View source for Xi'an Incident

{{Short description|1936 political crisis in China}}
{{for|the 1981 film based on the incident|The Xi'an Incident (film)}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=June 2022}}
{{Infobox event
| image = Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng and Chiang Kai-shek.jpg
| image_size = 250px
| caption = Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, and Chiang Kai-shek two months before the incident
| date = 12–26 December 1936
| place = [[Xi'an]], [[Republic of China (1912-1949)|Republic of China]]
| participants = {{ubl|[[Zhang Xueliang]]|[[Chiang Kai-shek]]|[[Yang Hucheng]]|[[Zhou Enlai]]|''others''}}
| outcome = {{plainlist|
* Chiang released
* Zhang arrested by Chiang
* Negotiations to create the [[Second United Front]] were accelerated
}}
| module = {{Infobox Chinese|child=yes|header=none|t=西安事變|s=西安事变|p=Xī'ān Shìbiàn (Xi'an Incident)|psp= Sian Incident |w=Hsi-an Shih-pian (Hsi-an Incident)|first=t}}
}}

The '''Xi'an Incident'''{{efn|{{IPAc-en|UK|ʃ|iː|ˈ|æ|n}} {{respell|shee|AN}}, {{IPAc-en|US|ʃ|iː|ˈ|ɑː|n}} {{respell|shee|AHN}}}} was a Chinese political crisis that lasted from 12 to 26 December 1936. [[Chiang Kai-shek]], the leader of the [[Nationalist government|Nationalist government of China]], was arrested in [[Xi'an]] by soldiers of the [[Northeastern Army]] under the command of General [[Zhang Xueliang]]. Zhang demanded that Chiang agree to a ceasefire in the [[Chinese Civil War]] so that the Nationalist government could ally with the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) against Japanese expansionism. Negotiations were held between Chiang and the CCP, resulting in verbal agreement on the broad outlines of an alliance. After Chiang was released, he publicly renounced the terms he had agreed to in captivity, but secretly continued the negotiations that would result in the [[Second United Front]].

The Xi'an Incident followed months of secret negotiations between the CCP and the Nationalists. Only minor progress had been made by December 1936. However, the CCP had also been negotiating directly with the Nationalist armies that surrounded it, including the Northeastern Army. These negotiations had been much more successful. The CCP formed a secret alliance with Zhang's Northeastern Army and [[Yang Hucheng]]'s Northwestern Army that aimed to see the civil war ended and a war of national liberation begun against Japan. With encouragement from the CCP, Zhang repeatedly but unsuccessfully pressured Chiang to agree to a ceasefire with the CCP. After Chiang gave Zhang an ultimatum to either attack the Communists or be reassigned, Zhang decided to take Chiang hostage and force a settlement.

Chiang Kai-shek's sudden capture was shocking news. The CCP was ecstatic, believing that an agreement with Chiang was no longer necessary now that he was in the custody of their ally, and they recommended he be put on trial and executed. [[Joseph Stalin]], however, was worried that executing Chiang would make an alliance with the Nationalist government impossible, and ordered the CCP to bring the incident to a peaceful resolution. The CCP accepted this directive and instructed [[Zhou Enlai]] to begin negotiations. The Nationalist government was thrown into disarray and was at first unsure at how to react. A full military assault on Xi'an was nearly carried out by General [[He Yingqin]] before [[Soong Mei-ling]] (Chiang's wife) and other leaders of the "peace faction" prevailed. Soong and other close advisors to Chiang flew to Xi'an and convinced him to begin negotiations with the Communists. After a few weeks of slow progress, Chiang had agreed in principle to a ceasefire and a united front against Japan.

On December 26, Zhang agreed to release Chiang and accompany him back to [[Nanjing]]. Upon arrival, Chiang immediately had Zhang arrested—he would remain under house arrest for the next 50 years. Chiang publicly reneged on his agreements, but in private he invited Zhou Enlai to come to Nanjing. Negotiations on the specifics of an alliance continued until shortly after the outbreak of the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]], at which point the two sides were able to finalize their terms.

==Background==
{{further|Chinese Civil War}}

[[File:China before the Xi'an Incident.svg|right|thumb|320px|Map of eastern China in December 1936:
{{legend|#FF4D4D|Held by the CCP}}
{{legend|#7A9FFF|Held by the central Nationalist Government}}
{{legend|#B0C6FF|Semi-autonomous areas aligned with the Nationalist Government}}
{{legend|#B0C660|Held by the Northeastern Army, Northwestern Army, or allies}}
{{legend|#C2986D|Held by the Empire of Japan}}]]

===Gradual changes in policy===
The [[Japanese invasion of Manchuria]] in November 1931 posed a clear threat to both sides of the Chinese Civil War (as well as to the Soviet Union), but it did not lead to an immediate cessation of hostilities.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=55-56}} The failure of the [[First United Front]] four years previously had created deep, lasting distrust.{{efn|{{Unbulleted list citebundle|For the attitude of the CCP, see {{harvnb|Sheng|1992|pp=153–155}} and {{harvnb|Yang|2020|p=56}}|For Chiang's attitude, see {{harvnb|Coble|1991|pp=56–57}} and {{harvnb|van de Ven|2003|p=172}}}}}} Chiang Kai-shek articulated his policy as "first internal pacification, then external resistance."{{efn|{{lang-zh|t=先安內，後讓外。|p=Xiān ānnèi, hòu ràngwài.}}}}{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=56-57}} The CCP called for simultaneously "Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang".{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=59}}

The first subtle changes in this mutual policy of non-cooperation was initiated by the Communists in Manchuria. There, guerilla groups found it impossible to fight against the Japanese while also fighting the Nationalists.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=57}} Starting in late 1932 the Comintern authorized the Communist guerillas in Manchuria to cooperate with all anti-Japanese forces.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=57}}{{sfn|Gao|2018|pp=80,123}} That same year, the USSR restored diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=58-59}} The events in Europe—including [[Hitler's rise to power]]—were a major influence on the move towards a united front. The [[7th World Congress of the Comintern]] encouraged Communist parties everywhere to form a united front with moderate forces to resist the Fascists.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=291}} [[Wang Ming]], head of the CCP delegation, published the "1 August Declaration" in October, which publicly called on all parties in China to form a united front against Japanese Imperialism.{{sfn|Gao|2018|p=124}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=220}} They proposed creating an anti-Japanese defense government to coordinate resistance.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=60-61}} Importantly, though, the offer did not extend to Chiang himself; the CCP's delegation still considered him and his central government the "running dog" of the Japanese.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=153}}

