View source for Chaebol

{{Short description|South Korean family-run business conglomerate}}
<!--Do not add {{Italic title}}; "chaebol" has become a word in English, so it is not italicized per [[MOS:FOREIGNITALIC]].-->
{{multiple issues|
{{More citations needed|date=January 2022}}
{{POV|date=August 2023|talk=This article seems super biased}}
}}
{{Use British English|date=April 2020}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=April 2020}}
{{Infobox Korean name/auto|hangul=재벌|hanja=財閥|ipa={{IPA|ko|tɕɛbʌɭ|}}}}
{{South Korean economy}}

A '''chaebol'''<!--Do not italicize; "chaebol" has become a word in English, so it is not italicized per [[MOS:FOREIGNITALIC]].--> ({{IPAc-en|UK|ˈ|tʃ|eɪ|b|əl|,_|ˈ|tʃ|eɪ|b|ɒ|l}} {{respell|CHAY|bəl|,_|CHAY|bol}},<ref name="ODE">{{cite web |title=chaebol |url=https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/chaebol |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160927030852/https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/chaebol |url-status=dead |archive-date=27 September 2016 |website=[[Oxford Dictionaries (website)|Oxford Dictionaries]] |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |access-date=15 August 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=CHAEBOL |url=https://dictionary.cambridge.org/pronunciation/english/chaebol |website=[[Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary|Cambridge Dictionary]] |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |access-date=29 April 2024}}</ref> {{IPAc-en|US|ˈ|tʃ|eɪ|b|oʊ|l|,_|ˈ|dʒ|ɛ|b|əl}} {{respell|CHAY|bohl|,_|JEB|əl}};<ref name="MW">{{cite web |title=Chaebol |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chaebol |website=[[Dictionary by Merriam-Webster]] |publisher=[[Merriam-Webster]] |access-date=30 August 2011 |archive-date=13 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180613133927/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chaebol |url-status=live }}</ref> {{korean|재벌}} {{IPA|ko|tɕɛbɔɭ||Ko-재벌.oga}}, {{literal translation|rich family|financial [[clique]]}}) is a large industrial [[South Korea]]n conglomerate <!-- Please DO NOT add a link to [[conglomerate (company)]] as chaebol ARE NOT companies. The chaebol, while being mostly (although not always) a "conglomerate" in a very general sense (a grouping of companies operating in various industries), has nothing to do with that Wikipedia article, describing a single, defined legal entity subject to much more strict regulations than the tradition-based and informal chaebol, which is composed by various technically independent legal entities interconected by family management and/or crossed minority shareholdings and controlled by an individual or family instead of being as conglomerate companies that are controlled by a single parent company that may or may not have subsidiaries, those being directly controlled (majority or wholly owned) secondary companies.-->run and controlled by an individual or family.<ref name="MW" /> A chaebol often consists of multiple diversified affiliates, controlled by a person or group.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303">{{cite journal|last=Jung|first=Dong-Hyeon|title=Korean Chaebol in Transition|journal=China Report |date=August 2004|volume=40|issue=3|pages=299–303|doi=10.1177/000944550404000306|s2cid=154720682}}</ref> Several dozen large South Korean family-controlled corporate groups fall under this definition. The term first appeared in English text in 1972.<ref name="MW" />

Chaebol have also played a significant role in [[South Korean politics]]. In 1988, a member of a chaebol family, [[Chung Mong-joon]], president of [[Hyundai Heavy Industries]], successfully ran for the [[National Assembly of South Korea]]. Other business leaders were also chosen to be members of the National Assembly through [[proportional representation]].<ref name=loc/> [[Hyundai Group|Hyundai]] has made efforts in the thawing of [[North Korea–South Korea relations|North Korean relations]], despite some controversy.<ref>{{cite news |date=9 February 2003 |title=Hyundai's $500 Million Payments to North Korea: A Bribe or Business Deal? |publisher=Korea WebWeekly |url=http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/2004/hyndais-money.pdf |url-status=dead |access-date=7 August 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210905114217/http://www2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/2004/hyndais-money.pdf |archive-date=5 September 2021}}</ref> Many South Korean family-run chaebol have been criticised for low dividend payouts and other governance practices that favor controlling [[shareholder]]s at the expense of ordinary [[investor]]s.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Lee |first1=Joyce |title=Samsung Electronics names new-generation leaders as profit soars |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-samsung-elec-results/samsung-electronics-names-new-generation-leaders-as-profit-soars-idUSKBN1CZ2U8 |access-date=31 October 2017 |work=Reuters |date=30 October 2017 |archive-date=31 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171031095732/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-samsung-elec-results/samsung-electronics-names-new-generation-leaders-as-profit-soars-idUSKBN1CZ2U8 |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Etymology ==
"Chaebol" is derived from the [[McCune–Reischauer]] romanization of the Korean word {{lang|ko|재벌}} (''chaebŏl''), without the [[breve]] above the o. In 2000, the [[South Korean Ministry of Tourism]] introduced a new system of converting the Korean language into the [[Roman alphabet]] called [[Revised Romanization]].<ref name="MoCT2000">{{cite web|url=http://www.korea.net/korea/kor_loca.asp?code=A020303|title=Romanization of Korean|date=July 2000|website=[[Korea.net]]|publisher=Ministry of Culture & Tourism|access-date=9 May 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070916025652/http://www.korea.net/korea/kor_loca.asp?code=A020303 <!-- Bot retrieved archive -->|archive-date=16 September 2007}}</ref> Under the new transliteration style, {{lang|ko|재벌}} is written as ''jaebeol'', not chaebol. Despite [[McCune–Reischauer]] being largely abandoned in South Korea, the term is still ubiquitously written as chaebol.

The word originates from the [[Sino-Japanese vocabulary|Sino-Japanese]] term ''[[zaibatsu]]'' ({{Lang|ja|財閥}}), where {{Lang|ja|財}} means 'wealth' and {{Lang|ja|閥}} means 'clan'.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.incheonilbo.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1043246|title=Where have you been, Chinese Characters? 72. Chaebol|publisher=[[Incheon Ilbo]]|publication-date=10 June 2020|access-date=17 January 2024}}</ref> The Japanese zaibatsu dominated their economy from 1868 until they were dissolved under the [[American Occupation of Japan]] in 1945. The rise and proliferation of the Korean chaebol resembles the Japanese zaibatsu at their peak.

The word has been [[Loan word|loaned]] into English since at least 1972.<ref name="MW" />

== History ==
{{more citations needed section|date=January 2011}}
[[File:Hyundai Headquarter Building, Jongno-gu, Seoul.jpg|thumb|right|The former headquarters of [[Hyundai Group|Hyundai]] in [[Seoul]]]]

===Formation and boom===

South Korea's economy was small and predominantly [[agriculture|agricultural]] well into the mid-20th century. However, [[Miracle on the Han River|policies]] of President [[Park Chung Hee]] spurred rapid [[industrialisation]] by promoting large businesses, following his seizure of power in 1961. [[Five-Year Plans of South Korea|The First Five Year Economic Plan]]<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303"/> by the government set [[industrial policy]] towards new investment, and chaebols were to be guaranteed loans from the banking sector. The chaebol played a key role in developing new industries, markets, and export production, helping make South Korea one of the [[Four Asian Tigers]].

Although South Korea's major industrial programs did not begin until the early 1960s, the origins of the country's entrepreneurial elite were found in the political economy of the 1950s. Very few Koreans owned or managed larger corporations during the Japanese colonial period. After the Japanese left in 1945, some Korean businessmen obtained the assets of some of the Japanese firms, several of which grew into the chaebols of the 1990s.<ref name=loc/>

The Japanese colonial government sometimes sought to co-opt local businessmen and wealthy individuals often linked to land ownership, and a significant minority of industries were jointly owned by Japanese and Korean businesses. A few Korean chaebols, such as Kyungbang, came into existence during this era.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kohli |first1=Atul |title=Where do high growth Political economies come from? The Japanese lineage of Korea's "Developmental State" |journal=World Development |date=1994 |volume=22 |issue=9 |pages=1269–1293|doi=10.1016/0305-750X(94)90004-3 }}</ref>

{{multiple image
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{{multiple image
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}}

The companies, as well as certain other firms that were formed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, had close links with [[Syngman Rhee]]'s First Republic, which lasted from 1948 to 1960. It is confirmed that many of these companies received special treatment from the government in return for kickbacks and other payments.<ref name=loc/>

When the military took over the government in 1961, its leaders announced that they would eradicate the corruption that had plagued the Rhee administration and eliminate "injustice" from society. Some leading industrialists were arrested and charged with corruption, but the new government realized that it would need the help of entrepreneurs if the government's ambitious plans to modernize the economy were to be fulfilled. A compromise was reached, under which many of the accused corporate leaders paid fines to the government. Subsequently, there was increased cooperation between corporate and government leaders in modernizing the economy.<ref name=loc/>{{rp|152}}

Government-chaebol cooperation was essential to the subsequent economic growth and astounding successes that began in the early 1960s. Driven by the urgent need to turn the economy away from consumer goods and light industries toward heavy, chemical, and import-substitution industries, political leaders and government planners relied on the ideas and cooperation of chaebol leaders. The government provided the blueprints for industrial expansion; the chaebol realized the plans. However, the chaebol-led industrialization accelerated the [[Monopoly|monopolistic]] and oligopolistic concentration of capital and economically profitable activities in the hands of a limited number of conglomerates.<ref name=loc/>

Park used the chaebol as a means of economic growth. Exports were encouraged, reversing Rhee's policy of reliance on imports. Performance quotas were established.<ref name=loc/>

Chaebols were able to grow because of two factors: foreign loans and special favours. Access to foreign technology also was critical to the growth of the chaebol through the 1980s. Under the guise of "guided capitalism", the government selected companies to undertake projects and channelled funds from foreign loans. The government guaranteed repayment should a company be unable to repay its foreign creditors. Additional loans were made available from domestic banks. In the late 1980s, chaebols dominated the industrial sector and were especially prevalent in manufacturing, trading, and heavy industries.<ref name=loc/>

Chaebols experienced tremendous growth beginning in the early 1960s in connection with the expansion of South Korean exports. The growth resulted from the production of a diversity of goods rather than just one or two products. Innovation and the willingness to develop new product lines were critical. In the 1950s and early 1960s, chaebols concentrated on wigs and textiles; by the mid-1970s and 1980s, heavy, defence, and chemical industries had become predominant. While these activities were important in the early 1990s, real growth was occurring in the electronics and high-technology industries. Chaebols also were responsible for turning the [[trade deficit]] in 1985 into a trade surplus in 1986. The [[Current account (balance of payments)|current account balance]], however, fell from more than US$14 billion in 1988 to US$5 billion in 1989.<ref name=loc/>

Chaebols continued their explosive growth in export markets in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, they had become financially independent and secure, thereby eliminating the need for further government-sponsored credit and assistance.<ref name=loc/>

===1990-present===
[[File:Seoul Square.jpg|220px|thumb|Former headquarters of the defunct [[Daewoo]] Group, once the second-largest conglomerate in South Korea]]

By the 1990s, South Korea was one of the largest [[newly industrialised countries]] and boasted a standard of living comparable to industrialized countries.

