View source for Power projection

{{Short description|Capacity of a state to deploy and sustain military forces outside its territory}}
[[File:USS Nimitz in Victoria Canada 036.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|[[Aircraft carrier]]s such as the {{USS|Nimitz|CVN-68|6}} play an important role in modern power projection.]]
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'''Power projection''' (or '''force projection''' or '''strength projection''') in [[international relations]] is the capacity of a [[Sovereign state|state]] to deploy and sustain [[#Power projection capabilities|forces outside its territory]].<ref>{{cite book|title=The Dictionary of Military Terms |author=US Department of Defense |location=New York |publisher=Skyhorse Publishing |year=2013 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rVgtAgAAQBAJ&q=%22power+projection%22+jp3-35&pg=PT957|isbn=9781628730197 }}</ref> The ability of a state to project its power into an area may serve as an effective diplomatic lever, influencing the decision-making processes and acting as a potential [[deterrence theory|deterrent]] on other states' behavior.<ref>Bartosz Głowacki [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/what-weapons-will-poland-send-to-ukraine-and-is-an-alliance-next/ (4 Feb 2022) What weapons will Poland send to Ukraine – and is an alliance next?]</ref><ref>Reuters [https://news.yahoo.com/factbox-ukraines-armed-forces-shape-142955096.html (February 1, 2022) Factbox-How Ukraine's armed forces shape up against Russia's]</ref>{{anchor|u24}}<ref name= u24 >[[Pravda]] (Правда) [https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/17/7332064/ (17 Mar 2022) Zelenskyy explained the essence of the new military alliance ] &nbsp; [[U-24 (association)|U24]] from Zelenskyy's night address verbatim: "I addressed the United States and all responsible states with a proposition to create a new U24 union: a new union that will ensure that each aggressor receives a coordinated world response quickly, effectively, and immediately - not in weeks, months, years, but for the first 24 hours after the attack."
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"We can no longer trust existing institutions. We cannot expect bureaucrats in international organisations to change fast enough, so we must look for new guarantees, create new tools, and to build alliances with those who have the courage to do what justice demands."</ref><ref>Salamah Magnuson, Morgan Keay, Kimberly Metcalf [https://tnsr.org/2022/01/countering-hybrid-warfare-mapping-social-contracts-to-reinforce-societal-resiliency-in-estonia-and-beyond/ (Spring 2022) Countering Hybrid Warfare: Mapping Social Contracts to Reinforce Societal Resiliency in Estonia and Beyond]</ref>

This ability is a crucial element of a state's [[power in international relations]]. Any state able to direct its military forces outside its territory might be said to have ''some'' level of power projection capability, but the term itself is used most frequently in reference to militaries with a worldwide reach (or at least significantly broader than a state's immediate area). Even states with sizable [[hard power]] assets (such as a large [[standing army]]) may only be able to exert limited [[regional power|regional influence]] so long as they lack the means of effectively projecting their power on a global scale. Generally, only a select few states are able to overcome the [[military logistics|logistical]] difficulties inherent in the [[Military deployment|deployment]] and direction of a modern, mechanized military force.<ref>[[Michael J. Mazarr]] [https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/toward-a-new-theory-of-power-projection/ (15 Apr 2020) Toward a New Theory of Power Projection]</ref><ref name= whyAndWhat /> Allies and partners can take up or share some of the burden of power projection.<ref>Katie Lange [https://www.defense.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1656016/national-defense-strategy-alliances-and-partnerships/ (8 Oct 2018) National Defense Strategy: Alliances and Partnerships]</ref><ref>Ian Ward [https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/23/supreme-court-ninth-amendment-bork-biden-00010847 (23 Feb 2022) Joe Biden’s Secret Constitutional Weapon]</ref><ref>Andrew Desiderio, Tara Palmeri and Meridith McGraw [https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/23/republicans-foreign-policy-russia-ukraine-00010780 (23 Feb 2022) Republicans descend into foreign policy factionalism over Russia-Ukraine standoff]</ref> One measure of the capability of a state to project power is the [[loss-of-strength gradient]], until a [[culminating point]] is apparent to others, once an operation is underway.

A state might [[#Gray zone competition|§ compete in the gray zone]] just short of conflict, exercising its soft power, or hard power, in a bid for [[potential superpowers|potential superpower]].<ref>Matthew Brown [https://news.yahoo.com/us-reiterates-stance-ukraine-call-160218473.html (February 1, 2022) Putin says US, NATO have 'ignored' Russia's security demands on Ukraine: What we know]</ref><ref name= putin's1Feb2022Statement>Russia Insight [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZen2NEYSfE (February 1, 2022) BREAKING! Putin: USA Is Using Ukraine As ‘Tool’ To Contain Russia] 8:01 Video clip, English closed captions</ref>{{rp|1:47}}{{efn|name= deglobalization}} While traditional measures of power projection typically focus on [[hard power]] assets (tanks, soldiers, [[aircraft]], naval vessels, etc.), the use of [[soft power]] shows that power projection does not necessarily have to actively put military forces in [[combat]], but only potentially.<ref name= joshi /> Assets for power projection can often serve dual uses, as the deployment of various countries' militaries during the [[humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake]] illustrates.

==History==
Early examples of power projection include [[Ancient Rome|Roman]] dominance of Europe and the wider Mediterranean basin: the ability to project power is tied to the ability to innovate and field such innovations. Roman engineering innovations such as machines ([[pile driver]]), concrete, aqueducts and modern roads provided the footing for an economic engine that powered a military that was unmatched in its day. Examples of Roman power projection include [[Julius Caesar]] constructing the [[Caesar's Rhine bridges|Rhine bridge]] in 10 days to demonstrate the ability to march his 40,000 troops as he saw fit: the local inhabitants enjoyed the natural protection of the river and fled when this natural protection was overcome. Although Rome is far from the center of modern power, its influence can be seen in the architecture of modern capitols around the world (domes, arches, columns). The demonstration of an extraordinary innovative military capability will signal power and, when properly applied, terminate conflicts summarily.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lyall |first1=Nicholas |last2=Brizhinev |first2=Dmitry |last3=Bradbury |first3=Roger |date=2020 |title=Rome as a Hegemon: A Portrayal and Database of its Power Projection over Seven Hundred Years |url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4tr2b5v0 |journal=Cliodynamics |language=en |volume=11 |issue=2 |doi=10.21237/C7clio11248308|s2cid=234267958 |doi-access=free |hdl=1885/295557 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

During the [[Ming treasure voyages]] in the 15th century, the Chinese treasure fleet was heavily militarized to exercise power projection around the Indian Ocean and thereby promote its interests.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wang |first1=Yuan-kang |title=Responding To China's Rise: US and EU Strategies |date=2015 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-10033-3 |chapter=The Myth of Chinese Exceptionalism: A Historical Perspective on China’s Rise| pages=59–62}}</ref>

The modern ability to project power and exert influence on a global scale can be tied to innovations stemming from the [[Industrial Revolution]] and the associated modernizations in technology, communications, [[finance]] and [[bureaucracy]]; this finally allowed the state to create unprecedented amounts of wealth and to effectively marshal these resources to exert power over long distances.<ref>Ostrovsky, Max (2018). ''Military Globalization: Strategy, Geography, Weaponry'', (New York: Edwin Mellen Press), p 2-3, https://archive.org/details/military-globalization/page/n9/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

As the birthplace of the [[Industrial Revolution]], Britain was the first to utilize its industrial-technological power advantage to dominate rivals and greatly expand its global [[British Empire|Empire]] throughout the 19th century. As a maritime power, the [[Royal Navy]] played a central role in providing Britain the strength and ability to dominate world trade and project power globally to further its interests. A worldwide system of [[naval base]]s and [[coaling station]]s, a large logistical bureaucracy to oversee shipbuilding, the supply of coal, food, water, and sailors, and an industrial base for the manufacture and technological enhancement of the [[Naval fleet|fleet]] were among the essential ingredients for this capability. During the [[First Opium War]] (1839–1842), it was this capacity that enabled a British expeditionary force of 15 [[barracks ship]]s, 4 steam-powered [[gunboats]] and 25 smaller boats with 4,000 marines to successfully defend its interests {{convert|6,000|mi}} from the fleet's home port.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{London Gazette|pages=2990–2991|issue=19930|date=15 December 1840}}</ref>

[[File:Magdala burning.jpg|thumb|right|200px|An illustration of the burning of Magdala, an event which took place during the [[British Expedition to Abyssinia]] in 1868. The expedition came about as a result of [[Tewodros II of Ethiopia]]'s imprisonment of European missionaries and officials, and demonstrated the power projection capabilities of the [[British Empire]]. ]]

The [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Anglo]]-[[Second French Empire|French]] [[Expeditionary warfare|expeditionary force]] sent to shore up the [[Ottoman Empire]] against Russian aggression during the [[Crimean War]] (1853–1856) was one of the earliest modern examples of a planned expeditionary power-projection campaign. It was the first campaign to use modern technology, including steam-powered warships and [[telegraph]] communications.{{citation needed|date=January 2021}}

Another illustrative example of industrial power projection, was the [[British Expedition to Abyssinia]] in 1868 as a retaliation against Emperor [[Tewodros II of Ethiopia]]'s imprisonment of several missionaries and [[Government of the United Kingdom|British government]] representatives. The expeditionary force sent was a tremendous logistical and technological challenge at the time. Commanded by Lieutenant-General [[Robert Napier, 1st Baron Napier of Magdala|Sir Robert Napier]] of the [[Bombay Army]], [[military intelligence]] was used to estimate the required size of the army and the difficulties of traversing the inhospitable terrain.{{citation needed|date=January 2021}}

A force of over 30,000 was shipped from [[British Raj|British India]] to [[Zula]] on the [[Red Sea]] on a fleet of more than 280 [[Steamship|steam ships]], while an advance detachment of [[engineer]]s built a large port with two piers, warehouses and a lighthouse, and constructed a {{convert|20|mi|adj=on}}-long railway towards the interior.<ref>{{cite book|last=Moorehead|first=Alan|title=The Blue Nile|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F_DsNWK_RkYC|publisher=New York: Harper and Row|year=1972|page=266|isbn=9780060956400}}</ref> A road was also built for the artillery to be moved along with the help of [[elephant]]s. After three months of trekking, the British force repelled an Ethiopian attack and launched an artillery bombardment against the fortress of [[Amba Mariam|Magdala]] which led to its capitulation; Tewodros committed suicide.<ref>Rubenson, ''Survival'', p. 268</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JBZBWQo3whQC|title=Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power|last=Ferguson |first= Niall|year=2008|publisher=Basic Books|isbn=9780465013104}}</ref>

In the [[Russo-Japanese War]] of 1904–1905, the [[Empire of Japan|Japanese]] destruction of the [[Imperial Russian Navy|Imperial Russian Navy's]] Pacific Fleet demonstrated [[Russian Empire|Imperial Russia]]'s inability to project force in the [[Far East|East]]. This immediately diminished Russia's diplomatic sway in that region. At the same time, Russia's western armies became less credible, as [[mobilization]] exposed organizational flaws and threw the western armies into chaos. This led analysts in Europe, such as [[German Empire|German]] [[Chief of staff (military)|chief of staff]] Count [[Alfred von Schlieffen]], to conclude that Russia would prove inept at projecting force in Europe, thus demoting Russia in European diplomatic relations.

Many other actions can be considered projections of force. The 19th century is full of incidents such as the 1864 [[Shimonoseki campaign]] and the [[Boxer Rebellion]]. More recently, the [[Falklands War]] provided an example of the [[United Kingdom]]'s ability to project force far from home. Other recent examples of power projection include the U.S.-led [[2003 invasion of iraq|invasion of Iraq]] and the [[NATO bombing of Yugoslavia]]. The ability of the [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]], the British [[Royal Navy]], and the [[French Navy]] to deploy large numbers of ships for long periods of time away from home are notable projection abilities. ''See [[#Power projection capabilities|§ Power projection capabilities]].''

The globalization of power projection was long avoided in the research with the subject of [[globalization]] mostly channeled to economic field, but in 2018 Historian Max Ostrovsky broke the path. In prehistory, he wrote, power was not projected behind entrance of a cave.<ref>Ostrovsky 2018: p 270, https://archive.org/details/military-globalization/page/269/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> In history, empires and colonies projected power ever farther, creating [[world system]] c. 1900. [[World Wars]] were expressions of power projected on global scale.<ref>Ostrovsky 2018: p I-II, https://archive.org/details/military-globalization/page/I/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

The potential of power projection can be estimated mathematically by calculating the speed of transportation and communication relatively to the extent of contemporary power projection. Roman troops moved 50 km per day; today [[Boeing C-17 Globemaster III|Globemasters]] move troops 20,000 km per day. The speed of communication in the largest Empire in Americas ([[Inca Empire|Inca]]) was 20 km per hour (running man); today it moves with the [[speed of light]]. Multiplying the range of power projection in those empires by increase in the speed of transportation or communication, Ostrovsky estimated the present power projection potential to exceed the size of Earth multiple times.<ref>Ostrovsky 2018: p 273-274, https://archive.org/details/military-globalization/page/273/mode/2up?view=theater</ref>

==Elements==
[[Image:Gulf War C-5A reserve aircraft.jpg|thumb|The cargo hold and intercontinental flight capabilities of the [[C-5 Galaxy]] make it a major asset for deploying military equipment around the globe.]]
The [[U.S. Department of Defense]] defines power projection as the "ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability".<ref name="dtic.mil">United States Department of Defense. ''J1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.'' [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/04211.html] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110522012656/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/04211.html|date=2011-05-22}}</ref><ref name= milleyOnThreatToUkraine>Jeremy Herb, Jennifer Hansler and Ellie Kaufman, CNN (28 January 2022) [https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/28/politics/us-russia-ukraine-invasion-warning/index.html Top US general warns of 'horrific' outcome if Russian forces 'unleashed' on Ukraine] Secretary of Defense Austin puts 8,500 US troops on alert for [[EUCOM]] engagement</ref>

As distance between a fighting force and its headquarters increases, [[Command and control (military)|command and control]] inevitably becomes more difficult. Modern-day power projection often employs high-tech communications and [[information technology]] to overcome these difficulties, a process sometimes described as the "[[Revolution in Military Affairs]]".

While a few long-range [[weapon]]s such as the [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s (ICBMs) and some [[unmanned combat aerial vehicle]]s ([[Drone strike|drones]]) are capable of projecting deadly force in their own right, it is [[military logistics]] that is at the heart of power projection. The ability to integrate [[naval]] and [[air force]]s with land [[army|armies]] as part of [[joint warfare]] is a key aspect of effective power projection; [[airlift]] and [[sealift]] capabilities facilitate the deployment of [[soldier]]s and [[weapon]]s to a distant [[theater (warfare)|theater of war]].

The [[carrier strike group|aircraft carrier strike group]], [[strategic bomber]], [[ballistic missile submarine]], and [[strategic airlift]]er are all examples of power projection platforms. Military units designed to be [[Light infantry|light]] and mobile, such as [[airborne forces]] ([[paratrooper]]s and [[air assault]] forces) and [[amphibious assault]] forces, are utilized in power projection. [[Forward basing]] is another method of power projection, which, by pre-positioning military units or stockpiles of arms at strategically located [[military base]]s outside a country's territory, reduces the time and distance needed to [[mobilization|mobilize]] them.