The CCP itself (cut off from radio communication with Moscow) learned of the 1 August Declaration in November 1935.{{sfn|Yang|2020|pp=60-61}} Party leaders held a conference at Wayaobu in December to discuss the implications of this new policy. Their [[Wayaobu Manifesto]] marked an important retreat from the hardline positions they had held during the early civil war. It called for "the most broad national united front" to resist Japan, and announced that the CCP would suspend class conflict in the interests of cross-class collaboration.{{sfn|Yang|1990|pp=182-184}} However, it also made clear that they did not want to give up their military strength. As a basis from which to resist the Japanese, the Manifesto called for the Red Army to be expanded to 1 million men and for the Chinese Soviet to dramatically increase its land area.{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=184}}

=== Establishing contact ===
In late 1935 Japan stepped up its expansionist policies in north China, severely worsening relations between Nanjing and Tokyo. Negotiations had reached an apparent impasse by October. China reached out to Nazi Germany for mediation, but afraid of offending Japan, the Germans declined to get involved.{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=251-252}}{{sfn|So|2002|p=237}} Chiang Kai-shek was concerned that war was imminent, and wanted to secure the material and diplomatic support of the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=58}} He also faced growing public pressure to actively resist Japan: on December 9, 1935, for example, [[December 9th Movement|a major student protest]] broke out in Beiping.{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=76-77}}{{sfn|Garver|1988|p=5}}{{sfn|Ienaga|1978|p=88}}

In January, Chiang Kai-shek sent emissaries to Moscow to negotiate a military mutual assistance treaty.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|pp=153-154}} However, as a precondition for a treaty, Chiang wanted the Soviet Union to order the CCP to submit to the Nationalist Government. The Soviet ambassador told Chiang that while the USSR hoped the CCP would agree to a unified command under the Nationalists, Chiang would have to negotiate directly with the CCP.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=62}} This upset Chiang, who worried that if the USSR was unwilling to order the CCP to stop, they might be willing to support further revolutionary actions by the CCP if a ceasefire broke down. Progress halted, and after news leaked to the press that Chiang was contemplating a treaty with the USSR, he called off negotiations.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=63}} These maneuvers left Stalin wary of Chiang's intentions.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=154}}

Nevertheless, Chiang still sought contacts with the CCP inside China. [[Soong Ching-ling]] and [[Chen Lifu]] managed to recruit two members of the Communist underground, [[Dong Jianwu]] and {{ill|Zhang Zihua|zh|张子华}}, to cross the front lines and bring the CCP the message that Chiang was interested in ending the civil war. They arrived on February 27.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=124-125}} The CCP Central Committee agreed to begin negotiations, sending five conditions to the Nationalists in March. They sought a ceasefire, a government of national defense (i.e., one which included representatives of the Communists and warlords as well as the Nationalists), a military alliance against Japan (but with continued Red Army independence), the right to move their base of operations to Hebei, and political and economic reforms.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|pp=181-182}} The Nationalist response proposed a different vision for a united front. They wanted to see the Red Army fully integrated into the [[National Revolutionary Army]] and a Communist base in (poorer and more exposed to Japanese attack) Suiyuan and Chahar rather than Hebei, but did agree to letting CCP leaders participate in the national government. The CCP disliked this proposal, but because their attempt to break into Shanxi was defeated in May, they had to continue to negotiate.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=182}}

=== Formation of a northwestern alliance ===
{{multiple image
 | total_width = 320
 | align = left
 | image1 = Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng.jpg
 | alt1 = Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng in uniform, sitting for a portrait
 | image2 = Yan Xishan8.jpg
 | alt2 = Portrait of Yan Xishan
 | footer = Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, and Yan Xishan}}

Simultaneous to the negotiations with the Nationalist central government, the Communists also opened direct, clandestine negotiations with Nationalist army leaders. In October 1935 the Communists had arrived in [[northern Shaanxi]] at the end of the [[Long March]]. Their new base area was economically backwards, agriculturally unproductive, and cut off from the outside world.{{sfn|Qian|2024|pp=129-130}} It was bordered to the north by the [[Ordos Desert]], to the east by Shanxi (governed by the warlord [[Yan Xishan]]), and to the south and west by the 130,000-strong [[Northeastern Army]], led by [[Zhang Xueliang]], and the 40,000-strong Northwestern Army, led by [[Yang Hucheng]].{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=342}} Both Yang and Zhang were former warlords who had pledged their armies to the Nationalist Government. Zhang had governed Manchuria before it was overrun by the Japanese, and strongly wished to retake his homeland.{{sfn|Hammond|2023|p=32}} He opposed the concessions that Chiang had made to Japan, and was frustrated by his orders to fight the Communists rather than the Japanese.{{sfn|Coble|1991|pp=224-225}} Yang had likewise become skeptical of Chiang's anti-Japanese commitment after the public demonstrations in December 1935.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=108}} Zhang and Yang had been promised an easy victory against the Communists. They were surprised and dismayed when the Red Army defeated them in several major engagements. The Red Army treated their POWs well and gave them a political education, sending them back to spread the word that the Communists wanted to form an anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese alliance.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=106–107}} This effectively destroyed morale in the Nationalist armies, and the soldiers began pressing for a truce with the Communists.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=107}} With his officer [[Nan Hanchen]] acting as intermediary, Yang Hucheng was able to conclude a ceasefire quickly.{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=187}} They formalized a non-aggression pact in May 1936.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}}