President [[Kim Young-sam]] began to challenge the chaebol,<ref>{{cite web |title=From Full-Blown Democracy to Disaster: The Kim Young-sam Years, 1993-97 |url=https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/341/4iie3373.pdf |publisher=[[Peterson Institute for International Economics]] |access-date=15 November 2025 |lang=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Aik Seng |first=Tan |title=The Changing Arena of Power Contestation Between the State and Chaebols in South Korea: Democracy and the Ascent of Legal Institutions |url=https://journals.library.cornell.edu/tmpfiles/CIAR_11_1_2.pdf |date=2017 |journal=[[Cornell International Affairs Review]] |volume=11 |access-date=15 November 2025 |lang=en}}</ref> but it was not until the [[1997 Asian financial crisis]] that the weaknesses of the system were widely understood. Initially, the crisis was caused by a speculative attack on the [[Thai baht]], which lead to a sharp drop in its value and immediate [[cash flow]] concerns needed to pay foreign debts; widespread [[Foreign portfolio investment|foreign investment]] and [[financial deregulation]] across [[Pacific Asia|East Asia]] allowed foreign investors to attack the values of the national currencies of other countries in the region, including South Korea, which spread the financial crisis to the affected countries and caused a downward spiral in the value of the [[South Korean won]].<ref>{{cite report |last=Akyüz |first=Yilmaz |title=Causes and Sources of the Asian Financial Crisis |url=https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ux_hi_akyuz.en.pdf |date=17 February 2000 |publisher=[[UNCTAD]] |access-date=15 November 2025 |lang=en}}</ref> As a result, chaebols, which at this point were  overleveraged in short-term debts and already suffering from falling export prices,<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Kyung |first=Pil-Kim |title=Crisis Management in South Korea and the Hegemonic Strategy of the Chaebols |url=https://monthlyreview.org/articles/crisis-management-in-south-korea-and-the-hegemonic-strategy-of-the-chaebols/ |magazine=[[Monthly Review]] |access-date=15 November 2025 |lang=en}}</ref> started going bankrupt: Of the 30 largest chaebols, 11 collapsed during the financial crisis.<ref>{{cite news |title=Two-thirds of top chaebol have disappeared since 1997 |url=https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2017/11/01/economy/Twothirds-of-top-chaebol-have-disappeared-since-1997/3040227.html |date=1 November 2017 |publisher=[[Korea JoongAng Daily]] |access-date=15 November 2025 |lang=en}}</ref>    

The remaining chaebols also became far more specialized in their focus. For example, with a population ranked 26th in the world, before the crisis, the country had seven major automobile manufacturers. Afterward, only two major manufacturers{{which|date=August 2025}} remained intact, though two additional ones continued, in a smaller capacity, under [[General Motors]] and [[Renault]]. Chaebol debts were not only to state industrial banks but also to independent banks and their financial services subsidiaries. The scale of the loan defaults meant that banks could neither foreclose nor write off bad loans without themselves collapsing, so the failure to service these debts quickly caused a systemic banking crisis, and South Korea turned to the IMF for assistance. The most spectacular example came in mid-1999, with the [[Daewoo dissolution and corruption scandal|collapse of the Daewoo Group]], which had some US$80 billion in unpaid debt. At the time, it was the largest corporate bankruptcy in history.<ref name="Daewoo">{{cite news | author = Newsweek Staff | title = Daewoo: Surviving a Bust-Up | work = Newsweek | date = 29 October 2006 | url = https://www.newsweek.com/daewoo-surviving-bust-111249 | access-date = 20 January 2022 | archive-date = 30 January 2022 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220130222933/https://www.newsweek.com/daewoo-surviving-bust-111249 | url-status = live }}</ref> Investigations also exposed widespread corruption in the chaebols, particularly fraudulent accounting, and bribery.

South Korea recovered quickly from the crisis, and most of the blame for economic problems was shifted to the [[International Monetary Fund|IMF]], which had forced the government to adopt 30% [[Interest rate#Monetary policy|interest rate]] in exchange for a [[US$]]55 billion bailout. The remaining chaebols have grown substantially since the crisis, but they have maintained far lower debt levels.<ref name="Daewoo" />

In 2019, the revenue of the largest chaebol, [[Samsung]], was worth about {{Percentage|17}} of the South Korean GDP<ref>{{Cite web |last= |date=2020-10-26 |title=South Korea's Lee Kun-hee, who made Samsung a global powerhouse, dies at 78 |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/26/south-koreas-lee-kun-hee-who-made-samsung-a-global-powerhouse-dies-at-78.html |access-date=2023-06-15 |website= |publisher=[[CNBC]] |language=en |agency=[[Reuters]]}}</ref> with the company holding billions of dollars in cash. In 2023, the revenue of the top four chaebols (Samsung, SK, Hyundai, and LG) was {{Percentage|408|1000|1}} of the South Korean GDP, and the top thirty chaebol were {{Percentage|769|1000|1}} of GDP.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-10-09 |title=Korea's top 4 conglomerates take up {{Percentage|40}} of GDP in 2023 |url=https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2025/01/602_383889.html |access-date=2025-01-16 |website=The Korea Times |language=en}}</ref><!-- top 64: 84.3% https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/949236.html -->

Recent financial statements show chaebols are slowly losing power due to either international competition or internal competition from startups.{{Citation needed|date=February 2023}} The net profit of South Korea's top conglomerates decreased from 2012 to 2015.{{Citation needed|date=February 2023}}

