View source for Political status of Taiwan

{{Short description|Dispute over sovereignty and independence of Taiwan}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=November 2020}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| t = 臺灣問題
| s = 台湾问题
| p = Táiwān wèntí
| bpmf = ㄊㄞˊ ㄨㄢ ㄨㄣˋ ㄊㄧˊ
| w = T'ai2-wan1 wên4-t'i2
| l = Taiwan issue
| h = Thòi-vàn mun-thì
| buc = Dài-uăng ông-dà̤
| y = Tòihwāan mahntàih
}}
{{Politics of the Republic of China}}
{{Politics of China}}
	
The [[island of Taiwan]] is the subject of a [[geopolitical]] dispute between the [[Republic of China]] (ROC), which controls it, and the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC), which claims it as part of its territory. 

The Republic of China (ROC) was established in 1912 and governed [[mainland China]] until 1949. In the [[Chinese Civil War]], the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated the ROC government, taking control of mainland China and establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) that same year. The ROC government retreated to Taiwan. Prior to this, [[surrender of Japan|Japan’s surrender in 1945]] ended its [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|colonial rule over Taiwan]] and the [[Penghu|Penghu Islands]], which were subsequently placed under the administration of the ROC as agreed by the major [[Allies of World War II]]. However, [[Treaty of San Francisco|post-war agreements]] did not clearly define sovereignty over these islands due to the ongoing rivalry between the [[Kuomintang]] and the [[Chinese Communist Party]].<ref>{{cite web |url= https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=1976 |title=MOFA reaffirms ROC sovereignty over Taiwan, Penghu |date=5 September 2011}}</ref><ref>''[[Hansard|HC Deb]]'' 26 July 1950, vol. 478 [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1950/jul/26/formosa#S5CV0478P0_19500726_CWA_26 c60W]. "Formosa is still de jure Japanese territory and there is no Government of Formosa as such. Following on the surrender of Japan, the Chinese Government of the day assumed, with the consent of the remaining Allies, the provisional administration of the territory pending the final determination of its status at a peace settlement."</ref> Since 1949, the PRC has governed mainland China, while the effective jurisdiction of the ROC has been limited to Taiwan proper and a collection of [[List of islands of Taiwan|smaller islands]].

This division led to the emergence of two rival governments on opposite sides of the [[Taiwan Strait]], each claiming to be the sole legitimate authority over all of China. The PRC and ROC both officially adhere to the principle of "[[one China]]," but fundamentally disagree on who is entitled to represent it. This has resulted in what is known as the "[[Two Chinas]]" scenario, reflecting the unresolved dispute over which government is the legitimate representative of China. The 1991 constitutional amendments and the [[Cross-Strait Act|1992 Cross-Strait Relations Act]] marked a pivotal shift, as the ROC ceased actively claiming governance over the mainland, [[Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion|stopped treating the PRC as a rebellious group]], and started treating it in practise, as an equal political entity effectively governing mainland China from ROC’s perspective, though the ROC constitution still technically includes the mainland as ROC territory.<ref>{{Cite news |author=Han Cheung |date=25 April 2021 |title=Taiwan in Time: The 'communist rebellion' finally ends |work=[[Taipei Times]] |url= https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2021/04/25/2003756299 |url-status=live |access-date=2 July 2022 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20211022130449/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2021/04/25/2003756299 |archive-date=22 October 2021 |quote=...Most importantly, with the repeal of the temporary provisions, the Chinese Communist Party would no longer be seen as a rebel group. "From now on, we will see the Chinese Communist Party as a political entity that controls the mainland region and we will call them the 'mainland authorities' or the 'Chinese Communist authorities'," President Lee said during the press conference}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=MacLeod |first=Andrew |date=2022-07-12 |title=When people say the West should support Taiwan, what exactly do they mean? |url= https://theconversation.com/when-people-say-the-west-should-support-taiwan-what-exactly-do-they-mean-186744 |access-date=2025-02-02 |website=The Conversation}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-06-06 |title=Talking Points: What Does ROC Law Say About Taiwan? |url=https://usali.org/publications/talking-points-what-does-roc-law-say-about-taiwan-wk6w8 |access-date=2025-06-11 |website=U.S.-Asia Law Institute |language=en-US}}</ref> The PRC asserts that it is the only sovereign state of China, having replaced the ROC, and considers Taiwan an inalienable [[Taiwan Province, PRC|province]], refusing to rule out military force to achieve [[Chinese unification]].<ref>{{cite web |author=中华人民共和国国务院台湾事务办公室 |title=一个中国的原则与台湾问题 |url= https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/twwtbps/202206/t20220606_10699030.html |language=zh-CN |quote=一九四九年十月一日，中华人民共和国中央人民政府宣告成立，取代中华民国政府成为全中国的唯一合法政府和在国际上的唯一合法代表，中华民国从此结束了它的历史地位。这是在同一国际法主体没有发生变化的情况下新政权取代旧政权，中国的主权和固有领土疆域并未由此而改变，中华人民共和国政府理所当然地完全享有和行使中国的主权，其中包括对台湾的主权。国民党统治集团退踞台湾以来，虽然其政权继续使用“中华民国”和“中华民国政府”的名称，但它早已完全无权代表中国行使国家主权，实际上始终只是中国领土上的一个地方当局。}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/faq-the-united-states-one-china-policy-is-not-the-same-as-the-prc-one-china-principle/ |title=The United States 'One China Policy' is NOT the same as the PRC 'One China Principle' |publisher=US-Taiwan Business Council |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220412030243/https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/faq-the-united-states-one-china-policy-is-not-the-same-as-the-prc-one-china-principle/ |url-status=live |archive-date=12 April 2022 |date=1 January 2022 |access-date=29 April 2022}}</ref><ref name="ccpwatch">{{cite web |last=Drun |first=Jessica |url= https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/one-china-multiple-interpretations |title=One China, Multiple Interpretations |publisher=Center for Advanced China Research |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200309224301/https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/One-China-Multiple-Interpretations |url-status=live |archive-date=9 March 2020 |date=28 December 2017 |access-date=29 April 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Fabry |first=Mikulas |title=The Effect of 'One China' Policies of Foreign States on the International Status of Taiwan |journal=Diplomacy & Statecraft |date=2 January 2024 |volume=35 |issue=1 |pages=90–115 |doi=10.1080/09592296.2024.2303855 |quote=In contrast, the 2005 law designed to forestall Taiwanese 'secession' ... left out the third part. This formulation, reiterated in the 2022 PRC white paper on Taiwan ....}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Bush |first1=Richard |last2=Hass |first2=Ryan |title=Policy Brief: Taiwan's democracy and the China challenge |series="Democracy & Disorder" ser. |url= https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FP_20190226_taiwan_bush_hass.pdf |access-date=19 November 2019 |url-status=live |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200124155534/https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FP_20190226_taiwan_bush_hass.pdf |archive-date=24 January 2020}}</ref> Its proposed "[[one country, two systems]]" as a model for unification, has been rejected by the Taiwanese government.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2019-10-10 |title=Taiwan leader rejects China's 'one country, two systems' offer |work=[[Reuters]] |url= https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-anniversary-president-idUSKBN1WP0A4 |access-date=2023-09-21 |archive-date=6 October 2023 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20231006041300/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-anniversary-president-idUSKBN1WP0A4 |url-status=live}}</ref> 

Within Taiwan, there is major political contention between eventual Chinese unification with a pan-Chinese identity contrasted with [[Taiwan independence movement|formal independence]] promoting a [[Taiwanese identity]], though moderates supporting the status quo have gained broad appeal in the 21st century.<ref>{{cite book |last=Fell |first=Dafydd |author1-link=Dafydd Fell |title=Party Politics in Taiwan |publisher=Routledge |date=2006 |isbn=978-1-134-24021-0 |page=85}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Achen |first1=Christopher H. |last2=Wang |first2=T. Y. |chapter=An Introduction |editor1-last=Achen |editor1-first=Christopher H. |editor2-last=Wang |editor2-first=T. Y. |title=The Taiwan Voter |date=2017 |publisher=[[University of Michigan Press]] |pages=1–2 |isbn=978-0-472-07353-5 |doi=10.3998/mpub.9375036 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

Since 1949, multiple countries have faced a choice between the PRC and the ROC with regard to establishing formal diplomatic relations and shaping their respective "One China" policy. Initially excluded from the [[United Nations]] in favor of Taipei, Beijing has gained increased recognition as the legitimate government of China. The ROC has formal diplomatic relations with only twelve nations but maintains unofficial bilateral ties and membership in international organizations as a non-state entity.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Chong |first=Ja Ian |date=2023-02-09 |title=The Many 'One China's': Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China |website=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] |url= https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/the-many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china?lang=en |access-date=6 May 2023 |url-status=live |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20230503074117/https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/09/many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china-pub-89003 |archive-date=3 May 2023}}</ref>

The Taiwan Strait is a vital maritime trade route, handling trillions of dollars’ worth of trade that pass through the sea between mainland China and Taiwan. The [[economy of Taiwan]] is also vital to the stability of the global economy, producing over 90 percent of the most cutting-edge [[Semiconductor chip|semiconductor chips]] used in smartphones, data centers, and advanced military equipment. Disruptions to the supply of these technologies could wipe trillions of dollars from global GDP.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://features.csis.org/chinapower/china-taiwan-strait-trade/ | title=Crossroads of Commerce: How the Taiwan Strait Propels the Global Economy }}</ref>

The [[United States]] considered Taiwan as a vital component in its [[Island chain strategy|island-chain strategy]] to prevent PRC influence from extending into the [[Indo-Pacific]], and potentially threatening [[Guam]], [[Hawaii]] and the [[West Coast of the United States]]. China, on the other hand, views the strategy as a form of [[containment]] that seek to prevent [[Chinese Century|China's rise to a superpower]] and accuse the U.S. of using Taiwan to overthrow the communist state.

== Background ==
{{Main|History of Taiwan}}
[[File:"Japan" with inset map "Formosa and Riu-Kiu Islands" from A Literary and Historical Atlas of Asia, by J.G. Bartholomew. J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd. 1912.jpg|thumb|right|230px|According to the [[Treaty of Shimonoseki]] Taiwan was part of Japan at the establishment of the ROC in 1912. The PRC (founded 1 October 1949) argues that the Treaty of Shimonoseki was never valid, saying it was one of several [[unequal treaties]] forced upon the Qing.]]
{{Anchor|Cession and retrocession|Cession and Retrocession|Cession, retrocession, legal status, and self-determination|Cession, retrocession, legal status, and self-determination|Cession, retrocession, legal status and self-determination of Taiwan|Cession, retrocession, legal status and self-determination of Taiwan}}

=== Pre-WWII ===
Taiwan (excluding [[Penghu]]) was first populated by [[Austronesian people]]. Chinese people started settling in southern Taiwan by the late 16th century.{{sfn|Knapp|1980|p=10}} The island was partially colonized by the [[Dutch Empire|Dutch]] who arrived in 1623. The Dutch colony was ousted by the [[Kingdom of Tungning]], which lasted from 1661 to 1683, and was the first [[Han Chinese|ethnic Han]] government to rule part of the [[Taiwan (island)|island of Taiwan]]. From 1683, the Qing dynasty ruled much of the western plains of the island [[Taiwan prefecture|as a prefecture]] and in 1875 divided the island into two prefectures, Taiwan and Taipeh. In 1887 the island was [[Taiwan Province#History|made into a separate]] [[Chinese province|province]] to speed up development in this region. In the aftermath of the [[First Sino-Japanese War]], Taiwan and Penghu were ceded by the Qing dynasty to Japan in 1895 under the [[Treaty of Shimonoseki]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Hsieh |first=Pasha L. |date=2009 |title=The Taiwan Question and the One-China Policy: Legal Challenges with Renewed Momentum |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23773999 |journal=Die Friedens-Warte |volume=84 |issue=3 |pages=60–61 |jstor=23773999 |issn=0340-0255 |access-date=20 June 2023 |archive-date=20 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230620175825/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23773999 |url-status=live }}</ref> The Qing dynasty fell in 1912, leaving [[List of warlords and military cliques in the Warlord Era|warlords]] to compete for power and influence in China. The country became more unified during the [[Nanjing decade]], and growing calls to push back against [[Japanese invasion of Manchuria|Japanese aggression]] led to the formation of the [[Second United Front]] before the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]].<ref>{{cite web |last1=Samarani |first1=Guido |last2=De Giorgi |first2=Laura |title=Guomindang (1912–1949) |website=Chinese Studies |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/obo/9780199920082-0138 |date=28 November 2016 |isbn=978-0-19-992008-2 |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199920082/obo-9780199920082-0138.xml}}</ref>

ROC leaders such as [[Sun Yat-sen]] and [[Chiang Kai-shek]] had expressed support for Korea's, Vietnam's, and Taiwan's independence from Japan.<ref name=":3"/> Academics Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan state that the early [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) viewed Taiwanese at that time as a separate ''[[Minzu (anthropology)|minzu]]'', a term that can refer to people, nation, race, or ethnic group.{{Efn|The CCP leadership considered the Taiwanese people ... a distinct "minzu." To be sure, the exact meaning of the term "minzu" ... is subject to debate.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last1=Hsiao |first1=Frank S. T. |last2=Sullivan |first2=Lawrence R. |date=1979 |title=The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928–1943 |journal=[[Pacific Affairs]] |volume=52 |issue=3 |page=446 |doi=10.2307/2757657 |jstor=2757657}}</ref>}} They theorize that being Chinese hinged on belonging to the same culture, but by then Taiwan had already undergone [[Japanization]].{{Efn|In this sense, peoples whose political links to Chinese culture were severed and, as in Taiwan's case, replaced by an alternative cultural tradition, transmitted through instruction in the Japanese language, ceased to be an integral part of the Chinese nation and emerged as a different "nationality," yet without losing all of their Chinese qualities.<ref name=":2"/>}} In a 1937 interview with [[Edgar Snow]], [[Mao Zedong]] stated "we will extend them (the Koreans) our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan."<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last=van der Wees |first=Gerrit |date=May 3, 2022 |title=When the CCP Thought Taiwan Should Be Independent |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/when-the-ccp-thought-taiwan-should-be-independent/ |access-date=2023-11-09 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |language=en-US |archive-date=8 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231108053621/https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/when-the-ccp-thought-taiwan-should-be-independent/ |url-status=live }}</ref>{{Efn|Van der Wees references Hsiao and Sullivan as the original source.}} The CCP's stance might have been intended as a temporary measure to build a coalition against the [[Empire of Japan]], which had colonized both Korea and Taiwan.{{Efn|If CCP support for Taiwan's ethnic separateness and political independence was based solely on strategic considerations during a period when all potential allies needed to be drawn into a broad anti-Japanese coalition and under Comintern pressure, then once in power they would naturally assume the role of the protective state and shift to an integrationist policy position.<ref name=":2"/>}} Regardless of its motivation, Mao's 1937 statement does not bind the CCP because the party was not in power.{{Efn|Was this an off-the-cuff statement by Mao ...? Without supporting documentary evidence we cannot prove conclusively that the CCP supported Taiwan independence in the period between 1928 and 1943 ... the CCP is not legally bound by pronouncements made when out of power and over thirty years ago.<ref name=":2"/>}}

=== WWII ===
In 1943 Chiang's Nationalists argued that after the end of the war, Taiwan should be restored to the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]]. The CCP followed suit and considered Taiwan an integral part of China.<ref name=":2"/> Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom agreed with Chiang at the [[Cairo Conference]] in November, resulting in the [[1943 Cairo Declaration|Cairo Declaration]]. That pledge was confirmed at the [[Potsdam Conference]] in 1945.<ref name=":3" />

=== Post-WWII ===
In 1945 Chinese Nationalists accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces in Taiwan on behalf of the Allied powers, ending [[History of Taiwan#Japanese Empire (1895–1945)|50 years of Japanese rule]].<ref name=":1" /><ref name="britannica">{{cite web | url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Taiwan | title=Taiwan &#124; History, Flag, Map, Capital, Population, & Facts &#124; Britannica | date=14 June 2024 }}</ref> Confident about their future prospects, they declared Taiwan a province of China again on 26 October 1945.<ref name="Henckaerts1996c"/> However the final legal dispensation awaited a peace treaty and formal ratification.<ref name="britannica"/> 

In 1949, Mao Zedong's forces defeated Chiang Kai-shek's ROC forces in the [[Chinese Civil War]], thus taking control of mainland China and founding the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chiang Kai-shek and his [[Kuomintang]] government [[Kuomintang's retreat to Taiwan|fled to Taiwan]], which was still under ROC control (as the CCP did not have a navy at that time). Tensions often soared in the following decades. The PRC [[Taiwan Strait Crises|shelled offshore islands held by Taiwan]] in the 1950s, and the ROC for a number of years harbored ambitions of recovering the mainland from the CCP.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chin |first=Josh |date=2022-05-23 |title=China and Taiwan Relations Explained: What's Behind the Divide |language=en-US |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-taiwan-relations-tensions-explained-11653322751 |url-access=subscription |access-date=2023-11-09 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=15 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230915070317/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-taiwan-relations-tensions-explained-11653322751 |url-status=live }}</ref> Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United Nations and most non-Communist nations still recognized the ROC as the sole government of China. Non-Communist nations referred to the CCP-controlled mainland as "Red China" during this time.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

In 1971, the UN General Assembly [[UN General Assembly Resolution 2758|voted]] to move the "China" [[China and the United Nations|United Nations seat]] from the ROC to the PRC. The United States recognized the Kuomintang government in Taiwan (ROC) as the legitimate representative of all China until 1979.<ref name=":0" /> And the ROC itself claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of all China until 1988.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Bulsara |first=Sanket |date=1995 |title=Out in the Cold: The Politics of Taiwan's Exclusion from the UN |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761198 |journal=Harvard International Review |volume=17 |issue=3 |pages=52–84 |jstor=42761198 |issn=0739-1854 |access-date=20 June 2023 |archive-date=20 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230620161151/https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761198 |url-status=live }}</ref> As of the present, most nations have switched their official diplomatic recognition of "China" to the PRC, though some of these nations have avoided clarifying what territories are meant by "China" in order to associate with both the PRC and ROC. These countries use vague terms such as "respects", "acknowledge", "understand", or "take note of" in regards to the PRC's claim over Taiwan, rather than officially "recognizing" the claim.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Lee|first=Tzu-wen|year=1996|title=The International Legal Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan|journal=UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs|volume=1|issue=2|pages=351–392|jstor=45302055}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Drun|first=Jessica|date=28 December 2017|title=One China, Multiple Interpretations|url=https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/one-china-multiple-interpretations|website=Center for Advanced China Research|access-date=5 July 2023|archive-date=9 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200309224301/https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/One-China-Multiple-Interpretations|url-status=live}}</ref> From 1988 onwards the Government of Taiwan turned to a [[checkbook diplomacy]] promising economic support in return of diplomatic recognition.<ref name=":0" /> Until 1995, Taiwan was able to establish diplomatic ties with 29 countries.<ref name=":0" /> However this policy was stalled by the PRC as it suspended trade with any country that held diplomatic ties with Taiwan.<ref name=":0" />

