded. The Fordow revelation galvanized international unity for tougher sanctions, manifested in Resolution 1929 (June 2010), which severely tightened economic restrictions on Iran.<ref name=":1" />

Meanwhile, covert operations also targeted the program. The [[Stuxnet]] [[cyberattack]], a sophisticated [[computer worm]] widely attributed to the US and Israel, was discovered in 2010 after it disrupted the control systems at Natanz, crippling a large number of Iran's spinning centrifuges.<ref name=":1" /> Between 2010 and 2012, four [[Assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists|Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated in Tehran]], killings Iran blamed on Israeli and Western agents. By mid-2013, Tehran had installed over 18,000 centrifuges (mostly IR-1 models) at Natanz and Fordow, including some 1,000+ more advanced IR-2m machine.<ref name=":1" /> Its stockpile had grown to nearly 10,000 kg of 3.5% low-enriched uranium and about 370 kg of 20% medium-enriched uranium – the latter quantity almost enough, if further enriched to weapons-grade, for one nuclear bomb.<ref name=":1" /> The world's concern was that Iran's "breakout" time, i.e. the time to produce bomb-grade uranium for a weapon, had shrunk to a matter of a few months.<ref name=":1" />

=== Diplomatic efforts and the JCPOA (2013–2018) ===
{{main|Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action}}{{See also|Correspondence between Barack Obama and Ali Khamenei|Joint Plan of Action}}
In 2013, Iran's newly elected president, [[Hassan Rouhani]], a centrist cleric and former nuclear negotiator, campaigned on ending sanctions through diplomacy. He had cautious backing from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama, having already authorized secret backchannel talks with Iranian officials in Oman in 2012, was open to a diplomatic solution.<ref name=":1" /> Formal multilateral negotiations resumed in October 2013 between Iran and the P5+1. By November 24, they reached the [[Joint Plan of Action]] (JPOA), an interim agreement that froze key elements of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief.<ref name=":1" /> Iran halted enrichment above 5% U-235, neutralized its 20% stockpile through dilution or conversion, suspended centrifuge installation, and agreed not to fuel or operate the Arak heavy-water reactor. In return, it received access to about $4.2 billion in frozen assets and limited relief on petrochemical and precious metals trade.<ref name=":1" /> The JPOA, which began in January 2014, was extended several times while talks continued toward a final accord.<ref name=":1" />

[[File:Negotiations about Iranian Nuclear Program - the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Other Officials of the P5+1 and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iran and EU in Lausanne.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|Negotiations about Iranian Nuclear Program, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Other Officials of the P5+1 and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iran and EU in Lausanne, April 2015]]After 20 months, the parties reached the [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]] (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015.<ref name=":1" /> Under this framework Iran agreed tentatively to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, all of which would last for at least a decade and some longer, and to submit to an increased intensity of [[Nuclear program of Iran#International Atomic Energy Agency reports, 2007–2015|international inspections]]. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was finally reached on 14 July 2015.<ref>{{cite news |first=Pamela |last=Dockins |title=Iran Nuclear Talks Extended Until July 7 |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/zarif-rejoins-iran-nuclear-talks/2842656.html |publisher=Voice of America |date=30 June 2015 |access-date=30 June 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |first=Paul |last=Richter |url=https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-nuclear-talks-extended-20150707-story.html |title=Iran nuclear talks extended again; Friday new deadline |date=7 July 2015 |work=Los Angeles Times |access-date=8 July 2015}}</ref> The final agreement is based upon "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially the [[IAEA safeguards]] system".<ref name="Carnegie">{{cite web | first1=George | last1=Perkovich | first2=Mark | last2=Hibbs | first3=James M. | last3=Acton | first4=Toby | last4=Dalton | url=http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/06/parsing-iran-deal/iec5 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150907182841/http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/06/parsing-iran-deal/iec5 | url-status=dead | archive-date=7 September 2015 | title=Parsing the Iran Deal | publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | date=8 August 2015}}</ref>

Enrichment was capped at 3.67% for 15 years, and the enriched uranium stockpile limited to 300 kg. Only 5,060 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges could operate at Natanz, and Fordow was repurposed for non-enrichment research. The Arak IR-40 reactor was to be redesigned and rebuilt, with its original core removed and filled with concrete to eliminate plutonium production capability. Iran agreed to provisionally implement the IAEA Additional Protocol, and accepted enhanced verification, including continuous surveillance of enrichment and conversion facilities, monitoring of uranium mines and mills, and oversight of centrifuge manufacturing. Iran's excess enriched uranium, including the bulk of its 20% material, was to be shipped abroad or down-blended. Over 13,000 centrifuges were dismantled. Limited R&D on advanced centrifuges was allowed under controlled conditions without accumulating enriched uranium.

In exchange, the UN, US, and EU committed to stepwise sanctions relief: UN Security Council Resolution 2231 endorsed the JCPOA. It retained a conventional arms embargo for five years and ballistic missile restrictions for eight, and introduced a "snapback" mechanism allowing reimposition of sanctions in case of noncompliance. US and EU sanctions targeting Iran’s energy, finance, shipping, and trade sectors were suspended. On "Implementation Day" (January 16, 2016), the IAEA verified Iranian compliance, leading to the unfreezing of billions in Iranian assets and restoration of access to international banking (e.g., [[SWIFT]]).<ref name="Nasrella">{{cite news |last1=Nasrella |first1=Shadia |date=16 January 2016 |title=Iran Says International Sanctions To Be Lifted Saturday |url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iran-sanctions-lifted_569a3500e4b0ce496424a2b2 |access-date=16 January 2016 |work=HuffPost |agency=[[Reuters]]}}</ref><ref name="Chuck">{{cite news |last1=Chuck |first1=Elizabeth |date=16 January 2016 |title=Iran Sanctions Lifted After Watchdog Verifies Nuclear Compliance |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/nuclear-sanctions-be-lifted-iran-fm-zarif-n497861 |access-date=16 January 2016 |work=NBC News |agency=Reuters}}</ref><ref name="Melvin">{{cite news |last1=Melvin |first1=Dan |title=UN regulator to certify Iran compliance with nuke pact |url=http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/16/middleeast/vienna-iran-iaea-nuclear-deal/ |access-date=16 January 2016 |publisher=[[CNN]]}}</ref> Some US sanctions tied to terrorism and human rights remained in force.