==Types==
Scholars have disaggregated military power projection into nine different categories based on political goals and level of force. Four of these employ "soft" military power (securing [[sea lane]]s of communication, [[non-combatant]] evacuation, [[humanitarian]] response, and [[peacekeeping]]) and the rest are primarily concerned with "hard" military power ([[wikt:show the flag|show the flag]], compellence/deterrence, punishment, armed intervention, and conquest).<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Ladwig III|first1=Walter C.|title=India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?|journal=Asian Survey|date=November–December 2010|volume=50|issue=6|pages=1162–1183|doi=10.1525/as.2010.50.6.1162|url=https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/india-and-military-power-projection(2d6b8b59-21e8-4c30-a57c-7873260fc827).html}}</ref> There is a [[#Gray zone competition|§ continuum in these capabilities]].{{efn|name= deglobalization}}

===Soft power===
{{Main|Soft power}}
Examples of soft power projection include:

* Securing sea lanes of communication: the protection of shipping lanes from attack by hostile states or irregular threats.
* Non-combatant evacuation operations: the evacuation of citizens or friendly third-country civilians from a foreign country when they are endangered by war or civil unrest.
* Humanitarian response: the use of military forces abroad to assist in the aftermath of a natural disaster.
* Peacekeeping: military operations designed to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement to an ongoing dispute.<ref name= u24 /><ref name= cnnAddress >Zachary B. Wolf, Curt Merrill and Ji Min Lee, CNN [https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2022/03/politics/ukraine-zelensky-congress-speech-annotated/ (16 Mar 2022) Zelensky’s address to Congress, annotated] </ref><ref name= Zelenskyy >Volodymyr Zelenskyy [https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/promova-prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelenskogo-pered-kong-73609 (16 Mar 2022) Address by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the US Congress] </ref>
* Establishing trust, as the basis of cooperation among allies and partners<ref name= trust >E. John Teichert [https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-hard-power-of-security-cooperation/ (24 Mar 2022) The Hard Power of Security Cooperation] </ref><ref name= rulesBasedOrder >Jim Garamone, DOD News [https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3227040/austin-nations-support-rules-based-orders/ (22 Nov 2022) Austin: Nations Support Rules-Based Order] [[ASEAN]] conference </ref>

===Gray zone competition===
:''This section has been [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_States_Army_Futures_Command&type=revision&diff=1065705346&oldid=1065704814 split from] [[United States Army Futures Command|US Army Futures Command]] § Other armies''

The gray zone between [[Conflict continuum|cooperation and conflict]]<ref name= joshi >Shashank Joshi [https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2022/01/29/the-technology-of-seeing-and-shooting-your-enemies (29 Jan 2022) The technology of seeing and shooting your enemies]</ref> has expanded due to the [[Conflict continuum#Competition continuum|competition]] in power projection capabilities of the world's armies, as well as in the competition for economic power among the world's nations.<ref name= militaryVsEconomicPower> James Graham [https://www.onthisday.com/world/power.php Military Power vs Economic Power in History] Compares nations</ref><ref name= militaryVsEconomicPower2> James Graham [https://www.onthisday.com/world/power2.php Military Power vs Economic Power in History (Part 2)] "[I]t is economic power that allows military power to be built up in the first place".</ref><ref name= postUkrInvasion> [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-facing-most-difficult-situation-104627011.html (7 Apr 2022) Russia facing most difficult situation in three decades, PM says] after 6 weeks of economic sanctions, [[Mikhail Mishustin]]: "the current situation could be called the most difficult in three decades for Russia".</ref><ref name= keyUsPartners >BILL GREENWALT and EMILY COLETTA [https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/1t-in-new-defense-spending-pledged-by-key-us-partners-in-1-year-analysis/ (23 Mar 2023) $1T in new defense spending pledged by key US partners in 1 year: Analysis] "In the last year, 37 nations have combined to announce defense spending increases of over $1 trillion, to be spent during the next five years, according to a new American Enterprise Institute analysis"</ref><ref name= oib2028 >Jen Judson [https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/2023/03/28/us-army-eyes-six-fold-production-boost-of-155mm-shells-used-in-ukraine/ (28 Mar 2023) US Army eyes six-fold production boost of 155mm shells used in Ukraine] Army is spending $1.45 billion on capacity in 2023 to increase production from 14,000 per month, to 24,000 per month in 2023, to 85,000 155mm howitzer shells per month by 2028.</ref> <!--==== Other armies ====-->

{{anchor| noWinInNukeWar }}
The US, Russia, China, Britain, and France have renounced the use of nuclear weapons in 2022.<ref name= noNukes2022 >NBC News [https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/no-one-can-win-nuclear-war-russia-china-britain-us-france-say-rcna10829 (4 Jan 2022) Russia, China, Britain, U.S. and France say no one can win nuclear war]</ref> However, in the face of threats of nuclear war (say from Russia, as threatened during the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]]),<ref name= lavrovRu >Reuters [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-says-western-weapons-ukraine-220334307.html (25 Apr 2022) Russia's Lavrov: Do not underestimate threat of nuclear war] </ref>{{efn|name=esperNote|1= When asked about countering tactical [[nuclear weapon]]s which Russia might possibly use against Ukraine, [[Mark Esper]] the US' 27th [[secretary of defense]] suggested that US and NATO allies agree to put an 'air cap' over Ukraine, to counter any Russian aircraft capable of delivering a tactical nuclear bomb (most likely a 1-10 kTon [[gravity bomb]], or via Iskander [[cruise missile]]), and to warn Russia not to fly such an aircraft at Ukraine.<ref name= 27thSecDef>CNN New Day [https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/10/05/russia-ukraine-putin-nuclear-weapons-esper-newday-sot-vpx.cnn (5 Oct 2022) Ex-US defense secretary says if Putin resorts to nukes, he's likely to use this weapon] 1-10 kTon gravity bomb, or Iskander cruise missile</ref>{{rp|min 1:30}} }} [[NATO]] keeps about 100 [[B61 nuclear bomb]]s in storage in Europe.<ref name= b61s>Dan Zak [https://www.greenwichtime.com/news/article/Meet-the-nuke-the-U-S-keeps-in-Europe-just-17028878.php (25 March 2022) Meet the nuke the U.S. keeps in Europe, just waiting to not be used]</ref><ref name= nuclEscMgt >Robbin Laird [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/time-to-relearn-nuclear-escalation-management-for-the-21st-century/ (11 Apr 2022) Time to relearn nuclear escalation management for the 21st century] </ref><ref name= yermakov >Reuters [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-says-risks-nuclear-war-125050584.html (30 Apr 2022) Russia says risks of nuclear war must be kept to minimum -TASS] </ref><ref name= russiaWouldVaporize >Gen. (USA Ret.) [[Barry R. McCaffrey]] [https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/gen-mccaffrey-putins-threat-of-nuclear-weapons-is-horrendously-unsettling/vi-AAWD12R (26 Apr 2022) "Putin's threat of nuclear weapons is horrendously unsettling"] </ref>{{rp|4:50, 5:55}}<ref name= dprkNds >Hyung-Jin Kim and Kim Tong-Hyung, Associated Press [https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2022/10/28/north-korea-fires-two-short-range-ballistic-missiles-toward-sea/10622477002/ (28 Oct 2022) North Korea fires missiles toward sea as US warns over nukes]  "The Pentagon's National Defense Strategy report issued on Thursday stated that any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its allies and partners will result in the end of [the DPRK (Kim)] regime".</ref><ref name= nds2022Uncl >PBS NewsHour [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwRO18QrQDs (28 Oct 2022) WATCH LIVE: Defense Secretary Austin holds news briefing to announce 2022 National Defense Strategy] Unclassified. Integrated deterrence— Strategy Across all domains</ref> Certain F-35As were certified to carry the [[B61 nuclear bomb]] on 12 October 2023.<ref name= f35aB61,12 >Michael Marrow [https://breakingdefense.com/2024/03/exclusive-f-35a-officially-certified-to-carry-nuclear-bomb (8 Mar 2024) EXCLUSIVE: F-35A officially certified to carry nuclear bomb] B61-12</ref> 

The [[British Army]] is investigating innovations, such as robots and drones,<ref name = ukPc22 >Jaspreet Gill   [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/how-project-convergence-is-informing-british-australian-military-modernization/ (14 Nov 2022)  How Project Convergence is informing British, Australian military modernization] [[Reorganization plan of United States Army#Project Convergence 2022|§ Project Convergence 2022]] </ref> including 70 technologies funded by the £800 million (US$1 billion) Defence Innovation Fund launched in 2016.<ref>{{citation |url=https://www.gov.uk/government/news/army-start-biggest-military-robot-exercise-in-british-history-defence-secretary-announces |title=Army start biggest military robot exercise in British history, Defence Secretary announces  |publisher=Ministry of Defence |date=12 November 2018 }}</ref> Two hundred troops will engage in "surveillance, long-range, and precision targeting, enhanced mobility and the re-supply of forces, urban warfare and enhanced situational awareness".<ref name=MIT>{{citation |first=Charlotte |last=Jee |url=https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/612409/the-british-army-is-carrying-out-a-massive-test-of-military-robots-and-drones/ |work=MIT Technology Review |date=13 November 2018 |title=The British Army is carrying out a massive test of military robots and drones}}</ref> The British Army is reducing size by about 10,000 troops as well, by 2025.<ref>{{citation |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-56477900  |title=Defence review: British army to be cut to 72,500 troops by 2025  |work= BBC News |date=22 March 2021}}</ref> The British Army will have Integrated Operating Concept (MDI—like MDO) for "gray zone" operations across domains, using a synthetic operating environment, with repeatable hard and soft strike capability.<ref name= mdiUk>{{citation |url=https://breakingdefense.com/2021/09/three-objectives-for-the-uk-militarys-future/ |first=Andrew |last=White |date=15 September 2021 |title=Three Objectives For The UK Military's Future |publisher=Breaking Defense }}</ref> The UK, Germany, and France respectively have established a joint command for space [[United Kingdom Space Command]], a Space Situational Awareness Centre (Germany), and [[French Space Command|''Commandement de l’espace'']] (France).<ref name= vMachi >Vivienne Machi [https://www.defensenews.com/space/2021/07/13/germany-establishes-new-military-space-command/ (13 Jul 2021) Germany establishes new military space command]</ref><!--ref name=  > [ ( ] </ref--><ref name= top15vendors >Rameesh Cheema [https://finance.yahoo.com/news/15-most-advanced-countries-military-203341021.html (17 Dec 2022) 15 Most Advanced Countries in Military Technology] Israel; Hellenic Republic; Brazil; Taiwan; Saudi Arabia; India; Italy; Republic of Türkiye; Japan; France 
*Rameesh Cheema  [https://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/5-most-advanced-countries-in-military-technology-1096385/  (17 Dec 2022) 5 Most Advanced Countries in Military Technology] UK; RoK (So. Korea); PRC (China); Russia; US</ref> In light of the [[2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine]] [[NATO]] members are implementing new stockpile guidelines for their arsenals.<ref name= natoRestocking >Vivienne Machi [https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/02/13/eyes-on-ukraine-nato-preps-new-ammo-guidelines-to-boost-production/ (13 Feb 2023) Eyes on Ukraine, NATO preps new ammo guidelines to boost production] "Orders placed today will only be delivered two-and-a-half years later". —[[Jens Stoltenberg]]</ref><ref name= 5000roundsDaily >Andrew White  [https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/nato-must-collaborate-be-smarter-about-rebuilding-munition-stockpiles-official/ (15 Feb 2023) NATO must collaborate, be ‘smarter’ about rebuilding munition stockpiles: Official] Ukraine is expending more than 5,000 artillery rounds daily. </ref>
"By 2020 the Army's programs for modernization were now framed as a decades-long process of cooperation with allies and partners,<ref name=cooperation2020>[https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/DefenderEurope Defender-Europe 20] videos, images and stories</ref><ref name=dettmer >Lt. Col. Travis Dettmer [https://www.army.mil/article/232549/us_army_futures_and_concepts_center_teaches_multi_domain_operations_to_nato_allied_land_command (9 February 2020) U.S. Army Futures and Concepts Center teaches Multi-Domain Operations to NATO Allied Land Command]</ref> for [[Conflict continuum#Competition continuum|competition]] with potential adversaries who historically have blurred the distinction between peace and war"<ref name=mccarthyUnendingCycle >Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. [https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/infinite-games-war-by-other-means-ryan-mccarthy/ (January 13, 2020) Infinite Games & War By Other Means: Ryan McCarthy]: 
"We must be engaged in constant competition, versus an episodic engagement strategy" —Secretary Ryan McCarthy</ref>—from: [[Reorganization plan of United States Army#By2020TheArmy|§ Reorganization plan of the United States Army]]

#In 2020, one measure of [[#Power projection capabilities|§ military power projection]] ranks the competition between the armies of the world (after the US Army, which is ranked atop this list).<ref name=globalFirepower >Greg Norman [https://www.foxnews.com/world/5-most-powerful-armies-in-the-world (22 Feb 2020) The 5 most powerful armies in the world]</ref><ref name=davidNorquistRecap21 >The Hon. David Norquist, Deputy Secretary of Defense, DoD [https://conference.defensenews.com/recap#21 (10 Sep 2020) Closing Keynote: Day 2] ''Defense News Conference 2020 : Sept 9 - 10'' 22:00 minutes</ref>{{efn|name= unclMdoConcept |1= The [[US Army]]'s unclassified Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept is "the combined arms employment of capabilities from all domains that create and exploit relative advantages to defeat enemy forces, achieve objectives and consolidate gains during [[Reorganization plan of United States Army#Competition|competition]], [[Reorganization plan of United States Army#Crisis|crisis]], and [[Reorganization plan of United States Army#Conflict|armed conflict]]".<ref name=mdoUnclass >Jen Judson [https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/03/23/multidomain-operations-concept-will-become-doctrine-this-summer/ (23 Mar 2022) Multidomain operations concept will become doctrine this summer] </ref>}}<ref name=heritageFound >Zamone Perez [https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2022/10/18/us-military-in-decline-threats-from-china-formidable-report-says/ (18 Oct 2022) US military in decline, threats from China 'formidable', report says] Heritage Foundation report for the case of 2 major wars (as opposed to 1.5 wars, rated as Favorable)</ref><ref name= dodResponse >C. Todd Lopez, DOD News [https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3192565/us-can-support-ukraine-while-meeting-its-own-security-commitments/ (18 Oct 2022) U.S. Can Support Ukraine While Meeting Its Own Security Commitments] </ref>  The list of armies, a mixture of allies, partners, and competitors is estimated to be:
#{{anchor|russia}}{{anchor|GPS}}Russia<ref name=globalFirepower/>  jammed the [[Global Positioning System|GPS]] signal during NATO exercises in November 2018.<ref name=2018JamGps>[https://tech.slashdot.org/story/18/11/14/164225/russia-jammed-gps-during-major-nato-military-exercise-with-us-troops (4 November 2018) Russia Jammed GPS During Major NATO Military Exercise With US Troops ]</ref><ref name=antiJamGPS >Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. [https://breakingdefense.com/2019/06/army-fields-anti-jam-gps-to-germany-this-fall/ (6 June 2019) Army Fields Anti-Jam GPS In Germany This Fall]</ref><ref name=jamUsDrones>[https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/russia-has-figured-out-how-jam-u-s-drones-syria-n863931 Russia has figured out how to jam U.S. drones in Syria, officials say]</ref>{{efn |name= gerasimovKilled |1= "All types of Russian precision munitions are seeing high failure rates".<ref name= hiFailureRates >Tara Copp [https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/forces-halt-kyiv-advance-russia-says-donbass-was-only-goal-all-along/363650/ (25 Mar 2022) Russian Forces Halt Kyiv Advance as Kremlin Says Donbass Was Only Goal All Along] "Pentagon official rebuts Moscow's claims about war aims, casualties; adds that Russian precision munitions are failing at high rates". (20 to 60 %)</ref> Connectivity to [[GLONASS]] is a factor in the lack of Russian [[Precision-guided munition|PGM]] availability,<ref name= grozev /><ref name= pntGps >Tobias Naegele [https://www.airandspaceforces.com/qa-the-new-chief-of-space-operations-on-empowering-the-force/ (27 Nov 2022) Q&A: The New Chief of Space Operations on Empowering the Force] "one B-2 hits 80 independent targets because of GPS".—Gen. B.Chance Saltzman, Space Force</ref> and the use of [[3G]]/[[4G]] [[cell tower]]s for Russian [[encrypted communication]]s (Era)
<ref name= 3g4gNeededForRussianERA >Rob Waugh (8 Mar 2022) [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-military-being-hacked-after-its-own-soldiers-destroy-3-g-internet-towers-104303881.html  'Idiots': Russian military phone calls hacked after own soldiers destroy 3G towers] 3G/4G Towers Needed For Russian encrypted communications (Era)</ref> at the beginning of the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]].<ref name= vakil >Caroline Vakil [https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/599747-us-officials-russia-behind-hack-of-ukrainian-satellite-communications-at (25 Mar 2022) US officials say Russia behind hack of Ukrainian satellite communications at invasion start: report] Apparently [[Spetsnaz GRU|GRU-instigated]]: 'compromise of tens of thousands of [[satellite modem]]s provided by Viasat's [[KA-SAT]] service' at the beginning of the invasion</ref> "On February 24, 2022 between 5 and 9 AM, just as Russian forces were starting their missile attacks, hackers targeted satellite modems that communicate with Viasat's [[KA-SAT]]".<ref name= notWhatYouThink >Not What You Think  [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4T1gz_0EHg (25 Mar 2022) Are Tanks Obsolete? The Future of Warfare]</ref>{{rp|min 15:01}} This weakness was unearthed during the use of open communication ("Russian commanders are sometimes piggybacking on Ukrainian cell phone networks to communicate")<ref name= "Russian troops taking Ukraine sim cards" >Mehul Srivastava, Madhumita Murgia, and Hannah Murphy, Financial Times (3/9/2022, 8:33 AM) [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/03/the-secret-us-mission-to-bolster-ukraines-cyber-defences-ahead-of-russias-invasion/ The secret US mission to bolster Ukraine’s cyber defences ahead of Russia’s invasion ] European official: "instead of communicating solely through encrypted military-grade phones, Russian commanders are sometimes piggybacking on Ukrainian cell phone networks to communicate, at times simply by using their Russian cell phones.