== Historical overview ==
=== End of Japanese rule ===
In 1942, after the United States entered the war against Japan and on the side of China, the Chinese government under the [[KMT]] renounced all treaties signed with Japan before that date and made Taiwan's return to China (as with [[Manchuria]], ruled as the Japanese [[Puppet States of WWII|wartime puppet state]] of "[[Manchukuo]]") one of the wartime objectives. In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Allied Powers declared the return of Taiwan (including the [[Pescadores]]) to the Republic of China as one of several Allied demands. The Cairo Declaration was never signed or ratified. Both of the US and the UK considered it not legally binding.<ref name="Hansard">{{Citation |url=https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1955/may/04/far-east-formosa-and-the-pescadores |title=Far East (Formosa and the Pescadores) |work=[[Hansard|Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)]] |date=4 May 1955 |access-date=2015-12-09 |archive-date=2017-10-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018112311/http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1955/may/04/far-east-formosa-and-the-pescadores |url-status=live }}</ref> The ROC, on the other hand, asserts that it is legally binding and lists later treaties and documents that "reaffirmed" the Cairo Declaration as legally binding.<ref>”[https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1329&s=32322 Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarifies legally binding status of Cairo Declaration]” (January 21, 2014).</ref>

In 1945, Japan unconditionally surrendered with the signing of the [[Japanese Instrument of Surrender|instrument of surrender]] and ended its rule in Taiwan as the territory was put under the administrative control of the Republic of China government in 1945 by the [[United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration]].<ref name="unhcr.org">{{cite web |url=http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,TWN,,4954ce6323,0.html |title=UNHCR &#124; Refworld &#124; World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Taiwan: Overview |access-date=2010-03-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728144641/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,TWN,,4954ce6323,0.html |archive-date=2011-07-28 }} UNHCR</ref><ref name="Lowther William">{{cite news
|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/06/09/2003564336
|title=CIA report shows Taiwan concerns
|work=Taipei Times
|date=9 Jun 2013
|page=1
|last=Lowther
|first=William
|quote=[Quoting from a declassified CIA report on Taiwan written in March 1949] From the legal standpoint, Taiwan is not part of the Republic of China. Pending a Japanese peace treaty, the island remains occupied territory in which the US has proprietary interests.
|access-date=2015-09-28
|archive-date=13 July 2013
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130713061649/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/06/09/2003564336
|url-status=live
}}</ref> The Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ordered Japanese forces in China and Taiwan to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek, who would act as a representative of the Allied Powers. On 25 October 1945, Governor-General [[Rikichi Andō]] handed over the administration of Taiwan and the Penghu islands to the head of the Taiwan Investigation Commission, [[Chen Yi (Kuomintang)|Chen Yi]].{{sfn|Tsai|2009|p=173}}<ref name ="Henckaerts1996"/> On 26 October, the government of the Republic of China declared that Taiwan had become a province of China.<ref name="Henckaerts1996c">{{cite book|last=Henckaerts|first=Jean-Marie|title=The international status of Taiwan in the new world order: legal and political considerations|year=1996|publisher=Kluwer Law International|isbn=90-411-0929-3|page=337|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_9kuVIayxDoC&q=cairo+declaration&pg=PA7|quote=p. 4. "On October 25, 1945, the government of the Republic of China took over Taiwan and the P'eng-hu Islands from the Japanese and on the next day announced that Taiwan had become a province of China."|access-date=4 July 2023|archive-date=12 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230412011937/https://books.google.com/books?id=_9kuVIayxDoC&q=cairo+declaration&pg=PA7|url-status=live}}</ref> The Allied Powers, on the other hand, did not recognize the unilateral declaration of annexation of Taiwan made by the government of the Republic of China.<ref>{{Cite web | author = [[CIA]] | title = Probable Developments in Taiwan | url = http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000258551.pdf | date = 1949-03-14 | pages = 1–3 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20141222073143/http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000258551.pdf | archive-date = 2014-12-22 | access-date = 2015-03-08 | url-status = live | language = en | quote = From the legal standpoint, Taiwan is not part of the Republic of China. Pending a Japanese peace treaty, the island remains occupied territory......neither the US, or any other power, has formally recognized the annexation by China of Taiwan......}}</ref>

In accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of [[San Francisco Peace Treaty]], the Japanese formally renounced the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan and Penghu islands, and the treaty was signed in 1951 and came into force in 1952. At the date when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force, the political status of Taiwan and Penghu Islands was still uncertain.<ref name="unhcr.org"/> The Republic of China and Japan signed the [[Treaty of Taipei]] on April 28, 1952, and the treaty came into force on August 5, which is considered by some{{Who|date=April 2025}} as giving a legal support to the Republic of China's claim to Taiwan as "de jure" territory. The treaty stipulates that all treaties, conventions, and agreements between China and Japan prior to 9 December 1941 were null and void, which according to Hungdah Chiu, abolishes the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceding Taiwan to Japan. The interpretation of Taiwan becoming the Republic of China's '"de jure" territory is supported by several Japanese court decisions such as the 1956 ''Japan v. Lai Chin Jung'' case, which stated that Taiwan and the Penghu islands came to belong to the ROC on the date the Treaty of Taipei came into force.<ref name="Henckaerts1996"/> Nevertheless, the official position of the [[Government of Japan]] is that Japan did not in the Treaty of Taipei express that Taiwan and Penghu belong to the Republic of China,<ref>{{lang|ja|[http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/038/0082/03802020082002a.html 衆議院会議録情報 第038回国会 外務委員会 第2号]. 2 February 1961. p. 23.}} (in Japanese) {{lang|ja|"従って日華条約によりまして日本が台湾及び澎湖島を中華民国に帰属せしめたという意思表示はしていないのでございます。"}}</ref> that the Treaty of Taipei could not make any disposition which is in violation of Japan's renouncing Taiwan and Penghu in San Francisco Peace Treaty,<ref>{{lang|ja|[http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/046/0514/04602290514017a.html 衆議院会議録情報 第046回国会 予算委員会 第17号]. 2 February 1964. p. 24.}} (in Japanese) {{lang|ja|"日華条約におきましても、これを、サンフランシスコできめた、日本が放棄したということに反するようなことはできないのであります。"}}</ref> and that the status of Taiwan and Penghu remain to be determined by the Allied Powers in the future.<ref>{{lang|ja|[http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/046/0082/04602060082001a.html 衆議院会議録情報 第046回国会 外務委員会 第1号]. 6 February 1964. p. 11.}} (in Japanese) {{lang|ja|"台湾の帰属の問題につきましては、御指摘のように、カイロ宣言では、中華民国に返させるというカイロ宣言の当事国の意思の表明がありました。これはポツダム宣言で確認されておりますが、最終的な領有権の問題については、日本の平和条約で、日本から放棄されるだけであって、将来の連合国間の決定にまかされておるというのが連合国の見解でございます。"}}</ref>

Writing in the ''[[American Journal of International Law]]'', professors Jonathan I. Charney and J. R. V. Prescott argued that "none of the post–World War II peace treaties explicitly ceded sovereignty over the covered territories to any specific state or government."<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/lawjrn/res-cs2.htm
|title=Resolving Cross-Strait Relations Between China and Taiwan
|author=Jonathan I. Charney and J. R. V. Prescott
|publisher=American Journal of International Law, July 2000
|access-date=2011-01-30
|archive-date=21 July 2011
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721183143/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/lawjrn/res-cs2.htm
|url-status=live
}}</ref> The [[Cairo Conference (1943)|Cairo Conference]] from November 22–26, 1943 in [[Cairo]], Egypt was held to address the Allied position against Japan during World War II, and to make decisions about postwar Asia. One of the three main clauses of the Cairo Declaration was that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". According to Taiwan Civil Society quoting the Taiwan Documents Project, the document was merely a [[Statement of Intent|statement of intent]] or non-binding declaration, for possible reference used for those who would draft the post-war peace treaty and that as a press release it was without force of law to transfer sovereignty from Taiwan to the Republic of China. Additional rationale to support this claim is that the Act of Surrender, and SCAP General Order no. 1, authorized the surrender of Japanese forces, not Japanese territories.<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://www.civil-taiwan.org/japansurr.htm
|title=The Japanese Act of Surrender
|publisher=Taiwan Documents Project
|year=2002
|access-date=2010-09-01
|archive-date=2 June 2023
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230602111836/https://civil-taiwan.org/japansurr.htm
|url-status=live
}}</ref>

In 1952, [[Winston Churchill]] said that Taiwan was not under Chinese sovereignty and the Chinese Nationalists did not represent the Chinese state, but that Taiwan was entrusted to the Chinese Nationalists as a military occupation. Churchill called the Cairo Declaration outdated in 1955. The legality of the Cairo Declaration was not recognized by the deputy prime minister of the United Kingdom, [[Anthony Eden]], in 1955, who said there was a difference of opinion on which Chinese authority to hand it over to.<ref name="Henckaerts1996"/><ref>{{Citation
|url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/hansard/uk/uk1955as.htm
|title=UK Parliament
|date=4 May 1955
|access-date=2010-02-27
|archive-date=21 July 2011
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721183000/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/hansard/uk/uk1955as.htm
|url-status=live
}}</ref><ref>{{Citation 
|url=https://www.taiwanbasic.com/hansard/uk/uk1955aq.htm 
|title=There was no transfer of the sovereignty of Taiwan to China in 1945. 
|date=February 7, 1955 
|access-date=2022-09-02 
|archive-date=23 January 2023 
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230123011308/https://www.taiwanbasic.com/hansard/uk/uk1955aq.htm 
|url-status=live 
}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |given=Drew |surname=Middleton |title=Cairo Formosa Declaration Out of Date, Says Churchill |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=2 February 1955 |page=1 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1955/02/02/archives/cairo-formosa-declaration-out-of-date-says-churchill-churchill.html |access-date=14 April 2021 |archive-date=17 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317183839/https://www.nytimes.com/1955/02/02/archives/cairo-formosa-declaration-out-of-date-says-churchill-churchill.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In 1954, the United States denied that the sovereignty of Taiwan and the Penghu islands had been settled by any treaties, although it acknowledged that the Republic of China effectively controlled Taiwan and Penghu.<ref name="Henckaerts1996b">{{cite book|last=Henckaerts|first=Jean-Marie|title=The international status of Taiwan in the new world order: legal and political considerations|year=1996|publisher=Kluwer Law International|isbn=90-411-0929-3|page=337|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_9kuVIayxDoC&q=effectively+controls&pg=PA7|quote=p. 5. "The United States position on the status of Taiwan is, as stated by the late Secretary of State Dulles in a press conference held on December 1, 1954, "that technical sovereignty over Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores has never been settled" and that "the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. On the other hand, the United States also recognizes that the Republic of China "effectively controls" Taiwan and the Pescadores."|access-date=4 July 2023|archive-date=2 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230502062904/https://books.google.com/books?id=_9kuVIayxDoC&q=effectively+controls&pg=PA7|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite periodical | author = [[Department of State]] |title=News Conference Statements: Purpose of treaty with Republic of China |periodical=Department of State Bulletin |volume=XXXI |issue=807 | page = [https://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat311954unit_0#page/896/mode/2up 896] | publisher = [[United States Government Printing Office]] | location = [[Washington, D.C.]] | date =December 13, 1954 | language = en | quote = The legal position is different, as I think I pointed out in my last press conference, by virtue of the fact that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled. That is because the Japanese peace treaty merely involves a renunciation by Japan of its right and title to these island. But the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan. Therefore, the juridical status of these islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, is different from the juridical status of the offshore islands which have always been Chinese territory.}}</ref> In the 1960 ''Sheng v. Rogers'' case, it was stated that, in the view of the [[U.S. State Department]], no agreement has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Taiwan to the ROC, though it accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over Taiwan and recognized the Government of the Republic of China as the legal government of China at the time.<ref>{{cite web | title = William P. Rogers, Attorney General of the United States, Appellant v. Cheng Fu Sheng and Lin Fu Mei, Appellees, 280 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1960) | url = https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/280/663/263772/ | date = 1960 | quote = But in the view of our State Department, no agreement has 'purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to (the Republic of) China.' At the present time, we accept the exercise of Chinese authority over Formosa, and recognize the Government of the Republic of China (the Nationalist Government) as the legal Government of China. | access-date = 4 July 2023 | archive-date = 30 September 2022 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220930073520/https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/280/663/263772/ | url-status = live }}</ref><ref name=StateDept />

The position of the US stated in the Department of State Bulletin in 1958 is that any seizure of Taiwan by the PRC “constitutes an attempt to seize by force territory which does not belong to it" because the Allied Powers had yet to come to a decision on the status of Taiwan.<ref name="StateDept">Maurer, Ely. "[https://books.google.com/books?id=WnM1Eaj_aQAC&pg=PA1005 Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands]", ''[[Department of State Bulletin]]'', Vol. 39, pp. 1005–1011 (December 22, 1958) (transcript of speech on November 20, 1958) ("Neither this agreement [of April 28, 1952] nor any other agreement thereafter has purported to transfer the sovereignty of Formosa to [the Republic of] China....The situation is, then, one where the Allied Powers still have to come to some agreement or treaty with respect to the status of Formosa. Any action, therefore, of the Chinese Communist regime to seize Formosa constitutes an attempt to seize by force territory which does not belong to it.").</ref> According to Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, a minority of scholars and politicians have argued that the international status of Taiwan is [[Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan|still undecided]], and that this has been used as an argument against the [[People's Republic of China]]'s claim over Taiwan. They point to [[President Truman]]'s statement on the pending status of Taiwan in 1950, the lack of specificity on whom the title of Taiwan was transferred to in the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty, and the absence of explicit provisions on the return of Taiwan to China in the 1952 Treaty of Taipei. However Wang notes that this is a weak argument, citing 2 Lassa Oppenheimer, International Law, under the principle of effective occupation and control, if nothing is stipulated on conquered territory in the peace treaty, the possessor may annex it.<ref name = "Henckaerts undecided view">{{cite book|last=Henckaerts|first=Jean-Marie|title=The international status of Taiwan in the new world order: legal and political considerations|year=1996|publisher=Kluwer Law International|isbn=90-411-0929-3|page=337|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_9kuVIayxDoC&dq=A+minor+issue+pertains+to+whether+the+ROC+controls+Taiwan&pg=PA95|quote=p. 95. "A minor issue pertains to whether the ROC controls Taiwan. A minority of scholars of scholars and politicians argue that the international status of Taiwan remains ''undecided''... That Taiwan's status is still undetermined is a peculiar argument to forestall PRC's claim over Taiwan. However, it is also an insignificant one, since the ROC can still ascertain its control over Taiwan through the principle of effective control and occupation (for a long period of time)."|access-date=4 July 2023|archive-date=4 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230504173831/https://books.google.com/books?id=_9kuVIayxDoC&dq=A+minor+issue+pertains+to+whether+the+ROC+controls+Taiwan&pg=PA95|url-status=live}}</ref> Still, the notion that a possessor may annex a conquered territory despite the peace treaty not stipulating so, was a means of territorial transfer recognized by classical international law, and its legality in recent years is either not recognized or disputed.<ref>{{Cite journal | author = Chen, Robert Lih-torng | date = May 2005 | title = 琉球群島主權歸屬－歷史角度與國際法 | trans-title = The Legal Status of the Okinawa Islands Under the Historical Stand and International Law | url = http://tunghai.lawbank.com.tw/22/01.pdf | journal = Tunghai University Law Review | volume = 22 | publisher = College of Law, [[Tunghai University]] | page = 17 | language = zh | quote = 按「征服」、戰後佔領原則或 Uti Possidetis 法則均為古典國際法承認的領土移轉方式，但晚近已不再承認上述方式係取得領土主權的合法方式，或對其取得主權的法律效力有爭論、疑慮。 | access-date = 2022-10-06 | archive-date = 2016-03-04 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160304130835/http://tunghai.lawbank.com.tw/22/01.pdf }}</ref> According to Jian-De Shen, a Taiwanese independence activist, applying such a notion on the Republic of China's territorial claim for Taiwan is invalid because the conqueror of World War II is the whole body of the Allied Powers rather than the Republic of China alone.<ref>{{cite news | author =Jian-De Shen |title=Untitled Document |author-link=:zh:沈建德 |script-title=zh:馬英九愛中國 不惜斷送台灣 | trans-title = Ma Ying-Jeou Loves China and Would Surrender Taiwan at Any Cost | url = http://taiwantt.org.tw/books/cryingtaiwan8/200411/20041123.htm | newspaper = [[Taiwan Daily]] | location = [[Taichung]] | date = 2004-11-23 |access-date = 2015-03-30 |archive-date = 2015-04-02 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150402190150/http://taiwantt.org.tw/books/cryingtaiwan8/200411/20041123.htm | url-status = live | language = zh | quote = {{lang|zh|馬英九所言「保持佔有」的定義是，戰後征服領土之割讓，雖未成為和平條約的條件之一(如舊金山和約的放棄台灣)，在法律上，即可因其被戰勝國持有、占據而被併吞。但二次大戰的戰勝國是同盟國全體，不是單指中國……中華民國對台「保持佔有」不成立。}}}}</ref> The Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan is supported by some politicians and jurists to this day, such as the [[Government of the United States]] and the Japanese diplomatic circle.<ref>{{Cite web | author = Shirley A. Kan | author2 = Wayne M. Morrison | title = U.S.–Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues | url = http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41952.pdf | publisher = [[Congressional Research Service]] | location = [[Washington, D.C.]] | date = 11 December 2014 | page = 4 | quote = The United States has its own "one China" policy (vs. the PRC's "one China" principle) and position on Taiwan's status. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan nor Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled. | access-date = 4 July 2023 | archive-date = 28 June 2015 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150628191112/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41952.pdf | url-status = live }}</ref><ref name="日本外交界常識">{{cite news | author = 曾韋禎 | script-title = zh:台灣主權未定論 許世楷：日本外交界常識 | trans-title = [[Koh Se-kai]]: Theory of the Undetermined Sovereignty of Taiwan Is a General Knowledge in the Japanese Diplomatic Circle | url = http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/300420 | newspaper = [[Liberty Times]] | location = [[Taipei]] | date = 3 May 2009 | access-date = 24 January 2015 | language = zh | archive-date = 3 April 2019 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190403133556/http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/300420 | url-status = live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news | author = 林良昇 | script-title = zh:國際法觀點 學者：台灣被中華民國政府佔領70年 | trans-title = ⟨International Law Perspective⟩ Scholar: Taiwan Has Been Occupied by the Government of the Republic of China for 70 Years | url = http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1485820 | newspaper = [[Liberty Times]] | location = [[Taipei]] | date = 24 October 2015 | access-date = 12 December 2015 | language = zh | archive-date = 22 December 2015 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20151222125812/http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1485820 | url-status = live }}</ref>