Negotiations with Zhang Xueliang took longer because the CCP had no established contacts in the Northeastern Army. But after Dong Jianwu requested passage to CCP territory on a mission from the central government, Zhang realized that the central government was negotiating with the CCP and was encouraged to do so himself.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=115, 124-125}} A ceasefire was agreed on February 25.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=118}} On April 9, Zhang Xueliang met with Zhou Enlai. Zhou, an experienced negotiator, was able to solidify the ceasefire and secure supplies for the Red Army.{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=221}} In this and subsequent meetings, Zhang Xueliang would argue that resisting Japan would only be possible if the CCP gave up its opposition to Chiang. Zhou said that the CCP would discuss the point, but refused to commit to changing the policy.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=119-120,123,127}} As negotiations between Zhang and the CCP continued, the Communists infiltrated the Northeastern Army. They spread communist ideas among the soldiers and recruited officers into secret societies.{{sfn|Yang|1990|pp=221-223}} In June they set up an officer training camp that celebrated the united front.{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=342}} This support from within the army helped them to persuade Zhang to form an alliance. They concluded a formal agreement on September 22.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}}

{{Quote box|The [CCP]'s call for suspending the civil war and forming a united anti-Japanese resistance touched not only my heart deeply but also the hearts of most of the men in the Northeastern Army.|source=Zhang Xueliang{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=115}}|width=25%|align=right| style = padding:8px;}}

Yan Xishan also moved towards a united front with the CCP. Illegally imported Japanese products were undermining the Shanxi economy and the Japanese puppet [[Mengjiang|Mongol Military Government]] was encroaching on Yan's rule over [[Suiyuan]].{{sfn|Gillin|1967|pp=228-230}} Out of fear of the Japanese, Yan accepted Mao's overtures and agreed to a truce in June 1936.{{sfn|Gillin|1967|p=232}} In September, he created the "League for Sacrifice and Salvation" to agitate the Shanxi public against the Japanese. CCP leaders [[Bo Yibo]] and [[Feng Xuefeng]] began working closely with Yan.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=180}}

The members of this northwestern alliance were united by their desire to resist Japan, but they differed over the details of how this could best be accomplished.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}} The Communists supported a plan to use Soviet support to take over [[Shaanxi]], [[Gansu]], [[Ningxia]], [[Qinghai]], and [[Xinjiang]] and turn northwest China into a base under Zhang's command to resist Japan and oppose Chiang.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=64}} Zhang, Yang, and Yan were still committed to convincing Chiang to lead the anti-Japanese resistance.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}} As they continued to negotiate, they kept their alliance secret and even staged fake military battles to deceive the Nanjing government.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=65}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=179}}

===Renewed negotiations===
{{multiple image
 | align = left
 | total_width = 340
 | image1 = Pan Hannian.jpg
 | caption1 = Pan Hannian
 | alt1 = Pan Hannian in a business suit
 | image2 = Chen Li-fu.jpg
 | alt2 = Colorized photo of Chen Lifu
 | caption2 = Chen Lifu
 | footer = The chief negotiators}}

Over the course of the year, the Soviets had become more convinced that the united front should include Chiang. This created a problem when, in late June, the CCP re-established radio communications with Moscow. They transmitted the Wayaobu Manifesto and informed the Comintern of their alliance with Zhang. They asked for assistance in carrying out their plan to form an anti-Japan, anti-Chiang base.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=64}} The Comintern responded with a telegram on August 15 admonishing the CCP for continuing to oppose Chiang. The Comintern did approve the other provisions of the Wayaobu Manifesto, agreeing that neither soviet power nor the independence of the Red Army should be sacrificed.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=157}} But they absolutely vetoed the CCP's plan to form a base in the northwest, knowing that such a move would scuttle any chance for a united front with the KMT.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=64}} The CCP accepted the new directive from the Comintern. They adopted the new slogan "compelling Chiang to resist Japan," and [[Pan Hannian]] was sent to Nanjing to begin negotiating a truce with [[Chen Lifu]].{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=158}}

Chiang continued to try to resolve the civil war militarily. He had always considered negotiations with the CCP to be a last resort, and after bringing the Liangguang Incident to a peaceful conclusion in September, he could bring all his force to bear on wiping out the Communists entirely.{{sfn|Chen|2024|pp=161-162}} He was encouraged by the results of the Ningxia campaign in mid-to-late October. The Second and Fourth Corps of the Red Army marched north to pick up supplies dropped in Mongolia by the Soviet Union, but found themselves trapped on the wrong side of the Yellow River.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=65}} They were cut to pieces by the [[Hui people|Hui]] cavalry allied with the Nationalists.{{sfn|Watt|2014|pp=111-112}} Chiang began making preparations for a sixth encirclement campaign, and instructed Zhang and Yang to participate.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=129-130}} In early November, Chen Lifu presented Pan Hannian with a set of extremely harsh conditions for a deal.{{efn|The terms called for, among other things, reducing the Red Army to 3,000 men and sending all of its senior officers into exile.{{sfn|Peng|2023|p=476}}{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=163}}}} Pan balked, calling them "conditions for surrender".{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=161}} In late November, Chiang ordered the Northeastern Army and forces from the central Nationalist Army, [[Hu Zongnan]]'s Right Route Army, to attack towards the Communist capital at [[Zhidan County|Bao'an]]. At the resulting Battle of Shanchengbao, the Northeastern Army withheld most of its forces from the attack. This allowed the Red Army to ambush and nearly wipe out Hu's 78th regiment.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|p=102}}{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=223}} This reversed the diplomatic situation: Chen Lifu moderated his conditions, but the CCP recalled Pan Hannian from Nanjing on December 10.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|pp=101-102}}{{sfn|Peng|2023|pp=476-477}}

The tensions between Zhang and Chiang were reaching a breaking point. During Chiang's birthday celebrations on October 31, Zhang Xueliang attempted to convince Chiang to give up the bandit suppression campaign and focus on Japan instead. Zhang was supported by [[Yan Xishan]] and Feng Yuxiang, but Chiang angrily refused. He gave a speech the following day where he proclaimed that "the Communists are our greatest traitors".{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=237}}{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=129-130}}{{sfn|Spence|1990|p=384}} When Zhang returned to Xi'an and recounted the incident to Yang Hucheng, the latter suggested the idea of a ''bingjian'' ({{lang-zh|links=no|c=兵谏|p=bīngjiàn|tr=military remonstrance}}). In an episode in ancient Chinese history, a military officer had arrested the Emperor to force him to change a bad policy. The officer had been rewarded for his conduct rather than punished. Zhang, who historian Alexander Pantsov calls a "gallant cavalier", was intrigued by the nobility of the idea.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|pp=241-242}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=302}} On November 23, Chiang ordered the arrest of seven leaders of the [[National Salvation Association]]. The move created an outcry across China.{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=339}} Zhang flew to Luoyang on December 3 and tried to convince Chiang to release the seven prisoners and to form a united front with the CCP against Japan, to no avail.{{sfn|Yang|2020|p=66}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}} Chiang declared "You are the only one in the whole country who sees things as you do. I am the revolutionary government; what I do is revolution!"{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}} When news arrived that day that Japanese marines had landed at [[Qingdao]], Chiang decided to redouble his efforts to defeat the Communists.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}}

==Chiang's arrest==
[[File:张学良公馆-西楼（C楼） 02.jpg|thumb|Zhang's residence in Xi'an, where he made the decision to arrest Chiang.]]