=== United States withdrawal and Iranian violations (2018–2025) ===
{{main|United States sanctions against Iran|United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action}}

In 2018, the [[Mossad]] reportedly stole nuclear secrets (a cache of documents from Iran's weaponization program) from a secure warehouse in the [[Turquzabad]] district of Tehran. According to reports, the agents came in a truck semitrailer at midnight, cut into dozens of safes with "high intensity torches", and carted out "50,000 pages and 163 compact discs of memos, videos and plans" before leaving in time to make their escape when the guards came for the morning shift at 7 am.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020">{{cite magazine |last1=Filkins |first1=Dexter |title=TheTwilight of the Iranian Revolution |magazine=The New Yorker |date=18 May 2020 |url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/the-twilight-of-the-iranian-revolution |access-date=7 June 2020 }}</ref><ref name="NYT-sanger-15-7-2018">{{cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Bergman |first2=Ronen |title=How Israel, in Dark of Night, Torched Its Way to Iran's Nuclear Secrets |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/us/politics/iran-israel-mossad-nuclear.html |access-date=9 June 2020 |work=The New York Times |date=15 July 2018}}</ref><ref>[https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/the-iaea-mossad-iran-dance-analysis-661468 How Mossad turned the IAEA around on Iran with evidence - analysis], Yonah Jeremy Job, Jerusalem Post, 9 March 2021.</ref> According to a US intelligence official, an "enormous" Iranian "dragnet operation" was unsuccessful in recovering the documents, which escaped through Azerbaijan.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020"/> According to the Israelis, the documents and files, which it shared with European countries and the United States,<ref>[https://www.timesofisrael.com/european-intelligence-officials-briefed-in-israel-on-irans-nuclear-archive/ European intelligence officials briefed in Israel on Iran’s nuclear archive] ''The Times of Israel'', 5 May 2018</ref> demonstrated that the AMAD Project aimed to develop nuclear weapons,<ref>[https://www.timesofisrael.com/mossads-stunning-op-in-iran-casts-giant-shadow-over-the-intelligence-it-stole/ Mossad’s stunning op in Iran overshadows the actual intelligence it stole] ''The Times of Israel'', 1 May 2018</ref> that Iran had a nuclear program when it claimed to have "largely suspended it", and that there were two nuclear sites in Iran that had been hidden from inspectors.<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020" /> Iran claims "the whole thing was a hoax".<ref name="Filkins-iran-5-18-2020" /> This influenced [[Donald Trump|Trump]]'s decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions on Iran.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-recording-netanyahu-boasts-israel-convinced-trump-to-quit-iran-nuclear-deal/amp/|title=In recording, Netanyahu boasts Israel convinced Trump to quit Iran nuclear deal|last=Fulbright|first=Alexander|date=17 July 2018|work=The Times of Israel}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46071747|title=Trump administration to reinstate all Iran sanctions|date=3 November 2018|work=BBC News}}</ref>

In 2018, the [[United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action|United States withdrew from]] [[United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action|JCPOA]], with President [[Donald Trump]] stating that "the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction: that a murderous regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program".<ref name=":12" /> The US also contended that the agreement was inadequate because it did not impose limitations on Iran's ballistic missile program,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Landler |first=Mark |date=2018-05-08 |title=Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html |access-date=2025-04-28 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> and failed to curb its backing of proxy groups.<ref name="Washington Post 2015">{{cite news |date=2015-07-14 |title=Read: An open letter from retired generals and admirals opposing the Iran nuclear deal |url=https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/read-an-open-letter-from-retired-generals-and-admirals-opposing-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1703/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018132614/https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/read-an-open-letter-from-retired-generals-and-admirals-opposing-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1703/ |archive-date=2017-10-18 |access-date=2018-01-14 |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref>

In February 2019, the IAEA certified that Iran was still abiding by the international [[Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]] (JCPOA) of 2015.<ref name=ReutersFeb19>{{cite web |last1=Murphy |first1=Francois |title=Iran still holding up its end of nuclear deal, IAEA report shows |date=22 February 2019 |url=https://news.yahoo.com/iran-still-holding-end-nuclear-deal-iaea-report-161005676.html |agency=[[Reuters]] |access-date=16 May 2019}}</ref> However, on 8 May 2019, Iran announced it would suspend implementation of some parts of the JCPOA, threatening further action in 60 days unless it received protection from US sanctions.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nuclear-deal-iran-announces-partial-withdrawal-2015-pact/|title=Iran news: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces partial withdrawal from 2015 nuclear deal|work=CBS News|date=8 May 2019 |language=en-US|access-date=8 May 2019}}</ref> In July 2019, the IAEA confirmed that Iran has breached both the 300&nbsp;kg enriched uranium stockpile limit and the 3.67% refinement limit.<ref>{{cite news |title=Why do the limits on Iran's uranium enrichment matter? |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48776695 |access-date=10 November 2019 |work=BBC News |date=5 September 2019}}</ref> On 5 November 2019, Iranian nuclear chief [[Ali Akbar Salehi]] announced that Iran will enrich uranium to 5% at the [[Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant]], adding the country had the capability to enrich uranium to 20% if needed.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Iran-will-enrich-uranium-to-5-percent-at-Fordow-nuclear-site-official-606964|title=Iran will enrich uranium to 5% at Fordow nuclear site -official|date=5 November 2019|website=The Jerusalem Post &#124; JPost.com}}</ref> Also in November, [[Behrouz Kamalvandi]], spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, stated that Iran can enrich up to 60% if needed.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-enrichment-idUSKBN1XJ0D5 |title=Iran able to enrich uranium up to 60%, says atomic energy agency spokesman|date=9 November 2019|work=Reuters|access-date=12 January 2020|language=en}}</ref> President Hassan Rouhani declared that Iran's nuclear program would be "limitless" while the country launches the third phase of quitting from the 2015 nuclear deal.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.post-gazette.com/business/powersource/2019/09/04/Iran-nuclear-deal-US-oil-sanctions-Iranian-network-Syria/stories/201909040207|title= Iran announces the 3rd phase of its nuclear-deal withdrawal amid new U.S. sanctions|access-date=5 September 2019|website=Pittsburgh Post-gazettel}}</ref>

