Enforcement
Script error: No such module "about". Enforcement is the proper execution of the process of ensuring compliance with laws, regulations, rules, standards, and social norms.[1]
Governments attempt to effectuate successful implementation of policies by enforcing laws and regulations.[2] Enactment refers to application of a law or regulation, or carrying out of an executive or judicial order.
Theories of enforcement
Enforcement serves a number of functions; the enforcement of social norms can ensure conformity within insular communities,[3] the enforcements of laws can maximize social benefits and protect the public interest,[4] and enforcement may also serve the self-interest of the institutions that oversee enforcement.[5] Enforcement can be effectuated by both public institutions and private, non-governmental actors.[6] Enforcement is often accomplished through coercive means or by utilizing power disparities to constrain action.[7] Some scholars, such as Kate Andrias, have also argued that institutions enforce rules when deciding "when and how to apply" laws and regulations.[8]
Delegation of enforcement powers
Some governments will delegate enforcement powers to subordinate governmental entities or private parties.[9] In the United States, for example, the federal government and state governments often delegate a range of enforcement powers to administrative agencies.[10] There has been considerable debate in legal scholarship about the degree to which governments should oversee and supervise institutions to which enforcement powers have been delegated.[11]
Enforcement mechanisms
Script error: No such module "Labelled list hatnote". Template:Excerpt In 2017, of 265 policies for ocean protection only 13% had specific enforcement mechanisms.[12]
Enforcement mechanisms are major component of governance structures.[13] It has been suggested that an effective global public health security convention would require a governing body (or bodies) to enforce the framework with appropriate enforcement mechanisms.[14] Similar approaches include the concept of "climate clubs" of polities for climate change mitigation. In such, "border adjustments [...] have to be introduced to target those states that do not participate [...] to avoid shifting effects with ecologically and economically detrimental consequences", with such "border adjustments or eco-tariffs" incentivizing other countries to adjust their standards and domestic production to join the climate club.[15] The Paris Agreement may lack enforcement mechanisms.[16]
On a national level, penalties for non-complying countries could include:
- public reprimands
- economic sanctions
- denial of benefits, such as those related to travel, trade, and tourism
- public disclosures of compliance, which could act either as an incentive or penalty[14]
- tariffs[15]
Benefits for countries could include:
- tangible resources, such as financial aid or technical assistance
- other support
- access to data and information, recommendations and guidance, or other services provided by a governing body[14]
- tariffs
Selective enforcement
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Institutions may choose to exercise discretion, thereby enforcing laws, regulations, or norms only in selective circumstances.[17] Some scholars, such as Joseph H. Tieger, have suggested that selective enforcement is an inherent component of all enforcement regimes, because it is impossible for enforcers to observe and catch every violation.[18] Other scholars, such as Margaret H. Lemos and Alex Stein, have suggested that "strategic" enforcement is a cost-effective method of achieving social benefits; by focusing enforcement on the worst violators, other violators will "downscale" their activities so that they do not appear to be the worst offender.[19]
See also
References
Template:BBstyle Template:Reflist
- ↑ See Template:Ifsubst, Enforcement (2d ed. 1910).
- ↑ Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power Template:Webarchive, 88 Template:Ifsubst 1031, 1034 (2013); Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 Template:Ifsubst 858, 901 (2014) (discussing "gaps" between the enactment and enforcement of legislation).
- ↑ Amalia D. Kessler, Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century Merchant Court, 22 Template:Ifsubst 71 (2011).
- ↑ John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 L. & Pol'yScript error: No such module "Check for unknown parameters". 385-88 (1984); see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 Template:Ifsubst 698, 701 (2011) ("The public interest promoted by state enforcement is the interest of the state and its citizens, while federal enforcement purports to serve the broader national interest.").
- ↑ Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 886 (2014).
- ↑ Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 Template:Ifsubst 285, 288 (2016); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 Template:Ifsubst 1401, 1456 (1998).
- ↑ See Scott A. Anderson, The Enforcement Approach to Coercion, 5 J. of Ethics &Soc. Phil. 1 (2010).
- ↑ Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power Template:Webarchive, 88 Template:Ifsubst 1031, 1040 (2013) (comparing "enforcement" with "rulemaking").
- ↑ Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 Template:Ifsubst 180, 184 (2014) (discussing enforcement powers in federalist systems of government); John F. Manning, The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Template:Ifsubst 1, 44 (2014) (citing specific examples of delegation of enforcement powers to agencies in the United States); Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power Template:Webarchive, 88 Template:Ifsubst 1031, 1040 (2013) (noting that enforcement powers can be delegated to "private parties").
- ↑ Robert F. Durant, Template:Ifsubst 379 (2010) (discussing agencies' "compliance and enforcement" powers).
- ↑ Compare, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen O. Robinson, Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Template:Ifsubst 1 (1982) with Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty To Supervise, 124 Yale L. J. 124 (2015).
- ↑ Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
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- ↑ a b c Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
- ↑ a b Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
- ↑ Script error: No such module "Citation/CS1".
- ↑ See Kenneth Culp Davis, Dialogue on Police Rulemaking: Police Rulemaking on Selective Enforcement: A Reply, 125 Template:Ifsubst 1167 (1977).
- ↑ Joseph H. Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 Template:Ifsubst 717, 743 (1971) ("The exigencies of police work are such that even the most elaborate set of statutory or regulatory directives could not succeed in removing all occasion for the exercise of judgment.").
- ↑ Margaret H. Lemos and Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 Template:Ifsubst 9, 9-10 (2010).