=== 1945–present – post-World War II status ===

==== 1947 – 228 Incident ====

When the [[228 Incident]] erupted on 28 February 1947, the U.S. Consulate-General in [[Taipei]] prepared a report in early March, calling for an immediate intervention in the name of the U.S. or the [[United Nations]]. Based on the argument that the Japanese surrender did not formally transfer sovereignty, Taiwan was still legally part of Japan and occupied by the United States (with administrative authority for the occupation delegated to the Chinese Nationalists), and a direct intervention was appropriate for a territory with such status. This proposed intervention, however, was rejected by the U.S. State Department. In a news report on the aftermath of the ''228 Incident'', some Taiwanese residents were reported to be talking of appealing to the United Nations to put the island under an international mandate since China's possession of Taiwan had not been formalized by any international treaties by that time, and the island was therefore still under belligerent occupation.<ref name=NYT033047>{{cite news |title=Formosans' Plea for Red Aid Seen; Harsh Repression of Revolt Is Expected to Increase Efforts to Escape Rule by China |last=Durdin |first=Tillman |date=30 March 1947 |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|url=http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10F1EF63B5F1A7A93C2AA1788D85F438485F9 |access-date=2007-10-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120930071826/http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10F1EF63B5F1A7A93C2AA1788D85F438485F9 |archive-date=30 September 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><!--archived copyvio requote at https://web.archive.org/web/20070306103355/http://228.lomaji.com/news/033047.html-->
They later made a demand for a treaty role to be represented at the forthcoming peace conference in Japan, in the hope of requesting a [[plebiscite]] to determine the island's political future.<ref>{{cite news |title=Formosans Ask Treaty Role |date=5 October 1947 |newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|url=http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F5061FFF395E17738DDDAC0894D8415B8788F1D3 |access-date=2007-10-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120930071845/http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F5061FFF395E17738DDDAC0894D8415B8788F1D3 |archive-date=30 September 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref><!--archived copyvio requote at https://web.archive.org/web/20070306142800/http://228.lomaji.com/news/100547.html-->

[[File:中華民國第一位民選首都市長吳三連於1951年勝選後 First People-elected Mayor of Taipei, the Capital of TAIWAN.jpg|thumb|Non-partisan Taiwanese political candidate Wu San-lian (2L) celebrated his landslide victory (65.5%) in the first [[Taipei city]] mayoral election in January 1951 with his supporters. [[Taipei]] has been the capital of the [[Republic of China]] since December 1949.]]

==== 1950–1953 – Korean War and U.S. intervention ====
At the start of 1950, [[President of the United States|U.S. President]] [[Harry S. Truman]] appeared to accept the idea that sovereignty over Taiwan was already settled when the [[United States Department of State]] stated that "In keeping with these <nowiki>[Cairo and Potsdam]</nowiki> declarations, Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang-Kai Shek, and for the past four years, the United States and Other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the Island."<ref>{{cite report |title=Statement by President Truman |chapter=United States Policy Toward Formosa |series=Department of State Bulletin |date=16 January 1950 |volume=22 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/stream/departmentofstat2250unit#page/78/mode/2up}}</ref>
However, after the outbreak of the [[Korean War]], Truman decided to "neutralize" Taiwan, claiming that it could otherwise trigger another world war. In June 1950, President Truman, who had previously given only passive support to Chiang Kai-shek and was prepared to see Taiwan fall into the hands of the CCP, vowed to stop the spread of communism and sent the [[U.S. Seventh Fleet]] into the [[Taiwan Strait]] to prevent the PRC from attacking Taiwan, but also to prevent the ROC from attacking mainland China. He then declared that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."<ref>{{Citation
|url=http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=800
|title=Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea
|date=27 June 1950
|publisher=Truman library
|access-date=2007-10-06
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141109112156/http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=800
|archive-date=9 November 2014
|url-status=live
}}</ref> President Truman later reaffirmed the position "that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the [[United Nations Charter|Charter of the United Nations]]" in his special message to Congress in July 1950.<ref>{{Citation
|url=http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=822
|title=Special Message to the Congress Reporting on the Situation in Korea
|date=19 July 1950
|access-date=2007-10-06
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927222807/http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=822
|archive-date=27 September 2007
|url-status=live
}}</ref> The PRC denounced his moves as flagrant interference in the internal affairs of China.

On 8 September 1950, President Truman ordered [[John Foster Dulles]], then Foreign Policy Advisor to the [[U.S. Secretary of State]], to carry out his decision on "neutralizing" Taiwan in drafting the [[Treaty of Peace with Japan]] ([[San Francisco]] Peace Treaty) of 1951. According to [[George H. Kerr]]'s memoir ''[[Formosa Betrayed (1965 book)|Formosa Betrayed]]'', Dulles devised a plan whereby Japan would first merely renounce its sovereignty over Taiwan without a recipient country to allow the sovereignty over Taiwan to be determined together by the United States, the United Kingdom, [[Soviet Union]], and the Republic of China on behalf of other nations on the peace treaty. The question of Taiwan would be taken into the United Nations (of which the ROC was [[China and the United Nations|still part]]) if these four parties could not reach an agreement within one year.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

==== 1952 – Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco) ====

When Japan regained sovereignty over itself in 1952 with the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Peace Treaty) with 48 nations, Japan renounced all claims and titles over Taiwan and the Pescadores. Some{{Who|date=April 2025}} claim that Japanese sovereignty only terminated at that point.<ref>{{cite book |title=Mandate for Change 1953–1956 |publisher=Doubleday & Co., New York |last=Eisenhower |first=Dwight D. |page=461 |url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/nstatus/eisenhower.htm |oclc=2551357 |date=1963 |quote=The Japanese peace treaty of 1951 ended Japanese sovereignty over the islands but did not formally cede them to 'China,' either Communist or Nationalist. |access-date=2011-07-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120308075947/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/nstatus/eisenhower.htm |archive-date=8 March 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Notably absent at the peace conference was the ROC which was expelled from [[mainland China]] in December 1949 as a result of the Chinese Civil War and had retreated to Taiwan. The PRC, which was proclaimed on 1 October 1949, was also not invited. The lack of invitation was probably due to the dispute over which government was the legitimate government of China (which both governments claimed to be); however, [[Cold War]] considerations might have played a part as well.{{Citation needed|date=August 2010}} Some major governments represented in the San Francisco Conference, such as the UK and Soviet Union, had already established relations with the PRC, while others, such as the U.S. and Japan, still held relations with the ROC.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The UK at that time stated for the record that the San Francisco Peace Treaty "itself does not determine the future of these islands," and therefore, the UK, along with Australia and New Zealand, was happy to sign the peace treaty.<ref name=taipeitimes20070930>{{Citation
|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/09/30/2003381074
|title=John Tkacik on Taiwan: Taiwan's status remains 'unsettled'
|date=30 September 2007
|author=John Tkacik
|publisher=Taipei Times
|page=8
|access-date=22 May 2014
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110918112346/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/09/30/2003381074
|archive-date=18 September 2011
|url-status=live
}}</ref> One of the major reasons that the delegate from the Soviet Union gave for not signing the treaty was that: "The draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories [Taiwan] but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories."<ref name=taipeitimes20070930 />

Article 25 of this treaty officially stipulated that only the Allied Powers defined in the treaty could benefit from this treaty. China was not listed as one of the Allied Powers; however, article 21 still provided limited benefits from Articles 10 and 14(a)2 for China. Japan's cession of Taiwan is unusual in that no recipient of Taiwan was stated as part of Dulles's plan of "neutralizing" Taiwan. The ROC protested its lack of invitation to the San Francisco Peace conference, to no avail.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

==== 1952 – Treaty of Taipei ====

Subsequently, the Treaty of Taipei was concluded between the ROC and Japan on 28 April 1952 (effective 5 August), where Japan essentially re-affirmed the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and formalized the peace between the ROC and Japan. It also nullified all previous treaties made between China and Japan. Article 10 of the treaty specifies:<blockquote>"For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be [[deem (law)|deemed]] to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendants who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores)."</blockquote> However, the ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs George Kung-ch'ao Yeh told the Legislative Yuan after signing the treaty that: "The delicate international situation makes it that they [Taiwan and Penghu] do not belong to us. Under present circumstances, Japan has no right to transfer [Taiwan] to us; nor can we accept such a transfer from Japan even if she so wishes."<ref name=taipeitimes20070930 /> In July 1971, the U.S. State Department's position was, and remains: "As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution."<ref name=taipeitimes20070930 />

== Positions of governments and other officials ==

=== People's Republic of China (PRC) ===

[[File:Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents (front).jpg|alt=|thumb|350x350px|A PRC [[Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents]]. Permits allow ROC residents of Taiwan to enter mainland China. The PRC refuses to accept ROC [[Taiwan passport|passports]].]]
The position of the PRC is that the ROC ceased to be a legitimate government upon the founding of the former on 1 October 1949 and that the PRC is the successor of the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China, with the right to rule Taiwan under the [[succession of states theory]].<ref name="prc_wp">{{cite web |year = 2005 |title = The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue |work = PRC Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council |url = http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=WhitePaper&title=White%20Papers%20On%20Taiwan%20Issue&m_id=4 |access-date = 6 March 2006 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060213045631/http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=WhitePaper&title=White+Papers+On+Taiwan+Issue&m_id=4 |archive-date = 13 February 2006 |url-status = dead }}</ref>

The position of the PRC is that the ROC and PRC are two different factions in the Chinese Civil War, which never legally ended. Therefore, the PRC claims that both factions belong to the same sovereign country—China. Since, as per the PRC, Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to China, the PRC's government and supporters believe that the secession of Taiwan should be agreed upon by all 1.3&nbsp;billion Chinese citizens instead of just the 23&nbsp;million residents of Taiwan.<ref>{{cite web |title = Four-point guidelines on cross-Straits relations set forth by President Hu |work = PRC Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the State Council |url = http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=OneCP&title=One-China+Principle&m_id=27 |access-date = 16 September 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20081012061448/http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=OneCP&title=One-China+Principle&m_id=27 |archive-date = 12 October 2008 |url-status = dead }}</ref> Furthermore, the position of PRC is that [[UN General Assembly Resolution 2758]], which states "Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations", means that the PRC is recognized as having the sovereignty of all of China, including Taiwan.{{NoteTag|Established by Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Proclamation and Japanese Instrument of Surrender, according to the PRC's claim.}} Therefore, the PRC believes that it is within its legal rights to extend its jurisdiction to Taiwan by military means if at all necessary.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

In addition, the position of the PRC is that the ROC does not meet the fourth criterion of the [[Montevideo Convention]], as it is recognized by only {{Numrec|ROC||UN member states}} and has been denied access to international organizations such as the UN. The PRC points out the fact that the Montevideo Convention was only signed by 19 states at the Seventh International Conference of American States. Thus the authority of the United Nations as well as UN Resolutions, should supersede the Montevideo Convention. However, "When speaking of statehood, one invariably refers to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 60 which, laying down what is now considered a rule of customary international law, states that "[t]he State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States." Taiwan indeed satisfies all these criteria for statehood."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Montevideo Convention of 1933 & UN Articles on Responsibility of States (2001) |url=https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/text_blocks/28904 |website=H2O platform |access-date=16 June 2022 |archive-date=15 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220915194735/https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/text_blocks/28904 |url-status=live }}</ref> Some{{Who|date=April 2025}} would argue that Taiwan meets all the requirements of the Montevideo Convention. But to make such an argument, one has to reject China's claim of sovereignty over the territory of the Taiwan island, a claim that has been recognized by most states in the world.<ref>{{Cite book | author = Stephen D. Krasner | title = Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=ISqwQIBQff4C | publisher = [[Columbia University Press]] | date = 2001 | location = [[New York City]] | page = 46 | isbn = 0231121792 | author-link = Stephen D. Krasner | access-date = 3 December 2019 | archive-date = 11 April 2023 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230411110842/https://books.google.com/books?id=ISqwQIBQff4C | url-status = live }}</ref>

It is clear that the PRC still maintains that "there is only one China in the world" and "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China". However, instead of "the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China", the PRC now emphasizes that "both Taiwan and the mainland belong to one and same China".{{citation needed|date=January 2020}} Although the current position allows for flexibility in terms of defining that "one China", any departure from the [[One-China policy]] is deemed unacceptable by the PRC government. The PRC government is unwilling to negotiate with the ROC government under any formulation other than the One-China policy, although a more flexible definition of "one China" such as found in the [[1992 consensus]] is possible under PRC policy. The PRC government considers the 1992 consensus a temporary measure to set aside sovereignty disputes and enable talks.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The PRC government considers perceived violations of its "One-China policy" or inconsistencies with it, such as supplying the ROC with arms a violation of its rights to [[territorial integrity]].<ref name="pdaily041010">{{cite news |url = http://english.people.com.cn/200410/10/eng20041010_159539.html |title = China expresses strong indignation for "US-Taiwan defense conference": FM spokesman |newspaper = [[People's Daily]] |date = 10 October 2004 |access-date = 11 June 2006 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060627143113/http://english.people.com.cn/200410/10/eng20041010_159539.html |archive-date = 27 June 2006 |url-status = live }}</ref> International news organizations often report that "China considers Taiwan a renegade province that must be united with the mainland by force if necessary", even though the PRC does not explicitly say that Taiwan is a "renegade province" in any press releases. However, official PRC media outlets and officials often refer to Taiwan as "China's [[Taiwan Province, People's Republic of China|Taiwan Province]]" or simply "[[Taiwan, China]]", and pressure international organizations to use the term.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

=== Republic of China (ROC) ===

{{More citations needed section|date=November 2007}}
[[File:Republic_of_China_(Taiwan)_Passport_2020.svg|thumb|Current [[Republic of China passport]] ([[Taiwan Passport]])]]

The ROC argues that it maintains all the characteristics of a state and that it was not "replaced" or "succeeded" by the PRC because it has continued to exist long after the PRC's founding.

According to the Montevideo Convention of 1933, the most cited source for the definition of statehood, a state must possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Some{{Who|date=April 2025}} argue that the ROC meets all these criteria. However, to make such an argument, one has to reject the PRC's claim of sovereignty over the territory of the [[Taiwan island]]. The PRC requires all other states that establish [[diplomatic relations]] with it not to challenge this claim in addition to severing said relations with the ROC. Most states have either officially recognized this claim or carefully worded their agreement ambiguously, such as the United States.<ref>{{Cite book | author = Stephen D. Krasner | title = Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=ISqwQIBQff4C | publisher = [[Columbia University Press]] | date = 2001 | location = [[New York City]] | page = [https://books.google.com/books?id=ISqwQIBQff4C&pg=PA46 46] | isbn = 0231121792 | author-link = Stephen D. Krasner | access-date = 9 May 2020 | archive-date = 11 April 2023 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230411110842/https://books.google.com/books?id=ISqwQIBQff4C | url-status = live }}</ref>

Both the original 1912 [[Constitution of the Republic of China|constitution]] and the 1923 draft version failed to list Taiwan as a part of the ROC since, at the time, Taiwan was a Japanese territory. It was only in the mid-1930s when both the CCP and KMT realized the future strategic importance of Taiwan that they altered their party positions to make a claim on Taiwan as a part of China. After losing the Civil War against the CCP in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party fled to Taiwan and continued to maintain that their government represented all of China, i.e. both Taiwan and the mainland.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The position of most supporters of [[Taiwan independence]] is that the PRC is the government of "China" and that Taiwan is not part of China, defining "China" as only including Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau. Regarding the ROC, one ideology within Taiwan's independence regards the ROC as already an independent, sovereign state and seeks to amend the ROC's existing name, constitution, and existing framework to reflect the loss of ROC's mainland territory and transform the ROC into a Taiwan state; while another ideology of Taiwan independence regards the ROC as both a military government that has been administering the Taiwan island as a result of post-war [[military occupation]] on behalf of the allies of World War II since 1945, and a Chinese refugee regime currently in exile on Taiwan since 1949, and seeks to eliminate the ROC and establish a new independent Taiwan state.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The Democratic Progressive Party states that Taiwan has never been under the jurisdiction of the PRC and that the PRC does not exercise any hold over the 23&nbsp;million Taiwanese on the island. On the other hand, the position of most [[Chinese unification]] supporters is that the Chinese Civil War is still not over since no peace agreement has ever been signed and that the current status is a state of [[ceasefire]] between two [[belligerents]] of "[[One China]]".{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The position of the Republic of China has been that it is a ''[[de jure]]'' sovereign state. "Republic of China," according to the ROC government's definition, extended to both mainland China (Including [[Hong Kong Special Administrative Region|Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]]) and the island of Taiwan.<ref name=mac>{{cite press release | publisher = Mainland Affairs Council, ROC Executive Yuan | date = 29 March 2005 | title = The Official Position of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on China's Passing of the Anti-secession (Anti-Separation) Law | url = http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/anti/mofa940329e.htm | access-date = 11 June 2006 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090215122022/http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/anti/mofa940329e.htm | archive-date = 15 February 2009 | url-status = dead }}</ref>

In 1991, [[President of the Republic of China|President]] [[Lee Teng-hui]] unofficially claimed that the government would no longer challenge the rule of the CCP in mainland China, although the ROC government under Kuomintang (KMT) rule actively maintained that it was the sole legitimate government of China. The Courts in Taiwan have never accepted President Lee's statement, primarily due to the reason that the (now defunct) [[National Assembly of the Republic of China|National Assembly]] never officially changed the acclaimed national borders. Notably, the People's Republic of China claims that changing the national borders would be "a precursor to Taiwan independence". The task of changing the national borders now requires a constitutional amendment passed by the [[Legislative Yuan]] and ratified by a majority of all eligible ROC voters, which the PRC has implied would constitute grounds for military attack.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

[[File:Exit and Entry Permit of Republic of China (Taiwan).jpg|thumb|Exit and Entry Permit Taiwan, Republic of China. The Republic of China issues this permit to enable residents of mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau to travel to Taiwan. The Republic of China refuses to accept [[People's Republic of China passport]]s.]]
On the other hand, though the constitution of the Republic of China promulgated in 1946 does not state exactly what territory it includes, the draft of the constitution of 1925 did individually list the provinces of the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] and [[Taiwan Province|Taiwan]] was not among them, since Taiwan was arguably ''de jure'' part of Japan as the result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. The constitution also stipulated in Article I.4, that "the territory of the ROC is the original territory governed by it; unless authorized by the National Assembly, it cannot be altered." 