On January 3, 2020, the US assassinated Iranian [[Quds Force]] commander [[Qasem Soleimani]], and Iran responded with missile strikes on US. bases. Two days later, Iran's government declared it would no longer observe any JCPOA limits on uranium enrichment capacity, levels, or stockpile size.<ref>[https://www.iiss.org/blogs/survival-blog/2020/01/iran-preserves-options-over-jcpoa Iran preserves options over the nuclear deal], Mark Fitzpatrick and Mahsa Rouhi, IISS, 6 January 2020.</ref> In March 2020, the IAEA said that Iran had nearly tripled its stockpile of enriched uranium since early November 2019.<ref name="IAEA March 2020">{{cite news |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-stockpile-of-enriched-uranium-has-jumped-u-n-atomic-agency-says-11583243861 |title=Iran's Stockpile of Enriched Uranium Has Jumped, U.N. Atomic Agency Says |date=3 March 2020 |last1=Norman |first1=Laurence |last2=Gordon |first2=Michael R. |access-date=3 March 2020 |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]}}</ref> In late June and early July 2020, there were several explosions in Iran, including one that damaged the Natanz enrichment plant (see [[2020 Iran explosions]]). In September 2020, the IAEA reported that Iran had accumulated ten times as much enriched uranium as permitted by the JCPOA.<ref>[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54033441 "Iran's enriched uranium stockpile '10 times limit'"], ''[[BBC News]]'', 4 September 2020</ref> On 27 November 2020, Iran's top nuclear scientist, [[Mohsen Fakhrizadeh]], was assassinated in Tehran. Fakhrizadeh was believed to be the primary force behind Iran's covert nuclear program for many decades. The [[New York Times]] reported that Israel's Mossad was behind the attack and that [[Mick Mulroy]], the former Deputy Defense Secretary for the Middle East said the death of Fakhirizadeh was "a setback to Iran’s nuclear program and he was also a senior officer in the [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]], and that "will magnify Iran’s desire to respond by force."<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Fassihi |first1=Farnaz |last2=Sanger |first2=David E. |last3=Schmitt |first3=Eric |last4=Bergman |first4=Ronen |date=27 November 2020 |title=Iran's Top Nuclear Scientist Killed in Ambush, State Media Say |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-scientist-assassinated-mohsen-fakhrizadeh.html |newspaper=The New York Times}}</ref>

Throughout 2021 and 2022, Iran installed cascades of advanced centrifuges (IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6) at Natanz and Fordow, significantly increasing its enrichment output.<ref name="jp160321">{{Cite web |date=17 March 2021 |title=Iran using advanced uranium enrichment at previously exploded facility |url=https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/iran-enriching-uranium-with-new-machine-at-underground-plant-iaea-662235 |website=The Jerusalem Post &#124; JPost.com}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> In February 2021, the IAEA reported that Iran stopped allowing access to data from nuclear sites, as well as plans for future sites.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wintour |first=Patrick |date=2025-06-13 |title=Is Iran as close to building a nuclear weapon as Netanyahu claims? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/13/is-iran-as-close-to-building-a-nuclear-weapon-as-netanyahu-claims |access-date=2025-06-15 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> In April 2021, a sabotage attack struck the Natanz enrichment plant, causing an electrical blackout and damaging centrifuges. Iran responded by further upping enrichment: days later, it began producing 60% enriched uranium, an unprecedented level for Iran, just short of weapons-grade (90% and above). This 60% enrichment took place at Natanz, and later at Fordow as well, yielding a stockpile that as of early 2023 exceeded ~70 kg of 60% uranium.<ref name=":1" /> If Iran chose to enrich this material to 90%, it would be sufficient for several nuclear warheads.  The UK, France, and Germany said that Iran has "no credible civilian use for uranium metal" and called the news "deeply concerning" because of its "potentially grave military implications" (as the use of metallic enriched uranium is for bombs).<ref>{{cite news |last1=Natasha Turak |date=16 February 2021 |title=Iran's uranium metal production is 'most serious nuclear step' to date, but deal can still be saved |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/16/iran-nuclear-deal-uranium-metal-production-called-provocative.html |agency=CNBC}}</ref> On 25 June 2022, in a meeting with the senior diplomat of the EU, [[Ali Shamkhani]], Iran's top security officer, declared that Iran would continue to advance its nuclear program until the West modifies its "illegal behavior."<ref>{{cite news |date=25 June 2022 |title=Iran says its nuclear development to continue until the West changes its "illegal behaviour" |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-its-nuclear-development-continue-until-west-changes-its-illegal-2022-06-25/ |access-date=27 June 2022 |work=Reuters |publisher=Reuters |agency=Reuters}}</ref>