Chiang and his entourage drove from Luoyang to Xi'an on December 4, 1936, in order to make preparations for another assault on the Communists.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=242}} By this time he was aware through intelligence reports that Zhang had been collaborating with the Communists, but he did not realize that he was in any actual danger.{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=162}} Chiang believed that he could convince Zhang to join his sixth encirclement campaign in earnest. He stayed at the [[Huaqing Pool]] complex, an ancient resort located in the town of Lintong, about 10 miles outside Xi'an.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=297}} Chiang's associates were staying in the city of Xi'an itself, in the newly built Western Capital Hotel.{{sfn|Will|2013|p=260}} Once again, Zhang, Yang, and Chiang met to discuss policy. Once again, they reached an impasse.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=297}} Chiang shouted at Zhang that "I am the Generalissimo; I do not err; I am China; and China cannot do well without me!"{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=243}} On December 9, Chiang threatened Zhang and Yang that if they did not attack the Communists, he would remove them from command and have their forces reassigned to distant provinces.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=186}} Historian [[Rana Mitter]] suggests that the risk of losing his command may have been the final straw for Zhang.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|pp=71-72}} The meeting was interrupted by the arrival in Lintong of tens of thousands of students demonstrating for a united front.{{efn|Estimates of the size of the crowd vary. Yang gives it at 20,000, Pantsov says over 10,000.{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=223}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=243}}}} Chiang demanded that Zhang disperse the crowd or he would have his guards open fire on them. Zhang promised the students "a definite reply in action within one week."{{sfn|Yang|1990|p=223}}

{{multiple image
 | total_width = 320
 | align = left
 | image1 = Lintong Xian China Huaqing-Pool-11.jpg
 | alt1 = A small simply furnished bedroom
 | image2 = Lintong Xian China Huaqing-Pool-10.jpg
 | alt2 = A window pane with a bullet hole surrounded by cracks
 | footer = The room where Chiang Kai-shek stayed in the ''Wujianting'' (five-room pavilion), part of the Huaqing Pool complex, and a bullet hole left by the firefight.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=297}}}}

Chiang was scheduled to leave on December 12.{{sfn|Kotkin|2017|p=360}} At 10 PM on Friday, December 11 Zhang Xueliang ordered Sun Mingjiu ({{lang-zh|labels=no|c=孫銘九}}), the captain of his personal guard, to arrest Chiang Kai-shek.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=297}} According to Sun's later account, his orders were to bring Chiang to Xi'an unharmed.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=136–137}} As Sun prepared, Zhang gathered the top officers of the Northeastern and Northwestern Armies to inform them of his decision.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=137}} He also sent a telegram to the CCP Central Committee. Mao and the other Central Committee members were surprised but elated by the news.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=299}}{{efn|Contrary to a common misconception, the CCP did not have prior knowledge of the conspiracy.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=145}}}} At 5 AM, December 12, Sun Mingjiu led a few hundred soldiers on an assault of the Huaqing Pool complex.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=297}} They reached the gate at 6 AM, where they were asked for the password. Unable to give it, they began a firefight with Chiang's guards.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=137}} This alerted Chiang to the attack, and in panic he fled out of his window. He jumped over the wall surrounding the compound, injuring his back in the process. Without his false teeth or one of his shoes, he fled up the side of a snow-covered mountain. He was discovered a few hours later, shivering and exhausted. Sun carried Chiang down the mountain on his back.{{sfn|Kotkin|2017|p=360}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=298}} Chiang was brought to Yang Hucheng's headquarters in Xi'an, where Zhang explained that he had kidnapped him in order to force him to change his policies. Chiang was indignant, and after an initial exchange, he refused to speak.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=144}}

Beginning at 5:30 AM that same day, Yang's Northwestern Army seized important locations around Xi'an: the government headquarters, the airport, the police station, and the Western Capital Hotel where Chiang's associates were staying.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=143}}{{sfn|Will|2013|p=260}} Those taken prisoner included governor of Shaanxi {{ill|Shao Lizi|zh|邵力子}}, the Shaanxi commmissioner of education [[Zhou Xuechang]], and Generals [[Chen Cheng]], [[Jiang Dingwen]], [[Wei Lihuang]], and [[Zhu Shaoliang]].{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=144}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|p=299}}{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=79}} [[Shao Yuanchong]], one of the authors of the [[National Anthem of the Republic of China]], was shot while trying to escape from the hotel. He died in the hospital two days later.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=79}} The Northwestern Army had poor discipline, and for three days after the coup, its soldiers carried out widespread looting of Xi'an. Only the areas controlled by Zhang's Northeastern Army were unaffected.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=80}}

[[File:西安宣传画 5117.jpg|thumb|A propaganda poster posted in Xi'an during the Xi'an Incident. It reads: "The realization of peace is our first step towards victory!"]]

