View source for China and weapons of mass destruction

{{Short description|none}}
{{Use American English|date=December 2020}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=December 2020}}
{{Infobox nukes
|country_name = [[China|People's Republic of China]]
|image_location = [[File:People's Republic of China.png|230px|Controlled territory of PRC]]
|program_start = 
|first_test = October 16, 1964
|first_fusion = December 28, 1966
|last_test = July 29, 1996
|largest_yield = 4 Mt
*Atmospheric – '''4 Mt''' (November 17, 1976)
*Underground – '''660~1,000&nbsp;kt''' (May 21, 1992)
|total_tests = 
|current_stockpile = 600 (estimated)<ref name=":8" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" />
|current_usable_stockpile_megatonnage =

|maximum_range = 15,000 km<ref name=":13" />
|NPT_party = '''Yes''' (1992, one of five recognized powers)
}}
{{Weapons of mass destruction}}

The [[People's Republic of China]] has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of [[List of nuclear weapons tests of China|China's nuclear weapons tests]] took place in 1964, and its [[Test No. 6|first hydrogen bomb test]] occurred in 1966 at [[Lop Nur]].<ref name=":10">{{Cite web |last=Zhang |first=Hui |date=2024-04-11 |title=The short march to China's hydrogen bomb |url=https://thebulletin.org/2024/04/the-short-march-to-chinas-hydrogen-bomb/ |access-date=2024-04-15 |website=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en-US |archive-date=April 11, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240411142418/https://thebulletin.org/2024/04/the-short-march-to-chinas-hydrogen-bomb/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]] (CTBT), but did not [[Ratification|ratify]] it.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Borger |first=Julian |author-link=Julian Borger |date=2020-04-16 |title=China may have conducted low-level nuclear test, US claims |language=en-GB |work=[[The Guardian]] |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims |access-date=2023-05-29 |issn=0261-3077 |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529174223/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims |url-status=live }}</ref> China acceded to the [[Biological Weapons Convention]] (BWC) in 1984<ref>{{cite web |title=China: Accession to Biological Weapons Convention |url=http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/bwc/china/acc/washington |access-date=2013-03-03 |publisher=[[United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs]] |archive-date=August 9, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200809230528/http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/bwc/china/acc/washington |url-status=live }}</ref> and ratified the [[Chemical Weapons Convention]] (CWC) in 1997.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |title=Evolution of the Status of Participation in the Convention |url=https://www.opcw.org/evolution-status-participation-convention |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529185625/https://www.opcw.org/evolution-status-participation-convention |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |access-date=2023-05-29 |website=[[Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons]] |language=en}}</ref> Since 2020, China has been wielding a [[nuclear triad]],<ref>{{cite web| url =https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/| title =How is China Modernizing its Nuclear Forces?| publisher =[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]| accessdate =26 October 2024| archive-date =December 1, 2022| archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20221201193758/https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/| url-status =live}}</ref> alongside [[List of nuclear triads|three other countries]].

The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a state secret.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |last3=Johns |first3=Eliana |last4=Knight |first4=Mackenzie |date=2024-01-02 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=80 |issue=1 |pages=49–72 |doi=10.1080/00963402.2023.2295206 |issn=0096-3402 |doi-access=free|bibcode=2024BuAtS..80a..49K }}</ref> There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The ''[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]'' and the [[Federation of American Scientists]] estimated in 2025 that China has a stockpile of approximately 600 nuclear warheads,<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last=Kristensen |first=Hans M. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |last3=Johns |first3=Eliana |last4=Knight |first4=Mackenzie |date=2025-03-04 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2025 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=81 |issue=2 |pages=135–160 |doi=10.1080/00963402.2025.2467011 |issn=0096-3402 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web |date=March 12, 2025 |title=Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025: Federation of American Scientists Reveals Latest Facts on Beijing’s Nuclear Buildup |url=https://fas.org/publication/nuclear-notebook-china-2025/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250312213428/https://fas.org/web/20250312213428/https://fas.org/publication/nuclear-notebook-china-2025/ |archive-date=March 12, 2025 |access-date=March 12, 2025 |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]]}}</ref> while the [[United States Department of Defense]] put the estimate at more than 600 operational nuclear warheads,<ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last=McLeary |first=Paul |date=December 18, 2024 |title=Pentagon report: China boosts nuclear stockpile |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/pentagon-report-china-boosts-nuclear-stockpile/ |access-date=December 18, 2024 |work=[[Politico]]}}</ref> making it the [[List of countries with nuclear weapons#Estimated worldwide nuclear stockpiles|third-largest]] in the world.

In 1964, China adopted a policy of [[No first use|no-first-use]] (NFU),<ref>{{cite web |date=September 11, 2024 |title=Nuclear Disarmament China |url=https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/china-nuclear-disarmament/ |access-date=October 12, 2024 |website=[[Nuclear Threat Initiative]]}}</ref><ref name=":9" /> which it continues to have as of 2025.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|pages=108-109}} Some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a [[launch on warning]] (LOW) posture in the early 2020s.<ref name="International Security 2023">{{Cite journal |last1=Hiim |first1=Henrik Stålhane |last2=Fravel |first2=M. Taylor |author-link2=Taylor Fravel |last3=Trøan |first3=Magnus Langset |date=2023-01-04 |title=The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China's Changing Nuclear Posture |journal=[[International Security (journal)|International Security]] |language=en |volume=47 |issue=4 |pages=147–187 |doi=10.1162/isec_a_00457 |issn=0162-2889 |doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name=":11" />

==Nuclear weapons==

===History===

[[File:Zhou Enlai announced the success of China's atomic bomb test.jpg|thumb|[[Zhou Enlai]] announces the success of China's atomic bomb test in 1964.]]
[[File:1966-10 1966年庆祝中国发射导弹核武器试验.jpg|thumb|360px|right|A celebration of Chinese nuclear missile tests in [[Tiananmen Square]] in [[Beijing]] in 1966.]]