In July 2022, according to an IAEA report seen by Reuters, Iran had increased its uranium enrichment through the use of sophisticated equipment at its underground Fordow plant in a configuration that can more quickly vary between enrichment levels.<ref>{{cite news |title=Exclusive: Iran escalates enrichment with adaptable machines at Fordow, IAEA reports |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-escalates-enrichment-with-adaptable-machines-fordow-iaea-reports-2022-07-09/ |access-date=11 July 2022 |work=Reuters |agency=Reuters |publisher=Reuters |date=9 July 2022}}</ref> In September 2022, Germany, United Kingdom and France expressed doubts over Iran's sincerity in returning to the JCPOA after Tehran insisted that the IAEA close its probes into uranium traces at three undeclared Iranian sites.<ref>{{cite news |title=Iran: Germany, France, UK raise concerns on future of nuclear deal |url=https://www.dw.com/en/iran-germany-france-uk-raise-concerns-on-future-of-nuclear-deal/a-63078519 |access-date=11 September 2022 |agency=Deutsche Welle |date=10 September 2022}}</ref> The IAEA said it could not guarantee the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, stating there had been "no progress in resolving questions about the past presence of nuclear material at undeclared sites."<ref>{{cite news |title=IAEA 'cannot assure' peaceful nature of Iran nuclear programme |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/7/iaea-cannot-assure-peaceful-nature-of-iran-nuclear-programme |access-date=11 September 2022 |agency=Al Jazeera |date=7 September 2022}}</ref> United Nations Secretary-General [[António Guterres]] urged Iran to hold "serious dialogue" about nuclear inspections and said IAEA's independence is "essential" in response to Iranian demands to end probes.<ref>{{cite news |title=UN chief urges Iran to hold 'serious dialogue' on nuclear inspections|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-chief-urges-iran-to-hold-serious-dialogue-on-nuclear-inspections/|access-date=15 September 2022 |agency=Times of Israel |date=14 September 2022}}</ref> In February 2023, the IAEA reported having found uranium in Iran enriched to 84%.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://m.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-732083/amp|title=IAEA finds uranium enriched to 84% in Iran, near bomb-grade|website=Jerusalem Post|access-date=21 February 2023|archive-date=21 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230221094946/https://m.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-732083/amp|url-status=dead}}</ref> The Iranian government has claimed that this is an "unintended fluctuation" in the enrichment levels, though the Iranians have been openly enriching uranium to 60% purity, a breach of the 2015 nuclear deal.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2023-03-01 |title=Iran nuclear: IAEA inspectors find uranium particles enriched to 83.7% |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64810145 |access-date=2023-03-01}}</ref> In 2024, Iranian President [[Masoud Pezeshkian]] expressed interest in reopening discussions with the United States on the nuclear deal.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Toossi |first=Sina |date=2025-03-20 |title=Iran's New Outreach to the West Is Risky |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/09/27/iran-pezeshkian-united-nations-nuclear-deal-outreach/ |access-date=2025-03-16 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-09-16 |title=Iran's president insists Tehran wants to negotiate over its nuclear program |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-program-masoud-pezeshkian-cf64d84ddba7f1c439d513f640671ba2 |access-date=2025-03-16 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref>

In late October 2024, during a series of [[October 2024 Israeli strikes on Iran|Israeli airstrikes in Iran]] carried out in response to a [[October 2024 Iranian strikes against Israel|ballistic missile attack earlier that month]], Israel reportedly destroyed a top-secret nuclear weapons research facility known as the Taleghan 2 building, located within the [[Parchin]] military complex.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ravid |first=Barak |date=2024-11-15 |title=Officials say Israel destroyed active nuclear weapons research facility in Iran strike |url=https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=Axios |language=en}}</ref> In November 2024, Iran announced that it would make new advanced centrifuges after IAEA condemned Iranians' non-compliance and secrecy.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Tawfeeq |first1=Mohammed |last2=Kourdi |first2=Eyad |last3=Yeung |first3=Jessie |date=2024-11-22 |title=Iran says it is activating new centrifuges after being condemned by UN nuclear watchdog |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/22/world/iran-iaea-centrifuges-censure-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=2024-11-22 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-22 |title=Iran to launch 'advanced centrifuges' in response to IAEA censure |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241122-iran-to-launch-advanced-centrifuges-in-response-to-iaea-censure |access-date=2024-11-22 |website=France 24 |language=en}}</ref>

== Current status and recent escalations (2025–) ==
{{main|2025 United States–Iran negotiations|June 2025 Israeli strikes on Iran}}

In January 2025, it was reported that Iran is developing [[Iranian missiles|long-range missile technology]] under the [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]] (IRGC), with some designs based on North Korean models. According to the [[National Council of Resistance of Iran]] (NCRI), these missiles, such as the [[Qaem 100|Ghaem-100]] and [[Simorgh (rocket)|Simorgh]], could carry nuclear warheads and reach targets as far as 3,000 km away, including parts of [[Europe]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Barnes |first=Joe |date=2025-01-31 |title=Iran 'secretly building nuclear missiles that can hit Europe' |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/01/31/iran-nuclear-warhead-europe-revolutionary-guard-north-korea/ |access-date=2025-04-28 |work=The Telegraph |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235}}</ref> &nbsp;