Zhang and Yang attempted to secure their strategic situation. Zhang sent telegrams to the Northeastern Army's 51st Army in [[Lanzhou]] and to the commander of some artillery brigades he had stationed in Luoyang. While the 51st Army successfully took control of Lanzhou, the commander in Luoyang immediately handed Zhang's telegram to the Nationalist garrison commander, {{ill|Zhu Shaozhou|zh|祝绍周}}.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=80-81}} Zhu reacted quickly. He informed Minister of War [[He Yingqin]], who ordered the a loyal division to occupy [[Tong Pass]], a critical chokepoint on the route from east from Xi'an. They arrived only four hours before [[Feng Qinzai]]'s 42nd Division, sent by Yang Hucheng for the same purpose.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=81,87-88}}{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=171}} Zhu also attempted an aerial mission to rescue Chiang, but it arrived too late and the pilot was taken prisoner.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=81}}

Zhang and Yang sent telegrams to Nanjing and all across China, explaining what they had done and listing eight demands for the government:
{{Blockquote
|text={{Ordered list |To reorganize the Nanjing government so that all political parties and groups can take part in it and assume responsibility for national salvation;|To suspend the civil war all over the country and adopt a policy for united anti-Japanese resistance;|To immediately release the [Seven] National Salvation Intellectual Leaders who were arrested in Shanghai;|To release all the political prisoners in China;|To liberate people’s patriotic movements;|To guarantee all the political freedoms and rights of the people, as well as the freedom of assembly and association;|To ensure compliance with the will of Sun Yat-sen; and|To immediately convene a national salvation congress.}}
|source=''Declaration of Eight-Point Demands''{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=144-145}}
}}

== Immediate reactions ==
News spread overnight through Bao'an, the CCP capital. The Communists were surprised but ecstatic. A mass meeting held the following morning approved a proposal by Mao Zedong to put Chiang on trial as a traitor.{{sfn|Pantsov|2012|pp=299-300}} Zhou Enlai was dispatched to Xi'an. The CCP advised Zhang to prepare for attacks by the Nationalist central government, and promised that the Red Army would not take advantage of the situation to occupy any Northeastern Army territory.{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=163}} They also notified the Comintern of what had occurred and asked permission to form a "revolutionary government of national defense" with Zhang, Yang, and other dissident Nationalists.{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=163}} A meeting of the CCP Central Committee was held on December 13 to discuss the situation in more detail. The vast majority approved the plan to force Chiang to step down and stand trial, and to sentence him to death. They also planned to make Xi'an the center of a government of national resistance to Japan.{{sfn|Chen|2024|p=163}} On December 15, the CCP sent a telegram to Nanjing urging them to comply with the Eight Demands, force Chiang to step down, and allow him to be tried.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=249}}

{{multiple image
 | align = left
 | total_width = 340
 | image1 = 何應欽 07.jpg
 | caption1 = He Yingqin, Minister of War
 | alt1 = A Chinese man with glasses in a military uniform
 | image2 = T. V. Soong Edit.jpg
 | alt2 = A Chinese man wearing round glasses and a western-style business suit
 | caption2 = T. V. Soong, Chiang's brother-in-law
 | image3 = HHKung.jpg
 | caption3 = H. H. Kung, Vice-President of the Executive Yuan
 | alt3 = Chinese man wearing a tangzhuang
 | footer = Three leading figures in the Nationalist Government}}

Nanjing received word of Chiang's arrest by 1 pm on December 12.{{efn|He Yingqin had learned of the revolt earlier, via Zhu Shaozhou.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=89}}}} An emergency meeting of the Central Standing Committee was convened that night.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=146}} The committee members were uncertain over whether Chiang was dead or alive. He Yingqin may have been convinced that Chiang was dead, and argued for an immediate military attack on Xi'an.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=251}} The Committee placed He Yingqin in charge of handling the military response.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=168}} However, the following day, [[H.H. Kung]] and [[Soong Mei-ling]] arrived in the capital and began lobbying hard for a negotiated settlement.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=169}} They had received a personal telegram from Zhang assuring them that Chiang was alive, and as the Generalissmo's relatives, they feared that they would lose their influence if he were killed in an attack.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=85}}{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=251}} Soong Mei-ling even argued that Zhang Xueliang's demands were worth hearing out.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=169}} In contrast, the mood in the army was sanguine. Hundreds of officers signed a letter to He requesting permission to attack Xi'an. Hundreds more sent a threatening telegram to Zhang demanding that he stand down.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=92}} In the end, He decided to put military pressure on the mutineers rather than attack or negotiate right away. On December 16, he received a mandate from the Central Standing Committee to begin a punitive expedition.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=97}} The Central Army took up positions surrounding Xi'an.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|p=170}} The Nationalist government attempted (unsuccessfully) to induce defections from the mutinous armies and pressure Zhang to surrender.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=92-93,97}} Bombing raids were conducted on [[Weinan]] and [[Huazhou District|Huaxian]] and the [[List of German-trained divisions of the National Revolutionary Army|Training Division]] of the Central Army launched an unsanctioned attack that ended in defeat.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=92-93}}

{{Gallery
| height       = 200px
| align        = right
| File:Ta Kung Pao 1936.12.18 Open Letter.png
| The December 18 editorial "An Open Letter to the Military Vocation in Xi'an" published in ''[[Ta Kung Pao (1902–1949)|Ta Kung Pao]]''. Critical of the coup, the newspaper dropped their editorial by plane into Xi'an.}}

Most warlords chose to stay neutral in the conflict rather than risk backing the losing side. Many, such as [[Liu Xiang (warlord)|Liu Xiang]] of Sichuan, [[Han Fuju]] of Shandong, and [[Song Zheyuan]] of Hebei, were privately sympathetic to the coup. They publicly reassured the central government of their loyalty while voicing support for a negotiated settlement.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=93, 115-119}} Zhang Xueliang had counted on the support of Yan Xishan, the governor of Shanxi who had also signed a secret deal with the CCP.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=113}} But Yan was afraid that a civil war would break out between Xi'an and Nanjing. He urged Zhang to let Chiang go—although simultaneously expressing his desire for Chinese unity against Japan and converting his anti-Communist militias into anti-Japanese militias.{{sfn|Gillin|1967|p=232}} Only one warlord faction, the Guangxi Clique, openly supported the rebels. They had recently led their own rebellion against the central government and shared Zhang and Yang's desire for a common front against Japan.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=116}}