[[Mao Zedong]] referred to nuclear weapons as a [[paper tiger]] which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Meyskens |first=Covell F. |url= |title=Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China |date=2020 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-108-78478-8 |location=Cambridge, United Kingdom |oclc=1145096137}}</ref>{{Rp|page=44}} In 1946 comments to American journalist [[Anna Louise Strong|Anne Louise Strong]], he stated, "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not one or two new types of weapon."<ref name=":23">{{Cite book |title=Mao's Little Red Book: A Global History |date=2013 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-107-05722-7 |editor-last=Cook |editor-first=Alexander C. |location=Cambridge |pages= |chapter=Introduction}}</ref>{{Rp|page=|pages=9-10}}

During the [[Korean War]], the U.S. [[Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower administration]] pursued the [[New Look (policy)|New Look policy]] through which nuclear weapons would be viewed as a "virtually conventional" force.<ref name=":23" />{{Rp|page=11}} The Eisenhower administration's threats during the [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]] to use nuclear weapons against military targets in [[Fujian]] province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program.<ref name=":17">{{Cite book |last=Crean |first=Jeffrey |title=The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-23394-2 |edition= |series=New Approaches to International History series |location=London, UK}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=89–90}} Mao favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means."<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|pages=44–45}} While Mao did not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, he believed that even a few bombs would increase China's diplomatic credibility. As a result of the [[Anti-Party Group]] incident in the Soviet Union, Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s position within the [[Eastern Bloc]] became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) and Mao. The CCP subsequently traded its support for Khrushchev for Soviet technology of nuclear weapons. The Agreement on New Technology for National Defence was later signed in October, which promised Soviet support for Chinese development of nuclear weapons.<ref name="mfv2">{{cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |url=https://archive.org/details/originsofcultura0000macf |title=The Origins of the Cultural Revolution- 2. The Great Leap Forward, 1958-1960 |date=1983 |pages=11–12 |publisher=New York, Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, and the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University by Columbia University Press |author-link=Roderick MacFarquhar}}</ref>

Mao's attitude toward nuclear weapons sometimes strained relations with the Soviet Union, which regarded his statements as cavalier, particularly his 1955 assertion that:<ref name=":23" />{{Rp|page=11}}

{{Blockquote|text=The Chinese people are not to be cowed by US atomic blackmail. Our country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kilometers. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs. Even if the US atom bombs were so powerful that, when dropped on China, they would make a hole right through the earth, or even blow it up, that would hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole, though it might be a major event for the solar system.}}

Construction of [[uranium enrichment|uranium-enrichment]] plants in [[Baotou]] and [[Lanzhou]] began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in [[Jiuquan]] and the [[Lop Nur]] nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production{{r|jstor2626706}} and, in October 1957, agreed to provide a prototype [[boosted fission weapon]], missiles, and related technology.<ref name=":10" /> The Chinese, who preferred to import technology and components to developing them within China, exported uranium to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets sent two [[R-2 (missile)|R-2]] missiles in 1958.{{r|jersild}}

That year, however, Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss [[arms control]] with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-[[Josef Stalin|Stalin]] policy of [[peaceful coexistence]]. Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet [[nuclear umbrella]], the disagreements widened the emerging [[Sino-Soviet split]]. In June 1959, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation,<ref name="jersild">{{cite web | url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sharing-the-bomb-among-friends-the-dilemmas-sino-soviet-strategic-cooperation | title=Sharing the Bomb among Friends: The Dilemmas of Sino-Soviet Strategic Cooperation | publisher=Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center | access-date=28 October 2013 | author=Jersild, Austin | date=2013-10-08 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029212149/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sharing-the-bomb-among-friends-the-dilemmas-sino-soviet-strategic-cooperation | archive-date=29 October 2013 | url-status=live }}</ref> and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Lewis |first1=John W. |title=China Builds the Bomb |last2=Xue |first2=Litai |date=1988-08-01 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-2147-3 |pages=53, 61, 12 |doi=10.1515/9781503621473}}</ref> As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb.<ref name=":10" />

In 1961, Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] articulated China's rationale for its conventional and nuclear military strategies, stating, "Once we have missiles and nuclear weapons, we can then prevent the use of missiles and nuclear weapons; if we don't have missiles, the imperialists can use missiles. But to face combat, we still need conventional weapons."<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=74}}

According to [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]] director [[William Chapman Foster|William Foster]], the American government, under the [[Kennedy administration|Kennedy]] and [[Lyndon B. Johnson Administration|Johnson]] administrations, was concerned about China's nuclear program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of [[Taiwan]] or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested. China conducted its first nuclear test, code-named [[596 (nuclear test)|596]], on 16 October 1964.<ref name="jstor2626706">{{cite journal |last1=Burr |first1=W. |last2=Richelson |first2=J. T. |year=2000–2001 |title=Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64 |journal=[[International Security]] |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=54–99 |doi=10.1162/016228800560525 |jstor=2626706 |s2cid=57560352}}</ref>{{r|jersild}} 

In 1966, Chinese leadership established a new branch of the People's Liberation Army, the [[Second Artillery]], to operate nuclear missiles.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=75}} China's first [[thermonuclear weapon]] test occurred on December 28, 1966.<ref name=":10" /> China's last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996.<ref>{{cite web |title=CTBTO World Map |url=https://www.ctbto.org/map/#mode=nuclear |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190201065733/https://www.ctbto.org/map/#mode=nuclear |archive-date=1 February 2019 |access-date=31 January 2019 |website=www.ctbto.org}}</ref> 