However, in 1946, [[Sun Fo]], son of [[Sun Yat-Sen]] and the minister of the [[Executive Yuan]] of the ROC, reported to the National Assembly that "there are two types of territory changes: 1. renouncing territory and 2. annexing new territory. The first example would be the independence of [[Mongolia]], and the second example would be the reclamation of Taiwan. Both would be examples of territory changes." Japan renounced all rights to Taiwan in the [[Treaty of San Francisco]] in 1951 and the Treaty of Taipei of 1952 without an explicit recipient. While the ROC continuously ruled Taiwan after the government was directed to Taiwan by the [[General Order No. 1]] (1945) to receive Japanese surrender, there has never been a meeting of the ROC National Assembly in making a territory change according to the ROC constitution. The explanatory memorandum to the constitution explained the omission of individually listing the provinces as opposed to the earlier drafts was an act of deliberate ambiguity: as the ROC government does not recognize the validity of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, based on Chiang Kai-shek's [[Denunciation]] of the treaty in the late 1930s, hence (according to this argument) the sovereignty of Taiwan was never disposed of by China. A ratification by the ROC National Assembly is, therefore, unnecessary.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The [[s:Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China|Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China]] have mentioned "Taiwan Province," and the now defunct National Assembly passed constitutional amendments that give the people of the "[[Free Area of the Republic of China]]", comprising the territories under its current jurisdiction, the sole right, until unification, to exercise the sovereignty of the Republic through elections<ref name=mac /><ref>{{cite news |title=Taiwan assembly passes changes |date=7 June 2005 |publisher=[[BBC News]]|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4616043.stm |access-date=11 June 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190223024224/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4616043.stm |archive-date=23 February 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref> of the President and the entire Legislature as well as through elections to ratify amendments to the ROC constitution. Also, Chapter I, Article 2 of the ROC constitution states that "The sovereignty of the Republic of China shall reside in the whole body of citizens." This suggests that the constitution implicitly admits that the sovereignty of the ROC is limited to the areas that it controls, even if there is no constitutional amendment that explicitly spells out the ROC's borders.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

[[File:Taiwan the Province Government Building.JPG|thumb|The building of the Provincial Government of the Taiwan Province of the Republic of China at Jhongsing Village]]
[[File:Presidential Office Taipei.jpg|thumb|The Republic of China Presidential Office Building is located in the Zhongzheng District of [[Taipei]].]]

In 1999, ROC President Lee Teng-hui proposed a [[Special state-to-state relations|two-state theory]] (兩國論) in which both the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China would acknowledge that they are two separate countries with a special diplomatic, cultural, and historic relationship.<ref name=2states_1>{{cite news | first=Sanya | last=Bunnag | title=Understanding Taiwan's tactics | date=20 July 1999 | publisher=[[BBC News]]| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/399381.stm | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040521081721/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/399381.stm | archive-date=21 May 2004 | url-status=live }}</ref><ref name = 2000vote>{{cite journal | author=Willem van Kemenade | title=Taiwan, Voting for Trouble? | journal=The Washington Quarterly | year=2000 | volume=23 | issue=2 | pages=135–151 | url=http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v023/23.2kemenade.html | doi=10.1162/016366000560809 | s2cid=219627253 | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-date=11 April 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230411110902/https://muse.jhu.edu/article/36529 | url-status=live | url-access=subscription }}</ref> This, however, drew an angry reaction from the PRC who believed that Lee was covertly supporting Taiwan independence.<ref name=2states_2>{{cite news | title=Beijing media ups the ante | date=20 July 1999 | publisher=[[BBC News]]| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/399350.stm | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090930011047/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/399350.stm | archive-date=30 September 2009 | url-status=live }}</ref>

President [[Chen Shui-bian]] (2000&nbsp;– May 2008) fully supported the idea that the "Republic of China is an independent, sovereign country" but held the view that the Republic of China is Taiwan and Taiwan does not belong to the People's Republic of China. This is suggested in his [[Four-stage Theory of the Republic of China]]. Due to the necessity of avoiding war with the PRC, however, President Chen had refrained from formally declaring Taiwan's independence. Government publications have implied that Taiwan refers to the ROC, and "China" refers to the PRC.<ref name=mac /> After becoming chairman of the [[Democratic Progressive Party]] in July 2002, Chen appeared to move further than Lee's special two-state theory and in early August 2002, by putting forward the "[[one country on each side]]" concept, he stated that Taiwan may "go on its own Taiwanese road" and that "it is clear that the two sides of the straits are separate countries." These statements essentially eliminate any "special" factors in the relations and were strongly criticized by opposition parties in Taiwan. President Chen has repeatedly refused to endorse the [[One China policy|One China Principle]] or the more "flexible" [[1992 Consensus]] the PRC demands as a precursor to negotiations with the PRC. During Chen's presidency, there had not been any successful attempts to restart negotiations on a semi-official level.

In the 2008 ROC elections, the people delivered KMT's [[Ma Ying-jeou]] with an election win as well as a sizable majority in the legislature. President Ma, throughout his election campaign, maintained that he would accept the 1992 consensus and promote better relations with the PRC. In respect of Taiwan's political status, his policy was 1. he would not negotiate with the PRC on the subject of unification during his term; 2. he would never declare Taiwan's independence; and 3. he would not provoke the PRC into attacking Taiwan. He officially accepted the 1992 Consensus in his inauguration speech, which resulted in direct semi-official talks with the PRC, and this later led to the commencement of weekend direct charter flights between mainland China and Taiwan. President Ma also interprets the cross-strait relations as "[[special non-state-to-state relations|special]]", "but not that between two nations".<ref name="chinapost.com.tw">{{cite news|title=Taiwan and China in 'special relations': Ma|newspaper=The China Post|date=4 September 2008|url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm|access-date=6 September 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080906092524/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm|archive-date=6 September 2008|url-status=live}}</ref> He later stated that mainland China is part of the territory of the Republic of China, and laws relating to international relations are not applicable to the relations between mainland China and Taiwan, as they are parts of a state.<ref name="taipeitimes.com">{{cite news |last=Ko |first=Shu-Ling |title=Ma refers to China as ROC territory in magazine interview |newspaper=Taipei Times |date=8 October 2008 |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320 |access-date=8 October 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090603213128/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320 |archive-date=3 June 2009 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |script-title=zh:馬總統：兩岸關係是現實關係 |trans-title=President Ma: Cross-strait relations are relations based on current reality |publisher=Central News Agency of the Republic of China |date=8 October 2008 |url=http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4?_section=3&_recNo=2 |language=zh |access-date=8 October 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171130073559/http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/prez/shownews.php4?_section=3&_recNo=2 |archive-date=30 November 2017 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=王寓中 |script-title=zh:馬：大陸是中華民國領土 |trans-title=Ma: the mainland is the territory of the Republic of China |work=Liberty Times|date=8 October 2008 |url=http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/oct/8/today-fo3.htm |language=zh |access-date=8 October 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081010072015/http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/oct/8/today-fo3.htm |archive-date=10 October 2008 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2016, [[Tsai Ing-Wen]] of the DPP won a landslide victory in the presidential election and was later re-elected for the second term in 2020. She refused to agree that Taiwan is part of China and also rejected the [[one country, two systems]] model proposed by the PRC. Instead, she said that "Republic of China, Taiwan" already is an independent country and that Beijing must "face reality".<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/tsai-ing-wen-says-china-must-face-reality-of-taiwans-independence |title=Tsai Ing-wen says China must 'face reality' of Taiwan's independence |website=[[TheGuardian.com]] |date=15 January 2020 |access-date=4 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200203232346/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/tsai-ing-wen-says-china-must-face-reality-of-taiwans-independence |archive-date=3 February 2020 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Other countries and international organizations ===
{{See also|Foreign relations of Taiwan|Taiwan and the United Nations}}
[[File:Voting res 2758.svg|thumb|600px|Voting situation in the [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758|UN general assembly respect to resolution 2758]] (1971)
{{legend|limegreen|Vote in favor}}
{{legend|red|Vote against}}
{{legend|blue|Non-Voting}}
{{legend|yellow|Abstention}}
{{legend|silver|Non-UN-members or dependencies}}
]]

Because of [[Anti-communism|anti-communist]] sentiment at the start of the [[Cold War]], the Republic of China was initially recognized as the sole legitimate government of China by the United Nations and most Western nations. On 9 January 1950, the Israeli government extended recognition to the People's Republic of China. [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 505]], passed on 1 February 1952, considered the CCP to be rebels against the Republic of China. 

However, the 1970s saw a switch in diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. On 25 October 1971, Resolution 2758 was passed by the [[UN General Assembly]], which "decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it." Multiple attempts by the Republic of China to rejoin the UN, no longer to represent all of China but just the people of the territories it governs, have not made it past committee, largely due to diplomatic maneuvering by the PRC, which claims Resolution 2758 has settled the matter.{{NoteTag|See: [[China and the United Nations]]}}

The PRC refuses to maintain diplomatic relations with any nation that recognizes the ROC,<ref name = prc_wp /> but does not object to nations conducting economic, cultural, and other such exchanges with Taiwan that do not imply diplomatic relations. Therefore, multiple nations that have diplomatic relations with Beijing maintain quasi-diplomatic offices in Taipei. Similarly, the government in Taiwan maintains quasi-diplomatic offices in most nations under various names, most commonly as the [[Taipei Economic and Cultural Office]].

[[File:U.S. President Eisenhower visited TAIWAN 美國總統艾森豪於1960年6月訪問臺灣台北時與蔣中正總統-2.jpg|275px|right|thumb|With President Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] waved hands to Taiwanese people during his visit to [[Taipei]], [[Taiwan]] in June 1960.]]
The United States of America is [[Taiwan–United States relations|one of the main allies]] of Taiwan and since the [[Taiwan Relations Act]] passed in 1979, the United States has sold arms and provided military training to Taiwan's [[Republic of China Armed Forces]].<ref name="TRA-review">{{cite web|url=http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1272.cfm|title=The Taiwan Relations Act After 20 Years: Keys to Past and Future Success|last=Yates|first=Stephen J.|date=16 April 1999|publisher=The Heritage Foundation|access-date=19 July 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090722095740/http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1272.cfm|archive-date=22 July 2009|url-status=unfit}}</ref> This situation continues to be a point of contention for the People's Republic of China, which considers US involvement disruptive to the stability of the region. In January 2010, the Obama administration announced its intention to sell $6.4&nbsp;billion worth of military hardware to Taiwan. As a consequence, China threatened the United States with economic sanctions and warned that their cooperation on international and regional issues could suffer.<ref>{{Cite news |title=China: US spat over Taiwan could hit co-operation |date=2 February 2010 |publisher=Agence France Presse |url=http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jDzKLVZ7X2dz8yrsshklcJZh38Cg |access-date=28 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100206214100/http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jDzKLVZ7X2dz8yrsshklcJZh38Cg |archive-date=6 February 2010 |url-status=dead }}</ref> The official position of the United States is that China is expected to "use no force or threat[en] to use force against Taiwan" and that Taiwan is to "exercise prudence in managing all aspects of [[Cross-Strait relations]]." Both are to refrain from performing actions or espousing statements "that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status."<ref name="UsPolicyToTaiwan">{{cite press release |publisher=US Department of State |date=21 April 2004 |title=Overview of US Policy Towards Taiwan |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm |access-date=22 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014064318/https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm |archive-date=14 October 2019 |url-status=dead }}</ref> The United States maintains the [[American Institute in Taiwan]].

The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, India, Pakistan, and Canada have in some form adopted the One China policy, under which the People's Republic of China is theoretically the sole legitimate government of China. However, the United States and Japan ''acknowledge'' rather than ''recognize'' the PRC position that Taiwan is part of China. In the case of the United Kingdom and Canada,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.canada.org.tw/taiwan/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/fs-taiwan-fd.aspx?view=d|title=Fact Sheet|publisher=[[Canadian Trade Office in Taipei]]|access-date=6 October 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141007025718/http://www.canada.org.tw/taiwan/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/fs-taiwan-fd.aspx?view=d|archive-date=7 October 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref> bilateral written agreements state that the two respective parties ''take note'' of Beijing's position but do not use the word ''support''. The UK government's position that "the future of Taiwan be decided peacefully by the peoples of both sides of the Strait" has been stated several times. Despite the PRC's claim that the United States opposes Taiwanese independence, the United States takes advantage of the subtle difference between "oppose" and "does not support". In fact, a substantial majority of the statements Washington has made say that it "does not support Taiwan independence" instead of saying that it "opposes" independence. Thus, the US currently{{clarify timeframe|date=December 2021}} does not take a position on the political outcome, except for one explicit condition that there be a peaceful resolution to the differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.<ref name= UsPolicyToTaiwan /> The United States bi-partisan position is that it does not ''recognize'' the PRC's claim over Taiwan, and considers Taiwan's status as unsettled.<ref>{{cite web | title=U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues | author1=Shirley A. Kan | author2=Wayne M. Morrison | page=4 | url=http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | date=4 January 2013 | publisher=Congressional Research Service | access-date=21 June 2013 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161211221234/http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202880.pdf | archive-date=11 December 2016 | url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:Pope johnpaul funeral politics.jpeg|thumb|President [[Chen Shui-bian]] (''far left'') attended the [[funeral of Pope John Paul II]] in 2005. As the Holy See's recognized head of state of China, Chen was seated in the front row (in French alphabetical order) beside the first lady and president of Brazil.]]
The ROC maintains formal diplomatic relations with {{Numrec|ROC||UN member states}}, mostly in Central America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Oceania. Additionally, the [[Holy See]] also recognizes the ROC, a largely non-Christian/[[Catholic]] state, due partly to the Catholic Church's traditional opposition to communism and also to protest what it sees as the PRC's [[Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association|suppression of the Catholic faith]] in mainland China. However, [[Vatican City|Vatican]] diplomats were engaged in talks with PRC politicians at the time of Pope [[John Paul II]]'s death, with a view towards improving relations between the two countries. When asked, one Vatican diplomat suggested that relations with Taiwan might prove "expendable" should PRC be willing to engage in positive diplomatic relations with the Holy See.<ref>{{cite news |first=Richard |last=Spencer |title=Vatican ready to sacrifice Taiwan for China |date=16 May 2005 |newspaper=[[The Daily Telegraph|The Telegraph]]|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/05/16/wvati16.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/05/16/ixworld.html |location=London |access-date=23 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071017154111/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2005%2F05%2F16%2Fwvati16.xml&sSheet=%2Fnews%2F2005%2F05%2F16%2Fixworld.html |archive-date=17 October 2007 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Under [[Pope Benedict XVI]], the Vatican and PRC have shown greater interest in establishing ties, including the appointment of pro-Vatican bishops and the Pope canceling a planned visit from the [[14th Dalai Lama]].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119810469258140621.html?mod=googlenews_wsj|title=The Vatican's Cold Shoulder|newspaper=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|date=20 December 2007|access-date=14 January 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120525173249/http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119810469258140621.html?mod=googlenews_wsj|archive-date=25 May 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>

During the 1990s, there was a diplomatic tug-of-war in which the PRC and ROC attempted to outbid each other to obtain the diplomatic support of small nations. This struggle seems to have slowed as a result of the PRC's growing economic power and doubts in Taiwan as to whether this aid was actually in the Republic of China's interest. In March 2004, [[Dominica]] switched recognition to the PRC in exchange for a large aid package.<ref>{{cite news | first=James | last=Painter | title=Taiwan's 'Caribbean headache' | date=30 March 2004 | publisher=[[BBC News]]| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3583733.stm | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025021735/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3583733.stm | archive-date=25 October 2007 | url-status=live }}</ref> However, in late 2004, [[Vanuatu]] briefly switched recognition from Beijing to Taipei,<ref>{{cite news | first=Fred | last=Vurobaravu | title=Parliament debates Vanuatu-Taiwan deal | date=24 November 2004 | newspaper=Vanuatu Daily Post | url=http://www.news.vu/en/news/diplomacy/041124-parliament-debates-vanuato-taiwan.shtml | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071017152234/http://news.vu/en/news/diplomacy/041124-parliament-debates-vanuato-taiwan.shtml | archive-date=17 October 2007 | url-status=dead }}</ref> followed by a return to its recognition of Beijing.<ref>{{cite news | title=Vanuatu gov. reshuffled after Taiwan controversy | date=11 December 2004 | publisher=[[China Radio International]] | url=http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/11/content_399473.htm | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060902225753/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/11/content_399473.htm | archive-date=2 September 2006 | url-status=live }}</ref> On 20 January 2005, [[Grenada]] switched its recognition from Taipei to Beijing, in return for millions in aid (US$1,500 for every Grenadian).<ref>{{cite news | title= Grenada picks China over Taiwan | date= 21 January 2005 | publisher=[[BBC News]]| url= http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia%2Dpacific/4190295.stm | access-date= 11 June 2006 | archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20060312132416/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4190295.stm | archive-date= 12 March 2006 | url-status= live }}</ref> However, on 14 May 2005, [[Nauru]] announced the restoration of formal diplomatic relations with Taipei after a three-year hiatus, during which it briefly recognized the People's Republic of China.<ref>{{cite news |last=Su |first=Joy |title=Nauru Switches its Allegiance Back to Taiwan from China |date=15 May 2005 |newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/05/15/2003254718 |access-date=30 April 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121002225907/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/05/15/2003254718 |archive-date=2 October 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 26 October 2005, [[Senegal]] broke off relations with the Republic of China and established diplomatic contacts with Beijing.<ref>{{cite news | title=Senegal picks China over Taiwan | date=26 October 2005 | publisher=[[BBC News]]| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4377818.stm | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060218094916/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4377818.stm | archive-date=18 February 2006 | url-status=live }}</ref> The following year, on 5 August 2006, Taipei ended relations with [[Chad]] when Chad established relations with Beijing.<ref>{{cite news| title=Taiwan Breaks Off Relations With Chad| url=http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-08-05-voa36.cfm| date=5 August 2006| publisher=[[Voice of America]]| access-date=6 August 2006| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060815041420/http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-08-05-voa36.cfm| archive-date=15 August 2006| url-status=dead}}</ref> On 26 April 2007, however, [[Saint Lucia]], which had previously severed ties with the Republic of China following a change of government in December 1996, announced the restoration of formal diplomatic relations with Taipei.<ref>{{cite news| title=Taiwan re-establishes diplomatic relations with St. Lucia| url=http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/01/asia/AS-GEN-Taiwan-China-St.-Lucia.php| date=30 August 2007| newspaper=International Herald Tribune| access-date=1 May 2007| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071017175419/http://iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/01/asia/AS-GEN-Taiwan-China-St.-Lucia.php| archive-date=17 October 2007| url-status=live}}</ref> On 7 June 2007, [[Costa Rica]] broke off diplomatic ties with the Republic of China in favour of the People's Republic of China.<ref name=BBCCostaRica>{{cite news| title=Taiwan loses Costa Rica's support| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6729035.stm| date=7 June 2007| work=[[BBC News]]News| access-date=7 June 2007| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070613052729/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6729035.stm| archive-date=13 June 2007| url-status=live}}</ref> In January 2008, Malawi's foreign minister reported Malawi decided to cut diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China and recognize the People's Republic of China.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/14/AR2008011400533.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120407153128/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/14/AR2008011400533.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=7 April 2012|title=Malawi Drops Ties With Taiwan for China|agency=Associated Press|date=14 January 2008|access-date=14 January 2008 | first=Debby | last=Wu | newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref>