'The Ukrainians love it—there is so much data in simply watching these phones, whether or not they are using encrypted apps,' he said.

The Ukrainians then block Russian phones from their local networks at key moments, further jamming their communications. 'Then you suddenly see Russian soldiers grabbing cell phones off Ukrainians on the street, raiding repair shops for sims,' he said. 'This is not sophisticated stuff. It’s quite puzzling."</ref> when [[Federal Security Service|FSB]] was discussing the [[List of Russian generals killed during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine|deaths of their generals]]: Vitaly Gerasimov, killed 7 Mar 2022;<ref name= pichetaGuy >Rob Picheta and Jack Guy, CNN [https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/08/europe/russian-general-killed-ukraine-kharkiv-intl/index.html (8 Mar 2022) Ukraine claims Russian general has been killed in Kharkiv]</ref> [[Andrei Sukhovetsky]], killed 28 Feb 2022.<ref name= cunningham >Doug Cunningham [https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2022/03/03/ukraine-russia-invasion-chechen-magomed-tushayev-killed/9981646322278/ (3 Mar 2022) Ukraine forces say Chechen commander Magomed Tushayev killed near Kyiv]</ref><ref name= grozev >Jamie Ross, who cites Christo Grozev of Bellingcat: (Tue, March 8, 2022, 5:32 AM) [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-officer-complains-dead-general-113255353.html (7 March 2022) Russian Officer Complains About Dead General and Comms Meltdown in Intercepted Call] FSB ([[Federal Security Service]], successor agency to the KGB) officers discuss Gerasimov's death amid the destruction of 3G/4G cell towers in Ukraine, and the loss of Russian encrypted communications (Era), which compromised the FSB officer's sim-card-enabled phone call.</ref><ref name= astoundingLosses >MSNBC Morning Joe [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kz7SBfr1Wu0  (28 Mar 2022) 'Astounding' Number Of Casualties: Why The Invasion Is Proving Deadly For Russia ]</ref><ref name= russiaJammingGps >Elizabeth Howell, Space.com [https://tech.slashdot.org/story/22/04/13/2252258/russia-is-jamming-gps-satellite-signals-in-ukraine-us-space-force-says (14 Apr 2022) Russia Is Jamming GPS Satellite Signals In Ukraine, US Space Force Says ] "When four satellites are available, GPS receivers can use their signals to calculate the user's position, often to within just a few feet" —Navstar being jammed</ref>}} In 2014 the DoD's research and engineering chief Alan Shaffer warned that the 'US lost dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum'<ref name=alanShaffer2014/>  (EMS), in part due to the US government selloff of EMS radio frequencies, and also due in part to the proliferation of digital technologies which allow for low-cost jammers.<ref name=alanShaffer2014 >Sydney Freedberg, Jr. [https://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/us-has-lost-dominance-in-electromagnetic-spectrum-shaffer/ (3 September 2014) US Has Lost ‘Dominance In Electromagnetic Spectrum’: Shaffer]</ref> (''See: [[meaconing]]'')<ref name=kosmos2542 >Stephen Clark [https://spaceflightnow.com/2019/11/25/russia-launches-space-surveillance-satellite/ (25 November 2019) Russia launches space surveillance satellite] Kosmos 2542, in a polar orbit—"[To] monitor the condition of other Russian satellites in orbit."</ref><ref name=cosmos2542 >Joseph Trevithick [https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32031/a-russian-inspector-spacecraft-now-appears-to-be-shadowing-an-american-spy-satellite (30 January 2020) A Russian "Inspector" Spacecraft Now Appears To Be Shadowing An American Spy Satellite] USA 245 is a [[KH-11 Kennen|KH-11 series]] satellite; Cosmos 2542 is now tailing the USA 245's movements with a precision of 150 to 300 kilometers. ''See [[Hall thruster]]''</ref> General [[Valery Gerasimov]] advocates [[hybrid warfare]], a "blend of political, economic and military power to bear against adversaries".<ref >Andrew E. Kramer [https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/world/europe/russia-hybrid-war-gerasimov.html (2 March 2019) Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War]</ref><ref name=aspirational >Paul McCleary [https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/dunford-first-nato-strategy-okd-in-decades/ (30 May 2019) Dunford: Leaders Mull First NATO Strategy In Decades]</ref><ref name=ruLibya > Neil Hauer [https://asiatimes.com/2020/02/russia-may-have-met-its-match-in-libya/  (26 February 2020) Russia may have met its match in Libya] Is unable to tip the balance, as it has in Syria. So Russia is escalating its involvement.</ref> Russia took Crimea without firing a shot.<ref name= putinPlanner >Andrew Goodman [https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/putin-the-planner/ (26 Apr 2022) Putin the Planner] Worked alongside Putin when he was Deputy Mayor of St. Petersberg. "Whatever happens on the ground now, there is good reason to think that Putin will continue to pursue a solution on his terms as long as he remains in power".</ref><ref name= postUkrInvasion/>{{efn|name= speedScopeOfLogisticAid}}<ref name= tinkov >Clare Sebastian and Chris Liakos, CNN [https://us.cnn.com/2022/04/20/business/oleg-tinkov-ukraine-insane-war/index.html (20 Apr 2022) Russian billionaire Oleg Tinkov blasts Putin's 'insane war' in Ukraine]</ref><ref name=nonKinetic >Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. [https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/covid-19-army-futures-command-takes-wargames-online/   (21 April 2020) COVID-19: Army Futures Command Takes Wargames Online ]</ref>{{anchor|antiSat}} In April 2020 Russia tested an anti-satellite system for [[low Earth orbit]] (LEO) satellites.<ref name=spaceArmsRace >Aaron Bateman [https://thebulletin.org/2020/05/as-russian-satellites-stalk-us-ones-is-a-space-arms-race-heating-up/ (22 May 2020) As Russia stalks US satellites, a space arms race may be heating up]</ref> On 15 November 2021, a Russian [[Anti-satellite weapon#Russia|anti-satellite test]] destroyed its [[Kosmos 1408]], endangering its own cosmonauts on the [[International Space Station]], and other satellites in [[low earth orbit]].<ref name= asat15Nov2021 >Theresa Hitchens [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/suspected-russian-ground-launched-asat-test-scatters-dangerous-debris-through-leo/ (15 November 2021) Russian suspected ground-launched ASAT test scatters dangerous debris through LEO]
*[https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/surprise-russian-asat-test-shows-need-to-scale-space-tracking-leolabs-says/ (16 November 2021) Surprise Russian ASAT test shows need to ‘scale’ space tracking, LeoLabs says]</ref><ref name= 2021Kupol>Specialist website Russian Space Web [https://phys.org/news/2021-11-russia-military-satellite.html (25 Nov 2021) Russia launches classified military satellite]</ref><ref name=ruSaysIncomingMeansNuclear >Vladimir Isachenkov, The Associated Press [https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/08/09/russia-warns-it-will-see-any-incoming-missile-as-nuclear/ (9 Aug 2020) Russia warns it will see any incoming missile as nuclear]</ref><ref name=useOfNuclearWeapRussia >Mark B. Schneider [https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/09/19/will_russia_further_lower_its_nuclear_weapons_use_threshold_577995.html (19 Sep 2020) Will Russia Further Lower Its Nuclear Weapons Use Threshold?]</ref>  Cyber attacks on the whole of the US government via [[Supply chain attack#SolarWindsOrionPlatform|Supply_chain_attack § Whole of government]] began in March 2020, but only reached the attention of the news media on 14 December 2020.<ref name=nscDec2020 >Eric Geller https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/14/massively-disruptive-cyber-crisis-engulfs-multiple-agencies-445376 (14 Dec 2020) 'Massively disruptive' cyber crisis engulfs multiple agencies]</ref><ref name=svrApt29Cozybear >Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg [https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/russian-government-hackers-are-behind-a-broad-espionage-campaign-that-has-compromised-us-agencies-including-treasury-and-commerce/ar-BB1bToak (14 Dec 2020)  Russian government hackers are behind a broad espionage campaign that has compromised U.S. agencies, including Treasury and Commerce] Identified as SVR /APT29 /Cozy Bear, according to FireEye. Breached using the update server of SolarWinds, its Orion Platform, versions released in Mar & Jun 2020.
*Catalin Cimpanu  [https://it.slashdot.org/story/20/12/15/1810225/solarwinds-says-18000-customers-were-impacted-by-recent-hack (14 Dec 2020) SolarWinds Says 18,000 Customers Were Impacted by Recent Hack]
*Dan Goodin [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/12/18000-organizations-downloaded-backdoor-planted-by-cozy-bear-hackers/ (14 Dec 2020) ~18,000 organizations downloaded backdoor planted by Cozy Bear hackers]</ref> Russia is mapping the undersea cables which bear the majority of the communications traffic{{efn |name= gerasimovKilled}} between the US and Europe.<ref name= natoRu >Lorne Cook [https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/05/30/as-russia-tensions-simmer-nato-conducts-massive-war-games/ (30 May 2021) As Russia tensions simmer, NATO conducts massive war games]
*Thomas Newdick [https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43094/norwegian-undersea-surveillance-network-had-its-cables-mysteriously-cut (11 Nov 2021) Norwegian Undersea Surveillance Network Had Its Cables Mysteriously Cut]</ref><ref name= russiaInArctic  >Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen and Gwladys Fouche, Reuters [https://news.yahoo.com/nato-allies-wake-russian-supremacy-113953199.html (16 Nov 2022) NATO allies wake up to Russian supremacy in the Arctic]</ref><ref name= emsUnderstated >John Christianson  [https://warontherocks.com/2022/12/fighting-and-winning-in-the-electromagnetic-spectrum/ (5 Dec 2022) FIGHTING AND WINNING IN THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM] (EMS)</ref>
#*On 25 December 2021 President Putin disclosed that Russia would be unable to defend itself against missiles launched against Moscow from Ukraine; their flight times would be four to five minutes, according to him.<ref name= missileDefenseGap >Vladimir Isachenkov, The Associated Press [https://www.armytimes.com/flashpoints/2021/12/26/putin-to-mull-options-if-west-refuses-guarantees-on-ukraine/ (26 Dec 2021) Putin to mull options if West refuses guarantees on Ukraine]</ref> However, Putin did not acknowledge that the West's [[Aegis_Ballistic_Missile_Defense_System#Aegis_Ashore|Aegis Ashore]] sites in Poland and Romania are for defense against ballistic missiles, and not the [[Tomahawk (missile family)|Tomahawk missile]]s which he named in his statement.<ref name= putin's1Feb2022Statement /> ''See: [[A-135 anti-ballistic missile system]], [[A-235 anti-ballistic missile system]], [[S-400 missile system]], [[S-500 missile system]] ''  To prove that Aegis Ashore is defensive only, inspection of the sites in Poland and Romania have been offered to Russia.<ref name= mongilio >Heather Mongilio [https://news.usni.org/2022/02/02/u-s-offered-russians-aegis-ashore-inspections-to-ease-ukraine-tensions-more-american-troops-headed-to-europe (2 Feb 2022) U.S. Offered Russians Aegis Ashore Inspections to Ease Ukraine Tensions; More American Troops Headed to Europe]</ref>
#*{{anchor|UkraineStandoff}}{{anchor| UkraineStandoff2021 }}[[File:2014_Russo-ukrainian-conflict_map.svg|right|thumb|2014 map of line separating Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces]][[Ukraine]] had a trench network on its border with Russia, in a [[standoff (draw)|standoff]] as of April 2021.<ref name=ukraineTrenches >Matthew Chance [https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/12/europe/ukraine-zelensky-front-lines/index.html (12 Apr 2021) Ukraine's President heads to the trenches as Russia masses its troops] Troops and armor are massing by rail, within Russia's border.</ref><ref name=donbassCrimea >ZEYNEP BILGINSOY [https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ukraine-turkey-leaders-meet-istanbul-76994425?cid=referral_taboola_feed  (10 Apr 2021) The leaders of Ukraine, Turkey stress territorial integrity] Donbass and Crimea are disputed.</ref><ref name=apBlinken >The Associated Press [https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/blinken-heads-brussels-talks-afghanistan-ukraine-77018360?cid=clicksource_4380645_7_film_strip_icymi_hed (12 Apr 2021) Blinken heads to Brussels for talks on Afghanistan, Ukraine] SecDef Lloyd Austin will attend.</ref><ref name=canUkraineDeployUsMateriel >Lara Seligman and Natasha Bertand [https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/12/ukraine-us-missile-weapons-russia-480985 (04/12/2021) Can Ukraine deploy U.S.-made weapons against the Russians?] [[FGM-148 Javelin]] anti-tank missiles barely overmatch Uran-9s</ref><ref name=eucomOnAlert >Lara Seligman [https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/12/ukraine-us-missile-weapons-russia-480985 (03/31/2021) Pentagon ‘watching’ as Russia steps up aggression in Eastern Europe] A ceasefire between the Ukraine Army and Donetsk separatists ended Jun 2020. EUCOM's [[V Corps (United States)|V Corps]] has been on pre-planned maneuvers, but in a NATO partner's territory as of April 2021.</ref><ref name= sanctionSeparatists>Vivian Salama in Kyiv and William Mauldin in Washington [https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-aims-sanctions-at-pro-russian-separatists-as-antony-blinken-plans-ukraine-russia-meetings-11642529955 (18 Jan 2022) U.S. Aims Sanctions at Pro-Russian Agents as Blinken Plans Ukraine, Russia Meetings]</ref><ref name= usMilitaryOptionsInUkraine >Robert Burns [https://news.yahoo.com/explainer-us-military-options-help-051846265.html (19 Jan 2022) Explainer: What are US military options to help Ukraine?]</ref> A border exercise involving 110,000 Russian troops on the Ukraine border<ref name=osceJammed /><ref name= tensOfThousands >Olivia Gazis [https://www.cbsnews.com/video/putin-russia-military-exercises-in-and-around-ukraine/ (22 Apr 2021)) After Putin's warning to West, Russia begins large-scale military exercises in and around Ukraine ]</ref> has pulled back; however hundreds of armored vehicles, including tanks are remaining {{convert|100|mi}} from Donbas (colloquial for Donets basin)<ref >Nils Adler, Laura King ''Los Angeles Times'' [https://www.yahoo.com/news/eastern-ukraine-trench-warfare-grinds-013859454.html (21 Jan 2022) In eastern Ukraine, trench warfare grinds on against backdrop of invasion fears]
*Greg Ganske [https://www.yahoo.com/news/opinion-why-war-ukraine-matter-155933627.html (22 Jan 2022) Opinion: Why would war in Ukraine matter to the United States?]</ref> in spite of a partial armor pullback.<ref name="tanksNotPulledBack">{{Cite news|last1=Kramer|first1=Andrew E.|last2=Troianovski|first2=Anton|author-link2=Anton Troianovski|last3=Jakes|first3=Lara|date=2021-04-22|title=Russia Orders Partial Pullback From Ukraine Border Region|language=en|work=[[The New York Times]]|location=Moscow and Kyiv|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/22/world/europe/russia-ukraine-military-pullback.html|url-access=limited|issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name= falseFlag>Jim Garamone, DOD News [https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2900210/russia-trying-to-develop-pretext-for-ukraine-invasion-dod-official-says/ (14 Jan 2022) Russia Trying to Develop Pretext for Ukraine Invasion, DOD Official Says]</ref> [[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe|Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]] (OCSE) drones which are monitoring the line between Ukrainian troops and the Donbas separatists are seeing jamming of their drone's dual GPS receivers, with tens of thousands of infantry troops remaining on the Ukrainian border.<ref name=osceJammed >Paul McLeary [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/jamming-strikes-osce-drones-tracking-russian-forces/ (7 May 2021) Jamming Strikes OSCE Drones Tracking Russian Forces]</ref> The OSCE has provided a map of the line dividing the Ukrainian forces and the Russian-backed forces.<ref name= osceMap>Michael Schwirtz 
 ''New York Times'' [https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/06/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-front.html (6 Dec 2021) On Ukrainian Front, Grinding War and Weary Anticipation of Invasion] Map of "Approximate line separating Ukrainian and Russian-backed forces"</ref><ref name= UkraineMap>''New York Times'' [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/01/07/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html Ukraine map (7 Jan 2022) How Russia's Military is Positioned To Threaten Ukraine]</ref> As of 18 February 2022 there were up to 190,000 troops along Ukraine's borders;<ref name= schogolSzoldra >Jeff Schogol, Paul Szoldra [https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-ukraine-invasion/ (21 Feb 2022) Moscow orders Russian troops into Ukraine]</ref> after recognizing the separatist states of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Moscow is moving troops over the border of Russia into the Donetsk and Luhansk areas, and establishing military bases there.<ref name= basesInDonetskLuhansk >Reuters [https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-gets-green-light-deploy-164113297.html (22 February 2022) Putin gets green light to deploy troops to eastern Ukraine]</ref> This troop movement triggered sanctions on five Russian banks and three individuals, on 22 February 2022.<ref name= riley >Charles Riley [https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/22/business/sanctions-russia-ukraine/index.html (22 February 2022) The sanctions that could really hurt Russia]</ref><ref name= schogolSzoldra /><ref name= marketReaction >Charles Riley  [https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/22/investing/russia-markets-ruble-economy/index.html (22 February 2022) Russia is already paying a hefty financial price for its aggression]</ref>{{efn|name= speedScopeOfLogisticAid}} (''See [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]]'' which began 24 February 2022)
#**{{anchor| Novorossia }}Andrei Illarionov cites Pavel Felgengauer, who projects a scenario by which Russia can create a '[[Novorossiya|Novorossia]]' (see [[#UkraineStandoff2021 |§ CSIS figures 2a-2c]])<ref name= pickrell>Ryan Pickrell [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-forces-massing-ukraines-border-171102353.html (25 Jan 2022) Russian forces are massing on Ukraine's border. Here's what Russia watchers think could be Putin's next big move.] Figures 2a-2c CSIS scenarios</ref> stretching across Southern Ukraine to Transnistria (Moldova) after a gas pipeline to the EU is completed (September 2021).<ref name= aillarionov >Andrei Illarionov [https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/putin-was-not-ready-to-launch-a-war-in-the-spring/ (30 April 2021) Putin was not ready to launch a war in the Spring]</ref> If the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline were to be weaponized by holding the [[liquefied natural gas]] (LNG) supply to Western Europe hostage, the US is countering this threat with contingency plans to redirect LNG supplies from the rest of the world.<ref name= germanyStopsNordStream2 /><ref name= stepUpLngProduction>natasha Bertrand [https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/23/politics/us-gas-production-strategy-russia-ukraine-invasion/index.html (23 Jan 2022) US putting together 'global' strategy to increase gas production if Russia invades Ukraine, officials say]</ref><ref name= swift>Charles Riley [https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/26/investing/swift-russia-ukraine/index.html (26 Jan 2022) What is SWIFT and why it might be the weapon Russia fears most]</ref> Germany has agreed to safeguard Ukraine, as well.<ref name= germanDefenseSpendTo2PercentOfGdp>[[Deutsche Welle]] [https://www.dw.com/en/germany-commits-100-billion-to-defense-spending/a-60933724 (27 Feb 2022) Germany commits €100 billion to defense spending] Scholz: Germany has now agreed to a one-time $113 billion increase in its defense budget.</ref><ref name= nordstream2 >Christian Datoc [https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-lifted-nord-stream-2-220700049.html (15 July 2021) US lifted Nord Stream 2 sanctions to gain German cooperation in safeguarding Ukraine, Biden says]</ref><ref name= aBaerbock>Alexander Ratz and Pavel Polityuk [https://news.yahoo.com/germany-says-russia-pay-price-123941018.html (17 Jan 2022) Germany says Russia will pay price if it moves on Ukraine]</ref><ref name= binkov'sProjectionForRussia'sAction >Binkov [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9c_HhpvBpg (26 Jan 2022) What might happen if Russia does attack Ukraine? ] Ukraine is outgunned. Russia would likely stop when resistance stiffens, in Spring 2022. Europe would be divided over heating supplies for impending winter. Ties between Russia and China would strengthen as Europe sanctions its trade with Russia due to war.</ref>{{efn|name= regionalBlocEu |1=In 2022 Russia's [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|actions against Ukraine]] alerted 'the West' (that is, Europe, and its NATO partners) to the threat to Europe's food and energy supply.<ref name= picheta>Rob Picheta [https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/29/europe/russia-ukraine-global-implications-cmd-intl/index.html (29 Jan 2022) How a Russian invasion of Ukraine would reverberate around the world]</ref><ref name= leadersPutin/> After the 2008 war in Georgia, and the 2014 takeover of Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine,<ref name= putin's1Feb2022Statement/>{{rp|2:42}} a political takeover of Ukraine is a likely objective of Russian leadership.<ref name= leadersPutin/><ref name= russGrandStrategy/><ref name= caspianReport/>}}<ref name= germanyStopsNordStream2 >Rick Rouan, Courtney Subramanian, Joey Garrison and David Jackson, USA Today [https://news.yahoo.com/germany-stops-nord-stream-2-124518525.html (22 February 2022) Biden levels sanctions on Russia for beginning an invasion of Ukraine: live updates]</ref><ref name= 23feb2022 >Jessie Yeung, Adam Renton, Rob Picheta, Ed Upright, Aditi Sangal, Adrienne Vogt and Melissa Macaya, CNN [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589 (23 Feb 2022) The latest on the Ukraine-Russia crisis] Situation</ref> ''See [[2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage]] —26 September 2022 ''
#**{{anchor|attacksOnUkraine2022}}Cyber attacks on Ukrainian government websites are occurring in January 2022.<ref name= cyberAttackOnUkraine>Roman Olearchyk and Henry Foy, Financial Times [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/01/ukraine-says-government-websites-hit-by-massive-cyber-attack/ (14 Jan 2022) Ukraine says government websites hit by "massive cyber attack"]</ref><ref name= ukraineViewOfStandoff >Howard Altman [https://www.armytimes.com/flashpoints/2022/01/19/russian-attack-could-happen-any-minute-ukraine-official-says/ (19 Jan 2022) Russian attack could happen 'any minute' Ukraine official says]</ref> Frida Ghitis and Richard Galant point out that the [[Rasputitsa|muddy season that ends winter]] would bog down an armored invasion.<ref name= ghitis>Frida Ghitis [https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/13/opinions/putin-russia-us-nato-miscalculation-ghitis/index.html (13 Jan 2022) Putin's big miscalculation]</ref><ref name= galant/><ref name= aillarionov/> US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinen points out that if the Russian Army were to attempt a quick ''[[fait accompli]]'' and then dig in, its logistical capability would be insufficient to complete a large land grab, as its logistic capabilities are largely based on railroads, but not trucks.<ref name= vershinen>US Army Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinen [https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-russian-army-logistics/ (23 Nov 2021) Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli]</ref><ref name= fieldHospital>Matthew Chance, Kylie Atwood, Emmet Lyons and Ami Kaufman, CNN  [https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/18/europe/ukraine-intelligence-russia-military-build-up-intl/index.html (19 Jan 2021) Ukraine warns Russia has 'almost completed' build-up of forces near border]
*[https://seemorerocks.is/russia-sets-up-army-field-hospital-near-ukraine-moves-iskander-missiles-and-amphibious-landing-craft-from-caspian-sea-to-ukraine-coast/ (10 Apr 2021) Russia Sets Up Army Field Hospital Near Ukraine; Moves Iskander Missiles and Amphibious Landing Craft From Caspian Sea to Ukraine Coast!]</ref> Russia's logistic capability without railroads is {{convert|90|mi}}, without replenishment;<ref name= vershinen /> thus Sebastien Roblin suggests that a "short, victorious war" by Russia (as in the 12-day war with Georgia in 2008), with stipulations largely resembling its current diplomatic demands, namely installation of pro-Russian leadership, Ukraine's withdrawal from the path of joining NATO etc., coupled with the expedient of bypassing Russian control of Kyiv's population, might avoid Russia's getting bogged down in Ukraine.<ref name= counterBoggingDown >Eric Schmitt, Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-recruiting-mercenaries-syrians-ukraine-115514041.html (7 Apr 2022) Russia Is Recruiting Mercenaries and Syrians to Ukraine, Western Officials Say]</ref> This calculation could get up-ended by a longer war,{{efn|name= speedScopeOfLogisticAid}}{{efn|name= surgeInMaterielDeterrence |1= [[#russia|Russia's invasion]] was countered by [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine#Foreign military sales and aid|$100 billion in logistical aid to Ukraine, Feb-Dec 2022]]; however the aid is becoming constrained by the capacity of the US's industrial base to surge production.<ref name= surgeInMaterielReqs>Joe Gould  [https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/11/21/weapons-shortages-spark-tough-choices-for-ukraines-allies/ (21 Nov 2022) Weapons shortages spark tough choices for Ukraine’s allies]</ref> The invasion is causing materiel shortages in Russia.<ref name= ruShortages >Stephen Fidler and Ann M. Simmons [https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-munitions-shortages-raise-questions-over-how-long-it-can-continue-ukraine-war-11669107174 (22 Nov 2022) Russia’s Munitions Shortages Raise Questions Over How Long It Can Continue Ukraine War]</ref> The surge in aid to Ukraine is causing NATO to acquire more interoperable materiel from a global industrial base, for more integrated deterrence across the NATO alliance against its adversaries.<ref name= putinTransformsNato >Rachel Nostrant [https://www.yahoo.com/scramble-rearm-ukraine-transforming-nato-224700788.html (22 Nov 2022) The scramble to rearm Ukraine is transforming NATO in a way that would've been hard without Putin's help]</ref><ref name= euDefenseInvest >Patrick Tucker  [https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/11/why-defense-budgets-will-stay-high-after-ukraine-war/380110/ ( Why Defense Budgets Will Stay High After the Ukraine War] "The war is exposing how European nations were underinvesting in defense, and the critical role that renewable energy will play in transatlantic security" </ref> }} with determined resistance in Ukraine,<ref>[https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-receives-second-batch-us-weapons-russian-stand-off-2022-01-23/ (23 Jan 2022) Ukraine receives second batch of U.S. weapons in Russian stand-off]</ref><ref name= ukrainianCivilianResistance >Julie Coleman [https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-afraid-us-regular-ukrainian-205128827.html (1 Feb 2022) 'Putin should be afraid of us': Regular Ukrainian civilians are training to fight off a Russian invasion] Training in Kharkiv and Kyiv</ref> via guerilla warfare,<ref name= cooper>Helene Cooper [https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/us/politics/russia-ukraine-biden-military.html (14 Jan 2022) U.S. Considers Backing an Insurgency if Russia Invades Ukraine]</ref><ref name= ruForceDesign >Michael Kofman and Rob Lee [https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/ (2 Jun 2022) Not Built For Purpose: The Russian Military's Ill-Fated Force Decision] Platoons on paper were half-sized in reality, leading to no dismounted infantry in motorized units.</ref> as in [[Afghanistan conflict (1978–present)|Afghanistan (1979-1989)]], which indirectly [[Dissolution of the Soviet Union|ended]] the Soviet Union.<ref name= roblinGeorgiaModel>Sebastien Roblin [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/the-georgia-model-russias-plan-for-invading-ukraine/ (21 Jan 2022) The ‘Georgia Model’: Russia’s Plan For Invading Ukraine?]</ref> Within two months of the beginning of the [[First Chechen War]], an antiwar movement arose in Russia.<ref name= vershinen /><ref name= putinAbsentG20 />
#***{{anchor|eveOfProxyWar}}On 22 February 2022 historian Sergey Radchenko recalled a vignette from September 1945, during the post World War II [[Potsdam Conference]] negotiations on the division of world power at the [[London Conference of Foreign Ministers]], when Soviet Foreign Commissar [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] asked U.S. Secretary of State [[James F. Byrnes]] whether he carried the atomic bomb in his side pocket, to which Byrnes threatened Molotov to stop stalling, or else Byrnes would pull the atomic bomb out of his pocket and use it on Molotov (''laughter''). Molotov was guided by Stalin's directive "It is clear that you must display complete obduracy".<ref name= obduracy >Sergey Radchenko [https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/moscow-musings-on-brinksmanship-from-stalin-to-putin/ (22 February 2022) Moscow Musings on Brinksmanship From Stalin to Putin]</ref> (''See [[Proxy war]]'')
#* Russia and Belarus began Zapad 2021, a 200,000-troop exercise held every four years.<ref>Anton Troianovski  [https://bdnews24.com/politics/2021/09/10/russia-and-belarus-inch-closer-to-a-full-blown-merger (10 Sep 2021) Russia and Belarus inch closer to a full-blown merger]</ref><ref>Michael Kofman [https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/zapad-2021-what-to-expect-from-russias-strategic-military-exercise/ (8 Sep 2021) Zapad-2021: What to Expect From Russia's Strategic Military Exercise]</ref> The [[Pripyat marshes]] would bog down an armored invasion through Belarus.<ref name= galant>Richard Galant [https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/23/opinions/putin-ominous-forecast-ukraine-column-galant/index.html (23 Jan 2022) Putin confronts the mud of Ukraine]</ref>{{rp|2:22}}{{efn|name= speedScopeOfLogisticAid}}
#*In the opinion of [[James Stavridis]], the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is showing that Special Forces, unmanned systems, and Cyber will become far more important in the future.<ref name= socomUnmannedCyber >James Stavridis [https://www.yahoo.com/news/u-military-needs-learn-ukraine-100039536.html (11 Apr 2022) What the U.S. Military Needs to Learn from the Ukraine War] </ref>
#*In 2021 Russia spent 2.7 percent of its GDP on defense, a level which is expected to drop to 2.3 percent by 2023, as part of a mandate to boost domestic production.<ref name= pctGdp >Alexander Bratersky [https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2021/09/03/private-companies-at-army-2021-forum-strive-for-survival-as-russian-military-orders-shrink/ (3 Sep 2021) Private companies at ‘Army 2021’ forum strive for survival as Russian military orders shrink]</ref>
#**{{anchor|Uran-9}}Unmanned ground combat vehicles (UGCVs), among them [[Uran-6]], [[Uran-9]] (Уран-9), and [[Uran-14]] are entering service in the Russian Army as of 2021. Uran-6 is a [[mine flail]]; Uran-14 is an unmanned firefighting vehicle. Uran-9s are semi-autonomous robotic combat vehicles; specialists can operate them using mobile control stations.<ref name=uran9/> Their first attempted service was in Syria. Analysts from [[BAE Systems]] (UK) assessed the Uran-9s in Syria as unreliable, with their radio-controls sometimes blocked by buildings; their sensors and guidance were unstabilized.<ref name=beltran2021/> An armed Uran-9 weighs 12 tons,<ref name=beltran2021>Isabella Beltran [https://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/30592/20210410/robotic-russian-tanks-deployed-near-future-despite-ukraine-war-fears.htm (10 Apr 2021) Uran-9, Russian Robotic Tanks Slated to be Deployed "Soon" Despite Flaws During Syrian Tests, The Sc''i''encetimes] (Mixed-font ''I'' in 'science' appears deliberate.)</ref> and measures 5 meters long, which is a fifth of the weight and half the length of a T-90 tank.<ref name=roblin/> Each Uran-9 control system operates at ranges up to {{convert|1.8|mi}} from the UGVs;<ref name= 20ugvs > Axx [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qOQk2gRU-Ls (14 Sep 2021) Russia one step ahead, Why Russia's strike robots is scary enough]</ref>{{rp|min 1:00}}<ref name=ugvControlSystem>[[Zvezda (TV channel)]] [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KDeWeQ1Z8Lc Воины будущего. Какими возможностями обладают поступившие на вооружение ВС РФ боевые роботы «Уран-9»] Uran-9 Control system</ref>{{rp|minute 2:20}} each control system currently (2021) guides 4 UGVs, in a leader-follower configuration.<ref name=roblin >Sebastien Roblin [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/robot-tank-russia-used-syria-89866 (21 October 2019) This Is the Robot Tank Russia Used in Syria]</ref><ref name=uran9 >Combat Approved [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b_qMMZqlByg (13 Feb 2021) Episode 44. The Uran-9 Russia’s First Combat Robot]</ref><ref name=armyTechology/>  Uran-9 was used in the [[Vostok 2018]] exercises in 2018. At least 20 Uran-9 UGCVs exist.<ref name=armyTechology >Army Technology.com [https://www.army-technology.com/projects/uran-9-unmanned-ground-combat-vehicle/ (2016) Uran-9 Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle]</ref><ref name=uran9/>