During the Cold War, China relied on concealment of its nuclear forces as the primary mechanism for their survivability.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=113}} Beginning in 1996, China has increasingly relied on the mobility of its land-based nuclear forces as a means of survivability.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=113}} 

In 2023, satellite [[open-source intelligence]] showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where nuclear weapons testing could resume.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Broad |first1=William J. |last2=Buckley |first2=Chris |last3=Corum |first3=Jonathan |date=2023-12-20 |title=China Quietly Rebuilds Secretive Base for Nuclear Tests |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/20/science/china-nuclear-tests-lop-nur.html |access-date=2023-12-21 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=December 21, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231221040055/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/12/20/science/china-nuclear-tests-lop-nur.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In September 2024, China's [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force]] launched a nuclear-capable missile in the South Pacific, the first test of its kind for the country in over 40 years.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2025-06-18 |title=China downplayed nuclear-capable missile test: Classified NZ govt papers |url=https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/china-downplayed-nuclear-capable-missile-test-classified-nz-govt-papers |access-date=2025-06-18 |work=[[The Straits Times]] |language=en |issn=0585-3923}}</ref>[[File:ChinaABomb 2.jpg|thumb|Satellite image of the testing site 4 days after China's first atomic bomb test]]

===Size===
[[Image:Chinese nuclear bomb - A2923.jpg|thumb|right|A mock-up of China's first nuclear bomb.]]
In 2025, the ''[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]'' and the [[Federation of American Scientists]] estimate that China has over 500 nuclear warheads.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" />

In 2025, the [[United States Department of Defense]] estimated China possesses more than 600 operational nuclear warheads.<ref name=":8" /> The same year, [[United States Strategic Command]] indicated that China has equipped more nuclear warheads on its ICBMs than the United States (550 according to the [[New START]] treaty).<ref name=":7">{{Cite news |date=December 7, 2022 |title=Chinese nukes real number |url=https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2022/12/07/china-may-have-surpassed-us-in-number-of-nuclear-warheads-on-icbms/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230719130054/https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2022/12/07/china-may-have-surpassed-us-in-number-of-nuclear-warheads-on-icbms/ |archive-date=July 19, 2023 |access-date=2023-02-10 |website=[[Defense News]] |language=en-US}}</ref> In 2025, the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] reported that China has approximately 300 missile silos and is estimated to reach at least 1000 operational warheads by 2030.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Capaccio |first=Anthony |date=October 23, 2024 |title=China Speeds Nuclear-Weapons Buildout, US Defense Agency Says |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-23/china-speeds-nuclear-weapons-buildout-us-defense-agency-says |access-date=October 23, 2024 |work=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref>
===Nuclear use policy===
China's policy has traditionally been one of [[no first use]] while maintaining a secure [[Second strike|second-strike]] capability.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Logan |first1=David C |last2=Saunders |first2=Philip C. |date=July 26, 2023 |title=Discerning the Drivers of China's Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230930001818/https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/ |archive-date=September 30, 2023 |access-date=2023-09-16 |website=[[National Defense University Press]] |language=en-US}}</ref> Following its first test in 1964, China stated that it would "never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons."<ref>{{Cite report |title=China's No First Use of Nuclear Weapons |last=Zhenqiang |first=Pan |date=2016 |publisher=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] |pages=51–78 |jstor=resrep26903.7 |jstor-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Zhao |first=Tong |date=2022-09-02 |title=China and the international debate on no first use of nuclear weapons |journal=Asian Security |language=en |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=205–213 |doi=10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654 |issn=1479-9855}}</ref> It also implemented centralized command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons so that they could not be used without orders from top leadership.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=75}} The 1975 ''General Combat Regulations for a Combined Army'' stated, "at any time, under any circumstances, we will absolutely not use nuclear weapons first, only when the enemy uses them first, will we, according to the order of the supreme command, then use this kind of weapon to resolutely counterattack."<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=75}}

During the Cold War, China developed a [[neutron bomb]] but refrained from deploying tactical nuclear weapons on delivery systems such as [[Unguided bomb|gravity bombs]] or artillery.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=76}} In peacetime, it has traditionally stored nuclear warheads separately from their launching systems.<ref name=":9" /><ref>{{cite report |url=http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/2014_OP_A_Disturbance_in_the_Force.pdf |title=A Disturbance in the Force |author=Hugh Chalmers |date=January 2014 |publisher=[[Royal United Services Institute]] |page=4 |access-date=4 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140204054944/http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/2014_OP_A_Disturbance_in_the_Force.pdf |archive-date=4 February 2014 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all}}</ref> 

From 1986 to 1993, debates in China addressed the role of China's nuclear forces in potential local wars.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Cunningham |first=Fiona S. |title=Under the Nuclear Shadow: China's Information-Age Weapons in International Security |date=2025 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-26103-4 |location= |doi=10.2307/jj.16040335 |jstor=jj.16040335}}</ref>{{Rp|page=66}} Chinese leadership doubted that a first-use posture was credible.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=66}} After these debates, China decided to remain in a no first use posture.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=76}} [[Jiang Zemin]] stated, "We develop strategic nuclear weapons, not in order to attack, but in order to defend. If people don't attack us, we won't attack them, but if people attack us, we must attack them."<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|pages=86-87}}

From 2000 to 2006, PLA strategists and civilian strategists debated whether China should add conditions to its no first use policy.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=73}} Some proponents of conditioning the no-first use policy pointed to the U.S. Bush administration's [[Nuclear Posture Review]], which discussed U.S. nuclear weapons in the context of a "Taiwan contingency".<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|pages=98-99}} Proponents of adding conditions contended that doing so would make China's nuclear deterrence more effective if a "Taiwan contingency" occurred.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=99}} Ultimately, Chinese leadership rejected the idea of conditioning its no first use policy.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=73}}