In March 2025, US President [[Second presidency of Donald Trump|Donald Trump]] sent [[Donald Trump's letter to Ali Khamenei|a letter]] to Iran seeking to reopen negotiations.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Fassihi |first2=Farnaz |last3=Broadwater |first3=Luke |date=2025-03-08 |title=Trump Offers to Reopen Nuclear Talks in a Letter to Iran's Supreme Leader |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-talks.html |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-03-07 |title=Trump sends letter to Iran's supreme leader amid tensions over country's nuclear program |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-sends-letter-to-irans-supreme-leader-amid-tensions-over-countrys-nuclear-program |access-date=2025-03-16 |website=PBS News |language=en-us}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-03-07 |title=Trump wrote to Iran's leader about that country's nuclear program and expects results 'very soon' |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-trump-letter-khamenei-f78aeb869d146978b6d377184e236ef9 |access-date=2025-03-16 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> Ayatollah Ali Khamenei later said, "Some bullying governments insist on negotiations not to resolve issues but to impose their own expectations," which was seen as in response to the letter.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sampson |first=Eve |date=2025-03-08 |title=Iran's Leader Rebuffs Trump's Outreach Over Its Nuclear Program |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-leader-response.html |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Bigg |first=Matthew Mpoke |date=2025-03-10 |title=Iran Signals Openness to Limited Nuclear Talks With U.S. |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/10/world/europe/iran-nuclear-trump-us.html |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Garrett |first=Luke |date=2025-03-09 |title=Trump rebuffed by Iran's leader after sending letter calling for nuclear negotiation |url=https://www.npr.org/2025/03/09/g-s1-52882/trump-iran-nuclear |access-date=2025-03-16 |work=NPR |language=en}}</ref> 

In April 2025, Trump revealed that Iran had decided to undertake [[2025 United States–Iran negotiations|talks with the United States]] for an agreement over its nuclear program.<ref>[https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-is-giving-talks-with-us-genuine-chance-foreign-ministry-spokesperson-says-2025-04-11/ Iran says it will give US talks about nuclear plans a 'genuine chance'], Nayera Abdallah, Reuters, 11 April 2025.</ref> On 12 April, both countries held their first high-level meeting in Oman,<ref>{{Cite web |date=12 April 2025 |title=US and Iran hold 'constructive' first round of nuclear talks |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g2eggzvjgo |access-date=19 April 2025 |website=BBC |language=en}}</ref> followed by a second meeting on 19 April in Italy.<ref>{{Cite web |date=19 April 2025 |title=Iran, US conclude second round of high-stakes nuclear talks in Rome |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250419-iran-us-to-hold-second-round-of-high-stakes-nuclear-talks-in-rome |access-date=19 April 2025 |website=France 24 |language=en}}</ref> On May 16, Trump sent Iran an offer and said they have to move quickly or else bad things would happen.<ref>{{Cite web |date=May 16, 2025 |title=Trump administration live updates: President says U.S. offered a nuclear proposal to Iran and inks AI deal with UAE |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/live-blog/trump-administration-live-updates-president-trump-set-end-mideast-trip-rcna206143 |website=NBC News}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Miller |first1=Zeke |last2=Gambrell |first2=Jon |date=2025-05-16 |title=Trump says Iran has a proposal from the US on its rapidly advancing nuclear program |url=https://www.ksnt.com/news/international/ap-trump-says-iran-has-a-proposal-from-the-us-on-its-rapidly-advancing-nuclear-program/ |website=KSNT}}</ref> On May 17, Khamenei condemned Trump, saying that he lied about wanting peace and that he was not worth responding to, calling the US demands "outrageous nonsense."<ref>{{cite web |date=May 20, 2025 |title=Iran's Khamenei slams 'outrageous' US demands in nuclear talks |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-reviewing-proposal-5th-round-nuclear-talks-2025-05-20/ |website=Reuters}}</ref> Khamenei also reiterated that Israel is a "cancerous tumour" that must be uprooted.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Khamenei: Trump lied when he said he wants peace; Israel 'cancerous tumor' in region |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/khamenei-trump-lied-when-he-said-he-wants-peace-israel-cancerous-tumor-in-region/ |access-date=2025-05-20 |website=www.timesofisrael.com |language=en-US |agency=Reuters}}</ref>

On May 31, 2025, IAEA reported that Iran had sharply increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% purity, just below weapons-grade, reaching over 408 kilograms, a nearly 50% rise since February.<ref name=":5">{{Cite web |date=2025-06-12 |title=UN nuclear watchdog board censures Iran, which retaliates by announcing a new enrichment site |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-sanctions-728b811da537abe942682e13a82ff8bd |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> The agency warned that this amount is enough for multiple nuclear weapons if further enriched. It also noted that Iran remains the only non-nuclear-weapon state to produce such material, calling the situation a "serious concern."<ref name=":5" /> In June 2025, the  NCRI said Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons through a new program called the "Kavir Plan". According to the NCRI, the new project involves six sites in [[Semnan province]] working on warheads and related technology, succeeding the previous AMAD Project.<ref>{{cite web |title=Iran Nuclear Espionage Battle Intensifies with New Leak Claims |url=https://www.newsweek.com/iran-nuclear-espionage-battle-intensifies-new-leak-claims-2083594 |publisher=Newsweek}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Exiled opposition group says Iran hid nuclear weapons hub in desert |url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/202506102992 |publisher=Iran International}}</ref>