== Ranking ==
{{Row hover highlight}}{{sticky header}}
{| class="wikitable sortable mw-datatable sticky-header" style="text-align:center"
|+Ranking of Chaebols by assets {{as of|2025|05|1|lc=y}}<ref>{{Cite web |script-title=ko:보도자료 - 공정거래위원회 |url=https://www.ftc.go.kr/www/selectBbsNttView.do?pageUnit=10&pageIndex=1&searchCnd=all&key=12&bordCd=3&searchCtgry=01,02&nttSn=46053 |access-date=2025-05-02 |website=www.ftc.go.kr}}</ref>
!2025 Rank
!2024 Rank
!Change
!Group Name
!Representative
!Affiliates 2025
!Affiliates 2024
!Assets 2025 (trillion [[South Korean won|KRW]])
!Assets 2024 (trillion [[South Korean won|KRW]])
!Type
|-
|1
|1
|{{steady}}
|[[Samsung]]
|[[Lee Jae-yong]]
|63
|63
|589.1
|571.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|2
|2
|{{steady}}
|[[SK Group|SK]]
|[[Chey Tae-won]]
|198
|219
|363
|352.1
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|3
|3
|{{steady}}
|[[Hyundai Motor Group|Hyundai Motor]]
|[[Chung Eui-sun]]
|74
|70
|306.6
|297.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|4
|4
|{{steady}}
|[[LG]]
|[[Koo Kwang-mo]]
|63
|60
|186.1
|180.5
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|5
|6
|{{increase}}1
|[[Lotte Group|Lotte]]
|[[Shin Dong-bin]]
|92
|96
|143.3
|139
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|6
|5
|{{decrease}}1
|[[POSCO]]
|[[POSCO]]
|49
|47
|137.8
|133.7
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|7
|7
|{{steady}}
|[[Hanwha Group|Hanwha]]
|Kim Dong-kwan
|119
|108
|125.7
|122
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|8
|8
|{{steady}}
|[[HD Hyundai Heavy Industries]]
|[[Chung Mong-joon]]
|32
|29
|88.7
|86.1
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|9
|10
|{{increase}}1
|[[Nonghyup Bank|NongHyup]]
|[[Nonghyup Bank|NongHyup]]
|56
|54
|80.1
|77.7
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|10
|9
|{{decrease}}1
|[[GS Group|GS]]
|[[Huh Chang-soo]]
|98
|99
|79.3
|76.9
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|11
|11
|{{steady}}
|[[Shinsegae]]
|[[Chung Yong-jin]]
|59
|53
|63.9
|61.9
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|12
|14
|{{increase}}2
|[[Hanjin]]
|[[Walter Cho]]
|42
|34
|58.2
|56.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|13
|12
|{{decrease}}1
|[[KT Corporation|KT]]
|[[KT Corporation|KT]]
|47
|48
|46.3
|44.9
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|14
|13
|{{decrease}}1
|[[CJ Group|CJ]]
|[[Lee Jay-hyun]]
|66
|73
|39.4
|38.2
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|15
|16
|{{increase}}1
|[[LS Group|LS]]
|Koo Ja-eun
|72
|67
|36
|34.9
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|16
|15
|{{decrease}}1
|[[Kakao]]
|[[Kim Beom-soo (businessman)|Kim Beom-soo]]
|115
|128
|34.8
|33.8
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|17
|20
|{{increase}}3
|[[HMM (company)|HMM]]
|[[HMM (company)|HMM]]
|4
|5
|33.5
|32.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|18
|17
|{{decrease}}1
|[[Doosan Group|Doosan]]
|Park Jeong-won
|24
|22
|28.2
|27.3
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|19
|18
|{{decrease}}1
|[[DL Group|DL]]
|Lee Hae-wook
|45
|45
|27
|26.2
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|20
|21
|{{increase}}1
|Jeungheung
|Jeong Chang-seon
|51
|53
|26.7
|25.9
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|21
|19
|{{decrease}}2
|[[Celltrion]]
|[[Seo Jung-jin (businessman)|Seo Jung-jin]]
|9
|8
|26.7
|25.9
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|22
|23
|{{increase}}1
|[[Naver Corporation|Naver]]
|[[Lee Hae-jin]]
|45
|54
|25.5
|24.7
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|23
|25
|{{increase}}2
|[[S-Oil]]
|[[S-Oil]]
|2
|2
|24.5
|23.8
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|24
|22
|{{decrease}}2
|[[Mirae Asset Financial Group|Mirae-Asset]]
|미래에셋
|28
|30
|23.5
|22.8
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|25
|27
|{{increase}}2
|[[Coupang]]
|[[Coupang]]
|16
|13
|22.3
|21.6
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|26
|24
|{{decrease}}2
|[[Hyundai Department Store Group|Hyundai Department Store]]
|현대백화점
|24
|27
|22.3
|21.6
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|27
|49
|{{increase}}22
|[[Hankook|Hankook & Company]]
|Jo Yang-Rae
|25
|24
|21.5
|20.9
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|28
|26
|{{decrease}}2
|Booyoung
|Lee Joong-geun
|21
|21
|21.5
|20.8
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|29
|32
|{{increase}}3
|[[Young Poong Group|Young Poong]]
|Jang Hyung-jin
|30
|28
|20.9
|20.3
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|30
|29
|{{decrease}}1
|Harim
|Kim Hong-guk
|43
|45
|20
|19.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|31
|33
|{{increase}}2
|[[Hyosung]]
|[[Cho Hyun-joon]]
|60
|57
|19.8
|19.2
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|32
|38
|{{increase}}6
|Sinokor
|Jeong Tae-soon
|28
|27
|19.5
|18.9
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|33
|30
|{{decrease}}3
|[[SM Group (South Korean company)|SM]]
|Woo Oh-hyun
|58
|58
|18.3
|17.8
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|34
|31
|{{decrease}}3
|[[HDC Hyundai Development Company|HDC]]
|[[Chung Mong-gyu]]
|34
|35
|17.5
|17
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|35
|34
|{{decrease}}1
|Hoban
|Kim Sang-yeol
|40
|39
|16.9
|16.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|36
|53
|{{increase}}17
|[[Upbit|Dunamu]]
|[[Upbit|Dunamu]]
|11
|12
|15.9
|15.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|37
|36
|{{decrease}}1
|[[Korea Tobacco & Ginseng Corporation|KT&G]]
|[[Korea Tobacco & Ginseng Corporation|KT&G]]
|17
|14
|15.7
|15.3
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|38
|40
|{{increase}}2
|Kolon
|Lee Woong-yeol
|45
|48
|15.2
|14.7
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|39
|37
|{{decrease}}2
|[[KCC Corporation|KCC]]
|Jeong Mong-jin
|13
|14
|15
|14.5
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|40
|35
|{{decrease}}5
|[[DB Group|DB]]
|Kim Jun-ki
|24
|25
|14.8
|14.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|41
|43
|{{increase}}2
|[[Nexon]]
|Yoo Jeong-hyeon
|23
|19
|14.5
|14.1
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|42
|41
|{{decrease}}1
|OCI
|Lee Woo-hyun
|24
|24
|13.8
|13.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|43
|45
|{{increase}}2
|[[LG#Associated companies|LX]]
|Bon-Joon Koo
|17
|17
|12.7
|12.3
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|44
|44
|{{steady}}
|[[SeAH Holdings]]
|Lee Soon-hyung
|24
|26
|12.4
|12
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|45
|46
|{{increase}}1
|[[Netmarble]]
|[[Bang Jun-hyuk]]
|31
|35
|11.8
|11.4
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|46
|48
|{{increase}}2
|[[E-Land Group|E-Land]]
|Park Seong-su
|32
|31
|11.6
|11.3
|limited assurance{{efn|name="limited assurance"}}
|-
|47
|39
|{{decrease}}8
|[[Kyobo Life Insurance|Kyobo]]
|[[Shin Chang-jae]]
|16
|14
|11.1
|10.8
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|48
|58
|{{increase}}10
|[[GM Korea]]
|[[GM Korea]]
|3
|3
|10.8
|10.5
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|49
|52
|{{increase}}3
|Daokuwoom
|Kim Ik-rae
|45
|48
|10.4
|10.1
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|50
|51
|{{increase}}1
|[[Kumho Petrochemical|Kumho]] 
|Park Chan-gu
|16
|14
|10
|9.7
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|51
|60
|{{increase}}9
|Daebang
|Gu gyo-un
|41
|42
|10
|9.7
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|52
|42
|{{decrease}}10
|Taeyoung
|Yoon Seyoung
|51
|82
|9.8
|9.5
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|53
|54
|{{increase}}1
|Samchully 
|Lee Man-deuk
|33
|47
|9.7
|9.4
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|54
|56
|{{increase}}2
|[[KG Group|KG]]
|Kwak Jae-sun
|26
|34
|9.6
|9.3
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|55
|47
|{{decrease}}8
|EcoPro
|Lee Dong-chae
|17
|23
|9.4
|9.1
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|56
|57
|{{increase}}1
|[[HL Group|HL]]
|[[Chung Mong-won]]
|15
|13
|9.3
|9
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|57
|55
|{{decrease}}2
|[[Dongwon Industries|Dongwon]]
|Kim Namjeong
|23
|26
|8.9
|8.6
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|58
|59
|{{increase}}1
|[[Amorepacific Corporation|Amoraepacific]]
|[[Suh Kyung-bae]]
|15
|13
|8.7
|8.4
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|59
|50
|{{decrease}}9
|[[Taekwang Group|Taekwang]]
|[[Lee Ho-jin (businessman)|Lee Ho-jin]]
|20
|20
|8.7
|8.4
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|60
|64
|{{increase}}4
|[[Krafton]]
|[[Chang Byung-gyu]]
|9
|8
|8.5
|8.3
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|61
|70
|{{increase}}9
|Global Sae-A Group
|Woonggi Kim
|23
|20
|8.3
|8
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|62
|61
|{{decrease}}1
|[[Korea Aerospace Industries|KAI]]
|[[Korea Aerospace Industries|KAI]]
|4
|4
|8.1
|7.9
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|63
|63
|{{steady}}
|MDM
|Moon Joo-hyun
|19
|15
|8
|7.8
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|64
|86
|{{increase}}22
|Sono international
|Park Chun-hee
|25
|23
|7.4
|7.2
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|65
|62
|{{decrease}}3
|Aekyung
|Jang Young-shin
|30
|31
|7.3
|7.1
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|66
|67
|{{increase}}1
|[[Dongkuk Steel|Dongkuk]]
|Jang Se-ju
|16
|12
|7.3
|7.1
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|67
|66
|{{decrease}}1
|BS
|Lee Ki-seung
|66
|65
|7.3
|7
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|68
|65
|{{decrease}}3
|[[Samyang Foods|Samyang]]
|Kim Yun
|13
|13
|7.1
|6.9
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|69
| -
|New
|[[LIG Nex1|LIG]]
|Koo Bon-sang
|18
| -
|7.1
|6.9
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|70
|69
|{{decrease}}1
|[[JoongAng Ilbo|Joongang]]
|[[Hong Seok-hyun]]
|57
|54
|6.9
|6.7
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|71
|72
|{{increase}}1
|[[Eugene Group|Eugene]]
|Yoo Kyung-seon
|63
|60
|6.8
|6.6
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|72
|75
|{{increase}}3
|Korea HC
|Park Jeong-seok
|26
|24
|6.7
|6.5
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|73
|77
|{{increase}}4
|BGF
|Hong Seok-jo
|19
|18
|6.3
|6.1
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|74
| -
|New
|Daekwang
|Cho Young-hoon
|64
| -
|6.1
|5.9
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|75
|83
|{{increase}}8
|Bando
|Kwon Hong-sa
|15
|18
|6.1
|5.9
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|76
|78
|{{increase}}2
|Dashin
|Yang Hong-seok
|84
|117
|6
|5.9
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|77
|76
|{{decrease}}1
|Okay
|Choi Yun
|16
|16
|5.8
|5.6
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|78
|79
|{{increase}}1
|[[HiteJinro]]
|Park Mun-deok
|12
|11
|5.7
|5.6
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|79
|80
|{{increase}}1
|[[Nongshim]]
|[[Shin Dong-won]]
|22
|23
|5.6
|5.5
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|80
|74
|{{decrease}}6
|DN
|Kim Sang-heon
|7
|8
|5.6
|5.5
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|81
|68
|{{decrease}}13
|[[Hyundai Marine & Fire Insurance]]
|Jeong Mong-yoon
|14
|13
|5.6
|5.4
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|82
|81
|{{decrease}}1
|Shinyoung
|Jeong Chun-bo
|32
|33
|5.6
|5.4
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|83
|88
|{{increase}}5
|Paradise
|Jeon Philip
|11
|14
|5.4
|5.3
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|84
|71
|{{decrease}}13
|IS
|Gwon Hyuk-woon
|32
|36
|5.4
|5.2
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|85
|85
|{{steady}}
|[[Hybe Corporation|Hybe]]
|[[Bang Si-hyuk]]
|12
|15
|5.4
|5.2
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|86
|82
|{{decrease}}4
|[[Hansol]]
|Jo Dong-gil
|21
|21
|5.4
|5.2
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|87
|84
|{{decrease}}3
|[[Sampyo]]
|Jeong Do-won
|28
|33
|5.3
|5.2
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|88
| -
|New
|Sajo
|Joo Jin-woo
|40
| -
|5.3
|5.1
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|89
|87
|{{decrease}}2
|Wonik
|Lee Young-han
|47
|54
|5.3
|5.1
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|90
| -
|New
|[[Bithumb]]
|Lee Jeong-hoon
|20
| -
|5.2
|5.1
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|91
| -
|New
|[[EUKOR]]
|[[EUKOR]]
|2
| -
|5.1
|5
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
|92
|73
|{{decrease}}19
|Youngone
|Sung Gi-hak
|20
|50
|5
|4.9
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|-
| -
| -
|Excluded
|[[Kumho Asiana Group|Kumho Asiana]]
|Park Sam-gu
| -
|24
| -
|17.4
|publicly disclosed corporate group{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"}}
|}
{{Notelist|refs={{efn|name="limited assurance"|Chaebols whose assets exceed {{Percentage|1|200|1}} of South Korea's GDP}}{{efn|name="publicly disclosed corporate group"|Chaebols whose assets exceed 5 trillion won}}}}

== Corporate governance ==

=== Management structure ===
Some chaebols are one large [[corporation]] while others have broken up into loosely connected groups of separate companies sharing a common name. Even in the latter case, each is almost always owned, controlled, or managed by the same family group.