The Chinese public reacted with shock at the news of Chiang's arrest. There was widespread concern for Chiang's safety.{{sfn|Eastman|1991|p=48}} ''[[Ta Kung Pao (1902–1949)|Ta Kung Pao]]'', a major newspaper, published an editorial excoriating Zhang and calling for Chiang's immediate release.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=123-124}} Even members of the National Salvation Association, who also wanted a ceasefire with the Communists and war against Japan, feared that Chiang's captivity could give Japan an opening to conquer China. Groups across the political spectrum  advocated for Chiang's release.{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=344}} A major exception were Chinese students. In [[North China]] they strongly supported the coup, while in South China there was a divide between left-wing students, who largely supported the coup, and right-wing students, who largely opposed it.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=121}}

New Zealand journalist [[James Munro Bertram|James Bertram]], who managed to enter Xi'an shortly after the incident began, reported on the mood of the city. He observed [[Republic of China Air Force|fleets of government aircraft]] flying low over the roofs, and hearing H. H. Kung's declare over radio that there would be "no dealings with armed rebellion, no truce with the 'Communist bandits.'"{{sfn|Bertram|1938|pp=118-122}} The city's population remained strongly supportive of the rebels and their cause.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=98}}

===Stalin's intervention and CCP reversal===
{{Gallery
| height       = 200px
| align        = right
| File:Page of Pravda.png
| The December 14 article in ''Pravda'' "Events in China" condemned the coup as a Japanese plot
}}
Moscow received news of Chiang's arrest on December 13. The head of the Comintern, [[Georgi Dimitrov]], was delighted. He was preparing to authorize Chiang's execution until he read the articles in ''[[Pravda]]'' and ''[[Izvestia]]'', which condemned the Xi'an Incident as a plot by "pro-Japanese elements". In a subsequent meeting, Stalin made it clear to Dimitrov that he viewed Chiang as indispensable.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=248}}

Stalin feared that in Chiang's absence, a figure like Wang Jingwei, perhaps assisted by He Yingqin (who had already contacted Wang in Italy after Chiang's arrest), would take control of the Nationalists and create a pro-Japanese Chinese regime, placing the Soviet Union in extreme danger of a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union. His anxieties were confirmed when Chiang's rival Wang Jingwei met with Adolf Hitler to discuss the prospect of China enlisting in the anti-Communist Axis in exchange for greater German aid to China.{{sfn|Frank|2020|pp=21-22}} Following Chiang's abduction, Pan Hannian had advised Stalin that without Chiang, "China would be without a leader to fight the Japanese and this would not benefit the Soviet Union."{{sfn|Frank|2020|pp=21-22}}{{efn|Wang Jingwei was in Europe recovering from an assassination attempt the previous year. He Yingqin notified him when Chiang was abducted, but he did not arrive back in China until January 14, 1937, after the incident was already over.{{sfn|Worthing|2016|pp=174-175}}{{sfn|So|2002|p=244}}}}

Following Stalin's orders, the Comintern sent a telegram on December 16 instructing the CCP to bring the Xi'an incident to a peaceful conclusion.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=249}}{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=187}} The telegram was not received until the 17th, and would not be fully decrypted for several days. However, by the 17th the CCP's leadership had already learned of Moscow's stance from public news sources and decided to change course.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|pp=249-250}} On that day, the CCP announced that they desired a peaceful settlement. On December 18, they recanted their former call for a public trial of Chiang as "inappropriate".{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=187}}

== Negotiations ==
[[File:西安事变旧址（系列）-高桂滋公馆 - panoramio.jpg|thumb|left|Gao Guizi's residence, the building where Chiang was held from December 14 until his release]]
The Xi'an mutineers never expected Chiang to agree to all eight of their demands, but Zhang made it clear to Chiang that he would have to accept some of them before he would be released.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=95}} Chiang at first refused to talk.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=250}} The situation improved when [[William Henry Donald|William Donald]] arrived on December 14. Donald knew both men, as a former advisor to Zhang and current advisor to Chiang. He convinced Chiang to accept the offer of better lodgings at the house of Gao Guizi.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=94-96}} He also explained to the leaders of the mutiny that the Chinese public was strongly opposed to Chiang's arrest.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=96}}

Zhou Enlai, who had departed Bao'an on December 15, arrived in Xi'an late on the 17th in the middle of an extremely delicate situation.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|p=104}} A faction of the army led by Yang Hucheng and the radical young officers of the "Anti-Japanese Comrade Society" wanted to execute Chiang, in line with the CCP's earlier pronouncements.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=176–178}}{{sfn|Eastman|1991|p=48}} But Zhang was gravely concerned with the Central Government's military response, the lukewarm support he had received from fellow warlords, and the unexpected opposition of the Chinese public.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=164}}{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=97-98}} He wanted to negotiate Chiang's release, and was anxious to know if Moscow was going to be providing the material support for an anti-Japanese war that he had counted on.{{sfn|Sheng|1992|p=164}} Zhou, aware at this point that Moscow had condemned the coup, had to carefully walk back the CCP's radical stance and break the bad news to Zhang without jeopardizing the northwest alliance.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=103-104}} Their talks lasted all night. Zhou managed to convince the Xi'an leaders that they should negotiate for Chiang's safe release, so long as the Central Government did not start a civil war.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|p=105}} Yet he also emphasized that Chiang was still extremely powerful, and so they also agreed that Chiang would not be let go unless he accepted some minimal conditions.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|pp=66-67}}

[[File:张学良公馆-西二楼会议室周恩来、张学良、杨虎城、宋子文、宋美龄谈判场景还原.jpg|thumb|right|The room in Zhang Xueliang's residence where negotiations were held on December 23 and 24, featuring a recreation of that scene. From left to right: T. V. Soong, Soong Mei-ling, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Xueliang, and Yang Hucheng.]]