On June 10, Trump stated in that Iran was becoming "much more aggressive" in the negotiations.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-10 |title=Donald Trump says Iran is becoming more aggressive in nuclear talks |url=https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-857235 |access-date=2025-06-10 |website=The Jerusalem Post |language=en}}</ref> On 11 June, the Iranian regime threatened US bases in the Middle East, with Defense Minister [[Aziz Nasirzadeh]] stating, "If a conflict is imposed on us... all US bases are within our reach, and we will boldly target them in host countries."<ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-06-11 |title=Iran threatens to strike US bases in region if military conflict arises |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-threatens-us-bases-region-if-military-conflict-arises-2025-06-11/ |access-date=2025-06-11 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref> The US embassy in Iraq evacuated all personnel.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/11/iran-threatens-to-strike-us-bases-if-conflict-erupts-over-nuclear-programme | title=Iran threatens to strike US bases if conflict erupts over nuclear programme }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-he-is-less-confident-about-iran-nuclear-deal-2025-06-11/ | title=Trump says he's less confident about nuclear deal with Iran | work=Reuters }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.newsweek.com/iraq-us-embassy-evacuated-iran-nuclear-talks-2084155 | title=US embassy in Middle East prepares to evacuate after warning from Iran | website=[[Newsweek]] }}</ref> The Iran-backed Yemen-based [[Houthis|Houthi movement]] threatened to attack the United States if a strike on Iran were to occur.<ref>{{Cite news | title=U.S. shrinks presence in Middle East amid fears of Israeli strike on Iran - The Washington Post | newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] | url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/11/us-israel-iran-attack-fears/ | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250611220030/https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/06/11/us-israel-iran-attack-fears/ | access-date=2025-06-14 | archive-date=2025-06-11}}</ref><ref>https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-houthis-warn-us-israel-war-if-iran-attacked-2084306ref></ref> [[United States Central Command|CENTCOM]] presented a wide range of military options for an attack on Iran.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5342574-centcom-commander-gave-trump-wide-range-of-military-options-if-iran-talks-fail/amp/ | title=CENTCOM Commander gave Trump 'wide range' of military options if Iran talks fail }}</ref> UK issued threat advisory for ships on [[Arabian Gulf]].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-israel-evacuations/ | title=Update: US warnings, evacuations came only a day before attacks &#124; Responsible Statecraft }}</ref> US Secretary of Defense [[Pete Hegseth]] told Congress that Iran was attempting a nuclear breakout.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/06/hegseth-tells-congress-indications-iran-moving-toward-nuclear-weapon | title=Hegseth tells Congress 'indications' Iran moving toward nuclear weapon - AL-Monitor: The Middle Eastʼs leading independent news source since 2012 }}</ref> 

On 12 June 2025, IAEA found Iran non-compliant with its nuclear obligations for the first time in 20 years.<ref name=":3" /> Iran retaliated by announcing it would launch a new enrichment site and install advanced centrifuges.<ref name=":4" /> On the night of June 13, Israel has initiated [[June 2025 Israeli strikes on Iran|Operation Rising Lion]], a large‑scale aerial assault targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, missile factories, military sites, and commanders across cities including Tehran and Natanz.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2025 |title=Israel hits Iran nuclear facilities, missile factories; Tehran launches drones |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-it-strikes-iran-amid-nuclear-tensions-2025-06-13/?utm_}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-13 |title=Israel attacks Iran's nuclear and missile sites and kills top military officials |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-explosions-israel-tehran-00234a06e5128a8aceb406b140297299 |access-date=2025-06-13 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref>

== Main facilities ==
{{Main article|Nuclear facilities in Iran}}

=== Natanz ===
{{Main article|Natanz Nuclear Facility}}
[[Natanz Nuclear Facility|Natanz]], located about 220 km southeast of Tehran, is Iran's main uranium enrichment site.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |date=2025-05-22 |title=Iran has several major nuclear program sites, now the subject of negotiations with the US |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-sites-explained-us-negotiations-cb602a7b53f9314dfba7e35a889fc086 |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> The facility includes an underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) housing large cascades of gas centrifuges, as well as a smaller Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) above the ground. Iran has installed thousands of first-generation ''IR-1'' centrifuges and more advanced models (''IR-2m, IR-4, IR-6'') here. As of 2025, Natanz is enriching uranium up to 60% U-235, a level approaching weapons-grade.<ref name=":14">{{Cite news |last=Murphy |first=Francois |date=2024-11-28 |title=Iran plans new uranium-enrichment expansion, IAEA report says |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-plans-uranium-enrichment-expansion-natanz-fordow-iaea-report-says-2024-11-28/ |access-date=2025-06-12 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref> Iran has also begun excavating a new enrichment hall deep under the adjacent ''Kūh-e Kolang Gaz Lā'' (“Pickaxe Mountain”) to harden the site against airstrikes.<ref name=":6" />

In the past, the site saw multiple sabotage attacks (such as the Stuxnet cyberattack and unexplained explosions).<ref name=":6" /> On 13 June 2025, the site was struck by Israeli airstrikes during [[June 2025 Israeli strikes on Iran|Operation Rising Lion]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=IAEA Says Natanz Is Among Iranian Sites That Were Hit |url=https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-strike-conflict/card/iaea-says-natanz-is-among-iranian-sites-that-were-hit-ZlgPnqnyEHkctTYvlFI9 |access-date=2025-06-13 |website=WSJ |language=en-US}}</ref>

=== Fordow ===
{{Main article|Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant}}
[[Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant|Fordow]] (near the city of [[Qom]], approximately 100 km southwest of Tehran) is an underground enrichment site built inside a mountain.<ref name=":6" /> Originally designed to host about 3,000 centrifuges, Fordow was revealed in 2009 and appears engineered to withstand airstrikes.<ref name=":6" /> It was re-purposed under the 2015 nuclear deal as a research facility with no enrichment, but Iran resumed enrichment at Fordow after 2019. By 2025, Iran is using Fordow to enrich uranium up to 60% U-235 as well, deploying advanced IR-6 centrifuges.<ref name=":14" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=UN nuclear watchdog board finds Iran in breach of non-proliferation duties |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/12/un-nuclear-watchdog-says-iran-non-compliant-of-nuclear-safeguards |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref> Fordow's smaller size and heavy fortification make it a particular proliferation concern. The IAEA still inspects Fordow, but Iran's suspension of the Additional Protocol means inspectors no longer have daily access.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |title=The Status of Iran's Nuclear Program {{!}} Arms Control Association |url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-program-1 |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20250601063215/https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-program-1 |archive-date=2025-06-01 |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=www.armscontrol.org |language=en}}</ref> In June 2025, Iran revealed plans to install advanced centrifuges at the facility.<ref name=":5" />