South Korea's chaebols are often compared with Japan's ''[[keiretsu]]'' business groupings, the successors of the pre-war [[zaibatsu]], but they have some major differences:{{According to whom|date=August 2023}}
* Chaebols are still largely controlled by their founding families while ''keiretsu'' are controlled by groups of professional managers. Chaebols, furthermore, are more family-based and family-oriented than their Japanese counterparts.
* Chaebols are centralized in ownership while ''keiretsu'' are more decentralized.
* Chaebols have more often formed subsidiaries to produce components for exports while large Japanese corporations have mostly switched to employing outside contractors.<ref name=loc/>
* The major structural difference between Korean chaebols and Japanese ''keiretsu'' is that chaebols do not have affiliated banks for credit access. Most were heavily dependent on government loans and loan guarantees in their early years, and they still have a closer relationship with the government than their Japanese counterparts. Chaebols are largely prohibited from owning private banks, partly to spread risk and partly to increase the government's leverage over the banks in areas such as credit allocation. In 1990, government regulations made it difficult for a chaebol to develop an exclusive banking relationship, but following the cascading collapses of the late 1990s, they were somewhat relaxed.{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}} ''Keiretsu'' have historically worked with an affiliated bank, giving the affiliated companies almost unlimited access to credit,<ref name=loc>{{Country study|country=South Korea|editor-last=Savada|editor-first=Andrea Matles|date=1992|edition=4th|url=https://lccn.loc.gov/91039109|location=Washington|publisher=Federal Research Division, Library of Congress|pd=<!-- yes/no - no removes the notice about pd text -->|isbn=0-8444-0736-4}}</ref> so the economic problems for which the Japanese have been known are [[zombie bank]]s rather than systemic banking crises. However, many of the largest ''keiretsu'' have diversified their debt practices, and public bond sales have become somewhat common.{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}}

The chaebol model is heavily reliant on a complex system of interlocking ownership. The owner, with the help of family members, family-owned charities, and senior managers from subsidiaries, has to control only three or four public companies, which control other companies that in turn control subsidiaries. A good example of this practice would be the owner of [[Doosan]], who controlled more than 20 subsidiaries with only minor participation in about 5 companies.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Kim|first=Dong-Woon|date=April 2003|title=Interlocking Ownership in the Korean Chaebol|journal=Corporate Governance: An International Review|volume=11|issue=2|pages=132–142|doi=10.1111/1467-8683.00014}}</ref>

=== Equity ===
The chairman of a typical chaebol possesses a small portion of the equity in the companies under the large umbrella of the chaebol but is very powerful in making decisions and controls all management. For example, Samsung owns {{Percentage|1|200|1}} of the group's listed firms. This demonstrates a weakness in the rule of law.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303" /> The method that allows this type of possession is called cross-holding, which is a horizontal and vertical structure that enhances the control of the chairman.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Moskalev|first1=Sviatoslav|last2=Park|first2=Seung Chan|date=March 2010|title=South Korean Chaebols and Value-Based Management|journal=Journal of Business Ethics|volume=92|pages=49–62|doi=10.1007/s10551-009-0138-5|s2cid=154121368}}</ref>

=== Workplace culture ===
The typical culture of a chaebol is highly paternalistic. Much of the environment is defined by the chairman who acts as a "fatherly figure" to his subordinates. This can be traced back to [[Neo-Confucianism|Neo-Confucian]] values that permeate Korean society.{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}} A chaebol head's demeanour towards his employee can be described as "loving" while maintaining "sternness and a sense of responsibility". Workers commit to long hours, most notably on weekends and holidays, to appease their superiors.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Korea: The Impossible Country|last=Tudor|first=Daniel|publisher=Tuttle|year=2012|location=UK}}</ref> Company outings and drinking sessions tend to be compulsory to foster a sense of family and belonging among employees. Employers believe that enhancing a common bond between them will translate into prosperity and productivity for the company. Other practices that would be uncommon for Western workplaces to engage in include gift-giving to employees and arranging dates for workers in search of relationships or marriage.{{citation needed|date=January 2023}}

Chaebols are notoriously hierarchical. As such, it is unusual for an individual to challenge or question the decision-making of his or her boss. This dynamic adds to the culture that orients itself around whoever is in charge but can lead to undesirable circumstances. For example, the [[Asiana Airlines Flight 214|Asiana flight 214]] crash led critics to speculate that cultural factors prevented a pilot on board from aborting the low-speed landing and thus straying from his superior's commands.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asiana-culture-idUSBREA1906U20140210|title=Asiana Airlines seeks cockpit culture changer after U.S. crash|date=2017-02-10|newspaper=Reuters|access-date=2016-12-01|archive-date=30 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201230163951/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asiana-culture-idUSBREA1906U20140210|url-status=live}}</ref> Promotion is rarely merit-based. Rather, it is through the order of age and time served to the conglomerate. This is reflected by the fact that most executives are far older than their employees. If a worker does not attain an executive or senior-management role by the age of fifty, he or she is commonly forced to resign. Again, this is attributable to the age-hierarchy dynamics in Korean Confucian culture. A typical firm heavily emphasizes loyalty to the firm, as demonstrated in the standard recruiting process. Newly acquired employees undergo an intense initiation that includes activities such as training camps and singing company-unique songs that reiterate the production goals of the firm.<ref name=":0" />

===Emergence and inflation===
The origins of the modern chaebol system in South Korea came as a consequence of the [[Korean War]]. The war resulted in much destruction and halted industrial production, which led the government to print money to pay for the war and meet the requirements of the United Nations forces for the Korean currency,{{clarify|date=March 2022}} all of which caused mass inflation. This inflation caused many commodity prices to double every six months.

The government had to react and so devised a plan in providing strong financial incentives to private companies between the 1960s and 1970s. These included the government's choosing to select various family businesses to distribute the incentives (imported raw materials, commodities, bank loans). The impact was immediate, and most of the businesses flourished rapidly. The protection of infant companies allowed them to develop because of the highly regulated market, which prevented foreign companies from entering.<ref>{{cite journal | last=Beck | first=Peter M. | journal= Asian Survey| title=Revitalizing Korea's Chaebol |date=November 1998 | volume=38 | issue=11 | pages=1018–1035 | doi=10.2307/2645683| jstor=2645683 }}</ref> Many companies that were not in the circle of businesses saw the system as flawed and corrupted.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303" /> Corruption scandals have occurred periodically in all chaebols. Such incidents suggest a form of "[[crony capitalism]]" which is common in developing countries.

===Internal market transactions accountability===
Because the government gave out incentives to help businesses, it had a lot of control over them. However, there was no way to ensure the businesses would use the incentives effectively and efficiently.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303"/> In other words, there was no external monitoring system to monitor chaebols and ensure that they were efficient in the allocation of resources.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Park|first1=Seung-Rok|last2=Yuhn |first2=Ky-hyang|title=Has the Korean Model of Chaebol Succeeded?|journal=Journal of Economic Studies|year=2012|volume=39|issue=2|pages=260–274|doi=10.1108/01443581211222680}}</ref> All businesses undertake internal market transactions, which constitute "purchase and sale of intermediate inputs, the provision and receipt of loan collaterals, and the provision and receipt of payment guarantees among member firms in a business group".<ref>{{cite journal|last=Park|first=Seung-Rok|author2=Yuhn, Ky-hyang|title=Has the Korean chaebol model succeeded?|journal=Journal of Economic Studies|date=April 2011 |volume=39 |issue=2 |doi=10.1108/01443581211222680 |pages=260–274}}</ref> There is the question of efficiency, especially in production and management. Therefore, the chaebol system was not very transparent. Behind the scenes, businesses were provided with subsidiary financing and intragroup transactions. This allowed them easy loans to cover their deficits, and before the [[1997 Asian financial crisis]], huge debts had accumulated, many of which were hidden. That gave the illusion that the system was flourishing into the 1990s.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303"/>

===Relationship with foreign investors===
According to the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, the majority of South Korea's economy is driven by exports.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/products/south_korea/sk_co/website/default.html?type=chapter%25index=1&moduleID=0&taskID=0.|access-date=2021-08-05|website=fieldsupport.dliflc.edu|title=South Korean Cultural Orientation|archive-date=5 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210805043254/https://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/products/south_korea/sk_co/website/default.html?type=chapter%25index=1&moduleID=0&taskID=0.|url-status=live}}</ref> South Korea is one of the leading exporters worldwide. Additionally, the majority of investors in the Korean stock market are foreign investors. Out of 711 listed companies in the Korean stock market, approximately 683 have shares that are held by foreign investors.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last1=Lee|first1=Youkyoung|last2=Cho|first2=Myeonghyeon|date=July 2016|title=Does control-ownership disparity matter to foreign investors in Korea?|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.04.007|journal=International Review of Economics & Finance|volume=44|pages=219–231|doi=10.1016/j.iref.2016.04.007|issn=1059-0560|access-date=5 August 2021|archive-date=28 September 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220928132932/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S105905601630020X?via%3Dihub|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Nearly a third of the market's value is owned by foreigners, a trend that is expected to continue.