In the early 2020s, some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a [[launch on warning]] (LOW) posture.<ref name="International Security 2023" /><ref name=":11" /> In 2024, the [[United States Department of State]] described China's no-first-use policy as "ambiguous".<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Torode |first1=Greg |last2=Doyle |first2=Gerry |last3=Chen |first3=Laurie |date=June 21, 2024 |title=U.S. and China hold first informal nuclear talks in 5 years, eyeing Taiwan |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us-china-hold-first-informal-nuclear-talks-5-years-eyeing-taiwan-2024-06-21/ |access-date=June 21, 2024 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref> American defense analysts have contended that China is shifting away from a strict no-first-use strategy and toward a launch on warning (LOW) posture, which would allow it to retaliate upon the detection of incoming warheads without waiting for them to strike Chinese targets first.<ref name=":11">{{Cite news |date=September 27, 2024 |title=A missile test by China marks its growing nuclear ambitions |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2024/09/27/a-missile-test-by-china-marks-its-growing-nuclear-ambitions |url-access=subscription |access-date=2024-09-27 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=September 27, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240927182939/https://www.economist.com/china/2024/09/27/a-missile-test-by-china-marks-its-growing-nuclear-ambitions |url-status=live }}</ref> These concerns increased after China began to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal in the early 2020s. The move was seen as a response to progress made in U.S. missile defense systems (such as the [[Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System]] and [[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]]) and long-range precision strike abilities (such as [[Conventional Prompt Strike]]), which decreases the survivability of a Chinese second strike, as well as the possibility that American strategy may require nukes to compensate for the numerical disadvantage of its conventional forces overseas. There is debate among Chinese strategists regarding the merits and drawbacks of a LOW posture similar to that of Russia and the United States, and as of 2023 the bulk of China's strategic forces had not moved to a LOW posture.<ref name="International Security 2023" />

China maintains an official no-first-use policy, which it continues to do so {{As of|lc=y|2025}}.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|pages=108-109}}

===Nuclear proliferation===
[[File:World nuclear weapons.png|thumb|right|260px|Large stockpile with global range (dark blue), smaller stockpile with global range (medium blue), smaller stockpile with limited range (light blue).]]
Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program before China ratified the [[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]] in 1992. In the early 1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan a "package" including uranium enrichment technology, high-enriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear weapon.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kroenig |first=Matthew |title=Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons |date=2010 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8014-4857-7 |edition=1 |jstor=10.7591/j.ctt7v7z8 |author-link=Matthew Kroenig}}</ref> China also received stolen technology that [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]] brought back to Pakistan and Pakistan set up a centrifuge plant in China as revealed in his letters which state "(1)You know we had cooperation with China for 15 years. We put up a centrifuge plant at [[Hanzhong]] (250km south-west of [[Xi'an]]). We sent 135 C-130 plane loads of machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges. Our teams stayed there for weeks to help and their teams stayed here for weeks at a time. Late minister Liu We, V. M. [vice minister] Li Chew, Vice Minister Jiang Shengjie used to visit us. (2)The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%). Chinese helped PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the rival organization to the Khan Research Laboratories] in setting up UF6 plant, production reactor for plutonium and reprocessing plant."<ref>{{Cite news|url = http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/09/15/letter-written-by-aq-kahn-to-his-wife/#ixzz1Yz3pXRmj|title = A Letter Written by A.Q. Khan to His Wife|website = [[Fox News]]|date = 2015-03-27|access-date = 2017-03-14|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150806045125/http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/09/15/letter-written-by-aq-kahn-to-his-wife/#ixzz1Yz3pXRmj|archive-date = 2015-08-06|url-status = dead}}</ref>

===Nuclear non-proliferation===
Before the 1980s, China viewed arms control and nuclear non-proliferation regimes as mechanisms through which Western powers (particularly the U.S.) sought to restrain China.<ref name=":5" />{{Rp|pages=266–267}} The Chinese government believed that the Treaty “[served] the interests of some States” and only favored the countries that already had nuclear weapons.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Wu |first=Haotan |date=March 2017 |title=China's Non-proliferation Policy and the Implementation of WMD Regimes in the Middle East |journal=Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies |language=en |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=65–82 |doi=10.1080/25765949.2017.12023326 |s2cid=158461812 |issn=2576-5949|doi-access=free }}</ref> Additionally, the Chinese government thought this Treaty was discriminatory since many countries were attempting to restrict and deprive nuclear weapons of a country that had only just tested them successfully, rather than countries like the U.S. or U.S.S.R., which have at least 100 times more nuclear weapons.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/nuclear/|title=Chinese Nuclear Weapons &#124; Development of Nuclear Program in China &#124; NTI|access-date=May 17, 2021|archive-date=February 20, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200220203733/https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/nuclear/|url-status=live}}</ref> Therefore, China chose not to join the [[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]] (NPT) at that time. 
    
Beginning in the 1980s, China's policy and attitude toward nuclear weapons and the NPT had changed under the administration of [[Deng Xiaoping]].<ref name=":0" /> Though China continued developing more advanced nuclear technology and weapons, by the 1980s, the country had indicated that it intended on accepting the terms of the NPT.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Zhu |first=Mingquan |date=March 1997 |title=The evolution of China's nuclear nonproliferation policy |journal=[[The Nonproliferation Review]] |language=en |volume=4 |issue=2 |pages=40–48 |doi=10.1080/10736709708436664 |issn=1073-6700}}</ref> China acceded to the treaty in 1992.<ref>{{Cite web |title=UNTC |url=https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801d56c5 |access-date=2024-10-22 |website=treaties.un.org |archive-date=August 23, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240823171137/https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801d56c5 |url-status=live }}</ref>