T. V. Soong decided to fly to Xi'an after learning that Chiang was still alive. He arrived on December 20 accompanied by William Donald. Zhang told him that he was ready to negotiate, but warned that he would turn Chiang over to the Communists if the Central Government launched a full-scale attack.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=252}} Soong and Donald could not convince Chiang to negotiate and returned to Nanjing on December 21. The following day, they returned with Soong Mei-ling and [[Dai Li]].{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=252}} Finally, his wife was able to persuade Chiang to negotiate. He refused to sign any document, but verbally agreed to "reshuffle the government, hold a national salvation conference three months from now, reorganize the Kuomintang, and approve an alliance with Russia and cooperation with the Communist party."{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=252}} He also authorized T. V. Soong to conduct further negotiations with his captors. On December 23–24, negotiations were held between Zhou, T. V. Soong, Soong Mei-ling, Zhang, and Yang that resulted in a more concrete agreement (although still not signed by Chiang). The civil war would be ended, the Communist party legalized, and the Red Army incorporated as a unit of the NRA.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=252}}

On December 24, Chiang received Zhou for a meeting, the first time the two had seen each other since Zhou had left [[Huangpu District, Guangzhou|Whampoa Military Academy]] over ten years earlier. Zhou began the conversation by saying: "In the ten years since we have met, you seem to have aged very little." Chiang nodded and said: "Enlai, you were my subordinate. You should do what I say." Zhou replied that if Chiang would halt the civil war and resist the Japanese instead, the Red Army would willingly accept Chiang's command.{{sfn|Barnouin|Yu|2006|p=67}} Chiang then agreed to accept the terms finalized earlier that day. He also promised to continue negotiations with Zhou about the details of a new united front once he had returned to Nanjing.{{sfn|Pantsov|2023|p=252}}

Chiang was released on 26 December and returned to Nanjing with Zhang Xueliang.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=176–180}}

== Aftermath ==
[[File:Chiang Kai-shek after Xi'an incident.jpg|thumb|[[Lin Sen]] receives Chiang Kai-shek at the Nanjing Airport after the Xi'an Incident.]]
When Chiang was released, public opinion was decisively in his favor. His arrival to Nanjing was greeted by cheering crowds of over 400,000 people.{{sfn|Spence|1990|p=386}} Edgar Snow declared that Chiang had returned with a national standing "higher than that of any leader in modern Chinese history."{{sfn|Frank|2020|pp=21-22}} The event served to further consolidate power within the Nationalist government into Chiang's hands.{{sfn|Eastman|1991|p=48}}

Historian Jay Taylor writes how Xi'an turned Chiang from a "popular leader" into a "national hero."{{sfn|Taylor|2009|pp=128–129}} American ambassador [[Nelson T. Johnson]] wrote how "Whereas the outstanding developments during the first half of 1936 increased the precariousness of China's position, the significant events of the second half, in their larger aspects, have had the opposite effect." He observed that the Xi'an crisis "fostered another spontaneous outburst of nationalism throughout the country and caused universal rejoicing when the Generalissimo was released on Christmas Day."<ref>{{Cite book |title=Foreign Relations of the United States |date=1936 |edition=IV |pages=453}}</ref>

=== The Second United Front ===
After Chiang returned to Nanjing, he announced a cease fire in the civil war. However, he also repudiated any promises that he had made in Xi'an. He had Zhang imprisoned and charged with treason.{{sfn|Coble|2023|p=53}} Chiang then sent 37 army divisions north to surround the Northeastern Army and force them to stand down. The army was deeply divided on the appropriate response. Yang Hucheng and the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society wanted to stand and fight if the KMT army attacked, and refuse to negotiate until Zhang was released. The Communist representatives strongly disagreed and cautioned that civil war would, in the words of Zhou Enlai, "make China into [[Spanish Civil War|another Spain]]".{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=176–180}}
[[File:1937年红军改组为国民革命军命令.jpg|thumb|upright|A Communist army order instructing its troops to accept orders from the Nationalist government]]
Further negotiations between the CCP and Nanjing continued. However, when a conference of Northeastern officers in January 1937 overwhelmingly resolved not to surrender peacefully, the CCP reluctantly decided that they could not abandon their allies and pledged to fight alongside them if the KMT attacked. The situation was again reversed when the five most senior Northeastern generals met separately and decided to surrender. The radical officers were enraged and assassinated one of the generals on 2 February, but this only turned the majority of the soldiers against the plan to stand and fight.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|pp=180–185}} The Northeastern Army peacefully surrendered to advancing KMT forces and was divided into new units, which were sent to Hebei, Hunan, and Anhui.{{sfn|Itoh|2016|p=191}} Yang Hucheng, however, was arrested and eventually executed,{{sfn|Wakeman|2003|p=234}} while the leaders of the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society defected to the Red Army. Zhang was kept under house arrest for over 50 years before emigrating to Hawaii in 1993.{{sfn|Eastman|1991|p=48-49}}

The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]].{{sfn|Paine|2012|pp=102-103}} This in turn hastened the two Chinese factions into formalizing their alliance as the [[Second United Front]].{{sfn|Eastman|1991|p=48-49}}

The Xi'an Incident was a turning point for the CCP. Chiang's leadership over political and military affairs in China was affirmed, while the CCP was able to expand its own strength under the new united front, which played a role in the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]].{{sfn|Garver|1988|p=78}}

== Legacy ==

Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists believed that had the Xi'an Incident not occurred, they would have been able to destroy the CCP.{{sfn|Wu|1976|p=xi}} In China, the story of Chiang's capture is frequently retold as "illustration of the cowardice and duplicity of Chiang Kai-shek", according to historian Michael Dillon.{{sfn|Dillon|2020|p=103}}

Historians have tended to downplay the event's significance in comparison with its public perception. Parks Coble writes that "the basic concepts" determining Nationalist policy remained the same, and that Chiang had already decided on a course of confrontation with Japan.{{sfn|Coble|1991|p=360}} Rana Mitter points out that the terms agreed to at Xi'an differed little from the outline of a deal that had been in the works for months.{{sfn|Mitter|2013|p=73}} Even Tien-wei Wu, who calls the Xi'an Incident "the pivotal in modern Chinese history", also acknowledges that "there was no guarantee the KMT or Chiang Kai-shek would not resume the campaign" against the Communists after he had been released.{{sfn|Wu|1976|pp=xi-xii}} Hans van de Ven states that the main importance of the Xi'an Incident was that both the CCP and Chiang survived, given how close both got to destruction.{{sfn|van de Ven|2003|p=188}}

==See also==
* [[Outline of the Chinese Civil War]]
* Other [[political kidnapping]]s:
** [[Kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro]]
** [[October Crisis]]
** [[Gretchen Whitmer kidnapping plot]]