Because of their major role in the Korean stock market, foreign investors play a massive part in whether or not chaebol conglomerates remain financially successful. Foreign investors tend to avoid chaebols, especially those that displayed heavy political influence in South Korea, like Samsung and Hyundai. Investors are reluctant to invest in large control-ownership disparity businesses because these companies tended to cheat shareholders to have higher personal financial gain.<ref name=":4" /> This information is extremely helpful, especially when it comes to determining how these corrupt conglomerates are still heavily supported, considering foreign investors show little interest in them. However, a study published in the Journal of the Japanese and International Economies found that after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, foreign investment behavioural patterns changed drastically. While foreign investors like to hold shares in large companies with high profit and liquidity margins, they do not show any particular interest in either chaebol or non-chaebol companies.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Joe|first1=Denis Yongmin|last2=Oh|first2=Frederick Dongchuhl|date=December 2017|title=Foreign investor behavior in Korea after the 1997 Asian financial crisis|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jjie.2017.10.002|journal=Journal of the Japanese and International Economies|volume=46|pages=69–78|doi=10.1016/j.jjie.2017.10.002|issn=0889-1583|access-date=5 August 2021|archive-date=28 September 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220928132929/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0889158317300552?via%3Dihub|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> As of January 2025, many Chaebol corporations have a high share of foreign investors, with Samsung Electronics at {{Percentage|73}},<ref name="한국거래소">{{Cite web |last=한국거래소 |title=KRX 정보데이터시스템 |url=http://data.krx.co.kr/contents/MMC/RANK/rank/MMCRANK007.cmd |access-date=2025-01-21 |website=data.krx.co.kr |language=ko}}</ref> Hyundai Motors at {{Percentage|50}},<ref name="한국거래소"/> and SK Hynics at {{Percentage|558|1000|1}}.<ref>{{Cite web |title=SK하이닉스 종목 상세 정보 확인하기 |url=https://stockplus.com/m/stocks/KOREA-A000660/quotations/foreign |access-date=2025-01-21 |website=증권플러스 |language=ko-KR}}</ref> Nonetheless, chaebols are still able to survive, highlighting just how much power and aid they receive from the Korean government.

==="Too big to fail"===
{{Further|Too big to fail}}
During the [[1997 Asian financial crisis]], bankers feared that chaebols would go bankrupt so they allowed these businesses to roll over their loans each time they were unable to repay their debts. Many did not believe that the chaebols were capable of collapsing and that the more they borrowed, the safer they were.

However, the theory was proven wrong when many businesses collapsed during the crisis. Since they were linked through debt guarantees, many of the companies fell into a chain reaction.<ref name="Jung 2004 299–303" /> The focus on capacity expansion created debt that was manageable when the economy was growing. However, when the economy stalled, [[debt-to-equity ratio]]s became a huge problem.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Akaba|first=Yuji|author2=Budde, Florian|author3=Jungkiu Choi|title=Restructuring South Korea's Chaebol|journal=McKinsey Quarterly|date=1 December 1998|issue=4|pages=68–79|url=http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=5f415648-0f8c-4e09-b4e1-b55ac6bf1fcc%40sessionmgr13&hid=14|access-date=13 February 2013}}{{Dead link|date=August 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

Since the crisis, chaebols had less debt and were less vulnerable to similar crises, as was demonstrated in the 2008 crisis. With the growth of the fewer remaining chaebols, however, each of them occupies a larger portion of the economy, with the largest chaebols making up (by sales revenue) a substantial portion of South Korea's GDP.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Premack |first=Rachel |url=https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/frankel/files/skorea-conglomerates2017sage.pdf <!--https://businessresearcher.sagepub.com/sbr-1863-103804-2830718/20170821/south-koreas-conglomerates--> |title=South Korea's Conglomerates |chapter=South-koreas-conglomerates |date=21 August 2017 |publisher=SAGE Publishing |doi=10.1177/237455680324.n1}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Aghion |first1=Philippe |last2=Guriev |first2=Sergei |last3=Jo |first3=Kangchul |date=2022-01-09 |title=Chaebols and firm dynamics in Korea |url=https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/article/36/108/593/6350484 |journal=Economic Policy |language=en |volume=36 |issue=108 |pages=593–626 |doi=10.1093/epolic/eiab016 |issn=0266-4658|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fukagawa |first=Yukiko |title=Chapter 4 "Chaebol " -Led High Growth System in South Korea |journal=East Asian Development Experience: Economic System Approach and Its Applicability |year=1997 |pages=79–103 |doi=10.20561/00025460}}</ref>

=== Monopolistic behavior ===
The [[Protectionism|protectionist]] policies and [[Anti-competitive practices|preferable government treatment]] granted chaebols the ability to exhibit monopolistic behaviour. The absence of a market free of intervention meant that "true competition" became a rarity in South Korea. Especially in the era before the [[1997 Asian financial crisis]], the only products available to the Korean people were those made by chaebols. Therefore, the social fabric of the country lacked a welcoming culture toward entrepreneurship. The intensity and extent of market concentration became evident as {{Percentage|80}} of the country's GDP is derived from chaebols. The largest of the group, Samsung, exports {{Percentage|20}} of South Korea's goods and services alone. Although no longer financially supported by the government, these firms have attained [[economies of scale]] on such a massive level that it is extremely difficult for a startup or small or medium enterprise (SME) to surmount the high barriers to entry. A majority of these smaller companies ended up becoming acquired by the chaebols, thereby further stacking their size and economic dominance. During recent years a growing trend to scale globally has increased among aspiring Korean entrepreneurs.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-G20-country-report-2013-South-Korea/$FILE/EY-G20-country-report-2013-South-Korea.pdf|title=EY G20 Country Report 2013 South Korea|last=Ernst & Young|publisher=Ernst & Young|access-date=1 December 2016|archive-date=1 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161201211231/http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-G20-country-report-2013-South-Korea/$FILE/EY-G20-country-report-2013-South-Korea.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> Conversely, chaebols have also been moving money abroad with the tacit endorsement of the South Korean government and investing in commercial enterprises, particularly in [[Koreatown, Manhattan|Koreatown]] [[Manhattan]], [[New York City]].<ref name=ChaebolsKoreatownManhattan>{{cite web|url=https://ny.eater.com/2018/7/31/17633796/k-town-nyc-restaurants-chains-report|title=NYC's K-Town Isn't What It Used to Be|author=Sam Kim, photography by Gary He|publisher=Vox Media|date=31 July 2018|access-date=21 November 2018|quote=Most mom-and-pops are gone, and 32nd Street is now dominated by chains due to high rents and policies in Korea itself.|archive-date=30 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201230164023/https://ny.eater.com/2018/7/31/17633796/k-town-nyc-restaurants-chains-report|url-status=live}}</ref>

To this day, chaebols maintain dominance across all industries. Reductions in [[tariff]]s and the removal of trade regulations designed to protect Korean conglomerates have led to increased competition from abroad. However, among domestic firms, chaebols have kept their market share intact. Most notably, [[Apple Inc.|Apple]]'s entry into the smartphone market pressured rival Samsung into diversifying its revenue streams from overseas. All but 3 of the top 50 firms listed on the [[Korea Exchange|Korean Stock Exchange]] are designated as chaebols,<ref name=":0" /> and despite chaebols only accounting for just over 10 per cent of the country's workers, the four largest chaebols hold 70 per cent of total market capitalization, and all chaebols together holding 77 per cent as of the late 2010s.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Albert |first=Eleanor |date=2018-05-04 |title=South Korea's Chaebol Challenge |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/south-koreas-chaebol-challenge |access-date=2023-06-15 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |language=en}}</ref> Consequently, chaebols have more bargaining power and often take pricing action that squeezes both suppliers and consumers. Typically the firms down the supply chain fail to increase their profit margins enough to expand and thus never see growth. Collusion among chaebols is commonplace. [[Price fixing|Price-fixing]] acts mean consumers expect to pay an inflated value for most goods and services.<ref name=":0" /> For instance, in 2012 [[Samsung]] and [[LG Electronics]] were fined for colluding to raise prices for home appliances.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.cnet.com/news/lcd-makers-fined-388-million-for-alleged-price-fixing/|title=LCD makers fined $388 million for alleged price fixing|newspaper=CNET|access-date=2016-12-01|archive-date=1 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161201210845/https://www.cnet.com/news/lcd-makers-fined-388-million-for-alleged-price-fixing/|url-status=live}}</ref>

=== Government ties, corruption, and abuse of power ===
{{Main|Corruption in South Korea}}{{see also|Gapjil}}
[[File:Korea President Park Business Leaders 20130508 01.jpg|thumb|South Korean President [[Park Geun-hye]] at a breakfast meeting with business magnates [[Lee Kun-hee]] and [[Chung Mong-koo]]]]
Since the inception of the chaebol, the government has been closely involved in its affairs. Many of the reforms enacted over the years, especially those under President [[Kim Dae-Jung]], have cracked down on kickbacks and preferential treatment. Moreover, the state is no longer a majority shareholder of any chaebol.<ref name=":0" /> But their sheer size and wealth have been used to gain influence. For the most part, the government sees the function of chaebols as crucial to the Korean economy. When President [[Lee Myung-bak|Lee Myung-Bak]] took office, he pardoned [[Samsung|Samsung Group]] chairman [[Lee Kun-hee|Lee Kun-Hee]] for [[tax evasion]]. President Lee then proceeded to champion pro-chaebol deals, including a nuclear energy contract with the city of [[Abu Dhabi]], and loosened laws preventing the conglomerates from owning financial services companies.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2010/03/31/return-of-the-overlord|title=Return of the overlord|date=2010-03-31|newspaper=The Economist|issn=0013-0613|access-date=2016-12-01|archive-date=24 April 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170424182407/http://www.economist.com/node/15816702|url-status=live}}</ref> Samsung's leader is not the only chaebol chairman to be excused from a criminal conviction. [[Chey Tae-won|Choi Tae-Won]] of [[SK Group]], [[Chung Mong-koo|Chung Mong-Koo]] of [[Hyundai Group|Hyundai]], Kim Seung-Youn of Hanwha, and [[Shin Dong-bin]] of Lotte<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/business/international/south-korea-lotte-chaebol-conglomerate-indicted.html|title=Family Behind Korean Conglomerate Lotte Is Indicted in Corruption Case|last=Choe|first=Sang-hun|date=19 October 2016|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|issn=0362-4331|access-date=1 December 2016|archive-date=30 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201230164031/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/business/international/south-korea-lotte-chaebol-conglomerate-indicted.html|url-status=live}}</ref> are a few examples of chairmen who have been charged, convicted, or are currently serving a prison sentence for white-collar crime. Accusations include bribery, tax evasion, accounting fraud, embezzlement, and violent crime.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-07-07/chaebol-behaving-badly-aren-t-korea-s-biggest-worry|title=Don't Fret Over the Chaebol|last=Fickling|first=David|date=2016-07-07|newspaper=Bloomberg Gadfly|access-date=2016-12-01}}</ref> Typically chaebol chairmen are pardoned of any crimes. In the rare case that an executive is sentenced to prison, as the CEOs of SK and CJ Group were, it is typically a relatively light punishment of up to 4 years depending on the charge.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21648178-dark-side-family-capitalism-those-have|title=To those that have|date=2015-04-18|newspaper=The Economist|issn=0013-0613|access-date=2016-12-01|archive-date=30 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201230163956/https://www.economist.com/special-report/2015/04/16/to-those-that-have|url-status=live}}</ref>