China was active in the [[six-party talks]] in an effort to end North Korea's nuclear program in the early 2000s.<ref name=":5">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |pages= |doi=10.1515/9781503634152 |oclc=1331741429 |author-link=Suisheng Zhao}}</ref>{{Rp|page=71}} The six-party talks ultimately failed,<ref name=":5" />{{Rp|page=75}} and in 2006, China voted in favor of sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear program.<ref name=":5" />{{Rp|page=237}}

The field of nuclear security has become a well-established area of successful [[China–United States relations|U.S.-China cooperation]].<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Moore |first=Scott |date=2022 |title=China's Next Act: How Sustainability and Technology Are Reshaping China's Rise and the World's Future |location=New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=210 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197603994.001.0001 |isbn=978-0-19-760401-4 |oclc=1316703008}}</ref> In 2009, [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP general secretary]] [[Hu Jintao]] called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States President [[Barack Obama]]'s earlier calls for a nuclear-free world.<ref name=":5" />{{Rp|page=237}} Precipitated by a [[2010 Nuclear Security Summit]] convened by the Obama administration, China and the U.S. launched a number of initiatives to secure potentially dangerous, Chinese-supplied, nuclear material in countries such as Ghana or Nigeria.<ref name=":12" /> Through these initiatives, China and the U.S. have converted Chinese-origin Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSRs) from using highly enriched uranium to using low-enriched uranium fuel (which is not directly usable in weapons, thereby making reactors more proliferation resistant).<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-26 |title=The Little Known Success Story of U.S.-China Nuclear Security Cooperation |url=https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/little-known-success-story-us-china-nuclear-security-cooperation/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220726130140/https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/little-known-success-story-us-china-nuclear-security-cooperation/ |archive-date=26 July 2022 |access-date=2022-07-26}}</ref>

China, along with all other nuclear weapon states and all members of [[NATO]] with the exception of the Netherlands, decided not to sign the UN [[treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons]], a binding agreement for negotiations for the total elimination of [[nuclear weapons]].<ref>{{cite news |date=7 July 2017 |title=122 countries adopt 'historic' UN treaty to ban nuclear weapons |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/un-treaty-ban-nuclear-weapons-1.4192761 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190814183525/https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/un-treaty-ban-nuclear-weapons-1.4192761 |archive-date=14 August 2019 |access-date=9 August 2019 |publisher=[[CBC News]]}}</ref>

China refused to join talks in 2020 between the U.S. and Russia on extending their bilateral [[New START]] nuclear arms reduction treaty, as the [[First presidency of Donald Trump|Trump administration]] requested. China's position is that as its nuclear warhead arsenal is a small fraction of the U.S. and Russia arsenals, their inclusion in an arms reduction treaty is unnecessary, and that it will join such talks when both U.S. and Russia has reduced their arsenal to near China's level.<ref name="foreignpolicy-20200429">{{cite news |last1=Gramer |first1=Robbie |last2=Detsch |first2=Jack |date=29 April 2020 |title=Trump Fixates on China as Nuclear Arms Pact Nears Expiration |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/29/trump-china-new-start-nuclear-arms-pact-expiration/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201017084724/https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/29/trump-china-new-start-nuclear-arms-pact-expiration/ |archive-date=October 17, 2020 |access-date=15 October 2020 |newspaper=[[Foreign Policy]]}}</ref><ref name="brookings-20200701">{{cite web |last=Pifer |first=Steven |date=1 July 2020 |title=Unattainable conditions for New START extension? |url=https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/07/01/unattainable-conditions-for-new-start-extension/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201008082922/https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/07/01/unattainable-conditions-for-new-start-extension/ |archive-date=October 8, 2020 |access-date=15 October 2020 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution]]}}</ref>

The United States has a classified strategy called Nuclear Employment Guidance, updated by president [[Joe Biden]] in March 2024, reported to refocus U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy more toward China.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Biden Approved Secret Nuclear Strategy Refocusing on Chinese Threat |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/20/us/politics/biden-nuclear-china-russia.html |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |access-date=August 23, 2024 |archive-date=August 23, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240823151952/https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/20/us/politics/biden-nuclear-china-russia.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Delivery systems estimates===

==== Miniaturization ====
China has made significant improvements in its [[miniaturization]] techniques since the 1980s. There have been accusations, notably by the [[Cox report|Cox Commission]], that this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s [[W88]] [[nuclear warhead]] design as well as [[guided missile|guided]] [[ballistic missile]] technology.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Broad |first=William J. |date=1999-09-07 |title=Spies vs. Sweat: The Debate Over China's Nuclear Advance |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/07/us/spies-vs-sweat-the-debate-over-china-s-nuclear-advance.html |access-date=2024-02-15 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=September 18, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170918031630/http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/07/us/spies-vs-sweat-the-debate-over-china-s-nuclear-advance.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Intelligence Community Damage Assessment on Chinese Espionage |url=http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/dci042199.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170330195324/http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/dci042199.html |archive-date=2017-03-30 |access-date=2019-10-30}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Gerth |first=Jeff |author-link=Jeff Gerth |date=2003-03-06 |title=2 Companies Pay Penalties For Improving China Rockets |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/06/world/2-companies-pay-penalties-for-improving-china-rockets.html |url-status=live |access-date=2023-05-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091002172240/https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/06/world/2-companies-pay-penalties-for-improving-china-rockets.html |archive-date=October 2, 2009 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today: Why China Won't Build U.S. Warheads |url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_04-05/rgam99.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051105021618/http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_04-05/rgam99.asp |archive-date=2005-11-05 |access-date=2020-05-23}}</ref>

===Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles===
{{main|People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|DF-4|DF-5|DF-31|DF-41}}