#**Russia's defense ministry has signed a contract to field the Tsirkon hypersonic missiles to its troops in 2025.<ref name= tsirkon >James Crump  [https://www.newsweek.com/russia-defense-ministry-tsirkon-hypersonic-missile-test-putin-weapons-combat-alert-1622512 (24 Aug 2021) Russia Orders Hypersonic Missiles As Putin Vows to Put Weapons on 'Combat Alert']</ref>
#**During the 2021 negotiations for defusing the Ukraine-Russia confrontation, Deputy Foreign Minister [[Sergei Ryabkov]] has warned that its [[9M729]] nuclear-capable cruise missile, which is already deployed in the European part of Russia, might be further employed there.<ref name= 9M729>Alexander Marrow and Mark Trevelyan (Reuters) [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-says-lack-nato-security-075933695.html (13 Dec 2021) Russia says it may be forced to deploy mid-range nuclear missiles in Europe]</ref>{{efn|name=esperNote}}
#** The [[hypersonic flight#Hypersonic weapons development|hypersonic]] [[Kh-47M2 Kinzhal]], and [[3M22 Zircon]] (Tsirkon) are standoff strike weapons, for keeping adversaries at bay; they are land-based, and sea-based respectively.<ref name= 7feb2022rcd >Roger McDermott [https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/02/07/the_role_of_hypersonic_weapons_in_russian_military_strategy_815512.html (7 Feb 2022) The Role of Hypersonic Weapons in Russian Military Strategy] Giperzvukovogo Oruzhiya—(GZO); or Giperzvukovyye letatel’nyye apparaty—(GZLA) Kinzhal, Tsirkon, Kalibr, Poseidon, Avangard, Burevestnik, Sarmat,</ref>{{efn|name=esperNote}}
#* On 1 September 2022 Russia, China, India, and 11 other nations began a scaled-down Vostok 2022 (East 2022).<ref name= vostok2022 >The Moscow Times [https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/01/russia-stages-scaled-down-war-games-with-china-india-a78694 (1 September 2022) Russia Stages Scaled-down War Games With China, India]</ref> Vostok will exercise 50,000 troops, down from 300,000 in 2018. India is contributing 75 troops.<ref name= vostok2022/>
#* By 19 October 2022 NATO nations were providing winter [[Foreign involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine#Foreign military sales and aid to Ukraine|equipment to Ukraine]].<ref name= winterMateriel >Paul McLeary [https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/19/ukraine-nato-russia-winter-equipment-00062596 (19 October 2022) NATO is rushing equipment to Ukraine as troops hunker down for the winter] "The war begins a new phase as Russia launches missiles and temperatures fall"</ref> By Spring 2023 the US industrial base can be providing 20,000 rounds of 155mm howitzer munitions per month to Ukraine.<ref name= reaganForum >Brian Bender and Laura Seligman  [https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/04/pentagon-industry-struggle-to-arm-ukraine-00072125 (4 Dec 2022) "We haven't got this figured out just yet": Pentagon, industry struggle to arm Ukraine] "The Russia problem takes center stage at this year's Reagan National Defense Forum". </ref>
#* Beginning 1 April 2023 400,000 contract servicemen are to replenish the Russian army.<ref name=400thousandContractors >Ukrayinska Pravda [https://news.yahoo.com/russian-army-replenished-400-000-032206330.html (15 Mar 2023) Russian army to be replenished with 400,000 new contract service personnel] starting 1 Apr 2023</ref><ref name= diffRadarOnS200 >David Axe [https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/08/20/add-a-new-radar-to-an-old-air-defense-missile-and-youd-get-the-ukrainian-5v28-kyivs-most-potent-deep-strike-weapon/?sh=7f93c967ec9b (20 Aug 2023) Add A New Radar To An Old Air-Defense Missile, And You'd Get The Ukrainian 5V28—Kyiv's Most Potent Deep-Strike Weapon] Moscow shows no black/brown clouds of AK27F/TG02 propellant in its skies, to back its claims of an intercept</ref>
#*In a meeting in Moscow, March 2023 the presidents of China and Russia agreed to cooperate over a wide range of business, and economic issues, such as payment in local currencies (viz., Yuan or Rubles).<ref name=zhRuEconCoop >Evelyn Chang [https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/22/china-and-russia-affirm-multi-year-economic-cooperation.html (22 Mar 2023) China and Russia affirm economic cooperation for the next several years] Presidents Xi Jinping, V.V. Putin, respectively</ref><!--</><ref name= > [ ( ]</ref>-->
#{{anchor|china}}China<ref name=globalFirepower/>—RAND simulations show Blue losses.<ref name=7mar2019Aps >Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. [https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/us-gets-its-ass-handed-to-it-in-wargames-heres-a-24-billion-fix/ (7 March 2019) US ‘Gets Its Ass Handed To It’ In Wargames: Here’s A $24 Billion Fix] Army prepositioned stocks (APS) vulnerability</ref> Six of the top 15 defense companies in the world are now Chinese, in 2019 for the first time.<ref>''Defense News'' [https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/ (July 2019) Top 100 for 2019]</ref> The [[continuum of conflict#Competition continuum|competition]] with China was shaped in the decade 2010–2020, according to David Kriete.<ref name=KrieteStratcom >Theresa Hitchens  [https://breakingdefense.com/2019/07/competition-with-china-is-the-new-deterrence-us-military-leader-say/  (31 July 2019) Competition (With China) IS The New Deterrence, US Military Leaders Say] Vice Adm. David Kriete of [[US Strategic Command]]</ref><ref name=hypersonicNuclearWeapon>[https://tech.slashdot.org/story/19/10/01/1754209/china-confirms-new-hypersonic-nuclear-missile-on-70th-anniversary aj.com (1 Oct 2019) China Confirms New Hypersonic Nuclear Missile On 70th Anniversary ] [[DF-17]]
*Kristin Huang  [https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3023972/chinas-hypersonic-df-17-missile-threatens-regional-stability (23 Aug 2019) China’s hypersonic DF-17 missile threatens regional stability, analyst warns]
*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnDUjOl69Zw (1 Oct 2019) China unveils Dongfeng-17 conventional missiles in military parade] See minute 0:05 to 0:49 for 16 Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (white-tipped contrast atop their DF-17 fuselages mounted on booster rockets)
*Kathrin Hille in Taipei and Qianer Liu in Beijing [https://www.ft.com/content/07c7cfb0-e125-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc (1 Oct 2019) China displays military advances in show of strength to rivals] Lists missile armaments. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2FRDfF0V-iI FT video] FT estimates 1/3rd of China's missile arsenal is on display in 1 Oct parade
*BILL POWELL  [https://www.newsweek.com/chinas-hypersonic-missiles-aka-carrier-killers-are-holy-st-moment-us-military-1462794 (10/3/19) China's Hypersonic Missile, AKA 'Carrier Killers,' Are a 'Holy S**t Moment' for US Military]</ref><ref name=jl,3 >Bill Gertz [https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/dec/24/china-tests-submarine-launched-jl-3-missile-capabl/ (24 December 2019) China's test of sub-launched missile a threat to peace, retired captain warns] [[JL-3]] is an [[SLBM]]</ref> By 2023 China's defense companies were offering competitors to US Javelins, armed drones, and supersonic cruise missiles.<ref name= idexUae2023 >Ashley Roque [https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/as-us-worries-over-beijings-influence-in-middle-east-chinese-defense-firms-flock-to-idex-2023/ (22 Feb 2023) As US worries over Beijing’s influence in Middle East, Chinese defense firms flock to IDEX 2023] International Defense Exhibition in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates</ref>
#*Secretary [[Mark Esper]] said that China is aiming to be the dominant military power in Asia by 2049.<ref name=2049goalChina >Robert Burns [https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/08/27/esper-visit-to-tiny-palau-highlights-us-china-competition/ (27 Aug 2020) Esper visit to tiny Palau highlights US-China competition ]</ref><ref name= uscc.gov>uscc.gov [https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/Chapter%204%20Section%201%20-%20Beijing%E2%80%99s%20%E2%80%9CWorld-Class%E2%80%9D%20Military%20Goal.pdf (Nov 2019) Chapter 4: China's Global Ambitions]</ref><ref name= 2021airShow >David Kirton [https://www.yahoo.com/news/chinas-high-end-military-technology-043204687.html (30 Sep 2021) China's high-end military technology touted at biggest air show] Airshow China in Zhuhai</ref> The 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) of China's ruling party, aims to accelerate the army's modernization and informationization, in order to improve national security for 2027 (100th anniversary of its ruling party), according to Dean Cheng.<ref name=deanCheng >Dean Cheng [https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/chinese-party-sets-bold-military-goal-mechanized-informationized-by-2027/ (23 Nov 2020) Chinese Party Sets Bold Military Goal: ‘Mechanized & Informationized’ By 2027]</ref><ref name= JointGangyao >Dean Cheng [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/how-chinas-thinking-about-the-next-war/ (19 May 2021) How China’s Thinking About The Next War] Proposed doctrine: brigade-based, joint MDO</ref><ref name= j31j20f35Jadc2 >Kris Osborn [https://warriormaven.com/future-weapons/china-military-piracy-j-31-j-20-f-35-jadc2 (4 Feb 2022) China is Trying to Steal and Copy U.S. Military Multi-Domain Warfare Tactics] "accompanied by an effort to replicate emerging U.S. strategies and warfare maneuvers" including JADC2</ref> By 2023 China's working-age demographic (a shrinking labor force/ capital savings rate) will start to work against the Party's aspiration for 2027,<ref name= demographics >Deutsche Welle [https://youtube.com/watch?v=uGPije50LcI (21 May 2021) China releases population census with enormous implications for the country's future]</ref><ref name= birthrateFalling >Tanner Brown [https://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-population-crisis-is-complicated-what-it-means-for-the-countrys-economy-51642406402 (17 Jan 2022) China’s Population Crisis Is Complicated. What It Means for the Country’s Economy.]</ref><ref name= popDrop22 >Evelyn Cheng [https://slashdot.org/story/23/01/17/0318204/chinas-population-drops-for-the-first-time-in-decades (17 Jan 2023) China's Population Drops For the First Time In Decades] in 2022 </ref><ref name= chrisCappy >Task & Purpose  [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FgykoiAxR8 (22 Mar 2023)  4 Reasons China's Outta Time to Invade Taiwan] 1) Demographics; 2) TSMC; 3) Russia is now the largest oil supplier to China; 4) Ukraine as cautionary example. </ref><ref name= navyReadiness >60 Minutes [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEc5hsWNsCQ (19 Mar 2023) Is the Navy ready? How the U.S. is preparing amid a naval buildup in China ] USS Nimitz</ref><ref name= warByTimeframe >Michael C Horowitz [https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/war-by-timeframe-responding-to-chinas-pacing-challenge/ (19 Nov 2021) War by Timeframe: Responding to China's Pacing Challenge]</ref>{{efn|name=milleyAssessCN|1= During the DoD secretary's review of the 7th monthly meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Gen. Mark Milley was pressed for an assessment of the CCP's readiness for war; Gen. Milley reminded the press that the PLA had not fought a war since 1979; that China's GDP was being harvested for materiel, and that the US military would remain atop the world's armies as long as the US GDP remained strong.<ref name= udcgNov22/>{{rp|38:30}} 
*On 7 December 2022 "Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Royal Navy Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom's chief of defense staff, said the Russian leader has continued to make calamitous mistakes in Russia's war on Ukraine"; when asked "might the invasion of Ukraine embolden China to invade Taiwan"? —Radakin rejected the premise, and Milley reiterated "[The US] is the number one military in the world, and it's the most capable that combined arms maneuver," ... "We're one of the few militaries remaining in the world that can bring it all together in time and space and in all the domains of space, cyber, land, sea and air and undersea. We are very skilled and talented at doing all that. And, and no adversary should underestimate our capabilities".<ref name= usUkOnUkraineChina >Jim Garamone, DOD News [https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3239311/us-uk-military-chiefs-discuss-ukraine-china/ (7 Dec 2022) U.S., U.K. Military Chiefs Discuss Ukraine, China] </ref>}} which, according to Xi Jinping's plan, is for China's military to reach parity with the US military in 2027.<ref name= spaceForceAssessment >Paul McLeary and Alexander Ward [https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/20/hypersonic-technology-us-behind-china-russia-523130 (20 Nov 2021) U.S. ‘not as advanced’ as China and Russia on hypersonic tech, Space Force general warns]</ref><ref name= zhRetention >TAYLOR A. LEE and PETER W. SINGER [https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/01/plas-people-problem/381728/ (7 Feb 2023) The PLA’s People Problem] "China’s military has long struggled to field quality personnel". </ref> As of June 2023 a diplomatic solution is being sought.<ref name= pamuk2023 >Humeyra Pamuk [https://www.reuters.com/world/china/blinken-wrap-up-rare-visit-china-may-meet-xi-jinping-2023-06-18/ (19 Jun 2023) Xi, Blinken agree to stabilise U.S.-China relations in rare Beijing talks]</ref><ref name= zakariaGpsMilley >Fareed Zakaria, GPS [https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/09/17/exp-gps-0917-general-milley-on-chinas-military.cnn (14 Sep 2023) On GPS: Gen. Mark Milley on estimating China's military power]</ref><ref name= denialWorst >JACOB HEIM, ZACHARY BURDETTE, AND NATHAN BEAUCHAMP-MUSTAFAGA  [https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/denial-is-the-worst-except-for-all-the-others-getting-the-u-s-theory-of-victory-right-for-a-war-with-china/ (11 Jun 2024) DENIAL IS THE WORST EXCEPT FOR ALL THE OTHERS: GETTING THE U.S. THEORY OF VICTORY RIGHT FOR A WAR WITH CHINA]</ref>
#* The International Federation of Robotics reports that China has been the world leader in implementing industrial robots for the past eight years; in 2020 China used almost half the world's industrial robots.<ref name=robotics >Roopinder Tara [https://www.engineering.com/story/almost-half-of-industrial-robots-are-in-china (22 Sep 2022) Almost Half of Industrial Robots Are in China]</ref>
#** The takeover of a UK semiconductor fab by a Chinese-owned firm has been blocked on national security grounds.<ref name= Nexperia >Ryan Browne  [https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/16/chinese-takeover-of-biggest-uk-chip-plant-blocked-by-government.html (16 Nov 2022) Chinese takeover of the UK’s biggest chip plant blocked on national security grounds] as reported in  [https://hardware.slashdot.org/story/22/11/20/0221224/chinese-takeover-of-uks-largest-chip-plant-blocked-on-national-security-grounds (20 Nov 2022) Chinese Takeover of UK's Largest Chip Plant Blocked on National Security Grounds] </ref> 
#*In 2017 China adopted the [[National Intelligence Law]] which obligates Chinese companies to subordinate themselves to intelligence-gathering measures for the state.<ref name=prc2017 >Reuters World News [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-lawmaking-idUSKBN19I1FW (27 June 2017) China passes tough new intelligence law] National Intelligence Law</ref> China is militarizing the South China Sea.<ref name=nonKinetic/> In 2020 a match-up of the Chinese aircraft carrier [[Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning|''Liaoning'']] (a rebuilt aircraft cruiser) versus the supercarrier {{USS|Ronald Reagan}} is assessed to give the ''Ronald Reagan'' air superiority within one hour.<ref name= 1hour >Defense updates [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lx7PsFBqXdI (30 Apr 2020) 3 Reasons Chinese Liaoning Will Not Last an Hour Against USS Ronald Reagan Protecting Japan!]</ref><ref name= balloon23 >Smerconish  [https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/02/04/smr-balloon-and-china-relations.cnn (6 Feb 2023)  Chang: Not shooting down balloon could embolden China] 'By not shooting down the balloon, "we convince the Chinese we're incapable," says Gordon Chang, author of The Great US-China Tech War. "It could push them to do things which can't be undone." '</ref>
#*The 3rd generation GPS network of BeiDou satellites (BDS-3) was completed in July 2020 with the launch of the [[List of BeiDou satellites|30th BDS-3 satellite]].<ref name= 3rdGenGPS >Sutirtho Patranobis [https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/science/china-says-its-beidou-system-now-fully-operational-to-challenge-us-s-gps/ar-BB17p0yn  (31 Jul 2020) China says its Beidou system now fully operational, to challenge US’s GPS]</ref> The 30th BDS-3 satellite, meant to complete China's own global navigation satellite system,<ref name=BeiDou >P.W. Singer and Taylor A. Lee [https://www.popsci.com/story/blogs/eastern-arsenal/beidou-china-gps-gnss/ (31 March 2020) China’s version of GPS is almost complete. Here's what that means.]</ref> had been previously postponed.<ref name=BeiDou30 >Elizabeth Howell [https://www.space.com/china-postpone-launch-bds-3-satellite-launch.html (16 June 2020) China postpones launch of Beidou global navigation satellite]</ref><ref name= 400satsIn2years >Adil Brar [https://www.newsweek.com/china-military-satellites-space-tracking-conflict-1898177 (8 May 2024) China's Military Satellites Are Watching America's Every Move] "China has added over 400 satellites in the past two years", 200 with tracking capability. </ref> ''See [[Restrictions on geographic data in China]]''
#* [[Satellite image]]s of 4 June 2021 reveal an estimated 250 additional [[missile silo]]s under construction near [[Yumen Pass|Yumen]], China, warn specialists at the [[James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies]].<ref name= yumen >Huizhong Wu and Jon Gambrell, The Associated Press [https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/07/30/us-military-warns-china-is-building-more-nuclear-missile-silos/ (30 July 2021) US military warns China is building more nuclear missile silos]</ref> By 2024 China had over 500 nuclear warheads.<ref name=mDaltonSummary >C. Todd Lopez, DOD News [https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3910495/with-2-nuclear-armed-strategic-competitors-us-modernization-top-priority/ (18 Sep 2024) With Two Nuclear-Armed Strategic Competitors, U.S. Modernization Top Priority] Summary of Nuclear Triad by Melissa Dalton, UnderSecretary, USAF </ref>
#*The [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] projects that China will at least double its nuclear arsenal and that its production capability will be far expanded in the 2020s.<ref>James Anderson (31 July 2020) China's troubling nuclear buildup ''The New York Times'' Op-Ed p. A25. —James Anderson is Acting undersecretary of defense for policy</ref><ref name= strategicDeterrenceBy2027 >Dean Cheng  [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/10/china-calls-for-new-strategic-guidance-at-20th-party-congress/ (28 Oct 2022) China calls for new ‘strategic guidance’ at 20th Party Congress ] in a call for strategic deterrence [standoff] by 2027 </ref><ref name= nuclearAndConventional >Colin Clark [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/chinese-nuke-modernization-prompts-shift-in-dod-strategy/ (18 Jun 2021) Chinese Nuke Modernization Prompts Shift In DoD Strategy] cites SIPRI as authority</ref><ref name= balancePowerNuclearEnergy >DANIEL SHATS and PETER W. SINGER  [https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/10/balance-power-shifting-among-nuclear-energy-titans/378067/ (5 Oct 2022) The Balance of Power Is Shifting Among Nuclear-Energy Titans] RosAtom vs CNNC, CGN</ref>
#*China controls 80% of world [[rare earth mineral]] production, and routinely floods this market when other nations attempt to ramp up their own rare earth production.<ref name=rareEarths >Sun Yu and Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times [https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/02/china-targets-rare-earth-export-curbs-to-hobble-us-defense-industry/ (16 Feb 2021) China targets rare earth export curbs to hobble US defense industry] 
*Gabriel Crossley and Min Zhang [https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-says-underpricing-rare-earths-030211176.html (28 Feb 2021) China says domestic competition hurting rare earth prices]</ref><ref name=afghanRareEarths >Small Wars journal [https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/letter-editor-critical-afghanistan-assessment (14 Aug 2021) Letter to the Editor: Critical Afghanistan Assessment] "Now the rare earth minerals in Afghanistan will fall into the hands of the CCP."</ref><ref name= afghanMilitaryFailure >Daniel L. Davis [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZ8FbzqSlAc (6 Aug 2021): Defense Priorities fellow Daniel Davis BBC to discuss Afghanistan withdrawal]</ref>
#**The tech leaders of China are being enlisted to aid '[[socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era|Socialism with Chinese characteristics]]' by pledging part of their wealth to 'common prosperity'.<ref name= killPigsList >Fergus Ryan [https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/china-takes-on-its-tech-leaders/ (26 Aug 2021) China Takes on Its Tech Leaders]</ref> The Cyberspace Administration of China is regulating algorithms on its financial reporting websites which republish foreign financial journalists.<ref name= chinaCleansingWebsites >Bloomberg [https://slashdot.org/story/21/08/30/1732217/china-to-cleanse-online-content-that-bad-mouths-its-economy  (30 Aug 2021) China To Cleanse Online Content That 'Bad-Mouths' Its Economy ]</ref> 
#*Chinese cyber groups are attacking Russia, reports Ben Watson.<ref name= chinaHackingRussia >Ben Watson  [https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/08/the-d-brief-august-06-2021/184342/ (6 Aug 2021) China is hacking Russia] who cites [https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1423304084183031812 Sam Bendet's tweet]</ref><ref name= goalOf2030forAiParity >Brandi Vincent [https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2022/02/ai-algorithms-could-rapidly-deploy-battlefield-under-new-initiative/361819/ (9 Feb 2022) New Operating System Aims to Speed AI to the Battlefield] China has goal of 2030 for Parity with US on AI —Lt. Gen. Michael Groen, for DoD's Artificial Intelligence and Data Accelerator (AIDA)</ref> China is accelerating its timeline to take Taiwan.<ref name= taiwanTimeline >Mallory Shelbourne [https://news.usni.org/2022/10/19/chinas-accelerated-timeline-to-take-taiwan-pushing-navy-in-the-pacific-says-cno-gilday (19 Oct 2022) China’s Accelerated Timeline to Take Taiwan Pushing Navy in the Pacific, Says CNO Gilday]</ref><ref name= taiwanODC >Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee [https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained/ (3 Nov 2020) Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept, Explained] "The concept’s developer explains the asymmetric approach to Taiwan’s defense".</ref>
#*149 Chinese fighters and bombers swept over Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 1–4 October 2021.<ref name= 149aircraft >Colin Clark [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/10/149-chinese-fighters-bombers-sweep-across-taiwan-adiz-in-4-days/  (4 Oct 2021) 149 Chinese Fighters, Bombers Sweep Across Taiwan ADIZ In 4 Days]</ref><ref name= taiwanOptions>Harry Halem and Eyck Freymann [https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/ukraine-shows-why-taiwan-needs-more-air-defense/ (7 Apr 2022) Ukraine Shows Why Taiwan Needs More Air Defense] options: "transferring air-defense systems to Taiwan, funding Taiwan’s domestic air-defense programs, and deploying American-made integrated air-defense technology" </ref><ref name= 3reasonsUkraineTaiwan >Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/three-reasons-why-defense-is-beating-offense-in-ukraine-and-why-it-matters-for-taiwan/ (8 Apr 2022) Three reasons why defense is beating offense in Ukraine – and why it matters for Taiwan] 1) precision-guided firepower 2) sprawling urbanization 3) mass mobilization</ref> Taiwan has countered with Civil Air Patrol warnings.<ref name= 149aircraft /><ref name= canTaiwan >Covert Cabal [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kqyIKHkSDns (10 Oct 2021) Can Taiwan Stop a Chinese Invasion?]</ref><ref name= taiwanOptions/><ref name= as2030 >Military Aviation History [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvyLGeEcjgc (4 Feb 2018) Air Superiority 2030 - How America Wants To Retain Dominance] Encapsulates the factors for 2030</ref><ref name= mig19Drones >Mike Yeo [https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/10/20/china-shows-off-drones-recycled-from-soviet-era-fighter-jets/ (20 Oct 2021) China shows off drones recycled from Soviet-era fighter jets] J-6=Mig-19 Drones</ref><ref name= usTrainingTaiwan >Oren Liebermann, CNN [https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/23/politics/us-taiwan-forces-training/index.html (24 Feb 2023) US plans to expand training of Taiwanese forces]</ref><ref name= Mitchell40 >Heather Penney [https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Scale_Scope_Speed_Survivability_-KillChain_-Policy_Paper_40-New.pdf (May 2023) Scale, Scope, Speed & Survivability: Winning the Kill Chain Competition] Mitchell Institutem Policy Paper '''40''' seeks to counter China's Warfighting Strategy of “System Destruction” of "sensor networks, datalinks, C2 architectures, and other nodes"</ref>
#* China is implementing its plan for 2027: Office of Secretary of Defense (3 Nov 2021) "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China", Annual report to Congress<ref name= 2021AnnualRept >Tara Copp [https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/11/china-likely-have-least-1000-nukes-2030-pentagon-estimates/186597/ (3 Nov 2021) China Likely to Have ‘At Least’ 1,000 Nukes by 2030, Pentagon Estimates] CJCS views Taiwan invasion unlikely over next two years.
*Office of Secretary of Defense [https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF (3 Nov 2021) Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China]  Annual report to Congress</ref> China has been reverse-engineering its purchases of Russian materiel, and selling to Russia's defense customers.<ref name= zhRevEngRu >THOMAS CORBETT and PETER W. SINGER [https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/04/china-eating-russias-lunch-defense-market/384736/ (3 Apr 2023) China Is Eating Russia’s Lunch in the Defense Market]</ref><ref name= udcgNov22/>{{rp|38:30}}<ref name= rogers/>{{efn|name= speedScopeOfLogisticAid|1= In light of the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]] which began 24 February 2022, earlier assumptions of the truth of public statements about the situation up to that time were reassessed. The speed of the [[military logistics|logistical]] response of the partners in the NATO alliance when funnelling aid like [[Bayraktar TB2]]s to Ukraine is instructive. By 7 April 2022, "the U.S. and allies have provided [Ukraine] 60,000 anti-tank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons"—Gen. [[Mark Milley]].<ref name= javelinsAndStingers >Joe Gould [https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/04/07/putins-probably-given-up-on-kyiv-as-ukraine-war-enters-new-phase/ (7 April 2022) Putin’s ‘probably given up’ on Kyiv as Ukraine war enters new phase] 
* C. Todd Lopez, DOD News [https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2991979/dod-more-javelins-approved-for-ukraine-switchblades-on-their-way/ (6 April 2022) DOD: More Javelins Approved for Ukraine; Switchblades On their Way ]</ref><ref name= rogers />
By 31 October 2022, the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]] had slowed due to the rainy season.<ref name= rainInUkraine >Ben Watson [https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/10/the-d-brief-october-28-2022/379042/ (28 Oct 2022) Today's D Brief: Difficult years ahead for Europe; Rain slows Ukraine fight; Pentagon’s strategy trio; US Army’s new training center; And a bit more.]  </ref><ref name= putinAbsentG20 /><ref name= udcgNov22 />{{rp|minute 8:10}} }}{{efn| name= 24of35InFy2023|Andrew Eversden [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/heres-the-armys-24-programs-in-soldiers-hands-by-2023/ (17 Dec 2021) Here's the Army's 24 programs in soldiers’ hands by 2023]
# Precision Strike Missile ([[United States Army Futures Command#PrSM|§ PrSM]]) 
# Extended Range Cannon Artillery ([[M1299|ERCA]])
# [[Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon]] ([[United States Army Futures Command#lrhw|§ LRHW]])
# Mid-range capability ([[United States Army Futures Command#MRC|§ MRC]]) missile
# [[Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle]] (AMPV)
# Robotic Combat Vehicle ([[United States Army Futures Command#unmannedGroundSystems|§ RCV]])
# Mobile Protective Firepower ([[United States Army Futures Command#mpf|§ MPF]])
# Future Unmanned Aircraft Systems/ Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (FUAS)/(FTUAS)<ref name=ftuas1Bct >Ashley Roque [https://www.janes.com/defence-news/c4isr-command-tech/latest/us-army-picks-aerovironments-jump-20-for-ftuas-increment-1 (22 Aug 2022) US Army picks AeroVironment's Jump 20 for FTUAS Increment 1]</ref>
# Integrated Tactical Network ([[United States Army Futures Command#ITNcapabilities|§ ITN]]) unified with [[United States Army Futures Command#unifiedNetworkPlan|§ echelons above brigade, and the multi-domain task forces]]
# Common Operating Environment: Command Post Computing Environment<ref name= cpce >Jaspreet Gill [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/01/army-well-on-its-way-to-first-oconus-cloud-in-indo-pacific/ (14 Jan 2022) Army ‘well on its way’ to first OCONUS cloud in Indo-Pacific]</ref>/Mounted Computed Environment (CPCE)/(MCE) ''See [[Common operational picture ]]''
# Command Post Integrated Infrastructure (CPI2)
# Mounted Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing System (MAPS)<ref name= daps/><ref name= updated24 >Andrew Eversden  [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/heres-the-armys-24-programs-in-soldiers-hands-by-2023/ (Feb. 2, 2022 at 12:09 PM ET update) Here’s the Army’s 24 programs in soldiers’ hands by 2023] Updated by AFC </ref>
# Dismounted Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing System (DAPS)<ref name= daps>[https://web.archive.org/web/20210730094936/https://peoiews.army.mil/pm-pnt/ Alternative PNT & Area Protection] DAPS</ref>
# Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) using high-energy lasers
# Indirect Fires Protection Capability: Iron Dome
# Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor ([[United States Army Futures Command#ltamds|§ LTAMDS]])<ref name= mdaa>MDAA [https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/lower-tier-air-and-missile-defense-sensor-ltamds/ (24 Jul 2020) Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS)]</ref> - Patriot radar replacement
# [[Missile defense#IBCS|Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense]] ([[United States Army Futures Command#Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System|§ IBCS]])
# Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense  (DE M-SHORAD)<ref name= 50kwHels>Jen Judson [https://news.yahoo.com/army-readies-deliver-first-set-181848878.html (13 Jan 2022) Army readies to deliver first set of Strykers with 50-kilowatt laser weapons]</ref> High energy lasers
# Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW)
# [[Integrated Visual Augmentation System]] (IVAS)
# [[United States Army Futures Command#envgb|Enhanced Night Vision Goggle – Binocular]] (ENVG-B)
# Reconfigurable Virtual Collective Trainer (RVCT) - [[United States Army Futures Command#ste|Synthetic training environment]]
# IVAS Squad Immersive Virtual Trainer (SiVT) - [[United States Army Futures Command#ste|Synthetic training environment]]
# One World Terrain/ Training Management Tools/ Training Simulation Software (OWT) / (TMT) / (TSS) - [[United States Army Futures Command#ste|Synthetic training environment]]