Collusion between chaebol members and the government granted preferential statuses to the companies. A chaebol would funnel bribes to politicians and bureaucrats through slush funds and illegal donations. This could help maintain the government's position of power, allowing them to secure contracts for major government projects and provide favourable treatment to the donor firm.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Lee|first=Phil-Sang|year=2000|title=Economic Crisis and Chaebol Reform in Korea|journal=APEC Study Center|volume=Discussion Paper Series, [[Columbia Business School]]}}</ref> Examples of this type of corruption were widespread in the years leading up to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Many of the firms that benefited from this relationship were too indebted, had poor corporate governance, and were inefficient. There was a huge inflow of capital and a bending of regulation in favour of these problematic firms. For example, in the 1990s, Hanbo Group, formerly South Korea's second-largest steel-maker, paid for special arrangements with high-ranking politicians so that it could secure contracts for large government projects over its competitors. Hanbo went bankrupt in 1997 after defaulting on debt payments along with other governance issues. Numerous chaebol companies had similar private agreements with the government in this fashion. It would be most common in companies dealing with heavy industries or projects that involved government procurement and urban planning. In the past, most successful political elections were won with chaebol support. Each time a new administration or regime stepped in, it would gear its policy platform towards chaebol revitalization.<ref name=":1" /> This was under the claim that to be a competitive economy more power must be given to the chaebols. In recent years, the leading political parties of South Korea have shifted their focus from supporting large corporations to promoting economic diversification.

== Reforms ==
Different reforms have been proposed or enacted to deal with the influence, power, and corruption associated with the chaebols, though it has been questioned whether real reform is possible.<ref name="Is real reform possible at South Korea's chaebols?">{{cite web |last1=Vaswani |first1=Karishma |title=Is real reform possible at South Korea's chaebols? |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-39690629 |website=BBC News |access-date=30 December 2020 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20201230163135/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-39690629 |archive-date=30 December 2020 |language=English |date=24 April 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== IMF agreement ===
Under [[Kim Dae-Jung]] and after the [[1997 Asian financial crisis]], many reforms were made to the chaebols. Most of these changes pertained to corporate structure, transparency in financial reporting, cuts in government subsidies, corporate governance, and debt stabilization.<ref>{{Cite web |title=South Korea's Chaebol Challenge |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/south-koreas-chaebol-challenge |access-date=2022-08-24 |website=Council on Foreign Relations |language=en |archive-date=1 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220901061231/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/south-koreas-chaebol-challenge |url-status=live }}</ref> In 1997, the [[International Monetary Fund|IMF]] provided a bailout loan of $60 billion conditional on revision.<ref name=":0" /> Distressed financial institutions were to be closed down and those that were deemed viable were to be restructured and recapitalized by the levels it set forth. This affected the chaebol because it severely restricted its easy access to financing which led to over-leveraged balance sheets.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Chekan_YB2010.pdf|title=Korea and the Great Recession: The Effects of Chaebol Reform on South Korea's Recovery from the 2008 Financial Crisis|last=Chekan|first=Kate|publisher=Johns Hopkins University|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140210233654/http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Chekan_YB2010.pdf|archive-date=2014-02-10|url-status=dead}}</ref> Lenient accounting practices and disclosure rules were to be strengthened and standardized for international practice. Hence, transparency was increased to what would be expected from a public company. The chaebols agreed to be subject to independent auditors and were obligated to provide consolidated financial statements regularly.<ref name=":1" /> The IMF agreement brought about the following changes. First, the authority to establish and implement accounting standards, previously centered on financial supervisory authorities and the government, was transferred to a private, independent organization.<ref>KAI 연혁. https://www.kasb.or.kr/front/board/historyList.do. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> Second, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Adapted to the domestic context, these standards were adopted as K-IFRS, which was selectively applied starting in 2009 and then expanded to include listed companies and others in 2011, gradually expanding their application. This brought about changes that enhanced the international comparability of financial information and the accuracy of disclosure.<ref>한국채택국제회계기준(K-IFRS) 도입 2년의 평가와 향후 과제 (2013년 7월 4일).https://www.fsc.go.kr/po010101/70762 . 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> Third, the external audit and disclosure system was strengthened. The revision of the External Audit Act mandated consolidated financial statements, introduced provisions related to internal accounting management, and expanded auditors' responsibility for internal accounting audits.<ref>주식회사의 외부감사에 관한 법률(2013년 5월 28일)https://law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=140589#0000 . 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref> To overcome the chaebol-dominated oligarchy, the accounting and disclosure improvements introduced by the IMF agreement primarily reduced information asymmetry and strengthened external oversight. As accounting and disclosure standards were standardized, investors, creditors, and regulators were able to more accurately assess a company's financial status, which increased market surveillance pressure on insiders. <ref>김태동, 이윤아, 배창현(2016). 특수관계자 거래와 기업의 공시수준 - 재무제표 주석을 중심으로 -</ref> Furthermore, the strengthened disclosure requirements for corporate transactions made it easier for external parties to verify abnormal transactions within the group, reducing incentives for insider-only (tunneling) activities. Finally, accurate accounting information helped supervisory agencies like the Financial Supervisory Service identify links between insolvent companies and affiliates, thereby weakening collusion between politics and business. <ref>유병규(2004), 기업지배구조와 기업범죄</ref>

=== Government-led reforms and the 2008 crisis ===
Kim Dae-Jung enacted what is known as the "Five Principles of Corporate Governance".<ref name=":2" /> These were the enhancement of management transparency, strengthening owner-manager accountability, elimination of cross-debt guarantees among chaebol affiliates, improvement of capital structures, and consolidation of core business areas. In his plans, debt-to-equity ratios was to be below {{Percentage|200}}. Chaebol subsidiaries that were debt-laden or on the verge of bankruptcy were instructed to be either liquidated, sold, or put up for merger. Each chaebol-holding group had to break up its subsidiaries and operations so that they were more manageable.<ref name=":1" /> By the end of 1997, each had an average of 26.8 subsidiaries. It was hoped that if there were fewer activities, the quality of the remaining businesses would see improvement. Many unrelated branches to their core competencies were swiftly shed. If any of the conglomerates failed to meet the conditions by the set deadlines, strict sanctions would be passed against them. During the [[2008 financial crisis]], many of these reforms ensured chaebols' quick recovery.<ref name=":2" /> Having had exposure to a massive recession before, they learned to cope better than those in foreign countries. With significantly healthier balance sheets and higher cash reserves, the chaebols were able to avoid any liquidity issues. Moreover, with fewer subsidiaries, they were less exposed to the full scope of the crisis and thus helped keep the Korean economy afloat.<ref name=":1" /> President Kim Dae-jung's five principles of corporate governance had several impacts on mitigating the chaebol oligarchy. First, they enhanced management transparency. Strengthening the board of directors and auditing functions, along with defining management accountability, could provide institutional restraints against the autocracy of the owner family. Second, they established a professional management system. The five principles of corporate governance created pressure to limit the direct management of the owner family and expand the decision-making power of professional managers. This can be seen in President Kim Dae-jung's strong insistence that Korean Air be transformed into a professional management system.<ref>"대한항공, 전문경영인 체제로 바뀌어야"...김대통령 밝혀 (1994년 4월 20일),https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART001506284</ref> This professional management system effectively limited the personal power of chaebol leaders, i.e., their political and economic oligarchy.<ref>박경서, 주요 토픽 분석 I. 지배주주경영과 전문경영자경영의 대체성과 보완성</ref> Furthermore, the ban on cross-subsidy guarantees between affiliates and the strengthened disclosure of related-party transactions weakened the political and financial safeguards against excessive leverage by chaebols.<ref>진태홍(2000), 재벌의 지배구조와 상호지급보증</ref>

President [[Roh Moo-hyun|Roh Moo Hyun]] pushed for even more extensive reform.<ref name=":2" /> His administration passed stringent regulations on fraudulent accounting, [[stock manipulation]], and irregular wealth succession. Chaebols were forced to improve objectivity on their board of directors. Rather than having the decision-makers be insiders, affiliates, or family members, chaebols were expected to hold representation that reflected the interests of investors, especially minority shareholders who gained a significant number of rights. As a result, it became easier for chaebols to raise capital through equity rather than riskier debt. This is because the new transparency laws and restructuring boosted investor confidence from abroad.<ref name=":0" /> The Roh Moo-hyun administration also took steps to strengthen oversight and enhance transparency of corporations and chaebols. Specifically, it revised the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act). It also enacted the Securities Class Action Act. Furthermore, it revised the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Acts, demonstrating efforts to improve the governance, investment structure, and disclosure practices of chaebols. However, some argue that the pace of reform slowed in the latter half of his term, and the total investment limit system was never fully implemented.<ref>주재현(2014), 노무현 정부의 이념적 지향과 정책현실: 주요 쟁점에 대한 대응을 중심으로</ref>