{{nuclear weapons}}
Chinese strategy makes use of the country's large geographic area as a strategy to protect its nuclear forces against a theoretical first strike against the country.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=114}} Nuclear missile units are dispersed and missile brigades are not located in the same places as the bases that command them.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=114}} The nuclear forces are commanded by six missile bases located in [[Liaoning]], [[Anhui]], [[Yunnan]], [[Hunan]], [[Henan]], and [[Gansu]].<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=114}} Most of the nuclear forces are commanded by the three missile bases in the interior of the country (in Hunan, Henan, and Gansu).<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|pages=114-115}}

China stores many of its missiles in huge tunnel complexes; US Representative [[Mike Turner|Michael Turner]]<ref>{{Cite news |date=October 17, 2011 |title=U.S. Lawmaker Warns of China's Nuclear Strategy |url=http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/10/u-s-lawmaker-warns-of-chinas-nuclear-strategy |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101012555/http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/10/u-s-lawmaker-warns-of-chinas-nuclear-strategy/ |archive-date=2016-01-01 |access-date=2011-10-18 |website=[[China Digital Times]]}}</ref> referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said "This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear weapons and forces."<ref>{{Cite news |date=October 14, 2011 |title=US worries over China's underground nuclear network |url=https://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_worries_over_Chinas_underground_nuclear_network_999.html |access-date=2023-05-29 |website=www.spacewar.com |agency=[[Agence France-Presse]] |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529190643/https://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_worries_over_Chinas_underground_nuclear_network_999.html |url-status=live }}</ref> A [[People's Liberation Army]] newspaper calls this tunnel system an [[underground Great Wall of China]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hsiao |first=Russell |date=December 16, 2009 |title=China's "Underground Great Wall" and Nuclear Deterrence |language=en-US |work=[[Jamestown Foundation]] |url=https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-underground-great-wall-and-nuclear-deterrence/ |access-date=2023-05-29 |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529190645/https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-underground-great-wall-and-nuclear-deterrence/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Medium-range ballistic missiles===
Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the medium-range category, targeted at regional [[theater (warfare)|theater]] targets.<ref name="faschinabook2006">{{Cite report |url=https://fas.org/publication/chinese-nuclear-forces-u-s-nuclear-war-planning/ |title=Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |last2=Norris |first2=Robert S. |date=2006 |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |jstor=resrep18927 |last3=McKinzie |first3=Matthew G. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |jstor-access=free |access-date=October 1, 2023 |archive-date=October 10, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231010115405/https://fas.org/publication/chinese-nuclear-forces-u-s-nuclear-war-planning/ |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|61}}

====DF-3A====
{{Excerpt|DF-3A|only=paragraph|paragraphs=1}}

====DF-21====
{{Excerpt|DF-21|only=paragraph|paragraphs=1}}The DF-21A, China's first road-mobile medium range ballistics missile, was first deployed in 1991.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=113}}

==== DF-26 ====
The [[DF-26]] is a dual-capable nuclear-conventional intermediate range ballistic missile.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=114}} It is road-mobile and its payload can be switched from a conventional weapon to a nuclear weapon mid-conflict.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=114}} It was announced in 2016, but may not have become fully operational until 2018.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=114}}

===Tactical cruise missiles===

==== CJ-10 ====
{{Excerpt|CJ-10 (missile)|only=paragraph}}

==== YJ-62 ====
{{Excerpt|YJ-62|only=paragraph}}

===Long-range ballistic missiles===
The Chinese categorize long-range ballistic missiles as ones with a range between 3000 and 8000&nbsp;km.<ref name="faschinabook2006" />{{rp|103}}

China "keeps most of its warheads at a central storage facility in the Qinling mountain range, though some are kept at smaller regional storage facilities."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans |author-link=Hans Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |year=2020 |title=Chinese nuclear forces, 2020 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |volume=76 |issue=6 |pages=443–457 |bibcode=2020BuAtS..76f.443K |doi=10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432 |s2cid=228097051 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

====DF-4/CSS-3====
{{main|DF-4}}

The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS-3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It was thought to be deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980.<ref name="faschinabook2006" />{{rp|67}} The DF-4 has a takeoff thrust of 1,224.00&nbsp;kN, a takeoff weight of 82,000&nbsp;kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of 28.05 m, and a fin span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2,190&nbsp;kg nuclear warhead with 3,300&nbsp;kt explosive yield, and its range is 5,500&nbsp;km.<ref name="faschinabook2006" />{{rp|68}} The missile uses inertial guidance, resulting in a relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.{{citation needed|date=August 2007}}

===Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)===

====DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2====
{{Excerpt|DF-5}}

====DF-31/CSS-10====
{{main|DF-31}}

The Dong Feng 31 (or CSS-10) is a medium-range, three stage, solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile developed by the People's Republic of China. It is a land-based variant of the submarine-launched JL-2.<ref>{{Cite web |date=April 23, 2024 |title=DF-31 (Dong Feng-31 / CSS-10) |url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-31/ |access-date=2025-03-12 |website=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

====DF-41/CSS-X-10====
{{main|DF-41}}

The DF-41 (or CSS-X-10) is an intercontinental ballistic missile believed to be operational. It is designed to carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), delivering multiple nuclear warheads.<ref name=":13">{{Cite web |date=April 23, 2024 |title=DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20) |url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/ |access-date=2025-03-12 |website=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

===Nuclear cruise missiles===
The US DoD estimated in 2006 that the PRC was developing ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that could easily be converted to carry nuclear warheads once developed.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006 |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA449718 |access-date=2024-05-22 |website=[[US Department of Defense]] |pages=26, 27 |language=en |archive-date=March 2, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240302212510/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA449718 |url-status=live }}</ref>

====DH-10====
{{main|DH-10}}

The DongHai 10 (DH-10) is a cruise missile developed in the People's Republic of China. According to ''[[Jane's Defence Weekly]]'', the DH-10 is a second-generation land-attack cruise missile (LACM), with over 4,000&nbsp;km range, integrated inertial navigation system, GPS, terrain contour mapping system, and digital scene-matching terminal-homing system. The missile is estimated to have a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters.