<ref name= mccarthy2019 >[https://web.archive.org/web/20191230055953/https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf Grinston, McConville, and McCarthy (2019) 2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the future] 7 —Figure 3. Current Cross Functional Teams and Signature Efforts</ref><ref name="by2023">{{Cite web|title=Chief of staff: Most signature systems to be fielded by 2023, people still No. 1 |url=https://www.army.mil/article/251126/chief_of_staff_most_signature_systems_to_be_fielded_by_2023_people_still_no_1_priority|access-date=2021-12-15|website=www.army.mil|date=13 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=34signaturePrograms>Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. [https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/army-braces-for-post-covid-cuts-gen-murray (20 May 2020) Army Braces For Post-COVID Cuts: Gen. Murray ] 34 Signature Programs: 31 in Futures Command, 3 in RCCTO</ref>
<!--Modular Active Protection Systems (MAPS)--><ref name= mapWins>MG [[Cedric T. Wins]] [https://asc.army.mil/web/news-alt-jfm19-rdecoms-road-map-to-modernizing-the-army-next-generation-combat-vehicle/ (5 Dec 2018) RDECOM’S ROAD MAP TO MODERNIZING THE ARMY: NEXT GENERATION COMBAT VEHICLE] MODULAR ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS. Second in a series.</ref>
}}{{efn|name= waypointsToMDO| In Future Vertical Lift, FARA and FLRAA are projected to be prototyped by 2028, with fielding by 2030.<ref name=flraaRFI >Jen Judson [https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/04/04/us-army-plans-to-field-a-future-long-range-assault-helicopter-by-2030/ (4 April 2019) US Army plans to field a future long-range assault helicopter by 2030] FLRAA
*RFI posted on the Federal Business Opportunities, 4 April
*Contract award: fourth quarter of FY21
*preliminary design review (PDR) second quarter of FY23
*first flight in the third quarter of FY24
*critical design review (CDR) in the fourth quarter of FY24
*fielding to first unit in second quarter of FY30</ref><ref name=fvlEntersServiceFy2030 >Steve Trimble [https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/us-army-upgrades-vision-future-vertical-lift-programs (24 July 2020) U.S. Army Upgrades Vision For Future Vertical Lift Programs]</ref> The OMFV prototype is projected for 2025.<ref name="omfvByPhasesFor2023,25,28">Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.  [https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/omfv-army-seeks-industry-advice-on-bradley-replacement/ (10 April 2020) Army Revamps OMFV Bradley Replacement For Russian Front ] OMFV digital designs by 2023, prototypes by 2025, operational by 2028
*OMFV [https://beta.sam.gov/opp/9f5bdc9e53bf49fb85a1dfbccc3c6730/view?keywords=omfv&sort=-relevance&index=&is_active=true&page=1 OPTIONALLY MANNED FIGHTING VEHICLE (OMFV) INDUSTRY DAY & PROGRAM QUESTIONS  (9-April-2020)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200417071016/https://beta.sam.gov/opp/9f5bdc9e53bf49fb85a1dfbccc3c6730/view?keywords=omfv&sort=-relevance&index=&is_active=true&page=1 |date=17 April 2020 }} 14 pages
*Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/a-war-with-china-would-spread-to-land-says-army-tanker/ (11 Mar 2021) A War With China Would Spread To Land, Says Army Tanker]</ref> }}
#**{{anchor|lockdownCovid2022}} By November 2022 a strict zero-Covid lockdown policy instituted in 2020 had led to [[2022 COVID-19 protests in China]]; China then allowed use of a locally-developed mRNA vaccine (2 December 2022), in lieu of lockdowns.<ref name= mRNA >Brian Yang [https://scrip.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/SC147467/China-Set-To-Green-Light-First-mRNA-Vaccine (2 December 2022) China Set To Green-Light First mRNA Vaccine]</ref><ref name= noWesternVaccines >Rebecca Cohen, Morgan McFall-Johnsen, and Paola Rosa-Aquino  [https://www.businessinsider.com/china-wont-use-western-covid-19-vaccines-protests-2022-11 (29 Nov 2022) China's refusal to use Western COVID-19 vaccines is making its protest problems even worse]</ref><ref name= moreCities >Bloomberg  [https://www.yahoo.com/news/more-china-cities-ease-curbs-041834787.html (4 Dec 2022) China's Covid Pivot Accelerates as Cities Ease Testing Rules] </ref>
#{{anchor|india}}India: faces Pakistan;<ref name=globalFirepower/><ref name= dwAfghan >Deutsche Welle DW News [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-3yoZvOQmo (16 Aug 2021) Taliban back in power: What does it mean for the Indo-Pacific region?]</ref><ref name=afghanRareEarths /> Pakistan can be supplied with Turkey's drones (such as the [[Bayraktar TB2]]), which were used with great effect by Azerbaijan against Armenian tanks and Armenian air defense<ref name=turkishDrones >The Print Team [https://theprint.in/opinion/how-drones-helped-azerbaijan-defeat-armenia-and-the-implications-for-future-modern-warfare/544668/  (14 Nov 2020) How drones helped Azerbaijan defeat Armenia, and the implications for future modern warfare]</ref> during the [[2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war]]. In 2010 China deployed 11,000 troops in Gilgit, near Kashmir.<ref name= gilgit >Indian Express [http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/china-deploys-11-000-troops-in-gilgit-area-in-occupied-kashmir/673770 (28 Aug 2010) China deploys 11,000 troops in Gilgit area in Occupied Kashmir]</ref>
#*Japan and India have agreed to enhance their bilateral defense cooperation (9 September 2022).<ref name= indiaJapanTies >Press Trust of India [https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-japan-to-enhance-defence-ties-to-bolster-their-strategic-partnership-122090800957_1.html (9 Sep 2022) India, Japan to enhance defence ties to bolster their strategic partnership] </ref>
#{{anchor|japan}}Japan: faces North Korea;<ref name=globalFirepower/><ref name=sixEyes >Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki 
[https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Japan-wants-de-facto-Six-Eyes-intelligence-status-defense-chief (14 Aug 2020) Japan wants de facto 'Six Eyes' intelligence status: defense chief]
*Masay Kato  [https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-s-deeper-ties-with-Five-Eyes-hinge-on-how-it-keeps-secrets (13 Aug 2020) Japan's deeper ties with Five Eyes hinge on how it keeps secrets]</ref> Japan has expressed interest in developing [[Mitsubishi F-X|its own F-X fighter program]];<ref name= burton >Brian Burton [https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/as-allies-design-fighter-aircraft-the-united-states-faces-a-decision/  (28 Jun 2021) As Allies Design Fighter Aircraft, The United States Faces a Decision]</ref>  Brian Burton notes that interoperable materiel is needed for allies and partners of the US, and that the US could constructively influence Japan's impending 20-year development effort with lessons learned from [[UAV]]s and air defense, for example.<ref name= burton/> On 26 December 2019, at Putin's annual news conference with foreign media, Hirofumi Sugizaki, a Japanese journalist asked about the end of the [[INF Treaty]] and the cooperation of Russia and China on an anti-missile system. Putin characterized the anti-missile system as defensive, and the relation of US and Russia as a [[Conflict continuum#Standoff|'draw' (ヒキワケ—''hikiwake'')]].<ref name= putin2019>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ba6hfm9GwG8 Russia Insight (26 December 2019) Putin Stunned By Words Of Japanese Journalist: What Are You Talking About!?] Video clip: 6:51</ref><ref name= senseOfCrisis >Colin Clark [https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/sense-of-crisis-on-china-taiwan-japan-defense-white-paper/ (15 Jul 2021) 'Sense Of Crisis' On China-Taiwan: Japan Defense White Paper] Japan draws closer to Taiwan</ref><ref name="warFooting">[[Zack Cooper]] and Eric Sayers [https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/japans-shift-to-war-footing/ (12 Jan 2023) JAPAN’S SHIFT TO WAR FOOTING] '2+2 Meeting' of defense/state us/japan bilateral agreements </ref><ref name= rogers >Mike Rogers [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/china-is-watching-ukraine-closely-the-us-should-watch-china/ (4 Mar 2022) China is watching Ukraine closely, the US should watch China]</ref><ref name= putinAbsentG20 >Allegra Goodwin CNN in London [https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-11-14-22/index.html (14 Nov 2022) Russia becoming a "pariah state," British PM Sunak says as he attends G20 summit] UK Prime Minister "Sunak said it was 'telling' that Putin would not attend" G20 in Indonesia, in light of the [[2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine]].
* Mark Galleoti [https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/11/opinions/after-putin-power-health-regime-galeotti/index.html (11 Nov 2022) Opinion: Putin can cling on to power, but his legend is dead] "Multiple security forces balance each other: in Moscow, for example, the military garrison, a special division of the National Guard and the Kremlin Regiment, all report to different chains of command. The Federal Security Service watches all three – and the Federal Protection Service in turn watch them". 
* Simone McCarthy, CNN [https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/18/asia/asia-summits-apec-russia-vladimir-putin-bangkok-thailand-intl-hnk/index.html (18 Nov 2022) World leaders met all week to address global issues. Putin appears to no longer have a seat at the table] "Putin ... is increasingly isolated".</ref><ref name= udcgNov22 >CNN [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m313YnbWU1U (16 November 2022) Pentagon gives update after missile hits Poland] 4 hour Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting with 50 nations 47:21</ref> Japan will compensate companies for not disclosing patents with military applications.<ref name= sensitivePatents >Reuters [https://www.yahoo.com/news/japan-pay-companies-keep-sensitive-204158588.html (25 Dec 2021) Japan to pay companies to keep sensitive patents secret- Nikkei]</ref> In a Joint test, Japan's [[Cooperative Engagement Capability]]  allowed JS Maya to detect and track a ballistic missile; JS Haguro shot it down.<ref name= CecJapan >Mike Yeo [https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/2022/11/22/japanese-destroyers-intercept-ballistic-missiles-in-tests-with-us-navy/ (22 Nov 2022) Japanese destroyers intercept ballistic missiles in tests with US Navy] </ref>