On 4 November 2013, the Government of the Gambia announced its break-up with Taiwan, but the Foreign Affairs Ministry of China denied any ties with this political movement, adding that they were not considering on building a relation with this African nation.<ref>{{cite news | title= Gambia breaks relations with surprised Taiwan; China says it wasn't in contact with government | date= 14 November 2013 | newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]| url= https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/gambia-breaks-relations-with-taiwan-in-diplomatic-setback-for-taipei/2013/11/14/c49436f4-4d94-11e3-97f6-ed8e3053083b_story.html | access-date= 8 September 2017 | archive-date= 15 November 2013 | archive-url= https://archive.today/20131115170346/http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/gambia-breaks-relations-with-taiwan-in-diplomatic-setback-for-taipei/2013/11/14/c49436f4-4d94-11e3-97f6-ed8e3053083b_story.html | url-status= dead }}</ref> After the [[2016 Taiwanese presidential election]], China announced in March that it had resumed diplomatic relations with Gambia.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/asia/china-gambia-taiwan-diplomatic-relations.html|title=China Resumes Diplomatic Relations With Gambia, Shutting Out Taiwan|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=18 March 2016|access-date=18 June 2023|archive-date=6 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406224902/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/world/asia/china-gambia-taiwan-diplomatic-relations.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The latest countries to break off formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan were [[Burkina Faso]] on 24 May 2018,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/taiwan-loses-second-ally-in-a-month-amid-china-pressure-10274736|title=Taiwan loses second ally in a month amid China pressure|date=24 May 2018|website=Channel NewsAsia|language=en|access-date=28 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190217034036/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/taiwan-loses-second-ally-in-a-month-amid-china-pressure-10274736|archive-date=17 February 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> [[El Salvador]] on 21 August 2018,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Horton |first=Chris |date=2018-08-21 |title=El Salvador Recognizes China in Blow to Taiwan |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/world/asia/taiwan-el-salvador-diplomatic-ties.html |access-date=2023-03-16 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=11 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220311143610/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/world/asia/taiwan-el-salvador-diplomatic-ties.html |url-status=live }}</ref> the [[Solomon Islands]] and [[Kiribati]] in September 2019,<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/20/taiwan-loses-second-ally-in-a-week-as-kiribati-switches-to-china |title=Taiwan loses second ally in a week as Kiribati switches to China |last=Lyons |first=Kate |website=[[The Guardian]]|date=20 September 2019 |language=en |access-date=19 August 2020 |archive-date=30 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200830155148/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/20/taiwan-loses-second-ally-in-a-week-as-kiribati-switches-to-china |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Nicaragua]] on 9 December 2021,<ref>{{cite tweet|number=1469073070048563202|user=KawsachunNews|title=BREAKING: Nicaragua breaks diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognizes only one China: the People's Republic of China|date=9 December 2021}}</ref> [[Honduras]] on 26 March 2023,<ref>{{cite news |title=Honduras cuts ties with Taiwan, opens relations with China |date=26 Mar 2023 |newspaper=[[Al Jazeera Arabic|Al Jazeera]] |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/26/honduras-cuts-diplomatic-ties-with-taiwan |access-date=18 June 2023 |url-status=live |archive-date=26 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326022309/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/26/honduras-cuts-diplomatic-ties-with-taiwan }}</ref> and [[Nauru]] on 15 January 2024.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Davidson |first1=Helen |last2=Hawkins |first2=Amy |date=2024-01-15 |title=Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of China |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/15/nauru-to-sever-diplomatic-ties-with-taiwan-in-favour-of-china |access-date=2024-01-15 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

As of at least 2024, the trend in [[East Asia|East Asian]] governments is not to generally discuss the issue of Taiwan's political status.<ref name=":Ma&Kang">{{Cite book |last1=Ma |first1=Xinru |title=Beyond Power Transitions: The Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of U.S.-China Relations |last2=Kang |first2=David C. |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-55597-5 |series=Columbia Studies in International Order and Politics |location=New York}}</ref>{{Rp|page=183}} Academics Xinru Ma and David C. Kang write that when East Asian countries do, "it is often to caution the United States from getting too far ahead of where even the Taiwanese themselves are."<ref name=":Ma&Kang" />{{Rp|page=183}}

==== International organizations ====
Under continuing pressure from the PRC to bar any representation of the ROC that may imply statehood, international organizations have adopted different policies toward the issue of ROC's participation. In cases where almost all UN members or sovereign states participate, such as the [[World Health Organization]],<ref>{{cite news |last=Klapper |first=Bradley |date=23 May 2006 |title=Taiwan fails in 10th bid for WHO observer status |url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/i_latestdetail.asp?id=38428 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060630173746/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/i_latestdetail.asp?id=38428 |archive-date=30 June 2006 |access-date=11 June 2006 |agency=Associated Press}}</ref> the ROC has been shut out. In others, it participates under other names, including [[Chinese Taipei]] (in the [[International Olympic Committee]] or [[APEC]]) and the "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kimmen and Matsu" (in the [[World Trade Organization]], and often also shortened as "Chinese Taipei"). After nine years of negotiations, members of the WTO completed the conditions on which to allow Taiwan admittance into the multilateral trade organization. At the end of 2011, Jeffery Bader, Assistant United States Trade Representative for China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, led and finalized the final stages of Taiwan's accession to the WTO, which were approved by trade ministers in November in Doha, Qatar. The [[ISO 3166]] directory of names of countries and territories registers Taiwan (TW) separately from and in addition to the People's Republic of China (CN), but lists Taiwan as "Taiwan, Province of China" based on the name used by the UN under PRC pressure. In [[ISO 3166-2:CN]], Taiwan is also coded CN-71 under China, thus making Taiwan part of China in [[ISO 3166-1]] and [[ISO 3166-2]] categories.

Naming issues surrounding Taiwan/ROC continue to be a contentious issue in non-governmental organizations such as the [[Lions Club]], which faced considerable controversy naming its Taiwanese branch.<ref>{{cite news |last=Yeh |first=Lindy |date=12 July 2002 |title=Taiwan's Lions Club gets another temporary name |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/07/12/147941 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060823223211/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/07/12/147941 |archive-date=23 August 2006 |access-date=11 June 2006 |newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] |page=3}}</ref>

==== Relations with the ROC and position on Taiwan ====
{{As of|2024|1|15}}, the countries who maintain formal diplomatic relations with the ROC are:
{| class="wikitable sortable"
!#
!Country
!Date
|-
|1
|{{flag|Guatemala}}
|{{dts|15 June 1933}}<ref>{{cite web |title=Relaciones Diplomáticas de Guatemala |url=https://www.minex.gob.gt/DirectorioPaisesRelacion.aspx |access-date=24 July 2021 |language=es}}</ref>
|-
|—
|{{flag|Holy See}}
|{{dts|23 October 1942}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Diplomatic relations of the Holy See |url=https://holyseemission.org/contents/mission/diplomatic-relations-of-the-holy-see.php |access-date=5 September 2022}}</ref>
|-
|2
|{{flag|Haiti}}
|{{dts|25 April 1956}}<ref name="taiwantoday.tw">{{Cite web |title=Taiwan, Haiti celebrate 65 years of diplomatic relations |url=https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=198803 |access-date=16 April 2023 |website=Taiwan Today| date=26 April 2021 }}</ref>
|-
|3
|{{flag|Paraguay}}
|{{dts|8 July 1957}}<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 May 2019 |title=Paraguay y Taiwán: Historia de sus relaciones |language=es |url=https://www.ultimahora.com/paraguay-y-taiwan-historia-sus-relaciones-n2820178 |access-date=15 July 2023}}</ref>
|-
|4
|{{flag|Eswatini}}{{ref|i|1}}
|{{dts|16 September 1968}}<ref>{{Cite web |date=20 September 2018 |title=R.O.C. (Taiwan) Ambassador reiterates robust friendship and cooperation between Taiwan and Eswatini |url=https://www.taiwanembassy.org/sz_en/post/2914.html |access-date=20 October 2023 |website=Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the Kingdom of Eswatini}}</ref>
|-
|5
|{{flag|Tuvalu}}
|{{dts|19 September 1979}}<ref>{{Cite web |date=30 November 2021 |title=A Special Relationship |url=https://www.fightfortuvalu.com/posts/a-special-relationship |access-date=12 July 2022 |archive-date=12 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220712131504/https://www.fightfortuvalu.com/posts/a-special-relationship |url-status=dead }}</ref>
|-
|6
|{{flag|Saint Vincent and the Grenadines}}
|{{dts|15 April 1981}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Diplomatic and Consular List |url=https://foreign.gov.vc/foreign/images/stories/DiplomaticRelations/Updated_Diplomatic_List_Revised-as_at_February_2020_1_1.pdf |access-date=11 July 2023 |pages=104–112}}</ref>
|-
|7
|{{flag|Saint Kitts and Nevis}}
|{{dts|23 September 1983}}<ref>{{cite web |title=Diplomatic Relations |url=https://www.foreign.gov.kn/2906-2/ |access-date=1 April 2021 |publisher=Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saint Kitts and Nevis}}</ref>
|-
|8
|{{flag|Saint Lucia}}{{ref|i|2}}
|{{dts|13 January 1984}}<ref>{{Cite book |title=Latin America Report |publisher=[Executive Office of the President], Federal Broadcast Information Service, Joint Publications Research Service |year=1984 |volume=29 |issue=84 |pages=108}}</ref>
|-
|9
|{{flag|Belize}}
|{{dts|11 October 1989}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Diplomatic Relations |url=http://www.mfa.gov.bz/images/documents/DIPLOMATIC%20RELATIONS.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171230194831/http://www.mfa.gov.bz/images/documents/DIPLOMATIC%20RELATIONS.pdf |archive-date=30 December 2017 |access-date=30 December 2016}}</ref>
|-
|10
|{{flag|Marshall Islands}}
|{{dts|20 November 1998}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Listing of All Countries Which Have Established Diplomatic Relations With the Republic of the Marshall Islands (As of 13 February 2019) |url=https://www.rmiembassyus.org/about-2 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230718175857/https://www.rmiembassyus.org/about-2 |archive-date=18 July 2023 |access-date=3 September 2023}}</ref>
|-
|11
|{{flag|Palau}}
|{{dts|29 December 1999}}<ref>{{cite web |title=Countries with which Palau has Diplomatic Relations |url=https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/oia/islands/upload/PalauDipRelations.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160317135821/https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/oia/islands/upload/PalauDipRelations.pdf |archive-date=17 March 2016 |access-date=4 April 2022 |publisher=U.S. Department of the Interior}}</ref>
|}
: 1.{{note|i}} Until 2018 called Swaziland.
: 2.{{note|i}} Established relations with the PRC on 8 September 1997,<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/pr1997/saint_lucia_establishes_diplomatic_relations_with_china.htm |title=Saint Lucia Establishes Diplomatic Relations with China |website=stlucia.gov.lc |access-date=22 January 2025}}</ref> but restored ties with the ROC on 26 April 2007.<ref>{{Cite web |date=4 May 2007 |title=Saint Lucia set to rejoin ROC allies |url=https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=10,23,45,10&post=14468 |website=Taiwan Today |access-date=15 February 2024}}</ref>

The following countries have unofficial economic and cultural relations with the ROC: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China (including Hong Kong and Macau), Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Somaliland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States (including Guam), and Vietnam.{{cn|date=October 2024}}

As of January 2023, fifty-one countries recognise Taiwan as a part of China: Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, France, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, the Maldives, Moldova, Montenegro, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Uganda, and Vietnam. Other countries have not committed to or have not made public statements indicating a position on the question.<ref>{{cite web |title=The Many 'One China's': Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/the-many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china?lang=en |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |language=en}}</ref>

== Legal arguments ==

The proclamation of Taiwan [[Retrocession Day]] on 25 October 1945 by the ROC (when the PRC had not yet been founded) was entirely uncontested. Had another party been sovereign over Taiwan, that party would have had a period of years in which to protest, and its failure to do so represents cession of rights in the manner of [[custom (law)|prescription]]. The lack of protest by any non-Chinese government persists to this day, further strengthening this argument.<ref>{{Citation
|last = Phillips
|first = Claude
|author-link = Claude S. Phillips
|title = The International Legal Status of Formosa
|journal = Political Research Quarterly
|volume = 10
|issue = 2
|pages = 276–289
|publisher = Sage Publications
|year = 1957
|doi = 10.1177/106591295701000203
|hdl = 2027.42/68790
|s2cid = 154997093
|access-date = 2009-06-12
|url = https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68790/2/10.1177_106591295701000203.pdf
|hdl-access = free
|archive-date = 10 April 2023
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230410211620/https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/68790/10.1177_106591295701000203.pdf;jsessionid=64F090427DFBA49182D5285DE100C881?sequence=2
|url-status = live
}}</ref>

Even if the San Francisco Peace Treaty were determinative, it should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Potsdam and Cairo Declarations. Therefore, sovereignty would still have been transferred to China.<ref>{{Citation
|last= Charney |first= Jonathan
|author-link = Jonathan I. Charney
|author2= J.R.V. Prescott
|title = Resolving Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan
|journal = The American Journal of International Law
|volume= 94 |issue= 3 |pages= 453–477
|publisher = American Society of International Law
|date = July 2000
|url = http://www.asil.org/ajil/chinatai.htm
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20040622182920/http://www.asil.org/ajil/chinatai.htm
|archive-date=2004-06-22 |access-date=2011-02-01
|doi = 10.2307/2555319 |jstor= 2555319
|s2cid= 144402230
|url-access= subscription
}}</ref>

Applying the principle of ''[[uti possidetis]]'' with regard to the Treaty of Taipei would grant Taiwan's sovereignty to the ROC, as it is undisputed that at the coming into force of the treaty, the ROC controlled Taiwan.<ref>{{Citation
|url=http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/NS/093/NS-C-093-187.htm
|date=22 November 2004
|title=Is sovereignty over Taiwan undecided?
|publisher=National Policy Foundation
|last=Hung
|first=Joe
|access-date=2007-10-06
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927005505/http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/NS/093/NS-C-093-187.htm
|archive-date=27 September 2007
|url-status=dead
}}</ref>

Taiwan was ''terra derelicta'' and, after 1951, became Chinese territory through appropriation. According to barrister [[D. P. O'Connell]], this theory of acquisition by occupation is more inherently consistent than several other theories on Taiwan's status.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=O’Connell |first=D. P. |date=April 1956 |title=The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem |journal=[[American Journal of International Law]] |language=en |volume=50 |issue=2 |pages=405–416 |doi=10.2307/2194957 |issn=0002-9300 |jstor=2194957}}</ref>

The San Francisco Peace Treaty's omission of "[[Two Chinas|China]]" as a participant was not an accident of history, but reflected the status that the Republic of China had failed to maintain its original position as the ''[[de jure]]''{{Which|date=October 2010}} and ''[[de facto]]'' government of the "whole China". By fleeing to Taiwan island in December 1949, the ROC government has then arguably become a [[government in exile]].<ref>{{Cite news|title=Tsai blasted for R.O.C. legitimacy remark|url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/05/27/258201/Tsai-blasted.htm|newspaper=China Post|date=27 May 2010|access-date=12 June 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100530025941/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/05/27/258201/Tsai-blasted.htm|archive-date=30 May 2010|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="PeaseTreaty">{{Cite news|last=Ko|first=Shu-ling|title=Treaty confirmed sovereignty: Ma|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/04/29/2003442293|access-date=14 June 2010|newspaper=Taipei Times|date=29 April 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090603162231/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/04/29/2003442293|archive-date=3 June 2009|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Henckaerts1996">{{cite book |last=Chiu |first=H. |chapter=The International Legal Status of Taiwan |editor-last=Henckaerts |editor-first=J. |title=The international status of Taiwan in the new world order: legal and political considerations |year=1996 |publisher=Kluwer Law International |isbn=9789041109293 |oclc=38016893 |pages=7–8 |quote = In any case, there appears to be strong legal ground to support the view that since the entry into force of the 1952 ROC-Japan bilateral peace treaty, Taiwan has become the ''de jure'' territory of the ROC. This interpretation of the legal status of Taiwan is confirmed by several Japanese court decisions. For instance, in the case of ''Japan v. Lai Chin Jung'', decided by the Tokyo High Court on December 24, 1956, it was stated that 'Formosa and the Pescadores came to belong to the Republic of China, at any rate on August 5, 1952, when the [Peace] Treaty between Japan and the Republic of China came into force...'...the principles of prescription and occupation that may justify the ROC's claim to Taiwan certainly are not applicable to the PRC because the application of these two principles to the Taiwan situation presupposes the validity of the two peace treaties by which Japan renounce its claim to Taiwan and thus makes the island ''terra nullius''.}}</ref>

=== Other viewpoints ===

{{Original research|section|date=May 2009}}
{{Self-published|section|date=October 2023}}
{{more citations needed|section|date=October 2023}}

==== Chinese sovereignty ====

'''Arguments common to both the PRC and the ROC'''

The ROC and PRC both officially support the One China policy and thus share common arguments. In the arguments below, "Chinese" is an ambiguous term that could mean the PRC and/or ROC as legal government(s) of China.