====CJ-10====
{{main|CJ-10}}

The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile developed by China, based on the [[Hongniao missile]] family. It has a range of 2,200&nbsp;km. Although not confirmed, it is suspected that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also been developed.<ref name="janes.com">{{cite journal |date=12 January 2000 |title=China's new cruise missile programme 'racing ahead' |url=http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Defence-Weekly-2000/China-s-new-cruise-missile-programme-racing-ahead.html |url-status=dead |journal=[[Jane's Defence Weekly]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090604083602/http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Defence-Weekly-2000/China-s-new-cruise-missile-programme-racing-ahead.html |archive-date=4 June 2009}}</ref>

====HongNiao missile family====
{{main|Hongniao missile}}

There are three missiles in this family: the HN-1, HN-2, and HN-3. Reportedly based on the [[Raduga Kh-55#Variants|Kh-SD/65]] missiles, the Hongniao (or Red Bird) missiles are some of the first nuclear-capable cruise missiles in China. The HN-1 has a range of 600&nbsp;km, the HN-2 has a range of 1,800&nbsp;km, and the HN-3 has a range of 3,000&nbsp;km.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hong-niao/ |title=HN-2 |publisher=CSIS Missile Threat |access-date=2010-04-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161104055901/http://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hong-niao/ |archive-date=2016-11-04 |url-status=live }}</ref>

====ChangFeng missile family====
{{main|Changfeng missile}}

There are two missiles in the Chang Feng (or Long Wind) family: CF-1 and CF-2. These are the first domestically developed long-range cruise missiles for China. The CF-1 has a range of 400&nbsp;km while the CF-2 has a range of 800&nbsp;km. Both variants can carry a 10&nbsp;kt nuclear warhead.{{citation needed|date=May 2023}}

===Sea-based weapons===
{{main|People's Liberation Army Navy|JL-1|JL-2}}

The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) stockpile of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is thought to be relatively new. China launched its first second-generation [[nuclear submarine]] in April 1981. The navy currently has a one Type 092 [[Type 092 submarine|''Xia'' class]] SSBN at roughly 8000 tons [[displacement (fluid)|displacement]]. A second Type 092 was reportedly lost in an accident in 1985. The Type 092 is equipped with 12 [[JL-1]] SLBMs with a range of 2150–2500&nbsp;km. The JL-1 is a modified [[DF-21]] missile. It is suspected that the Type 092 is being converted into a cruise missile submarine.

The Chinese navy has developed [[Type 094 submarine|Type 094]] ballistic missile submarine; open source satellite imagery has shown that at least two of these have been completed. This submarine will be capable of carrying 12 of the longer ranged, more modern [[JL-2]]s with a range of approximately 14,000&nbsp;km.{{citation needed|date=August 2007}}

China is also developing the [[Type 096 submarine]], claimed to be able to carry up to 24 [[JL-3]] ballistic missiles each. Some Chinese sources state that the submarine is already undergoing trials.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008/3/3/05A7F8B5-44E0-45F9-960D-42C6A6B54878.html |title=Global Security Newswire |publisher=NTI |access-date=2010-04-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080830071754/http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008/3/3/05a7f8b5-44e0-45f9-960d-42c6a6b54878.html |archive-date=2008-08-30 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Nuclear bomber force===
{{main|People's Liberation Army Air Force}}

China's bomber force consists mostly of Chinese-made versions of Soviet aircraft. The [[People's Liberation Army Air Force]] has 120 [[Xian H-6|H-6]]s (a variant of the [[Tupolev Tu-16]]). These [[bomber]]s are outfitted to carry nuclear as well as conventional weapons. While the H-6 fleet is aging, it is not as old as the American [[B-52 Stratofortress]].<ref name="faschinabook2006" />{{rp|93–98}} The Chinese have also produced the [[Xian JH-7]] ''Flying Leopard'' fighter-bomber with a range and payload exceeding the [[General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark|F-111]] (currently about 80 are in service) capable of delivering a nuclear strike. China has also bought the advanced [[Sukhoi Su-30]] from Russia; currently, about 100 [[Su-30]]s (MKK and MK2 variants) have been purchased by China. The Su-30 is capable of carrying [[tactical nuclear weapon]]s.<ref name="faschinabook2006" />{{rp|102}}

China is alleged to be testing new [[H-8 bomber|H-8]] and [[Xian H-20]] strategic bombers which are either described as an upgraded H-6 or an aircraft in the same class as the US [[Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit|B-2]], able to carry nuclear weapons.{{citation needed|date=May 2023}}

=== Fractional orbital bombardment system ===
In 2021, following tests by the [[China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology]], [[United States Secretary of the Air Force]] [[Frank Kendall III]] stated that China was developing and testing a [[Fractional Orbital Bombardment System|fractional orbital bombardment system]] (FOBS).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Axe |first=David |date=October 16, 2021 |title=Report: China Has Tested A Nuke That Can Dodge American Radars |work=[[Forbes]] |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/10/16/report-china-has-tested-a-nuke-that-can-dodge-american-radars/ |access-date=October 17, 2021 |archive-date=October 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211017000427/https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/10/16/report-china-has-tested-a-nuke-that-can-dodge-american-radars/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Watt |first1=Louise |last2=Parekh |first2=Marcus |date=2021-10-17 |title='We have no idea how they did this': Secret hypersonic launch shows China streaking ahead in arms race |language=en-GB |work=[[The Daily Telegraph]] |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2021/10/17/china-secretly-tests-first-hypersonic-missile-move-catches-us/ |access-date=2021-10-17 |issn=0307-1235 |archive-date=March 22, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230322140049/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2021/10/17/china-secretly-tests-first-hypersonic-missile-move-catches-us/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In May 2025, the U.S. [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] released a report stating that China will have nuclear-capable missiles operating as part of a FOBS by 2035.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Capaccio |first=Anthony |date=May 13, 2025 |title=US Warns of Missile Threats That Can Be Stopped by Golden Dome |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-13/us-warns-of-missile-threats-that-can-be-stopped-by-golden-dome |access-date=May 17, 2025 |work=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref>