=== Applications of power projection ===
The ''Texas National Security Review'' projects five scenarios for the global economy:<ref name= tnsr>Aaron L. Friedberg [https://tnsr.org/2022/01/the-growing-rivalry-between-america-and-china-and-the-future-of-globalization/ (Winter 2021/2022) The Growing Rivalry Between America and China and the Future of Globalization]</ref>
# Reglobalization as in the 1980s
# Deglobalization away from the trends of the 2000s<ref name= pZ >The Changing Order [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=atCXhFiveeg (9 Feb 2022) —Peter Zeihan: How Deglobalization Works, Full Webinar] video 58:24</ref><ref name= globDefSpend >FORECAST INTERNATIONAL STAFF, FORECAST INTERNATIONAL  [https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2024/04/global-defense-spending-annual-snapshot-part-1/395853/ (18 Apr 2024) Global defense spending jumped in 2023]</ref>
# Globalization with Chinese characteristics<ref name= zhRuEconCoop/>
# Regional blocs with partially closed trading<ref name= russGrandStrategy >Michael Kofman [https://frivarld.se/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Drivers-of-Russian-Grand-Strategy.pdf (Apr 2019) Drivers of Russian Grand Strategy]</ref>{{efn|name= deglobalization |1= In the view of Larry Fink, the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the [[COVID-19]] pandemic, and the disruption of their [[supply chain]]s show that companies and governments in regional blocs will have "to reevaluate their dependencies and reanalyze their manufacturing and assembly footprints".<ref name= fink >Anna Cooban [https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/24/business/blackrock-globalization/index.html (24 March 2022) BlackRock says Russia’s war in Ukraine is the end of globalization] </ref>}}<ref name= zhRuEconCoop/><ref name= globDefSpend /><ref name= deDollarization >Akhil Ramesh [https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3262514-are-we-witnessing-the-beginning-of-de-dollarization/ ( Are we witnessing the beginning of de-dollarization?] </ref>{{efn|name= deglobalizationInNextDecades |1= Peter Zeihan's [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_QvRX41Las (16 Mar 2022) prediction over the next few decades: End of globalization, breakdown into regional blocs]<ref name= deglobalizationZeihan >JackCarrUSA video 1:01:50 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_QvRX41Las Peter Zeihan (June 2022): The End of the World Is Just the Beginning] hardcover</ref><ref name= zeihanCorroboration >China Observer [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TBGrprepVFM (12 Aug 2023) No Orders From US & EU, No Money to Pay Salaries, China Faced Its Worst Manufacturing Year in 2023]
*Zeihan on Geopolitics [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A9-wfHgjTB8 (10 Aug 2023) The Chinese Slide Into Deflation (The Final Straw?)]</ref>}}<ref name= caspianRpt >Caspian Report [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YzCoJXxb5xI (14 Jun 2022) How Russia could collapse (again)] Local republics could blockade other republics of the Federation to preserve local stability, which appears to be the choice of the people.</ref><ref name= cSebastian >Clare Sebastian, CNN [https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/28/business/russia-economy-ukraine-six-months/index.html (28 Aug 2022) 'Slower burn.' Russia dodges economic collapse but the decline has started] Russia now selling oil to Asia, six months after sanctions by West.</ref>
# Shared strategic interests and common political values, which Friedberg judges will be the choice of the Western bloc<ref name= tnsr/> and its direction for power projection.{{efn|name= regionalBlocEu }}