# The waging of aggressive war by Japan against China in 1937 and beyond violates the peace that was brokered in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In 1941, with the declaration of war against Japan, the Chinese government declared this treaty void ''ab initio'' (never happened in the first place). Therefore, some{{Who|date=April 2025}} argue that, with no valid transfer of sovereignty taking place, the sovereignty of Taiwan naturally belongs to China.<ref>{{cite web |title=The True Legal Status of Taiwan |url=http://www.taiwanbasic.com/un/truelegal.htm |publisher=Taiwan Civil Government |website=taiwanbasic.com |access-date=22 May 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140522070049/http://www.taiwanbasic.com/un/truelegal.htm |archive-date=22 May 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
# The Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 was accepted by Japan in its surrender. This document states that Taiwan was to be restored to the Republic of China at the end of World War II. Likewise, the [[Potsdam Declaration]] of 26 July 1945, also accepted by Japan, implies that it will no longer have sovereignty over Taiwan by stating that "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands".
# The exclusion of Chinese governments (both ROC and PRC) in the negotiation process of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT) nullified any legally binding power of the SFPT on China, including any act of renouncing or disposing of sovereignty. In addition, the fact that neither ROC nor PRC government ever ratified SFPT terms prescribes that the SFPT is irrelevant to any discussion of Chinese sovereignty.
# SFPT's validity has come into question as some of the countries participating in the San Francisco conference, such as the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and North and South Korea, refused to sign the treaty.<ref name="The Strait Journal">{{Citation |script-title=zh:兩岸關係與台灣主權 |trans-title=Cross-strait relations and Taiwan's sovereignty |language=zh-tw |url= http://www.haixiainfo.com.tw/FF/214-7301.html |archive-url= https://archive.today/20130419133235/http://www.haixiainfo.com.tw/FF/214-7301.html |url-status= dead |archive-date= 2013-04-19 |publisher= The Strait Journal |date= October 2008 |author8= 李壽林 (Lee, Shou-lin) }}</ref>
# Assuming SFPT is valid in determining the sovereignty over Taiwan, Japan, in article 2 of the SFPT, renounced all rights, without assigning a recipient, regarding Taiwan. Japan, in the same article, also renounced, without assigning a recipient, areas that are now internationally recognized as territories of Russia as well as other countries. Given that the sovereignty of these countries over renounced areas is undisputed, the Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan must also be undisputed.<ref name="The Strait Journal"/>

'''ROC sovereignty'''

# The ROC fulfills all requirements for a state according to the [[Convention of Montevideo]], which means it has a territory, a people, and a government.
# The ROC continues to exist since its establishment in 1911, only on a reduced territory after 1949.
# The creation and continuity of a state is only a factual issue, not a legal question. Declarations and recognition by other states cannot have any impact on their existence. According to the declaratory theory of recognition, the recognition of third states is not a requirement for being a state. Most of the cited declarations by American or British politicians are not legal statements but solely political intents.
# The PRC has never exercised control over Taiwan.
# The Treaty of Taipei formalized the peace between Japan and the ROC. In it, Japan reaffirmed Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration and voided all treaties conducted between China and Japan (including the Treaty of Shimonoseki).
# Article 4 of the ROC Constitution clearly states that "The territory of the Republic of China" is defined "according to its existing national boundaries..." Taiwan was historically part of China and is, therefore, naturally included therein. Also, as Treaty of Shimonoseki is void ''ab initio'', China has never legally dispossessed of the sovereignty of the territory. There is, accordingly, no need to have a National Assembly resolution to include the territory.
# The [[Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty|ROC – USA Mutual Defense Treaty of 1955]] states that "the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan, and the Pescadores" and thus can be read as implicitly recognizing the ROC sovereignty over Taiwan. However, the treaty was terminated in 1980.

'''PRC sovereignty'''

# The PRC does not recognize the validity of any of the unequal treaties the Qing signed in the "century of humiliation," as it considers them all unjust and illegal, as is the position during [[transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong]] from the United Kingdom to the PRC. As such, the cession of Taiwan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki actually never took place in a ''de jure'' fashion. The PRC, as the successor to the Qing and ROC in that order, therefore inherited the sovereignty of Taiwan.
# The return of the sovereignty of Taiwan to the ROC was confirmed on 25 October 1945 on the basis of the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Proclamation, Japanese Instrument of Surrender, and the invalidity of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. According to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, the PRC became the successor government to the ROC in representing China, and as such, the PRC should hold the sovereignty of Taiwan.
# In the [[Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China]] to the end of the Treaty of Taipei, the document signifying the commencement of the PRC and Japan's formal relations, Japan in article 3 stated that it fully understands and respects the position of the Government of the People's Republic of China that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. Japan also firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, which says, "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out". The Cairo Declaration says, "All territories Japan has stolen from China, including Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China". The PRC argues that it is a successor state of the ROC and is therefore entitled to all of the ROC's holdings and benefits.<ref>{{Citation |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/tai_gang_ao/2005-10/24/content_3677774.htm |publisher=Xinhua News Agency |date=2008-05-08 |script-title=zh:有关台湾光复的国际法文件 |trans-title=Documents regarding the retrocession of Taiwan |language=zh |access-date=22 May 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151007195429/http://news.xinhuanet.com/tai_gang_ao/2005-10/24/content_3677774.htm |archive-date=7 October 2015 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

==== Taiwanese independence ====

'''Taiwan already is sovereign and independent'''
# The peace that was brokered in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was breached by the [[Boxer Rebellion]], which led to the conclusion of the Boxer Protocol of 1901 (Peace Agreement between the [[Historical powers|Great Powers]] and China),<ref>{{Citation
|url=http://www.china1900.info/ereignisse/boxerprotokoll.htm
|title=Boxer Protocol, Peking 7. September 1901; Peace Agreement between the Great Powers
|publisher=China um 1900; in Den Ugen Der Zeit
|access-date=2007-10-06
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080210014645/http://www.china1900.info/ereignisse/boxerprotokoll.htm
|archive-date=10 February 2008
|url-status=dead
}}</ref> and China, not by the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was a [[dispositive treaty]]. Therefore, it is not voidable or nullifiable (this doctrine being that treaties specifying particular actions which can be ''completed,'' once the action ''gets completed,'' ''cannot'' be voided or reversed without a new treaty specifically reversing that clause). Hence, the ''[[unequal treaty doctrine]]'' cannot be applied to this treaty. By way of comparison, as 200,000,000 Kuping [[tael]]s were not returned to China from Japan, and Korea had not become a Chinese-dependent country again, the cession in the treaty was executed and cannot be nullified. The disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores in this treaty was a legitimate cession by conquest, confirmed by treaty, and thus is not a theft, as described as "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese" in Cairo Declaration.
# It should also be noted that the Qing court exercised effective sovereignty over primarily the west coast of Taiwan only, and even then did not regard the area as an integral part of national Chinese territory.
# The "Cairo Declaration" was merely an unsigned press communiqué which does not carry a '''legal status''', while the Potsdam Proclamation and Instrument of Surrender are simply [[modus vivendi]] and [[armistice]] that function as temporary records and do not bear legally binding power to transfer sovereignty. Good faith of interpretation only takes place at the level of treaties.
# The "retrocession" proclaimed by ROC in 1945 was legally null and impossible since Taiwan was still ''de jure'' part of Japan before the post-war San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on 28 April 1952. Consequently, the announcement of the mass-naturalization of native Taiwanese persons as ROC citizens in January 1946 is unjust and void ''[[Ab initio]]''. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, the sovereignty of Taiwan naturally belonged to the Taiwanese people.
# Some of Taiwan independence supporters once used arguments not in favor of Chinese sovereignty to dispute to legitimacy of the Kuomintang-controlled government that ruled over Taiwan; they have dropped these arguments due to the democratization of Taiwan. This has allowed the more moderate supporters of independence to stress the [[popular sovereignty]] theory in order to accept the legitimacy of the ROC government in Taiwan; they hold that the island of Taiwan is ''already'' an independent state which is formally called the Republic of China. President [[Lai Ching-te]] and former President [[Chen Shui-bian]] (both members of the moderate pro-independence [[Democratic Progressive Party]]) have supported this position, which is known in Taiwanese politics as [[Huadu (Taiwan)|''Huadu'']].
# Sovereignty transfer to the ROC by [[custom (law)|prescription]] does not apply to Taiwan's case since:
## Prescription is the manner of acquiring property by a long, honest, and uninterrupted possession or use during the time required by law. The possession must have been ''possessio longa, continua, et pacifica, nec sit ligitima interruptio'' (long, continued, peaceable, and without lawful interruption). For prescription to apply, the state with title to the territory must acquiesce to the action of the other state. Yet, PRC has never established an occupation on Taiwan and exercised sovereignty;
## Prescription as a rule for acquiring sovereignty itself is not universally accepted. The [[International Court of Justice]] ruled that Belgium retained its sovereignty over territories even by non-assertion of its rights and by acquiescence to acts of sovereign control alleged to have been exercised by the Netherlands over a period of 109 years;<ref>{{Citation
|url=http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=32&case=38&code=bnl&p3=4
|title=Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land 
|date=20 June 1959
|publisher=International Court of Justice
|access-date=2009-04-14
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140522070111/http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=32&case=38&code=bnl&p3=4
|archive-date=22 May 2014
|url-status=dead
}}</ref>
## Also by way of comparison, even after 38 years of continuous control, the international community did not recognize sovereignty rights to the [[Gaza Strip]] by Israel, and the Israeli cabinet formally declared an end to military rule there as of 12 September 2005, with a removal of all Israeli settlers and military bases from the Strip;
## A pro-independence group, which formed a ''Provisional Government of Formosa'' in 2000, argued that both the [[228 incident]] of 1947 and the Provisional Government of Formosa have constituted protests against ROC government's claim of retrocession within a reasonable twenty-five-year (or more) acquiescence period;<ref>{{Citation
|url=http://www.taiwannation.com.tw/cairo05.htm
|script-title=zh:中國國務院台辦新聞發佈會實錄
|language=zh
|publisher=taiwannation.com.tw
|access-date=2007-10-06
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140630225437/http://taiwannation.com.tw/cairo05.htm
|archive-date=30 June 2014
|url-status=live
}}</ref>
## Taiwanese residents were unable to make a protest after the [[228 incident]] due to the authoritarian rule under KMT regime which suppressed all pro-independence opinion; and
## Japan was not able to cast a protest as it was under [[military occupation]] at the time; however, it did not renounce its sovereignty over Taiwan until 28 April 1952.<ref>{{Citation
|url=http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sovereignty.htm
|title=Sovereignty
|publisher=Taiwan Documents Project
|access-date=2007-10-06
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061015124645/http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sovereignty.htm
|archive-date=15 October 2006
|url-status=live
}}</ref>

== Controversies and media coverage ==
Many political leaders who have maintained some form of the One-China Policy have committed slips of the tongue in referring to Taiwan as a country or as the Republic of China. United States presidents [[Ronald Reagan]] and [[George W. Bush]] have been known to have referred to Taiwan as a country during their terms of office. Although near the end of his term as U.S. Secretary of State, [[Colin Powell]] said that [[Taiwan]] is not a state, he referred to Taiwan as the Republic of China twice during a testimony to the [[U.S. Senate]] Foreign Relations Committee on 9 March 2001.<ref>{{cite news | title=US scrambles as Powell learns the art of 'diplospeak' | date=15 March 2001 | publisher=[[Agence France-Presse]] | url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2001/03/15/77594 | access-date=31 August 2005 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060208085907/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2001/03/15/77594 | archive-date=8 February 2006 | url-status=live }}</ref> In the People's Republic of China Premier [[Zhu Rongji]]'s farewell speech to the [[National People's Congress]], Zhu accidentally referred to Mainland China and Taiwan as two countries.<ref>{{cite news | page=3 | title=China and Taiwan 'two countries': Zhu | date=6 March 2003 | newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] | url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/03/06/196950 | access-date=31 August 2005 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051126211426/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/03/06/196950 | archive-date=26 November 2005 | url-status=live }}</ref> Zhu says in his speech at MIT University on April 15, 1999, "These raw materials and the components are mainly imported from Japan, [Korea], Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, while the value-added parts in China is very, very insignificant. That is to say, Chinese exports to the United States actually represent a transfer of the exports to the United States by the above-mentioned countries and the regions that I mentioned."<ref>"Transcript of Premier Zhu Rongji's speech at MIT", MIT News: On Campus and Around the World, April 15, 1999, Par. 20, Lines 1–4, news.mit.edu/1999/zhufull</ref> There are also those from the PRC who informally refer to Taiwan as a country.<ref>{{cite news | first=Caroline | last=Gluck | title=Taiwan struggles with Chinese dissidents | date=17 August 2005 | publisher=[[BBC News]]| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4153594.stm | access-date=31 August 2005 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051027043243/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4153594.stm | archive-date=27 October 2005 | url-status=live }}</ref> South Africa delegates once referred to Taiwan as the "Republic of Taiwan" during [[Lee Teng-hui]]'s term as President of the ROC.<ref>{{cite web | author=Su Tseng-chang |date=3 June 1994 |script-title=zh:大聲說出「台灣属於我們中國」| publisher = [[Democratic Progressive Party|DPP]] | url=http://www.dpp.org.tw/news/common/ProductDetail.asp?prd_id=3068 | access-date=16 July 2006 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060223132537/http://www.dpp.org.tw/news/common/ProductDetail.asp?prd_id=3068 <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date = 23 February 2006|author-link=Su Tseng-chang }}</ref> In 2002, [[Michael Bloomberg]], the mayor of New York City, referred to Taiwan as a country.<ref>{{cite news |title=NY mayor stands up for Taiwan |date=2 May 2002 |newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/05/02/134226 |access-date=17 July 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929130645/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/05/02/134226 |archive-date=29 September 2007 |url-status=live }}</ref> Most recently, former [[United States Secretary of Defense|U.S. Secretary of Defense]] [[Donald Rumsfeld]] stated in a local Chinese newspaper in California in July 2005 that Taiwan is "a sovereign nation". The People's Republic of China discovered the statement about three months after it was made.{{citation needed|date=January 2020}}

In a controversial speech on 4 February 2006, [[Minister for Foreign Affairs (Japan)|Japanese Foreign Minister]] [[Taro Aso]] called Taiwan a country with high education levels because of previous [[Taiwan under Japanese rule|Japanese colonial rule]] over the island.<ref>{{cite news | page=2 | title=Good schools due to Japan: Aso | date=6 February 2006 | newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] | url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/06/2003291777 | access-date=12 March 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060208035456/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/06/2003291777 | archive-date=8 February 2006 | url-status=live }}</ref> One month later, he told a Japanese parliamentary committee that "[Taiwan's] democracy is considerably matured and [[Liberal theory of economics|liberal economics]] is deeply ingrained, so it is a law-abiding country. In various ways, it is a country that shares a sense of values with Japan." At the same time, he admitted that "I know there will be a problem with calling [Taiwan] a country".<ref>{{cite news | page=1 | title=Japan's Aso calls Taiwan a 'country' | date=10 March 2006 | newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] | url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2006/03/10/2003296575 | access-date=12 March 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060508201827/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2006/03/10/2003296575 | archive-date=8 May 2006 | url-status=live }}</ref>

Taiwan was classified as a province of the People's Republic of China in the [[Apple Maps]] application in 2013; searches for "Taiwan" were changed automatically to "China Taiwan province" in Simplified Chinese, prompting the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan)|Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] to demand a correction from [[Apple Inc.|Apple]].<ref>{{Cite news|url = https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/taiwan/10413744/Taiwan-demands-Apple-change-map-that-shows-it-as-part-of-China.html|title = Taiwan demands Apple change map that shows it as part of China|date = 30 October 2013|last1 = Ryall|first1 = Julian|access-date = 11 July 2018|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180612135856/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/taiwan/10413744/Taiwan-demands-Apple-change-map-that-shows-it-as-part-of-China.html|archive-date = 12 June 2018|url-status = live}}</ref>

On October 24, 2021, ''[[Last Week Tonight with John Oliver]]'' aired an episode about Taiwan after a petition on [[Change.org]] in June invited [[John Oliver|Oliver]] to discuss Taiwan's complex political situation and its international significance. In the segment, a brief but comprehensive [[history of Taiwan]] is provided with notable points such as occupation by the [[Dutch Formosa|Dutch]], [[Spanish Formosa|Spanish]], [[Taiwan under Qing rule|Manchu-Qing dynasty]], and [[Japanese rule in Taiwan|Japanese]]; path to [[History of Taiwan#Democratic reforms|becoming a prominent Asian democracy]]; and the strained relation with modern-day China. Oliver also highlighted Taiwan as the birthplace of [[bubble tea]], apologies made by [[John Cena]] after referring to Taiwan as a country, and the hesitation of international organizations like the [[World Health Organization]] and the [[International Olympic Committee|Olympics]] in properly representing Taiwan. He concluded the episode by emphasizing Taiwanese citizens' point of view and their right to determine the country's own future.<ref>{{cite news |title=John Oliver Irks China Press As Taiwan Skit Overshadows Xi Jinping Speech |url=https://www.newsweek.com/john-oliver-irks-china-press-taiwan-skit-overshadows-xi-jinping-speech-1642928 |access-date=30 November 2021 |publisher=[[Newsweek]]|date=27 October 2021 |archive-date=29 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211129174242/https://www.newsweek.com/john-oliver-irks-china-press-taiwan-skit-overshadows-xi-jinping-speech-1642928 |url-status=live }}</ref>

To avoid controversy, multiple mainstream American media outlets refer to Taiwan as an island or democracy.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Alperstein |first=Ben |date=November 6, 2024 |title=How Do Media Organizations Define Taiwan? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/how-do-media-organizations-define-taiwan/ |access-date=2024-11-08 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