== Notes ==
{{notelist}}

== References ==
{{reflist}}

== Bibliography ==
{{Refbegin|indent=yes|30em}}
*{{Cite book |last1=Barnouin |first1=Barbara |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780674290112/ |title=Zhou Enlai: A Political Life |last2=Yu |first2=Changgen |date=2006 |publisher=The Chinese University Press |location=Hong Kong |access-date=28 January 2023}}
* {{Cite book |last=Bertram |first=James M |title=First Act in China: The Story of the Sian Mutiny |date=1938 |publisher=Viking Press |location=New York |pages=118–122}}
* {{cite book |last1=Chen |first1=Jian |title=Zhou Enlai: A Life |date=2024 |publisher=Belknap Press |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}
* {{cite book |last1=Coble |first1=Parks M. |title=Facing Japan: Chinese politics and Japanese imperialism; 1931 - 1937 |date=1991 |publisher=Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard Univ |location=Cambridge, Mass. |isbn=9780674290112}}
* {{Cite book |last=Coble |first=Parks M. |title=The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War |date=2023 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-009-29761-5 |location=Cambridge New York, NY |author-link=Parks M. Coble}}
* {{cite book |last1=Dillon |first1=Michael |title=Zhou Enlai: The Enigma Behind Chairman Mao |date=2020 |publisher=I.B. Tauris |location=New York}}
* {{cite book |last1=Eastman |first1=Lloyd E. |title=The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949 |date=1991 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=New York |chapter=Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927-1937|isbn=0521385911}}
* {{Cite book |last=Frank |first=Richard |title=Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War: July 1937-May 1942 |date=2020 |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company}}
* {{cite book |last1=Gao |first1=Hua |title=How the Red Sun Rose: The Origins and Development of the Yan'an Rectification Movement |date=2018 |publisher=The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press |isbn=9789629968229}}
* {{cite book|last1=Garver|first1=John W.|title=Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism|date=1988|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|isbn=0195363744}}
* {{cite book |last1=Gillin |first1=Donald |title=Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949 |date=1967 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=Princeton}}
* {{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY}}
* {{cite book |last1=Ienaga |first1=Saburo |title=Pacific War, 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II |date=1978 |publisher=Pantheon Books |location=New York}}
* {{Cite book |last=Itoh |first=Mayumi |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VcswDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 |title=The Making of China's War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang |date=3 October 2016 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-981-10-0494-0}}
* {{Cite book |last=Kotkin |first=Stephen |title=Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 |date=2017 |publisher=Penguin Press}}
* {{Cite book |last=Mitter |first=Rana |title=Forgotten Ally |date=2013 |publisher=Houghton Mifflin Harcourt}}
* {{cite book|last1=Paine|first1=Sarah C.|title=The Wars for Asia 1911–1949|date=2012|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge|isbn=978-1107020696}}
* {{cite book |last1=Pantsov |first1=Alexander V |translator-last=Levine |translator-first=Stephen I |title=Mao: The Real Story |date=2012 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |location=New York}}
* {{cite book |last1=Pantsov |first1=Alexander V |translator-last=Levine |translator-first=Stephen I |title=Victorious in Defeat: The Life and Times of Chiang Kai-shek, 1887–1975 |date=2023 |publisher=Yale University Press |location=New Haven}}
* {{cite book |last1=Peng |first1=Lü |translator-last=Doar |translator-first=Bruce |title=A History of China in the 20th Century |date=2023 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |location=Singapore |isbn=978-981-99-0733-5 |edition=1st}}
* {{Cite book |last=Qian |first=Ying |title=Revolutionary Becomings: Documentary Media in Twentieth-Century China |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=9780231204477 |location=New York, NY}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Sheng |first1=Michael |title=Mao, Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japanese United Front: 1935-1937 |journal=The China Quarterly |date=1992 |volume=129 |issue=129 |pages=149–170|doi=10.1017/S0305741000041266 }}
* {{Cite journal |last=So |first=Wai-Chor |date=2002 |title=The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932–1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei |journal=Modern China |publisher=Sage Publications |volume=28 |issue=2 |pages=213–252 |doi=10.1177/009770040202800203 |jstor=3181354 |s2cid=143785141}}
* {{Cite book |last=Spence |first=Jonathan |title=The Search for Modern China |date=1990}}
* {{cite book|last1=Taylor|first1=Jay|title=The Generalissimo|date=2009|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge|isbn=978-0674033382|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/generalissimochi00tayl}}
* {{Cite book |last=van de Ven |first=Hans |title=War and Nationalism |date=2003 |publisher=Routledge|location=New York}}
* {{cite book|last1=Wakeman|first1=Frederic|title=Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service|date=2003|publisher=University of California Press|location=Berkeley|isbn=0520234073}}
* {{cite book |last1=Watt |first1=John R. |editor1-last=Dudbridge |editor1-first=Glen |editor2-last=Pieke |editor2-first=Frank |title=Saving Lives in Wartime China |date=2014 |publisher=Brill |location=Leiden}}
* {{cite book |last1=Will |first1=Pierre-Étienne |title=Xi'an, 1900–1940: From isolated Backwater to Resistance Center |date=2013 |publisher=Brill |location=Boston}}
* {{Cite book |last=Worthing |first=Peter |title=General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China |date=2016 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9781107144637 |location=Cambridge}}
* {{cite book |last1=Wu |first1=Tien-wei |title=The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Moment in Modern Chinese History |date=1976 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |location=Ann Arbor}}
* {{cite book |last1=Yang |first1=Benjamin |title=From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March |date=1990 |publisher=Westview Press |location=Boulder, Colorado}}
* {{cite book |last1=Yang |first1=Kuisong |editor1-last=Shen |editor1-first=Zhihua |translator-last=Xia |translator-first=Yafeng |title=A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991 |date=2020 |publisher=Palmgrave Macmillan and Social Sciences Academic Press |location=Singapore |chapter=Sino-Soviet Diplomacy Under the Threat of War}}
{{Library resources box|onlinebooks=yes}}
{{refend}}

== External links ==
{{Commons category}}
{{wikisource}}
{{Chinese Civil War}}

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Xi'an Incident}}
[[Category:Chinese Civil War]]
[[Category:Military history of Xi'an]]
[[Category:1936 in China]]
[[Category:War scare]]
[[Category:Political crisis]]