===Hard power===
{{Main|Hard power}}
Examples of hard power projection include:

*{{anchor|symbolicDeployment}} Showing the flag: the symbolic deployment of military forces to a region for the purposes of demonstrating political interest, resolve, or willingness to take more forceful military action.
*{{anchor|diplomacyDeterrence}}  Compulsion/deterrence: the use of the threat of military force against another state to either induce it into or dissuade it from pursuing a given policy. In this form, power projection acts as a diplomatic tool, attempting to influence the decision-making process of foreign actors.<ref name= putinWatchers >[https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/01/26/russia-ukraine-putin-experts-00000019 (26 Jan 2022) Will There Be a War Over Ukraine? 13 Putin Watchers Weigh In]</ref><ref name= howTopUkrGeneralPreparedForWar >David M. Herszenhorn and Paul McLeary [https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-iron-general-hero-hes-083000614.html (8 Apr 2022) Ukraine’s 'iron general' is a hero, but he's no star] ala SoF</ref><ref name= ukUkrainePolandPact >Sebastian Sprenger [https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-uk-poland-announce-security-212021540.html (17 Feb 2022) Ukraine, UK, Poland announce security pact amid heightened tensions]</ref><ref name= adamowskiVandiverMcLeary >Jaroslaw Adamowski [https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/07/09/poland-could-purchase-m1-abrams-tanks-from-us/ (9 Jul 2021) Poland could purchase M1 Abrams tanks from US] 250 M1A2 SEPv3s, + dozen tracked vehicles, purchase confirmed [https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/07/14/polish-defence-ministry-confirms-plan-to-buy-m1-abrams-tanks/ 14 July 2021 ]
*John Vandiver [https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2022-02-18/tanks-poland-united-states-defense-5067639.html (18 Feb 2022) US will sell Poland tanks to bolster NATO defense]
*Paul McLeary [https://news.yahoo.com/mr-putin-did-not-want-133913427.html (18 Feb 2022) ‘What Mr. Putin did not want’: U.S. approves $6B tank deal with Poland] State Department approval, so the tanks are not yet available for shipment from Vendor
</ref><ref name= shadowWar >Douglas London, Foreign Affairs [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-04-11/shadow-war-against-putin (11 Apr 2022) A Shadow War Against Putin] </ref> ''See [[Power projection#Gray zone competition]] for context''
*{{anchor|punitiveForce}}  Punishment: the punitive use of force against another state in response to their pursuit of a given policy.{{efn|name= deglobalization}}
*{{anchor|armedIntervention}}  Armed intervention: the movement of military forces into another nation's territory for the purposes of influencing the internal affairs of the target country short of outright conquest.<ref name= leadersPutin >Leaders: [https://www.economist.com/leaders/2022/01/29/a-war-in-ukraine-could-have-global-consequences (29 Jan 2022) A war in Ukraine could have global consequences] "The likelihood of China invading Taiwan would surely rise."</ref><ref name= nemtsova >Anna Nemtsova [https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-lost-us-city-russian-204500815.html (28 Jan 2022) ‘Putin Lost Us’: A City of Russian-Speaking Ukrainians Is Vowing To Fight Moscow’s Aggression]</ref><ref name= kottasová >Ivana Kottasová, Tamara Qiblawi and Helen Regan [https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/21/europe/russia-ukraine-tensions-monday-intl/index.html (22 Feb 2022) Putin orders troops into pro-Russian regions of eastern Ukraine]</ref><ref name= radchenko >Sergey Radchenko [https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/moscow-musings-on-brinksmanship-from-stalin-to-putin/ (22 Feb 2022) MOSCOW MUSINGS ON BRINKSMANSHIP FROM STALIN TO PUTIN]</ref><ref name= 23feb2022 />
*{{anchor|forcibleEntryInvasion}}  Conquest: the offensive use of military assets to forcibly occupy territory controlled or claimed by another state.<ref name= caspianReport >CaspianReport [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNIU6TRsRzk (29 Jan 2022)  What a Russian assault on Ukraine would look like] video clip 14:41</ref><ref name= amphibGroupInBlackSea >Sam LaGrone [https://news.usni.org/2022/02/08/six-ship-russian-navy-amphibious-group-attack-sub-approach-black-sea-as-warships-mass-in-the-mediterranean (8 Feb 2022) UPDATED: Russian Navy Amphibious Group Enters Black Sea as Warships Mass in the Mediterranean]</ref><ref name= uncoiling >Liudas Dapkus and Dasha Litvinova [https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/ukraine/2022/02/19/russia-uncoiling-and-poised-to-strike-says-us-defense-secretary/ (19 Feb 2022) Russia ‘uncoiling and poised to strike’ says US defense secretary]</ref><ref name= opnZ >Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds [https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202204-operation-z-web.pdf (22 Apr 2022) Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion] 26 pages</ref><ref name= restockingDoomed >Reuben Johnson [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/russian-attempts-to-restock-its-military-may-be-doomed-to-failure/ (19 May 2022) Russian attempts to restock its military may be doomed to failure]</ref><ref name= 8warningSigns >Kyle Mizokami [https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a38873856/russia-ukraine-conflict-warning-signs/ (27 Jan 2022) Russia Won't Start a War With Ukraine Out of the Blue. Look For These 8 Warning Signs.]
#Fuel and Ammunition Stockpiles
#Cyberwarfare
#GPS Jamming, Spoofing
#Attack submarine sorties
#Electronic warfare
#Social media blackout
#Little green men Events
#Drone reconnaissance</ref><ref name= warningSigns >Jeremy Herb, Katie Bo Lillis, Barbara Starr and Sean Lyngaas, CNN  [https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/10/politics/ukraine-russia-invasion-signs/index.html (10 February 2022) What the US is watching that could signal Russia is launching an invasion of Ukraine]</ref><ref name= 70percentLevel >Phil Stewart and Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters [https://news.yahoo.com/russian-forces-70-level-needed-204542600.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall (5 Feb 2022) Russian forces at 70% of level needed for full Ukraine invasion - U.S. officials]</ref> In 2022 [[Michael Kofman]] projected that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be eastward via Donbas, northward from Crimea, and up the Dnieper river to encircle Ukraine's capital Kyiv,<ref name= kofman>Michael Kofman [https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/putins-wager-in-russias-standoff-with-the-west/ (24 Jan 2022) Putin's Wager in Russia's Standoff With the West]</ref><ref name= russiaCouldInvadeInDays>Karen DeYoung, Dan Lamothe, John Hudson and Shane Harris. The Washington Post [https://www.pressherald.com/2022/02/05/russia-could-invade-ukraine-within-days-causing-up-to-50000-civilian-deaths-u-s-intelligence-assessments-find/ (5 Feb 2022) Russia could invade Ukraine within days, causing up to 50,000 civilian deaths, U.S. intelligence assessments find]</ref> with a political takeover of Ukraine [[2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis#putinsEssay|a likely objective]] of Russian leadership.<ref name= leadersPutin/><ref name= caspianReport/><ref name= nytMaps >''The New York Times'' [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html (24 Feb 2022) Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine]</ref><ref name= treismanOpinion >[[Daniel Treisman]] [https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/22/opinions/putin-russia-ukraine-plan-donbas-treisman/index.html (22 Feb 2022) Putin isn't likely to stop here]</ref><ref name= whyAndWhat >Paul Kirby [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589 (23 Feb 2022) Why is Russia ordering troops into Ukraine and what does Putin want?]</ref><ref name= ukraineDraftingReservists18to60 >Reuters [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-starts-drafting-reservists-aged-18-60-after-presidents-order-2022-02-23/ (23 Feb 2022) Ukraine starts drafting reservists aged 18-60 after president's order]</ref><ref name= harringtonMcCabe >Jake Harrington and Riley McCabe [https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/keeping-pace-in-the-gray-zone-recommendations-for-the-u-s-intelligence-community/ (1 Feb 2022) Keeping Pace in the Gray ZOne: Three Recommendations for the U.S. Intelligence Community]</ref><ref name= 23feb2022 /><ref name= russiaSeeksRegimeChange >Michael Kofman [https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/02/23/michael-kofman-an-expert-on-russias-armed-forces-explains-why-the-kremlin-will-seek-regime-change-in-ukraine (23 Feb 2022) Michael Kofman, an expert on Russia’s armed forces, explains why the Kremlin will seek regime change in Ukraine]</ref> However, in lieu of a political takeover,<ref name= putinAbsentG20 /> a [[decapitation strike]] is a possible tactic.<ref name= insinna>Valerie Insinna [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/russia-aiming-to-decapitate-ukrainian-government-us-official/ (24 Feb 2022) Russia aiming to ‘decapitate’ Ukrainian government: US official]</ref><ref name= breakingDefense>Valerie Insinna [https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/top-american-generals-on-three-key-lessons-learned-from-ukraine/ (11 March 2022 at 12:35 PM) Top American generals on three key lessons learned from Ukraine] Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger, Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, and Air Combat Command head Gen. Mark Kelly: 1) Humble “Legacy” Technology Can Still Play a Role Against a Sophisticated Adversary, 2) The Human Element (Still) Matters, and 3) Logistics Are Not Optional</ref><ref name=ZYaohCWtyyA >Sky News [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZYaohCWtyyA (28 Apr 2022) Can Russia be pushed out of Ukraine entirely?] Retired Air Vice Marshal Sean Bell 2:25/4:08 use 155mm howitzers, coupled with counterfire radar (i.e. [[AN/TPQ-53 Quick Reaction Capability Radar|TPQ-53]]) against Russian artillery</ref><ref name= picheta>Rob Picheta [https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/29/europe/russia-ukraine-global-implications-cmd-intl/index.html (29 Jan 2022) How a Russian invasion of Ukraine would reverberate around the world]</ref><ref name= MsfUiTJv2lE>Frontline (Mar 15, 2022) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MsfUiTJv2lE Putin's Road to War (full documentary) ] 53:18</ref> [[Alexander Vindman]] has projected a path for Ukraine to retake Crimea.<ref name= vindmanCrimea >Francis P. Sempa [https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/02/07/alexander_vindman_and_the_road_to_world_war_iii_880075.html (7 Feb 2023) Alexander Vindman and the Road to World War III]</ref> By 5 April 2023 Ukraine signalled that it might entertain talks with Russia if the Ukrainian counteroffensive reached the border of Crimea.<ref name= kyivTalksOnCrimea >Christopher Miller in Kyiv and Felicia Schwartz in Washington [https://www.ft.com/content/d68b4007-4ddf-4320-b29a-f2eee2662d6e (5 Apr 2023) Ukraine 'ready' to talk to Russia on Crimea if counteroffensive succeeds] </ref><ref name= 3to5yearsOut >Barry Rosenberg [https://breakingdefense.com/2023/07/three-to-five-years-from-now-is-the-danger-time-when-the-us-could-face-both-china-and-russia/ (20 July 2023) 3-to-5 years from now is the danger time when the US could face both China and Russia] Justin Bronk RUSI(UK) US/Europe power projection</ref>