In 2021, the China's Taiwan Affairs Office stated that they would not allow pro-Taiwan independence people into China, including Hong Kong and Macau, naming Taiwanese Premier [[Su Tseng-chang]], Legislative Yuan Speaker [[You Si-kun]] and Foreign Minister [[Joseph Wu]] as people who are "stubbornly pro-Taiwan independence".<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-05/china-taiwan-independence-banned-hong-kong-macau/100599500|title=If you support Taiwan's independence, China won't let you into the mainland, Hong Kong, or Macau|newspaper=[[ABC News (United States)|ABC News]]|date=5 November 2021|via=www.abc.net.au|access-date=5 November 2021|archive-date=5 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105154312/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-05/china-taiwan-independence-banned-hong-kong-macau/100599500|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2020, the [[board game]] [[Reversed Front: Dear Revolutionaries]] was launched under a private crowdfunding initiative, sparking minor escalations as such initiative attracted much attention by reaching more than 20 million during the initial phase.<ref>{{cite web |author1=ESC臺灣境外戰略溝通工作小組 |title=反共史詩桌遊《逆統戰：致地與海的革命者》每一位贊助人，都是下一場革命的金主 |url=https://www.zeczec.com/projects/reversedfront |website=嘖嘖 |access-date=2020-09-27 |archive-date=2021-04-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418231549/https://www.zeczec.com/projects/reversedfront }}</ref> Later on, the Chinese authorities banned their fellows from discussing the topic.<ref>{{cite news |title=怕了？台反共桌遊「逆統戰」頻遭出征 中官員竟下令不准討論 |url=https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/3295750 |publisher=自由時報 |date=2020-09-18 |accessdate=2020-09-27 |archive-date=2020-11-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201129013059/https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/3295750 }}</ref> During the mean time, a count of eight [[Denial-of-service attack]] was found, sourcing to [[Chinese Communist Party|Chinese origins]], while CCP-controlled tabloid ''[[Global Times]]''<ref>{{Cite news |date=2020-09-27 |title=多怕？台灣桌遊《逆統戰》讓中國官媒撰文崩潰狂嗆「台獨」 |url=https://www.msn.com/zh-tw/news/national/%E5%A4%9A%E6%80%95%EF%BC%9F%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E6%A1%8C%E9%81%8A%E3%80%8A%E9%80%86%E7%B5%B1%E6%88%B0%E3%80%8B%E8%AE%93%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%98%E5%AA%92%E6%92%B0%E6%96%87%E5%B4%A9%E6%BD%B0%E7%8B%82%E5%97%86%E3%80%8C%E5%8F%B0%E7%8D%A8%E3%80%8D/ar-BB19q4MH?li=BBqiNIb |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210605125037/https://www.msn.com/zh-tw/news/national/%E5%A4%9A%E6%80%95%EF%BC%9F%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E6%A1%8C%E9%81%8A%E3%80%8A%E9%80%86%E7%B5%B1%E6%88%B0%E3%80%8B%E8%AE%93%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%98%E5%AA%92%E6%92%B0%E6%96%87%E5%B4%A9%E6%BD%B0%E7%8B%82%E5%97%86%E3%80%8C%E5%8F%B0%E7%8D%A8%E3%80%8D/ar-BB19q4MH?li=BBqiNIb |archive-date=2021-06-05 |access-date=2020-09-27 |publisher=MSN新聞 |agency=三立新聞網}}</ref> criticized the game of demolishing teenage growth. [[Taiwanese people|Taiwanese]] then responded by saying that their fate should not be decided by CCP and that freedom is assured, with the production team responded by "welcoming" such "opportunity".<ref>{{Cite news |last=黃順祥 |date=2020-09-26 |title=反共桌遊「逆統戰」遭中國官媒批台獨 設計團隊樂喊：我們終於被譴責了 |url=https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2020-09-26/470866 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210430082217/https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2020-09-26/470866 |archive-date=2021-04-30 |access-date=2020-09-27 |publisher=Newtalk新聞}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Instagram|url=https://www.instagram.com/p/CT1NYrul4eu/|website=www.instagram.com|access-date=2024-02-05}}</ref> Later, on April 5th of 2025, with the [[video game]] version being launched, the platform experienced a long term [[DDOS]] attack from unidentified sources, which was speculated to be from within [[Chinese Communist Party|Chinese]] authorities, causing the release to be put off.<ref>{{Cite web |last=逆統戰 Reversed Front |title=逆統戰 Reversed Front 的 threads |url=https://www.threads.net/@reversedfront/post/DIDaiNmPFZe?xmt=AQGzAA6AjzvuoL9aI-fYU1SLLl073bekVPHMiAVlU7asCg}}</ref>

== Developments since 2004 ==

=== Political ===
{{original research section|date=July 2021}}

Although the situation is complex, most observers believe that it is stable with enough understandings and [[gentlemen's agreement]]s to keep things from breaking out into open warfare. The current controversy is over the term ''one China'', as the PRC insists that the ROC must recognize this term to begin negotiations. Although the Democratic Progressive Party has moderated its support for Taiwan independence, there is still insufficient support within that party for former President Chen Shui-bian to agree to one China. By contrast, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the [[People First Party (Republic of China)|People First Party]] (PFP) appear willing to agree to some variation of one China, and observers believed the position of the PRC was designed to sideline Chen until the [[2004 ROC presidential election|2004 presidential election]] where it was hoped that someone who was more supportive of [[Cross-Strait Unification|Chinese unification]] would come to power. Partly to counter this, Chen Shui-bian announced in July 2002 that if the PRC does not respond to Taiwan's goodwill, Taiwan may "go on its own ... road." {{citation needed|date=January 2020}} What ROC president, Chen Shui-bian, means by this is that there are other ways of combatting China as a powerful hegemon. For example, "If Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian had declared legal independence by a popular referendum, scholars agree that is could have immediately triggered a crisis in China, due to its political sensitivity on the mainland".<ref>Wei, C. N. (2010). "China's Anti-Secession Law and Hu Jintao's Taiwan Policy". ''Yale J. Int'l Aff.'', 5, 112. p. 115, Par. 2, Lines 7–10.</ref> Taiwan's forced establishment of sovereignty scares the PRC; so when they implement laws, such as the Anti-secession law, it angers ROC's public opinion, and actually creates a "rallying around the flag" effect<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Baker |first1=William D. |last2=Oneal |first2=John R. |date=October 2001 |title=Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the "Rally 'Round the Flag" Effect |journal=[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]] |language=en |volume=45 |issue=5 |pages=661–687 |doi=10.1177/0022002701045005006 |issn=0022-0027 |jstor=3176318}}</ref> in support of the Taiwanese independence movement.

With Chen's re-election in 2004, Beijing's prospects for a speedier resolution were dampened, though they seemed strengthened again following the Pan-Blue majority in the [[2004 ROC legislative election|2004 legislative elections]]. However, public opinion in Taiwan reacted unfavorably towards the [[Anti-Secession Law|anti-secession law]] passed by the PRC in March 2005. Following two high-profile visits by KMT and PFP party leaders to the PRC, the balance of public opinion appears to be ambiguous, with the Pan-Green Coalition gaining a majority in the [[2005 ROC National Assembly election|2005 National Assembly elections]], but the Pan-Blue Coalition scoring a landslide victory in the 2005 municipal elections.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

Legislative elections were held in Taiwan on [[2008 Republic of China legislative election|12 January 2008]]. The results gave the Kuomintang and the [[Pan-Blue Coalition]] an absolute majority (86 of the 113 seats) in the Legislative Yuan, handing a heavy defeat to President [[Chen Shui-bian]]'s Democratic Progressive Party, which won the remaining 27 seats. The junior partner in the [[Pan-Green Coalition]], the [[Taiwan Solidarity Union]], won no seats.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The election for the 12th President of ROC was held on [[2008 Republic of China presidential election|22 March 2008]]. Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou won, with 58% of the vote, ending eight years of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leadership. Along with the 2008 legislative election, Ma's landslide victory brought the Kuomintang back to power in Taiwan. This new political situation has led to a decrease of tension between both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the increase of [[cross-strait relations]], making a declaration of independence, or war, something unlikely.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

Taiwan's [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] (SEF) and its Chinese counterpart&nbsp;– the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait]] (ARATS)&nbsp;– signed four agreements in Taipei on 4 November 2008. Both SEF and ARATS have agreed to address direct sea links, daily charter flights, direct postal service, and food safety.<ref>{{cite news|title=Taiwan reached deals with China at the expense of sovereignty and democracy|publisher=[[European Federation of Taiwanese Associations|EFTA]]|date=6 November 2008|url=http://www.eutaiwan.org/en2.html|access-date=25 June 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110726042820/http://www.eutaiwan.org/en2.html|archive-date=26 July 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref>

It has been reported that China has set a 2049 deadline for the unification of Taiwan with Mainland China, which is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bagshaw|first=Eryk|date=2021-01-29|title=Why Taiwan might be the next global flashpoint|url=https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/why-might-taiwan-be-the-next-global-flashpoint-20210129-p56xya.html|access-date=2021-03-11|website=The Sydney Morning Herald|language=en|archive-date=24 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224035547/https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/why-might-taiwan-be-the-next-global-flashpoint-20210129-p56xya.html|url-status=live}}</ref> [[General Secretary of the Communist Party|CCP general secretary]] [[Xi Jinping]] has been saying that unification was part of the [[Chinese Dream]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=Taiwan's Tsai shoots down Xi's unification road map|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Taiwan-s-Tsai-shoots-down-Xi-s-unification-road-map|access-date=2021-03-11|website=Nikkei Asia|language=en-GB|archive-date=12 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210212073025/https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Taiwan-s-Tsai-shoots-down-Xi-s-unification-road-map|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2021, the China's Taiwan Affairs Office stated that they would not allow pro-Taiwan independence people into China, including Hong Kong and Macau, naming Taiwanese Premier [[Su Tseng-chang]], Legislative Yuan Speaker [[You Si-kun]] and Foreign Minister [[Joseph Wu]] as people who are "stubbornly pro-Taiwan independence".<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-05/china-taiwan-independence-banned-hong-kong-macau/100599500|title=If you support Taiwan's independence, China won't let you into the mainland, Hong Kong, or Macau|newspaper=[[ABC News (United States)|ABC News]]|date=5 November 2021|via=www.abc.net.au|access-date=5 November 2021|archive-date=5 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211105154312/https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-05/china-taiwan-independence-banned-hong-kong-macau/100599500|url-status=live}}</ref>

=== Taiwanese public opinion ===
{{Further|Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity}}
Public opinion in Taiwan regarding relations with the PRC is notoriously difficult to gauge, as poll results tend to be extremely sensitive to how the questions are phrased and what options are given, and there is a tendency by all political parties to [[spin (politics)|spin]] the results to support their point of view.<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1177/0021909616649210 | title=Change and Continuity in Taiwan's Public Opinion on the Cross-Strait Economic Interactions | year=2017 | last1=Lin | first1=Yitzu | last2=Hsieh | first2=John Fuh-Sheng | journal=Journal of Asian and African Studies | volume=52 | issue=8 | pages=1103–1116 | s2cid=148166577 }}</ref>

According to a November 2005 poll from the [[Mainland Affairs Council]], 37.7% of people living in the ROC favor maintaining the status quo until a decision can be made in the future, 18.4% favors maintaining the status quo indefinitely, 14% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual independence, 12% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual unification, 10.3% favors independence as soon as possible, and 2.1% favors unification as soon as possible. According to the same poll, 78.3% are opposed to the "[[One Country, Two Systems]]" model, which was used for [[Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]], while 10.4% is in favor.<ref>{{cite web |script-title=zh:民意調查：「民眾對當前兩岸關係之看法」結果摘要 | access-date =18 October 2006 | publisher=[[Mainland Affairs Council]] | url= http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9411/po9411ch.htm |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070927003332/http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9411/po9411ch.htm <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date = 27 September 2007}}</ref> However, it is essential to consider current events or newly developing positions when determining public opinion in order to maintain accuracy and efficiency, especially when it comes to conducting foreign policy and determining Taiwan's political status and hopeful eventual independence. For example, "Large jumps in the proportion of independence supporters after China's missile test in mid-1996 (from 13% in February to 21% in March) and Lee Teng-hui's "special state-to-state" speech in mid-1999 (from 15% in March to 28% in August) suggest that the cross-Strait tension influenced the Taiwanese to become more independence-minded".<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sobel |first1=Richard |last2=Haynes |first2=William-Arthur |last3=Zheng |first3=Yu |date=2010 |title=The polls—Trends |journal=[[Public Opinion Quarterly]] |language=en |volume=74 |issue=4 |pages=782–813 |doi=10.1093/poq/nfq045 |issn=1537-5331}}</ref> According to a June 2008 poll from a Taiwanese mainstream media [[TVBS]], 58% of people living in Taiwan favor maintaining the status quo, 19% favors independence, and 8% favors unification. According to the same poll, if status quo is not an option and the ones who were surveyed must choose between "Independence" or "Unification", 65% are in favor of independence while 19% would opt for unification. The same poll also reveals that, in terms of self-identity, when the respondents are not told that a Taiwanese person can also be a Chinese person, 68% of the respondents identify themselves as "Taiwanese" while 18% would call themselves "Chinese". However, when the respondents are told that duo identity is an option, 45% of the respondents identify themselves as "Taiwanese only", 4% of the respondents call themselves "Chinese only" while another 45% of the respondents call themselves "both Taiwanese as well as Chinese". Furthermore, when it comes to preference in which national identity to be used in international organizations, 54% of people in the survey indicated that they prefer "Taiwan", and only 25% of the people voted for "Chinese Taipei".<ref>{{cite web |script-title=zh:民意調查：兩會復談前國族認同民調 | access-date=20 June 2008 | publisher=TVBS | url=http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/even/200806/even-20080610175239.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080626155825/http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/even/200806/even-20080610175239.pdf | archive-date=26 June 2008 | url-status=live }}</ref>

According to an October 2008 poll from the Mainland Affairs Council, on the question of Taiwan's status, 36.17% of respondents favor maintaining the status quo until a decision can be made in the future, 25.53% favors maintaining the status quo indefinitely, 12.49% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual independence, 4.44% favors maintaining the status quo until eventual unification, 14.80% favors independence as soon as possible, and 1.76% favors unification as soon as possible. In the same poll, on the question of the PRC government's attitude towards the ROC government, 64.85% of the respondents consider the PRC government hostile or very hostile, 24.89% consider the PRC government friendly or very friendly, while 10.27% did not express an opinion. On the question of the PRC government's attitude towards the people in Taiwan, 45.98% of the respondents consider the PRC government hostile or very hostile, 39.6% consider the PRC government friendly or very friendly, while 14.43% did not express an opinion.<ref>{{cite web| script-title=zh:「大陸政策與兩岸協商」民意調查(民國97年10月10日~10月12日)問卷及百分比分布 | access-date=16 October 2008|publisher=Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China| url=http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9710/9710a.pdf| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081029155949/http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/pos/9710/9710a.pdf| url-status=dead| archive-date=29 October 2008|language=zh}}</ref>

In May 2009, Taiwan's (Republic of China) Department of the Interior published a survey examining whether people in Taiwan see themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both. 64.6% see themselves as Taiwanese, 11.5% as Chinese, 18.1% as both, and 5.8% were unsure.<ref>{{cite web| script-title=zh:「民眾的政治態度及族群觀點」民意調查 加權百分比摘要表| access-date=11 June 2009| publisher=Taiwan's (Republic of China) Department of the Interior| url=http://www.rdec.gov.tw/public/Data/952711431071.pdf| language=zh| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111008164032/http://www.rdec.gov.tw/public/Data/952711431071.pdf| archive-date=8 October 2011| url-status=dead}}</ref>

According to a December 2009 poll from a Taiwanese mainstream media [[TVBS]], if status quo is not an option and the ones who were surveyed must choose between "Independence" or "Unification", 68% are in favor of independence while 13% would opt for unification.<ref>{{cite web | title=Taiwanese text | access-date=23 December 2009 | publisher=TVBS | url=http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/200912/doshouldo-20091218191946.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927053933/http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/200912/doshouldo-20091218191946.pdf | archive-date=27 September 2011 | url-status=live }}</ref>

A June 2013 poll conducted by DPP showed that 77.6% consider themselves as Taiwanese.<ref name=":4">{{cite web |last=Lee |first=Hsin-fang |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/07/07/2003566539 |title=DPP poll finds 77.6% identify as Taiwanese |date=7 July 2013 |access-date=7 July 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130707182016/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/07/07/2003566539 |archive-date=7 July 2013 |url-status=live }}</ref> On the independence-unification issue, the survey found that 25.9 percent said they support unification, 59 percent support independence, and 10.3 percent prefer the "status quo." When asked whether Taiwan and China are parts of one country, the party said the survey found 78.4 percent disagree, while 15 percent agreed. As for whether Taiwan and China are two districts in one country, 70.6 percent disagree, while 22.8 percent agree, the survey showed. When asked which among four descriptions—"one country on each side," "a special state-to-state relationship," "one country, two areas," and "two sides are of one country"—they find the most acceptable, 54.9 percent said "one country on each side," 25.3 percent chose "a special state-to-state relationship," 9.8 percent said "one country, two areas", and 2.5 percent favor "two sides are of one country," the survey showed.<ref name=":4" />

A June 2023 poll conducted by the [[National Chengchi University]] showed 62.8% identified as Taiwanese, 2.5% as Chinese, and 30.5% as both.<ref>{{cite web |title=Election Study Center, NCCU-Taiwanese / Chinese Identity |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |website=esc.nccu.edu.tw |language=zh-TW |access-date=8 October 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210306094327/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |url-status=live }}</ref> Regarding independence, 32.1% indicated status quo forever, 28.6% wanted to decide later, 21.4% said status quo moving toward independence, and 5.8% said status quo moving toward unification.<ref>{{cite web |title=Election Study Center, NCCU-Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainl |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |website=esc.nccu.edu.tw |language=zh-TW |access-date=8 October 2023 |archive-date=26 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026231952/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Military operations ==
[[Chinese Civil War#Aftermath|Intermittent clashes]] between the two sides occurred throughout the 1950s and 1960s, including the [[First Taiwan Strait crisis|First]] and [[Second Taiwan Strait crisis|Second Taiwan Strait crises]].