=== Bushehr ===
{{Main article|Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant}}
Bushehr is Iran's only commercial nuclear power station, situated on the Persian Gulf coast in southern Iran.<ref name=":6" /> The site's first unit, a 1000 MWe pressurized water reactor (VVER-1000) built with [[Iran–Russia relations|Russian assistance]], began operation in 2011–2013. Russia supplies the enriched fuel for Bushehr-1 and removes the spent fuel, an arrangement that minimizes proliferation risk.<ref name=":6" /> Iran is constructing two additional [[VVER|VVER-1000]] reactors at Bushehr with Russian collaboration, slated to come online in the late 2020s.<ref name=":6" /> Bushehr is under full IAEA safeguards. Its operation is closely monitored by the Agency, and Iran, like any NPT party, must report and permit inspection of the reactor and its fuel.<ref name=":6" />

=== Arak ===
{{Main article|IR-40}}
[[File:Arak_Heavy_Water4.JPG|thumb|[[Arak IR-40]] complex, a heavy water reactor and production plant]]
[[IR-40|Arak]], about 250 km southwest of Tehran, is the site of Iran's IR-40 [[heavy water]] reactor and associated heavy water production plant.<ref name=":6" /> The 40 MW (thermal) reactor, still under construction, is designed to use natural uranium fuel and heavy water moderation, which would produce [[plutonium]] as a byproduct in the spent fuel.<ref name=":6" /> In its original configuration, the Arak reactor could have yielded enough plutonium for roughly 1–2 nuclear weapons per year if Iran built a reprocessing facility (which it does not have).<ref name=":8">{{Cite web |title=Nuclear Power in Iran - World Nuclear Association |url=https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/iran |access-date=2025-06-12 |website=world-nuclear.org}}</ref> Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to halt work on Arak and redesign the reactor to a smaller, proliferation-resistant version. In January 2016, Iran removed and filled Arak’s original reactor core with concrete, disabling it.<ref name=":8" /> As of mid-2025, Iran, with international input, has been modifying the reactor design to limit its plutonium output, and the reactor has not yet become operational.<ref name=":7" /> A heavy water production plant at the Arak site continues to operate (25 tons/year capacity), supplying heavy water for the reactor and medical research; Iran's heavy water stockpile is under IAEA monitoring per its safeguards commitments.<ref name=":8" />

=== Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center ===
{{Main article|Isfahan Nuclear Technology/Research Center}}
[[Isfahan Nuclear Technology/Research Center|Isfahan]], located ~350 km south of Tehran, is another major hub of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and research activities. The site hosts the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) where [[yellowcake]] (uranium ore concentrate) is converted into [[uranium hexafluoride]] (UF₆) gas – the feedstock for enrichment.<ref name=":8" /> The UCF at Isfahan has produced hundreds of tons of UF₆ for Natanz and Fordow.<ref name=":8" /> Isfahan also houses a Fuel Fabrication Plant for producing nuclear fuel (e.g. fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor and prototype fuel for Arak).<ref name=":8" /> In addition, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center includes laboratories and several small research reactors, [[China–Iran relations|supplied by China]], used for research and isotope production.<ref name=":6" />

=== Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) ===
Located in Tehran at the headquarters of the [[Atomic Energy Organization of Iran]], the [[Tehran Research Reactor]] is a 5 MW [[Sodium-cooled fast reactor|pool-type]] research reactor.<ref name=":6" /> It was provided by the United States in 1967 as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program.<ref name=":6" /> Originally fueled with highly enriched uranium (HEU), the TRR was converted in 1987 to use 19.75% enriched uranium (LEU).<ref name=":6" /> The TRR is used to produce medical isotopes (such as [[molybdenum-99]]) and for scientific research. Its need for 20% LEU fuel became a point of contention when Iran's external fuel supply ran low in 2009, prompting the decision to enrich uranium to 20%.<ref name=":8" />

=== Other sites ===
According to a May 2025 report by IAEA, several undeclared locations in Iran remain at the center of its investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities. These include [[Turquzabad]], first identified publicly in 2018 when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed it was a secret nuclear warehouse. Inspectors later detected man-made uranium particles there in 2019.<ref name=":13" /> Two other sites, [[Varamin]] and [[Marivan]], also yielded traces of undeclared nuclear material when IAEA inspectors were granted access in 2020.<ref name=":13" /> A fourth site, [[Lavizan-Shian|Lavisan-Shian]], has been under scrutiny as well, though inspectors were never able to visit it because it was demolished after 2003.<ref name=":13" /> IAEA concluded that these locations, and possibly others too, were part of an undeclared nuclear program conducted by Iran up until the early 2000s.<ref name=":13" />

On 12 June 2025, Iran announced the activation of a third uranium enrichment site following the IAEA's first formal censure of Iran in two decades. While the location has not been disclosed, Iranian officials described it as "secure and invulnerable."<ref name=":5" />

==Views on Iran's nuclear power program==
{{main|Views on the nuclear program of Iran}}Analysts and researchers say that a nuclear-armed Iran poses significant global security risks and undermines the stability of the [[Middle East]]. [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) chief [[Rafael Grossi]] warns that an Iranian nuclear weapon could trigger broad [[nuclear proliferation]], as other countries, particularly in the Middle East, may seek similar capabilities in response. Concerns also exist that Iran's nuclear assets could fall into the hands of extremist factions due to internal instability or regime change.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Freilich |first=Charles David |title=Israeli National Security: a New Strategy for an Era of Change |date=2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-060293-2 |location=New York |pages=83–85}}</ref> Additionally, the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons has raised concerns about a regional arms race, with countries such as [[Saudi Arabia and weapons of mass destruction|Saudi Arabia]] and [[Turkey]] indicating they might pursue nuclear capabilities if Iran were to develop them.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Khan |first=Saira |title=The Iran Nuclear Deal: Non-Proliferation and US-Iran Conflict Resolution |date=2024 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-3-031-50195-1 |series=Studies in Iranian Politics Series |location=Cham |pages=176}}</ref> The potential transfer of nuclear technology or weapons to radical states and terrorist organizations heightens fears of [[nuclear terrorism]].<ref name=":9" />