==Power projection capabilities==
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="font-size:95%"
!Colspan=7 | Power projection capabilities
|-
!Country
!Bloc/Group
![[Blue-water navy|Maritime<br>force]]
![[Helicopter carrier|Helicopter]]/[[List of aircraft carriers by country|aircraft<br>carriers]] active <!-- in sort order helicopter counts as 0.9 of aircraft carriers -->
![[List of countries with overseas military bases|Overseas<br>bases]]
!data-sort-type="number" | Troops deployed<br>in operations abroad
![[Nuclear deterrence|Nuclear<br>deterrence]]
|-
|{{AUS}} || [[G20]]/[[MIKTA]]/[[Five Eyes|FVEY]]/[[Commonwealth of nations|Commonwealth]]/[[APEC]]/[[ANZUS]]/[[MNNA]]/[[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|QUAD]]/[[AUKUS]]||[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]
|| {{sort|1.8|2 / 0}} || 1 || 2900<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/|title=Home : Global Operations : Department of Defence|website=www.defence.gov.au|date=2 February 2024 }}</ref> || {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Argentina}} || [[G20]]/[[UNASUR]]/[[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]]/[[Mercosur]]/[[MNNA]]/[[Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance|Rio]]|| [[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]] || 0 || 2 ||1050<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org">Providing for Peacekeeping: [http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/profiles/ Country Profiles]</ref> || {{N}}
|-
| {{Flagcountry|Bangladesh}} || [[D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation|D-8]]/[[Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation|BIMSTEC]]/[[South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation|SAARC]]/[[Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition|IMCTC]]/[[Commonwealth of Nations]]|| || 0 || 1 || 6417<ref>{{cite web |title=Bangladesh |url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/bangladesh |website=United Nations Peacekeeping |access-date=2 August 2020 |language=en}}</ref> || {{N}}
|-
| {{Flagcountry|Belgium}} || [[EU]]/[[NATO]]|| || 0 || 0 || 710<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/> || [[Nuclear sharing]]
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Brazil}} || [[G20]]/[[G4 nations|G4]]/[[BRICS]]/[[UNASUR]]/[[Mercosur]]/[[MNNA]]/[[Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance|Rio]]|| <span style="color:#0a0">[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]</span>
 || {{sort|0.9|1 / 0}} ||0 ||273<ref name="peacekeeping.un.org">{{Cite web| title=Summary of Troop Contributing Countries By Ranking | url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2_country_ranking_9.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190215050527/https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2_country_ranking_9.pdf | archive-date=2019-02-15}}</ref> ||{{N}}
|-
|{{flagcountry|Canada}} || [[G20]]/[[G7]]/[[NATO]]/[[APEC]]/[[Five Eyes|FVEY]]/[[Commonwealth of nations|Commonwealth]]/[[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]]|| <span style="color:#0a0">[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]</span>
|| 0 || 0 || 3600<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-recurring/index.page |title=Recurring Operations &#124; Canada North America &#124; National Defence &#124; Canadian Armed Forces |access-date=2014-07-27 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140728043310/http://forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-recurring/index.page |archive-date=2014-07-28 }}</ref> || {{N}}
|-
|{{flagcountry|China}} || [[UNSC|P5]]/[[G20]]/[[BRICS]]/[[APEC]]/[[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation|SCO]]|| <span style="color:#0000FF">[[Blue-water navy|<span style="color:#0000FF">Blue-water navy</span>]]</span> || {{sort|3.8|2 / 2}} ||1 ||11,775<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/><ref>{{cite web|url=http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/china-deploys-11-000-troops-in-gilgit-area-in-occupied-kashmir/673770|title=China deploys 11,000 troops in Gilgit area in Occupied Kashmir – Indian Express|website=archive.indianexpress.com}}</ref>||{{Y}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Egypt}} || [[African Union]]/[[Arab League]]/[[D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation|D-8]]/[[MNNA]]|| || {{sort|1.8|2 / 0}} || 0 ||3760<ref name="peacekeeping.un.org"/>|| {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|France}} ||[[UNSC|P5]]/[[G20]]/[[G7]]/[[EU]]/[[NATO]]/[[NATO Quint|Quint]]|| <span style="color:#0000FF">[[Blue-water navy|<span style="color:#0000FF">Blue-water navy</span>]]</span>|| {{sort|3.7|3 / 1}} || 10 || 10,300<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gouvernement.fr/en/french-military-forces-deployed-in-operations-abroad|title=French military forces deployed in operations abroad|website=Gouvernement.fr}}</ref> || {{Y}}
|-
|{{flagcountry|Germany}} ||[[G20]]/[[G7]]/[[G4 nations|G4]]/[[EU]]/[[NATO]]/[[NATO Quint|Quint]] ||<span style="color:#0a0">[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]</span>|| 0 ||1|| 3597<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.statista.com/statistics/265883/number-of-soldiers-of-the-bundeswehr-abroad/|title=Soldiers of the Bundeswehr abroad 2023 – Statistic|website=Statista}}</ref> || [[Nuclear sharing]]
|-
|{{Flagcountry|India}} ||[[G20]]/[[BRICS]]/[[G4 nations|G4]]/[[Commonwealth of nations|Commonwealth]]/[[SAARC]]/[[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation|SCO]]/[[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|QUAD]]||<span style="color:#0000FF">[[Blue-water navy|<span style="color:#0000FF">Blue-water navy</span>]]</span>|| {{sort|3.8|2 / 2}} || 6 || 6430<ref name="peacekeeping.un.org"/> || {{Y}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Iran}}
|[[Economic Cooperation Organization|ECO]]/[[OPEC]]/[[Gas Exporting Countries Forum|GECF]]/[[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation|SCO]]/[[Brics]]/[[D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation|D-8]]
|[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]
|0
|3
|
|{{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Indonesia}} ||[[G20]]/[[ASEAN]]/[[APEC]]/[[MIKTA]]/[[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]]/[[D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation|D-8]] || || 0 || 0 ||3064<ref name="peacekeeping.un.org"/> || {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Italy}} || [[G20]]/[[G7]]/[[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]]/[[EU]]/[[NATO]]/[[NATO Quint|Quint]] || <span style="color:#0000FF">[[Blue-water navy|<span style="color:#0000FF">Blue-water navy</span>]]</span> || {{sort|2.9|1 / 2}} || 2 ||6000<ref>{{Cite web | url=http://www.reportdifesa.it/coi-visita-del-sottosegretario-tofalo-seimila-i-militari-impegnati-allestero-e-7-200-in-italia/ |title = COI, visita del sottosegretario Tofalo. Circa 6.000 i militari impegnati all'estero e 7.200 in Italia|date = 2018-08-10}}</ref> || [[Nuclear sharing]] 
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Japan}} || [[G20]]/[[G7]]/[[G4 nations|G4]]/[[APEC]]/[[MNNA]]/[[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|QUAD]]|| <span style="color:#0a0">[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]</span>
 || {{sort|3.8|2 / 2}} || 1 || 278<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/> || {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Mexico}} ||[[G20]]/[[MIKTA]]/[[APEC]]/[[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]] || || 0 || 0 || || {{N}}
|-
|{{flagcountry|Netherlands}} || [[EU]]/[[NATO]]||<span style="color:#0a0">[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]</span> || 0 || 0 ||650<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/> || [[Nuclear sharing]]
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Nigeria}}|| [[African Union]]/[[OPEC]]/[[Commonwealth of nations|Commonwealth]]/[[D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation|D-8]] ||<span style="color:#0a0"></span>|| 0 || 0 || 2190<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/> || {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Pakistan}} || [[D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation|D-8]]/ [[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]]/[[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation|SCO]]/[[MNNA]]/[[South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation|SAARC]]/[[Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition|IMCTC]]/[[Commonwealth of Nations|Commonwealth]]|| || 0 || 1 ||5264<ref name="peacekeeping.un.org"/> || {{Y}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Poland}} || [[EU]]/[[NATO]] || || 0 || 0 || 3000<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/> || {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Russia}} || [[UNSC|P5]]/[[G20]]/[[BRICS]]/[[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation|SCO]]/[[Eurasian Economic Union|EAEU]]/[[APEC]]/[[CSTO]]/[[Commonwealth of Independent States|CIS]]|| <span style="color:#0000FF">[[Blue-water navy|<span style="color:#0000FF">Blue-water navy</span>]]</span> || {{sort|1|0 / 1}} || 10 || 48,500<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/> || {{Y}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Saudi Arabia}} || [[G20]]/[[Opec]]/[[OIC]]/[[Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf]]/[[Arab League]] || || 0 || 0 || || {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|South Africa}} || [[G20]]/[[BRICS]]/[[African Union]]/[[Commonwealth of Nations|Commonwealth]] || || 0 || 0 || 1171<ref name="peacekeeping.un.org"/> || {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|South Korea}} ||[[G20]]/[[APEC]]/[[MIKTA]]/[[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]]/[[MNNA]]|| <span style="color:#0a0">[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]</span>
 || {{sort|1.8|2 / 0}} || 0 || 1008<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/>|| {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Spain}} || [[EU]]/[[NATO]]/[[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]] || <span style="color:#0000FF">[[Blue-water navy|<span style="color:#0000FF">Blue-water navy</span>]]</span>|| {{sort|1|0 / 1}} || 0 ||1500<ref name="providingforpeacekeeping.org"/> || {{N}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|Turkey}} || [[G20]]/[[D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation|D-8]]/[[MIKTA]]/[[NATO]]/[[Uniting for Consensus|UFC]]|| <span style="color:#0a0">[[Green-water navy|<span style="color:#0a0">Green-water navy</span>]]</span>
|| {{sort|0.9|1 / 0}} || 12<ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-01-17|title=Türkiye'nin hangi ülkelerde askeri üssü var?|url=https://tr.euronews.com/2020/01/17/turkiye-nin-yabanci-topraklarda-askeri-varligi-ne-hangi-ulkelerde-us-bulunduruyor|access-date=2021-07-03|website=euronews|language=tr}}</ref>|| 60,000+<ref name="ReferenceB">{{Cite web|url=https://www.indyturk.com/node/316736/her-yedi-askerden-biri-s%C4%B1n%C4%B1rlar%C4%B1n-%C3%B6tesinde-tskn%C4%B1n-yurtd%C4%B1%C5%9F%C4%B1ndaki-g%C3%BCc%C3%BC-50-bini-a%C5%9Ft%C4%B1#.Y|title = Her yedi askerden biri sınırların ötesinde: TSK'nın yurtdışındaki gücü 50 bini aştı}}</ref>|| [[Nuclear sharing]]
|-
|{{Flagcountry|United Kingdom}} || [[UNSC|P5]]/[[G20]]/[[G7]]/[[Five Eyes|FVEY]]/[[NATO]]/[[NATO Quint|Quint]]/[[Five Power Defence Arrangements|FPDA]]/[[Commonwealth of nations|Commonwealth]]/[[AUKUS]]|| <span style="color:#0000FF">[[Blue-water navy|<span style="color:#0000FF">Blue-water navy</span>]]</span> || {{sort|1.95|0 / 2}} || 15 || |15,000|| {{Y}}
|-
|{{Flagcountry|United States}} || [[UNSC|P5]]/[[G20]]/[[G7]]/[[NATO]]/[[APEC]]/[[Five Eyes|FVEY]]/[[NATO Quint|Quint]]/[[ANZUS]]/[[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|QUAD]]/[[Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance|Rio]]/[[AUKUS]]|| <span style="color:#0000FF">[[Blue-water navy|<span style="color:#0000FF">Blue-water navy</span>]]</span> || {{sort|20.9|11 / 11}}|| 38 || 130,000||{{Y}}
|}

==See also==
*[[Blue-water navy]]
*[[Green-water navy]]
*[[Exercise RIMPAC]]
*[[Expeditionary maneuver warfare]]
*[[Expeditionary warfare]]
*[[Force concentration]]
*[[Force multiplication]]
*[[List of countries by military expenditures]]
*[[List of countries with overseas military bases]]
*[[Loss of Strength Gradient]]
*[[Military budget of the United States]]
*[[Military deployment]]
*[[Military globalization]]
*[[Military logistics]]
*[[Overmatch]]
*[[Over-the-beach capability]]
*[[Seabasing]]
*[[Sovereignty]]
*[[Unsinkable aircraft carrier]]

==Notes==
{{Notelist}}
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}

==External links==
{{Commons category|Military power projection}}
* [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-10-1/ch1.htm US Army Field Manual 100-10 Chapter 1: Power Projection]
* [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-7/f1007_11.htm#REF53h2 US Army Field Manual 100-7 Chapter 6: Force Projection]

{{International power}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Power Projection}}
[[Category:Power (international relations)]]
[[Category:Military logistics]]
[[Category:Military strategy]]
[[Category:Military doctrines]]
[[Category:Power (social and political) concepts]]