=== Third Taiwan Strait crisis ===
{{Main|Third Taiwan Strait Crisis}}
[[File:ROCN kang ding class.jpg|thumb|300px|[[Republic of China Navy|ROCS]] {{sclass|Kang Ding|frigate|1}} with [[Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk|S-70C]] helicopter]]<!--ROCS=Republic of China Ship, USS=United States Ship, etc.-->

In 1996, the PRC began conducting [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis|military exercises near Taiwan]], and launched several [[ballistic missile]]s over the island. The saber-rattling was done in response to the possible re-election of then President Lee Teng-hui.<ref>Scobell, A. (1999). Show of force: the PLA and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Working Paper, 1–24.</ref> The United States, under President Clinton, sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region, reportedly sailing them into the Taiwan Strait.<ref>Ross, R. S. (2000). The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation: Coercion, credibility, and the use of force. International Security, 25(2), 87–123.</ref> The PRC, unable to track the ships' movements, and probably unwilling to escalate the conflict, quickly backed down. The event had little impact on the outcome of the election, since none of Lee's contestants were strong enough to defeat him, but it is widely believed that the PRC's aggressive acts, far from intimidating the Taiwanese population, gave Lee a boost that pushed his share of votes over 50 percent.<ref>Yu, T. (1997). Taiwanese democracy under threat: impact and limit of Chinese military coercion. Pacific affairs, 7–36.</ref>
This was an aggressively serious escalation in response to the Taiwan Strait and the ongoing conflict between China and Taiwan. This hostile reaction by mainland China is the result of China implementing Putnam's [[Two-level game theory]]. This theory suggests that the chief negotiator of a state must balance and abide by both international and domestic interests, and in some cases must focus more on domestic interests. In the case of China, "a serious escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait and raised the specter of war—one that could conceivably draw in the United States. This turn of events is either the result of pressure by hawkish, hardline soldiers on moderate, mild-mannered statesmen for a tougher, more aggressive response to Taiwan, or a strong consensus among both civilian and military leaders in the Politburo."<ref>Scobell, A. (1999). Show of force: the PLA and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Working Paper, p. 7. Par. 3–5, Lines 1–10.</ref>

=== PRC's condition on future military intervention ===
{{Main|PRC threat of military operation against Taiwan}}
Notwithstanding, the PRC government has issued triggers for an immediate war with Taiwan, most notably via its controversial [[Anti-Secession Law of the People's Republic of China|Anti-Secession Law of 2005]]. These conditions are:
* if events occur leading to the ''"separation"'' of Taiwan from China ''in any name'', or
* if a major event occurs which would lead to Taiwan's ''"separation"'' from China, or
* if all possibility of peaceful unification is lost.

It has been interpreted{{By whom|date=August 2024}} that these criteria encompass the scenario of Taiwan developing nuclear weapons (''see main article'' [[Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction]] also [[Timeline of the Republic of China's nuclear program]]).{{cn|date=August 2024}}

The third condition has especially caused a stir in Taiwan as the term "indefinitely" is open to interpretation.{{Citation needed|date=March 2009}} It has also been viewed by some{{Who|date=April 2025}} as meaning that preserving the ambiguous status quo is not acceptable to the PRC, although the PRC stated on a number of occasions that there is no explicit timetable for unification.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

Concern over a formal declaration of ''de jure'' Taiwan independence is a strong impetus for the military buildup between Taiwan and mainland China. The former US Bush administration publicly declared that given the status quo, it would not aid Taiwan if it were to declare independence unilaterally.<ref>{{cite news| page=1| title=Bush Opposes Taiwan Independence| date=9 December 2002| publisher=[[Fox News]]| url=https://www.foxnews.com/story/bush-opposes-taiwan-independence| access-date=20 July 2007| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070808054530/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,105239,00.html| archive-date=8 August 2007| url-status=live}}</ref>

According to the US Department of Defense report "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011", the conditions that mainland China has warned that may cause the use of force have varied. They have included "a formal declaration of Taiwan independence; undefined moves "toward independence"; foreign intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs; indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification; Taiwan's acquisition of [[nuclear weapon]]s; and, internal unrest on Taiwan. Article 8 of the March 2005 "Anti-Secession Law" states Beijing would resort to "non-peaceful means" if "secessionist forces ... cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China," if "major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession" occur, or if "possibilities for peaceful reunification" are exhausted".<ref name=DOD-china-2011>{{cite report |url=http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf |work=Annual Report to Congress |title=Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2011 |author=Office of the Secretary of Defense |date=6 May 2011 |access-date=16 February 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150328201817/http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf |archive-date=28 March 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{check quotation}}

=== Balance of power ===
The possibility of war, the close geographic proximity of ROC-controlled Taiwan and PRC-controlled mainland China, and the resulting flare-ups that occur every few years, conspire to make this one of the most watched focal points in the Pacific. Both sides have chosen to have a strong naval presence. However, naval strategies between both powers greatly shifted in the 1980s and 1990s, while the ROC assumed a more defensive attitude by building and buying [[frigate]]s and missile [[destroyer]]s, and the PRC a more aggressive posture by developing long-range [[cruise missile]]s and supersonic [[surface-to-surface missile]]s.{{cn|date=August 2024}}

Although the [[People's Liberation Army Air Force]] is considered large, most of its fleet consists of older generation [[Chengdu J-7|J-7]] fighters (localized [[MiG-21]]s and Mig-21BIs),{{When|date=November 2024}} raising doubts over the PLAAF's ability to control Taiwan's airspace in the event of a conflict. Since mid-1990s, PRC has been purchasing, and later localizing, [[SU-27]] based fighters. These Russian fighters, as well as their Chinese [[Shenyang J-11|J11A]] variants, are currently{{when|date=January 2021}} over 170 in number, and have increased the effectiveness of PLAAF's [[Beyond Visual Range missile|Beyond Visual Range]] (BVR) capabilities. The introduction of 60 new-generation [[Chengdu J-10|J10A]] fighters is anticipated to increase the PLAAF's firepower. PRC's acquisition of Russian [[Sukhoi Su-30|Su30MKKs]] further enhanced the PLAAF's [[air-to-ground]] support ability. In October 2017, Chinese media reported that Chinese stealth aircraft [[Chengdu J-20]] began production, which gave the PLAAF a significant advantage in air superiority over the ROC Air Force.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-strategy/ | title=The Dragon's Wing: The People's Liberation Army Air Force's Strategy > Air University (AU) > Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs Article Display | date=August 2022 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/11/08/display-at-zhuhai-airshow-reveals-info-on-chinas-j-20-j-16-inventory/ | title=Zhuhai Airshow display reveals info on China's J-20, J-16 inventory | date=8 November 2022 }}</ref> The [[Republic of China Air Force|ROC's air force]], on the other hand, relies on Taiwan's fourth generation fighters, consisting of 150 US-built [[F-16 Fighting Falcon]]s, approximately 60 French-built [[Dassault-Breguet Mirage 2000|Mirage 2000-5s]], and approximately 130 locally developed [[AIDC Ching-kuo|IDFs]] (Indigenous Defense Fighters). All of these ROC fighter jets are able to conduct [[BVR]] combat missions with BVR missiles, but the level of technology in mainland Chinese fighters is catching up. Also, the United States [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] has reported that few of Taiwan's 400 total fighters are operationally capable.<ref>{{cite web |last=Minnick |first=Wendell |url=http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4508720 |title=U.S. Intel Report on Taiwan Air Power Released |publisher=Defensenews.com |date=22 February 2010 |access-date=6 December 2011 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130121093509/http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4508720 |archive-date=21 January 2013 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Hebert |first=Adam J. |url=http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/May%202010/0510issbf.aspx |title=Behind the Taiwan Arms Sales |publisher=Airforce-magazine.com |access-date=6 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120331195033/http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/May%202010/0510issbf.aspx |archive-date=31 March 2012 |url-status=usurped }}</ref>

In 2003, the ROC purchased four missile destroyers—the former {{sclass|Kidd|destroyer|4}}, and expressed a strong interest in the {{sclass|Arleigh Burke|destroyer|4}}. But with the growth of the PRC [[People's Liberation Army Navy|navy]] and [[PLAAF|air force]], some{{Who|date=April 2025}} doubt that the ROC could withstand a determined invasion attempt from mainland China in the future. These concerns have led to a view in certain quarters that Taiwanese independence, if it is to be implemented, should be attempted as early as possible, while the ROC still has the capacity to defend itself in an all-out military conflict. Over the past three decades, estimates of how long the ROC can withstand a full-scale invasion from across the Strait without any outside help have decreased from three months to only six days.<ref>{{cite news | first=Rich | last=Chang | page=3 | title=War simulations reveal communication problem | date=1 May 2006 | newspaper=[[Taipei Times]] | url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/05/01/2003305538 | access-date=11 June 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060625183105/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/05/01/2003305538 | archive-date=25 June 2006 | url-status=live }}</ref> Given such estimates, the US Navy has continued practicing "surging" its carrier groups, giving it the experience necessary to respond quickly to an attack on Taiwan.<ref>{{cite web |author= Dunnigan, James |date= 7 July 2004 |title= US Navy Sticks it to China |work= Dirty Little Secrets |publisher= StragtegyPage.com |url= http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200477.asp |access-date= 11 June 2006 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20061115210801/http://strategypage.com/dls/articles/200477.asp |archive-date= 15 November 2006 |url-status= dead }}</ref> The US also collects data on the PRC's military deployments, through the use of [[spy satellite]]s, for example.<ref>{{cite news|last=Yao|first=Chung-yuan|page=6|title=China's new satellite can pose threat to Taiwan|date=10 August 2020|newspaper=[[Taipei Times]]|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/08/10/2003741403|access-date=20 May 2023|archive-date=20 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230520054943/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/08/10/2003741403|url-status=live}}</ref> Early surveillance may effectively identify PRC's massive military movement, which may imply PRC's preparation for a military assault against Taiwan.{{cn|date=October 2024}}

Naturally, war contingencies are not being planned in a vacuum. In 1979, the [[Congress of the United States|United States Congress]] passed the Taiwan Relations Act, a law generally interpreted as mandating U.S. defense of Taiwan in the event of an attack from the Chinese Mainland (the Act is applied to Taiwan and Penghu, but not to Kinmen or Matsu, which are usually considered to be part of mainland China). The United States maintains the world's largest permanent fleet in the Pacific Region near Taiwan. The [[Seventh Fleet]], operating primarily out of various bases in Japan, is a powerful naval contingent built upon the world's only permanently forward-deployed [[aircraft carrier]] {{USS|George Washington|CVN-73|6}}. Although the stated purpose of the fleet is not Taiwanese defense, it can be safely assumed from past actions that it is one of the reasons why the fleet is stationed in those waters.{{citation needed|date=January 2020}} It is written into the strategy of the United States department of defense within this region that, "First, we are strengthening our military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed. Second, we are working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their capacity to address potential challenges in their waters and across the region. Third, we are leveraging military diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road."<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF |title=The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment. Department of Defense. Page 3, Par. 2, Lines 2–7. |access-date=4 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191216102508/https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF |archive-date=16 December 2019 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Starting in 2000, Japan renewed its defense obligations with the US and embarked on a rearmament program, partly in response to fears that Taiwan might be invaded. Some analysts{{Which|date=April 2025}} believed that the PRC could launch [[preemptive strike]]s on military bases in Japan to deter US and Japanese forces from coming to the ROC's aid. Japanese strategic planners also see an independent Taiwan as vital, not only because the ROC controls valuable shipping routes, but also because its capture by PRC would make Japan more vulnerable. During [[World War II]], the US invaded the [[Philippines]], but another viable target to enable direct attacks on Japan would have been Taiwan (then known as Formosa). However, critics of the preemptive strike theory assert that the PRC would be loath to give Japan and the US such an excuse to intervene.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=4217193543447225711&hl=en&as_sdt=0,33&sciodt=0,33|title=Google Scholar|website=[[Google News]]|access-date=4 December 2019|archive-date=11 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230411110853/https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=4217193543447225711&hl=en&as_sdt=0,33&sciodt=0,33|url-status=live}}</ref>

The [[United States Department of Defense]] in a 2011 report stated that the primary mission of the PRC military is a possible military conflict with Taiwan, including also possible US military assistance. Although the risk of a crisis in the short-term is low, in the absence of new political developments, Taiwan will likely dominate future military modernization and planning. However, also other priorities are becoming increasingly prominent and possible due to increasing military resources. A number of mainland China's most advanced military systems are stationed in areas opposite Taiwan. The rapid military modernization is continually changing the military balance of power towards mainland China.<ref>Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2011, Office of the Secretary of Defense</ref>

A 2008 report by the [[RAND Corporation]] analyzing a theoretical 2020 attack by mainland China on Taiwan suggested that the US would likely not be able to defend Taiwan. [[Cruise missile]] developments may enable China to partially or completely destroy or make inoperative US [[aircraft carrier]]s and bases in the Western Pacific. New Chinese radars will likely be able to detect US [[stealth aircraft]] and China is acquiring stealthy and more effective aircraft. The reliability of US [[beyond-visual-range missile]]s as a mean to achieve air superiority is questionable and largely unproven.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3774348|title='Rand Study Suggests U.S. Loses War With China', Wendell Minnick, 2008, RAND}}{{Dead link|date=June 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

In 2021, Admiral [[Philip S. Davidson|Phillip Davidson]] said in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that China could take military action on Taiwan some time in the next 6 years.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-03-10|title=China could invade Taiwan in next six years, top US admiral warns|url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns|access-date=2021-03-11|website=[[The Guardian]]|language=en|archive-date=11 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210311083644/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=China could invade Taiwan in the next 6 years, warns U.S. admiral|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-could-invade-taiwan-next-6-years-assume-global-leadership-n1260386|access-date=2021-03-11|website=[[NBC News]]|date=10 March 2021 |language=en|archive-date=10 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210310234951/https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-could-invade-taiwan-next-6-years-assume-global-leadership-n1260386|url-status=live}}</ref> A spokesperson for China's foreign ministry later responded stating that Davidson was trying to "hype up China's military threat."<ref>{{Cite web|last=Bowden|first=John|date=2021-03-10|title=China: US admiral trying to 'hype up' threat to Taiwan|url=https://thehill.com/policy/international/china/542537-china-us-admiral-trying-to-hype-up-taiwan-invasion-threat|access-date=2021-03-11|website=[[The Hill (newspaper)|The Hill]]|language=en|archive-date=11 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210311114457/https://thehill.com/policy/international/china/542537-china-us-admiral-trying-to-hype-up-taiwan-invasion-threat|url-status=live}}</ref>

In the wake of [[US House Speaker]] [[Nancy Pelosi]]'s [[2022 visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan|2022 visit to Taiwan]], China increased its air and naval crossings of the [[Taiwan Strait#Median line|Taiwan Strait median line]], an unofficial understanding between the two sides when relations are good. In 2024 China moved [[Airway (aviation)|civil aviation routes]] closer to the line, which is expected to further “squeeze” the airspace controlled by Taiwan within 12 nautical miles of its coast.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/what-is-the-median-line-between-china-and-taiwan/5637905.html | title=What is the Median Line Between China and Taiwan? | date=28 October 2020 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3250431/beijings-changes-civil-flight-path-near-taiwan-strait-median-line-likely-squeeze-islands-air-defence | title=Beijing's changes to cross-strait flight path will 'squeeze' Taiwan air defence | date=31 January 2024 }}</ref>

== See also ==
{{Portal|China|Taiwan}}
* [[History of the Republic of China]]
* [[Federalism in China]]
* [[Secession in China]]
* [[United front in Taiwan]]
* [[Han Taiwanese]]
* [[Taiwanese indigenous peoples]]
* ''[[China Military Power Report]]''
* [[China and weapons of mass destruction]]
* [[Foreign relations of Taiwan]]
* [[Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act|TAIPEI Act]]
* [[Three Communiqués]]

== Notes ==
{{NoteFoot}}
{{notelist}}

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

== Further reading ==
{{Library resources box}}
{{Wikisource|US-PRC Joint Communique}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Bush |first1=Richard C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MPYzRoOI77UC |title=A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America |last2=O'Hanlon |first2=Michael E. |date=2007 |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]] |isbn=978-0-471-98677-5 |location=Hoboken, N.J}}
* {{Cite book |last=Bush |first=Richard C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oodSGN8ZufcC |title=Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait |date=2005 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution Press]] |isbn=978-0-8157-9781-4 |location=Washington, D.C}}
* {{Cite book |last=Carpenter |first=Ted Galen |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UHKWBgAAQBAJ |title=America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan |date=2006 |publisher=[[St. Martin's Press]] |isbn=978-1-4668-9301-6 |location=New York}}
* {{Cite book |last=Cole |first=Bernard |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cih-AgAAQBAJ |title=Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects |date=2006 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-134-21423-5 |location=London}}
* {{Cite book |last=Copper |first=John F. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BbTOEAAAQBAJ |title=Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan |date=2006 |publisher=[[Praeger Security International]] |isbn=978-0-313-05639-0 |location=Westport, Conn}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |url=https://nuke.fas.org/guide/china/Book2006.pdf |title=Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning |last2=Norris |first2=Robert S. |last3=McKinzie |first3=Matthew G. |date=2006 |publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists|FAS]], [[Natural Resources Defense Council|NRDC]] |isbn=978-0-9653386-4-6 |location=Washington, DC}}
* {{Cite book |last=Gill |first=Bates |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lXkvEIUmg68C |title=Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy |date=2010 |publisher=[[Brookings Institution Press]] |isbn=978-0-8157-3146-7 |edition=Rev. |location=Washington, DC}}
* {{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0VnGDwAAQBAJ |title=China's Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography of Taiwan |publisher=[[University Press of Hawaii]] |year=2019 |isbn=978-0-8248-8004-0 |editor-last=Knapp |editor-first=Ronald G. |location=Honolulu |orig-year=1980}}
* {{Cite book |last=Shirk |first=Susan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M1JRhQHv17cC |title=China: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise |date=2008 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-537319-6 |location=New York ; Oxford}}
* {{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KAfGBQAAQBAJ |title=If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics |date=2006 |publisher=[[Taylor and Francis]] |isbn=978-0-415-40785-4 |editor-last=Tsang |editor-first=Steve Yui-Sang |series=Asian security studies |location=Hoboken}}
* {{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CXjI23YHC0MC |title=Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis |date=2005 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-13564-1 |editor-last=Tucker |editor-first=Nancy Bernkopf |location=New York}}

{{Cross-Strait relations}}
{{Foreign relations of the Republic of China (Taiwan)}}
{{foreign relations of China}}
{{Chinese Civil War}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Political Status Of Taiwan}}
[[Category:Cross-strait relations]]
[[Category:Political history of Taiwan]]
[[Category:Law of Taiwan]]
[[Category:Sovereignty]]
[[Category:Diplomatic recognition|Taiwan]]