==Missile ranges==
<gallery widths="200" heights="200">
Image:Maximum Ranges for China’s Conventional SRBM Force.png|Maximum Ranges for China's Conventional [[SRBM]] Force (2006). Note: China currently is capable of deploying ballistic missile forces to support a variety of regional contingencies.
Image:PLA ballistic missiles range.jpg|[[Medium-range ballistic missile|Medium]] and [[Intercontinental ballistic missile|Intercontinental]] Range Ballistic Missiles (2007). Note: China currently is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the [[DF-31]], [[DF-31A]], and [[JL-2]], will give China a more survivable nuclear force.
Image:Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait.png|Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait (2006). Note: This map depicts notional coverage provided by China's [[SA-10]], [[S-300 missile system#S-300PMU-1.2F2 .28SA-20.29|SA-20]] SAM systems, as well as the soon-to-be acquired [[S-300 missile system|S-300PMU]]2. Actual coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites.
</gallery>

==Biological weapons==
{{main|Chinese biological weapons program}}
{{See also|Ethnic bioweapon}}

China is currently a signatory of the [[Biological Weapons Convention]] and Chinese officials have stated that China has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. However, China was reported to have had an active biological weapons program in the 1980s.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Langford |first=R. Everett |url=https://archive.org/details/introductiontowe0000lang_m9j9 |title=Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Radiological, Chemical, and Biological |date=2004-02-19 |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]] |isbn=978-0-471-46560-7 |language=en}}</ref>

[[Kenneth Alibek|Kanatjan Alibekov]], former director of one of the [[Biopreparat|Soviet germ-warfare programs]], said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance satellites identified a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The Soviets suspected that two separate epidemics of [[hemorrhagic fever]] that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Broad |first1=William J. |author-link=William Broad |last2=Miller |first2=Judith |author-link2=Judith Miller |date=1999-04-05 |title=Soviet Defector Says China Had Accident at a Germ Plant |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/05/world/soviet-defector-says-china-had-accident-at-a-germ-plant.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220826070308/https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/05/world/soviet-defector-says-china-had-accident-at-a-germ-plant.html |archive-date=August 26, 2022 |access-date=2023-05-29 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>

US Secretary of State [[Madeleine Albright]] expressed her concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to [[Iran]] and other nations in a letter to [[United States Senate|Senator]] [[Bob Bennett (politician)|Bob Bennett]] (R-Utah) in January 1997.<ref>Leonard Spector, [https://web.archive.org/web/20041124094236/http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=129 Chinese Assistance to Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs], [[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]], September 12, 1996</ref> Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Iranian government which concerned her and that the United States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive export controls to prevent assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed [[sanctions (law)|sanctions]] on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. In response to this, China issued [[export control]] protocols on [[Dual-use technology|dual use]] biological technology in late 2002.<ref>[[Nuclear Threat Initiative]], [http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Biological/index.html Country Profile: China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110827144021/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Biological/index.html|date=2011-08-27}}</ref>

A biological program in China was described in a 2015 detailed study by the [[Ministry of Defence (India)|Indian Ministry of Defence]] funded [[Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses]]. It pointed to 42 facilities, some in the same compound, that had the capacity, possibly latently, of research, development, production or testing of biological weapons.<ref name="Shoham">{{cite journal |last=Shoham |first=Dany |year=2015 |title=China's Biological Warfare Programme |url=https://idsa.in/system/files/jds/jds_9_2_2015_DanyShoham.pdf |url-status=live |journal=Journal of Defence Studies |publisher=Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses |publication-place=New Delhi |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=132, 139 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210210162222/https://idsa.in/system/files/jds/jds_9_2_2015_DanyShoham.pdf |archive-date=February 10, 2021 |access-date=4 July 2021}}</ref>

According to [[Nuclear Threat Initiative]], no evidence of the program's existence has been officially released.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2014-11-03 |title=China Biological Overview |url=https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/china-biological/ |access-date=2024-12-23 |website=[[Nuclear Threat Initiative]] |language=en |archive-date=July 22, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240722223726/https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/china-biological/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

==Chemical weapons==
The People's Republic of China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on January 13, 1993, and ratified it on April 25, 1997.<ref name=":6" />

China was found to have supplied [[People's Socialist Republic of Albania|Albania]] with a stockpile of chemical weapons in the 1970s during the [[Cold War]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Warrick |first=Jo |date=2005-01-10 |title=Albania's Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/01/10/albanias-chemical-cache-raises-fears-about-others/96d72926-8c08-42ff-915c-895dda5a29ad/ |access-date=2023-05-29 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |language=en-US |issn=0190-8286}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|China|Nuclear technology}}
{{Library resources box}}
* [[863 Program]]
* [[List of nuclear weapons tests of China]]
* [[List of states with nuclear weapons]]
* [[People's Liberation Army]]
* [[Project 596]]
* [[Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction]]
* [[Two Bombs, One Satellite]]
* [[Underground Great Wall of China]]

== References ==
{{Reflist|30em}}

{{Chinese Missiles}}
{{People's Liberation Army}}

[[Category:1964 in military history]]
[[Category:Military of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Nuclear program of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Weapons of mass destruction by country]]