==Regulation==
{{Unreferenced section|date=January 2011}}
Some [[competition law]]s were passed to attempt to limit the expansion of chaebol:
* Law for separate finance from industry ({{korean|hangul=[[:ko:금산분리법|금산분리법]]|hanja=金産分離法|labels=no}}): Chaebols may no longer have banks since 1982
During the government-led growth process, a structure emerged in which industrial capital, such as conglomerates, owned or controlled financial companies, posing a risk of industrial capital dominating finance.<ref>이병윤(2006), 금산분리 관련 제도의 현황과 논점.</ref>
This could lead to affiliate-centered internal transactions, low-interest loans, and preferential lending, further expanding the economic power and capital control of a small number of conglomerates. In essence, this would lead to an oligarchy-like governance structure centered on conglomerates, which could threaten the soundness of the entire financial system.<ref>배윤정(2012), 금융계열회사 분리제도의 의의 및 주요내용.</ref>
To prevent this, the Financial and Industrial Separation Act was introduced to separate financial and industrial capital. This system began to be institutionalized in Korea in the 1980s, restricting industrial capital from owning a certain percentage of bank shares. Since then, the Financial Holding Companies Act and the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act have developed institutional frameworks to restrict industrial capital's control over financial companies and financial capital's control over industrial capital. Recent discussions are examining strengthening measures, such as the separation of financial affiliates and stock ownership restrictions for general and financial holding companies. These regulations on the separation of finance and industry have served to institutionally control the internal capital transfers, low-cost lending, and unfair support for affiliates that arise from the ownership and control of financial companies by conglomerates through industrial capital. These regulations have also served to limit the oligarchic structure in which conglomerates use financial companies as their private vaults to simultaneously expand their economic and political power.<ref>CGS(2008), CG 리뷰 Vol.37. </ref>
* Law for the limit of investment ({{korean|hangul=출자총액제한|hanja=出資總額制限|labels=no}}): A chaebol's growth by [[Mergers and acquisitions|M&A]] was limited until 2009
The Investment Limit Act is more accurately known as the Total Investment Limit System. Korean conglomerates have created a structure in which minority owners and controlling shareholders control numerous affiliates with relatively small stakes through circular investment among affiliates, expanded equity investment, and a control structure through investment. This was recognized as an oligarchic concentration of economic power and a chain reaction of risks across the entire group. The Total Investment Limit System was introduced as an institutional mechanism to control this structural risk.<ref>한국민족문화대백과사전 출자총액제한제도, https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0080959. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref>
This system was first introduced through the amendment to the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in December 1986 and went into effect in April 1987. The core provision of the Act is a ceiling provision that prohibits companies belonging to large conglomerates from using more than a certain percentage of their net assets for equity investments in other domestic companies. This provision was later abolished in 1998 due to concerns about its effectiveness and changing economic conditions, but was reintroduced in 1999.<ref>행정안전부 국가기록원 출자총액제한제도 (2007년 12월 1일), https://www.archives.go.kr/next/newsearch/listSubjectDescription.do?id=005099&pageFlag=&sitePage. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref>
Opinions are divided on the effectiveness of the system in alleviating oligarchy. Some argue that excessive investment by large conglomerates is gradually being curbed, with the investment-to-net-asset ratio approaching 25%. However, others argue that it is difficult to assess the improvement in investment behavior, as there are instances of intensified circular investment among affiliates.<ref>대한민국 정책브리핑 출자총액제한제도 공정위 입장 (2003년 8월 4일), https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148745433. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref>
* Law for the limit of assurance ({{korean|hangul=상호출자채무보증제한|hanja=相互出資債務保證制限|labels=no}}): Defends the insolvency of a chaebol's affiliates
The correct name for the Guarantee Limit Act is the "Debt Guarantee Limit System." Debt guarantees and cross-guarantees among affiliates of Korean conglomerates were feared to pose risks to financial supervision and the concentration of economic power. To prevent this, the Debt Guarantee Limit System was introduced.<ref>시사경제용어사전 채무보증제한제도 (2020년 11월 3일). https://www.moef.go.kr/sisa/dictionary/detail?idx=2449. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref>
Article 24 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act stipulates, "Domestic companies belonging to conglomerates subject to cross-shareholding restrictions shall not guarantee the debt of their affiliates."<ref>독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률(2025년 10월 1일), https://www.law.go.kr/lsLawLinkInfo.do?chrClsCd=010202&lsJoLnkSeq=1000527862. 2025년 11월 8일 확인.</ref>
However, this prohibits "inter-affiliate debt guarantees" for conglomerates with a certain total asset value. For example, this applies to groups with total assets exceeding 5 trillion won. This system served to institutionally control the mechanism by which conglomerates, through guarantees between affiliates, transferred internal funds and shared risks across the entire group, thereby strengthening the concentration of economic power. Indeed, since the system's introduction in 1998, the amount of inter-affiliate debt guarantees within conglomerates subject to cross-shareholding restrictions has steadily declined. Previously, conglomerates provided low-interest guarantees to their affiliates, which in turn formed a circulating capital network for the entire conglomerate. Therefore, this system served as an institutional mechanism to weaken the oligarchic control established by a small number of conglomerate owners through guarantees and investment networks between affiliates.<ref>기업집단국 기업집단정책과(2020), 2020년 상호출자제한기업집단 채무보증 현황 및 금융･보험사의 의결권 행사현황 정보공개 실시.</ref>



Formally, the [[Fair Trade Commission (South Korea)|Korea Fair Trade Commission]] announces a limited chaebol list every year by size of industrial assets (not including financial companies).<ref>{{cite book|author=S. Lew|title=The Korean Economic Developmental Path: Confucian Tradition, Affective Network|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vIkBAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA106|date=17 December 2013|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-1-137-34729-9|pages=106–|access-date=18 October 2017|archive-date=30 December 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201230164012/https://books.google.com/books?id=vIkBAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA106|url-status=live}}</ref>
* Appointment: Korea Fair Trade Commission
* Inclusion: industrial groups (assets: 5 [[Trillion (short scale)|trillion]] won or more)
* Exclusion: bank and financial groups
{{Row hover highlight}}{{sticky header}}
{| class="wikitable sortable mw-datatable sticky-header" style="text-align:center"
|+Chaebols with limited assurance ({{korean|hangul=상호출자제한기업집단|hanja=相互出資制限企業集團|labels=no}})
|-
!Year
!Chaebols
!Affiliates
!Assets
|-
|2007
|62
|1,196 Ent
|979.7 trillion won (''Not'' including bank and financial group by South Korean law)
|-
|2008
|79
|1,680 Ent
|1,161.5 trillion won (more than 2 trillion won)
|-
|2009
|48
|1,137 Ent
|1,310.6 trillion won (more than 5 trillion won)
|-
| colspan="4" |[[Samsung Group]]'s total assets are 317 trillion won, but the FTC recognizes only 174 trillion [[South Korean won|won]], which excludes financial subsidiaries.
|}The following tables list chaebols by category.

=== Owned by family groups ===
{{Row hover highlight}}{{sticky header}}
{| class = "wikitable sortable mw-datatable sticky-header" style="text-align:center"
|+ List of major chaebols by family group
|-
! Family group
! Operating groups
|-
| [[Lee Byung-chul]] family group || [[Samsung Group]], [[Shinsegae Group]], [[CJ Group]], [[JoongAng Ilbo|JoongAng Group]], [[CU (store)|BGF Group]], [[Hansol|Hansol Group]], and others 
|-
| [[Chung Ju-yung]] family group || [[Hyundai Motor Group]], [[Hyundai Heavy Industries|Hyundai Heavy Industries Group]], [[Hyundai Department Store Group]], [[Hyundai Marine & Fire Insurance|Hyundai Marine & Fire]], [[Hyundai Sungmoo Holding]], [[Halla Group]], [[HDC Hyundai Development Company|HDC Group]], [[HL Mando]], [[KCC Corporation]], and others
|-
| [[Koo In-hwoi]] family group || [[LG]], [[GS Group]], [[LS Group]], [[LG|LX Group]], [[LIG Group]], Ourhome Corp, LF Group, LT Group, Heesung Electronics, and others
|-
| [[Shin Kyuk-ho]] family group || [[Lotte Group]], [[Nongshim]], Pulemil, and others
|-
| [[Cho Choong-hoon]] family group || [[Hanjin Group]], [[Meritz Financial Group]], and others
|-
| [[Park In-chon]] family group || [[Kumho Asiana Group]], [[Kumho Petrochemical]], [[Kumho Tire]] and others
|-
| Other chaebols || [[SK Group]], [[Hanwha Group]], [[Doosan Group]], [[Hankook]], [[HiteJinro]], [[POSCO]], [[Amorepacific Corporation]], [[E-Land Group]], [[Kyobo Life Insurance Company|Kyobo Life Insurance]], [[Dong-A Ilbo|Samyang Group]], [[KG Group]], [[OCI (company)|OCI Group]], [[Hyosung|Hyosung Group]], [[Daelim Group]], [[Young Poong Group]], [[Dongwon Industries|Dongwon Group]],[[DB Group]], [[Kolon Industries]], [[Taekwang Group]], [[Seah Holdings]], [[SeAh Steel Holdings]], [[Dongkuk Steel]], [[Aekyung|Aekyung Group]], [[Eugene Group]], [[Iljin Group]], Booyoung Group, Harim Group, Taeyoung Engineering, Hoban Construction, etc. 
|}

=== Multiple monopolies ===
{{Row hover highlight}}{{sticky header}}
{| class = "wikitable sortable mw-datatable sticky-header" style="text-align:center"
|+ Business area: chaebols that have several [[monopolies]]
|-
! Group
! Number of affiliates
! Major businesses 
|-
| [[Samsung Group]]||60  || Electronics, semiconductors, batteries, IT Solutions, construction, shipbuilding, insurance
|-
| [[SK Group]]|| 186  || Energy, chemicals, telecom, semiconductors, batteries, trading, biopharmaceuticals
|-
| [[Hyundai Motor Group]]||57  || Automobiles, auto parts, steel, construction, logistics, credit card
|-
| [[LG]]||73  || Electronics, batteries, chemicals, telecom, display, food, cosmetics
|-
| [[Lotte Group]]|| 85  || Retail, food, entertainment, hotels, chemicals, construction, tourism 
|-
| [[Hanwha Group]]|| 91  || Explosives, aerospace, energy, insurance, chemicals, hotels, construction
|-
| [[GS Group]]|| 93  || Energy, retail, hotels, construction, trading
|-
| [[Hyundai Heavy Industries Group]]|| 36  || Shipbuilding, engineering, heavy industries, construction equipment, energy, robotics
|-
| [[Shinsegae Group]]|| 53  || Retail, food, hotels, entertainment, fashion
|-
| [[CJ Group]]|| 85  || Food, retail, logistics, biopharmaceuticals, entertainment 
|-
| [[Hanjin Group]]|| 33  || Aviation, logistics, transportation, hotels, info systems, airports 
|}