Scholars argue that a nuclear-armed Iran could feel emboldened to increase its [[Iran and state-sponsored terrorism|support for terrorism and insurgency]], core elements of its strategy, while deterring retaliation through its newfound nuclear leverage.<ref name=":10" />

== Cost ==

=== Direct financial expenditures ===
Estimating the direct costs of Iran's nuclear program is complicated by secrecy, but available assessments suggest significant expenditures.
{| class="wikitable"
|+
!Category
!Estimated cost
!Source
|-
|[[Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant|Bushehr nuclear plant]]
|>$10 billion (vs $2B official)
|<ref name=":15">{{Cite web |last=Rajabi |first=Sia |date=2025-04-15 |title=Iran’s Nuclear Power Dream: From Fantasy to Reality |url=https://iranfocus.com/nuclear/53948-irans-nuclear-power-dream-from-fantasy-to-reality/ |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=Iran Focus |language=en-US}}</ref>
|-
|Broader nuclear infrastructure
|>$100 billion
|<ref name=":15" />
|-
|Eurodif take (1970s)
|$1 billion
|<ref name=":1" />
|-
|Hormozgan plant (planned)
|>$20 billion
|<ref name=":16">{{Cite web |date=31 May 2025 |title=Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) |url=https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf}}</ref>
|-
|Annual operational costs
|$250-$300 million 
|<ref name=":16" /><ref name=":17">{{Cite web |title=Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Costs, Risks, and Motivations |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/events/2013/04/irans-nuclear-ambitions-costs-risks-and-motivations?lang=en |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |language=en}}</ref>
|-
|Total spending estimate
|>$30 billion 
|<ref name=":17" />
|}
The Bushehr plant alone has generated only $5 billion worth of electricity over ten years, a net loss compared to its construction cost.<ref name=":18">{{Cite web |title=How Much The Nuclear Program Has Impoverished Iran |url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/20211205244208}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Mecklin |first=John |date=2014-01-21 |title=A nuclear energy program that benefits the Iranian people |url=https://thebulletin.org/2014/01/a-nuclear-energy-program-that-benefits-the-iranian-people/ |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |language=en-US}}</ref> The enrichment program also underperforms globally, producing what [[Urenco Group|Urenco]]/[[Khan Research Laboratories|KRL]] accomplishments in mere hours/ or in few weeks.

=== Indirect economic burdens and opportunity costs ===
The sanctions and lost economic opportunities far outweigh direct spending:
{| class="wikitable"
|+
!Cost area
!Estimated value 
!Source
|-
|Lost economic opportunity
|$2-3 trillion
|<ref name=":15" />
|-
|Lost oil revenues
|>$450 billion
|<ref name=":16" />
|-
|Lost foreign investment
|>$100 billion
|<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-13 |title=How the militaries of Israel and Iran compare |url=https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-militaries-mideast-us-613e71aff67f6e1701981583bf699bc6 |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref>
|-
|Rial devaluation (2014-2025)
|~95%
|<ref name=":18" />
|-
|Energy renovation cost (alternative)
|~$54 billion
|<ref name=":19">{{Cite web |last=Qaed |first=Anas Al |date=2021-04-25 |title=Iran's Nuclear Program Might Not Be Worth the Cost |url=https://gulfif.org/irans-nuclear-program-might-not-be-worth-the-cost/ |access-date=2025-06-17 |website=Gulf International Forum |language=en}}</ref>
|}

Despite the vast reserves of natural gas and abundant solar and renewable energy potential, Iran continues to invest in extremely  high-cost nuclear projects. Former Foreign Minister Zarif admitted that financial expenditures spent on nuclear projects could have upgraded the entire energy sector over 20 times.<ref name=":19" />

==See also==
{{stack|{{Portal|Iran|Energy|Nuclear technology}}}}

* [[Iran and weapons of mass destruction]]
* [[Timeline of the nuclear program of Iran]]
* [[Iran-Israel war]]
** [[June 2025 Israeli strikes on Iran]]
** [[June 2025 Iranian strikes on Israel]]
* [[Nuclear weapons and Israel]]
* [[Iran's ballistic missiles program]]
* [[Iran and state-sponsored terrorism]] 
'''Malware:'''
* [[Duqu]]
* [[Flame (malware)]]
* [[Stuxnet]]

'''People'''
* [[Akbar Etemad]], the "father of Iran's nuclear program"
* [[Mehdi Sarram]], nuclear scientist
* [[List of Iranian nuclear negotiators]]

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==External links==
{{Commons category|Nuclear program of Iran}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20091026213523/http://geocities.com/csafdari/ The first-ever English-language website about Iran's nuclear energy program]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20080205201053/http://www.aeoi.org.ir/ Iran's Atomic Energy Organization]
* [http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml In Focus: IAEA and Iran], [[IAEA]]
* [http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html Iran's Nuclear Program] collected news and commentary at ''[[The New York Times]]''
* [http://www.parstimes.com/nuclear/ Iran Nuclear Resources], parstimes.com
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20130423113515/http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst.aspx?keyword=indian*nuclear*weapons*program&creator=&title=&media=all&genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15 Annotated bibliography for the Iranian nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues]

{{Energy in Iran}}
{{Nuclear power by country}}
{{Iran–United States relations}}
{{Iran–Israel proxy conflict}}
[[Category:Nuclear program of Iran]]
[[Category:Iran–European Union relations]]
[[Category:Iran–Israel proxy conflict]]
[[Category:Iran–United States relations]]
[[Category:Nuclear energy in Iran]]
[[Category:Politics of Iran]]
[[Category:Underground construction]]