=== Affiliates ===
{{Row hover highlight}}{{sticky header}}
{| class = "wikitable sortable mw-datatable sticky-header" style="text-align:center"
|+ List of well-known chaebol affiliates (revenue and assets in 2021)
|-
! Unit
! Parent
! Revenue (trillion KRW)
! Total assets (trillion KRW)
! Industries
|-
| [[Samsung Electronics]]
|[[Samsung Group]]||279.6     ||426.6  || Electronics, semiconductors, smartphones, appliances
|-
| [[Samsung Life Insurance]]
|[[Samsung Group]]|| 35.1     || 341.4  || Insurance
|-
| [[Samsung C&T Corporation|Samsung C&T]] 
|[[Samsung Group]]|| 34.5     || 55.2  || Construction, trading, hotels
|-
| [[Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance]]
|[[Samsung Group]]|| 24.4     ||94.9  || Insurance
|-
| [[Samsung SDI]]
|[[Samsung Group]]|| 13.6     || 25.8  || Batteries
|-
| [[Samsung SDS]]
|[[Samsung Group]]|| 13.6     || 10.5  || IT Solutions
|-
| [[Samsung Electro-Mechanics]]
|[[Samsung Group]]|| 9.7     || 9.9  || Electronics, electronic components
|-
|[[Hotel Shilla]]
|[[Samsung Group]]
|3.8
|2.6
|Hotels, duty-free, entertainment
|-
|[[Hyundai Motor Company]]
|[[Hyundai Motor Group]]|| 117.6 || 233.6  || Automobiles
|-
| [[Kia]]
|[[Hyundai Motor Group]]|| 69.9  ||66.8  || Automobiles
|-
| [[Hyundai Mobis]]
|[[Hyundai Motor Group]]|| 41.7 ||  51.5  || Auto parts
|-
| [[Hyundai Steel]]
|[[Hyundai Motor Group]]|| 22.8 || 37.1  || Steel
|-
| [[Hyundai Engineering & Construction]]
|[[Hyundai Motor Group]]|| 18.1 || 19.6  || Construction
|-
| [[Hyundai Glovis]]
|[[Hyundai Motor Group]]|| 21.8     || 12.2  || Logistics
|-
| [[SK Hynix]]
|[[SK Group]]|| 42.9     ||  96.3  || Semiconductors
|-
| [[SK Innovation]]
|[[SK Group]]|| 46.8     ||  49.5  || Energy, batteries, 
|-
| [[SK Telecom]]
|[[SK Group]]|| 16.7     || 30.9  || Telecom
|-
| [[SK Networks]]
|[[SK Group]]|| 11.1     ||  9.4  || Trading, logistics
|-
| [[LG Electronics]]
|[[LG Corporation|LG Group]]|| 74.7     || 53.5  || Electronics
|-
| [[LG Chem]]
|[[LG Corporation|LG Group]]|| 42.7     || 51.1  || Chemicals
|-
| [[LG Display]]
|[[LG Corporation|LG Group]]|| 29.8     || 38.2  || Display
|-
|[[LG Chem|LG Energy Solution]]
|[[LG]]
|17.9
|23.8
|Batteries 
|-
| [[LG Uplus]]
|[[LG]]
| 13.9     || 19.4  || Telecom 
|-
| [[Lotte Shopping]]
|[[Lotte Group]]
| 15.6     || 33.4  || Retail 
|-
| [[Lotte Corporation|Lotte Chemical]]
|[[Lotte Group]]
| 18.1     || 22.9  || Chemicals
|-
|[[Lotte Hotels & Resorts]]
|[[Lotte Group]]
|4.2
|18.3
|Hotels
|-
|[[Lotte Corporation|Lotte Life Insurance]]
|[[Lotte Group]]
|3.5
|18.9
|Insurance
|-
| [[Lotte Chilsung]]
|[[Lotte Group]]|| 2.5     || 3.6  || Food
|-
|[[Hanwha Group|Hanwha Corporation]]
|[[Hanwha Group]]
|52.8
|202.3
|Defense systems, explosives, aerospace
|-
| [[Hanwha Life Insurance]]
|[[Hanwha Group]]|| 27.1     ||  163.6  || Insurance
|-
| [[Hanwha Solutions]]
|[[Hanwha Group]]|| 10.7     ||  20.0  || Renewable energy 
|-
|[[GS Caltex]]
|[[GS Group]]
|34.5
|23.6
|Energy 
|-
| [[GS Group|GS Construction]]
|[[GS Group]]
| 9.1     || 15.2  || Construction
|-
| [[GS Group|GS Retail]]
|[[GS Group]]|| 9.8     || 9.5  || Retail
|-
|[[Hyundai Heavy Industries]]
|[[Hyundai Heavy Industries Group]]
|8.3
|13.8
|shipbuilding, heavy industries
|-
|[[Hyundai Mipo Dockyard]]
|[[Hyundai Heavy Industries Group]]
|2.9
|4.3
|shipbuilding, heavy industries
|-
|[[Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries]]
|[[Hyundai Heavy Industries Group]]
|4.1
|5.0
|shipbuilding, heavy industries
|-
|[[Hyundai Oilbank]]
|[[Hyundai Heavy Industries Group]]
|20.6
|18.2
|Energy
|-
| [[Shinsegae]]
|[[Shinsegae|Shinsegae Group]]|| 6.3     || 13.6  || Retail, duty-free, department stores 
|-
| [[E-mart]]
|[[Shinsegae|Shinsegae Group]]|| 24.9     ||  31.2  || Retail, food
|-
|[[Shinsegae|Josun Hotels & Resorts]]
|[[Shinsegae|Shinsegae Group]]
|data-sort-value="0.3 trillion"|0.3107 
|1.6
|Hotels
|-
| [[CJ CheilJedang]]
|[[CJ Group]]|| 26.3     || 26.9  || Food, biochemicals
|-
|[[CJ Group|CJ Daehan Express]]
|[[CJ Group]]
|11.3
|8.9
|Logistics
|-
|[[CJ E&M]]
|[[CJ Group]]
|3.6
|7.9
|Entertainment
|-
|[[CJ CGV]]
|[[CJ Group]]
|data-sort-value="0.7 trillion"|0.736
|3.8
|Movie theaters
|-
|[[Korean Air]]
|[[Hanjin Group]]
|9.1
|26.7
|Airlines
|-
|[[Asiana Airlines]]
|[[Hanjin|Hanjin Group]]
|4.3
|13.1
|Airlines 
|-
|[[Hanjin]]
|[[Hanjin Group]]
|2.5
|3.9
|Logistics 
|}

== Depictions in popular culture ==
Like many other conglomerates across the world, Korean chaebols have a presence in popular media. There are a large number of [[Korean drama|K-dramas]] that feature chaebols and chaebol family members. Some of these shows, including ''[[Business Proposal|A Business Proposal]]'', ''[[Coffee Prince (2007 TV series)|Coffee Prince]]'', ''[[What's Wrong with Secretary Kim]]'', ''[[King the Land]]'', and ''[[The Heirs]]'', depict chaebol family members being competent and attractive. Other dramas, however, depict chaebol family members being materialistic and arrogant, including ''[[Innocent Defendant]]'', ''[[Remember (TV series)|Remember]]'', ''[[Vincenzo (TV series)|Vincenzo]]'', ''[[Reborn Rich]]'', and ''[[Big Mouth (South Korean TV series)|Big Mouth]]'', reflecting the massive income inequality and political corruption related to chaebols in South Korea.

In addition, many chaebol family members have taken to [[social media]] outlets like [[Instagram]] and [[Twitter]], where they publish snippets of their personal lives. Some chaebols also partake in popular social media trends like [[mukbang]]s, as seen on [[Ham Yon-ji|Ham Yon-Ji]]'s [[YouTube]] channel, 햄연지 YONJIHAM. Some have suggested that these attempts at humanizing chaebols are purely financial strategies.<ref>{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6oS0PF88S0 |title=Korea's chaebol on social media: Pure communication or marketing tool? |date=2021-01-15 |last=Won |first=Debbie |type=Video |language=en |publisher=[[Yonhap News Agency]] |others=Hosted by Debbie Won. Edited by SeiYeon Kim |access-date=2021-08-05 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211108/q6oS0PF88S0 |archive-date=2021-11-08 |via=[[YouTube]]}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

== See also ==
* [[Conglomerate (company)|Conglomerate]]
* [[Economy of South Korea]]
* [[Family business]]
* [[Four big families of Hong Kong]]
* [[Four big families of the Republic of China]]
* [[Holding company]]
* [[Horizontal integration]]
* [[Keiretsu]]
* [[List of South Korean companies]]
* [[Megacorporation]]
* [[Miracle on the Han River]]
* [[National champions]]
* [[Vertical integration]]
* [[Zaibatsu]]

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

=== General and cited references ===
* Beck, Peter M. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20000829094854/http://www.keia.com/chaebol2000.pdf Are Korea's Chaebol Serious About Restructuring?]" Presentation at the Korea 2000 conference, 30 May 2000. Korea Economic Institute of America
* "[http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1697767 Unfinished Business]," ''[[The Economist]]'', 17 April 2003
* "[http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=109064 Web site: South Korean conglomerates]," ''[[The Economist]]'', 11 December 1997
* Whitmore, Stuart and Nakarmi, Laxmi. "[http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/97/1010/aa5.html Guide to the Groups: The pecking order of the top 20 chaebols]," ''[[Asiaweek]]'', 10 October 1997.
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20080516141140/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/22/content_8029589.htm S.Korea's Samsung president resigns over corruption scandal]

{{Business organizations}}
{{Economy of South Korea}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Chaebol| ]]
[[Category:Economy of South Korea]]
[[Category:1970s neologisms]]
[[Category:Industrial policy]]